Meade and Lee After Gettysburg: The Forgotten Final Stage of the Gettysburg Campaign

Contrary to popular belief, the Gettysburg Campaign did not end at the banks of the Potomac on July 14, but deep in central Virginia two weeks later along the line of the Rappahannock. Once Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia slipped across the swollen Potomac back to Virginia the Lincoln administration pressed George Meade to cross quickly in pursuit-and he did. Rather than follow in Lee’s wake, however, Meade moved south on the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains hoping for a chance to capture the strategic gaps penetrating the high wooded terrain and trap Lee in the northern reaches of the Shenandoah Valley where the Federals might spark the potentially decisive victory that had eluded Union arms north of the Potomac.
The two weeks that followed was a grand chess match between Meade and Lee, both of who were operating without firm intelligence on their enemy’s movements and maneuvering with armies mauled by Gettysburg. Lee had to get his army through the mountains back to central Virginia in order to shield Richmond. Meade needed to stop him. The ensuing two weeks of hard marching, cavalry combats, heavy skirmishing, and set-piece fighting threatened to escalate into a major engagement with the potential to end the war in the Eastern Theater. Throughout, two things remained clear: Union soldiers from private to general continued to fear the lethality of Lee’s army and the Gettysburg Campaign was far from over.
Jeffrey William Hunt is Director of the Texas Military Forces Museum, the official museum of the Texas National Guard in Austin, TX and an adjunct professor of History at Austin Community College. He had also served as the Curator of Collections and Director of the Living History Program at the Admiral Nimitz National Museum of the Pacific War in Fredericksburg, TX, and is the author of The Last Battle of the Civil War: Palmetto Ranch.
Copies of Mr. Hunt's book can be purchased here:
www.savasbeatie.com/meade-and...

[@johnwayneeverett6263]

THANK YOU FOR THIS HISTORY .....GREAT. THANK YOU, GUYS,.

[@JeagerTank]

So sad I missed you guys due to your closure. I was in Gettysburg the couple days enjoying the duck weather. Maybe next time.

[@edwardstoner9967]

Excellent maps!

[@lawrencemyers3623]

Great presentation as I know nothing about what happened in the weeks following Falling Waters.
Guess I'll have to get Mr. Hunt's trilogy. Thanks for posting.

[@mykofreder1682]

Lee had to force march back across the river or face the real possibility his bridge and supply line would be cut. Meade did not have to do anything with his worn out troops who were depleted and had not slept or ate properly for days. He probably did not have more than a reserve division that could march and fight. I suspect he had no more than half his force when he followed the river and met Lee's prepared divisions, any charges would have been no more successful than Pickett. He could have gone to the other side and cut him off there but he was not prepared for that and there are plenty of Confederates on the other side of the river. Unless they are prepared day on July 5 or 6th, they probably could have done it, but took the easy route on their side of the river and lost that option. The whole plan with half troops depended on Lee being slow in his retreated, so they either beat him to the crossing or getting across the river in force before he finished his bridge. None of this happened and going into a major battle against prepared forces in some on the fly effort would have been a disaster, they seemed to have done their due diligence and there should be no second guessing. A lot of people see armies on a map and move them around like some war game, after the biggest battle in the US at that time that is not a real situation.

[@savanahmclary4465]

John Mosby was waiting for Lee South of the River.

[@noelp4916]

Thank you, Excellent. 🇦🇺

[@ginamaria2579]

Coming to Gettysburg for Spring break 🤗 so excited .

[@scottnorvell2955]

Fascinating!

[@avenaoat]

Washington was not in danger. Why did not Halleck send minimum 1 infantry division with strong artillery to help Meade's cavalry at the Potomac river? Lee should have fought hard for the riverhead.

[@The_PaleHorseman]

In wars this happens, this is a big one and in WW2 after Paris is liberated, there's a void and it's straight to the battle of the bulge but what many don't realize is the Battle of the Hurtgen Forrest was going on. I hate that historians do that. All parts are important.

[@civilwarwildwest]

31:43 Is he saying there was a Third Battle of Manassas??? I'll bite. It's fascinating stuff!

[@mindbomb9341]

Was this Kelley's force as "tactically insignificant" as the command of the Susquehanna under Darius Couch? Could these guys actually fight? Or was it a rabble of poor militia who would stand for 10 minutes in a fight and run?

[@marknewton6984]

Meade did not follow through. Probably a good move.

[@ginamaria2579]

Can these books be purchased on audio ?

[@keithkuhn6404]

Any relation to Gen. Hunt?

[@marcsheinberg6487]

Yes, but cavalry and horse artillery would be speedier

[@savanahmclary4465]

Gettysburg is the saddest place in America. Over 53,000 Americans died
FOR NO REASON.

[@jeffclark7888]

Please stop saying, “going forward” and “moving forward”.