Good job Vanya! The language is simple and effective. The way you discussed the topic is impressive. Contents is also tight and concise but full of desired information. Good start. Keep it up. All the best.
The actual numerical value doesn't matter (for a qualitative analysis as presented in this video), the important thing is that the incentives to testify are kept lower than the incentive to stay silent.
@@VanyaBisht Manu is right. The numerical value doesnt matter but the relation does. In the prisioners dilemma its always better to defect no matter what the other player does. This is not the case with your numbers. If in your example the other one cooperates it is equaly good for you to cooperate as it is to defect. Thats a way of looking at the situation but its definetly not a prisioners dilemma. Look it up: in prisioners dillema defecting is a dominant strategy, meaning that its ALWAYS strictly better to defect - no matter what the other one does. Doesnt mean that your modelling is not also a good way of looking at situatons where no coordination is possible but its not a prisioners dillema. Im an economics Student with specialisation in game theory so maybe you should research that again. Otherwise its a good Video! :) Edit: May be a bit nit-picking but also your example with the fishing pond where you write: "most powerful wins" in the defect/defect cell is not a prisioners dilemma if that means that the most powerful is better of than she would be in the cooperate/cooperate case. That is because in prisioners dilemma both are worse of in the defect/defect situation than in coop/coop. Technically spoken defect/defect is not pareto efficient but the only nash equilibrium. But again thats also an interesting modelling approach for such a Situation!
@@VanyaBisht you're welcome! Actually I think that your modiefied prisioners dilemma is very interesting so thank you for that :) Yours is more about trust and about what each Player thinks the other one could do. You only defect because of fear that the other one could possibly defect, but initially there is no clear reason why the other one would defect except from fear that you could defect and so on... So you don't trust just because you're not sure if the other one trusts you. Thats a weird Situation...
The simplicity and easy-flow of the lecture is amazing. I wish professors would be this simple.
Thank you for the kind words :)
@@VanyaBisht Uttarakhand must be a fascinating homeland. thanks for your work.
@@voidisyinyangvoidisyinyang885 It is the most beautiful place in the world :)
Great video!!! Hours of reading economic articles and nothing. 10 minutes video and now everything is clear. Thank you
Thank you so much Sophie :)
Congratulations Vanya! Good description of the problems of environmental conservation, well explained in layman's language.
Finally I understand this ! Thank you!!
Yay 😁😁
Blessed to have encountered this lecture.
Hi Vini
Wonderful. Don't believe that its your voice. Too good and clear.
Wow! What an insightful video! Can't wait for the upcoming videos in the series! :D
Congratulations Vanya! Very well explained. Liked it very much. God bless you. All the best
Amit Asthana
Good job Vanya! The language is simple and effective. The way you discussed the topic is impressive. Contents is also tight and concise but full of desired information.
Good start. Keep it up. All the best.
Great start vanya! Keep going :)
This such a good video! Love how the topics were organized!
Thank you!
Vanya your work is incredible as always! Thanks so much for your hard work, it is appreciated.
Thank you very much!
Awesome content vanya.
Glad you enjoyed it :)
Well done.
Thank u so much 🥰💕💕💕
Just brilliant
Thank you :)
Shouldn't it be 0,20 and 20,0 (rather than 5,20 and 20,5) else they have no incentive to testify
The actual numerical value doesn't matter (for a qualitative analysis as presented in this video), the important thing is that the incentives to testify are kept lower than the incentive to stay silent.
@@VanyaBisht
Manu is right.
The numerical value doesnt matter but the relation does. In the prisioners dilemma its always better to defect no matter what the other player does. This is not the case with your numbers. If in your example the other one cooperates it is equaly good for you to cooperate as it is to defect. Thats a way of looking at the situation but its definetly not a prisioners dilemma.
Look it up: in prisioners dillema defecting is a dominant strategy, meaning that its ALWAYS strictly better to defect - no matter what the other one does.
Doesnt mean that your modelling is not also a good way of looking at situatons where no coordination is possible but its not a prisioners dillema.
Im an economics Student with specialisation in game theory so maybe you should research that again.
Otherwise its a good Video! :)
Edit: May be a bit nit-picking but also your example with the fishing pond where you write: "most powerful wins" in the defect/defect cell is not a prisioners dilemma if that means that the most powerful is better of than she would be in the cooperate/cooperate case. That is because in prisioners dilemma both are worse of in the defect/defect situation than in coop/coop.
Technically spoken defect/defect is not pareto efficient but the only nash equilibrium.
But again thats also an interesting modelling approach for such a Situation!
Thanks for the detailed explanation!
@@VanyaBisht you're welcome! Actually I think that your modiefied prisioners dilemma is very interesting so thank you for that :)
Yours is more about trust and about what each Player thinks the other one could do.
You only defect because of fear that the other one could possibly defect, but initially there is no clear reason why the other one would defect except from fear that you could defect and so on... So you don't trust just because you're not sure if the other one trusts you. Thats a weird Situation...