Despite the amount of words used, this is just plain vanilla dual aspect monism, it doesn't account for the role matter has in reality, it just claims it is a mirror image of the metaphysical
I used to think this about what Bernardo says, but it is an understandable mistreatment. I think that if understood correctly, it’s is mostly a way to language most precisely what is available to know and not-know. It’s more of an epistemic exercise combined with recognizing what doesn’t come along for the ride if alternative epistemologies are truly dropped. It is not dual aspect monism because there is no dual aspect: The singular condition of experience is mind. Matter appears to us as mind. It is the appearance of matter that is mind, and it is matter that is also mind. But neither is matter any more than red light is truly red. I think I’m explaining this badly, but I think it’s perceivable just by noticing that we don’t experience matter, we experience mind. We define matter like a cartographer maps a territory, but as a matter of experience, both the map and the territory are mental. The best way that I have been able to see what Bernardo sees is just by noticing that matter is the needless postulation of an additional ontological category.
Despite the amount of words used, this is just plain vanilla dual aspect monism, it doesn't account for the role matter has in reality, it just claims it is a mirror image of the metaphysical
I used to think this about what Bernardo says, but it is an understandable mistreatment. I think that if understood correctly, it’s is mostly a way to language most precisely what is available to know and not-know. It’s more of an epistemic exercise combined with recognizing what doesn’t come along for the ride if alternative epistemologies are truly dropped. It is not dual aspect monism because there is no dual aspect: The singular condition of experience is mind. Matter appears to us as mind. It is the appearance of matter that is mind, and it is matter that is also mind. But neither is matter any more than red light is truly red. I think I’m explaining this badly, but I think it’s perceivable just by noticing that we don’t experience matter, we experience mind. We define matter like a cartographer maps a territory, but as a matter of experience, both the map and the territory are mental. The best way that I have been able to see what Bernardo sees is just by noticing that matter is the needless postulation of an additional ontological category.