Was Operation Market Garden Doomed to Fail? | James Holland & Al Murray | WW2 Walking The Ground
ฝัง
- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 14 ธ.ค. 2024
- After a day walking World War Two battlegrounds at Grave, Heuman and Nijmegen, historians James Holland and Al Murray discuss why Operation Market Garden failed over strong Dutch pints at the Blue Hand Tavern. Was Market Garden essentially a flawed plan or could it actually have succeeded? ✅ SUBSCRIBE / @ww2walkingtheground " World War Two historians
Note to viewers: This video looks and sounds different to other Walking the Ground episodes because it was filmed on backup equipment.
Popular episodes from the Operation Market Garden series that you might have missed!
• Battle for Nijmegen: D...
• 82nd Airborne's Most S...
• The Vital Fight to Sec...
• James Holland & Al Mur...
Watch the first series of WW2 Walking the Ground in Normandy here: • Season 1 | D-Day and t...
#ww2walkingtheground #operationmarketgarden #nijmegen #bridgetoofar #82ndairborne #jamesholland #almurray #almurrayarnhem #arnhem #arnhem80th #xxxcorps #battlefieldinsights #xxxcorps #waalrivercrossing #whydidmarketgardenfail
If you are enjoying walking the ground with Jim and Al, please do like our videos and subscribe to the channel. We are so appreciative of all the comments and support. As you were 🫡
It is called ‘the blue hand’ (de blaauwe hand) cause back in the day they used to make cloth in indigo! All the workers that came in for a pint had blue hands. It’s written on e plaque in the arch to the church.
This is literally how I spend my evenings in the pub with my mates about this operation!!!! Top series guys👍👍👍
Absolutely love this series . Heavy subject matter , light banter without undermining the men who suffered so much .Really informative and in depth without giving brain ache . Wonderful . :)
Thank you Adrian. This is exactly what we aimed for with the series. We never forget the sacrifices and bravery of these men whilst keeping their stories alive.
Couldn’t agree more…
I'm walking the ground at the moment with the help of these videos and the maps in "Arnhem Black Tuesday". I went to the Airborne At The Bridge museum, then Oosterbeek War Cemetery for the Remembrance Sunday Service, and after that the Hartenstein Museum. Tomorrow it'll be Son, Gravy (!) and Nijimegen bridges, with a pint at the Blaawe Hand to finish.
Oh and the ladies at the Hartenstein are going to get their book buyer to look into getting some copies of "Arnhem Black Tuesday" on sale! Now about that commission... 😉
@@enright13 THANK YOU!
Nice to see our boys doing us proud. A beer each in around 15 minutes despite all that chatting.
So we're on pace for four beers an hour. Outstanding!
Just don't try that with anything near 8%
Tabletop exercises down the pub should be THE method for teaching history. Another great episode, Gents. Thanks for all you are doing to keep the stories alive.
It’s a stunningly brilliant yet simple concept - walk the battlefield ! But when told by 2 blokes who not only know their subject inside out but are also clearly good friends, it’s utterly brilliant. I love all the knowledgable insights and map views and how they correspond to observations on the ground. It’s just a shame I have to wait a week between each episode.
James Holland and Al Murray are fantastic. I hope James Holland write a book about operation Market Garden and the Arnhem book from Al Murray is great.
Living in the area I've grown up with all the stories of Market Garden. It's wonderful to see you make this series. I think your observations are refreshing. These are things I and many people who live here have talked about for a long time. It just seems that there are many historians who live far away are making observations solely based on maps and reports etc. Actually walking the grounds and matching the stories to the locations gives such valuable insights.
Nothing beats walking the ground… thanks for allowing us to tag along
Fellas, what can I say? I've thoroughly enjoyed both the Normandy episodes and the Dutch ones. Incredibly informative, done with great knowledge, passion, enthusiasm, and humour. But above all, respect for those who were there and fighting towards the goal of Berlin. I've another trip planned for both areas next year, and along with the books you've mentioned ( yep, got yours al, as well as some of james) it's going to be far more meaningful. Thankyou guys, just brilliant. More please!
@@pauljane3323 Thanks very much Paul.
“He’s Jumpin’ Jim Gavin not Walkin’ Jim Gavin!” Bloody brilliant as always.
Great stuff, lads. After Arnhem, not too mention the Americans getting bogged down at Metz and the Hurtgen Forest, I think the Allies realised the Germans were no longer retreating.
I wish my dad were around. He joined the Paras as an 18 year old in 1944. Brilliant series, thank you.
Was able to many, many years ago to have a Market Garden Tour. Loved it very much.
You mentioned the bombing of Nijmegen. My great grandfather was there when it happened. He had cycled from his home in Leur to Nijmegen to take the train to Arnhem when the bombers flew over and started bombing the city. He and others took refuge under the train. He was near the back of the train. The front of the train was hit, but luckily he made it out alive. After the bombing he had to move through many dead people to get to his bicycle to be able to get home again. He came home covered in blood, to the horror of my grandmother.
Thank you for sharing this reminder of the horrors faced by citizens. We found the photos of bombed out Nijmegen so hard square with the calm, elegance of the city today.
Nothing like walking the ground and, at the same time, discussing all the issues to get a feel for the fighting. Thanks
I think like Jim and Al, I cant wait for Arnhem, but this series was excellent, the fighting in Nijmegen with the mixed force of Guards Armored and US Para's in such a large urban fight feels extremely overlooked. Glad they shared so much light on the subject. Walking the ground is one of the best series on WW2 coming out right now.
I think the way you have told the stories has been so much better than a lot of other documentaries. Seems far more real
Best series on the tube right now. Goodness knows I’ve watched all the decent war especially WW2 documentaries to death. Thanks guys I’d sure love to have been with you guys throughout the trip thus far. Cheers from across the big pond.
Thank you for the kind words! And thank you for watching!
This series has rapidly become my favourite channel on TH-cam - I really hope to see Al and James don Pub Landlord blazers for their next pub visit!
It's good to hear others have faith that Market Garden was a workable venture. A huge part of its failure has been skirted around on this series up to now i believe. Although you have alluded briefly, in patches, the role of the occupiers was more integral to the downfall of the plan. The allies reluctance to heed the warnings of Brian Urquhart and the others of the intelligence community was a huge faux pas on the part of those in key appointments.
The problem with Brian Urquhart's account was that when Cornelius Ryan interviewed him in 1967 he did not have access to Browning's side of the story (who already passed away in 1965) or the aerial photo in question. At least the photo has been located (actually two overlapping prints to provide a steroscopic image) in a Dutch government archive in 2014 and studied by Dr Sebastian Ritchie of the RAF's Air Historical Branch for a booklet on the RAF website in 2016, and a second edition in 2019. A third edition is in the works with more data contributed to it. The analysis showed that the tanks were indeed obsolete models and not confirmation a 1944-Type panzer division was in the area. The unit has been identified as a Luftwaffe training unit, and the tanks were near Son on 17 September and failed to interfere with the landings of the 101st Airborne. The operation failed for other reasons not connected to the intelligence that Ryan's research either ignored or failed to unearth.
I covered the area of Market Garden. My Regiment the RCR took over control from the 82Airborne. The trophy for the the Soldier of the year in 3RCR is a Thompson machine gun “borrowed” from the 82.
Thank you so very much for doing this! There are so many half-baked, confusing documentaries about Market Garden, but you making your points very clear, having great maps at hand with the actual sites to see - that's a thrilling history lesson, once again. Okay, the German point of view is a bit out of focus, but it's complex enough without that perspective already. Very well done!
Loving this series. As an American we never really learned that much about Market Garden besides watching, A Bridge Too Far, in history class. So this is really filling in a lot of gaps.
If you guys play any video games I'd recommend checking out Squad 44 which has ton of maps set in accurate recreations of the Market Garden battlefields.
Thank you for watching. - so glad you’re enjoying the series. Will check out Squad 44!
This has been a terrific series. You are doing a great job letting *us* see the landscape. It's a very difficult thing to do.
Also - lots of praise for Black Tuesday which I picked up at Al's signing in Cambridge the other weekend (had no idea you were going to be there so that was a bonus).
I remain, like you, baffled by that basic planning error. Even on the maps it seems "obvious". Especially given Montgomery's constant mantra of both balance and overwhelming concentration.
I really like the way you guys have done this, it's a departure from the accepted norm of how information on the Second World War is delivered. The relaxed, informal nature and the enjoyment of two friends just exploring the sites is wonderful. As someone who has become obsessed with The Siege of Malta since reading James' book on it, I would love to see you do a series there.
Thank you so much for the kind words. We have a long list of places we'd love to walk, but it also helps to know where people watching would like to see as well.
If anything, all of this highlights the importance of "Red Teaming" a plan. Asking the uncomfortable questions and testing your plan is vital. The responsibility of a commander is to not be fixed by ego (and let's face it there were plenty of egos in the mix). Rushing ahead without thinking that the Germans could muster the ability to respond was naive at best.
They knew the Germans had the ability to respond. Thats why they used paratroopers.
I have been an avid watcher since the D-Day series. Enjoyed these videos immensely. Have recently finished a second listen of Al's Black Tuesday audio book. Thank you for writing, and reading such an emotive, brilliant and unfortunately bitterly sad story. Made me respect even more the bravery of the airborne forces.
A pleasure to listen to you two...congratulations..really enjoyed!!! Ciao
I love this guys, it feels like you're a couple of old friends of mine talking about military history.
Great videos! Keep them coming!
I just want to say thank you guys, between discovering this and the podcast a few months back I’ve been utterly enthralled with the war again, something I’ve not been since I was in school. The new perspectives and information I’ve learnt from you guys has been fascinating and I can’t wait to keep learning more and understanding this monumental part of our history. Keep up the amazing work! ☺️
The best podcasts are like overhearing an interesting conversation in a pub. End of.
My uncle was in HQ 1st Battalion 508 PIR. He was killed on the 20th of September in the Village of Beek with the goal of cutting the Wylerbahn highway going to Nijmegen. After surviving Normandy, he told his buddies before the jump that he was never leaving Holland alive.
Hope you get the chance to cover Varsity in the same way. Fascinating to contrast what works there and how the lessons from Market Garden were used (if at all).
I could listen to you guys for hours and hours. Great show.
Absolutely fantastic video, enjoyable and informative.
Can’t wait for the next instalment.
I think your perspective is totally valid,plus it's two knowledgable blokes ,having a pint 😉👍
Love these 2 and the information they provide . Keep up the great work. 🙂🙂
Wonderful video as always. I think one of the major schools of thought of both US and British airborne planners is that you could not reuse a landing zone to either drops or gliders again once it had gliders on the ground. It would be too hazardous with the field plastered with wrecks and then yet another another armada of gliders coming in. The risk of accidents and potential loss rate of men and equipment in collisions would be too high. This is only the time you see a second combat lift being attempted. They had only done it on D Day in Normandy before this.on D Day, the afternoon/evening glider wave also used landing zones that had not previously been designated or used. Those were not technically meant to be opposed landings and the landing zones were supposed to already be under ground forces control. . It explains the landing zone further away at Arnhem, but not the failure of Nijmegen to centralise the zones for reinforcements. That for me is, as you say, a big failure.
I think it was a school of thought that you had to have completely clear fields for every new wave. Otherwise the loss to accidents would be too high.high.
I don't think that's correct. The Drop Zone 'X' at Arnhem was reused as Landing Zone 'X' for the second lift gliders, which forced the use of DZ 'Y' at Ginkel Heide for the 4th Parachute Brigade - there were no large zones around Wolfheze not already full of gliders. The 82nd Airborne second lift re-used DZs 'N' and 'T' as LZs 'N' and 'T', and the third lift for the 325th GIR re-used DZ 'O' at Overasselt. In the 101st Airborne area, the LZ 'W' was overlaid over the first lift DZs 'B' and 'C'.
Absolutely great sceries of videos. So easy to understand and grasp what was going on. Lovely to hear about the Brits in WW2 Normandy and beyond too. I enjoy the American stuff but to have the Britts stuff too is helpful in getting the bigger picture. Thanks - keep it up!
Paddy's ghost looks up from his pint of black, and mumbles, "We weren't fecking Brits, we were Limeys".
Enjoying this videos. It's great to see two people who are genuinely passionate about the subject matter, and have clearly spent huge amounts of time studying the history. Fascinated to see which ground you cover next!
Great series Al and Jim…. You question why the British did not use the first day’s DZ instead of Ginkel Heath on day 2. The simple reason is that the original DZ was being used as a glider LZ on the 18th, Ginkel Heath being less than ideal for gliders and the day 1 zones being somewhat full of gliders already. The only other alternative would have been the Polish zone at Johannahoeve which could have been used by 4th Brigade on the 18th and the Polish gliders on the following day. I don’t know if this was considered as it would certainly have allowed 4th Brigade to link up with the rest of the division more quickly and the KOSB need not then have had to redeploy from Ginkel to Johannahoeve to cover both landings on the 18th and 19th. The only fly in the ointment it seems to me would be the supposed flak concentrations at Arnhem and Deelen which might have been able to come into play
Amazing series gents! Its inspired me to plan and book a trip to Normandy for that first time, can’t wait!
My Granddad said he was actually here before as part of the scottish rifles now that part has never been confirmed but i beleived him as well i have the news paper clip and his words, "Joe Counter Started off in the Scottish rifles then became a Paratrooper". He and his men were cornered and hid in a brothel and this is his quote "Not for the woman, Just so that they could feed us before we could find a way out." Strange to think you could possibly sat roughly where he was hiding. Much love keep up the good work.
I have enjoyed these, despite factual errors. Keep going.
What a fantastic series this is guys , you both make it so fascinating to watch , keep it going 👍🏻👍🏻🙌🏻
Hugely informative guys ... Just creating a series of joined wargames on market garden and this is valuable source material. And watching on armistice day ♥️
Guys check the 1943 US Army map of Nijmegen www.loc.gov/resource/g6000m.gct00040/?sp=37
Fascinating stuff chaps. I have to agree with you, in so much as the more I have studied the circumstances of this Operation, the more I came to the conclusion that it was feasible to achieve the objectives, but for some unforeseen elements of bad luck and a couple of poor decisions. Every plan no matter how executed will start to unravel at the first engagement with the enemy…that is a fact of life., you just need the chips to fall your way which can be the difference between success and failure. This conceivably could have been the much sought after breakthrough for the push into the heart of the Reich. Monty was a man not without his failings, but I do feel he has been unfairly castigated for the failure of the Operation as a whole, when as we’ve seen from this series and continue to see that there is a hell of lot of nuance. The plan certainly had merit in my humble opinion.
Top job guys really loved the series..... what a great job to have
Good job guys. Beers looked good. A few snacks would have been nice. @09:38 Yep well said Al. My wife get fed up with me reading Al's book because I kept saying "Oh no" "Come on" , "No, oh FFS". Great job and everytime as James said I'm looking for them to make it this time.
The point of a high percentage beer is to drink it slowly and enjoy the taste, not just neck it 😂 General rule, if its hot and you are thirsty, dont go for the high percentage beer, this is more a Heineken/Amstel situation, chilling in the evening with your mates, one high percentage beer.
Great video series to complement the podcast 😊
I truly hope that next spring you do more filming for the Rhine crossing and the advance into north western Germany. There's never anyone interested in the capture of Hamburg and the drive into Schleswig-Holstein. I'd love to see it. 😊😊❤❤😊😊
“He’s not ‘Walking Jim Gavin’!” Love it! Would love to have a beer and chat with you two…. Perhaps over Belgian Beers?
Those of us born in late 60s early 70s it is fascinating the what if market garden had succeeded? The Soviets would have been beaten to Berlin, Cold War may not have happened in the form it did and our childhoods and early adulthood hood could have taken a different unknown path! This is what and why it holds so many what ifs.
Another brilliant video, keep up the great work. Booked to follow your footsteps early next year, I can't wait, you explain everything so well. Thank you James and Al.
You guys are the best! Keep the vids coming ;)
This series has been thoroughly enjoyable. Way way better than I expected, & in that the vids work really well!
Definitely hook,line and sinkered on your wonderful informative series lads. That pint looked good as well 😊. Thank you for sharing and all the best from Somerset 👍🏻👍🏻🍺🍺💯✨
Excellent channel so informative and interesting and respectful thank so much 😊for
Absolutely loved this series. It still boggles my mind that Montgomery, or whoever made the decision, DID NOT tell Urqhart and Gavin about the location of the II SS Panzer Korps. They tell Gavin about a “forces” that may be in the Reichswald but NOT 6-8 miles north of him. Also, not telling Urqhart is criminal, if not just plain wrong. Plans could have been modified. British 1st Airborne may not have been split in three parts. Gavin moves quicker to the Rais Bridge., etc…
Urquhart and Gavin were not cleared to know that II.SS-Panzerkorps had been identified by 'Ultra' code intercepts, because only Montgomery and Dempsey (2nd Army) were cleared to know that Ultra even existed. The main point is that Cornelius Ryan also didn't know about it when he published his book (A bridge Too Far) in the same year Ultra was declassified and made public in FW Winterbotham's book, The Ultra Secret (1974). Many authors have also followed Cornelius Ryan's narrative because it sells books in the huge US market.
Montgomery cancelled the original Arnhem operation COMET on 10 September as a result of this intelligence and the still stiff resistance on 2nd Army's immediate front in the Belgian canal zone and the Dutch border. He realised 1st Airborne Division and the Polish Brigade landing at Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave were not strong enough to deal with the SS units (even in reduced condition from Normandy) and two divisions would be required in this area, and another division was needed to form a corridor between 2nd Army and Grave.
When Gavin was told on the evening of 10 September his division was now to land at Nijmegen-Grave for operation MARKET, he went immediately to 1st Airborne Division HQ to see their latest intel and plans they had made for COMET, and saw the Dutch resistance reports on heavy armour in the Reichswald and SS troops in Nijmegen. By 13/14 September the Dutch had identified vehicle insignia for the Hohenstaufen Division (9.SS-Panzer-Division) near Arnhem, and it was presumed the troops in the Nijmegen area may be the 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg', but in fact they had gone to Ruurlo east of Arnhem, where the Dutch had identified Kasteel Ruurlo was a division headquarters - but not which division.
The details could not be disseminated to lower formations because the Dutch reports could not be confirmed by other means, such as aerial reconnaissance, and the Ultra source had to be protected. The decision to concentrate 1st Airborne and the Poles at Arnhem was no doubt because of their strong anti-tank establishments, having 84 guns combined, and Model was assessed to have only 50-100 operational panzers in his entire Army Group B. In fact by a bizarre coincidence, his September returns listed exactly 84 operational panzers. The British anti-tank units (such as Major Arnold's 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery supporting 1st Parachute Brigade) were briefed to expect heavy armoured counter-attacks from the first day, and that may include Panther and Tiger tanks - this is code to expect a 1944-type panzer division and a Corps heavy tank battalion respectively, so although specifics and names were removed ("sanitised" in the Ultra vernacular) from the raw intel, it could be passed down on a very restricted need to know basis. Cornelius Ryan wrote that the presence of Bittrich's panzer troops came as a complete surprise to the British Airborne, but only in a sense of the specific identifications, and it also depended on who in 1st Airborne you talked to.
In the correspondence between Cornelius Ryan and Gavin in the Cornelius Ryan Collection of his papers held at Ohio State University, there's a cover letter Gavin sent Ryan enclosing some papers by Dutch researcher Colonel TA Boeree, who had tracked the movements of the Hohenstaufen Division on its withdrawal from Belgium, crossing the Maas at Maastricht on 4 September and assembling near Sittard, before receiving orders on 7 September to withdraw to the north of Arnhem for refit. Its route went through Venlo, Gennep, Nijmegen and Arnhem, apparently making a stop in the Reichswald. Only now in 1966 did Gavin suddenly realise the source of the reports of armour in the Reichswald was the Hohenstaufen Division in transit to Arnhem. The real crime was Ryan not including this in his book and instead giving the impression there had been a complete breakdown in Montgomery's intelligence.
The operation did not fail for reasons of intelligence, it was actually accurate as far as it went, but incomplete.
What was surprising was the speed of II.SS-Panzerkorps' reaction to the landings, and this was because of two measures that Bittrich had underataken. First, he had the ren=mnants of the combat units in the two divisions formed into 'alarm companies' ready to move on an hour's notice. Second, he installed a direct phone line between his Kasteel Slangenburg headquarters and the nearby Luftwaffe FLUKO (air warning command centre) in Doetinchem and his HQ placed on the list of units to be alerted of any unusual air activity. He received a warning call from the FLUKO within half an hour of the airborne landings starting and his units were ready to move in another hour. By the time Model had evacuated his Oosterbeek headquarters and made his way to Bittrich's headquarters at Slangeburg, Bittrich already had his units moving in response and Model approved the orders he had given.
This was what Montgomery meant when he wrote in his memoirs that he knew II.SS-Panzerkorps were there, but didn't know they could react so quickly. Your mind was successfully boggled by Cornelius Ryan, and few authors have since put the record straight, but I can recommend Swedish historian Christer Bergström's two volumes as the best update of Cornelius Ryan using unpublished documents and interviews in his own papers and also debunking the many myths in the Hollywood film.
Sources:
Letter James Gavin, 18 November 1966, box 101, folder 09: James Maurice Gavin page 48, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University.
Arnhem 1944 - An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2, Christer Bergström (2019, 2020)
The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery At Arnhem: A-Z Troop volumes, Nigel Simpson, Secander Raisani, Philip Reinders, Geert Massen, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts (2020-2022)
Fantastic series guys, absolutely love the way you guys walk the ground 👍👍
At Site Hillman I met the team from a Dutch WW2 podcast called Radio Orange. Great chance meeting.
I’m quite sure that in one of the other 10 time lines in the universe, Market Garden WAS a success!
Love these episodes guys
Thank you! Please spread the word!
This lager is strong, the chat is one pint off Ultra cypher strength😂
Love the whole series by the way
Most of their strong beers aren't lagers, they are ales.
Really good video mate can't wait for the next one
Love this series. I hope you guys are coming to Bastogne later this year.
As for Market-Garden, I've always felt it should have been combined with a 2 division amphibious landing somewehere n the north of Holland.
Excellent guys
Thanks James & Al - great series. One question I'm not sure has been raised or answered is 'What if 82nd had been given Arnhem and the British Airborne targeted Nijmegen do you think ther ewould/could have been a different outcome? Would Frost had taken Nijmegen Bridge on the first day? Did the British have to be given Arnhem? Thanks again.
And I guess then that the better division commander-Gavin over Urqhuart- would have also held Arnhem in this scenario.
Fascinating and entertaining episode
Love the series guys they are just the best. 👍
"In de Blauwe Hand' is probably the famous cafe in Nijmegen. Great place to be. I spent quite some evenings there when I studied in Nijmegen.
We love it there. James Holland's favourite place in Nijmegen. He was mortified on our last trip when we tried to take XXX Corp for a drink and it was closed.
@@WW2WalkingTheGround Well, seems James made up for that during your September trip. I thoroughly enjoy your video and podcast series 'Walking the ground'. And James is right, Dutch beer and ales tend to be a little stronger in the alcohol department. Cheers from the Arnhem/Nijmegen area!
The resistance HQ in Nijmegen that 1st Battalion 508th was due to stop by on their way into town was a hotel on the corner of Molenstraat and Tweede Walstraat, which is now the Pinoccio pizza restaurant. I'm sure they could have had a beer with their pizza...
Conveniently, the resistance HQ was just a few doors away from the old civil hospital building that was occupied by the headquarters of the German Ordnungspolizei for the entire Netherlands until they evacuated in a hurry on 17 September, now redeveloped as the Molenpoort shopping centre.
Thank you
Those beers look sooo good
Cheers! 🍻
was a good one again in the oldest pub from Nijmegen, up to Arnhem
Great to hear alternatives to A Bridge Too Far even though it was written in stone and stained by acid dye.
I really enjoyed this series, seeing the actual ground is very helpful in understanding how the battle played out. As to whether Market Garden would have ended the war early, that is tossup. One thing I would point out is that Market Garden was very out-of-character for Monty. His normal strategy was to assemble overwhelming force and a meticulous plan to defeat his enemies. Market Garden was nothing like that, a bold thrust to be sure but it seemed to lack the careful planning that Monty was known for. In my opinion, Monty was chafing under Allied command and resented the fact that Britain needed the Americans to win the war. I believe that Monty proposed Market Garden as a way to end the war on British terms with a definitive British victory. But hey, that's just my opinion man
It's out of character for Montgomery because the operation only had its genesis in the all British/Polish operation COMET, planned by Browning (British I Airborne Corps) and Dempsey (British 2nd Army), and then after being cancelled by Montgomery it was expanded by Browning and Dempsey into a three-division outline provisionally called SIXTEEN, and then turned over to Brereton (1st Allied Airborne Army) and Williams (US IX Troop Carrier Command) in England for detailed planning to create MARKET.
Most of the key features of the COMET/SIXTEEN concept were compromised at this stage with the deletion of double airlifts on D-Day, deleted drop zones close to obejctives, and glider coup de main assaults on the big bridges, and Browning (Brereton's deputy in 1st AAA) was unable to object after previously threatening to resign over Brereton's LINNET II operation scheduled on just 36 hours notice and was in turn threatened with replacement by Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps. Thankfully, LINNET II was cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident, but Brereton and Williams had full control over the MARKET air plan and there was little that Browning could do about it. Gavin (82nd Airborne Division) said "the British" (I presume Browning) wanted him to drop a battalion on the north end of the Nijmegen bridge, but while he toyed with the idea he said he eventually discarded it because of his experience in Sicily with a scattered drop. Division commanders were responsible for their own divisional plans and Gavin could not be ordered by a British officer o how to dispose his troops - even if Browning had been awarded his DSO for the 1917 battle of Cambrai when young Jimmy Gavin was 10 years old and still in short trousers.
21st Army Group (Montgomery) was also not notified of the changes until after Brereton's 12 September cut-off date for making any further changes to the air plan, so it was too late for Montgomery to object unless he was prepared to go to Eisenhower to adjudicate, and after the war he said he did regret not intervening. James Daly, in his book Proposed Airborne Assaults in the Liberation of Europe (2024), covered the LINNET II, COMET and early MARKET planning issues, points out that Brereton had the authority to cancel or reject airborne operations ordered by Montgomery (he had rejected Montgomery's 4 September order for an airborne operation INFATUATE on Walcheren island to help the Canadians open Antwerp, and this had to be resurrected in November as an amphibious assault). If Montgomery appealed to Eisenhower, Daly thinks he would probably consult his air chief, Arthur Tedder (who was also Eisenhower's Deputy Supreme Commander), and Tedder was not well disposed towards Montgomery. If Eisenhower overruled Brereton, then he would probably have to replace him.
The main area of conflict seemed to be that Browning was prepared to accept 33% casualties going in, so long as the troops were delivered close to their objectives and as rapidly as possible, while Brereton and Williams were not prepared to accept such losses to their air assets and were also charged with improving their poor navigation and drop accuracy record in the Sicily and Normandy operations when Eisenhower had appointed them commander and air transport commander respectively of the new Allied Airborne Army.
Operation MARKET was definitely not conducted on British terms, the control of the air plan and airborne parts of MARKET GARDEN was in the hands of USAAF officers Brereton and Williams, and the divisional commanders were constrained in their own planning by the fixing of the air plan.
Interesting to hear how modern assessments of the viability of the Market Garden plan are more amenable to it's chances of success. I grew uo reading about this stuff as a teenager in the 70's and it was generally judged doomed to fail.
Although not representative of anything the old Avalon Hill game Storm Over Arnhem also made out that it was near impossible to succeed as the Allies. Of course we have the benefit of hindsight but once the initial pieces are on the board it's pretty obvious what the plan is. Must have been so for the German command too
Great series again - I think this one was even better than Normandy. One question I have for the guys - I wonder how much the waiting around for the 2nd drop issue would've been avoided had Browning not insisted on taking over 38 (or is it 35) gliders with his HQ? Seems to me that's a lot of the lift that would've been better purposed for frontline action and would have have been enough to overcome the "waiting for drop 2" inertia?
The I Airborne Corps HQ flight consisted of 32 British Horsa and 6 US Waco gliders, towed by RAF 38 Group Stirlings and Albemarles respectively. This included 14 Horsas for the Corps staff, liaison, SAS, Jedburgh, and other minor units. The remainder of the Horsa allocation I don't have a manifest for, but I imagine it was for the Royal Signals staff, minus a radio section that had to be provided by the US XVIII Airborne Corps. The six Waco gliders carried US liasion officers from their two divisions and two teams from the USAAF 306th Fighter Control Squadron with VHF sets for contacting air support - these were the people with the wrong crystals for their radios due to the haste in forming the unit without proper training or testing - another two teams went to Arnhem. The British I Airborne Corps was not raised as a field Corps HQ but as an administrative GHQ for Airborne Forces lately converted into a Corps HQ, while US XVIII Corps had been an ordinary Army Corps HQ converted into Airborne by simply replacing the senior staff positions with Airborne personnel - notably Matthew Ridgway - the former commander of 82nd Airborne Division. Ridgway had no role in MARKET, but his Corps staff in England were used to coordindate the aerial resupply operations.
Browning's decision to move the transport of his Corps HQ to Groesbeek from the originally planned second lift to the first lift was a consequence of decisions made beyond Browning's control:
The first was Brereton and Williams' decision to conduct all flights for MARKET in daylight and this restricted the airlifts to one flight per day. This meant the second lift would no longer arrive in the afternoon or early evening of D-Day as Browning proposed, but was now due to arrive in the morning of D+1, unless delayed to the afternoon by weather, which became the case.
The second was that this decision on daylight flights ruled out the planned dawn glider coup de main raids on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges, conducted by D Companies of 2nd South Staffords, 7th KOSB, and 1st Border Regiment respectively in 18 gliders, as these raids were deemed too risky for broad daylight. Browning had deemed the raids as so essential that he cabled Dempsey (2nd Army) that the original Arnhem operation COMET should not go ahead without them. Browning sought to have alternative coup de main plans for these big bridges to be taken quickly in MARKET, and Urquhart's solution was to use his Reconnaissance Squadron Jeeps to rush to the bridge as quickly as possible. For Nijmegen, Gavin said in his interview with (A Bridge Too Far) author Cornelius Ryan that the British wanted him to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge, and while he toyed with the idea he said he eventually discarded it because of his experience in Sicily with a scattered drop and a division that was disorganised for days. It's interesting that for the Grave bridge, the highly experienced Colonel Reuben Tucker 'insisted' on a special drop zone for one Company to land south of the bridge so it could be taken from both ends, and he got it.
All the evidence points to Browning being concerned about the Njmegen bridge and events proved him right to be concerned. I don't think it was 'ego' that drove his decision to take the Corps HQ there on the first lift, because it was originally scheduled to arrive there on the second lift. I think the main motive was his frustration at being unable to influence the planning once it was handed over to Brereton and Williams, and could only hope to influence events once he was on the ground in the Netherlands and wanted that to happen as quickly as possible. Browning had previously objected to a Brereton plan called LINNET II being scheduled too soon to print and distribute maps and Browning threatened to resign if it went ahead. Brereton had planned to accept Browning's resignation as his deputy and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation, but LINNET II was fortunately cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident. The point being that MARKET was out of Browning's hands and he knew what would happen if he objected to the plan. Montgomery's 21st Army Group was also not notified of the changes to the proposed plan that he had presented to Eisenhower for his approval on 10 September until after Brereton's 14 September cut-off date for any further amendments, so unless Eisenhower was prepared to dismiss Brereton and promote Browning to command 1st AAA, it was Brereton's show.
As for units that were bumped by the late change to the glider schedule, I presumed for a long time, as many do, that the unit affected was the second half of the South Staffords Airlanding battalion going to Arnhem, because they required another 40 Horsas and a Hamilcar (41 tug aircraft), but since reading the recently published 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Troop volumes by Nigel Simpson et al (2020-2022), it appears from these and the glider flight schedules in the Appendices of Peters and Buist (2009) that the bumped glider loads were the four guns of Z-Troop (Division HQ defence) and the second line ammunition trailers and Jeeps for the whole 1st Battery, and the Jeep transport for 1st Parachute Brigade.
I had even studied what effect taking the whole of the South Staffords to Arnhem on the first lift would have and found it would make little difference, since Brigadier Hicks (standing in for the missing Urquhart) had decided to release the first half of the battalion from its Phase 1 task of protecting LZ 'S' early (they were Brigade reserve in Phase 2) and send them into Arnhem to reinforce 1st Parachute Brigade's efforts to reach the bridge, but by the time they arrived in the western outskirts of Arnhem the delayed second lift had landed and the other two companies had caught up with the battalion. An examination of the 1st Anti-Tank Battery's actions at Arnhem show that they did not lack for ammunition or guns, as German tanks were very wary of British anti-tank guns and avoided known sight lines. Some guns barely fired a round in the entire battle and at the bridge the only form of unexpended ammunition the Germans recovered after the seige was 6-pounder AT rounds - Frost was forced to surrender when they had run out of everything else.
I'm convinced that if you're looking for the reasons the operation failed, the answers are not here, but I do think that the much maligned Browning was very concerned with and looking at the right area all along.
Sources:
Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (box 101 folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
Glider Pilots At Arnhem, Mike Peters and Luuk Buist (2009)
Arnhem: Myth and Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market Garden, Sebastian Ritchie (2011, 2019)
Little Sense Of Urgency - an operation Market Garden fact book, RG Poulussen (2014)
The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery At Arnhem: A-Z Troop volumes, Nigel Simpson, Secander Raisani, Philip Reinders, Geert Massen, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts (2020-2022)
Proposed Airborne Assaults in the Liberation of Europe, James Daly (2024)
These series are fantastic.. I hope you guys do more..please cover more theatres ✌️
Please do like, subscribe and spread the word! The bigger the community we can create here, the bigger the opportunity we have to do cover more ground which we would absolutely love to do. Thank you for watching!
Cracking stuff lads
Poetry in motion - MORE MORE MORE 👍👍
When its time to leave the pub I always have the last one for the ditch.
Great blog as usual Gent's, and a well deserved beer to ease the throat. Al's mike seemed a bit off today and sounded strange, not sure why.......or was it the Dutch lager 😉
We were having to work with back up equipment for this episode. But don't worry -- just a one-off!
@@WW2WalkingTheGround Thank you, that explains it.
I've drunk in Arnhem a few times, but never in Nijmegen. In de Blauwre Hand looks worth a visit. Do they have "Chaos in Nijmegen" by The Squats on the jukebox?
Just wondering if you stayed for a second beer and carried on the conversation! Great series so far
Interestingly, James is a regular sipper and Al is an irregular gulper yet they pretty much finish a pint at the same time!!
Ha! Good observation skills. Thank you for watching!
The biggest problem with Market-Garden is the failure to keep moving after the capture of Antwerp. The Germans were completely disorganized and much of the ground could have been taken before the seventeenth. The pause to prepare for Market-Garden allowed the Germans to recover.
11th Armoured Division was exhausted after their deep penetration into Belgium to secure the city. One of the battalion commanders complained that he had to order barbed wire to be errected around his command post just so he could think. The next day (5 September), two infantry battalions were ordered to cross the Albert canal and establish brudgeheads, without proper planning or reconnaissance. They were contained by a regiment of 712.Infanterie-Division and the newly refitted schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 with Jagdpanther and StuG III vehicles. Horrocks, who was of the opinion they should have pressed on, had to be shown the situation himself by being taken onto the roof of the Sports Palais to see the hopelessness of the bridgehead and on seeing this he immediately ordered the troops withdrawn.
The Albert canal would have to be breached further east and this was done by Guards Armoured Division at Beringen, and a secondary line on the Meuse-Escaut canal at Neerpelt was breached a few days later after some hard fighting. This was the start point for operation GARDEN, which characteristically for Montgomery was a wider envelopment operation as well as a Rhine crossing, after the smaller envelopment of 15.Armee at Antwerp was not possible.
I recommend Autumn Gale / Herbststurm - Kampfgruppe Chill, schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 and the German Recovery in the autumn of 1944, by Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts (2013). Although not going further than the city of Antwerp on 4 September was seen as a lost opportunity, the reality is that the opportunity probably only existed on 4 September itself, as the following day the hastily executed canal crossing operation failed. Bear in mind the last German resistance in the city was not extinguished until 2230 hours on 4 September, I think it's a lot to expect the division (with what forces?) to go another 25 kilometers to cut off the Zuid-Beveland peninsula after a two-day advance of 100 kilometers from Tournai on the French border. They were potentially overextended and needed to consolidate the gains already made.
Even Cornelius Ryan in the book that gave rise to the popular impression of this battle as "A Bridge Too Far" concedes at the end that for all the blunders, how close they came to success.
Out of the two main ideas out there, only Market Garden was worth doing. Patton's lunge into central Germany was insane and would make the looming supply situation worse, not better.
For me the big question of Market Garden is this: Why not Walcheren?
Montgomery requested an airborne operation called INFATUATE on Walcheren on 4 September and Brereton rejected this on the grounds of Flak and his fear that his own airmen would drop American paratroopers (this was during the planning for COMET which tied up British and Polish units) into the North Sea or flooded areas of the island. INFATUATE was later revived as an amphibious operation in November.
Why not Walchern? Eisenhower was fixated in gaining a bridgehead over the Rhine and had ordered both Montgomery and Bradley in late August to gain them as soon as possible. Montgomery’s response was Operation Comet which morphed into Market Garden.
At the time 21st Army Group had the Canadian Army all along the channel coast fighting to clear ports and other elements pushing against the 15th Army south of the Scheldt,.
All of which was in part to help with the delivery of supplies for the 21st Army Group as per the original plan developed prior to Normandy. The 21st Army Group were to be supplied through the channel ports and the US initially through Cherbourg and then the French Atlantic ports in Brittany. The fact the ports in Brittany held out for so long and the destruction of the French transport system and the inability of the allies logistics plan to keep up with where the ground troops were on the ground verses the logistics schedule ( when Market Garden started the allied schedule said it would be May 1945, the logistics were still at September and trying to rebuilt railways etc which is why the red ball express and the British equivalent became key).
Eisenhower even said in his memoir that he should have prioritised Antwerp but was fixated on the Rhine.
Basically it was all down to resources and priorities. When you have a finite amount of resources in this case divisions and a list of priorities it becomes a huge juggling act and Eisenhower as the Allied Land Forces Commander a role (he took on as well as being Supreme Allied Commander) from Montgomery on 31st August was the juggler.
this *so* needs a voice-over from Pete and Dudley. "The thing about Jayne Mansfield..."
Another great episode chaps, yes probably worth a gamble, but the price was maybe to high for me 😢 and feel there was far too many things that could go wrong than right. But certainly makes you think 👍
Nice series. But what's wrong with the beer in de Blaauwe Hand (mostly Belgian by the way)?
P.s. even if Market Garden had been a succes, I doubt the war would have been over before Xmas. 0:28
The Germans were very good in “mission command”. This is where initiative is encouraged by lower command such as junior officers and NCOs. This is especially more important when orders from staff level is slow to come down especially when at staff level they need time to understand what was going on and this would have been the case during the initial parachute landings. Had, the operation been against the Italian army (hypothetical scenario), Market Garden although poorly planned would have succeeded.
The city of Nijmegen was not destroyed by the fighting with Market Garden , but by a USAF bombardement on 22 februari 1944, 7 months earlier ! The bomb fleet could not reach their mission target , sonthey had to drop it elsewhere , to get home to England . With Nijmegen ,just across the border they thought a German city.
Over 800 people got killed . Nearly as much as in Rotterdam , but in a 4x smaller city .
The same day the cities Arnhem , Enschede and Deventer were also hit by air raids of USAF/RAF .
Very interesting video! But, the guys are discussing the new buildings being built after the old ones being destroyed by the fighting during Market Garden. I don't know if know that Nijmegen was bombed by the Americans by accident? That caused the major destruction of the city. Not Market Garden. Keep up the good work!
Not an accident - the railway yards at Nijmegen, Arnhem and Enschede were all bombed as secondary targets by the USAAF in February 1944 because their primary targets in Germany were covered by cloud. The Nijmegen bombs fell short of the target and hit the city centre.
That thinking, "What if" and you think about it and hope "this time it could work" is also what is in my mind so many times. In those last 9 months of the war, the destruction of people, military, civilians and people also in the camps was on its peak, both in the west and in the east. The destruction of cities and villages, the future of complete countries would have been different. If only .....
They were definitely a bit pissed there. I'm not imagining that am I?
Come on then, we all know that as soon as the camera stopped filming James & Al started an argument/discussion with the school kids about Market Garden. If true - that would have been fun to watch. 😄