I think I may need to review some material pertaining to probability density functions. I’m trying to think of a type of document that is well formatted and also portable, but I can’t quite put my finger on it…
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17:20 - 18:35 I did not understand that part at all. A "crazy thing," perspective, "low-cost types 'for her'," threshold? Completely lost me, TBH. Wouldn't it be clearer to skip it and say: We're looking for a symmetric equilibrium defined by a cost C below which everyone volunteers. At the point C, the utilities must be equal, so u(V)=u(N) i.e. 1-C=P. The probability P (that the other player volunteers) is just the probability that the other players cost is below C, which is F(C).
I think I may need to review some material pertaining to probability density functions. I’m trying to think of a type of document that is well formatted and also portable, but I can’t quite put my finger on it…
I guess there is a typo at 18:25 (second bullet!). The relevant equation for player 2 should be 1-c2* = F(c1) not 1-c1* = F(c2*) .
I think the number of people volunteering is decreasing as c star shift to the right in your example because F(c star) decreases.
Neat video! Also #69.
nice
nice
nice
That’s a cool number!
Could you recommend some resources to learn about probability theory?
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@@ivoriankoua3916 Thank you!
17:20 - 18:35 I did not understand that part at all. A "crazy thing," perspective, "low-cost types 'for her'," threshold? Completely lost me, TBH.
Wouldn't it be clearer to skip it and say: We're looking for a symmetric equilibrium defined by a cost C below which everyone volunteers. At the point C, the utilities must be equal, so u(V)=u(N) i.e. 1-C=P. The probability P (that the other player volunteers) is just the probability that the other players cost is below C, which is F(C).
the number of views decreasing is a sign that things are getting harder bruh