I read the book-its a well researched study that shows how Germany never had the resources to fight a global war-against three of the economic superpowers of the day. Hitler's invasion of the USSR had a very small chance of success, and once December 1941 arrived, a zero chance of success. In the 6 months from June 1941 to December, Germany lost over 3/4s of its transport vehicles in Russia. At that point, the Germans had no choice but to take draft horses from the farms and use them to haul supplies in Russia. In all, 5 million horses would die in Russia-and their loss made German food production even worse off.
More importantly, every German advance in 1941 whittled away its elite corps of tactically proficient junior officers. What survived were 'fire brigade' detachments...increasingly less proficient and murderous of both the enemy and their own troops. Putin is learning this in Ukraine in 2024🇺🇸 ❤️ 🇺🇦
Read this book several years ago, and several times since then. I highly recommend it to anyone wanting a clearer understanding of some of the why's that Nazi Germany did certain things. Only thing that didn't completely satisfy me was the explanation for declaring war on the United States. The reasons given seemed to depart from a rational economic basis which underlay the prior decisions for going to war. But an excellent book nonetheless.
I mean there was not economic or rational reason to declare war on the US, there was no chance of winning against the American industry and financial strength
The declaration of war on the United States made sense at the time for the following reasons: 1.) The Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941) : a de facto military cooperation between the US and UK 2.) Destroyers for Bases Agreement (September 2, 1940) 3.) Lend-Lease (March 11, 1941) : Adam Tooze goes in a lot of detail regarding the scale and scope of the program 4.) Undeclared naval war against the Kriegsmarine by shooting on sight any German ships within the Pan-American Security Zone (April 18, 1941) 5.) Leak of the Rainbow War Plans in the Chicago Tribune (December 5, 1941) : Hitler references this in his declaration of war speech 6.) For political reasons, it made sense. a.) By declaring war and standing in solidarity with the Japanese, Hitler had gained an ally and a chance to tie down a considerable amount of Allied resources on the other side of the globe. b.) The mood among the German people was gradually darkening since it appeared that the war in the east had no end in sight or at least was not going to be resolved before the end of the year. The declaration of war against the United States would electrify the German people and with a commitment to a global struggle of historical dimensions or so Hitler thought. c.) It was only a matter of time that the United States was going to declare war on Germany for any of the above mentioned reasons. If Hitler did it first, he at least had the appearance of capturing the moment for propaganda purposes and to show the world that the United States was the aggressor and that Germany had been constantly tormented 7.) Most importantly, it is essential to understand what was going on at the time at the start of December 1st 1941 and taking the events one day at a time. a.) At the time of December 11, the day that Germany declared war against the United States, the German Army outside Moscow had assumed defensive stance since December 8th. The Red Army had only launched their counteroffensive in a staggered gradual manner only several days before. At the time, it appeared that the German Army could hold the line even after a few withdrawals had been ordered. It was also believed that the Red Army was just as exhausted and spent as the Germans were and that they would not be able mount a counteroffensive so large as to drive the German Army back. It was only several days later when Hitler returned to the Eastern Front AFTER declaring war on the US and found the situation had become a full blown crisis in which Army Group Center was pushed back in key sectors of the front line. In hindsight, it appears that Hitler made a stupid decision, but with the intelligence that he possessed at the time in early December 1941, it made sense at the time.
@@BBurgren My dissatisfaction is this: while all these points are true, none provide a sufficient Casus Belli. I am basing this on the very clear and urgent reasons presented earlier in the book for the prior declarations. Hitler may have been willing to take extraordinary risks, but he was clearly driven by an acute and imminent sense of threat to Germany presented by the SU and the western allies. None of that appears the case to me with regards the US. Japan had already made its move so Germany didn't need to follow up with its own declaration. Doing so removed any remaining obstacles to giving full support to GB and USSR against Germany as well as direct military action. But for this, sentiment in the US would have been fully against Japan as the first priority. That was Churchill's fear. Seizing Moscow would have been a great victory, but not the end of the German campaign by a long stretch. The Germans, including Hitler, knew this and fully understood the war in the East was far from over. Even if it had, the Germans realized they would need years before they would have marshaled the resources to challenge the US, which was the whole point of attacking the SU. Based on the logic of the book and the reasoning presented, Hitler actions make no sense to me and seem inconsistent with his decision making up to that point.
@@BlmCtySanDept I disagree for THREE reasons. ONE: You're assuming that the United States was a benign inert entity with its relationship with Germany. The United States was gradually creeping up to war with the expansion of the United States Army, Navy and military industrial complex with the passage of the various Navy Bills, lend-lease bill and 1940 Draft Act in Congress (a first in U.S. peacetime history) while relations with Germany had gradually deteriorated. The expansion of the armed forces ties in with the war plans laid out by the US war department anticipating a conflict with both Germany and Japan (Rainbow Five). In Hitler's speech, his VERY LAST POINT was the leak of the rainbow war plans which called for a 5 million man expeditionary force to land in Europe to fight Germany in 1943. I can't emphasize enough how important the leak of the Rainbow war plans was at the time. It caused quite a diplomatic stir and an uproar in Congress. The attack on Pearl Harbor, only a few days later, overshadowed it. Coupled with the escalating undeclared naval war and the increasing hostile diplomatic exchanges between the two countries, if these series of events, provocations, and escalations are not a sufficient Cassus Belli, I don't know what is. TWO: Your assumption that Hitler and his generals anticipated a LONG campaign in Russia is false. Operation Barbarossa was envisioned as a SHORT campaign, designed to encircle and destroy the Red Army west of the Dvina and Dnieper rivers before the army would run into logistical issues. Hitler and his generals largely correctly estimated the size and position of the Red Army west of those rivers, but UNDERESTIMATED the Red Army's reserve capacity and ability to call up new formations even after the Germans destroyed other formations deployed in the field. The assumption of a long campaign in Russia also does not tie with the changes the German war economy was making in 1941. Adam Tooze makes the case that factories were being retooled to produce air and naval assets to fight the UK in 1942 with a semi-demobilized army to be sent back to the factories to produce these assets. However these changes came at a cost of allocating a limited amount of resources for the Army and their needs for the rest of 1941 and 1942 assuming a quick victory in the East. The changes to the German war economy left little room for error for the army. They NEEDED to defeat the Soviet Union that summer or they would be not only facing the same labor, food, oil, and resource crises, but facing a major disruption to the war economy trying to undo the changes they setup for 1942. THREE: Hitler may have been a madman, but he was not an idiot. Based on the series of provocations, escalations, and hostile events in the Atlantic, it was only a matter of time that the United States was going to declare war against Germany, regardless of what Churchill thought. I'm quite sure that a sound case could have been made in Congress that Germany had conspired with Japan to attack the United States and that Germany attacked the United States by sinking destroyers and ships in the Atlantic. There was precedent at the time for undeclared naval wars to turn to fully declared wars (War of 1812, World War I). Why should December 1941 be any different?
@@BBurgren My issue isn't with the why, but the when. Whatever their plans and intent, Germany still hadn't secured their objectives in December 1941. Hitler had clearly stated that the food, mineral, and oil resources of the SU were essential for Germany to compete as a global power against the US. It escapes me why Hitler saw an advantage in declaring war with the US at that particular point in time. Japan had already attacked. The American public's attention was already focused elsewhere. Roosevelt may have been able to make a case for Germany's role, but Hitler's declaration removed the need, for no good reason that I can see. American material aid to Britain was not sufficient for Britain to pose a serious threat of invasion in the immediate future. Why turn the apparent American intent to get into the war against Germany at some future point into a certainty, before they were ready? If Hitler had not taken that step, it might have delayed America's entry against him for 6 months to a year, giving the Germans additional time to complete the war in the east. I agree, at this point Hitler was still in full possession of his faculties. That is why his decision baffles me.
At the one hour mark you talk about the food situation, and the hierarchy or eaters spreadsheet... This sounds like a nation that simply does not have enough food to feed the people inside its own borders because of the British blockade, not a country that is withholding available food.
Alas, I found this lecture on his website, and it appears that there is only audio, Google "New York Military Affairs Symposium Podcast - The Wages Of Destruction September 25, 2015 "
Tooze seems to be a sound man dealing with an interesting topic -- in an area in which he seems to be about the only expert. It is a pity that his book is presented to us here in the form of a man shouting into an empty echoing room. Couldn't the publishers arrange a reading or a competent, moderated commentary? This undignified yelling serves neither the author nor us, the audience.
Here is what Tooze himself says about it, in his Chartbook post: "I sound as though I was on speed, or preaching, or committed to the longest high-energy solo in history. The delivery is unusually staccato, but lucid and strangely urgent." 'Bout right.
Amazing lecture, Prof. Tooze is a genius.
I read the book-its a well researched study that shows how Germany never had the resources to fight a global war-against three of the economic superpowers of the day. Hitler's invasion of the USSR had a very small chance of success, and once December 1941 arrived, a zero chance of success. In the 6 months from June 1941 to December, Germany lost over 3/4s of its transport vehicles in Russia. At that point, the Germans had no choice but to take draft horses from the farms and use them to haul supplies in Russia. In all, 5 million horses would die in Russia-and their loss made German food production even worse off.
More importantly, every German advance in 1941 whittled away its elite corps of tactically proficient junior officers. What survived were 'fire brigade' detachments...increasingly less proficient and murderous of both the enemy and their own troops. Putin is learning this in Ukraine in 2024🇺🇸 ❤️ 🇺🇦
absolutely fantastic lecture, thouroughly enjoyed listening to it.
My goodness this man is remarkable!!
It would be nice to see the ppt.
thanks for posting
When he says hydration, he means hydrogenation.
Read this book several years ago, and several times since then. I highly recommend it to anyone wanting a clearer understanding of some of the why's that Nazi Germany did certain things. Only thing that didn't completely satisfy me was the explanation for declaring war on the United States. The reasons given seemed to depart from a rational economic basis which underlay the prior decisions for going to war. But an excellent book nonetheless.
I mean there was not economic or rational reason to declare war on the US, there was no chance of winning against the American industry and financial strength
The declaration of war on the United States made sense at the time for the following reasons:
1.) The Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941) : a de facto military cooperation between the US and UK
2.) Destroyers for Bases Agreement (September 2, 1940)
3.) Lend-Lease (March 11, 1941) : Adam Tooze goes in a lot of detail regarding the scale and scope of the program
4.) Undeclared naval war against the Kriegsmarine by shooting on sight any German ships within the Pan-American Security Zone (April 18, 1941)
5.) Leak of the Rainbow War Plans in the Chicago Tribune (December 5, 1941) : Hitler references this in his declaration of war speech
6.) For political reasons, it made sense.
a.) By declaring war and standing in solidarity with the Japanese, Hitler had gained an ally and a chance to tie down a considerable amount of Allied resources on the other side of the globe.
b.) The mood among the German people was gradually darkening since it appeared that the war in the east had no end in sight or at least was not going to be resolved before the end of the year. The declaration of war against the United States would electrify the German people and with a commitment to a global struggle of historical dimensions or so Hitler thought.
c.) It was only a matter of time that the United States was going to declare war on Germany for any of the above mentioned reasons. If Hitler did it first, he at least had the appearance of capturing the moment for propaganda purposes and to show the world that the United States was the aggressor and that Germany had been constantly tormented
7.) Most importantly, it is essential to understand what was going on at the time at the start of December 1st 1941 and taking the events one day at a time.
a.) At the time of December 11, the day that Germany declared war against the United States, the German Army outside Moscow had assumed defensive stance since December 8th. The Red Army had only launched their counteroffensive in a staggered gradual manner only several days before. At the time, it appeared that the German Army could hold the line even after a few withdrawals had been ordered. It was also believed that the Red Army was just as exhausted and spent as the Germans were and that they would not be able mount a counteroffensive so large as to drive the German Army back. It was only several days later when Hitler returned to the Eastern Front AFTER declaring war on the US and found the situation had become a full blown crisis in which Army Group Center was pushed back in key sectors of the front line.
In hindsight, it appears that Hitler made a stupid decision, but with the intelligence that he possessed at the time in early December 1941, it made sense at the time.
@@BBurgren My dissatisfaction is this: while all these points are true, none provide a sufficient Casus Belli. I am basing this on the very clear and urgent reasons presented earlier in the book for the prior declarations. Hitler may have been willing to take extraordinary risks, but he was clearly driven by an acute and imminent sense of threat to Germany presented by the SU and the western allies. None of that appears the case to me with regards the US. Japan had already made its move so Germany didn't need to follow up with its own declaration. Doing so removed any remaining obstacles to giving full support to GB and USSR against Germany as well as direct military action. But for this, sentiment in the US would have been fully against Japan as the first priority. That was Churchill's fear. Seizing Moscow would have been a great victory, but not the end of the German campaign by a long stretch. The Germans, including Hitler, knew this and fully understood the war in the East was far from over. Even if it had, the Germans realized they would need years before they would have marshaled the resources to challenge the US, which was the whole point of attacking the SU. Based on the logic of the book and the reasoning presented, Hitler actions make no sense to me and seem inconsistent with his decision making up to that point.
@@BlmCtySanDept I disagree for THREE reasons.
ONE: You're assuming that the United States was a benign inert entity with its relationship with Germany. The United States was gradually creeping up to war with the expansion of the United States Army, Navy and military industrial complex with the passage of the various Navy Bills, lend-lease bill and 1940 Draft Act in Congress (a first in U.S. peacetime history) while relations with Germany had gradually deteriorated. The expansion of the armed forces ties in with the war plans laid out by the US war department anticipating a conflict with both Germany and Japan (Rainbow Five). In Hitler's speech, his VERY LAST POINT was the leak of the rainbow war plans which called for a 5 million man expeditionary force to land in Europe to fight Germany in 1943. I can't emphasize enough how important the leak of the Rainbow war plans was at the time. It caused quite a diplomatic stir and an uproar in Congress. The attack on Pearl Harbor, only a few days later, overshadowed it. Coupled with the escalating undeclared naval war and the increasing hostile diplomatic exchanges between the two countries, if these series of events, provocations, and escalations are not a sufficient Cassus Belli, I don't know what is.
TWO: Your assumption that Hitler and his generals anticipated a LONG campaign in Russia is false. Operation Barbarossa was envisioned as a SHORT campaign, designed to encircle and destroy the Red Army west of the Dvina and Dnieper rivers before the army would run into logistical issues. Hitler and his generals largely correctly estimated the size and position of the Red Army west of those rivers, but UNDERESTIMATED the Red Army's reserve capacity and ability to call up new formations even after the Germans destroyed other formations deployed in the field. The assumption of a long campaign in Russia also does not tie with the changes the German war economy was making in 1941. Adam Tooze makes the case that factories were being retooled to produce air and naval assets to fight the UK in 1942 with a semi-demobilized army to be sent back to the factories to produce these assets. However these changes came at a cost of allocating a limited amount of resources for the Army and their needs for the rest of 1941 and 1942 assuming a quick victory in the East. The changes to the German war economy left little room for error for the army. They NEEDED to defeat the Soviet Union that summer or they would be not only facing the same labor, food, oil, and resource crises, but facing a major disruption to the war economy trying to undo the changes they setup for 1942.
THREE: Hitler may have been a madman, but he was not an idiot. Based on the series of provocations, escalations, and hostile events in the Atlantic, it was only a matter of time that the United States was going to declare war against Germany, regardless of what Churchill thought. I'm quite sure that a sound case could have been made in Congress that Germany had conspired with Japan to attack the United States and that Germany attacked the United States by sinking destroyers and ships in the Atlantic. There was precedent at the time for undeclared naval wars to turn to fully declared wars (War of 1812, World War I). Why should December 1941 be any different?
@@BBurgren My issue isn't with the why, but the when. Whatever their plans and intent, Germany still hadn't secured their objectives in December 1941. Hitler had clearly stated that the food, mineral, and oil resources of the SU were essential for Germany to compete as a global power against the US. It escapes me why Hitler saw an advantage in declaring war with the US at that particular point in time. Japan had already attacked. The American public's attention was already focused elsewhere. Roosevelt may have been able to make a case for Germany's role, but Hitler's declaration removed the need, for no good reason that I can see. American material aid to Britain was not sufficient for Britain to pose a serious threat of invasion in the immediate future. Why turn the apparent American intent to get into the war against Germany at some future point into a certainty, before they were ready? If Hitler had not taken that step, it might have delayed America's entry against him for 6 months to a year, giving the Germans additional time to complete the war in the east. I agree, at this point Hitler was still in full possession of his faculties. That is why his decision baffles me.
This was brilliant. The way he handled the Q&As!
Great lecture. Wish it had been video recorded.
This guy is a genius
WHY were the slides not displayed in the video?
Not incidentally, re the Icarus myth, pre--war Germany was wildly interested in flying and gliding as a hobby.
That was fucking incredibly good.
At the one hour mark you talk about the food situation, and the hierarchy or eaters spreadsheet... This sounds like a nation that simply does not have enough food to feed the people inside its own borders because of the British blockade, not a country that is withholding available food.
Having such basic shortages is a typical feature in socialist economies.
man, I wish the slides were presented. audio only is almost impossible to follow.
What are the odds I could get the slides for this presentation?
Alas, I found this lecture on his website, and it appears that there is only audio, Google "New York Military Affairs Symposium Podcast - The Wages Of Destruction
September 25, 2015 "
He just sent out a PDF of them with his chartbook/substack thing as at 17/2/22
Do you have a link to the PDF? I looked through his blog and can't seem to find it.@@black__bread
A very different approach to the Nazi regime through economic analysis.
bro who is the “if they just waited!!” guy, he sounds so familiar.
Who is “Spickman” or “speakman” he says they worked at Yale it’s at about 1:34:00 in the video
Nicholas Spykman, Yale professor (political science & international relations) from 1925 to 1940
Slides... :(
Hey woman
He just sent out a PDF of them with his chartbook/substack thing as at 17/2/22
Fucking brilliant
58:54
Oil!
nobody = perfect...
not even a dutch peter
M
Tooze seems to be a sound man dealing with an interesting topic -- in an area in which he seems to be about the only expert.
It is a pity that his book is presented to us here in the form of a man shouting into an empty echoing room. Couldn't the publishers arrange a reading or a competent, moderated commentary? This undignified yelling serves neither the author nor us, the audience.
Here is what Tooze himself says about it, in his Chartbook post: "I sound as though I was on speed, or preaching, or committed to the longest high-energy solo in history. The delivery is unusually staccato, but lucid and strangely urgent."
'Bout right.