Transcendental Solipsism | Felipe Bautista

📚 The above amounts to a rigorous philosophical demonstration that transcendental solipsism-as distinct from metaphysical solipsism-is necessarily apodeictic. While metaphysical solipsism remains eternally problematic, transcendental solipsism follows necessarily from the very nature of mind and representation.
This comprehensive analysis shows how the mind can never transcend its own sphere of immanent representations. Any attempt to conceive of such transcendence would itself be an immanent representation, revealing the self-contradictory nature of denying transcendental solipsism.
🔍 Key Points Demonstrated:
The crucial distinction between metaphysical and transcendental solipsism
Why transcendental solipsism is apodeictic while metaphysical solipsism remains problematic
How appeals to intersubjective agreement constitute an appeal to the stone
Why any mental content whatsoever must be an immanent representation
The relationship between transcendental solipsism and Kant’s transcendental illusion
The compatibility between transcendental solipsism and practical reason’s regulative ideas
💭 This analysis reveals how the very concept of mind transcending its sphere of immanent representations is necessarily self-contradictory. Even our awareness of this necessity is itself an immanent representation, demonstrating the inescapable nature of transcendental solipsism.
🎓 Whether you’re interested in epistemology, consciousness, the limits of knowledge, or the nature of mind, this analysis provides crucial insights into why certain philosophical truths are necessary while others must remain perpetually undecidable.
“To begin with the senses, ’tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu’d existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation.”-David Hume
📚 For further reading:
Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”
Hume’s “Treatise of Human Nature”
Hume’s “Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding”
Berkeley’s “Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision”
Zhuangzi
#Philosophy #Epistemology #Solipsism #ConsciousnessStudies #KantsPhilosophy #CriticalPhilosophy #Philosophy101 #PhilosophicalAnalysis #Metaphysics #ConsciousnessStudies #PhilosophyTube #PhilosophyExplained #DeepThinking #PhilosophicalCritique #KantianPhilosophy #PhilosophyDebate #PhilosophicalThinking #AcademicPhilosophy #TranscendentalPhilosophy #MindAndConsciousness
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[@OokwaYikmagwa]

Your philosophy sounds like Fichte’s.

[@OuroboricIdealism]

@@OokwaYikmagwa Thank you for leaving a comment. It is true that Fichte, Kant, and German Idealism as a whole has had a tremendous influence on me (I will not deny it).

[@OokwaYikmagwa]

@ You’re welcome. Good for you. In my case it’s been Schopenhauer.

[@OuroboricIdealism]

@@OokwaYikmagwa That’s awesome. I will confess that Schopenhauer has also had a major influence on me. In fact, there was a period of time (about two or three years ago) when I went practically a whole year dedicated basically only to studying Schopenhauer’s philosophy. I’m happy to hear that Schopenhauer’s philosophy has had such an influence on you (as I regard Schopenhauer as one of the major figures in the history of Western thought).

[@federicaviero4376]

Within the context of "mind cannot transcend its sphere of inner represetations" how do you know that such solipsistic mind is "you"? What does "my mind" even mean in this context, without any certainty about the existence of any other minds?

[@OuroboricIdealism]

@federicaviero4376 There actually is a reply to your question already in the above video itself: namely, in the “Obiter dictum” section where reference is made to “one’s attaining the express awareness that one’s identity is not essentially some empirical entity (e.g., a man, a butterfly, etc.) but that one essentially is a mind that happens to be representing (or, for lack of a better term, ‘dreaming’) itself in this or that empirical situation”; subject-object identity, that is.
Thank you for sharing a comment.

[@federicaviero4376]

@@OuroboricIdealism Thanks for your reply. Have you written about the sense/meaning of one's existence from the perspective of this philosophical outlook? More practically: what is it that rules/should rule life conduct, and is moral life represented in any way?

[@OuroboricIdealism]

​@@federicaviero4376
Thank you for your follow-up question-and, yes, I have actually written about practical implications. As I upload more content, I will be sure to include content which references practical implications. To say a little bit about it now, however, I take a lot of inspiration from Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre and his emphasis on human freedom there: “Fichte’s concept of the self-positing self goes beyond Locke, Hume, and Kant by conceiving of the self as nothing more than the product of its free activity” (Beiser, German Idealism, Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 282).