I am not French, I am Belgian. H.Poirot Our friend here is from Austria 🇦🇹, he is not German, maybe somehow through magic 🪄 similar views might be there 😂.
I am shocked that the American war in Vietnam wasn't mentioned. That war was a good example of technology in action without proper doctrine and political decisions. I remember watching a Vietnam documentary where a bomber pilot complained that they kept bombing a bridge in North Vietnam, but they kept rebuilding it. Everyone knew there was a concrete factory near by, but they weren't allowed to bomb it because it was not on the list of approved targets...
well as far as I know US military was testing out new doctrine out there. and not without a successes either they were pretty much winning the war until the social noise about "hurrdurr brutal soldiers doing nasty things in vietnam why did we even send those boys there" and the drama that arose back in their homeland because war was shown to the wide public for the first time. Imagine kinda like tsushima in russo-japanese war but instead with russians winning it but the citizens being upset over realisation that war is a nasty thing.
@MehrumesDagon The American "bodycount doctrine was stupid and it didn't bring America close to victory. On the contrary, it incentivised false statistics, and massacres on civilians to get the body count number up.... because if the enemy lost more men than they could replace then the war soon be won the US Military promised. However, this promise turned out to be false. Truth is that the US Military had no idea how many Vietcongs and North Vietnamease army men were out there. So while the US Military promised a soon victory in 1967, those dreams were soon scattered with the tet-offensive in 1968. And the tet-offensive was far from this outstanding American victory like the mainstream narrative goes, because even despite the Vietcong leadership got totally wiped out in the cities and the vietcong took heavy losses, the war still progressed as before with equally high losses for the Americans as previous years. And while the Americans won the battle for the cities, they also at the same time lose all the control of the countryside as units were moving from the countryside into the cities to take them back. So the war continued. And American solidiers got tired of this stupid bodycount doctrine, because the military leadership just saw them as expandable materia that could be replaced with new recruits if someone died when a careerist officer wanted his medals and promotions. The stupid and costly fighting to take Hamburger hill is a typical example of this doctrine. In other wars Armies fight to gain control over vital areas - the Normandy beachhead, the Caucausus oilfields and so on.... But in Vietnam the Americans just attacked the worthless Hamburger Hill to kill Vietcongs, and then they just abandoned this hill soon after, even if many men had fought and died to get it, and within a few months would the Vietcong be back in control over it. So all this crap made the morale in the American Army to fall apart, and fragging became common from 1969 and onwards, and the unreported numbers are surely higher than even the official statistics. And the reason was simple, the solidiers were throwing handgrenades at their own officers because they didn't wanna die in some pointless offensive. And the search-and-avoid operations became common as well as more fraudgelent reporting of bodycounts, so that the leadership would be happy with the numbers and not try to play more aggressive and the send the men out on dangerous missions to get the bodycount number up. All in all did the morale fall apart and a continuation of the war was no longer possible for Americas part, as the men refused to obey their own officers. So who is the blame for the defeat? The US Military and its stupid doctrine. th-cam.com/video/lFvcuuS5eUI/w-d-xo.html th-cam.com/video/Hpr1HYZDzHY/w-d-xo.html
nattygsbord You have the right point, but it's oversimplification to say body count is stupid. In a war of attrition, number is ultimately a factor, it's just that's never what warfare is about.
Most people forget how much work it is to even produce a single knife, starting with mining ore and coal. Even in the late middle ages many smiths could not make knives, not to speak of swords. That's why we had blacksmiths, knifesmiths and swordsmiths as guilds. Purification and heat-treatment were major issues, explaining why longswords, rapiers and plate armours only showed up very late. Now, imagine how much more effort and experience needs to be put into making a 170mm howitzer (9m barrel 17t weight)... In one day of WWII so many ships were sunk that the weight of iron corresponded to everything ever produced in this entire world from the iron age to the 16th century! Just imagine, that you knew all about WWII-technology and tactics and were thrown back to Austria 1900 and wanted to help us win WWI. How many tanks and assault rifles would they be able to produce until 1914?
Even small innovations no one thinks about have helped the western world getting an edge over Asia, Arabia and the rest. Just things like church bells, clocks and glasses. The first thing gave us the experience of iron melting that allowed us to make the first cannons. And the glasses allowed a highly skilled precision worker to double his service life, even he passed the age of 30 and his eyes was starting to turn shitty. And this process of making better glass then allowed us to make telescopes and microscopes and using our skills in making mechanical clocks into making high precision tools with microscopic precision.
edi True, to a degree, but I'd argue that the development of full plate harnesses came about as armorers figured out how to make plates of steel large enough to make the armor from and not necessarily a result of being able to make better steel. Longswords came about as a result of plate armor and fighting men needing a better sword to get around plate armor by being designed more for thrusting into small gaps in the armor rather than trying to cut exposed parts of the body. Rapiers came about more as fashion item and for personal defense than as a counter to any particular form of armor or as the result of any particular technological breakthrough/advancement in metallurgy.
Longswords were not developed to defeat plate armour, but because of them. With good enough armour, no shield was required allowing the use of two hands on one weapon (yes, polearms existed before, but that put speermen into a huge disadvantage against ranged weapons). To defeat plate armour you best take a poleaxe.1) The sword would be your back-up weapon. Higher purity steel and forges allowing to heat-treat larger pieces allowed bigger swords. Bigger swords have a ranged advantage and are more intimidating. Similarly, the forges allowed the production of plate armour where before only scale armour like brigandines were possible. Helmets had to be riveted together from smaller pieces, whereas later, they were hammered into shape from a single plate in many cases. I'm not an expert on rapiers, but I do think that civilians wanted to keep the range advantage of a longsword, while having a lighter and more agile weapon. Many early rapiers cut well enough to seriously wound an unarmoured opponent. Combine that with the range and tip-speed, the rapier becomes a quite impressive weapon for civilians. I guess slender blades were also to show off the smiths skill, just like the fancy guards and gold and jewellry inlays. 1) the second best weapon is a mace together with a shield. After the opponent was knocked down, you typically would finish him off with a rondell dagger. Stabbing though gaps in the armour was more of a last resort thing, just like flipping a sword around and using it as a warhammer. Swords became more thrust-centric because they needed to fight more and more people wearing mail armour. The problem was that swords were the best weapons against unarmoured or lightly armoured opponents, but more and more people were wearing armour. If you carry only one melee weapon, you probably still go for a sword and hope that most enemies you'll face have enough unarmoured spots to slash and stabb. This does not mean that swords became thrust-centric because of plate armour. If someone wears a breastplate and helmet, you could still use a 1796 light cavalry sabre. Gambesson and mail however, force you to thrust.
Yes, the iron source played a great role. Woodz-steel in India, the same in Damascus and Ferrum Norricum for the Romans (which came by meteor and allowed them to make actual plate armour 500+ years before anyone else repeated that feat in Europe!). Any blacksmith can attempt to make a knife, but the quality was in most cases was abysmal. However, over time iron purification evolved considerably and in the high middle ages it already surpassed the technology of the Japanese from the 16th c. Pretty much any smith could get their hands on quality iron. If they had a decent forge and the knowledge, they could all make knives, with enough experience even swords. Over time, the gap between knife smiths and sword smiths decreased and the guild fought fiercely to protect their privileges. That was the time the messer family emerged. At the beginning they were only 50cm blades very similar to khyber knives, but soon they even became comparable to longswords. The hilting and one edged blade were for legal reasons (not so much weapon law, but guild, however in osme places double edged swords were for nobility and war only).
Was reminded in this video of a casual discussion in college about military history and weapons -- this would be about 1982. At a point we were arguing as to what the "best" or "single most effective weapon" on the battlefield at that time would be. My roommate wandered into the room and listened a bit, then we asked him as he had served in the 82nd Airborne for four years and was currently in the Army Reserve and attending OCS. "With observer training, a radio." he said simply. "Simplifying things a lot, no one is in the field alone. If I have a radio and I can see you, you're gone by any one of several weapon systems. End of story." Your comment on the impact of the radio from WWII forward brought that to mind. I like your videos a great deal. I have to particularly commend this one. The topic might not be a "favorite" but you bring your usual logic and insight, and exceptional clarity to this. Well done.
As always; an excellent and both profound, and profoundly digestible video presentation. :) I run a company of men in/on a game called star Citizen - I find myself at once wishing more people were aware of your work (hence my sharing it) and hoping my competition doesn't run across your work. :) Never stop, my friend. Many thanks.
Lame. It’s no fun if your the biggest fish in a small pond. Although I think the biggest issue is whether or not Star Citizen will enable as much strategic game play as we hope. Everything hinges on how everything balances out, and regardless of what CIG claim they want, what they can deliver may be very different. As far as I’ve studied history, there were few idiot commanders in history. They just made a tiny mistake, and that was their undoing. And frequently, that mistake wasn’t even under their control. The mistake was, perhaps most often, getting involved in a war with the wrong country at the wrong time, and frequently, the enemy gave them little choice. Thus, if there is ANY advantageous way to fight in Star Citizen, it will be abused. That includes methods that degrade both the complexity and enjoyment from combat... especially those two.
I recommend this book Misguided Weapons: Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield by Azriel Lorber. It goes into details how technologies were ignored, misused and misunderstood in warfare.
Andres - what did you think of it? That's my oldest history documentary, so be nice! :) Slane - I am working towards more. They just take time to get them right.
Still waiting for Stalingrad ;) I thought it was great. Different timing from usual, but still great. I really liked the way you portray the territory occupied by the different units, that should make a comeback.
Axel Pingol - Surprisingly, it was intentional. Waffenamt believed that weapons would have to be upgraded and replaced too often to justify mass production. In retrospect, they were wrong, but without the benefit of hindsight it made logical sense. Also, the fact that funds were stretched thin surely played a role. (Source: Vol 1 “Panzer Truppen: Complete Guide go Creation and Combat Deployment of Germany’s Task Force)
TIK it was the Ford company who was specialised in this technology. There most important designer went to Russia to instruct the Soviets how to design there production process (source The Marshall Foundation) . Wikipedia ‘ to construct an integrated automobile-manufacturing plant at Nizhny Novgorod. Many American engineers and skilled auto workers moved to the Soviet Union to work on the plant and its production lines, which was named Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod (GAZ), or Gorki Automotive Plant in 1932.’
One small issue with your assessment of the Franco-Prussian war is that it gives the impression of overwhelming french technological superiority. Whereas in reality at a tacitcal level superior Prussian Artillery "Checkmated" the usage of Chassepot rifles in multiple cases, notably at St Privat.
Two examples spring to mind: - France 1940, the French had very advanced some tanks like the S35, but weaknesses such as the one-man turret and poor tactical doctrine made them far less effective than the panzers. - Zulu War, the British obviously benefited from their rifles and could achieve spectacular results against the spear-armed Zulus such as at Rourke's Drift, but on the same day a large British force was destroyed nearby at Isandlwana due to complacency, poor scouting and shortage of ammo.
Actually, the evidence is that the defeat at Isandlwana was not due to shortage of ammunition, but rather technical issues surrounding said ammunition and weaponry. For example, a large portion of the ammunition was carried in wooden boxes that were screwed down. While that meant that the ammunition was safely and properly delivered to the site of the fighting, it also meant, especially with only one screwdriver available, that soldiers could run out of ammunition because the boxes could not be opened quickly enough when it was being expended in large amounts. Another problem was with the rifles which had a bad matchup between bullet and ammunition charge. Or in other words, the rifles overheated because of the high rate of fire. There were other components to the British loss regarding ammunition and the rifles, but this'll be enough.
I thought the thing with the overheats was that it was only a problem thanks to how spread out the British line was set up. If the line had been concentrated closer to the camp, there would've been more working guns at any given area, allowing jammed and overheated rifles to be fixed under the cover of comrades with functioning rifles. As it was, with a spread out skirmish line, a few failures left major holes in the British kill zone, allowing the Zulus to break through the line and turn the battle into a chaotic melee. A tighter deployment and/or laagered camp would've let the British keep the Zulus at arms length for longer, and probably carried the battle. If Isandlwana was lost due to technology malfunctions rather than complacency and command incompetence, why wasn't it repeated? The British pretty much massacred the Zulus at every other engagement during the war, using the same tech as they had at Isandlwana. Which would suggest that something other than tech issues were the root cause of the Isandlwana defeat.
I love this channel. As a history buff, this is basically the only channel where I can watch a video and enjoy a ton of new info thats super interesting. I always find myself waiting for your next video. I love your work! Keep up the great content!
Boo, he also neglected to mention that France was under Napoleon III, the Emperor of Phail. Napoleon III is the Leroy Jenkins of the late 19th Century.
British tank troops: Petrol engines burn us up! British tank makers: Diesel it is! British tank troops: Thanks, mates! German tank troops: Petrol engines? Nein! German tank makers: Use what we build! German tank troops: We're on fire!
Diesel engines are not some magic cure all to the "Oh god, the tank is on fire" problem. Soviet T-34s burned as profusely as pretty much any other WWII tank. In fact the biggest reason why tanks "brew up" is due to ammunition burning, hence why later model M4 Shermans with "Wet" ammunition storage caught fire less often than early shermans or basically any other tank of the war.
Both British and American tanks used petrol engines. Most British/US tanks were fitted with aero engines or derivatives. A diesel engine at that time would have to be specifically designed for the task, whereas powerful petrol engines though originally designed for aircraft were already available in large numbers or were at least tried and tested (I.e. the Liberty engine of WW1 vintage). For example late war British cruiser tanks (and also the Centurion) used the Meteor engine which was effectively a Merlin without a supercharger. The US often fitted Sherman tanks with radial engines a design commonly fitted to aircraft, this is what gives the Sherman it's high profile. Some Sherman's even had an engine made of 5 car engines bolted together. The difference was the Germans were purpose building tank engines but still choosing petrol as opposed to the US and UK who were using existing designs. The USSR was really alone in it's use of diesel, they were much bigger on tanks in the pre-war era than the US and UK who's budgets were only shrinking. The image of a burning tank is most probably due to crew sabotage on them leaving the tank or the custom of shooting a tank until it caught fire (to ensure it was knocked out), as well as the ammunition burning as the other commenter said
Long story short, the most critical feature in winning a war are the skills inherent in fighting a war: logistics, strategy and tactics. Fancy tech, be it a vehicle that can move a cannon faster than any horse (early use of automobiles on the battlefield) or a fancy new gun to give your soldiers, or even a better training regimen that teaches every sailor on a ship how to fix leaks rather than having a dedicated repair crew who the sailors call in (Battle of Midway), they're all just tools in the toolchest. You can give me all the tools a mechanic needs to fix a car, but unless you get me a mechanic, I'm not fixing your car; similarly, you can give a commander all the best tools for fighting a war, but they still need to know how to use them.
In particular in present day Afghanistan or in the past with the French and US in Vietnam, numbers, training and supplies matter a lot. "Tech" is only useful if training, supplies and repairs are available. Also, I think technology is often crowned superior in hindsight. If I was transported back in time to World War One, I'd want a lever action rifle or pump shotgun, a simple reliable revolver, and a bowie knife. All of which saw combat but were considered "antiquated" or specialized technology. The real breakthru in artillery was math, and changing the doctrine of direct fire. Today the best close air support jet is the A-10, which was designed decades ago. A "technological" advantage is only proved via hindsight and a lot of past and present day tech advantages are really something else. Great video!
Contrary to what it may seem, a revolver in muddy trenches isn't what you want. There are giant gaps around the cylinder. If mud gets in that, it's not gonna just work. Semi automatic pistols are more complicated, but by that time they were reliable enough to not be a problem. The 1911 went through US military trials with no real reliability issues, and the P08 luger has been put through mud tests and still functioned fairly well even though the same type of test. Well made bolt action rifles aren't inherently inferior to lever actions either. Maybe for trench raids, but I'd rather have a BAR than either.
@@Tinfoil_Hardhat The 1911 is good, P08 is better per InRange mud tests. Assuming I'm American or French I probably can't have a P08 and it isn't really compatible with my other choices (lever, Bowie knife). Revolvers can be fired from inside a great coat pocket or an oiled canvas bag, so I can keep it clean. They are also much easier to clean than a P08. Check out Paul Harrell's shooting a revolver from a pocket vid. And the stopping power of a 45 revolver and 1911 are both good. Some of this comes down to goals. An M1917 Enfield isn't bad all around but I ONLY care about trench raid defense or offense because it determines MY rate of survival. People across no man's land died from machineguns & artillery. I don't really care if I miss people them with my lever gun. The BAR looks really good on paper, but I've never seen one positively reviewed (too heavy). I'd probably prefer a stationary Lewis gun if I was assigned a machinegun. I'd prefer a BAR gun for trench defense, but it isn't ideal for hauling across no man's land AND back in the middle of the night. Especially the getting back part. In any case, I for sure prefer Lever gun/revolver to some of the weapon combos that were issued in mass like Lebel & 32ACP pistol or a 1903 & Colt Pocket Hammerless.
I will comment that the Prussians appear to have made a conscious decision to expend their resources on superior breech loading artillery, knowing full well that the Chassepot was superior to the needle gun. As evidence of recognizing the superiority of the Chassepot, whenever possible, the Prussian infantry discarded the needle gun in favor of the French rifle. It is impossible to disentangle the superiority of Prussian artillery from the superiority of Prussian tactics, preparation and strategy in the F/P war, but going into the war with the inferior shoulder arm was a conscious choice of the allocation of resources for the Prussians, believing that their superior mobilization and modern artillery would carry the day.
It's really nice to see an historian who knows how some economic concepts play a major role on warfare. I'm not even saying anything about macro-theory or political aspects of economics (as market vs government solutions), but rather technical ones such as opportunity costs, returns to scale, allocation of labor force and transaction costs (transportation, administration, social norms, etc). I can see examples to use in intro to econ classes in the whole video. I don't want to criticize other historians that don't take that much interest in economic reasoning and concepts on their analysis, but instead I wanted praise the awesome content that you provide for economics nerds like me, as it's rare to find. I Just met the channel and subscribed! Greeting from Brazil!
THANK you so much for this one! People tend to believe that technology works like in Civilization or Hearts of Iron. You press the button and as soon as its researched its there, ready to by used or deployed. They talk about it as if the jet engine was build by one guy an his garage.. or whatever the topic may be. Its good to see you summarizing it up in an understandable way. Thank you again!
Thank you for posting original German quotes along with translations as well as information sources, it makes it easier to check information sources and get a cleared picture of things. :) More people should do this.
whole europe? it wasn't even half of europe all the french conquered were loose states or countries in civil unrest when they met the russians well that was a different story
-Pierre Dudoret Then A brilliant Frenchman discovered that by properly folding a white flag, it could fit beneath a beret, freeing the French soldier from choosing between it or his cigarettes and copies of Guide Michelin. The rest, as we say, is history.
This video was superb. I have never seen the issue presented with such clarity and insight. And as long as I live I will never forget your observation, "yes, bean counters can win wars." I subbed a long time ago.
If you want to conquer the world, the best way would be to acquire the United States, China, Russia, and Japan first. provided you had the logistics and administrative know-how to keep everything running smoothly up to that point, those four countries would give you the industrial capacity to fuel your army for decades, provided France doesn't wise up and nuke your factories.
Just a quick comments: Even if the french had a better rifle in 1870 war, their military leadership, mobilization process were terrible. Plus if we were talking about technological superiority, Krupp canons in this war were vastly superior to French artilery. Also the railway quality was also inferior on the French side. Most French documention points toward doctrinal failure, poor military leaders and the failure of the 1867 military reform bloked by the French parliament which was meant to solve mobilization problem.
Basis is an important element. I found it interesting to see the U. S. Army spend about 20 years trying to change back to the brown rough out boot. Despite all its experience using them for years including through 2 wars..( agreeing there was some technological changes to be learned.) there were many who resisted the change just because they liked black shinny ones. They refused to see the benefits.
Even though the video takes inspiration from the military, the concepts mentioned in the video can be applied on any aspect of society (stone age and today). You have clearly explained how society works, specialize and depend on each other to produce and sustain a specific product/technology.
Your BRAIN is still the deadliest weapon on the battlefield. Technological superiority is negated without the infrastructure, personnel and doctrine/tactics to effectively exploit this advantage.
Great points as always! The only thing I might eventually add is that technology tends to function as a complement or supplement, rather than a replacement. There's a tendency to think in video game tech trees, where the newer always surpasses the older. Rather, they tend to complement or supplement each other.
Well its important to remember the panzer divisions didn't have good radios because both Rommel and Guderian had communication troubles during the battle of France, and continued moving even after being told to stop
I think this is another issue with people learning most they know about war from video games. Since RTS games abstract their production and organization to a ludicrous level and even games from the HoI series don't model the whole process you end up with tech-ups which give an instant buff to all your units. And the buff is usually significant enough to be the decider in most situations. And even where the research unlocks a new unit which has to be built and moved into combat the power gaps between two units in games are much greater than the small incremental power change found in real weapon system development. Thus the misconception.
I like your emphasis on how technology and industry are connected. In Zero: Combat & development history of Japan's Legendary ..Zero fighter by Mikeash, Robert C. He addresses the limitations of Japan's rapid industrial development, how many industries were underdeveloped, so the chemists could design good self-sealing fuel tanks but the industry could not produce them.By contrast other elements of Japanese industry were on a par with the US and UK. Also appreciate you pointing out com tech/radios & organization and the coordination they allowed were true force multipliers. One of your best videos imho!
One thing I've noticed in history is that the West has very high expectations of technology. We tend to think it can solve problems for us which isn't always the case. This usually ends in massive casualties or other disasters. Less so in some Western countries but the US is the biggest country that does this. They invest so much into technology which isn't a problem but the expectations are so high on it's capabilities. I think this also leads to the US expecting countries to be easy to defeat when in reality it ends in disaster. Look at the Korean war against China, Korea and Vietnam. Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany. I'm sure there are many other as well.
You touch on an important concept of technology. For the last few years I have been trying to refine the definition of technology away from what I consider an over emphasis on the concept of "tools." Technology is truly distinguished by both the tools used and how they're used. What we call a technological shift or leap is rarely present as only significantly better tool. The increase in effectiveness is almost always attributable to the evolution of better technique with new or existing tools. Therefore a technology is more of a system than an item. While this is intuitively understood on the tactical level, technology as a technique is also true on the operational and strategic level. Getting the shell from the factory and to the tank and aimed through the barrel at a target can only be considered together to analyze the effectiveness or diserability of a technology. The most common example I give people is that, with proper technical documents and skills, a single AK-47 could have probably been manufactured sometime around the late 19th century, yet that doesn't mean the technology of semiautomatic rifles was just a matter of blueprints and a skilled gunsmith. Industry needs to learn their own techniques and build their own superior tools before serial production can be considered.
Ever hear the truism, amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics? btw, it can only be correctly understood in proper context. Otherwise, the cart gets put before the horse.
The variable that screws over a lot of high tech weapons when faced with less advanced tech? Mud... Half the time I hear about a modernized army having to abandon the use of their best tech is because it can't be made to move through muddy terrain, or has issues being used after being exposed to muddy conditions.
The advancement of the radio in World War 2 was also a contributing factor in Germany's successes against the Soviet Union since only one in 10 Red Army tanks had radios, which the Germans exploited like at the battle of Kursk and the USA didn't supply the Soviet Union with FM radios as they did with Germany.
Citation needed. During WW2 we never supported Germany not sent any form of supplies. We sent Britain, France, Canada and Russia (after being betrayed by Hitler) with weapons, tanks and supplies. Not sure why we would supply our enemies with then-highend radios.
I believe radio was more relevant during the first years of the war, rather than the battle of Kursk, mostly because during Barbarossa, the only soviet tank capable of mounting radios was the KV.(mostly known as KV-1). However, this changed, altough the soviet radios were in poorer quality than the german ones.
USSR lack of radios (1 in 10 tanks) was a factor in 1941-42. But by mid 1942 the Brits were shipping a lot, and by 1943 the US flooded with radios - from that time until the end of the war, 60% to 80% of USSR tanks were equipped with allied radios. So by the time of Kursk, the lack of radios were not really a factor. (Same thing for trucks to supply - US sent a lot of reliable trucks - some served in USSR until about 1980s.....)
The problem in Russia at the time was Stalin purged his generals. The tanks the Soviets had T34 made the German tanks look like a toy. As well while the Soviets had lost 2 million men due to mismanagement by Stalin, they had 200 million more to fight.
What are your thoughts on the current state of Germany's military? I thought making a short list about what they lack, but decided that it would be easier saying what they still have in sufficient supplies and quality: shoes and food.
This is an excellent summary study, and as usual, you've taught me something brand new. I had no idea that German tanks were limited to gasoline (petrol) by the inability of the motor manufacturers to retool their plants. Fascinating as always - please keep up the good work.
I really enjoy all of your videos! I’m kind of a novice to a lot of things though, and I was wondering if there was a reference somewhere you could recommend on what force multipliers are, how they are implemented, and how they are categorized and defined? I know things like a tower allows for a smaller number of troops to cover a larger area than their numbers would indicate, but is there a comprehensive study of the different types of force multipliers, or a general set of them like having the high ground, etc.?
Missing from his section on the Franco - Prussian War was that the French had muzzle loading cannons, whereas the Prussians had breech loading artillery. Furthermore the French had this mitrailleuse (? - not sure of spelling), a type of Gatlin gun. The French treated it as an artillery piece & kept it too far back. Also they didn't train the troops in how to use it. With both sides still using Napoleonic tactic of troops advancing over open ground in large "blocks", this would have really chewed them up. This guy is a damn fine Researcher & the videos really Educational & Informative.
Thank you for a VERY interesting piece. Technology is important, but it is not a magic bullet. A good example is the Six Day War. In technology the Egyptian military was a match for the Israelis, in practice the Israelis used their equipment much better. Thanks again for some well thought out work.
On the matter of the Franco-Prussian war, couldn't a technology proponent simply argue the Prussians had the technological advantage in other, more important, areas? Such as modernised artillery guns which the French neglected to develop?
Could you explain your reasoning on why artillery did not contribute heavily to the outcome of the F-P war? I agree that Prussian leadership was significantly superior, but as artillery is generally the biggest killer in war, why wouldn't having VASTLY superior artillery guns be important?
This reminds me of something I remember from a history text book about European history when the Franco Prussian War was being fought. The Prussian Field Marshal von Moltke actually led his army from his office by using telegraphs and utilizing railways to move his troops around. Of course the Prussians learned about these devices from observing the American Civil War, but they saw what worked and what didn't and they organized accordingly.
Great video, the example of technology and industry reminds me of the essay "I, Pencil" by Leonard E. Read, who highlights in entirety the complex processes for , mining, manufacturing, and labor needed to produce a seemingly simple product the pencil.
The war was a stalemate. At the end the prewar border between them remained the same. Iran was led by Religious leaders ignorant of basic military doctrine instead of the well trained but mistrusted professional military commanders. The Iraqi army was led by party and tribal appointees. Iran had it's larger population but it's military equipment was from the West who refused to supply ammunition, spare parts and replacements. Iraq had supplies coming in and probably satellite intelligence for both the Russians and Americans. It's smaller population always meant a smaller army. Saddam Hussein would not have dared to attack the Shah's large modern well trained army backed by the USA with intelligence and resupply. He thought he saw a weak easily defeat-able enemy and he gambled with his peoples lives. None of his own sons served at the front.
With breach vs muzzle loading guns, rate of fire is commonly mentioned. Was the ability to reload from the prone position seen as a major benefit and was doctrine altered to take advantage of it?
Yet another good video. I do have a question about the French division you described. You said one lacked punch and the other was too slow. I presume the under armed one was the Cavalry divisions while the tank divisions were the slow ones. My - limited - understanding of the French Cavalry divisions was they were a versatile all arms formation that may have been better organized than the Panzer divisions.
Very excellent video. I especially liked your analysis of the Franco-Prussian. I would be very interested to see you do a video that compares general staff between the French, Prussians, and Austrians during time of the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian war.
From first hand experience... in 2004 in the Iraq War, we were being handed new technology at a MUCH accelerated pace, before there was doctrine or even a user manual. However, the tech itself is useless without a SOP for using it. In the US Army, we call this METTTC - Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain ,Troops and Civilians on the battlefield. It wasn't until we developed these SOPs that any of the new sights and communications gear did us any good.
I observed the same asinine idiocy during my '04/'05 tour (OIF II, the war was in '03 btw). Too many high ranking careerists who got promoted by being dutiful glorified admin clerks with piss poor tactical sense. They latched onto anything new and lost sight of the basics and fundamentals all too often. A more Jason Borne and less James Bond approach would have achieved much more success with much less expense imo.
I think that Japan's naval air force in WWII is a great example that highly experienced pilots in superb aircraft are not guaranteed to win in the long run. There are a few reasons for their failure but 2 of them are: 1. It takes a lot of time in the seat to make a great pilot, more than what they were able to give pilots later in the war. 2. Achilles' heel in the airplanes not having self sealing gas tanks made the planes death traps even for seasoned pilots who were hit by "lucky" shots which caused the plane to catch fire right away.
Germany's selection of sound powered telephones over telegraphs were key to their loss of control of the 1st and 2nd Armies in 1914. Telegraphs have long range, sound power phones were limited to about 60 km.
Its a known fact that the end result of Battles/Wars is the culmination of all those factors mentioned in the video; having an advantage in a given area will improve your chances but neither will it dominate if the efficiency in other areas is too far behind. And with technology an important factor to consider is whether to produce highly advanced weapons which require more advanced production/special resources or to produce larger amounts of less-advanced/easily-produced types for which resources are abundant. Logistics to keep your army operational is important for long campaigns but less for short campaigns. Finding the proper balance between all areas is the key to succesful and efficient warfare. A problem with some institutionalized countries is that each branch tends to operate on its own; proper overlapping communication between the branches can ensure that their work is properly coordinated
There is some very important info here that so many people forget. The radio in particular. Since we werent there at the beginning of radio we dont know just what a revolution it caused. Just compare it to PCs and the internet. That will help you understand.
Well, you make it seem like a simple idea now that you have put it into words, but it is all very true. To use a bad comparison in modern computer games one has the choice of rushing out low-level units in high numbers vs waiting and developing more advanced units. Usually, it is a combination of the 2 that works best. A real-world example from my own area of New Zealand is the NZ land wars. The local Maori had traded for shotguns from the Europeans so they had some arms when conflict came. Though the British brought what was the best field artillery of the times. With 4 times the manpower the British laid siege to the Maori at a place called Ohaeawai. After 7 days of constant shelling, the British charged the fort expecting the defenders to be broken. Keep in mind the walls were made of woven flax, and the British had a position on a hillside overlooking the Pa(fort). Much to their surprise, the British charge was cut down. While the Maori could do little to fight the artillery they could do much to dig. The thin walls mostly served to hide the trenches they had dug, and most of the shells had safely passed overhead. After the battle the Maori Warriors slipped away in the night. They had proved their point, and would prove it again. th-cam.com/video/njmK1iGl0wc/w-d-xo.htmlm14s
An interesting example that illustrates your point well was an action during the Crimean war. British troops were advancing on a fording point in thick fog when they noticed suddenly a wave of Russian infantry charging at them. Officers had been trained largely with the doctrines that emerged from the Napoleonic wars and as such ordered their men to fix bayonets and charge. The men and more importantly the NCOs knew the capabilities of their weapons and disregarded the order, formed line and gave fire. This broke the Russian charge an of course saved their lives. People forget that technology is useless unless deployed effectively.
I read "Arms of the Krupps" by Manchester a few years ago, and he said that the Franco-Prussian war WAS won by superior technology. But while you focused on the infantry guns, he focused on artillery, saying that basically, the French guns were useless because the Krupp artillery prevented the French from ever getting near the Prussians. If true, That does not completely invalidate what you say about that, because he also allows for the mistake the French made in not pushing for closer encounters more aggressively, but still, I think it's something worth mentioning.
Well this was a bit of a surprise for me, as I have for the last 20 years heard a lot about the German mortars, that they were good ('best' is of course quite subjective and contextbased for something as simple as a mortar), employed effectively and were probably the greatest killer of Allied troops. Now that is not necessarily in opposition to a lesser focus on those weapons (that just means they did well with those mortars they did have, or that those they had just had a higher impact than other weapons even if not used supremely well), but it does come as somewhat of a surprise to me. Especially with the infamous lack of artillery shells the big guns suffered later on. But to say that Germany wasn't known for their mortars I would argue is a wrong statement. What they were known for doesn't have to line up with what they had a specific focus on, and in this case I feel that it might apply quite well. Since I haven't actually seen anyone go beyond overview, this might be a subject worth investing in?
Actually, the Germans WERE severely lacking in the area of mortars. Unlike the American, British, and Soviet Armies (and for that matter, the Japanese) during World War Two, the Germans never developed and deployed in large numbers small Company level mortars. They did have a small (50mm?) mortar, but it was not issued nor deployed in very large numbers.
The 8cm mortar was a good weapon and very effectively used, though it also frequently wasnt supplied with enough ammunition. However, neither the germans(until they copied it) nor the western allies had a match for the outstanding 12cm mortar of the soviets.
However, the Americans at least didn't need something similar to the Soviet 120mm because their Divisional Artillery was some of the best. Soviet artillery on the other hand was certainly lacking, and so Soviet Commanders were forced to use their own mortars, so it was fortunate that the Soviets had very good mortars.
For an in depth comparison of German, American, and Soviet tank "technology" in World War II that greatly expands on this MHV in a specific area, this video from the 26 minute point is excellent. th-cam.com/video/N6xLMUifbxQ/w-d-xo.htmlm13s Jonathan Parshall is best known for covering the WWII Imperial Japanese Navy (e.g. "Shattered Sword"), but he also looks a lot at the Allied vs. Axis economics of World War II. This video may give you a new appreciation for the Sherman tank's underlying chassis, if not the M4 itself. MHV has done an excellent overview of this general subject matter. However, he might have mentioned that a significant problem for Germany's tank factories was they and their suppliers were frequently disrupted by Allied strategic bombing. Look up the impact of strategic bombing on Tiger II tank production.
One thing about tank production that should perhaps be identified is standardization. A foreign member of one of the allied nations (I think Britain, but am not completely sure) visited an American Tank Factory during the Second World War, and he noted that there were no vises anywhere near where the tanks were being assembled. That was because the Americans had standardization down to a science, and so therefore the lack of vises meant that there was no need to modify parts before emplacing them on the actual tank. (This comes from a TH-cam Video by the Chieftain by the way). On the other hand, German tanks were almost assembled like watches, with very little, if any standardization, and almost every part being specifically modified for the place and tank it is to go in. That is why the Americans built 53,000 Sherman Tanks, along with a whole bunch of numerous tanks and TD's, and why the Germans only were able to produce around 5,000 tanks or thereabouts, total. And while I may be wrong with regard to German tank production, it was swamped by the numbers the Americans built.
If you watch Jonathan Parshall's part of that Battle of Kursk video I pointed out above, The Chieftain himself appears in the audience next to a man who asks a question during the Q&A session. Standardization was crucial. As a former US Army logistics trained officer, I shudder at what my German counterparts faced in WWII. Instead of a highly standard hull with a variety of turrets and guns (everything from the M3 Grant/Lee to the M107 Priest and M36 Jackson), a German logistician was juggling parts books of likely thousands of pages with Panzer I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and Panzer 35t and 38t hulls, not to mention so many captured and often converted hulls. The Germans adapted hundreds and thousands of captured French, British, American, Italian, and Soviet AFVs. It's little wonder Shermans could provide 95 percent uptime while 50 to 70 percent was routine for German AFVs. ("Herr Hauptmann, we are waiting for the team to bring back some bogies from a wrecked Panzer III we saw 50 miles back so it can be mounted on our StuG III sitting in the maintenance tent.") It is in this Kursk video that Parshall makes a very convincing case that the Soviets may have been the absolute best at producing war winning tanks. They had far fewer coal and iron resources than Germany, much less Germany after it had conquered Alsace-Lorraine, secured the Swedish iron ore supplies across a Baltic "lake", and so on. Yet, the Soviets "punched far above their weight class" in manufacturing American volumes of AFV's, rather than British or German volumes (80,000 versus 30,000 for the British and Germans). Essentially, the Americans and Soviets were cranking out highly standardized AFV's like Henry Ford had produced the Model T in large batches with no deviations until the next "block". The German approach did not use conveyor belts, had few machine tools or standardization of models or parts, and practically crafted each AFV uniquely. Anyone who has the slightest knowledge of WWII tanks has heard of the fearsome Tiger tank with its 88mm cannon and thick armor. Try to see how many have heard of an Allied AFV with a 90mm cannon and plenty of speed. The Germans built exactly 1347 Tiger I tanks while the USA built 2324 Jackson M36 tank destroyers. There were almost 1000 more M36's than Tigers and virtually all the M36's would serve in the West while Tigers were divided between the Western and Eastern Fronts. With the correct HVAP ammo, 76mm armed Shermans and assorted Allied tank destroyers (M10, M1A1, M18, M36) could penetrate the armor of virtually any German tank at reasonable combat range. An interesting laboratory to consider for WWII tanks is the first year of the Korean War where the best Shermans (M4A3E8 "Easy Eight") met the best T-34 (T-34/85).
Samuel Thompson this is from mathew coopers book. the german army 12933-1945 page 487.In November 1943 army group south had 977 tanks.only 288 were fit for action.that was because they didnt have the spare parts to repair them.
_On the other hand, German tanks were almost assembled like watches, with very little, if any standardization, and almost every part being specifically modified for the place and tank it is to go in_ I am not so sure about this. If there was no standarization, how could maintenance units in the front lines mount spare parts?
I think Parshall exaggerates somewhat to make his point. Contrast the Willow Run Bomber Plant in Michigan with the Tiger tank plant he covers. At Willow Run, a huge machine tool created absolutely standardized wing panels for the B-24 Liberator that did not require any "shimmying" to slot them into their adjoining parts. Multiply this by all the other special purpose machine tools used in American assembly line style factories, and you see real contrast and a ready supply of highly standardized spare parts. At its peak, a new B-24 rolled out of Willow Run every 45 MINUTES. For the German factories, there were far fewer specialized machine tools, so craftsmen had to scrape off a bit here, flatten a bit there, to get parts to fit together. Factor in that 20 tanks on the line might be subject to five slightly different construction plans. ("Change the turret rotation handle for the next five, Hans. Herr Oberst from the Waffenamt said Tiger operators from the 504th Independent Heavy Tank Battalion prefer that handle to be bent another 30 degrees counterclockwise. He also has some changes for the next 10 tanks after we get those five out of here.") If you add in that extremely specialized machine tools could be damaged or destroyed by Allied heavy bombers, and you can see some of the reasons the Germans were less reliant on highly standardized parts and less able to produce them. As for the maintenance units in the front lines, Allied and German alike, they had mobile shop vehicles with lathes, vises, grinders, welders, and so on. If parts came from the factory for a Panzer IV Ausf G and you had a Panzer IV Ausf F to repair, you bent, heated, and ground that Ausf G part until it fit your Ausf F tank. That is, if you couldn't exchange the Ausf G part with a nearby maintenance shop for the correct part. Ask me how I know... Here is a video of the improvised hedgerow cutters that accelerated the Allied breakout from the bocage country in 1944. God Bless the maintenance crews. th-cam.com/video/iWxt7b2zXtY/w-d-xo.html
Speaking of the WW2 German infantry gun's use being perpetuated for the benefit of special interests, that was a common theme in Germany as different factions vied for funding and power. In OKW, different arms of the army kept jockeying for funding. Artillery officers kept pushing for the obsolete 37mm PaK 36 to keep being produced so that funding wouldn't be absorbed by assault guns and tank destroyers, which were considered tanks and took away influence from the artillery generals.
Completely agree, MHV. People tend to focus on comparing technology on a vacuum, in a 1v1 situation (what is better, a Sherman, a Panzer IV or a T-34?) And I can understand why they do so: because equipment specifications are more or less concrete numbers, and being measured in absoulte values, it is easier to weight and compare them. And it is one of the few aspects of war that can measured in such a way, because morale, propaganda, doctrine, logistics, etc, are very hard to judge by comparison. I believe that is why 1v1 tank "jousts" are so popular: a "winner" can be easily determined (nevermind that the result is flaw, becuase doesn´t account for the entire context) The only thing I would not agree is your example of smoothbore musket vs needle gun vs _Chassepot_. The _Chassepot_ does not represent a great leap forward for the French when compared to Austro-German engagements. The French rifle is much closer to the German one than the German one is to the Austrian. To put it in another comparison, if the Dreyse needle gun is a Panzer II, then the _Chassepot_ is a T-26S. The Austrian musket would be a truck with a couple of soldiers armed with Mausers loaded with K bullets.
Hello, great channel and very good video (very good explanation on this rather tricky subject). I have one question regarding one of your examples: ww2 german army and mortars/infantry guns. As far as I`m aware the German army have and used mortars the same way and in same proportions as a main infantry support weapon on platoon/company and battalion level as any other major army from the same period. The infantry guns you are referring to were regimental guns (one company per regiment, at least according to organization tables) and were additional tool to the mortars, used on lower levels (so, where the main infantry "work" was done). In the beginning of the war they have the same types of mortars as everyone else (more or less): light 50 mm as platoon/company organic support and 81 mm as company/battalion level organic support weapon. In fact, almost all other major armies have somewhat similar regimental artillery, although the guns were different (almost all on this level have 70+mm guns or light howitzers and not anything heavier (at this level)). So, I think that this kind of support weapons have somewhat different place and role from the mortars (at least, in the beginning/first period of ww2): they were for direct fire support (role that can`t be executed by mortars), when needed or in any case as a additional support tool on the next level (to be used as a hole on regimental level or to be distributed as reinforcement on lower levels when needed). There were some uniqueness in german regimental artillery - they have a 150 mm infantry guns (a rather powerful tool). I suppose that there is some concurrence between german infantry guns and mortars in some technical sense (the german infantry guns can be fired in very high trajectory - like mortars, which was probably redundant), but I don`t think that the infantry guns were substitute for mortars. At least, in the beginning or the war. I think that in later stages there were some disappointment whit light mortars (50 mm ones) and to some extend they were try to replace them with lighter version of 81 mm mortars (at the sane platoon/company level), but on the other hand, the infantry guns were too changed (the new 75 mm type of infantry gun) to e more suitable for anti-tank role in latter stages of the war. And, in the same time, I think that I have read that their infantry highly valued mortars and used them extensively. They have copied the soviet heavy mortar (120 mm) as a battalion/regimental support weapon in 1942 and latter used it extensively. So, to summarize, the infantry guns were not, IMHO, some sort of substitute for mortars: they have different role and place as an infantry "tool".
Another key problem with relying too much on technology is that effective counter measures are often way cheaper to obtain: WWI tanks are a good example: even though the Germans were practically unable to assemble an effective armored force of their own, they were able to counter the british technological innovations mostly by innovating tactically:using small pieces of artillery as anti-tank guns, or just digging wide enough trenches that the tanks couldn`t easily cross them.
![[Barbarossa] The Major Errors and Blunders - Or why Barbarossa Failed](/img/n.gif)
"Let us move onto a more refreshing topic, namely organization." how very german
❤️
Cracked me up too XD
I am not French, I am Belgian. H.Poirot
Our friend here is from Austria 🇦🇹, he is not German, maybe somehow through magic 🪄 similar views might be there 😂.
"And, since I mentioned complicated let's talk about Germany again."
Charles Lathrop a phrase that can be applied to almost the entire history of Germany
haha good one
Germany before unification
"Please, excuse him, he hasn't slept since 1945."
@@deltoroperdedor3166 >a phrase that can be applied to almost the entire history of Germany
And France. And Italy. And Poland. ANd AHHHH MOTHERLAND
I am shocked that the American war in Vietnam wasn't mentioned. That war was a good example of technology in action without proper doctrine and political decisions. I remember watching a Vietnam documentary where a bomber pilot complained that they kept bombing a bridge in North Vietnam, but they kept rebuilding it. Everyone knew there was a concrete factory near by, but they weren't allowed to bomb it because it was not on the list of approved targets...
well as far as I know US military was testing out new doctrine out there.
and not without a successes either they were pretty much winning the war until the social noise about "hurrdurr brutal soldiers doing nasty things in vietnam why did we even send those boys there" and the drama that arose back in their homeland because war was shown to the wide public for the first time.
Imagine kinda like tsushima in russo-japanese war but instead with russians winning it but the citizens being upset over realisation that war is a nasty thing.
@MehrumesDagon
The American "bodycount doctrine was stupid and it didn't bring America close to victory. On the contrary, it incentivised false statistics, and massacres on civilians to get the body count number up.... because if the enemy lost more men than they could replace then the war soon be won the US Military promised.
However, this promise turned out to be false. Truth is that the US Military had no idea how many Vietcongs and North Vietnamease army men were out there. So while the US Military promised a soon victory in 1967, those dreams were soon scattered with the tet-offensive in 1968. And the tet-offensive was far from this outstanding American victory like the mainstream narrative goes, because even despite the Vietcong leadership got totally wiped out in the cities and the vietcong took heavy losses, the war still progressed as before with equally high losses for the Americans as previous years. And while the Americans won the battle for the cities, they also at the same time lose all the control of the countryside as units were moving from the countryside into the cities to take them back.
So the war continued. And American solidiers got tired of this stupid bodycount doctrine, because the military leadership just saw them as expandable materia that could be replaced with new recruits if someone died when a careerist officer wanted his medals and promotions.
The stupid and costly fighting to take Hamburger hill is a typical example of this doctrine. In other wars Armies fight to gain control over vital areas - the Normandy beachhead, the Caucausus oilfields and so on.... But in Vietnam the Americans just attacked the worthless Hamburger Hill to kill Vietcongs, and then they just abandoned this hill soon after, even if many men had fought and died to get it, and within a few months would the Vietcong be back in control over it.
So all this crap made the morale in the American Army to fall apart, and fragging became common from 1969 and onwards, and the unreported numbers are surely higher than even the official statistics. And the reason was simple, the solidiers were throwing handgrenades at their own officers because they didn't wanna die in some pointless offensive.
And the search-and-avoid operations became common as well as more fraudgelent reporting of bodycounts, so that the leadership would be happy with the numbers and not try to play more aggressive and the send the men out on dangerous missions to get the bodycount number up.
All in all did the morale fall apart and a continuation of the war was no longer possible for Americas part, as the men refused to obey their own officers. So who is the blame for the defeat? The US Military and its stupid doctrine.
th-cam.com/video/lFvcuuS5eUI/w-d-xo.html
th-cam.com/video/Hpr1HYZDzHY/w-d-xo.html
nattygsbord
You have the right point, but it's oversimplification to say body count is stupid. In a war of attrition, number is ultimately a factor, it's just that's never what warfare is about.
nattygsbord loved this comment
“To win 1000 battles is not the acme of military excellence, but to break your opponent without fighting.” -Sun Tzu (heavily paraphrased I might add)
Most people forget how much work it is to even produce a single knife, starting with mining ore and coal. Even in the late middle ages many smiths could not make knives, not to speak of swords. That's why we had blacksmiths, knifesmiths and swordsmiths as guilds. Purification and heat-treatment were major issues, explaining why longswords, rapiers and plate armours only showed up very late. Now, imagine how much more effort and experience needs to be put into making a 170mm howitzer (9m barrel 17t weight)... In one day of WWII so many ships were sunk that the weight of iron corresponded to everything ever produced in this entire world from the iron age to the 16th century!
Just imagine, that you knew all about WWII-technology and tactics and were thrown back to Austria 1900 and wanted to help us win WWI. How many tanks and assault rifles would they be able to produce until 1914?
Even small innovations no one thinks about have helped the western world getting an edge over Asia, Arabia and the rest. Just things like church bells, clocks and glasses. The first thing gave us the experience of iron melting that allowed us to make the first cannons. And the glasses allowed a highly skilled precision worker to double his service life, even he passed the age of 30 and his eyes was starting to turn shitty. And this process of making better glass then allowed us to make telescopes and microscopes and using our skills in making mechanical clocks into making high precision tools with microscopic precision.
+nattygsbord I am pretty sure, that cannons in their early form originated in China, but I see your point.
edi True, to a degree, but I'd argue that the development of full plate harnesses came about as armorers figured out how to make plates of steel large enough to make the armor from and not necessarily a result of being able to make better steel. Longswords came about as a result of plate armor and fighting men needing a better sword to get around plate armor by being designed more for thrusting into small gaps in the armor rather than trying to cut exposed parts of the body. Rapiers came about more as fashion item and for personal defense than as a counter to any particular form of armor or as the result of any particular technological breakthrough/advancement in metallurgy.
Longswords were not developed to defeat plate armour, but because of them. With good enough armour, no shield was required allowing the use of two hands on one weapon (yes, polearms existed before, but that put speermen into a huge disadvantage against ranged weapons). To defeat plate armour you best take a poleaxe.1) The sword would be your back-up weapon. Higher purity steel and forges allowing to heat-treat larger pieces allowed bigger swords. Bigger swords have a ranged advantage and are more intimidating. Similarly, the forges allowed the production of plate armour where before only scale armour like brigandines were possible. Helmets had to be riveted together from smaller pieces, whereas later, they were hammered into shape from a single plate in many cases.
I'm not an expert on rapiers, but I do think that civilians wanted to keep the range advantage of a longsword, while having a lighter and more agile weapon. Many early rapiers cut well enough to seriously wound an unarmoured opponent. Combine that with the range and tip-speed, the rapier becomes a quite impressive weapon for civilians. I guess slender blades were also to show off the smiths skill, just like the fancy guards and gold and jewellry inlays.
1) the second best weapon is a mace together with a shield. After the opponent was knocked down, you typically would finish him off with a rondell dagger. Stabbing though gaps in the armour was more of a last resort thing, just like flipping a sword around and using it as a warhammer. Swords became more thrust-centric because they needed to fight more and more people wearing mail armour.
The problem was that swords were the best weapons against unarmoured or lightly armoured opponents, but more and more people were wearing armour. If you carry only one melee weapon, you probably still go for a sword and hope that most enemies you'll face have enough unarmoured spots to slash and stabb. This does not mean that swords became thrust-centric because of plate armour. If someone wears a breastplate and helmet, you could still use a 1796 light cavalry sabre. Gambesson and mail however, force you to thrust.
Yes, the iron source played a great role. Woodz-steel in India, the same in Damascus and Ferrum Norricum for the Romans (which came by meteor and allowed them to make actual plate armour 500+ years before anyone else repeated that feat in Europe!).
Any blacksmith can attempt to make a knife, but the quality was in most cases was abysmal. However, over time iron purification evolved considerably and in the high middle ages it already surpassed the technology of the Japanese from the 16th c. Pretty much any smith could get their hands on quality iron. If they had a decent forge and the knowledge, they could all make knives, with enough experience even swords. Over time, the gap between knife smiths and sword smiths decreased and the guild fought fiercely to protect their privileges. That was the time the messer family emerged. At the beginning they were only 50cm blades very similar to khyber knives, but soon they even became comparable to longswords. The hilting and one edged blade were for legal reasons (not so much weapon law, but guild, however in osme places double edged swords were for nobility and war only).
Was reminded in this video of a casual discussion in college about military history and weapons -- this would be about 1982. At a point we were arguing as to what the "best" or "single most effective weapon" on the battlefield at that time would be. My roommate wandered into the room and listened a bit, then we asked him as he had served in the 82nd Airborne for four years and was currently in the Army Reserve and attending OCS. "With observer training, a radio." he said simply. "Simplifying things a lot, no one is in the field alone. If I have a radio and I can see you, you're gone by any one of several weapon systems. End of story." Your comment on the impact of the radio from WWII forward brought that to mind.
I like your videos a great deal. I have to particularly commend this one. The topic might not be a "favorite" but you bring your usual logic and insight, and exceptional clarity to this. Well done.
As always; an excellent and both profound, and profoundly digestible video presentation. :)
I run a company of men in/on a game called star Citizen - I find myself at once wishing more people were aware of your work (hence my sharing it) and hoping my competition doesn't run across your work. :)
Never stop, my friend.
Many thanks.
Lame. It’s no fun if your the biggest fish in a small pond.
Although I think the biggest issue is whether or not Star Citizen will enable as much strategic game play as we hope. Everything hinges on how everything balances out, and regardless of what CIG claim they want, what they can deliver may be very different.
As far as I’ve studied history, there were few idiot commanders in history. They just made a tiny mistake, and that was their undoing. And frequently, that mistake wasn’t even under their control. The mistake was, perhaps most often, getting involved in a war with the wrong country at the wrong time, and frequently, the enemy gave them little choice.
Thus, if there is ANY advantageous way to fight in Star Citizen, it will be abused. That includes methods that degrade both the complexity and enjoyment from combat... especially those two.
I recommend this book Misguided Weapons: Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield by Azriel Lorber. It goes into details how technologies were ignored, misused and misunderstood in warfare.
Just found it on Amazon..nice
Whats always amusing / terrifying is the difference between the climes of effectiveness beforehand and gloomy after action reports.
Another great video MHV! Surprised to hear about the lack of German conveyor belts for panzer production
What a coincidence!
I've just finished watching the whole of your Operation Market-Garden video.
Andres - what did you think of it? That's my oldest history documentary, so be nice! :)
Slane - I am working towards more. They just take time to get them right.
Still waiting for Stalingrad ;)
I thought it was great. Different timing from usual, but still great. I really liked the way you portray the territory occupied by the different units, that should make a comeback.
Axel Pingol - Surprisingly, it was intentional. Waffenamt believed that weapons would have to be upgraded and replaced too often to justify mass production. In retrospect, they were wrong, but without the benefit of hindsight it made logical sense. Also, the fact that funds were stretched thin surely played a role. (Source: Vol 1 “Panzer Truppen: Complete Guide go Creation and Combat Deployment of Germany’s Task Force)
TIK it was the Ford company who was specialised in this technology. There most important designer went to Russia to instruct the Soviets how to design there production process (source The Marshall Foundation) . Wikipedia ‘ to construct an integrated automobile-manufacturing plant at Nizhny Novgorod. Many American engineers and skilled auto workers moved to the Soviet Union to work on the plant and its production lines, which was named Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod (GAZ), or Gorki Automotive Plant in 1932.’
With this channel, there is no "best ever" video, only "better" videos to come :D
One small issue with your assessment of the Franco-Prussian war is that it gives the impression of overwhelming french technological superiority. Whereas in reality at a tacitcal level superior Prussian Artillery "Checkmated" the usage of Chassepot rifles in multiple cases, notably at St Privat.
Two examples spring to mind:
- France 1940, the French had very advanced some tanks like the S35, but weaknesses such as the one-man turret and poor tactical doctrine made them far less effective than the panzers.
- Zulu War, the British obviously benefited from their rifles and could achieve spectacular results against the spear-armed Zulus such as at Rourke's Drift, but on the same day a large British force was destroyed nearby at Isandlwana due to complacency, poor scouting and shortage of ammo.
Actually, the evidence is that the defeat at Isandlwana was not due to shortage of ammunition, but rather technical issues surrounding said ammunition and weaponry. For example, a large portion of the ammunition was carried in wooden boxes that were screwed down. While that meant that the ammunition was safely and properly delivered to the site of the fighting, it also meant, especially with only one screwdriver available, that soldiers could run out of ammunition because the boxes could not be opened quickly enough when it was being expended in large amounts. Another problem was with the rifles which had a bad matchup between bullet and ammunition charge. Or in other words, the rifles overheated because of the high rate of fire. There were other components to the British loss regarding ammunition and the rifles, but this'll be enough.
I thought the thing with the overheats was that it was only a problem thanks to how spread out the British line was set up. If the line had been concentrated closer to the camp, there would've been more working guns at any given area, allowing jammed and overheated rifles to be fixed under the cover of comrades with functioning rifles. As it was, with a spread out skirmish line, a few failures left major holes in the British kill zone, allowing the Zulus to break through the line and turn the battle into a chaotic melee. A tighter deployment and/or laagered camp would've let the British keep the Zulus at arms length for longer, and probably carried the battle.
If Isandlwana was lost due to technology malfunctions rather than complacency and command incompetence, why wasn't it repeated? The British pretty much massacred the Zulus at every other engagement during the war, using the same tech as they had at Isandlwana. Which would suggest that something other than tech issues were the root cause of the Isandlwana defeat.
I love this channel. As a history buff, this is basically the only channel where I can watch a video and enjoy a ton of new info thats super interesting. I always find myself waiting for your next video. I love your work! Keep up the great content!
2:24 I was like, "Oh, come on! Where is the baguette miniature representing the French?"
2:56 You never fail to impress me, MHV.
Boo, he also neglected to mention that France was under Napoleon III, the Emperor of Phail. Napoleon III is the Leroy Jenkins of the late 19th Century.
@@johnd2058 And nobody gave a single shit.
I love the line in this video about Beancounters and how they can win wars too, and how its depressing. Made me chuckle.
9:29 Food conversation was low?! I love to talk about food. :-)
I think he meant the food wasn't talking as much back then
But has food really changed that much over the years?
I think he wanted to write conservation
-conversation- _preservation_
British tank troops: Petrol engines burn us up!
British tank makers: Diesel it is!
British tank troops: Thanks, mates!
German tank troops: Petrol engines? Nein!
German tank makers: Use what we build!
German tank troops: We're on fire!
Diesel engines are not some magic cure all to the "Oh god, the tank is on fire" problem. Soviet T-34s burned as profusely as pretty much any other WWII tank. In fact the biggest reason why tanks "brew up" is due to ammunition burning, hence why later model M4 Shermans with "Wet" ammunition storage caught fire less often than early shermans or basically any other tank of the war.
Both British and American tanks used petrol engines. Most British/US tanks were fitted with aero engines or derivatives. A diesel engine at that time would have to be specifically designed for the task, whereas powerful petrol engines though originally designed for aircraft were already available in large numbers or were at least tried and tested (I.e. the Liberty engine of WW1 vintage). For example late war British cruiser tanks (and also the Centurion) used the Meteor engine which was effectively a Merlin without a supercharger. The US often fitted Sherman tanks with radial engines a design commonly fitted to aircraft, this is what gives the Sherman it's high profile. Some Sherman's even had an engine made of 5 car engines bolted together.
The difference was the Germans were purpose building tank engines but still choosing petrol as opposed to the US and UK who were using existing designs. The USSR was really alone in it's use of diesel, they were much bigger on tanks in the pre-war era than the US and UK who's budgets were only shrinking.
The image of a burning tank is most probably due to crew sabotage on them leaving the tank or the custom of shooting a tank until it caught fire (to ensure it was knocked out), as well as the ammunition burning as the other commenter said
Long story short, the most critical feature in winning a war are the skills inherent in fighting a war: logistics, strategy and tactics. Fancy tech, be it a vehicle that can move a cannon faster than any horse (early use of automobiles on the battlefield) or a fancy new gun to give your soldiers, or even a better training regimen that teaches every sailor on a ship how to fix leaks rather than having a dedicated repair crew who the sailors call in (Battle of Midway), they're all just tools in the toolchest. You can give me all the tools a mechanic needs to fix a car, but unless you get me a mechanic, I'm not fixing your car; similarly, you can give a commander all the best tools for fighting a war, but they still need to know how to use them.
In particular in present day Afghanistan or in the past with the French and US in Vietnam, numbers, training and supplies matter a lot. "Tech" is only useful if training, supplies and repairs are available. Also, I think technology is often crowned superior in hindsight. If I was transported back in time to World War One, I'd want a lever action rifle or pump shotgun, a simple reliable revolver, and a bowie knife. All of which saw combat but were considered "antiquated" or specialized technology. The real breakthru in artillery was math, and changing the doctrine of direct fire. Today the best close air support jet is the A-10, which was designed decades ago. A "technological" advantage is only proved via hindsight and a lot of past and present day tech advantages are really something else. Great video!
Contrary to what it may seem, a revolver in muddy trenches isn't what you want. There are giant gaps around the cylinder. If mud gets in that, it's not gonna just work. Semi automatic pistols are more complicated, but by that time they were reliable enough to not be a problem. The 1911 went through US military trials with no real reliability issues, and the P08 luger has been put through mud tests and still functioned fairly well even though the same type of test. Well made bolt action rifles aren't inherently inferior to lever actions either. Maybe for trench raids, but I'd rather have a BAR than either.
@@Tinfoil_Hardhat
The 1911 is good, P08 is better per InRange mud tests. Assuming I'm American or French I probably can't have a P08 and it isn't really compatible with my other choices (lever, Bowie knife). Revolvers can be fired from inside a great coat pocket or an oiled canvas bag, so I can keep it clean. They are also much easier to clean than a P08. Check out Paul Harrell's shooting a revolver from a pocket vid. And the stopping power of a 45 revolver and 1911 are both good.
Some of this comes down to goals. An M1917 Enfield isn't bad all around but I ONLY care about trench raid defense or offense because it determines MY rate of survival. People across no man's land died from machineguns & artillery. I don't really care if I miss people them with my lever gun. The BAR looks really good on paper, but I've never seen one positively reviewed (too heavy). I'd probably prefer a stationary Lewis gun if I was assigned a machinegun. I'd prefer a BAR gun for trench defense, but it isn't ideal for hauling across no man's land AND back in the middle of the night. Especially the getting back part.
In any case, I for sure prefer Lever gun/revolver to some of the weapon combos that were issued in mass like Lebel & 32ACP pistol or a 1903 & Colt Pocket Hammerless.
I will comment that the Prussians appear to have made a conscious decision to expend their resources on superior breech loading artillery, knowing full well that the Chassepot was superior to the needle gun. As evidence of recognizing the superiority of the Chassepot, whenever possible, the Prussian infantry discarded the needle gun in favor of the French rifle. It is impossible to disentangle the superiority of Prussian artillery from the superiority of Prussian tactics, preparation and strategy in the F/P war, but going into the war with the inferior shoulder arm was a conscious choice of the allocation of resources for the Prussians, believing that their superior mobilization and modern artillery would carry the day.
Same artillery superiority nearly allowed Germans to win WWI.
It's really nice to see an historian who knows how some economic concepts play a major role on warfare. I'm not even saying anything about macro-theory or political aspects of economics (as market vs government solutions), but rather technical ones such as opportunity costs, returns to scale, allocation of labor force and transaction costs (transportation, administration, social norms, etc). I can see examples to use in intro to econ classes in the whole video.
I don't want to criticize other historians that don't take that much interest in economic reasoning and concepts on their analysis, but instead I wanted praise the awesome content that you provide for economics nerds like me, as it's rare to find. I Just met the channel and subscribed!
Greeting from Brazil!
The proper pronounciation for Chassepot is "Chass-poh". You know, French thing with missing consonants.
merci segnor
They eat the consonants...
Delicious buttered French Consonants.
omg lol
Man, it's always the French that have to correct someone's pronunciation.
THANK you so much for this one!
People tend to believe that technology works like in Civilization or Hearts of Iron. You press the button and as soon as its researched its there, ready to by used or deployed.
They talk about it as if the jet engine was build by one guy an his garage.. or whatever the topic may be.
Its good to see you summarizing it up in an understandable way. Thank you again!
Thats amazing, this style looks just beautiful. You could take some frames as wallpapers or so... Love That qualitiy and attention to detail!
Thank you for posting original German quotes along with translations as well as information sources, it makes it easier to check information sources and get a cleared picture of things. :)
More people should do this.
"French tactical doctrine was confused"
A fancy way of describing two French units trying to surrender to one another.
Forgive us, we probably got used to have whole Europe surrenduring to us in early XIXth century.
whole europe?
it wasn't even half of europe all the french conquered were loose states or countries in civil unrest
when they met the russians well that was a different story
Totalferdox you should refresh your knowledge of the era
BananaCriesSheep already holding the ground
-Pierre Dudoret Then A brilliant Frenchman discovered that by properly folding a white flag, it could fit beneath a beret, freeing the French soldier from choosing between it or his cigarettes and copies of Guide Michelin.
The rest, as we say, is history.
Specially good conclusion bringing all concepts discussed about in the video together. Great job MHV!
This video was superb. I have never seen the issue presented with such clarity and insight. And as long as I live I will never forget your observation, "yes, bean counters can win wars." I subbed a long time ago.
Thanks!
Feel free to delete comments when done with them or if you have no use for them, DM.
Thank you!
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized No trouble
Bean counters - the unsung heroes of war
Damn u for breaking my world conquest dreams over and over again
If it weren't so difficult I expect someone might have managed it by now.
If you want to conquer the world, the best way would be to acquire the United States, China, Russia, and Japan first. provided you had the logistics and administrative know-how to keep everything running smoothly up to that point, those four countries would give you the industrial capacity to fuel your army for decades, provided France doesn't wise up and nuke your factories.
Ryan Cauffman Sure! Let's start with the 3 most powerful countries first! I don't see ANYTHING wrong with that plan.
*evil laugh*
Reg Ner go big or go to gulag
Ryan Cauffman Why would you want Japan
Just a quick comments: Even if the french had a better rifle in 1870 war, their military leadership, mobilization process were terrible. Plus if we were talking about technological superiority, Krupp canons in this war were vastly superior to French artilery. Also the railway quality was also inferior on the French side.
Most French documention points toward doctrinal failure, poor military leaders and the failure of the 1867 military reform bloked by the French parliament which was meant to solve mobilization problem.
Basis is an important element. I found it interesting to see the U. S. Army spend about 20 years trying to change back to the brown rough out boot. Despite all its experience using them for years including through 2 wars..( agreeing there was some technological changes to be learned.) there were many who resisted the change just because they liked black shinny ones. They refused to see the benefits.
Even though the video takes inspiration from the military, the concepts mentioned in the video can be applied on any aspect of society (stone age and today). You have clearly explained how society works, specialize and depend on each other to produce and sustain a specific product/technology.
Let me congratulate you on an excellent video! These are the types of nuances that make our and many other topics so very interesting. Carry on!
Your BRAIN is still the deadliest weapon on the battlefield. Technological superiority is negated without the infrastructure, personnel and doctrine/tactics to effectively exploit this advantage.
Ted Fields something that the US military dont seem to master properly
@@fulcrum2951
Que vietnam
Ted Fields human intelligence is the reason we fight each other because fighting what used to be predators is now a sport or a business
10:41 MHV.exe has encountered a syntax error. Autocorrects in process.
hehe, nice one 😋
i dont get it
The text reads "avoid to avoid", so MHV cut out the audio of himself reading that portion of the text.
thanks. overlooked that one.
Great points as always! The only thing I might eventually add is that technology tends to function as a complement or supplement, rather than a replacement. There's a tendency to think in video game tech trees, where the newer always surpasses the older. Rather, they tend to complement or supplement each other.
Well its important to remember the panzer divisions didn't have good radios because both Rommel and Guderian had communication troubles during the battle of France, and continued moving even after being told to stop
I think this is another issue with people learning most they know about war from video games. Since RTS games abstract their production and organization to a ludicrous level and even games from the HoI series don't model the whole process you end up with tech-ups which give an instant buff to all your units. And the buff is usually significant enough to be the decider in most situations. And even where the research unlocks a new unit which has to be built and moved into combat the power gaps between two units in games are much greater than the small incremental power change found in real weapon system development. Thus the misconception.
This channel is getting better and better! A great video.
I like your emphasis on how technology and industry are connected. In Zero: Combat & development history of Japan's Legendary ..Zero fighter by Mikeash, Robert C. He addresses the limitations of Japan's rapid industrial development, how many industries were underdeveloped, so the chemists could design good self-sealing fuel tanks but the industry could not produce them.By contrast other elements of Japanese industry were on a par with the US and UK. Also appreciate you pointing out com tech/radios & organization and the coordination they allowed were true force multipliers. One of your best videos imho!
One thing I've noticed in history is that the West has very high expectations of technology. We tend to think it can solve problems for us which isn't always the case. This usually ends in massive casualties or other disasters. Less so in some Western countries but the US is the biggest country that does this. They invest so much into technology which isn't a problem but the expectations are so high on it's capabilities. I think this also leads to the US expecting countries to be easy to defeat when in reality it ends in disaster. Look at the Korean war against China, Korea and Vietnam. Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany. I'm sure there are many other as well.
2:58 thumbs up for the baguette broken over a pickel helmet 😄
This was definitely one of your best videos. Well done.
You touch on an important concept of technology. For the last few years I have been trying to refine the definition of technology away from what I consider an over emphasis on the concept of "tools." Technology is truly distinguished by both the tools used and how they're used. What we call a technological shift or leap is rarely present as only significantly better tool. The increase in effectiveness is almost always attributable to the evolution of better technique with new or existing tools. Therefore a technology is more of a system than an item. While this is intuitively understood on the tactical level, technology as a technique is also true on the operational and strategic level. Getting the shell from the factory and to the tank and aimed through the barrel at a target can only be considered together to analyze the effectiveness or diserability of a technology. The most common example I give people is that, with proper technical documents and skills, a single AK-47 could have probably been manufactured sometime around the late 19th century, yet that doesn't mean the technology of semiautomatic rifles was just a matter of blueprints and a skilled gunsmith. Industry needs to learn their own techniques and build their own superior tools before serial production can be considered.
Ever hear the truism, amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics?
btw, it can only be correctly understood in proper context. Otherwise, the cart gets put before the horse.
I love you using the sources and showing them in the video
The variable that screws over a lot of high tech weapons when faced with less advanced tech?
Mud... Half the time I hear about a modernized army having to abandon the use of their best tech is because it can't be made to move through muddy terrain, or has issues being used after being exposed to muddy conditions.
The advancement of the radio in World War 2 was also a contributing factor in Germany's successes against the Soviet Union since only one in 10 Red Army tanks had radios, which the Germans exploited like at the battle of Kursk and the USA didn't supply the Soviet Union with FM radios as they did with Germany.
Citation needed.
During WW2 we never supported Germany not sent any form of supplies.
We sent Britain, France, Canada and Russia (after being betrayed by Hitler) with weapons, tanks and supplies.
Not sure why we would supply our enemies with then-highend radios.
I think he meant before the war.
I believe radio was more relevant during the first years of the war, rather than the battle of Kursk, mostly because during Barbarossa, the only soviet tank capable of mounting radios was the KV.(mostly known as KV-1). However, this changed, altough the soviet radios were in poorer quality than the german ones.
USSR lack of radios (1 in 10 tanks) was a factor in 1941-42. But by mid 1942 the Brits were shipping a lot, and by 1943 the US flooded with radios - from that time until the end of the war, 60% to 80% of USSR tanks were equipped with allied radios.
So by the time of Kursk, the lack of radios were not really a factor.
(Same thing for trucks to supply - US sent a lot of reliable trucks - some served in USSR until about 1980s.....)
The problem in Russia at the time was Stalin purged his generals. The tanks the Soviets had T34 made the German tanks look like a toy. As well while the Soviets had lost 2 million men due to mismanagement by Stalin, they had 200 million more to fight.
What are your thoughts on the current state of Germany's military?
I thought making a short list about what they lack, but decided that it would be easier saying what they still have in sufficient supplies and quality: shoes and food.
Do a part two: a review of the Vietnam War & other conflicts where low tech beats high tech…
great video! keep up the good work!
This is an excellent summary study, and as usual, you've taught me something brand new. I had no idea that German tanks were limited to gasoline (petrol) by the inability of the motor manufacturers to retool their plants. Fascinating as always - please keep up the good work.
No Womble in this clip, 1/10 video at best.
Jk it`s very informative and high quality content as usually.
I have spent the last week binge watching your channel lol. I love your visuals. What software are you using? Keep up the good work
2:57 I like you used a broken baguette for the French defeat :D
10:47 Tactics are for amateurs, professionals do logistics.
Speaking of Terraria, will you be streaming it again?
I love your videos and how your mind works. Your points about doctrine and logistics are quite good.
Thank you so much for making this, way too many people who follow these misconceptions on historical forums.
I really enjoy all of your videos! I’m kind of a novice to a lot of things though, and I was wondering if there was a reference somewhere you could recommend on what force multipliers are, how they are implemented, and how they are categorized and defined? I know things like a tower allows for a smaller number of troops to cover a larger area than their numbers would indicate, but is there a comprehensive study of the different types of force multipliers, or a general set of them like having the high ground, etc.?
Animation seems different and so good. Great video man.
Gotta love the colouring in Prussians and Austrians to resemble their flags. As always, excellent video
Missing from his section on the Franco - Prussian War was that the French had muzzle loading cannons, whereas the Prussians had breech loading artillery. Furthermore the French had this mitrailleuse (? - not sure of spelling), a type of Gatlin gun. The French treated it as an artillery piece & kept it too far back. Also they didn't train the troops in how to use it. With both sides still using Napoleonic tactic of troops advancing over open ground in large "blocks", this would have really chewed them up. This guy is a damn fine Researcher & the videos really Educational & Informative.
Your videos always remind me why i study engineering.
... now i sound like a warmongerer.
Thank you for a VERY interesting piece. Technology is important, but it is not a magic bullet. A good example is the Six Day War. In technology the Egyptian military was a match for the Israelis, in practice the Israelis used their equipment much better. Thanks again for some well thought out work.
Since the 100th Anniversary of the 1918 German Spring Offensive is coming up can you make an episode of it or maybe Hutier infiltration tactics?
On the matter of the Franco-Prussian war, couldn't a technology proponent simply argue the Prussians had the technological advantage in other, more important, areas? Such as modernised artillery guns which the French neglected to develop?
Could you explain your reasoning on why artillery did not contribute heavily to the outcome of the F-P war? I agree that Prussian leadership was significantly superior, but as artillery is generally the biggest killer in war, why wouldn't having VASTLY superior artillery guns be important?
This reminds me of something I remember from a history text book about European history when the Franco Prussian War was being fought. The Prussian Field Marshal von Moltke actually led his army from his office by using telegraphs and utilizing railways to move his troops around. Of course the Prussians learned about these devices from observing the American Civil War, but they saw what worked and what didn't and they organized accordingly.
Great video, the example of technology and industry reminds me of the essay "I, Pencil" by Leonard E. Read, who highlights in entirety the complex processes for , mining, manufacturing, and labor needed to produce a seemingly simple product the pencil.
A nuanced POV. That is a bit of fresh air. Keep on with excellent work.
That misconception applies also to health tech
Another fascinating video, thank you. I learn a lot from your videos
Can u please put subtitles on your videos? Sometimes I find it difficult tor understand you. Great work thought keep it up !!:)
During the Irak-Iran war , Irak lost the war because the army was not well trained with the technology they used .
Yes, Iraq was poorly trained. But Iran at that time have some of the contemporary U.S. weapons, like the F-14.
The war was a stalemate. At the end the prewar border between them remained the same. Iran was led by Religious leaders ignorant of basic military doctrine instead of the well trained but mistrusted professional military commanders. The Iraqi army was led by party and tribal appointees. Iran had it's larger population but it's military equipment was from the West who refused to supply ammunition, spare parts and replacements. Iraq had supplies coming in and probably satellite intelligence for both the Russians and Americans. It's smaller population always meant a smaller army. Saddam Hussein would not have dared to attack the Shah's large modern well trained army backed by the USA with intelligence and resupply. He thought he saw a weak easily defeat-able enemy and he gambled with his peoples lives. None of his own sons served at the front.
With breach vs muzzle loading guns, rate of fire is commonly mentioned. Was the ability to reload from the prone position seen as a major benefit and was doctrine altered to take advantage of it?
Yet another good video. I do have a question about the French division you described. You said one lacked punch and the other was too slow. I presume the under armed one was the Cavalry divisions while the tank divisions were the slow ones. My - limited - understanding of the French Cavalry divisions was they were a versatile all arms formation that may have been better organized than the Panzer divisions.
Very excellent video. I especially liked your analysis of the Franco-Prussian. I would be very interested to see you do a video that compares general staff between the French, Prussians, and Austrians during time of the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian war.
I just love how one of the pictures of a german pickle helm breaking a baguette
From first hand experience... in 2004 in the Iraq War, we were being handed new technology at a MUCH accelerated pace, before there was doctrine or even a user manual. However, the tech itself is useless without a SOP for using it. In the US Army, we call this METTTC - Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain ,Troops and Civilians on the battlefield. It wasn't until we developed these SOPs that any of the new sights and communications gear did us any good.
I observed the same asinine idiocy during my '04/'05 tour (OIF II, the war was in '03 btw).
Too many high ranking careerists who got promoted by being dutiful glorified admin clerks with piss poor tactical sense. They latched onto anything new and lost sight of the basics and fundamentals all too often.
A more Jason Borne and less James Bond approach would have achieved much more success with much less expense imo.
Another great video. Will it ever stop?
Doctrine, maturation, and flexible production matters
I think that Japan's naval air force in WWII is a great example that highly experienced pilots in superb aircraft are not guaranteed to win in the long run. There are a few reasons for their failure but 2 of them are: 1. It takes a lot of time in the seat to make a great pilot, more than what they were able to give pilots later in the war. 2. Achilles' heel in the airplanes not having self sealing gas tanks made the planes death traps even for seasoned pilots who were hit by "lucky" shots which caused the plane to catch fire right away.
Germany's selection of sound powered telephones over telegraphs were key to their loss of control of the 1st and 2nd Armies in 1914. Telegraphs have long range, sound power phones were limited to about 60 km.
Not to mention the Anglo-Zulu war where the British severely underestimated the strength of the "savages."
Its a known fact that the end result of Battles/Wars is the culmination of all those factors mentioned in the video; having an advantage in a given area will improve your chances but neither will it dominate if the efficiency in other areas is too far behind. And with technology an important factor to consider is whether to produce highly advanced weapons which require more advanced production/special resources or to produce larger amounts of less-advanced/easily-produced types for which resources are abundant. Logistics to keep your army operational is important for long campaigns but less for short campaigns. Finding the proper balance between all areas is the key to succesful and efficient warfare. A problem with some institutionalized countries is that each branch tends to operate on its own; proper overlapping communication between the branches can ensure that their work is properly coordinated
There is some very important info here that so many people forget. The radio in particular. Since we werent there at the beginning of radio we dont know just what a revolution it caused. Just compare it to PCs and the internet. That will help you understand.
Well, you make it seem like a simple idea now that you have put it into words, but it is all very true. To use a bad comparison in modern computer games one has the choice of rushing out low-level units in high numbers vs waiting and developing more advanced units. Usually, it is a combination of the 2 that works best.
A real-world example from my own area of New Zealand is the NZ land wars. The local Maori had traded for shotguns from the Europeans so they had some arms when conflict came. Though the British brought what was the best field artillery of the times.
With 4 times the manpower the British laid siege to the Maori at a place called Ohaeawai. After 7 days of constant shelling, the British charged the fort expecting the defenders to be broken. Keep in mind the walls were made of woven flax, and the British had a position on a hillside overlooking the Pa(fort).
Much to their surprise, the British charge was cut down. While the Maori could do little to fight the artillery they could do much to dig. The thin walls mostly served to hide the trenches they had dug, and most of the shells had safely passed overhead. After the battle the Maori Warriors slipped away in the night. They had proved their point, and would prove it again.
th-cam.com/video/njmK1iGl0wc/w-d-xo.htmlm14s
you're right. technology depends on the people at the top utilising it correctly. there are many factors in successful warfare.
An ad has broken through my AdBlock? impossible!
An interesting example that illustrates your point well was an action during the Crimean war. British troops were advancing on a fording point in thick fog when they noticed suddenly a wave of Russian infantry charging at them. Officers had been trained largely with the doctrines that emerged from the Napoleonic wars and as such ordered their men to fix bayonets and charge. The men and more importantly the NCOs knew the capabilities of their weapons and disregarded the order, formed line and gave fire. This broke the Russian charge an of course saved their lives. People forget that technology is useless unless deployed effectively.
I read "Arms of the Krupps" by Manchester a few years ago, and he said that the Franco-Prussian war WAS won by superior technology. But while you focused on the infantry guns, he focused on artillery, saying that basically, the French guns were useless because the Krupp artillery prevented the French from ever getting near the Prussians. If true, That does not completely invalidate what you say about that, because he also allows for the mistake the French made in not pushing for closer encounters more aggressively, but still, I think it's something worth mentioning.
can you please make a video on military logistics and supply chains
and talk about the supply train (ho chi Minh) in the Vietnam war
Well this was a bit of a surprise for me, as I have for the last 20 years heard a lot about the German mortars, that they were good ('best' is of course quite subjective and contextbased for something as simple as a mortar), employed effectively and were probably the greatest killer of Allied troops.
Now that is not necessarily in opposition to a lesser focus on those weapons (that just means they did well with those mortars they did have, or that those they had just had a higher impact than other weapons even if not used supremely well), but it does come as somewhat of a surprise to me. Especially with the infamous lack of artillery shells the big guns suffered later on.
But to say that Germany wasn't known for their mortars I would argue is a wrong statement. What they were known for doesn't have to line up with what they had a specific focus on, and in this case I feel that it might apply quite well.
Since I haven't actually seen anyone go beyond overview, this might be a subject worth investing in?
Actually, the Germans WERE severely lacking in the area of mortars. Unlike the American, British, and Soviet Armies (and for that matter, the Japanese) during World War Two, the Germans never developed and deployed in large numbers small Company level mortars. They did have a small (50mm?) mortar, but it was not issued nor deployed in very large numbers.
The 8cm mortar was a good weapon and very effectively used, though it also frequently wasnt supplied with enough ammunition. However, neither the germans(until they copied it) nor the western allies had a match for the outstanding 12cm mortar of the soviets.
However, the Americans at least didn't need something similar to the Soviet 120mm because their Divisional Artillery was some of the best. Soviet artillery on the other hand was certainly lacking, and so Soviet Commanders were forced to use their own mortars, so it was fortunate that the Soviets had very good mortars.
For an in depth comparison of German, American, and Soviet tank "technology" in World War II that greatly expands on this MHV in a specific area, this video from the 26 minute point is excellent. th-cam.com/video/N6xLMUifbxQ/w-d-xo.htmlm13s Jonathan Parshall is best known for covering the WWII Imperial Japanese Navy (e.g. "Shattered Sword"), but he also looks a lot at the Allied vs. Axis economics of World War II. This video may give you a new appreciation for the Sherman tank's underlying chassis, if not the M4 itself. MHV has done an excellent overview of this general subject matter. However, he might have mentioned that a significant problem for Germany's tank factories was they and their suppliers were frequently disrupted by Allied strategic bombing. Look up the impact of strategic bombing on Tiger II tank production.
One thing about tank production that should perhaps be identified is standardization. A foreign member of one of the allied nations (I think Britain, but am not completely sure) visited an American Tank Factory during the Second World War, and he noted that there were no vises anywhere near where the tanks were being assembled. That was because the Americans had standardization down to a science, and so therefore the lack of vises meant that there was no need to modify parts before emplacing them on the actual tank. (This comes from a TH-cam Video by the Chieftain by the way). On the other hand, German tanks were almost assembled like watches, with very little, if any standardization, and almost every part being specifically modified for the place and tank it is to go in. That is why the Americans built 53,000 Sherman Tanks, along with a whole bunch of numerous tanks and TD's, and why the Germans only were able to produce around 5,000 tanks or thereabouts, total. And while I may be wrong with regard to German tank production, it was swamped by the numbers the Americans built.
If you watch Jonathan Parshall's part of that Battle of Kursk video I pointed out above, The Chieftain himself appears in the audience next to a man who asks a question during the Q&A session. Standardization was crucial. As a former US Army logistics trained officer, I shudder at what my German counterparts faced in WWII. Instead of a highly standard hull with a variety of turrets and guns (everything from the M3 Grant/Lee to the M107 Priest and M36 Jackson), a German logistician was juggling parts books of likely thousands of pages with Panzer I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and Panzer 35t and 38t hulls, not to mention so many captured and often converted hulls. The Germans adapted hundreds and thousands of captured French, British, American, Italian, and Soviet AFVs. It's little wonder Shermans could provide 95 percent uptime while 50 to 70 percent was routine for German AFVs. ("Herr Hauptmann, we are waiting for the team to bring back some bogies from a wrecked Panzer III we saw 50 miles back so it can be mounted on our StuG III sitting in the maintenance tent.")
It is in this Kursk video that Parshall makes a very convincing case that the Soviets may have been the absolute best at producing war winning tanks. They had far fewer coal and iron resources than Germany, much less Germany after it had conquered Alsace-Lorraine, secured the Swedish iron ore supplies across a Baltic "lake", and so on. Yet, the Soviets "punched far above their weight class" in manufacturing American volumes of AFV's, rather than British or German volumes (80,000 versus 30,000 for the British and Germans). Essentially, the Americans and Soviets were cranking out highly standardized AFV's like Henry Ford had produced the Model T in large batches with no deviations until the next "block". The German approach did not use conveyor belts, had few machine tools or standardization of models or parts, and practically crafted each AFV uniquely.
Anyone who has the slightest knowledge of WWII tanks has heard of the fearsome Tiger tank with its 88mm cannon and thick armor. Try to see how many have heard of an Allied AFV with a 90mm cannon and plenty of speed. The Germans built exactly 1347 Tiger I tanks while the USA built 2324 Jackson M36 tank destroyers. There were almost 1000 more M36's than Tigers and virtually all the M36's would serve in the West while Tigers were divided between the Western and Eastern Fronts. With the correct HVAP ammo, 76mm armed Shermans and assorted Allied tank destroyers (M10, M1A1, M18, M36) could penetrate the armor of virtually any German tank at reasonable combat range. An interesting laboratory to consider for WWII tanks is the first year of the Korean War where the best Shermans (M4A3E8 "Easy Eight") met the best T-34 (T-34/85).
Samuel Thompson this is from mathew coopers book. the german army 12933-1945 page 487.In November 1943 army group south had 977 tanks.only 288 were fit for action.that was because they didnt have the spare parts to repair them.
_On the other hand, German tanks were almost assembled like watches, with very little, if any standardization, and almost every part being specifically modified for the place and tank it is to go in_
I am not so sure about this. If there was no standarization, how could maintenance units in the front lines mount spare parts?
I think Parshall exaggerates somewhat to make his point. Contrast the Willow Run Bomber Plant in Michigan with the Tiger tank plant he covers. At Willow Run, a huge machine tool created absolutely standardized wing panels for the B-24 Liberator that did not require any "shimmying" to slot them into their adjoining parts. Multiply this by all the other special purpose machine tools used in American assembly line style factories, and you see real contrast and a ready supply of highly standardized spare parts. At its peak, a new B-24 rolled out of Willow Run every 45 MINUTES. For the German factories, there were far fewer specialized machine tools, so craftsmen had to scrape off a bit here, flatten a bit there, to get parts to fit together. Factor in that 20 tanks on the line might be subject to five slightly different construction plans. ("Change the turret rotation handle for the next five, Hans. Herr Oberst from the Waffenamt said Tiger operators from the 504th Independent Heavy Tank Battalion prefer that handle to be bent another 30 degrees counterclockwise. He also has some changes for the next 10 tanks after we get those five out of here.") If you add in that extremely specialized machine tools could be damaged or destroyed by Allied heavy bombers, and you can see some of the reasons the Germans were less reliant on highly standardized parts and less able to produce them.
As for the maintenance units in the front lines, Allied and German alike, they had mobile shop vehicles with lathes, vises, grinders, welders, and so on. If parts came from the factory for a Panzer IV Ausf G and you had a Panzer IV Ausf F to repair, you bent, heated, and ground that Ausf G part until it fit your Ausf F tank. That is, if you couldn't exchange the Ausf G part with a nearby maintenance shop for the correct part. Ask me how I know...
Here is a video of the improvised hedgerow cutters that accelerated the Allied breakout from the bocage country in 1944. God Bless the maintenance crews. th-cam.com/video/iWxt7b2zXtY/w-d-xo.html
Speaking of the WW2 German infantry gun's use being perpetuated for the benefit of special interests, that was a common theme in Germany as different factions vied for funding and power. In OKW, different arms of the army kept jockeying for funding. Artillery officers kept pushing for the obsolete 37mm PaK 36 to keep being produced so that funding wouldn't be absorbed by assault guns and tank destroyers, which were considered tanks and took away influence from the artillery generals.
Completely agree, MHV. People tend to focus on comparing technology on a vacuum, in a 1v1 situation (what is better, a Sherman, a Panzer IV or a T-34?) And I can understand why they do so: because equipment specifications are more or less concrete numbers, and being measured in absoulte values, it is easier to weight and compare them. And it is one of the few aspects of war that can measured in such a way, because morale, propaganda, doctrine, logistics, etc, are very hard to judge by comparison. I believe that is why 1v1 tank "jousts" are so popular: a "winner" can be easily determined (nevermind that the result is flaw, becuase doesn´t account for the entire context)
The only thing I would not agree is your example of smoothbore musket vs needle gun vs _Chassepot_. The _Chassepot_ does not represent a great leap forward for the French when compared to Austro-German engagements. The French rifle is much closer to the German one than the German one is to the Austrian. To put it in another comparison, if the Dreyse needle gun is a Panzer II, then the _Chassepot_ is a T-26S. The Austrian musket would be a truck with a couple of soldiers armed with Mausers loaded with K bullets.
Very interesting video, thanks!
Hello, great channel and very good video (very good explanation on this rather tricky subject).
I have one question regarding one of your examples: ww2 german army and mortars/infantry guns. As far as I`m aware the German army have and used mortars the same way and in same proportions as a main infantry support weapon on platoon/company and battalion level as any other major army from the same period. The infantry guns you are referring to were regimental guns (one company per regiment, at least according to organization tables) and were additional tool to the mortars, used on lower levels (so, where the main infantry "work" was done). In the beginning of the war they have the same types of mortars as everyone else (more or less): light 50 mm as platoon/company organic support and 81 mm as company/battalion level organic support weapon. In fact, almost all other major armies have somewhat similar regimental artillery, although the guns were different (almost all on this level have 70+mm guns or light howitzers and not anything heavier (at this level)).
So, I think that this kind of support weapons have somewhat different place and role from the mortars (at least, in the beginning/first period of ww2): they were for direct fire support (role that can`t be executed by mortars), when needed or in any case as a additional support tool on the next level (to be used as a hole on regimental level or to be distributed as reinforcement on lower levels when needed). There were some uniqueness in german regimental artillery - they have a 150 mm infantry guns (a rather powerful tool). I suppose that there is some concurrence between german infantry guns and mortars in some technical sense (the german infantry guns can be fired in very high trajectory - like mortars, which was probably redundant), but I don`t think that the infantry guns were substitute for mortars. At least, in the beginning or the war.
I think that in later stages there were some disappointment whit light mortars (50 mm ones) and to some extend they were try to replace them with lighter version of 81 mm mortars (at the sane platoon/company level), but on the other hand, the infantry guns were too changed (the new 75 mm type of infantry gun) to e more suitable for anti-tank role in latter stages of the war. And, in the same time, I think that I have read that their infantry highly valued mortars and used them extensively. They have copied the soviet heavy mortar (120 mm) as a battalion/regimental support weapon in 1942 and latter used it extensively.
So, to summarize, the infantry guns were not, IMHO, some sort of substitute for mortars: they have different role and place as an infantry "tool".
Do you know how many german mortar positions I destroyed in CoD2? Many
Another key problem with relying too much on technology is that effective counter measures are often way cheaper to obtain: WWI tanks are a good example: even though the Germans were practically unable to assemble an effective armored force of their own, they were able to counter the british technological innovations mostly by innovating tactically:using small pieces of artillery as anti-tank guns, or just digging wide enough trenches that the tanks couldn`t easily cross them.