A Primer to Competitive Electricity Markets: Smart Markets for a Smart Grid

Speaker/Performer: Shmuel Oren, UC Berkeley
Sponsor: CITRIS (Ctr for Info Technology Research in the Interest of Society)
Part of the Spring 2011 i4Energy Seminar Series. Live broadcast at mms://media.citris.berkeley.edu/webcast. Questions can be sent via Yahoo IM to username: citrisevents. All talks may be viewed on our TH-cam channel
The schedule for the spring i4energy series is at www.citris-uc.org/events/i4ene....
Webviewing at UC Davis: 2022 Academic Surge Building
Webviewing at UC Merced: SE1 100
Webviewing at UC Santa Cruz: SOE E2 Building, Room 506
Abstract:
About 70% of electric energy consumed in the US is being supplied through regional transmission organizations managed by nonprofit independent system operators (ISO) regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The ISOs control the transmission grid and operate wholesale electricity markets through which energy, ancillary services and transmission rights are being procured. These markets are auction-based "smart markets" where procurement quantities and clearing prices are being determined by sophisticated optimization algorithms. This talk will provide an overview of the underlying methodology and scope of these markets and the risk management implications for market participants. I will also discuss the emerging challenges and opportunities for such markets presented by renewables penetration and the proliferation of smart grid technologies.

[@inklipMedia]

A nice look at the energy market complexity under the hood of, for example, the crazy energy trading engine that was ENRON.

[@martinlinskey]

I'd like to hear Shmuel's take on the NYISO auction market logic...

[@ramgopallageju8449]

excellent

[@flowewritharoma]

good vid!

[@GlobalLeon]

Hi, can we find the powerpoint deck somewhere? Very interesting presentation

[@inklipMedia]

On limits of computing power / safe limits on efficiencies from computing power vs. raw simple-switched grid capacity:
- Suppose someone sabotages the computing system either with a virus/software intervention, intercepting and corrupting data inputs to the system, or by compromising the compututational system itself (physical or chip-level sabatage), or data network interruption. At what capacity would simple trading and power switching systems then be able to operate? How much 100% reliable, 100% non-gamed, 100% command-controlled generation capacity, demand-response, and power switching / routing capacity is there left when all the complicated trading and data systems fail? What would it take to cause such a failure (how likely is it)? Given this, shouldn't some margin of safety be established such that the dumb, command-based model of operation could still provide basic 4-hour rolling-black-out every 24-hour period level service, to all customers?