Abortion - Don Marquis (1996)
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 10 ก.พ. 2024
- Don Marquis discusses the moral issue of abortion on the basis of his account of the wrongness of killing with host Hugh LaFollette in a 1996 radio program called "Ideas and Issues" from WETS-FM.
#philosophy #ethics #abortion
This is a long comment focusing on one objection that's raised in this interview that Marquis responses to that, I think, undermines his overall argument.
There seems to be an arbitrary line that Marquis is drawing here about what qualifies as a “definite individual.” Why is the line drawn at conception? What's underpinning this difference?
He says that sperm and eggs aren't individuals because we can't point to a definite individual that has a future like ours. On the other hand, a fertilized egg is a definite individual that does have a future like ours. What makes it the case the X egg pre-fertilization makes it a non-definite non-individual that fertilized X egg IS a definite individual?
In reading a part of "Why Abortion is Immoral," he considers all the possible ways that sperm and eggs are possible candidates for individuals subject to harm. There are millions of possible combinations that sperm can have to an egg. Given that there are just too many ways that sperm and eggs pre-fertilization can combine, there isn't any ONE definite individual that is actual that deprives sperm and eggs of a future like ours. It's one definite individual because it's "actual" and not simply "possible" that there is a subject of harm.
Firstly, it seems as if "actuality" is being used here where the only threshold to meet the definition is simply ONE specific combination of reproductive human biological life at a certain state and discarding the parts of a combination that's disqualified by the definition. That is, parts of Y, a state of reproductive biological life, are possibilities to the overall combination of Y, a different state of reproductive biological life. Yet, those parts are just a previous state of reproductive human biological life and independently exist before Y. The individual parts of Y can be identifiable as a reproductive state of before Y that’s different from the overall state of Y. Given these parts are identifiable, wouldn't it be the case, just like Y, they are subject to harm in exactly the same way as Y? This is arbitrary because both states are, in fact, identifiable in the same way even if they differ in terms of composition. Take the following case.
1. A given X egg is human biological life
2. X has a biological function of reproduction
3. X egg being prevented from its biological function of reproduction deprives it from a future state of human biological life.
4. Therefore, X egg is subject to harm if (3) it's not able to fulfill its biological function of reproduction.
X, not being a part of Y, is a definite subject of harm given it isn't able to fulfill its biological function of reproduction.
There are definite eggs and definite sperm, however many of them there are, that count as reproductive human biological life. In his paper, he says that pointing to any possible sperm, eggs, or any combinations of both isn’t pointing to any actual individuals. Yet, one can point to an egg and apply this as one ACTUAL, not just possible, definite individual that’s a subject of harm if it’s not fertilized. Given that it could be fertilized with a number of different sperm, doesn’t make it’s individuation arbitrary when a given X egg is individuated as a certain state just like Y fertilized egg is individuated. An egg doesn’t have special status when fertilized that a non-fertilized egg doesn’t if the standard is that 'actual' or 'definite' is identifiable by individuation. The same is true in the case of sperm.
Also, my argument don’t comment a fallacy of division given what is actual is definite to a given scope of reproductive biological human life. Sperm and eggs aren't fertilized eggs and sperm and eggs aren't fetuses. Nevertheless, they fall under the scope of reproductive biological life that I think Marquis is arbitrarily drawing a line by defining that only a certain state of reproductive biological life count as definite individuals while other states don't fit that description because there are just too many individuals, even if you can individuate them, that disqualifies it as reproductive biological life subject to harm by deprivation.
Secondly, in the interview he unclearly states, and doesn't explain (this is a construction of what I think he means), that human biological life in cases of sperm and eggs aren't subject to harm if they depend on actions that are taken. So, in the case of an egg there are actions that are taken, that result in not being fertilized, that makes it a non-individual that isn't subject to harm. There is an action that prevents this human biological life from achieving its biological function of reproduction. Yet, this applies to fertilized eggs too. There are actions that can be taken that prevent or realize reproductive human biological life into developing into a different state of reproductive human biological life. Diet, exercise, stress level, and all other environmental and biological variables depend on actions taken or avoided that prevent the actualization of a future state of reproductive human biological life that is, similar but not identical to sperm and eggs, that makes it the subject of harm. These are different actions that are taken that prevent or nurture human biological life in different ways, but human biological life in all its different states, from eggs, sperm, fertilized eggs, and fetuses, nevertheless depend on actions for their capacity to achieve a different state of reproductive human biological life. If actions after a given point of reproductive human life produce harm, it seems that harm would also be done at a previous time regardless of the state of reproductive human life. It's harm to a different state, but nonetheless harm that is done given different actions.
Do actions only have moral significance for some states of reproductive biological human life that don't have moral significance for others? Marquis might respond that actions affect the moral status of fertilized eggs or fetuses, but that there is already a definite individual that is harmed by this actions and the eggs and sperm aren't harmed due to there being no definite individual in either case. If so, his account of actions collapses into his definition of what counts as definite individuals, which falls back to my first point.
I think the consequence of Marquis' argument applies to all reproductive human biological life, where there isn't just ONE definite individual subject to harm, but MANY definite individuals. Any given egg or sperm is being deprived of a future like ours if they don't result in their biological end of producing a fetus coming to term. If that the case, it's too far reaching (where masturbation for biological males and menstruation for biological females is morally impermissible) and fails to capture and differentiating the moral status of fetuses from other reproductive human biological life that makes abortion either morally permissible or impermissible.
"If a biologically different being lands on your front lawn, we would think it's wrong," says that while looking at a burger
We can use all the verbal gymnastics that our vocabulary allows to one's abortion proclivity, but it's also too simple to fathom why abortion is wrong, cause the reason you and me can be Pro or Anti abortionists is that our mothers din't do it us
The fetus isn't and has never been conscious, it radically alters its mother's body and life, and we as a society put it on a moral level well below a newborn. This is probably because fetuses die quite often, while infant mortality has decreased dramatically. I know norms do not factor into this argument, but I just want to point out the obvious. We don't care about even late fetuses as much as we care about newborns
Human cancer cell cultures are not "human". Basic confusion of the one and the many, whole and part
Composition fallacy.
They must be to the extent that you label them as human cancer cells and not non-human ones. There is in fact an aspect of humanness here.
@PonyPhuckcast you are equivocating on the term human here. Actually you are just misusing the term. The point is obvious, and might be clearer if you say this:
"A human cancer cell culture is a human"
This sentence actually needs to hold for the point being made to work. And this sentence is obviously ridiculous
@@PonyPhuckcast another way to show the problem: they are not human to the extent that you label them cancer cells.
I mean this is silly. Are we pretending we cannot differentiate btwn a fetus and a tumor? Ofc we can, thats why we have different words for them
Moot point, as cancer cells aren't, and can never be, destined for a "future like ours".
I think his counter to the objection that sperm or eggs have a future is weak. He’s dancing around a metaphysical question, it seems to me, of when the human comes into existence. And he seems to assume that the human comes into existence at conception, which I think is really questionable. See Kingma. I think Kingma makes persuasive case that the human does not come into being until birth. It’s at that moment that the future of the baby should be considered.
Well part of the replication strategy Human DNA evolved is at some point not being birthed and instead being in a womb so you're drawing arbitrary lines.
I agree that it is a hard problem, but you do have to draw a line somewhere. I think say 3-4 months after conception seems good to me. Of course, it is a bit arbitrary--- but just as arbitrary as picking 18 years to be a legal adult for instance (it'd be ridiculous to think that something magical happens at midnight on our 18th birthday, and yet a trial for a minor is different from that of an adult).
I think for example that if somebody kills a pregnant woman (>= 3-4 months into pregnancy), he should get a sentence equivalent to killing 2 humans, not just one! The fact that the baby hasn't experienced birth yet seems irrelevant to me.
The birth issue seems weak as well, although for different reasons. Say a baby is programmed to be born through a c-section. The day before, the baby "has not come into being"? Seems absurd.
Conception is too early, birth is too late, I think you need to pick something in between, knowing it is somewhat arbitrary but being honest about it and moving on.
100% agree he is just pushing the metaphysical question of valuable life into the metaphysical question of having a future. His argument brings us no closer to answering the question.
Disagree with you about birth instinctively though. Would be interested in a full reference for the argument you mention.
its actully a non question, because Sperm and Eggs are Haploid cells, they are not full genetic self replicating organisms when left unhindered continue on. So comparing a sperm or egg to Zygote is like comparing raw cocoa powder to milk choclate.
@@allthingsgardencad9726 except nothing in his argument depends on full self replicating anything.
The relevant question on his reframing is whether something has a valuable future. Which to my mind is no more obvious than whether it is a moral patient. ‘Thing’, ‘future’ and ‘valuable’ are not as easy to define as they might first seem. They certainly aren’t at all obviously equivalent to self replicating genetics.
Her body her choice.
Institutional misogyny is real.
Oh look!
Here some now!
It's not her body. Come up with an argument instead of accusations of blasphemy.
@@joaorobalo7594 About this “not her body” do you own this woman as a slave?
Explain.
@@spherence What? What are you talking about? The fetus is not her body.
@@joaorobalo7594 is your kidneys part of your body or can I take them?
Asking for a friend.
Sir, what you have is misogynistic thoughts.
Try dating men.
Do men smell good to you?