Can you make a video about doctrinal differences of ru and ua approaches in planning and conducting mil ops? P.s. it’s rare to find a so deeply thought over videos like yours, so I hope you will continue to develop your channel!
The ukrainian attack is pure American doctrine: achieve surprise, firepower advantage, big aggressive advances highly coordinated with artillery, EW, and drones. It is only missing one element to work: air superiority. The border defense here seems to follow the standard border guard region it was lightly defended as it was not a high priority area Russian self-defense doctrine relies on mobile reserves shuffled in from fast reaction battalions and later army groups over rail lines. When the Russians practice now is not "deep battle doctrine" which is obsolete and doesn't account for changes in 21st century warfare. The analogy of a Russian bear is still appropriate for the Russian army.
Thank you for your professional, insightful and objective analysis. It is a welcome contrast to the non-stop cheerleading that has taken over most of the newsfeed.
It's very interesting to see the developments from the war in this perspective. The successful defense of Korenevo by the airfield personnel seems like it had a big effect on the outcome of the offensive. Do you think if they had failed in their task, the situation now would have been very different? It seems to me that then, after the capture of Korenevo the whole Glushkovo area would have fallen, thus securing the offensive's western flank. But would it have significantly changed the success of the Russian counteroffensive? Was it even relevant that the airfield personnel succeeded in their defense, would Korenevo have been quickly recaptured by Russian forces if it had fallen? It's interesting to see how even in the grand scale of conflict, small actions like the one by the airfield personnel can have big impacts. Thank you for your video!
It had zero effect whatsoever. Ukrianians were not planning to hold all the area from the beginning. They employ defence in depth tactics and they would have moved back anyway.
@@konfunable But wouldn't a capture of kornevo have been followed by a capture of the Glushkovo area? I recall videos of russians taking casualties while tryng to supply the Glushkovo area with pontoon crosings, as Ukraine had blown the bridges that connceted to the northen bank of the river. Maybe if Ukraine had controlled Korenevo the Russians would have seen fit to retreat to the northen bank of the river. If that had happened, wouldn't that have changed the situation quite a bit? The ukranians would not have had to deffend their Western flank, as the river would do that for them. It would also have given an big are of territory 500 KM^2 that was very easy to defend, for refrence it would roughly be the same are as they have now but with less than 1/3 of perimeter to deffend (not counting the area where a river crossing is required).
Also, as the vido talked about Korenevo being a key checkpoint to capture, so maybe it's capture would have allowed Ukraine to deffend more easily from Russian Counter Atacks
@@goglinasgolosinas64 I don't think so. If Ukrainians did not have enough troops to take Koronevo how would they manage to hold 2x the territory. Yes, it would be better now for sure, but Ukrainians simply don't have the manpower. This is also Ukrainian fault because Zelensky refuses the mobilization. I am pretty sure the war would be not as bad if they lowered mobilization age a year ago. This talk of lack of arms is only excuse in my opinion.
@@goglinasgolosinas64 Yes, could have. But the fact does not change that Ukrainians simply did not have the manpower to do that. And there were a lot of Russians there, not some airfield personel.
The initial success of the Ukrainians was to be expected, given their opposition. As was their eventual destruction by an ever increasing Russian reaction. What is not clear to me is why they attacked and spent forces that would be best employed elsewhere. Thanks again Mark for another outstanding presentation, Merry Christmas to you and yours !
The only logical explanation is us/uk/eu forced ukrainians to attack on russian soil. Definetely no ukrainian interest was achieved there and I guess thats why ru border wasn't so well guarded too
Thanks Mark. Part 1 is pretty interesting - the UKR plan of attack was actually pretty well executed in the first few days. But I'm still not convinced it was operationally very wise. Look forward to part 2. Were you with the 4th Mech Bde?
So...🙄🤔... a difficult question to answer, as well as difficult to ask... I am not asking in relation to its strategic aspect, but in relation to its technical feasibility... Is that the general staff Russia can afford to use tactical H-bombs in the Kursk salient? (To my knowledge, tactical nuclear bombs are no longer A bombs, but H bombs of small powers... right?) What will be the effects on the regiments located in this salient which does not have real bunkers. .. while assuming that civilians are evacuated ?
I believe the following were the reasons for the offensive: 1. Try to capture the Kursk NPP to later exchange it for Zap. NPP 2. Drum up enthusiasm about the war in the West to keep receiving weapons and aid 3. Improve flagging AFU morale 4. Damage war support in Russia by bringing the war to Russia 5. Force Russia to redeploy some troops from Donbas and slow the offensive there. In the end 1 failed, 2 worked, 3 worked temporarily, 4 had the opposite effect and 5 failed.
I expect that UA holding some Russian territory will prevent Putin from trying to freeze the conflict again. They also demonstrated that Russia won't reflexively launch a nuclear strike if you invade their territory so another 'red line' turns out to be fictional.
Great summary, still any meaningful analysis must cover the operational objectives (Best & most probable scenarios) - if the objective was merely to show to western officials that Ukraine is able to take initiative then something is fundamentaly wrong...the defender should never stretch its forces and extend the combat line against a numerically superior enemy. See lesson from Herson - there Ukraine played the chess well as they streched the Russian forces and could conduct the Harkiv offensive - but at that time they had a distinct numerical advantage...
"The leaked Russian map" at 3:30 is a fake. If you look at the town of Sverdlikovo (west of the map north of the border), its name is written in Ukrainian with the Latin letter i. If in Russia even the names of Ukrainian cities are written in Russian, then why should they write the names of their cities in Ukrainian?
There is no significance of Kursk operation. Ukrainians are barely holding half of their gains for god knows what while Russians move on in Donetsk. I will see this 1. An expensive PR attempt 2. Didnt distract Russians 3. Wont help Ukraine in any negotiations either.
Can you make a video about doctrinal differences of ru and ua approaches in planning and conducting mil ops?
P.s. it’s rare to find a so deeply thought over videos like yours, so I hope you will continue to develop your channel!
The ukrainian attack is pure American doctrine: achieve surprise, firepower advantage, big aggressive advances highly coordinated with artillery, EW, and drones. It is only missing one element to work: air superiority. The border defense here seems to follow the standard border guard region it was lightly defended as it was not a high priority area Russian self-defense doctrine relies on mobile reserves shuffled in from fast reaction battalions and later army groups over rail lines. When the Russians practice now is not "deep battle doctrine" which is obsolete and doesn't account for changes in 21st century warfare. The analogy of a Russian bear is still appropriate for the Russian army.
Thank you for your professional, insightful and objective analysis. It is a welcome contrast to the non-stop cheerleading that has taken over most of the newsfeed.
excellent, sir. thank you very much from Los Angeles
It's very interesting to see the developments from the war in this perspective. The successful defense of Korenevo by the airfield personnel seems like it had a big effect on the outcome of the offensive. Do you think if they had failed in their task, the situation now would have been very different? It seems to me that then, after the capture of Korenevo the whole Glushkovo area would have fallen, thus securing the offensive's western flank. But would it have significantly changed the success of the Russian counteroffensive? Was it even relevant that the airfield personnel succeeded in their defense, would Korenevo have been quickly recaptured by Russian forces if it had fallen?
It's interesting to see how even in the grand scale of conflict, small actions like the one by the airfield personnel can have big impacts. Thank you for your video!
It had zero effect whatsoever. Ukrianians were not planning to hold all the area from the beginning. They employ defence in depth tactics and they would have moved back anyway.
@@konfunable But wouldn't a capture of kornevo have been followed by a capture of the Glushkovo area? I recall videos of russians taking casualties while tryng to supply the Glushkovo area with pontoon crosings, as Ukraine had blown the bridges that connceted to the northen bank of the river. Maybe if Ukraine had controlled Korenevo the Russians would have seen fit to retreat to the northen bank of the river.
If that had happened, wouldn't that have changed the situation quite a bit? The ukranians would not have had to deffend their Western flank, as the river would do that for them. It would also have given an big are of territory 500 KM^2 that was very easy to defend, for refrence it would roughly be the same are as they have now but with less than 1/3 of perimeter to deffend (not counting the area where a river crossing is required).
Also, as the vido talked about Korenevo being a key checkpoint to capture, so maybe it's capture would have allowed Ukraine to deffend more easily from Russian Counter Atacks
@@goglinasgolosinas64 I don't think so. If Ukrainians did not have enough troops to take Koronevo how would they manage to hold 2x the territory. Yes, it would be better now for sure, but Ukrainians simply don't have the manpower. This is also Ukrainian fault because Zelensky refuses the mobilization. I am pretty sure the war would be not as bad if they lowered mobilization age a year ago. This talk of lack of arms is only excuse in my opinion.
@@goglinasgolosinas64 Yes, could have. But the fact does not change that Ukrainians simply did not have the manpower to do that. And there were a lot of Russians there, not some airfield personel.
Outstanding
I love this channel
Great stuff, thanks
The initial success of the Ukrainians was to be expected, given their opposition.
As was their eventual destruction by an ever increasing Russian reaction.
What is not clear to me is why they attacked and spent forces that would be best employed elsewhere.
Thanks again Mark for another outstanding presentation, Merry Christmas to you and yours !
The only logical explanation is us/uk/eu forced ukrainians to attack on russian soil. Definetely no ukrainian interest was achieved there and I guess thats why ru border wasn't so well guarded too
amazing 😮
thank you very much, this is very enlightening!
Thanks Mark. Part 1 is pretty interesting - the UKR plan of attack was actually pretty well executed in the first few days. But I'm still not convinced it was operationally very wise. Look forward to part 2. Were you with the 4th Mech Bde?
Question: Do you have any recommended readings, especially relating to military art and the Russian army?
www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf
www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf
So...🙄🤔... a difficult question to answer, as well as difficult to ask... I am not asking in relation to its strategic aspect, but in relation to its technical feasibility... Is that the general staff Russia can afford to use tactical H-bombs in the Kursk salient? (To my knowledge, tactical nuclear bombs are no longer A bombs, but H bombs of small powers... right?) What will be the effects on the regiments located in this salient which does not have real bunkers. .. while assuming that civilians are evacuated ?
I believe the following were the reasons for the offensive:
1. Try to capture the Kursk NPP to later exchange it for Zap. NPP
2. Drum up enthusiasm about the war in the West to keep receiving weapons and aid
3. Improve flagging AFU morale
4. Damage war support in Russia by bringing the war to Russia
5. Force Russia to redeploy some troops from Donbas and slow the offensive there.
In the end 1 failed, 2 worked, 3 worked temporarily, 4 had the opposite effect and 5 failed.
I expect that UA holding some Russian territory will prevent Putin from trying to freeze the conflict again.
They also demonstrated that Russia won't reflexively launch a nuclear strike if you invade their territory so another 'red line' turns out to be fictional.
Great summary, still any meaningful analysis must cover the operational objectives (Best & most probable scenarios) - if the objective was merely to show to western officials that Ukraine is able to take initiative then something is fundamentaly wrong...the defender should never stretch its forces and extend the combat line against a numerically superior enemy. See lesson from Herson - there Ukraine played the chess well as they streched the Russian forces and could conduct the Harkiv offensive - but at that time they had a distinct numerical advantage...
Et merci pour votre vidéo assez (trop) complète...
J’ai regardé à 0.5x
❤
"The leaked Russian map" at 3:30 is a fake. If you look at the town of Sverdlikovo (west of the map north of the border), its name is written in Ukrainian with the Latin letter i. If in Russia even the names of Ukrainian cities are written in Russian, then why should they write the names of their cities in Ukrainian?
You’re absolutely right. Russian fonts/keyboards don’t even have that letter.
Intresting, could this then be a map of Russian postions made by Ukrainian inteligence?
There is no significance of Kursk operation. Ukrainians are barely holding half of their gains for god knows what while Russians move on in Donetsk.
I will see this 1. An expensive PR attempt 2. Didnt distract Russians 3. Wont help Ukraine in any negotiations either.
Első.