One bizarre thing about Browning is this. As Frost eloquently pointed out; the German armoured presence in the Reichswald was based only on rumour, but Browning chose to treat it as hard fact. Yet when presented with hard evidence of German armour existing elsewhere, he chose to ignore it. One can only wonder why.
The unacceptable consequence fallacy. They desperately wanted the operation to proceed after so many other drops had been cancelled. Acknowledging the presence of panzer forces in the area might have caused the plan to be shelved. That was unacceptable so the threat "couldn't" be real. The threat from the Groesbeek heights didn't prevent the operation from going ahead, so it could be treated as real.
Not bizarre if you're across all of the facts: The concern was that II.SS-Panzerkorps was known to be in northeastern Netherlands with two shattered SS-Panzer-Divisions under command - the 9.'Hohenstaufen' and the 10.'Frundsberg' Divisions. The Dutch resistance had only identified elements of the 9.SS-Panzer among the scattered troops billeted in the area between Arnhem-Apeldoorn-Deventer-Ruurlo, and they had identified a divisional headquarters at Ruurlo, but not which division it belonged to. The Allied intelligence assessment (the latest before the operation was SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary #26, dated 16 September 1944) was that these divisions were each reduced to a regimental battlegroup with few if any tanks, and that they were refitting by drawing new tanks from a depot thought to be in the Kleve area just across the German border southeast of Nijmegen. There was a fear that the Reichswald could be hiding up to 1,000 tanks - hyperbole that started a silly rumour the tanks were actually there, and Gavin was told the excellent Dutch army barracks facillites in Nijmegen may have a regiment of SS troops in them. This in turn created the concern over the Groesbeek heights - an area of woodland ridge line that was a natural defensive position between the drop zones and the city of Nijmegen with its bridges. It was for this reason the 508th PIR had to seize three initial objectives on the ridge at De Hut (2nd Battalion), De Ploeg (1st Battalion), and Berg-en-Dal (3rd Battalion), but as soon as this was achieved the 508th were expected to send 1st Battalion into the city to seize the highway bridge as soon as possible, and this is where things went wrong - the precise details of which are the answer to another question and not the one you're asking here, so that's a discussion for another comment. Browning's dismissal of the tanks photographed by reconnaissance Spitfire on 12 September in the Deelerwoud north of Arnhem, was based on his view that the tanks were obsolete models and probably not even serviceable. This story rested on Browning's Corps Intelligence Officer, Major Brian Urquhart (name changed to 'Fuller' in the film A Bridge Too Far), who connected these tanks to the Dutch resistance reports and gave his story to Cornelius Ryan in an interview for his 1974 book, A Bridge Too Far. The 1977 film is based on the book and is highly controversial, not least because Browning's widow and actor Dirk Bogarde both objected to the portrayal of Browning in the film, but Bogarde didn't opt to turn down the part and seems (in my personal opinion watching the film) to have sought to mitigate the script by playing the character as somewhat conflicted. I presume it was all he could do, or pass and have someone else play the role. By the way, Bogarde served in the war as an RAF photo interpreter working on Dempsey's 2nd Army staff, selecting bombing targets during the European campaign, including Operation Market Garden. He knew all the key personalities, including Montgomery and Browning. The problem with Major Brian Urquhart's testimony is that Browning was no longer alive to give his side of the story, and the photo in question was no longer available... until 2015. The photo (Frame 4015 taken 12 Sep 44 by 541 Sqn), along with the RAF's entire library of images, was donated to the Dutch government after the war to help with reconstruction and land use surveys, and only came to light when the Dutch government digitised their archives and put them online. The key photo frame was identified and studied by the RAF's Air Historical Branch, and under magnification the tanks can be determined to be Mark III and older Mark IV models (with the short 7.5cm gun), ruling out a 1944 panzer division as the likely owner. The study is available as a free pdf called 'Arnhem: The Air Reconnaissance Story' (2nd Ed, 2019) on the RAF MoD site. So, we now know which unit the tanks belonged to, because the only unit in the Netherlands with those vehicles at the time (before Market Garden started) was the Reserve Panzer Kompanie of Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', the training unit for the Luftwaffe's only panzer division currently fighting the Soviets in Poland. The Regiment was based in Utrecht and the Reserve Panzer Kompanie in Harderwijk on the Zuider Zee coast. During the crisis in the west in September 1944, the 1.Fallschirm-armee was formed to plug the gap in the line in Belgium. the 'HG' Regiment transferred to it from LXXXVIII Korps (Netherlands occupation forces), and the three training Abteilungen (infanterie/panzer/artillerie) were mobilised and sent south to fight British 2nd Army on the Albert canal. The Reserve Panzer Kompanie was mobilised on 7 September and sent to Hechtel in Belgium to join II.Abteilung, but only three tanks completed the journey without breaking down, and were destroyed with much of the battalion at Hechtel by Guards Armoured Division on 12 September, the same day the remainder were photographed near Deelen undergoing maintenance (turrets were turned to allow engine hatches to be opened) at a supply dump in the woods near Fliegerhorst Deelen, the largest German airbase in the Netherlands. On 17 September, the day Market Garden was launched, these tanks were laagered at Wolfswinkel, near Son north of Eindhoven, and they attempted to fire on the drop zone of the 506th PIR (101st Airborne) during the landings, but were shot up by escorting fighter bombers. Two Mark III tanks escaped, one ran the gauntlet of 502nd troopers in St Oedenrode but was only hit by unprimed bazooka rounds, and they both by-passed the 501st at Veghel to bump the E/504th (82nd Airborne) roadblock at Grave. Some casualties were caused to troopers climbing out of their foxholes, in the belief the tanks were the British arriving early, and they then turned tail were not seen again. So, Browning's dismissal of the tanks in the photo appears to have been good judgement on his part, and history proves that he was right to be more concerned about the unknown location of 10.SS-Panzer-Division - it was not known that the Ruurlo headquarters was the 10.SS-Panzer-Division's, the 9.SS-Panzer were headquartered at Beekbergen near Apeldoorn. Your question is all part of the Arnhem mythology created by Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge Too Far, but I hope I've been able to answer this part of it at least.
Obviously there was conflict Between the americans and British because of the combined operation Eisenhower should have told Monty okay go ahead with it But make it an all British thing!
I met Lieutenant Colonel John Frost's grandsons here in Australia. Nice chaps both of them and very proud of their grandfather as they rightly should be.
We Dutch are very grateful for everyone participating in Market Garden (perhaps not Browning 😂). The Arnhem road bridge is named the John Frost Bridge. And I’m in awe of the 82nd crossing the Waal in dingy’s. Stuff of legends. Even in Close Combat II the scenario is unforgivable hard.
There is plenty of blame to go around for failure on the Allied side. The other commentators are knowledgeable and I will not rehash them. I think Ridgeway as the Airborne Corps Commander, however, and not Browning, could have made a difference. My point, however, was that in the 1970s when I was a Cadet at a famous military academy a retired SgtMajor from Frost's Bn. with the 1st Parachute Div. at Arnhem spoke to us in a Saturday afternoon lecture. During Q&A I asked him when he knew the operation was in peril. Note: he retired as a SgtMajor and he did not hold that rank at Arnhem. He answered me: " I knew the operation was going to fail when we landed in the DZ, and could not contact anyone with our radios."
I heard the radios were tuned to different wavelengths, and some of the corps were transmitting on wavelengths reserved for German public radio. Maybe this part about the radios is underestimated.
With Ridgeway in charge there was more chance to succeed, but he couldt change the weather and the quality of the radio's either. It was one bridge too far!
Very interesting thank you for that.About the radios it seems strange that the US Army had been using their famed ‘walkie talkies’ why on earth weren’t they used at Arnhem?Why was the clear and present danger of German armour ignored by Browning and why was the drop zone so far from the bridge?It seems that the whole operation was rushed into action too soon when basic issues like the radios failed.What on earth did the high command think they were playing at?
"I think Ridgeway as the Airborne Corps Commander, however, and not Browning, could have made a difference." - How would he have made a difference? The compromises to the MARKET plan that caused it to fail were American compromises, and having more American control over the planning is unlikely to help. One of the problems with the planning for MARKET was that once Browning's outline plan for provisional operation SIXTEEN, based on his cancelled all-British and Polish operation COMET, was passed over to Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army for detailed planning and became operation MARKET, the concept was compromised by many changes Browning could not object to without losing his position to Ridgway. Browning had already threatened to resign over Brereton's plan for operation LINNET II (Liege-Maastricht bridges) because it had been scheduled with too short notice to print and distribute maps to the troops. Fortunately for all concerned, the ground troops overran the drop zones and the airborne operation was cancelled, so Browning withdrew his resignation letter and both men agreed to forget the incident. When Brereton removed the D-Day double airlift and the dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges for MARKET, Browning could hardly threaten to resign again, knowing that Brereton had planned to accept his resignation over LINNET II and replace him with Matthew Ridgway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation. Browning's only option was to try to influence events once he was on the ground at Groesbeek and that was probably the real reason he advanced the transport of his Corps HQ from the 2nd to the 1st airlift, at the expense of some anti-tank glider loads scheduled for 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem - we know it was a last minute change to the glider schedule and not a pre-planned "ego trip" as many historians suggest. On the British radios, the equipment was perfectly serviceable, but experienced severely reduced range performance at Arnhem because of the local terrain - sandy glacial moraine with a high iron content. The radios were working, but with greatly reduced ranges than they had experienced in North Africa and Italy. Only the two special VHF sets supplied to the USAAF 306th Fighter Control Squadron teams had been supplied with the "wrong crystals" problem. The standard battalion No.22 sets were virtually useless because of the dispersed deployment of the units, but the Royal Artillery used the more powerful No.18 sets, which although affected by the same problem, the reduced ranges were still useful - the forward observers at the bridge could still contact the Light Regiment's gun batteries at Oosterbeek for example. The British did use the American supplied SCR-536 "handie-talkie" (the "walkie-talkie" was originally the nickname given to the backpack SCR-300 used for battalion communications in the US Army), but both armies found it virtually useless except for very short range and almost restricted to line of sight communcations by the platoons. There was indeed one frequency that could not be used because it conflicted with a very powerful German transmitter at Deelen airfield. Why was German armour ignored by Browning? Because the aerial photos showed obsolete Mark III and early Mark IV models, and this ruled out a 1944 panzer division as the likely owner. Cornelius Ryan got this story from Browning's intelligence officer, Major Brian Urquhart, interviewed in 1967 after Browning had passed away in 1965 and the photo could not be located. In fact all the RAF's aerials of the Netherlands had been donated to the Dutch government after the war to help with reconstruction and land use surveys, and emerged in 2014 when the archives were digitised and put online. The suspect frame was identified and analysed by the Air Historical Branch (Royal Air Force) and the tanks identified as belonging to the Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', the training regiment based in Utrecht for the Luftwaffe's only panzer division currently fighting in Poland. The HG Regiment's reserve panzer kompanie at Harderwijk had been mobilised (under the 'Valkyrie' Plan) on 7 September and ordered south to Eindhoven to join the regiment's II.Abteilung, but only three tanks survived the road march without breaking down and were destroyed at Hechtel in Belgium by the Guards Armoured Division, along with most of the II.Abteilung. Those vehicles that had broken down were being maintained at a supply dump near Deelen airfield when they were photographed by RAF reconnaissance Spitfire on 12 September and on 17 September (D-Day for MARKET GARDEN) they were laagered in an orchard at Wolfswinkel, opposite the 506th PIR's drop zone on Sonsche Heide. They attempted to interfere in the landings, but were shot up by escorting USAAF fighter aircraft and failed to have any impact on the operation. Browning's decision to disregard the photo can now be seen in a totally different light. Montgomery cancelled operation COMET when he received reports II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Arnhem area and realised COMET was not strong enough to deal with them. He and Browning then drew up the outline proposal called SIXTEEN by adding the two US airborne divisions to hold the corridor, allowing 1st Airborne and the Poles with their substantial anti-tank gun assets to be concentrated at Arnhem. The operation was compromised not at Arnhem, where a bridgehead was secured and its use denied to the enemy for 80 hours, but at Nijmegen. Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army had compromised Browning's outline plan SIXTEEN to seize the bridges by glider coup de main raids, and Gavin then compromised his own divisional plan by dismissing a British request (probably from Browning) to drop a battalion at the north end of the Nijmegen bridge to seize it by coup de main. Gavin then assigned his weakest regimental commander, Roy Lindquist of the 508th PIR, to the Nijmegen mission instead of the more aggressive and experienced 505th, instructing him to send his 1st battalion directly to the bridge as soon as practical after landing. Lindquist failed to act quickly, allowing 10.SS-Panzer-Division to occupy Nijmegen and reinforce the bridges. On the latter issue I would agree that Ridgway's presence would have been preferable, but only if he had still been divisional commander of the 82nd. Ridgway had part-dealt with command issues in the 508th in Normandy (the XO was court-martialled and replaced with a 505th officer) and may have been more wary of assigning them to the critical Nijmegen mission. Gavin had also failed to appoint a replacement for himself as Assistant Divisional Commander after Ridgway was promoted to XVIII Airborne Corps and Gavin inherited the 82nd Division, so he was doing both jobs during the planning and execution of MARKET. I don't think importing more American solutions would resolve what were imported American problems in the first place.
The key issue of Market Garden was the taking of all bridges within a time frame. The 36 hours delay at Nijmegen due to taking the hights first, was the critical factor for failure of Market Garden, so I am with Frost !
No Fred! The key issue for the distance from the british DZ to the Arnhrm bridge and the british (RAF) fear to attack it from both sides. After scoring the bridge part of the troops had been able to assist in taking the Nijmegen bridge also from two sides.
@@paulbien8421 However, the fact is that in spite of the distance of the DZ's from the Arnhem bridge, Frost and his men DID make it to the bridge and managed to hold out up to the time that XXX Corps had arrived at Nijmegen. Had the Nijmegen bridge been taken immediately after landing by a batallion of the 82nd, XXX Corps could have relieved Frost and the whole 1st Airborne by crossing the Rhine at Arnhem. This was made impossible by the fact that the 82nd didn't take the bridge in time.
@@paulbien8421 Most historians who have studied Market Garden in depth don't agree with you, including Eisenhower's official historian. Yes, there were several aggravating factors to the operation, but they were overcome and XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen bridge in good time. It is accepted that the main failure was US 82nd AB not going straight for the bridge after dropping.
@@renard801 Brit generals like Browning and Monty were too busy being infatuated with their own fame that they cost countless deaths, thank god for the 82nd’s amazing bravery for making it somewhat salvageable along with Frost group. Yikes, Monty was a bozo and dead weight to Patton in many places in Africa and Europe
@@abba-Flammenfresser You say it was US 82nd AB who made Market Garden 'somewhat salvageable'. Hah! Historians (including the official US Army historian) agree that the deaths of those brave men while crossing the river, and indeed the ultimate failure of the entire operation, was the fault of their own commanders in failing to assault Nijmegen bridge immediately upon landing. It was lightly defended then and might have been taken easily. Instead, when the British tanks arrived in good time, they found the bridge still in enemy hands and now heavily defended. That is why Gavin ordered Lindquist to take his men across the river, with such disastrous consequences. Far from salvaging the operation, the 82nd commanders doomed it - and their own men. As for that 'bozo' Montgomery: after the war, the five European countries forming the Western Union Defence Organisation unanimously chose him to be Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, essentially the commander of all European forces. They kept him in post from 1948 to 1951. And when NATO was formed in 1951 to counter the Soviet threat, the top politicians and military people of America, Canada and Europe chose Monty - out of all the possible candidates in those countries - to be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, second only to Eisenhower. They considered Monty to be the best man to command ALL the western forces (including America's) against Russia if Ike couldn't. He served in that post under successive Supreme Commanders until his retirement in 1958. That shows how much Monty's abilities were respected by people who knew him most, and who had most to lose had Russia invaded. I would back their judgement over yours any day!
It was a shameful act which Montgomery doubled down on. I've spoken to a lot of 1st Airborne vets who were unanimously disgusted by this. The Poles who made it north of the Rhine - the AT squadron that landed early - and those that got across the river fought very well and played a large part in covering the withdrawal.
The problem here is that there's no evidence Browning lacked judgement, was self-delusional, or scapegoated the Poles. If you're referring to his dismissal of the aerial photograph of German tanks near Arnhem, he was correct to dismiss it because the photo was located in a Dutch archive in 2014 and found to show obsolete Mark III and early Mark IV models ruling out a 1944 panzer division and belonged to a training unit that was not even in the Arnhem area during the landings. Cornelius Ryan made the mistake of basing this story on one person's account after Browning had passed away and unable to defend himself, and the RAF had donated all their aerials of the Netherlands to the Dutch government after the war and could not be located. If you're referring to his decision to move the transport of his Corps HQ to Groesbeek from the 2nd to the 1st lift, it was a last minute change to the glider schedule and not a pre-planned ego trip. Browning was unable to object to changes Brereton made to his COMET and proposed outline SIXTEEN for the final MARKET plan, because he had already threatened to resign over Brereton's operation LINNET II plan scheduled at too short notice to print and distribute maps. That operation was thankfully cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident, but Browning knew Brereton had planned to accept his resignation letter and replace him with Matthew Ridgway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation. Browning could do nothing about the changes, except advance his transport to the 1st lift and try to influence events once he was on the ground in the Netherlands. If you're referring to the Poles being blamed for the failure of MARKET GARDEN, that's a ridiculous slur. At no point could the Poles be blamed since they arrived late on D+4, and long after the operation had already been compromised by the Americans (most likely the source of this slur) at Nijmegen on D-Day. But it is an undisputed fact that General Sosabowski was difficult to work with and was insubordinate to General Horrocks at the Valburg conference on 24 September. The Polish troops were also reported to be ill-disciplined when they had a chance to fight the Germans - perhaps understandably - but when you get complaints even from the SS about the Poles firing on their medics trying to retrieve wounded from the battlefield, then you have a unit that falls below the disciplinary standard expected in the British Army. Montgomery initially wrote to Socabowski to praise him and his brigade for their efforts and to request recommendations for awards, but after receiving reports from Browning and Horrocks he changed his tune and asked the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to have the Polish Brigade removed from Browning's command and perhaps sent to Italy. At no point to my knowledge did any of these officers blame the Poles for the failure of the operation, and if you have a reference that does, then I would be grateful if you could provide it.
I'm a bit troubled by the notion that Market Garden's failure can be limited to a single factor. There's no doubt the failure to secure the Nijmegen bridge on the first day was a killer, but to assume that the entire operation would have succeeded ignores the other elements that contributed to the failure. I appreciate your thoroughness on this topic, but I don't know if it can be boiled down to one decision.
Ray Barata Market Garden failure to achieve 100% success *can* be put down to one failure - the failure to seize Nijmegen bridge immediately. If that bridge was not seized immediately the daring operation was bound not to be a 100% success. It was key.
John Burns Respectfully, that's a broad assumption to make. I agree that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge contributed to the failure of the operation but the timely capture of the bridge did not guarantee the success of the operation as a whole. 1st Para Div only had one battalion anywhere near the bridge. The rest was strung out kilometers away. And even seizure of the Arnhem bridge by XXX Corps did not mean that the narrow corridor would remain open to ensure the breakthrough Field Marshal Montgomery envisioned. Subsequent months after MG saw the Germans break the line several times.
Ray Barata I would concur with your assessment. Of course all this discussion is conducted with perfect hindsight, as usual. "If this had been done, that would have happened," etc. Frost's battalion dropped about as far from its objective as the 82nd was from Nijmegen; if the Germans had had troops to secure the northern end of Arnhem bridge quickly you would have seen a replay of Nijmegen there, more or less nullifying a successful early crossing of the Waal by XXX Corps if that bridge had been taken right away. It seems obvious to me at least that one battalion should have been dropped south of and very close to Arnhem bridge and one battalion north of Nijmegen bridge, with the mission of taking both bridges immediately in a coup de main. This standard airborne tactic had been proven time and time again to work. It was employed successfully by the 82 AB at Grave bridge during this operation. If it was decided to keep the 1 Para and 82 AB drop zones that far from the objectives, then assigning these drops to the Polish Brigade would have been the natural choice.
I have read the details of many battles and sadly often a single simple error can make all the difference. "For want of a shoe nail, a battle was lost". Someone failing to push enough or pushing to far, taking a right turn instead of a left, failing to call in for support when support was available...results, battle lost.
Ray Barata First of all the operation was a success, in creating a 60 mile salient (protection buffer) into German territory protecting the vital port of Antwerp and eliminating V rocket sites which were firing at London. And they did use the north of the salient to turn east into Germany. They just never got over the Rhine. The operation needed *all* the bridges secured *immediately.* All were secured at the end of the 1st day except Nijmegen. TIK in his 1st video blamed Gavin of the 82nd for not immediately moving towards the Nijmegen bridge. I agreed with that conclusion and still do. Browning did not drop into the zone with the troops near the bridge. He was way east on the German border, unlike Gavin who was near the bridge. Gavin was supposed to move on the bridge immediately, specifically Colonel Lindquist of the 508th who were to "move without delay", as ordered by Gavin. Gavin was not monitoring progress close enough as Lindquist dawdled. When Browning saw that the bridge was not secured he told Gavin to move to the bridge. Browning was no angel for sure. But! He had no part in the delay in not securing the vital Nijmegen bridge *immediately* on dropping. That falls 100% on General Gavin. If that bridge was seized immediately, XXX Corps would have run over it and onto Arnhem. Another point is that despite a delay in running over a Bailey bridge at Son, as the US 101st did not seize the bridge with the Germans destroying it, XXX Corps made up the time and got to Nijmegen *ahead of schedule* only to see the bridge in German hands. As TIK states, XXX Corps had to take the town _and_ the bridge. That vital initial delay, by Gavin (Lindquist), allowed German troops to pour south over the bridge into Nijmegen. There was only about 18 German troops on the bridge when the 82nd dropped. A 82nd 508 patrol took the guards, and their gun, prisoner on the south of the bridge for an hour, then left letting them go when no reinforcements arrived. When Lindquist's main bridge force, led by Colonel Warren, did get to the bridge it was swarming with Germans who had also set up shop in the park south of the bridge and were all over Nijmegen.
True, although he did dismiss the intelligence officer (who was called Brian Urquhart - not Roy Urquhart who commanded 1st Airborne Division). Perhaps he didn't actually know how much armour was actually in the Arnhem area.
Reconnaissance blunders were wide spread in this operation. Air recon photos which established the presence of Panthers(I do not recall confirmation of Tigers) but this was not confirmed by the resistance. The Reichswald would have been the absolute logical place for a tank force intent on rapid deployment to either Nijmegen or Arnhem from a forest between the two rivers. Senior staff had nightmares that if a significant armored force lay in wait in the Reichswald and 30 Corps was smashed in the rear when approaching Nijmegen, that could have resulted in a catastrophe.
Well - not exactly. Many other elements of various units also made into Arnhem, including parts of other Parachute battalions, glider pilots, and even a couple of airborne anti-tank guns. The blowing up of the Son bridge near Eindhoven caused a 36 hour delay from the near-start too, when 30 Corps linked up with the 101st there. The plan was flawed because it over optimistically assumed all the many bridges along the corridor would be taken intact and without delay. The German tiny battle groups that quickly blocked the north and center routes into Arnhem was another critical blow to the plan.
Browning is to blame, definetly. He ORDERED Gavin to secure the heights first before taking the bridge. So Gavin can't really get any blame, because he was just following his orders.
@John Cornell The 18th "The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment defended against German attacks in Horst, Grafwegen and Riethorst. Early in the day, German counterattacks seized one of the Allied landing zones where the Second Lift was scheduled to arrive at 13:00. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment attacked at 13:10 and cleared the landing zone by 14:00, capturing 16 German flak pieces and 149 prisoners." en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#82nd_Airborne_zone
Monty's grand idea so ultimately Monty is to blame. However Browning is the fool that had priorities wrong not Frost. Such is war when individual wants override the needs of the operation meaning the bridge at Nijmegan. Having spent time in this exact area I can clearly understand that the bridge is key. This is mostly low farm land which tanks would never be able to drive across. Thanks for the analysis...
Fun2 Drive All plans are speculations and I for one don’t believe those who devise the plan should be blamed on the basis that it didn’t succeed per se. And bear in mind the commanders believed the plan could work on the basis of their knowledge and trust of their own troops’ ability so in the end if a plan fails every senior commander responsible for every moving part of the plan has responsibilities. But yes perhaps Boy Browning was more at fault than Monty to have misappropriated priorities and as a result the troops weren’t able to fulfill their objectives.
Gavin did order one of his battalion commanders to go to the bridge immediatly after landing before the operation started. Lt-Col Roy Lindquist, 508thPIR. He instead followed his operational order and secured his assinged areas and only left after Gavin personnaly went to him that evening ordering him to go. Gavin said he had verbally given this order shortly before the start of the operation. lt-Col linquist said later he did not have any recollection of any pre jump instructions. Although some other officers do remember Gavin giving this pre-jump instructions. Gavin also said that due to the lack of aircraft he had a lack of troops. So you could also blame Lt-General Brereton for not allowing the IX troop carrier command to do 2 flights during the day.
Jim Omaha You are getting to it. Linquist was ordered to go to the bridge immediately by Gavin. There is a case that Gavin was not clear and specific enough - miscommunication. But Gavin did not check on Linquist's progress on the most vital part of his tasks - seizing the bridge. If he had he would have ordered them to the bridge earlier when seeing they were not moving to the bridge. So, Gavin was the blame for not seizing the bridge immediately.
A very good overview of Operation Market Garden where my dad lost his brother defending the area. So sad to read what happened and knowing if a few changes had been made our family would not have lost my dads brother there Daun Rice. Love how hard Maggie led the 82nd under such hard conditions. Sad very sad as our family had and has lost a critical member of the family there.
Sorry for your family's loss Vaughn. I hope you can all take solace and immense pride in that those who fought so valiantly ( even acknowledged by their German opponents) have their names and deeds immortalised in the history of our nation. One of the most tragic consequences of war is the loss of the most brave and selfless individuals who could then set an example to the young. We will never forget them. God rest Daun.
The basic plan was doomed to failure from it's inception. With a only single axis of advance, and the airborne landings marking this axis out for the Germans as clear as day, the Germans could concentrate their defenses on that single line of advance. Even had the allies seized each bridge on schedule, this single line of operation would have met a concentrated defense. Unless you have overwhelming superiority, such a single line of advance almost always fails.
The single line advance could have succeeded with SURPRISE, but surprise was lost when US General Brereton (along with US General Jackson of the Airborne support) did not allow two drops on the first day. Surprise is the airborne trump card, but it was lost because many of the ONLY drop on day one were obliged to defend the landing zones for the other drops scheduled for day two - not only too few landed on day one, but also many who were landed on day one could not use surprise. Obviously the US Generals (who owned the transport aircraft) did not want their valuable planes flying straight and low to give German AA gunners a shooting gallery, and so insisted the first part of the initial drop day was spent on flak suppression by allied fighter bombers.
Whoever decided that lightly armed airborne units would better defend relatively open terrain against tanks than defend against tanks in an urban environment may not have known of the lessons learned by the Soviets. Give me an RPG against a tank and a building to hide in, and I stand a fair chance of taking out a tank, even if the tank has infantry support. In open terrain with infantry support, tanks win, especially when 6 pounders were left out of the defenses in favor of a Corps headquarters. I only hope Browning's headquarters arrived with mimeograph machines at the ready.
The problem was not one minor engagement or other lost or delayed but the overarching supply situation. The Allies were at the end of their supply lines, Antwerp was taken too late, the French rail network was previously destroyed by the Allies who needed it now and the trucks just were not enough to supply the Allied armies ... there was simply not enough logistics capability to mount such an offensive at that point. "Home by Christmas" was too optimistic and too grand in scope. I would blame Montgomery not the smaller local commanders on the ground.
Andras Libal The Scheldt was not taken at the time of MG. Eisenhower delayed it for MG. Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust. The operation was under resourced, as Monty emphasised, with only *one* corps above Eindhoven. Monty wanted multiple crossings of the Rhine, there was only one and at Arnhem where he did not want it. Monty came out with the concept, and stood back. Mainly Americans planned it, Monty had no part in its execution. After, all he ever said of MG was that is was under resourced. He never mentioned the operation again. Einsehower never had a grip on Bradley and Patton who were stealing supplies from Hodges First Army, with some of his divisions initially to be a part of the operation. Lack of resources precluded Hodges from MG.
1:29 - Ha! Just realised the US paratrooper pictured on the map of Nijmegen here is Lt. Kelso C. Horne, commander of 1st Platoon, 'I' Company 508th PIR, who was wounded in Normandy and actually missed MARKET GARDEN. It's a well-known photo and appears in many books, including the front cover of the Osprey book on US Airborne Divisions in the ETO 1944-45. The battle in which Horne was wounded was the battle for Hill 95 (Saint Catherine) on 4 July, described in Chapter 8 ("We Practically Got Annihilated") of Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012), and it was one of Colonel Lindquist's worst mistakes before he failed to move quickly on the Nijmegen bridge in operation MARKET, and Gavin had to go to the 508th CP to chew him out and get him moving, unfortunately too late. Nordyke's principal witness in both instances was Captain Chet Graham, who was acting 2nd battalion commander at Hill 95, due to officer casualties, and 508th liaison officer to Division HQ in MARKET.
Great follow-up to your Market-Garden video. It seems that like in many military operations, every CO involved has their own version of the events. As for Gavin self-incriminating memoirs you have to take one thing into account that was not mentioned in your previous video: Some officers have a sense of self accountability: They had a mission to carry out, they failed. It's their burden to carry and no one else's. Gavin's own words certainly have some of that in them. Even as the full picture of the battle unfolds as the reports come in, he refuses "an easy way out" as to put the blame on their superior officers or their own staff. I was born into a four-generation military family, had a brief stint in the military myself(drafted, then stayed in for a bit longer) and had seen quite a bit of that-and the exact opposite-in my time in. If you read the declassified reports of Operation Gothic Serpent(The "Black Hawk Down" incident of Hollywood fame) you'll see a lot of that in Task Force Ranger's CO, Brigadier General William F. Garrison's account of the raid(He took full responsibility for the raid's outcome) At the same time, the 160th SOAR's force commander's report and the excellent "Black Hawk Down" book by Mark Bowden(Itself considered the most accurate non-military account of the operation, even by the military) paint a different picture of the same events(political pressure, ignoring previous warning signs, forcing a daytime operation in enemy controlled territory, previous military actions resulting in civilian casualties, growing civilian discontent with the TFR)What I mean with all this is that we have a lot of Gavin's personal perception of his actions tainted with his sense of failure and his tendency to take the burden of the defeat for not being able to succeed against the personal experience of other field commanders. Just by saying "I am to blame" doesn't make it the absolute truth. Anyway, keep up the good work!
General Horrocks in his auto-biography says that the operation was doomed anyway, because Monty ( understandably, after the ease of advance in the previous few weeks) underestimated the ability of the Germans to resist, and that the British did not have the forces to defend a single bridgehead on the Eastern side of the Rhine.
It seems a strange thing for Monty to underestimate, considering he got his fame in Africa, where he was very familiar with the back and forth nature of war as supply lines shrank and extended. I tend to feel that he came up with the plan and his input from that point was limited. For me, its enough blame to go around between Browning and Gavin.
The reason Nijmegen bridge wasn't taken on D-Day is because Browning told Gavin to not take it until the Groesbeek heights were secured. He also dropped them near the German border, which was naturally crawling with reinforcements. I believe had Ridgway been in command of operation Market, things may have gone better. In Guy LoFaro's book; 'The Sword of St. Michael; the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II,' Ridgway was the prime candidate to lead the operation. The US had more Airborne divisions committed to the operation, Ridgway had more combat experience, etc. But in the end, Brereton chose Browning which shocked Ridgway, who had been his rival since North Africa and the 'Red Beret incident.' This isn't my biased opinion as an American either, Ridgway was just a more capable leader. So it seems unfair when people blame Gavin and the 82nd for the failure of the operation, when they were only acting under orders. Also, the reason they didn't split up on D-Day to take both the heights and the bridge, is because the Division was going to be dropped over the course of several days, due to the lack of enough planes to get them there all at once.
_" it seems unfair when people blame Gavin and the 82nd for the failure of the operation, when they were only acting under orders."_ Gavin was ordered not to go for the bridge?
@@nickdanger3802 Frost is wrong. When Gavin found out no one had moved towards the bridge, he was in a rage, ordering them to the bridge immediately. By then it was too late. By the time they launched an attack the Germans had poured men onto the bridge and into Nijmegen - accessing Nijmegen via the bridge. If they moved to the bridge on landing the fight in Nijmegen town would not have happened. Browning was in the air when the 82nd should have been moving towards the bridge. When Browning found out the bridge had not been seized he was concerned, ordering Gavin to seize it.
@Duglife The US, British and Polish paras were all in the same army. Browning was highly experienced being involved in paras way before any American, that is why he was in the First Allied Airborne Army.
One factor often overlooked is disconnect between planning expectations for the accuracy of delivery of airborne troops and the capability to do so. I gather the assumption was that this would be at least as accurate as was achieved during Overlord however, either through lack of training or actual degrading of capability, the same was not achieved, too many troops were unable to play an effective part in operations as a result.
@Mathew WHERE did you come up with this brain fart? The British loved gliders precisely because they could be flown to a virtually pin point landing. After action photos show that very few gliders ever went astray. They cracked-up, but they weren't astray. Most were in such good shape they could've been reused - but for the tender mercies of the Germans - who were very much into bonfires. The utter absence of German ground troops meant that no parachutist failed to simply march on to where he was supposed to be. This was totally unlike D-Day, where every guy was lost in the dark and Krauts were just about everywhere. Your thesis lies bleeding -- no it's dead.
Actually they didn't, there were not such a large number present that it ought to have affected planning. What they underestimated was the ability of the German commanders on the scene to adapt, build scratch Kampfgruppe and to pull the right sort of heavy duty reinforcements from Germany itself and get them to the right places necessary to choke the operation. Mistakes on the ground, ie Urquhart/Lathbury's and Browning/Gavin's on 17th, were committed as they took no account of how fast the German forces could build a perimeter to stop the Allied Airborne forces. Add starting XXX corps advance at 2:30 in the afternoon with strict instructions not to advance after sunset and you have all the ingredients necessary to introduce enormous delays into receiving relieving forces and create a self made disaster.
If you can, you might do something about the complete disregard for Dutch underground intelligence immediately before and during the battle. I know they had infiltration difficulties during the war, but I don't see that as an obstacle in this instance.
We're seeing a lot of comments regarding Browning's weaknesses as a Corps commander and I would agree with most of them to be honest. However, perhaps we're not being entirely fair given the fact that 1st Allied Airborne Army represented the largest joint allied command of the war (one could make the case that 1st Canadian Army with all the commonwealth formations was a joint command, but I'm talking about merged American/UK formations). Browning had to balance a tremendous political football. 21st AG would get 9th US Army under its command, but that formation remained largely homogeneous. Brownings command was integrated at the division level. MG required 1st AAA to function seamlessly given the complexity and timing of the plan. Browning may have been flawed as a Corps commander and made poor decisions, but the nature of the command was a difficult proposition. It leads to American/British blame games. I don't think this series of vids is excuse making for one side or another. It's analyzing an interesting battle that was unique in the integrated nature of the allied participants.
I agree. Browning and Gavin. You can tell Frost is livid, and he should be. It was an ambitious plan, and there were other factors. But it actually should've worked.
According to Ryan, Browning also both ignored intelligence that should have affected commencement of the plan and had the intel officer responsible for identifying the potential threats basically dismissed from the operation.
The "ignored" intelligence was the main reason why the airborne operation was expanded from the initially planned 2 divisions up to 3 divisions (1st British Airborne, US 82nd, 101st) and the Polish Brigade.
While Browning and Gavin get a lot of blame in this series (and by those seeking to fix some sort of parochial attachment to whether it was a British or US failure), the nuances of the command decision set is fascinating to me. Why, for example, do we not mention that 1st Allied Airborne Army was actually under the command of US Lt. Gen Lewis Brerton, who'd recently been commander of the 9th Air Force (he was a USAAF officer) and was someone universally disliked by both US and UK field commanders for his poor performance on the close air role. Brerton was asked repeatedly to run two sorties on D-Day in order to double the number of troops dropped in the various landing zones. He refused based on crew weariness, but had done two airlifts to support the Dragoon landings. High commands seemed fixated on using 1st AAA in some way, with over 40 operations canceled prior to MG. MG was conceived and executed in less than a week, and relied on something never done with Airborne troops in the past, namely putting the farthest command 60 miles deep in enemy territory. The operation relied on the capture of no less than 19 bridges in terrain that did not facilitate overland travel with the lowlands, dikes and poulters endemic of Dutch countryside. Most of all, it almost ignored the Germans as a factor in the planning. As I've said before, we can make a reasonable assertion of the tactical failure vis a vis Browning/Gavin and the Nijmegen Bridge, but the strategic planning and conception of this was haphazard, at best.
Ray Barata _"the strategic planning and conception of this was haphazard, at best."_ The operation was daring and succeed in its prime aims. It was only 7 miles short of its objective, after covering around 65 miles in a few days. The AAA was itching to get in as all their operations were cancelled as the landing zones were overrun by ground troops. MG was derived from Comet. Monty let them all do it and stood back.
Market Garden, like so many other military operations was lost before it started. The entire operation was plagued with false assumptions and an over optimistic view of the outcome. (The Germans are defeated and we can do this in 3 days) Clearly there were more, but everything was founded on those. In the US Army we did many war gaming exercises as part of officer training. Market Garden was one such exercise. After we did this several times we had one clear takeaway. If they ever war gamed this before they tired it, they never would have done it. In 4 of 5 tries the operation failed and the 5th just barely succeeded. What we learned was there were just too many critical points where things could go wrong. If not at one bridge, then at another. The Germans only had to create enough difficulty at one point anywhere along the route for the whole thing to fail. Granted, we were just a bunch of Captains and Majors, but this was our job to learn.
@@johnsorge3034 He gets a big one, especially if he is as capable as the German Army. They were absolutely deadly, I remember General McCaffery saying that they were the most effective Army in history. He may have been right. I think the problem with most of these commentators is that they do not appreciate terrain. They think the world is a two dimensional game board.
Lets say against all odds half those Allies made it to Arnhem then what?They had no supply at all and back up only if weather permitted.And Model has the Ruhr right there and all the 88s,Tigers,Panzer IVs and Stugs at his beckoning by rail and in force - Dunkirk II - The Rhine
@@bigwoody4704 I have thought the same about the 82nd. Even if Gavin had mad dashed to the bridge over the Waal he would probably have lost his DZs and certainly been unable to hold the North end of the bridge, it probably would have been a disaster. In many way it came very close as it was, without the intervention of British tanks he would have lost the bridges vicinity Mook on Wednesday morning. It would have made the fight for the Waal river bridges moot.
I certainly wouldn't even dream of arguing with John Frost. However, as a layman I believe the loss of the radios was 'the beginning of the end for 1st Airborne at Arnhem. Good communication in any battle is vital for success!
Murphy's law of war: All plans go to hell after the first round is fired. The Market garden operation was doomed to failure because it required precise timing and movement.
@@TheImperatorKnight Like 1st AB stuck to the plan by not taking one bridge (out of three) until 2000 and with around 800 men? The only high ground between two river valley's and also the glider landing zone for the next lift less than 24 hours away ...and the place Browning had picked for his HQ, brought in by 36 of 1st AB's gliders.
Monty was an idiot,even the Russians used the Broad front thrust. *British author of Military History, Max Hastings, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495* “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force eighty miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation *The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer
The failure was ultimately down to Brereton who refused to commit all of the necessary transport aircraft to the operation, making it impossible to land all of the airborne troops in one landing on the first day as the original concept required. This was the critical decision that doomed the operation, if all the airborne troops had been landed as intended, they would have been able to secure all objectives.
On Day 1 there were 1,545 transport aircraft and glider tugs. 1,049 C-47s dropped paratroops. There were 478 gliders. www.ww2f.com/threads/exactly-numbers-of-aircraft-used-in-operation-market-garden.47416/
Ultimately Montgomery because it was a singular thrust and hence “easy” to stop with the movement of reserves. I use the term “easy” with notation because it is relative given the nature of war. The assumption the the Germans (pronounced Gerr-mans, like Sosabowski) were unable to react was a grave underestimation of the enemy and can be compared to Operation Shingle which took place approximately 100 days earlier. (more on that later) But given the nature of the question who was responsible for the failure within the operational boundaries of market garden it would be the delays encored to XXX corps and the drop sites given to 1st Airborne and even the 82 Airborne. Dropping the entire 1st Airborne south of Arnhem bridge and dropping one half of the 82nd north of Nijmegen would have placed them in a Cul-de-sac defensible and placed the supply drops for both divisions in the center. Not that they needed a defensible position but it would’ve made it easy to attack directly across both bridges with the entire division in the British case and if the Americans had dropped 1/2 North and 1/2 south of the bridge they would have taken it on the first day. I Do you understand that splitting the division 1/2 north and 1/2 of South of the river the Americans would have entailed risk but that would have allowed the taking Nijmegen bridge first and Grave bridge second. Nijmegen bridge was irreplaceable the Grave bridge was replaceable. The concerns About the flag at Arnhem bridge and the terrain south of Arnhem must ring hollow because it’s exactly were they dropped the Poles. Also the dispersement available transport was botched because they should have allocated priority to the first airborne. It was far out on the limb and therefore should have been dropped all at once with in the 101st being given less transport because it was closer to XXX corps. Yes the 82nd airborne should’ve taken the bridge it was assigned on D day (the 17th) but ultimately it’s delay was only 24 hours. If it has been standing there with bridge in hand when XXX corps rolled up on the 19th on time the Irish guards armor would not have been able to make it to Arnhem because the 43rd division was still 24 hours behind and the armor was not going to operate independently without infantry divisional support, Especially in between Nijmegen and Arnhem. The end around amphibious landings at Anzio show how adept the Germans were at planning and movement of reserves. As a result general Lucas said afterwards “Never try and supply a corps up a single road” Stalin, Zhukov and Rokossovsky were planning the destruction of army group center And Rokossovsky said he wanted to attack at two places. Stalin said to Rokossovsky “One strong blow is better than two weak blows” R Rokossovsky Corrected Stalin which must’ve took some balls and said t”Two strong blows are better than one strong blow.” So in closing your supposition that market garden failed because of the 82nd airborne is demonstrably false because of the delays suffered XXX corps even if the Vanguard had made it there on time ultimately it would’ve been delayed because I didn’t all arrive there at one time. One thing you fail to mention Is that if 82nd airborne had gone straight to the Neimegan bridge and taking it or attempted to take it the explosives would have gone off they were set it was only the battle of the river crossing that caused the disconnect of explosive charges. It is problematic I understand but if the 82nd airborne had attempted to take the bridge on time and/ or was close to successful the Germans would’ve blown the bridge. as it is the delay caused the bridge not to be blown And the delay was the only thing that kept the bridge standing
I also think that putting the blame on one person mostly (Gavin) to save the honour of the British generals, as the author does here, is too narrow-minded and leads to false conclusions. Your informations show that there were even more obstacles and shortcomings in the planning and execution of the plan. Imagine: What would have happened, if the Nimwegen bridge had been taken on the first day. As you have pointed out, the "cavalry" wouldn't have arrived in time anyway. But let's say, they would have arrived earlier and reached the Arnheim bridge on the first or second day. The bridgehead, established by Frost's small group, was very small. And the tanks reinforcement would have had to fight it's way through the narrow streets of Arnhem. German anti-tank guns, tank destroyers, panzerfausts etc. would have been hastily concentrated to block the advance of the Allied tanks. Even if they would have managed to conquer the whole city, the Allied would have been surrounded by more and more German forces and all next fighting would have been a bloody mess. A successful Allied attack required overwhelming forces so that they could take Arnhem and expand on sufficient terrain on the other side of the Rhine on the first two days. The whole operation relied too much on airborne troops alone who work best as a surprise in combination with a major attack. This was one teaching which led to a better use of paratroopers in operation varsity when the Allied crossed the Rhine at Wesel and dropped the airborne troops simultaneously to the advance of the main forces. There were too many "ifs" in this operation. Remember: Strategic management should not rely on that what should happen but what could happen.
Browning *did not* prioritize the Heights over the bridge. He gave them *equal* priority. Gavin de-prioritized the bridge after he failed to seize it, ordering *all* his men out of Nijmegen town. _"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it-for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend."_ - Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH. The American post war version of events is one that attempts to whitewash their failure at Nijmegen, to capture the bridge on the first day. The film _A bridge Too Far,_ made when Browning had already died, only cemented the false narrative in the minds of the public. Since then many researchers have uncovered the real facts. The 508th did launch some patrols into Nijmegen. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion almost reached the bridge. Three stragglers from the patrol of 40 men took prisoner seven of the 18 guards prisoner, including their cannon guarding the southern end of the bridge. If the 82nd had bothered to turn up at the bridge two hours earlier rather than hanging around DePloeg they would have hopped and skipped onto the bridge whistling Dixie. When Gavin found out the 508th were not moving to the bridge, he was livid, expecting them to be moving to the bridge, if there was no opposition. The 508th did send a recon patrol. According to Phil Nordyke’s Put Us Down In Hell (2012) three lead scouts of the troop of 40, were separated making it to the vicinity of south end of the road bridge approaches, not the main steel span. They captured seven Germans and also their small artillery gun. They waited about an hour for reinforcements that never arrived, having to withdraw then observed the 9.SS-Panzer recon battalion arriving from Arnhem. These few scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge just before the 9th SS recon, reached the bridge about an hour before the 9th SS. Joe Atkins in The 508th said, _"at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge."_ That was the 9th SS arriving. US Official History, page 163: _Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol_ After around 4.5 hours after landing a _patrol_ of 40 men were sent. _Colonel Warren directed Companies A and B to rendezvous at a point just south of Nijmegen at_ *_1900_* _and move with the Dutch guide to the bridge. Company C, a platoon of which already had gone into the city as a patrol, was withheld in regimental reserve. Although Company A reached the rendezvous point on time, Company B "got lost en route." After waiting until about 2000, Colonel Warren left a guide for Company B and moved through the darkness with Company A toward the edge of the city._ *_Some seven hours after H-Hour, the first real move against the Nijmegen bridge began._* _As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight._ _As Company A formed to attack, the men heard the noise of an approaching motor convoy emanating from a side street on the other side of the traffic circle. Enemy soldiers noisily dismounted (the 9th SS now in the town)_ _No one could have said so with any finality at the time, but the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of mostly_ *_low quality troops_* _encountered at most other places on D Day._
The irony is, that by having his HQ in the Groesbeek Heights, Browning had a front row seat to the door being slammed shut on 30.Corps. So he can't even say it was some sort of miscommunication, you could argue that this is the part of the operation he could monitor in almost real time and he would be able to have the most influence over. I would be curious to know how much airlift the Corps HQ took up, if instead they had maybe, brought another regiment, or even a battalion to Njiamagen that could have taken the bridge in a coup de maine.
Within 82 airborne, there is a discrepancy about events. Gen Gavin says he VERBALLY told his Brigade commander Lundquist to take the Nijmegen bridge soon after landing, while Lt Colonel Lundquish produces his written order saying his Brigade was to hold the landing grounds for subsequent air drops. The 82nd did not take the bridge, and did not seal off roads from western Holland, which allowed German troops from the west to cross the Nijmegen bridge to assist in the defence of the north bank of the Waal. Several hours were wasted, losing the airborne trump card of surprise, and evening attacks on the bridge were repulsed.
My father was at the bridge with Jonny, All 2 para veterans that I met said it was a suicidal mission. Frost had to do what he did and the men respected him for that. After all that you said I am glad you are keeping this historic event alive and who is blame is an interesting point of view. Thank you .
Absolutely correct. The failure to secure the bridge by the 82nd as the death blow to the entire operation. Whether the blame rests with Browning or Gavin is irrelevant, as the both failed to indentify the real importance or necessity to secure the bridge. The aim of the operation was "to secure the bridges" to allow a passage of lines by 30 Corps all the way to Arnhan. Hence not securing the brigde on day one was contrary to the plan.
"In Nijmegen, the arrival of British armour had raised the intensity and scale of the fighting. Extensive fires had broken out, marking the progress of the XXX Corps advance. Combined Sherman and infantry attacks during the early night hours of 20 September had been halted by accurate artillery fire around the traffic circle south of the Hunner park. SS-Captain Krueger of 21 Battery had personally directed the fire. At 0130 two Shermans remained with sheared tracks after the attack had been repelled. During the course of the morning three more combined arms attacks were concentrated upon the gradually shrinking 10SS perimeter defending the southern bank of the Waal." - It Never Snows in September, by Kershaw, page 192. "At 1500, 40 Sherman tanks plus artillery and air support began firing to cover the advance of Cook's 3rd Battalion as they crossed the Waal in boats. - Kershaw, P196. But resistance inside Nijmegen continued for quite some time after the famous actions to take the bridges. Bittrich (commander of IISS Corps) reported at 2330 on September 20th that "nothing [had] been heard from the Nijmegen garrison for two hours" and that he could "only assume the German units had been destroyed". - Kershaw, page 212. Just because nothing had been heard for two hours at 2330, didn't mean that Nijmegen was cleared of German units. It just meant that they hadn't been in contact. Some units continued to fight on. Kampfgruppe Euling were still holding their positions at 2230, although they then made a break for it in the dark some time afterwards." - It Never Snows in September, by Kershaw, page 213 "The Guards Armoured Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the Airborne division. This left but two armoured groups to go across the Waal [Nijmegen road bridge]. Even those did not make it until next day, D plus 4, 21 September, primarily because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings." - The Battle for the Rhine 1944, Neillands _At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced by eleven tanks, another infantry battalion, two batteries of 88mm guns, 20 20mm anti-aircraft guns and survivors of earlier fighting in Nijmegen._ "American readers should note that the above comments come from the US Official History, where the notion that Lord Carrington and his five tanks could have penetrated this screen and got up to Arnhem on the night of D plus 3 - even supposing such a move was ever suggested - is revealed as a delusion." - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the bridge the US *failed* to seize at Nijmegen, with the British having to take it for them? 20 points for the correct answer.
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@@bigwoody4704 *BZZZZZZZZZT!* Wrong answer. Rambo, the name the bridge the US 82nd *failed* to seize at Nijmegen, with the British having to take it for them was the.... 🍾🎊🎈 *WAAL bridge* 🍾🎊🎈 Zero points Rambo. Zero.
I saw a woman get off a bus in North Creek New York one summer day. She wore a light blue cotton dress that fell just below her knees and her skin was like warm milk chocolate. She had light blonde hair tied in a long pony tail and she took her shoes off and walked on the shady part of the grass by the river's edge, just beneath the tall trees. If I ever regret my life for a moment, if I forget to be thankful for living, I'll remember that gal and be happy that I saw her. Imagine you've jumped out the Dakota side door and are floating over Arnhem with 25K other paratroopers, what do you think they're thinking at that moment? I know I'd be thinking of this woman, the one I never spoke to but wish I did. Some guys might be thinking of the Germans and what they'll do when they hit the ground, not me, I'm a dreamer.
I like your videos and I think your research is well done. If Boy Browning had not been present at Nijmegen on that first day, I would definitely say that Gavin was at fault. But as Browning was there from the first drop... how could he not be to blame? Even if Gavin had gone "rogue" and decided to take the heights completely on his own, Browning was right there too... and Browning was in charge. At any point he could have said... "who's taking the bridge? why aren't we taking the bridge? Gavin, get your butt and your men on that bridge now!" And that would have been that.
91 views in the first 26 minutes... not bad, TIK. ;) I think that it wasn't a single variable or person that led to defeat. The operation had lots of moving parts, and both good and bad decisions were made. And no decision-making was made in a vacuum. Thanks for uploading! :D
It isn't bad at all. Good to see you were one of the first though :) I'm not so sure I agree with you. I know the operation had a lot going on, but if 30 Corps had stalled for 36 hours at Son Bridge, the 82nd may have been in trouble too by the time it got there. Blocking the road to Arnhem is ultimately what stopped the Allies from winning. And holding onto the bridge at Nijmegen was the biggest roadblock that needed to be overcome. If that hadn't happened and 30 Corps had been at Arnhem on day 3, or even day 4, the outcome of the battle may have changed.
Aw, thanks. :) I feel so special. One of the other factors that could have made a huge difference was a second drop on the 1st day by the Polish paras. It could have made the British toehold on the Arnham bridge stronger, and maybe helped them last longer. Another thing that could have been tried was to have 30th Corps spearheaded by their engineering companies, in case any bridges needed to be repaired or bypassed. The paras wouldn't have engineers when they seized the bridge, and the 30th Corps wouldn't be expecting a fight beyond the initial breakthrough of the German lines. The order of march was every bit as critical as the need to move the sheer mass from point A to B. Almost like a reverse Dunkirk, lol.
I haven't got the foggiest who was to blame for this operation to have not been fully successful. Judging by the never ending and longstanding debates on the subject I conclude that no one else knows either.
Honesty is awesome :) this is why this is a historical debate, and a controversial topic. It's left to interpretation. This is why for many history is classed as an 'art' (some may not agree with that statement) - because when it comes down to it, it's about interpretating the facts and weighing up the different sides of the argument. Yes, science can prove there is paint on the canvas, but how you perceive that paint changes your view on the events.
TIK My comment was a bit tongue in cheek, but you are right. All the debates, could haves, should haves and might have beens help to make it a fascinating subject. As for me, my father was an RAF code and cypher clerk attached to Montgomery’s HQ that advanced from the beaches right up to the surrender of the opposing German forces on Luneberg Heath. He would have received and sent out many of the signals during those momentous times.
Every single video you create is a gem my friend..... I want to tell you that it’s a CRIME that you don’t have a million subscribers. So insightful and informative..... as a WW2 enthusiast myself, most everything you talk about, I already know..... however, you still manage to always teach me something new with every topic. Keep up the outstanding work. I wish you all the best, and I will be becoming a patreon supporter of yours this week.
It’s very true that there is plenty of blame to go around especially at the core and army levels of command. The more I research market garden, incidentally it’s the most interesting battle to look into, the more it baffles me how these commanders actually thought this could succeed. It would only take one thing to go wrong to cause failure. It just so happens almost everything goes wrong and thus you have this disaster.
you do wonder some times! complicated plans that require every part to succeed. i was thinking in many ways though obviously not in the battles themseves how similar it was to the us armies campaign against the sioux in 1876.my point is they made the plans with no one seeming to say well what happens if this fails! 3 columns with no communication diverging on an unreconoittered sioux village travelling huge distances but expecting to arrive at the same time! same thinking as market garden! crook gets stopped on the yellowstone unknown to the rest making the objective now impossible.custer goes in half cocked against much heavier odds than he thought and gets wiped out.much the same planning at gallipolli well send ships in to wipe out the shore batteries whilst landing troops and turkey will fall! what if the ships cant get there as happened and the troops get dumped miles further back than anticipated ! that cant happen oh it has ! time and again in history commanders blind themselves to the real situation in the hope their great plan will succeed.sadly as at arnhem it normally involves ignoring the enemy potential problems with the terrain and normally as with operation market garden making the attempt which needed the maximum of equipment supplies vehicles etc to win with considerably less and hoping to luck! dieppe was another such fiasco!
From Monty, The Field Marshall by Nigel Hamilton: General Student, in a statement after the war,considered the ‘Market Garden’ Operation to have been proved to be a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of the vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of the war.
Not in Allied condition in 1944. Gain territory didn't help anyway help Allied in 1945 in ending the war. Much better was give this resources and manpower to Patton and his 3rd Army.
Horatio82 Market Garden, which was under resourced and which Montgomery wasn’t heavily involved in the planning of, was partially successful. Over 50 miles of German held territory was taken. The towns of Eindhoven and Nijmegen were liberated. It protected the only port taken intact, Antwerp.It prevented the Germans from operating V rocket from that part of holland.it isolated a whole German army.Troops from Nijmegen turned East into Germany. If you’re looking for someone to blame for why it wasn’t a 100% success, that can largely be laid at the feet of Lieutenant General James Gavin of the US 82nd Airboune Division who didn’t move to take the bridge in Nijmegen immediately. But it was partially successful. The Market Garden salient acted as a buffer, one of its prime objectives and proving it’s worth when the Germans rammed through through US lines in the Bulge. It stood between the advancing Germans and the German 15th Army. It prevented any German attempt to re-take Antwerp directly as the Germans had to try and get to Antwerp the long war round via the Ardennes in December. Keeping the 15th Army isolated was a real part of the operation. Market Garden prevented that vital German link up with the 15th Army. The salient was vital. The most direct and easiest route to Antwerp was via Venlo. It would have been easier for the Germans to go via Venlo from the Ruhr area but the British were in their way. Going through the Ardennes was one third longer at least in more difficult terrain, for an army desperately short of fuel the extra miles mean a lot, as was proven. They could go through Venlo if they liked but the British in the Market Garden salient between the Germans and Antwerp would have seen the build up and been prepared. The Germans refrained from attacking directly through British defended front lines after 1943. They avoided it and chose to attack through American lines instead. General Blummentritt said the British were next to impossible to dislodge once they were ensconced in defence but the Americans were prone to not defend so stubbornly. Market Garden almost certainly blocked an easier routed German counter attack on Antwerp. From Wikipedia: the Allies did possess a deep salient into German occupied territory that was quickly reinforced. Milton Shulman observed that the operation had driven a wedge into the German positions, isolating the 15th Army north of Antwerp from the First Parachute Army on the eastern side of the bulge. This complicated the supply problem of the 15th Army and removed the chance of the Germans being able to assemble enough troops for a serious counterattack to retake Antwerp. Chester Wilmot agreed with this, claiming that the salient was of immense tactical value for the purpose of driving the Germans from the area south of the Maas and removing the threat of an immediate counterattack against Antwerp. Brian Urquhart who was privy to some of the initial planning before he was sacked, said they were considering taking huge parts of Southern Holland Eisenhower’s broad font meant there was not enough resources to do this. In fact, German General Blummmetritt said that had Eisenhower given Montgomery the resources he wanted in September it would have been all over for the Germans at that point. Under Monty the allies moved 400 miles in just 3 months from June to September 1944. Under Eisenhower the allies didn’t move 100 miles in 7 months from September 1944 to March 1945. Wikipedia: Blumentritt disagreed with the Allies′ strategy in the west, discussing the precarious nature of the German position with its meager one armoured division against the twelve of the Allies, and he stated that had Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group been unleashed earlier for a concentrated armoured assault (as he had wished) rather than fighting on a broad front, "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944." Even with its’s problems and lack of resources, Market Garden would probably have been 100% successful if Gavin had followed his orders. It wasn’t the plan that was flawed, it was the failure to adhere to the plan. The biggest mistakes historians make is to glorify and narrow mindedly concern themselves with Arnhem and Oosterbeek. The Allies were stopped in the south just north of Nijmegen- that is why Arnhem turned out as it did. -SS Major-General Heinz Harmel, 1987
@@Phantomrasberryblowe All that point can't cover two facts: 1) MG operational goal was to cross the Rhine and in that Operation MG failed, rest is just covering failure with excuses, 2) MG was grave to any plans to cross Rhine in 1944 or even try to push in different region. Gained territory in anyway cover losses of supply and mapower. Plus any significant German forces weren't destoryed or even weakened. No real operational or startegic succeses was gained. Allied stuck on Rhine line to 1945 thanks to Monty's arrogance. Whole MG plan was full of holes. To optimistic timetable. Underestimating enemy and poor executed inteligence. Lack of planes to transport troops. Problems with communications. ETC, etc. From start this operation was more gamble than professional military work. All typical for Monty style. All lessons from operation Overlord was basicly forgotten by Montgomery and his staff.
@@Phantomrasberryblowe Plan was full of holes. Maybe Gavin just make it bigger failure. But still I am convinced that Montgomery and Browning are fathers of failure called Market-Garden. And in anyway MG was succses.
MG was Monty's "child", but once it began, he seems to have vanished. What sort of commanding is that? Browning and his HQ required how many dozen gliders on the vital first day? They could have brought in more allied troops and weapons, which surely would have better effected success. Browning had never before commanded troops in combat, knew the war was nearly over and likely wanted to enhance his career record. Actually, Browning was second in command of 1st AAA to the American general Louis Brereton...why did command fall to Browning! Once again in warfare, ego and "victory disease" in the very top ranks doom good soldiers to frustration, defeat, and needless deaths.
You reminded me that it was Brereton who directed Gavin to 'take the bridge with thunderclap surprise'. So really it was Brereton rather than Monty who Gavin directly disobeyed. And Brereton allowed Gavin to get away with it - so he is culpable as well! It's interesting that Brereton is usually left out of the MG narrative and he seems to get off lightly. Indeed Brereton seems to have gone AWOL after giving Gavin those orders which he subsequently ignored.
SuperCaratacus _" So really it was Brereton rather than Monty who Gavin directly disobeyed."_ Correct. Gavin was in the First Allied Airborne Army and was answerable to its leaders. Monty was in charge of an army group, a general over generals. Monty would have no contact with the likes of Gavin.
@@Caratacus1 It was also Brereton who refused to commit all of the necessary transport aircraft to the operation, making it impossible to land all of the airborne troops in one landing on the first day as the original concept required. This was the critical decision that doomed the operation, if all the airborne troops had been landed as intended, they would have been able to secure all objectives.
As Corps Commander, it was Brownings responsibility to ensure the correct tasks were correctly prioritised in order for the timetable to work as planned - therefore if a subordinate commander[Gavin] wanted to deviate from the assigned task, it was Browning's responsibility to identify what was the immediate priority - and wether a deviation was necessary and justifiable within the context of the stated aims and timings. It was Brownings job to make the right decision and he failed, badly. The subsequent delay of 36 hours cannot be justified if there was no evidence whatsoever of a potential German threat. I find it ironic that real evidence of German Panzers near Arnhem was brushed aside whilst a rumour was treated with such "concern". Still, Browning didn't get as many men killed as some of his WW1 predecessors did......but he is mostly responsible for the "Heroic Failure" that killed so many brave and determined men. GUILTY
Oh gosh, I've just written a long reply to someone else on the same point - if you don't mind a copy and paste job: The concern was that II.SS-Panzerkorps was known to be in northeastern Netherlands with two shattered SS-Panzer-Divisions under command - the 9.'Hohenstaufen' and the 10.'Frundsberg' Divisions. The Dutch resistance had only identified elements of the 9.SS-Panzer among the scattered troops billeted in the area between Arnhem-Apeldoorn-Deventer-Ruurlo, and they had identified a divisional headquarters at Ruurlo, but not which division it belonged to. The Allied intelligence assessment (the latest before the operation was SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary #26, dated 16 September 1944) was that these divisions were each reduced to a regimental battlegroup with few if any tanks, and that they were refitting by drawing new tanks from a depot thought to be in the Kleve area just across the German border southeast of Nijmegen. There was a fear that the Reichswald could be hiding up to 1,000 tanks - hyperbole that started a silly rumour the tanks were actually there, and Gavin was told the excellent Dutch army barracks facillites in Nijmegen may have a regiment of SS troops in them. This in turn created the concern over the Groesbeek heights - an area of woodland ridge line that was a natural defensive position between the drop zones and the city of Nijmegen with its bridges. It was for this reason the 508th PIR had to seize three initial objectives on the ridge at De Hut (2nd Battalion), De Ploeg (1st Battalion), and Berg-en-Dal (3rd Battalion), but as soon as this was achieved the 508th were expected to send 1st Battalion into the city to seize the highway bridge as soon as possible, and this is where things went wrong - the precise details of which are the answer to another question and not the one you're asking here, so that's a discussion for another comment. Browning's dismissal of the tanks photographed by reconnaissance Spitfire on 12 September in the Deelerwoud north of Arnhem, was based on his view that the tanks were obsolete models and probably not even serviceable. This story rested on Browning's Corps Intelligence Officer, Major Brian Urquhart (name changed to 'Fuller' in the film A Bridge Too Far), who connected these tanks to the Dutch resistance reports and gave his story to Cornelius Ryan in an interview for his 1974 book, A Bridge Too Far. The 1977 film is based on the book and is highly controversial, not least because Browning's widow and actor Dirk Bogarde both objected to the portrayal of Browning in the film, but Bogarde didn't opt to turn down the part and seems (in my personal opinion watching the film) to have sought to mitigate the script by playing the character as somewhat conflicted. I presume it was all he could do, or pass and have someone else play the role. By the way, Bogarde served in the war as an RAF photo interpreter working on Dempsey's 2nd Army staff, selecting bombing targets during the European campaign, including Operation Market Garden. He knew all the key personalities, including Montgomery and Browning. The problem with Major Brian Urquhart's testimony is that Browning was no longer alive to give his side of the story, and the photo in question was no longer available... until 2015. The photo (Frame 4015 taken 12 Sep 44 by 541 Sqn), along with the RAF's entire library of images, was donated to the Dutch government after the war to help with reconstruction and land use surveys, and only came to light when the Dutch government digitised their archives and put them online. The key photo frame was identified and studied by the RAF's Air Historical Branch, and under magnification the tanks can be determined to be Mark III and older Mark IV models (with the short 7.5cm gun), ruling out a 1944 panzer division as the likely owner. The study is available as a free pdf called 'Arnhem: The Air Reconnaissance Story' (2nd Ed, 2019) on the RAF MoD site. So, we now know which unit the tanks belonged to, because the only unit in the Netherlands with those vehicles at the time (before Market Garden started) was the Reserve Panzer Kompanie of Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', the training unit for the Luftwaffe's only panzer division currently fighting the Soviets in Poland. The Regiment was based in Utrecht and the Reserve Panzer Kompanie in Harderwijk on the Zuider Zee coast. During the crisis in the west in September 1944, the 1.Fallschirm-armee was formed to plug the gap in the line in Belgium. The 'HG' Regiment transferred to it from LXXXVIII Korps (Netherlands occupation forces), and the three training Abteilungen (infanterie/panzer/artillerie) were mobilised and sent south to fight British 2nd Army on the Albert canal. The Reserve Panzer Kompanie was mobilised on 7 September and sent to Hechtel in Belgium to join II.Abteilung, but only three tanks completed the journey without breaking down, and were destroyed with much of the battalion at Hechtel by Guards Armoured Division on 12 September, the same day the remainder were photographed near Deelen undergoing maintenance (turrets were turned to allow engine hatches to be opened) at a supply dump in the woods near Fliegerhorst Deelen, the largest German airbase in the Netherlands. On 17 September, the day Market Garden was launched, these tanks were laagered at Wolfswinkel, near Son north of Eindhoven, and they attempted to fire on the drop zone of the 506th PIR (101st Airborne) during the landings, but were shot up by escorting fighter bombers. Two Mark III tanks escaped, one ran the gauntlet of 502nd troopers in St Oedenrode but was only hit by unprimed bazooka rounds, and they both by-passed the 501st at Veghel to bump the E/504th (82nd Airborne) roadblock at Grave. Some casualties were caused to troopers climbing out of their foxholes, in the belief the tanks were the British arriving early, and they then turned tail were not seen again. So, Browning's dismissal of the tanks in the photo appears to have been good judgement on his part, and history proves that he was right to be more concerned about the unknown location of 10.SS-Panzer-Division - it was not known that the Ruurlo headquarters was the 10.SS-Panzer-Division's, the 9.SS-Panzer were headquartered at Beekbergen near Apeldoorn.
You continue to completely ignore a vital point. If the 82nd did take the bridge on the first day, what happens when Grabner's SS troops arrive? They either take the bridge back or they set up defensive positions on the other side. The SS reinforcements including the self propelled guns and 88s continue to arrive either way. Say the 82nd continues to hold the bridge against Grabner and his arriving reinforcements. Now the British have to come across one bridge into the fully prepared SS. Judging from how long it took for the British army to move up the road (against almost no opposition) after the bridge was open, they wouldn't have gotten there any quicker fighting the SS in the open up the one-lane high dike road. Actually, I think bringing the SS into Nijmegen did the British army a big favor. As may things as went wrong during Market Garden, trying to pin blame on any one thing or person is unfair. Browning certainly is my leading candidate as he used us so many resources to add nothing to the battle except a distraction for the 82nd airborne. It was ultimately his decision to secure the Grosbeak heights although that was a sound decision. There is blame from Monty on down but my biggest 'blame' is ignoring TWO SS divisions at Arnhem. If those two divisions are not there, this battle is won by the allies easily, hands down, war is over by Christmas.
Valid points, thanks for commenting :) I'll address most of these in my Browning video (will be out in a couple weeks). The fact that 10th SS Panzer could just park itself north of Nijmegen and block the route there is a good counter argument, and one which very few people have so far suggested. I wish more were capable of coming to that conclusion rather than simply dismissing the facts and blaming "Monty" or "the British". Here's one for you: Have you considered that Browning and Montgomery got a lot of flak over the fact that there were two depleted SS Panzer Divisions in the Arnhem area, but zero flak about the perceived threat of 1,000 Panzers in the Reichswald forest? They reacted to that by placing part of one parachute division on a gentle slope, which they hoped would stop the equivalent of an Army Group's worth of panzers.
I think they were more worried about controlling the Groesbeek heights for the terrain feature. Yes, it's a gentle slope but it's the highest point of ground and dominates the highway north. Any German presence there could easily cut the highway with artillery called in from batteries safely in Germany. In my research, I've never seen any evidence they truly thought or had intelligence to suggest armored forces there. However, the did know the 9th and 10th SS had disappeared from the battlefield and perhaps assumed the Reichswald forest as the place they most likely were. In most research I've done, both Gavin and Browning agreed the heights must be captured and controlled as well as the nearby landing zones which were needed on the following days. This was actually their agreed on #1 priority. Much like the British in Arnhem, they had to leave a significant force behind. They had three reasons for doing so: a) control the high ground b) Protect Browning's headquarters he established there and c) protect the drop and glider landing zones for the following day. I should also point out an error in your previous Market-Garden film. You stated one of the 101st Airborne gliders crashed near Student's headquarters with the entire Market-Garden plans. Only one glider from the 101st crashed in enemy territory with those aboard killed. The other six that landed in enemy territory ended up with their men and cargo reporting to the division on D+1 or D+2. The glider that did crash with loss of life was from the 101st Airborne Signal company and sure would not have had complete plans for the entire operation. As a matter of fact, I doubt Maxwell Taylor had (or had even seen) a copy of the complete plans. However, one of the gliders carrying Browning's headquarters (coming in in American gliders with the 82nd) did crash near Student's headquarters and that is where the entire plan of Market Garden fell into German hands. The 101st documentation on gliders can be found here: www.benning.army.mil/library/content/Virtual/Documents/Hardcopy/paper/D731.1_E91_no419.pdf I am currently working on a documentary about the Battle at Best. Did you know only two men won the Medal of Honor for the 101st airborne in the entire WW2? Did you know both died within 24 hours of each other at Best? Did you know the company commander tasked with capturing the Best bridge went on to survive the massacre at Chosin reservoir in the Korean war or that later on in life, he was the intelligence officer in Texas charged with keeping an eye on Lee Harvey Oswald who assassinated President Kennedy? Really interesting stuff in that Battle at Best. Thanks for replying and look forward to more debate!
What about the fact they had to use boats to cross the river to attach the bridge from the other side. The boats took forever to reach the bridge by trucks for the soldiers to cross. The narrow road and driving through the liberated town's caused a major delay to deliver the boats. That was a suicide mission for the 82nd airborne to cross the river.
I feel this was more of a strategic failure than a tactical failure. The plan for 30 Corps to be in Arnhem within a day was far too ambitious. Clearly the Germans weren't done fighting at that point. And the questionable landing area for the British airborne was just suicidal. 7 miles from the objective? Even if they had tanks on hand that's still too much ground for a light infantry unit to cover. Great video
Ray Barata's comment that there were a host of issues dooming Market Garden from the start aside, in this particular 'scene', Browning as senior commander to Gavin should have ordered the taking and securing of the bridge as the #1 priority, with a small scout force to occupy the heights as a precaution against flank/envelopment. Gavin should have been roasted as well in American command for not prioritising the bridge. Thanks for putting these video's together, by the way. Good job, all 'round.
I do not understand your desire to blame Gavin. Browning was there, and the superior officer. If he wanted the bridge taken day one he was in position to make it happen.
browning, according to several people, did tell gavin to secure groesbeek heights before proceeding to the nijmegen bridge. but this was only a small part of a plan that had little, if any, chance of success, and ultimate blame must go to the man who dreamed it up and pretty much forced it into being, montgomery.
Gavin was ordered by Browning to take the hill BEFORE taking the bridge: "...This hill mass went up to one hundred meters and dominated the countryside for many miles. It had been used as a maneuver area by both the Dutch and Germans and was well known. It is the only high ground in all of the Netherlands. At a conference at the headquarters of the British Airborne Corps on September 16 (D minus 1) General Browning directed the CG of the 82nd >>> "not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished and the Groesbeek-Bergendahl high ground was firmly in our hands."
I think that the plan for operation Market Garden was good, it wasn't an impossible mission. The problem was the 36 hours delay, otherwise they could succeed
What I would want to know is this: Even if the operation had succeeded, and Arnhem bridge taken intact by XXX Corps, then what? Did the Allies really have the strength and supplies to attack the Ruhr region, given the immense difficulties they were having just holding their supply corridor? The Allied intelligence about the German strength was wildly inaccurate, and I doubt they would have had the momentum left to fully exploit the strategic opportunity. I'm reading through A Bridge Too Far now, and the supply situation of the Allied armies was miserable.
I have often wondered the exact same thing about Market Garden. If the Allies could barely "maintain" the corridor, how in the world could they possibly have pushed through to the Ruhr and shut down German Military production. Surely, Monty and Ike and Brereton and all the other high level leadership of the western Allies. I have always suspected there must have been a different goal for Market Garden... just a goal that since the operation failed, they never felt the need to let people know just how badly they had failed.
In another video TiK clearly showed that the objective was not the Ruhr. The objective was reaching the sea and closing of the pocket so that the Canadians could open up the port of Antwerp. That would have allowed for major resupply of all Allied armies and would then in a second large operation have allowed an attack into the Ruhr. However for Market Garden the objective was the sea. Encircling a huge number of German troupes, crossing the Rhine and making it 'easy' to opening up the biggest port, all with one operation seem to me well worth doing. Specially if you have large numbers of Paras waiting for an operation. As for the supply situation, you must consider that the Germans were in just as bad a supply situation, usually far worse.
@@ppumpkin3282 To the best of my knowledge, no XXX Corps troops reached Arnhem itself during the battle. Some, however, did reach the north bank of the Rhine at Oosterbeek. Notably, parts of 4th battalion of the Dorsetshire regiment, part of 43 Wessex Infantry Division, which in turn was part of XXX corps. They were sent across the Rhine in small boats on 24 september to reinforce the Oosterbeek pocket and assist in the evacuation of 1st Airborne. Also, while they did not cross the Rhine themselves, the XXX Corps artillery made an impact in the last few days of the battle, giving heavy fire support to the Paras in Oosterbeek.
Were Browning and Gavin to blame for the failure ? The Market Garden plan was 'signed off' by Brereton. He was responsible for the 1st Allied Airborne Army. He knew that all the bridges had to be taken with 'thunderclap surprise' so why did he okay a plan that relegated the Nijmegen bridge to the lowest priority ? It was Brereton who approved the flight plan of General Williams that so hamstrung the Airborne commanders and ignored all the Airborne tactics.
@frankandersson76 I like some aspects of it, but I think the movie is responsible for a lot of myths people take as fact. And unquestionably blames the wrong people, except perhaps Browning.
My dad said that the RAF liaison was completely ignored when he explained that VHF radio sets would not work with that much surface water around, leading to the supply drops ending up in the wrong place.
Seems like you try to find opportunities at every turn to disparage the U.S. military. Lets face it, while the British have maintained a very impressive army throughout history it has for the most part been quite small in comparison to mainland European armies and has relied upon its colonies and smaller allies to supplement itself and furthermore in any major war it has required a few major allies to piggy-back off of, but just because the British army was so good does not mean that others were so bad. On the whole I find that many of your common talking points are often irrelevant and duplicitously cynical.
TheNightFox No. I put into place those who distort history. The US armies were not bad armies, just unexceptional. Facts prove that. The prime defence of Britain has traditionally been the navy, then supplemented by the RAF, which was the case even in 1939. The British army was small and highly mobile, because it need not be large. It was always very mobile having to deploy quickly to far off regions. Look at the amazing quick response to the Falklands invasion. The Soviets changed their tactics towards NATO because of it.
John Burns the British would never have been able to invade the falklands without the US. The US provided the army with night vision and also promised to replace an aircraft carrier if lost.
The Royal Navy has been the primary weapon in Britain's arsenal, successfully defending her from the risk of invasion by the "large armies" of other countries, and projecting British power
I definitely feel like Market Garden wasn't a case where a single factor doomed the operation...to a point. Perhaps its a personal variant of the "rotten plan, poorly executed" idea: the whole operation Market Garden battleplan reminds me of some of the Imperial Japanese Navy battle plans, where everything only works as long as the enemy obligingly cooperates and steams to its doom. Gavin certainly deserves blame for not securing the bridge. I will not deny that. I just feel like some of the arguments, like saying he flew in guns to pound mythical tanks, are made with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight which was not available at the time. the fact that the corps commander dropped in to the heights doesn't help either because obviously, you don't want to leave your corps HQ exposed to attack (even though now we know that on day one there were no forces that could threaten it...it's never a good idea to assume the enemy isn't there). Gavin may have felt that he needed to heavily fortify the HQ position and this would've left him short-handed to take the bridge. The moral of the story is there's enough blame to go around--Gavin, Browning, Urquhart, hell even Monty to some extent (it was after all his operation). The only part I don't necessarily agree with in the "rotten plan" idea is that 30 corps dawdled...it didn't. Let us not forget that the Germans were fighting off well-trained paratroopers at Arnhem with reserve units for the most part...thus the "German Victory" view is sort of right as well. Perhaps, when everything is said and done, all 3 views on why Market Garden failed are correct to varying degrees.
Sayer AWR _"I definitely feel like Market Garden wasn't a case where a single factor doomed the operation"_ In fact one single factor did doom the operation. The operation was relying on each crossing being seized immediately.
The plan was ridiculous- the execution mediocre. Browning was the husband of Daphne du Maurier who claimed he was haunted by the failure of this operation post war. Nijmegen wasn't the only issue - the drop zones for Arnhem were 8 miles from the bridge. It was amazing 2 Para even got there with a Panzer division resting in the town.
Absolutely, I agree it wasn't the only issue. However, the point was that there's no point even dropping at Arnhem if Nijmegen bridge isn't taken. The 36 hour delay at Nijmegen killed the operation more than the drop zones at Arnhem (even though they were bad).
@@TheImperatorKnight the problem with the operations was no one airborne division commit whole on day One An airborne operations to capture bridges but no airborne bridge equipment with the division if thing go wrong
So browning wanted to setup his corps HQ on the Groesbeek Heights? Maybe he prioritized the heights because wanted to be sure his HQ was secure. There are numerous examples throughout history of commanders prioritizing their own security over the success of the mission
@John Cornell Thats too many objectives for such a small force. Securing the drop zone, the heights and the bridge on day one was wishful thinking, they needed to prioritize the objectives and the bridge was more vital to the operations success. remember, less than 1/3 of Market's total force made it to their drop zones on day one, the rest of the force would come in the next two days. they could have secured the heights on day two when they got reinforcements.
They say not to speak ill of the dead but it's extremely difficult when Browning is mentioned. So many troops killed wounded and captured and all to satisfy his public school vanity.
One Yank's opinion: Browning was senior to Gavin; if he indeed ordered Gavin to secure the Groesbeek Heights before going for the Nijmegen Bridge, or if Gavin was indecisive and Browning did not say in effect "Jim, go for the bridge now; we're secure enough here", Browning has to accept a major share of the responsibility for Nijmegen Bridge not being taken on the first day. Your commentaries are very interesting. Have you evaluated the claim reported by Ryan that Col. George Chatterton, commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment, recommended a coup-de-main on the south approach of the Arnhem Bridge not unlike what was achieved at the Caen Canal bridge ("Pegasus Bridge") by Maj. John Howard's command on 5-6 June?
Mikey300 Lost at Nijmegen by Poulussen. It never Snows in September by Kershaw (the German view) Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Magry (a Dutchman) - the best. From here: clickamericana.com/eras/1940s/stories-from-wwii-nijmegen-holland _"Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible, as the bridge was the key to the division’s contribution to the success of the operation."_ _`After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me - let’s get him moving.” On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”`_ Lindquist said that Gavin was not specific in his instructions to him in the pre-drop briefing.
Mikey300 The events on the evening of the 82nd's first day :- Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards the Nijmegen bridge at all. - Lost at Nijmegen by Poulussen. Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what information the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen road bridge. - Lost at Nijmegen by Poulussen It was also around *21.00,* 6 hours after landing, when "A" Company left to attempt to capture the Waal [Nijmegen] bridge. "B" Company was not with them because they had split being night and "visibility was less than ten yards". - Poulussen The attacks were resisted by the Germans until the next day. Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge yet, another attack was about to go in. Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter. Then at around 11.00, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely by Gavin. - Poulussen
We know that the Germans failed to blow up the bridge after its capture was imminent due to wires that were disconnected at some point in the battle. If the 82nd had been close to capturing the bridge on day one, would the destruction mechanism been intact? We don't know. If the bridge had been blown on day one, the situation would have far worse.
Wellthe bridge would not have been blowed if they took the bridge on day 1 since due to the infantry shooting the germans that where guarding the bomb would have been shot down and with the force of their dead bodies it disconnected the bomb.
@@Aesthelica Since the Germans who had their trigger finger on the detonator were on the opposite side of the river from the paratroop landing and since the paratroopers would have had to go through the town, there would have been plenty of time for the Germans to blow the bridge.
TIK why don t u blame Monty for it? is Monty such gold star in your books? or he had no flaws? right... cause Monty was the man how wanted this OP in the first place? sure Browning Command 1st Airborne Corps and overall command of the ground operations, but it was Eisenhower how approved it before it started and Monty how "worked it out, with its flaws" which resulted in the backfire mission called Operation Market-Garden. sure blame Gavin for it, he was tasked first to secure and hold Nijmegen Bridge and 2nd task could have been Groesbeck Heights, so it was an error of decisions there, it didn t affect the Wars outcome, but the loss of life still, was shambles and should be blamed on Monty and him alone.
The premise is that the plan could have worked as it was, if they'd taken Nijmegen Bridge on Day 1 as ordered. I'm reserving my assessment of Montgomery until I get to him - that's why I'm working my way through the North Africa Campaign, so that I can assess him compared to what came before. I've already said Churchill was a poor military leader (although good politician) so I have no problem laying criticism on Montgomery. And he may be the worst general ever, but I'm not so such Market Garden was as bad a plan as people make out. I do think it could have worked, had Gavin decided that a hill was more important than one of the main objectives. And that's the point, Gavin's task was to take the bridge - but he chose to go for the secondary objective first, costing the operation.
TIK my response I hope wast to aggressive at all, I merely would like to hear your point on Monty, I think he was excellent General and Commander, but underestimate your opponents and "we will be home before Christmas" and poor intelligence or lack of trust towards the Dutch resistance? I have seen it or read it so many times how an operation goes south when you doubt your enemies capabilities, underestimate your opponent cause some or majority of the German forces in France were in full retreat, panicked or cause of several others possibilities if "what if or why". I am surprised my self why did Gavin posses the hights overtaking the bridge? was it possible he knew or feard that "if the Germans did have enough panzers in reichswald forest or were gathering forces for a Counterattack from it? or simple thought the heights were more important, in case another encirclement happened around the 82nd around Nijmegen? as it happened to 1st airborne at Arnhem and around osterbeeke? " if that's the case, or just the bad planning, no or very little intel on German forces and German possibilities in late 1944/1945? the overall command was Monty and planning was Monty, overall command during this operation was Browning, overall Unit commanders were Horrocks, Gavin, Taylor, and Urquhart, the Poles came in late "cause of four in England or that UK leadership still in late 1944 didn t trust or whatever reason didn t want the Poles in on it ? or why delay to deploy the Polish brigade at all? why? cause of losing "transport planes?" which could be made and shipped from the United States of America, in a risk of the war in EU to still be on in 1945 or 1946? or that "What if The Germans did do well in stopping the Market Garden plan, also which could have lead to a totally or slight difference in "Battle of Bulge" a few months later? was it even possible at the later stage for the Germans than to gain something of peace? and then able to use whatever German forces and resources to stop or halt the Soviet invasion? I know this is too much information or may opnion in the matter, Market Garden was important stepp in what lead as I bellive in that how the Germans manged to, with what they had left to do a small or very short counter offensive during the Battle of Bulge.
The Northern Warrior What is often forgotten (a bit of the benefit of hindsight I know) is that if XXX Corp had reached the Zuider Zee and then advanced in a pincer movement with the Americans to isolate the West Wall and the German industrial heartland the Ruhr would the thousands of Allied soldiers have been killed and wounded at the Battle of the Bulge, The Hurtgen Forest and the Rhine Crossing. Harmel of the 10SS is quoted as saying '...if crossing at Nijmegen had been secured on the first day it would have been all over for us. Even if we had lost it on the second day, we would have had difficulty stopping them....' All plans of War are risky. Nothing is a dead cert. Take Operation Overlord. It is arguable that the only reason why the 6th Airborne Division was not destroyed by the formidable 21 Panzer Division was because no one would wake up Hitler from his slumbers and give orders to attack the British. The Overlord planners could never have factored that into their plans. In total contrast the Germans, unshackled, acted swiftly and decisively during Market Garden. Some point out and argue that the Market Garden plan was drawn up too hastily, with some justification I acknowledge but how much time do you need to plan. Operation Overlord (including its predecessor) took over 12 months in the planning but they didn't have a plan for the Normandy Bocage with its sunken lanes. Although the Americans practised sea borne landings in Devon I'm not aware that any of their tanks ventured down the Devon country lanes because if they had I'm sure they would have come up with a solution.
tik: i had a short discussion with you about a year ago on this battle. ("it's the Americans' fault. spoken like good Brit.") just saw "a bridge too far (Not!) Horrock, Carrington refuse" which touches on our discussion. i've done a passing study on kursk. the russian and german historians have spilt almost as much ink refighting the battle as the soldiers originally spilt blood. unless it is a clear cut victory or defeat i really don't know how one can evaluate battles. local leaders will exaggerate their success and downplay their failures all the way up the line to the generals. eyewitness testimony is equally unreliable. military history is a really difficult area to determine truth.
One thing's for sure it's not because XXX corps were too busy drinking tea and following orders as the film and Band of brothers (both great btw) imply.
My understanding is that the allies didn't believe the Dutch underground's info, or trust them. For example the telephones were all still operating and at one point the Dutch using the phone to call someone in the next town to find out whatever info they had on the German army, and only then did they start to take notice but it was far too late
Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division, was a newbie in Airborne Operations, and so when he asked for drop zones closer to the bridge, was turned down on the pretext that it was impossible to drop people there. The spirit of the D-Day Landings (and in this, I am INCLUDING the Airborne Landings) where anything and everything was possible was long gone, and Market-Garden was a failure pretty much from the get-go. With the American Army it might have succeeded, but with the British Army it was never going to succeed. (Incidentally, I'm talking about the British Army of 1944-45, when more then one officer was reminded of the casualties in World War One, and most especially during the Battle of the Somme.)
David Briggs The US army in 1944-45 was nowhere near the quality of the British. The only allied retreat in 1944-45 was the Americans. When the Germans attacked at the Bulge the US 1st and 9th armies were put under British command, the 9th stayed under British command until the end of the war. Look at the US debacles at Metz (Patton move 10 miles in 3 months) and the Hurtgen Forest defeat. American armour was not up to it either.
The U.S. Army of 1944-1945 was nowhere near the quality of the British? Really! The British DURING OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN paused their advance for no apparent reason, with no opposition in front of them and with their infantry readily available To the Americans, it sometimes seemed as if the British soldiers stopped, sometimes at the drop of a hat, to brew up some tea. Look at what the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions did in Brittany after the breakout from the Contention Peninsula, where they drove some 15-30 miles a day (if not more), running off their maps in some cases. Did the British achieve anywhere near that rate of advance outside of North Africa at all during the war? Nope! You state that the only retreat in 1944-45 was the American's, but that was when the thinly held front lines under the Americans was hit by very strong German forces (American Divisions faced numerous German Divisions alone), and even there the Americans held the line and prevented the Germans from making a much deeper penetration, and only two Divisions (the 106th and 28th) suffered being overrun, and then only partly. Look at the actions of the 99th Infantry Division to the north, which held their position despite it being the target of one of the German advances; the Germans were forced to go around the 99th. You talk about the Battle of Metz (where my father first saw combat) and Hurtgen Forest as being American debacles, but you are forgetting something very important, the Third Army was VERY short on gasoline, having been diverted to the British up north. As a result, Patton was basically forced to hold in place (except for a few minor attacks) until Antwerp was opened up and the gasoline situation improved. THAT'S why it took Patton 3 months to take Metz, the lack of gas, not the lack of ability by the Americans. Once the gasoline situation improved, Patton, with only four Divisions (5th, 90th and 95th Infantry and the 10th Armored Divisions) was able to take Metz in only around 3 WEEKS. And with regard to the 1st and 9th Armies being placed under British command, that was because the German Ardennes Advance tore the 1st Army in two, and Eisenhower felt that the Commander of the First Army could not adequately control the elements of his Army to the north. The First Army returned to Bradley's command late in December or early in January, AS DID THE NINTH ARMY. The war in Europe ended in MAY 1945, and the 9th Army was returned back to Bradley's command in FEBRUARY 1945, several months before the end of the War. The biggest problem with Market-Garden was it was almost a completely British affair (except for the America Parachute Divisions), and the British Army was not up to the job, period. Read some history books about the subject, or perhaps watch the movies a Bridge Too Far and Patton for a better idea about the American and British Armies in 1944-45.
Have you read any books on the subject? British Historian John Keegan makes some very good points about the failures of the British in 1944-45, as does the book by Corneliius Ryan (I think), the author of “A Bridge Too Far”. While I might have been wrong about the reasons for the turning down the drop sites, the fact remains that the drop sites Urquhart request WERE turned down.
David Briggs XXX Corps in Market Garden *did not* pause their advance for no apparent reason at all. You have been watching that infactual film A Bridge Too Far. Hollywood history. The Yanks went into Brittany with few German troops there and never captured a port. A waste of time. Patton diverted a third of his force on a wild goose chase. The British moved from Normandy to Belgium in a matter of days. It is a fact that the only allied army retreat in 1944-45 was the Americans. The US 1st and 9th armies had to be put under British control - *fact.* *The US 9th army stayed under British control until the end of the war,* well about 2 weeks from the end when it was all over bar the shouting as the Germans had about 30 operational tanks. *All* armies in Normandy were under British control. No gasoline was diverted to the British up north from the US 3rd army. None. Patton fought a 3rd rate army full of units of deaf & dumb men - literally. He moved 10 miles in 3 months, losing 55,000 men. 40,000 lost at the Hurtgen Forest defeat. Gasoline was being brought from Ostend as a pipe from England was run over well before Antwerp was operational. _"watch the movies a Bridge Too Far"_ Oh he did watch the film! My oh my! LOL. And he watched the film Patton as well. Hollywood history at its best. LOL. *You were wrong on every point.* Read my posts on Market Garden on this video.
Sean Connery at first did not wish to cooperate with the making of "A Bridge Too Far." He was concerned it would be promoted as a blatant 'Glorious Defeat' whereas he was of the opinion it was just a collossal failure. So it wasn't just the director who had a low opinion of certain top Allied commanders. I mean, come one General Urquhart... Getting lost for a full day by getting stuck between enemy forces? He should have properly informed his back-up that, should anything happen to him (Urquhart), his back-up would have free reign in command of the operation.
Had Browning stayed in the UK on the first day he could shrug off responsibility on Gavin. However since he was in direct face to face contact with Gavin he should have ordered Gavin to secure the bridge following the original plan. Some could say that he was not paying attention to what Gavin was doing specifically while he was gathering the full picture of the battle. However he would have to rely of radio intelligence from all other units which could understandably be delayed in reporting while he should have expected reports from Gavin commands progress in real time and should have been curious why he had not heard that the bridge had been taken or what was going on with it. However it is claimed he knew nothing was going on with the bridge so he can not even claim that he did not know. Yes, Gavin fails directly but Browning fails for not over riding him. Frankly the way Gavin reports that he made the decision but his commander ok'd it, makes me wonder if Gavin was shielding Browning by shifting the brunt of the blame on to himself.
@Donald Hill You've found the acorn. Keep in mind that Gavin received his second star promptly after MG. He HAD done exactly as ordered: save Browning at any cost. Browning in SS hands would be a tortured LtG - a man who knew too much about ALL Allied airborne operations. If MG had been a success, Browning would certainly be given his fourth star -- and a life peerage -- like the other British greats. He was a PREMIER general in the eyes of all of his peers. How many guys can EVER claim to have founded a essential arm of the Service? That only happens about three times in a millennia. Gavin's personal bravery is beyond question. In this event, he's wiping clean the stain that Browning put on his own record. He should absolutely NOT have landed with his troops. He was far too valuable.
@Donald Hill Of course he was. At the end of the day, Gavin gets his second start, Browning disappears from WWII history. During Varsity, everything Browning did wrong is reversed. Gavin goes on to glory. That's some screw-up there. Heh.
MG airways felt like an extreme high-risk op to me. Too many single points of failure to succeed. Inability to capture any of these bridges leads to failure of the operation.
I am Canadian and I often defend Monty in talks with Americans. I think Normandy was his finest hour in my books. His failure to capture the Scheldt when it was an easier catch was his worse hour. That said for market garden I think the buck has to stop with him. He should have overseen the plan and made sure Browning knew his job and the job of the 82nd. I agree Browning doesn't impress me but unless he by passed Monty's orders then the blame has to at least partly lay on Monty.
Peorhum The Scheldt was flooded by the Germans and the river to Antwerp was mined with wrecks littering the narrow river. The idea was to take only coastal channel ports for supplies. The Canadians and Czechs failed to seize Dunkirk, with delays in getting Ostend and Bologne operational. Inconvenient Antwerp, 40 miles inland, was taken intact so had to be used despite not on the initial list of ports. The mines and wrecks had to be removed. Ships moving up to Antwerp needed protection all along the length with AA guns. Market Garden was a daring and sound plan. Eisenhower, who approved it, even in the late 1950s said it was well worth the effort and risk. Monty had no say in the execution of the operation. The created Market Garden salient did act as an essential buffer for Antwerp as was shown when the Germans scythed through US lines in the Bulge. British forces moved down from the salient to stop the German advance. The Schedlt was put on hold by *Eisenhower,* on on 6 October did he instruct Montgomery to clear the Scheldt, which he had started anyhow.
Actually I have read detailed books on the Scheldt and it was one nasty battle. There was a point after 30 corp took Antwerp that the Scheldt would have been a relatively easy catch but Monty ignore it despite increasing pressure by Ramsey and Eisenhower for him to clear it. Not saying market garden should not have happened but I am saying Monty failed to give the Scheldt the priority it needed both before and after market garden. It wasn't until Monty was about to be fired that he finally put enough resources into the Scheldt...again despite both Ramsey and Ike being on his case. Monty kept telling them he will make it his top priority yet kept working on plans to put him over the Rhine. As for Canadians and Czechs failing to take Dunkirk and some of the other canal ports, it was due to them being fortresses and all in all very hard to take. The Canadian army had basically 2 corps and with those 2 corps were expected to push on 2 axis, one towards Falaise and the other one along the Canal taking the ports. These operation were given little support by Monty, while Ramsey helped all he could. Knowing how long it would take to take, then make operational the canal ports Monty should have known the importance of the Scheldt yet ignored it until he was forced too act. He kept saying it would be his top priority but gave the Canadian forces he set to clearing it no support, all the while expecting them to clear or hold the other canal ports as well. In the end when forced he then give the support needed which lead to it's relatively quick clearing. Many historians who know of the Scheldt details, share my opinion that it was Monty's greatest failing. It almost cost him his job as head of British forces in Europe, as Ike was about to get him sacked but he then did what he was told to do and saved his job.
Peorhum _"Antwerp that the Scheldt would have been a relatively easy catch but Monty ignore it despite increasing pressure by Ramsey and Eisenhower for him to clear it."_ Montgomery approached the US leaders of the First Allied Airborne Army about a drop on the Scheld but they said no. It was also expected that the Canadians and Czechs would have taken Dunkirk, but they never. It took the Canadians 2 weeks to take Boulogne and Calais, ports much superior to Antwerp being on the coast. It was expected they would be taken in a few days like LeHavre. Only Admiral Ramsay was screaming to take the the Scheld immediately after seizing Antwerp intact. The Germans had over 100,000 troops there so Boulogne and Calais looked better bets. There was no delay in taking the Scheldt because the priority was Boulogne and Calais for obvious reasons.
I have read a fair amount of detail meetings between Ike, Ramsey and Monty and the ports were top priority from the start and sure once Antwerp was taken that is when the real pressure was applied to Monty to clear the Scheldt and Monty kept doing lip service only, as he had his mind elsewhere. Don't forget the Cdn army had to push along the coast taking the ports while pushing to Falaise, and when Falaise was done, half the army had a few days rest then was sent either to help with the ports or sent to Belgium to begin clearing the pocket and pushing out of Antwerp. Actually Antwerp was not really taken by 30 corp, just part of it was, the Belgium underground and Cdn forces had to clear the Germans completely out. I read how at 1st it was like a 9-5 work day where Cdn troops would take the trams to fight the Germans like they were heading off to work. Anyways, Monty delayed clearing the Scheldt as much as he could by not giving proper support to the Cdn Army which just did not have the resources to clear the Scheldt quickly like Ike and Ramsey wanted. I just got one of my books out and found the chapter about Monty putting off doing what was needed to clear the Scheldt. I wish i could copy and paste it for you. In a letter of Oct 9 to Ike, Monty stated he saw the Ruhr "a definite and clear cut military objective" that could be taken only with one commander in charge...HIM and he did not mention the Scheldt at all. In response Ike wrote...he acknowledged Monty's comments then said "That the real issue is Antwerp" The parlous supply state was "why I keep reverting again and again to the matter of getting Antwerp into workable condition. I have been informed by both the chief of imperial staff(Brooke) and chief of staff of US army(Marshall) that they seriously considered giving me a flat order that until the capture of Antwerp and it's approaches were fully assured, this operation(clearing the Scheldt) should take precedence over all others" Ever since the failure of market garden, "I have been ready to furnish additional troops from US sources for the purpose, provided that you desired them, and that gotten to you and supplied...I do not mean to be repeating myself about something well known to us both. The reason for restating it, however, is that the Antwerp operation does not involve questions of command in the slightest degree. Everything that can be brought in to help no matter of what nationality, belongs to you." That was just one of many letters and minutes on the subject made after market garden between Ike and Monty. Monty was fixated on getting himself into Germany!! This debate between Ike and Monty finally ended on Oct 16th, a month after Market garden started. In the meanwhile the Canadians had a hard fight with limited resources in France and in clearing the scheldt. Monty wanted to be the hero in Germany and HE wanted command like he had in Normandy and I think his delay in clearing the scheldt was part of his power struggle with Ike. Here is a quote from Ramsey "I lambasted him for not having Antwerp the immediate objective of highest priority, and I let fly with all guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Our forces were practically grounded for lack of supply, and now we got Antwerp and not the corridor(Nijemgen bridgehead) we should be in a far better position for launching the knock out blow. CIS Brooke told me after the meeting that I had spoken his thoughts and it was high time someone expressed them." From Brooke "I feel that Mont's strategy for once is at fault. In stead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place...Ike nobly took all the blame on himself as he approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem." on and on it goes...Monty did not care about clearing the Scheldt and had to be pushed to give it the resources needed. I had details of talks with Ike about Monty being removed of command for not doing as told but it is late and I don't have time to find it.
Peorhum *Montgomery was in a dilemma:* • Antwerp was taken intact, but it was up a 40 mile narrow river that was mined also with some wrecks in it that would take quite a time to clear. Not ideal. • 100,000 German troops had moved north from Belgium and France onto the Scheldt, so difficult to shift such a large body of men in such terrain. • LeHavre was taken in a few days which was only 107 miles south of Boulogne, so supply was improving. • Boulogne and Calais were superior ports than Antwerp being on the coast, not up a 40 mile river with slow moving ships vulnerable to air attack along its length. • Germany was not that far away and Monty knew the Germans were capable of launching a counter attack towards the coast hitting at the Allied supply. • V rockets were dropping on London from launch sites in Holland. *What do you do?* • You try and seize Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. Which Monty did. • You put in buffer in southern Holland to prevent the Germans getting to the coast and eliminate the V rocket launch sites. Monty did with Market Garden. Now. Monty never thought it would take *two weeks* to take Calais and Boulogne and fail to seize Dunkirk. If he thought it was take so long to seize Bolougne and Calais he would have acted on the Scheldt earlier. Imagine if Monty put all resources into the Scheldt in a big fight and ignored Bolougne and Calais? He would have been castigated as LeHavre was taken in only a few days. Even if the Scheldt was taken earlier the 40 mile river had to be cleared of mines and wrecks and parts of the port itself needed putting back into action as parts of it were under constant bombing. Taking the Scheldt earlier would not have made much difference to the opening of the port of Antwerp. More V rockets were targeted at Antwerp than London.
Nobody is to blame. It was a worthwhile gamble that had a slim chance of paying off hugely. Blaming anyone on the field is like blaming the dice for losing the bet.
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower, approved and under-resourced the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed - they were the prime planners. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a *whisker.* It was Brereton and Williams: ♦ Who ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practiced and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy; ♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps; ♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused; ♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet; ♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here; ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, however rarely seen at Market Garden; ♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of _"possible flak"._ The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said _'thunderclap surprise'._ Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends. General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives. Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 *seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges.* They arrived at 2200, *eight hours after being ready to march.* Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, *five hours after the jump.* The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself. XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film _'A Bridge Too Far'_ is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corps' Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin. Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
@@johnburns4017 Correct. The operation was killed by wrong planning by the air commanders. Monty handed the idea over to the air commanders Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst, Gavin, Taylor and Urquhart as he had zero jurisdiction over any air units.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Despite bad planning the operation was nearly a 100% success. Why? Because the Germans were in total disarray. Still in shock after being chased from Normandy.
@@johnburns4017 Indeed. And Monty only came up with the idea because earlier that same day, September 4th, the SHAEF intel summary assured him the Germans facing his 2nd British Army were "disorganised, demoralised and short of equipment and arms". Monty immediately sent communication to Eisenhower to get his idea approved but it took the best part of a week for Eisenhower just to get back to him. What on earth was Eisenhower doing?
how experienced was he? as far as i am aware british paras had not that much experience in combat jumps prior to D-day ,though some had jumped in desert operations.
I would lay the blame on a poor plan cooked by Browning and Montgomery. There was no effort to allow for things to go wrong such as bad weather in England. Also, I have often been puzzled by the relative drop weights of 3 divisions. The 1st Paras should have been dropped in its entirety on the first day along with the Polish brigade. The gives the most weight at Arnhem when the Germans are scrambling and best chance of capturing the bridge. The 82nd has the next task in importance. If there is one division that could be lightened it would 101st as they were the closest to XXX Corps and would reinforced/relieved first. Depending on weather and flow of the battle the rest of the airborne reinforcements (mostly 101 in this scenario) could be dropped to reinforce the 1st Paras or 82nd if needed. There was too much operational rigidity combined with not focusing on the key objectives that had to be taken for the operation to be a success. I tend to subscribe to theory bad plans are almost never saved by brilliant execution and I thing the MG plan was rather poor. Also, Dutch staff officers commented that they would fail anyone who came with the MG plan in staff school; they were never consulted in the planning from what I have read.
Ever since I watched these dokus by Tik, I wondered wether landing the main force in between Arnhem and Nijmegen would have been better. That way, imaginary tanks would not have been such a threat to the 82 and the British and Americans could have supported each other better. Also, there would have been a safer dropzone for reinforcements and supply.
Browning and Montgomery to blame? Did the US General Brereton command the whole operation? Monty was Field Marshall, and Browning commanded all three airborne divisions involved, there was another layer of command between them. The film has to avoid blaming any US generals, to protect the $$$ which could be earned in the USA, but what mistakes did Brereton (or US General Paul L Williams of troop carrier command) make? Troop carrier chose many landing grounds, insisting drops were not made in areas likely to meet heavy anti aircraft fire (so frequently far from the objectives). Film director Attenborough was a weasel, mocking the British armed forces so he could gross huge amounts of money from the USA audience.
@@keithhallam1155 As many have stated, there's plenty of blame to go around and Bereton certainly gets some. That being said, the focus on Browning is for a specific tactical decision that erroneously get's laid at Gavin's feet by many Brits protecting their own national pride. The blame Monty gets is because he was the primary architect of the operational design, which was ludicrous. It is true he wanted more resources than he got from Eisenhower, but they wouldn't have been decisive. XXX Corps wasn't going to get up that road any faster than they did, and weather is weather no matter how many planes you have. The plan was too optimistic and inflexible, and those men in Arnhem paid a terrible price for it.
Douglas Strother indeed, it is clear there was a problem with airforce command and its resistance to risk more during this critical battle. It is now, years latter utterly astonishing this wasn’t a priority given the fact that this was to be a drive to end the war in Europe early.
Well I would have thought that the fact the RAF did not give all of it attention to the operation would have been a big factor too. I would have thought with full typhoon support the German tank divisions would have been fucked good and proper
The lack of air support for 1st Airborne has always struck me as odd. The air resupply was getting through (on the wrong drop zones), so where were the Typhoons? But my major objection to the official story is 1st Airborne's radios going duff. What, all of them? And the excuse given both in Ryan's book and the movie: "Wrong crystals" and "It worked fine in the desert" is bollocks. 1st Airborne had been using its radios on training schemes in Britain for more than a year after North Africa. The whole thing stinks to high heaven.
@Peorhum: Caen was leveled by Bomber Command in Operation Charnwood, and this was in part in support of British 6th Airborne. Collateral damage was not an issue in July. @Howard Payne: There's a whole lot of surface water in the Lakes District of Britain, where 1st Airborne exercised. @John Burns: So the weather closed in to block radio, but did not block air re-supply to the German-held drop zones?
I never imagined I would hear such a different perspective on the failure to hold the Arnhem Bridge, and since that perspective comes from the commander of the only cohérent unit to reach and deny it to the Germans for any length of time, it is important. God bless the heroes of 1st British Airborne Division.
And when 4 tanks show up late then sit it wasn't going to either.They would have been blasted back into the Rhine,the Gerries where bringing in tons of armor from the Ruhr right around the corner..Monty being the amatuer and braggart missed the chance to open Antwerp as was 1st directed by SHAEF.The Wehr macht had an actual Field Marshall and the Allies unfortunately had......Monty.Who got played like a cheap violin
XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three and "back on schedule" having averaged just over one mile per hour. If it had continued at that pace it would have arrived at the German held end of Arnhem bridge at about the same time Frosts' men ran out of ammunition and made for the pocket.
Browning was to blame. It's what happens when politicians wear uniforms. No reasonable soldier would've thought the heights, and head quarter tents were a priority.
I agree.Even though Gavin came with the idea; Browning - as his superioir approved.That - and that alone - makes him responsible.As the superior officer, he should have kept to the priorities of mission.
I read that it took 33 planes to bring over his headquarters. Certainly hope they weren't in the first wave. Also another 7 planes for his signal corp. I read elsewhere they couldn't communicate because they were not on the same wavelength.
Given that the brave John Frost was not privy to communication between Lieutenant General Browning and Major General Gavin, and given that Major General Gavin himself "*admits it was his decision*" (see at 5:00) to not assign crucial priority to the capture of the Nijmegen Bridge, one could reasonably conclude that Major General Gavin was the one at fault here. Still, there could be nonetheless something that John Frost knows about that we do not know about.
Footnote: Although given command on the 82nd ABN, Gavin was still a mere brigadier. Not promoted to Major General until October, 1944. Unlike his counterpart, Maxwell Taylor, Gavin never got the coveted fourth star. Even in the inflated, wartime Army of the United States.
@Matt MG died with the drop zone selection. The loss of the southern end of the Arnhem bridge doomed MG. From that location, the SS could blow the bridge sky high at ANY TIME. Both bridges were built with integral explosive charges - pre-wired with detonation cables -- as from Day One the Dutch expected to be invaded by Nazi Germany. Both bridges ran the detonation circuits to the far side -- in the case of Arnhem that was the south side... the end that the SS controlled... the end that was never in British hands -- because Urquhart's request to land near the bridge was turned down FLAT. Ditto for Gavin's request to land near the north side of Nijmegen bridge. The failure to land paras on the island sealed the doom for MG. John Burns, et, al. are dreaming. Monty can't prevail if the Arnhem bridge is in the river. To re-emphasize -- the Arnhem bridge was pre-wired to be blown up by the Dutch. All that the SS had to do was double check the installation and then slam the plunger.
Horrocks said in "World at War" that he wanted to start as soon as humanly possible, when it was credibly verified that all that was defending the area was "The Stomach Brigade", and not II SS Panzer Corps. Of course, UK Bureaucracy of the time, won out
Montgomery ultimately was to blame he was only glory seeking to make a name for himself he wanted to be Knowles as the one who ended the war in Germany if you dig deeper he was jealous of General George Paton a devised market Garden he as far as I'm concerned gave no thought about the loss of life this operation. Would glean
'if you dig deeper he was jealous of General George Paton' Why would he be? He was in different army, at the other end of the Front and was higher up the chain of command.
of course you missed this little tid bit in your "research" because it makes the bits look bad, so it must be ignored Ridgway also had a negative perspective about the GARDEN force leadership. “I have always felt, and I still feel, that the sluggish actions of the ground armies in that campaign were inexcusable. A more vigorous command supervision from the top could have driven that armored force through.”55 He personally observed a situation which formed this perspective. On 20 September, D+3, he was moving through the battlefield near Eindhoven. He was alone but for his jeep, driver, and two aides. [W]e came up with the advance elements of British armor. There a junior officer stopped me and told me I could go no further because the road in front was swept with small arms fire. So we stopped a minute to watch how good our British comrades would take out this resistance. They had the muzzles of their tank guns pointing down the road toward where the enemy was supposed to be, but not a shot was being fired. It was a demonstration of caution. . . .I had seen it, and dealt with it many times before. . . .I couldn’t order this tank commander to move on down the road. So, after waiting about forty minutes, and seeing no visible effort being made to outflank this resistance. . .we (Author’s note: “we” means Ridgway and his aides) started walking down the ditch along the side of the road. We went a mile and a half, perhaps, with every sense alert, but not a shot was fired at us. . . .We moved on until we found General Max Taylor at the CP of the 101st Division.56 So Ridgway with his lone jeep was able to move along while the ground force did not
I have to ask whether taking Nijmegan Bridge would have been truly decisive. The armored thrust along the many-bridge route was being hampered by tough German resistance; unless the follow up assault reached Nijmegan, taking the bridge would have counted for nothing. I have to say again that Market Garden was flawed because too many things had to go perfectly. Of course, if for some reason the Germans' confused retreat hadn't been brought under control in time, the plan might had had a chance of success. But that's a big "if."
Were they there to capture a hill or a bridge? Gavin screwed up, and of course Browning being a British general in the airborne, WTF was he thinking? Was he jealous of Frost, and left him and his men there to die?
Understand your analysis on “ weakest link” of the operation, but is this perhaps more about whether the plan should have stopped one or more bridges before. Maybe at Nijmegen. Seems a bit that reactions are around what happened, not what would have been the better plan. What do you think?
the point's on your head it was blown apart pretty much everywhere much like your arguements. One elevated lane with no room for maenuver is the idea of an idiot - so I can see why you like it
Why? And I mean why with regard to both points. Both can be debunked by education. The more you look into Browning and Montgomery's roles, the more sympathetic you can become to their positions. A lot of people simply don't want to know. On the treatment of Brig.Gen. Sosabowski, he was rightly criticised for being difficult to work with, and for being insubordinate to Lt.Gen. Horrocks at the Valburg conference on 24 September, for which he immediately apologised at the latter incident. Montgomery initially wrote to Sosabowski to praise him and his Brigade for their actions at Arnhem, and to ask for recommendations for awards. It was only later he got reports from British officers about the difficulties they had with him, and that was why Montgomery then wrote to Alan Brooke (CIGS) that he was unhappy having the Poles under his command and wanted them removed (the relationship was always awkward because they were attached to the British Army but under Polish Government-in-exile control). Somehow, these documented facts got conflated into a suggestion that 'the British' blamed the Poles for the failure of the operation, which is a ridiculous notion to anyone familiar with the timeline. Sosabowski and most of his Brigade arrived late on D+4, too late to influence the outcome of an operation that had already failed, and in fact contributed greatly to saving the remnants of the British 1st Airborne Division by enabling its final evacuation across the Rijn on 25/26 September.
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One bizarre thing about Browning is this. As Frost eloquently pointed out; the German armoured presence in the Reichswald was based only on rumour, but Browning chose to treat it as hard fact. Yet when presented with hard evidence of German armour existing elsewhere, he chose to ignore it. One can only wonder why.
The unacceptable consequence fallacy. They desperately wanted the operation to proceed after so many other drops had been cancelled. Acknowledging the presence of panzer forces in the area might have caused the plan to be shelved. That was unacceptable so the threat "couldn't" be real. The threat from the Groesbeek heights didn't prevent the operation from going ahead, so it could be treated as real.
Not bizarre if you're across all of the facts:
The concern was that II.SS-Panzerkorps was known to be in northeastern Netherlands with two shattered SS-Panzer-Divisions under command - the 9.'Hohenstaufen' and the 10.'Frundsberg' Divisions. The Dutch resistance had only identified elements of the 9.SS-Panzer among the scattered troops billeted in the area between Arnhem-Apeldoorn-Deventer-Ruurlo, and they had identified a divisional headquarters at Ruurlo, but not which division it belonged to.
The Allied intelligence assessment (the latest before the operation was SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary #26, dated 16 September 1944) was that these divisions were each reduced to a regimental battlegroup with few if any tanks, and that they were refitting by drawing new tanks from a depot thought to be in the Kleve area just across the German border southeast of Nijmegen. There was a fear that the Reichswald could be hiding up to 1,000 tanks - hyperbole that started a silly rumour the tanks were actually there, and Gavin was told the excellent Dutch army barracks facillites in Nijmegen may have a regiment of SS troops in them.
This in turn created the concern over the Groesbeek heights - an area of woodland ridge line that was a natural defensive position between the drop zones and the city of Nijmegen with its bridges. It was for this reason the 508th PIR had to seize three initial objectives on the ridge at De Hut (2nd Battalion), De Ploeg (1st Battalion), and Berg-en-Dal (3rd Battalion), but as soon as this was achieved the 508th were expected to send 1st Battalion into the city to seize the highway bridge as soon as possible, and this is where things went wrong - the precise details of which are the answer to another question and not the one you're asking here, so that's a discussion for another comment.
Browning's dismissal of the tanks photographed by reconnaissance Spitfire on 12 September in the Deelerwoud north of Arnhem, was based on his view that the tanks were obsolete models and probably not even serviceable. This story rested on Browning's Corps Intelligence Officer, Major Brian Urquhart (name changed to 'Fuller' in the film A Bridge Too Far), who connected these tanks to the Dutch resistance reports and gave his story to Cornelius Ryan in an interview for his 1974 book, A Bridge Too Far. The 1977 film is based on the book and is highly controversial, not least because Browning's widow and actor Dirk Bogarde both objected to the portrayal of Browning in the film, but Bogarde didn't opt to turn down the part and seems (in my personal opinion watching the film) to have sought to mitigate the script by playing the character as somewhat conflicted. I presume it was all he could do, or pass and have someone else play the role. By the way, Bogarde served in the war as an RAF photo interpreter working on Dempsey's 2nd Army staff, selecting bombing targets during the European campaign, including Operation Market Garden. He knew all the key personalities, including Montgomery and Browning.
The problem with Major Brian Urquhart's testimony is that Browning was no longer alive to give his side of the story, and the photo in question was no longer available... until 2015. The photo (Frame 4015 taken 12 Sep 44 by 541 Sqn), along with the RAF's entire library of images, was donated to the Dutch government after the war to help with reconstruction and land use surveys, and only came to light when the Dutch government digitised their archives and put them online. The key photo frame was identified and studied by the RAF's Air Historical Branch, and under magnification the tanks can be determined to be Mark III and older Mark IV models (with the short 7.5cm gun), ruling out a 1944 panzer division as the likely owner. The study is available as a free pdf called 'Arnhem: The Air Reconnaissance Story' (2nd Ed, 2019) on the RAF MoD site.
So, we now know which unit the tanks belonged to, because the only unit in the Netherlands with those vehicles at the time (before Market Garden started) was the Reserve Panzer Kompanie of Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', the training unit for the Luftwaffe's only panzer division currently fighting the Soviets in Poland. The Regiment was based in Utrecht and the Reserve Panzer Kompanie in Harderwijk on the Zuider Zee coast.
During the crisis in the west in September 1944, the 1.Fallschirm-armee was formed to plug the gap in the line in Belgium. the 'HG' Regiment transferred to it from LXXXVIII Korps (Netherlands occupation forces), and the three training Abteilungen (infanterie/panzer/artillerie) were mobilised and sent south to fight British 2nd Army on the Albert canal. The Reserve Panzer Kompanie was mobilised on 7 September and sent to Hechtel in Belgium to join II.Abteilung, but only three tanks completed the journey without breaking down, and were destroyed with much of the battalion at Hechtel by Guards Armoured Division on 12 September, the same day the remainder were photographed near Deelen undergoing maintenance (turrets were turned to allow engine hatches to be opened) at a supply dump in the woods near Fliegerhorst Deelen, the largest German airbase in the Netherlands.
On 17 September, the day Market Garden was launched, these tanks were laagered at Wolfswinkel, near Son north of Eindhoven, and they attempted to fire on the drop zone of the 506th PIR (101st Airborne) during the landings, but were shot up by escorting fighter bombers. Two Mark III tanks escaped, one ran the gauntlet of 502nd troopers in St Oedenrode but was only hit by unprimed bazooka rounds, and they both by-passed the 501st at Veghel to bump the E/504th (82nd Airborne) roadblock at Grave. Some casualties were caused to troopers climbing out of their foxholes, in the belief the tanks were the British arriving early, and they then turned tail were not seen again.
So, Browning's dismissal of the tanks in the photo appears to have been good judgement on his part, and history proves that he was right to be more concerned about the unknown location of 10.SS-Panzer-Division - it was not known that the Ruurlo headquarters was the 10.SS-Panzer-Division's, the 9.SS-Panzer were headquartered at Beekbergen near Apeldoorn.
Your question is all part of the Arnhem mythology created by Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge Too Far, but I hope I've been able to answer this part of it at least.
@@davemac1197brilliant info, thank you!
@@stormblooper - cheers, thank you.
Obviously there was conflict
Between the americans and
British because of the combined operation
Eisenhower should have told
Monty okay go ahead with it
But make it an all British thing!
I met Lieutenant Colonel John Frost's grandsons here in Australia. Nice chaps both of them and very proud of their grandfather as they rightly should be.
there is a this your life episode with john frost on you tube
We Dutch are very grateful for everyone participating in Market Garden (perhaps not Browning 😂). The Arnhem road bridge is named the John Frost Bridge. And I’m in awe of the 82nd crossing the Waal in dingy’s. Stuff of legends. Even in Close Combat II the scenario is unforgivable hard.
There is plenty of blame to go around for failure on the Allied side. The other commentators are knowledgeable and I will not rehash them. I think Ridgeway as the Airborne Corps Commander, however, and not Browning, could have made a difference. My point, however, was that in the 1970s when I was a Cadet at a famous military academy a retired SgtMajor from Frost's Bn. with the 1st Parachute Div. at Arnhem spoke to us in a Saturday afternoon lecture. During Q&A I asked him when he knew the operation was in peril. Note: he retired as a SgtMajor and he did not hold that rank at Arnhem. He answered me: " I knew the operation was going to fail when we landed in the DZ, and could not contact anyone with our radios."
I heard the radios were tuned to different wavelengths, and some of the corps were transmitting on wavelengths reserved for German public radio. Maybe this part about the radios is underestimated.
With Ridgeway in charge there was more chance to succeed, but he couldt change the weather and the quality of the radio's either. It was one bridge too far!
Very interesting thank you for that.About the radios it seems strange that the US Army had been using their famed ‘walkie talkies’ why on earth weren’t they used at Arnhem?Why was the clear and present danger of German armour ignored by Browning and why was the drop zone so far from the bridge?It seems that the whole operation was rushed into action too soon when basic issues like the radios failed.What on earth did the high command think they were playing at?
"I think Ridgeway as the Airborne Corps Commander, however, and not Browning, could have made a difference." - How would he have made a difference? The compromises to the MARKET plan that caused it to fail were American compromises, and having more American control over the planning is unlikely to help.
One of the problems with the planning for MARKET was that once Browning's outline plan for provisional operation SIXTEEN, based on his cancelled all-British and Polish operation COMET, was passed over to Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army for detailed planning and became operation MARKET, the concept was compromised by many changes Browning could not object to without losing his position to Ridgway.
Browning had already threatened to resign over Brereton's plan for operation LINNET II (Liege-Maastricht bridges) because it had been scheduled with too short notice to print and distribute maps to the troops. Fortunately for all concerned, the ground troops overran the drop zones and the airborne operation was cancelled, so Browning withdrew his resignation letter and both men agreed to forget the incident. When Brereton removed the D-Day double airlift and the dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges for MARKET, Browning could hardly threaten to resign again, knowing that Brereton had planned to accept his resignation over LINNET II and replace him with Matthew Ridgway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation. Browning's only option was to try to influence events once he was on the ground at Groesbeek and that was probably the real reason he advanced the transport of his Corps HQ from the 2nd to the 1st airlift, at the expense of some anti-tank glider loads scheduled for 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem - we know it was a last minute change to the glider schedule and not a pre-planned "ego trip" as many historians suggest.
On the British radios, the equipment was perfectly serviceable, but experienced severely reduced range performance at Arnhem because of the local terrain - sandy glacial moraine with a high iron content. The radios were working, but with greatly reduced ranges than they had experienced in North Africa and Italy. Only the two special VHF sets supplied to the USAAF 306th Fighter Control Squadron teams had been supplied with the "wrong crystals" problem. The standard battalion No.22 sets were virtually useless because of the dispersed deployment of the units, but the Royal Artillery used the more powerful No.18 sets, which although affected by the same problem, the reduced ranges were still useful - the forward observers at the bridge could still contact the Light Regiment's gun batteries at Oosterbeek for example.
The British did use the American supplied SCR-536 "handie-talkie" (the "walkie-talkie" was originally the nickname given to the backpack SCR-300 used for battalion communications in the US Army), but both armies found it virtually useless except for very short range and almost restricted to line of sight communcations by the platoons.
There was indeed one frequency that could not be used because it conflicted with a very powerful German transmitter at Deelen airfield.
Why was German armour ignored by Browning? Because the aerial photos showed obsolete Mark III and early Mark IV models, and this ruled out a 1944 panzer division as the likely owner. Cornelius Ryan got this story from Browning's intelligence officer, Major Brian Urquhart, interviewed in 1967 after Browning had passed away in 1965 and the photo could not be located. In fact all the RAF's aerials of the Netherlands had been donated to the Dutch government after the war to help with reconstruction and land use surveys, and emerged in 2014 when the archives were digitised and put online. The suspect frame was identified and analysed by the Air Historical Branch (Royal Air Force) and the tanks identified as belonging to the Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', the training regiment based in Utrecht for the Luftwaffe's only panzer division currently fighting in Poland.
The HG Regiment's reserve panzer kompanie at Harderwijk had been mobilised (under the 'Valkyrie' Plan) on 7 September and ordered south to Eindhoven to join the regiment's II.Abteilung, but only three tanks survived the road march without breaking down and were destroyed at Hechtel in Belgium by the Guards Armoured Division, along with most of the II.Abteilung. Those vehicles that had broken down were being maintained at a supply dump near Deelen airfield when they were photographed by RAF reconnaissance Spitfire on 12 September and on 17 September (D-Day for MARKET GARDEN) they were laagered in an orchard at Wolfswinkel, opposite the 506th PIR's drop zone on Sonsche Heide. They attempted to interfere in the landings, but were shot up by escorting USAAF fighter aircraft and failed to have any impact on the operation. Browning's decision to disregard the photo can now be seen in a totally different light.
Montgomery cancelled operation COMET when he received reports II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Arnhem area and realised COMET was not strong enough to deal with them. He and Browning then drew up the outline proposal called SIXTEEN by adding the two US airborne divisions to hold the corridor, allowing 1st Airborne and the Poles with their substantial anti-tank gun assets to be concentrated at Arnhem.
The operation was compromised not at Arnhem, where a bridgehead was secured and its use denied to the enemy for 80 hours, but at Nijmegen. Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army had compromised Browning's outline plan SIXTEEN to seize the bridges by glider coup de main raids, and Gavin then compromised his own divisional plan by dismissing a British request (probably from Browning) to drop a battalion at the north end of the Nijmegen bridge to seize it by coup de main. Gavin then assigned his weakest regimental commander, Roy Lindquist of the 508th PIR, to the Nijmegen mission instead of the more aggressive and experienced 505th, instructing him to send his 1st battalion directly to the bridge as soon as practical after landing. Lindquist failed to act quickly, allowing 10.SS-Panzer-Division to occupy Nijmegen and reinforce the bridges.
On the latter issue I would agree that Ridgway's presence would have been preferable, but only if he had still been divisional commander of the 82nd. Ridgway had part-dealt with command issues in the 508th in Normandy (the XO was court-martialled and replaced with a 505th officer) and may have been more wary of assigning them to the critical Nijmegen mission. Gavin had also failed to appoint a replacement for himself as Assistant Divisional Commander after Ridgway was promoted to XVIII Airborne Corps and Gavin inherited the 82nd Division, so he was doing both jobs during the planning and execution of MARKET.
I don't think importing more American solutions would resolve what were imported American problems in the first place.
The key issue of Market Garden was the taking of all bridges within a time frame.
The 36 hours delay at Nijmegen due to taking the hights first, was the critical factor for failure of Market Garden, so I am with Frost !
No Fred! The key issue for the distance from the british DZ to the Arnhrm bridge and the british (RAF) fear to attack it from both sides. After scoring the bridge part of the troops had been able to assist in taking the Nijmegen bridge also from two sides.
@@paulbien8421
However, the fact is that in spite of the distance of the DZ's from the Arnhem bridge, Frost and his men DID make it to the bridge and managed to hold out up to the time that XXX Corps had arrived at Nijmegen. Had the Nijmegen bridge been taken immediately after landing by a batallion of the 82nd, XXX Corps could have relieved Frost and the whole 1st Airborne by crossing the Rhine at Arnhem. This was made impossible by the fact that the 82nd didn't take the bridge in time.
@@paulbien8421 Most historians who have studied Market Garden in depth don't agree with you, including Eisenhower's official historian. Yes, there were several aggravating factors to the operation, but they were overcome and XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen bridge in good time. It is accepted that the main failure was US 82nd AB not going straight for the bridge after dropping.
@@renard801 Brit generals like Browning and Monty were too busy being infatuated with their own fame that they cost countless deaths, thank god for the 82nd’s amazing bravery for making it somewhat salvageable along with Frost group. Yikes, Monty was a bozo and dead weight to Patton in many places in Africa and Europe
@@abba-Flammenfresser You say it was US 82nd AB who made Market Garden 'somewhat salvageable'. Hah! Historians (including the official US Army historian) agree that the deaths of those brave men while crossing the river, and indeed the ultimate failure of the entire operation, was the fault of their own commanders in failing to assault Nijmegen bridge immediately upon landing. It was lightly defended then and might have been taken easily. Instead, when the British tanks arrived in good time, they found the bridge still in enemy hands and now heavily defended. That is why Gavin ordered Lindquist to take his men across the river, with such disastrous consequences. Far from salvaging the operation, the 82nd commanders doomed it - and their own men.
As for that 'bozo' Montgomery: after the war, the five European countries forming the Western Union Defence Organisation unanimously chose him to be Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, essentially the commander of all European forces. They kept him in post from 1948 to 1951.
And when NATO was formed in 1951 to counter the Soviet threat, the top politicians and military people of America, Canada and Europe chose Monty - out of all the possible candidates in those countries - to be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, second only to Eisenhower. They considered Monty to be the best man to command ALL the western forces (including America's) against Russia if Ike couldn't.
He served in that post under successive Supreme Commanders until his retirement in 1958.
That shows how much Monty's abilities were respected by people who knew him most, and who had most to lose had Russia invaded.
I would back their judgement over yours any day!
Totally confused when the “object” of the entire airborne operation was the bridges. Thank you for exposing this fact.
Browning lack of judgement/self delusion is confirmed by scape goating the Poles.
It was a shameful act which Montgomery doubled down on. I've spoken to a lot of 1st Airborne vets who were unanimously disgusted by this. The Poles who made it north of the Rhine - the AT squadron that landed early - and those that got across the river fought very well and played a large part in covering the withdrawal.
The problem here is that there's no evidence Browning lacked judgement, was self-delusional, or scapegoated the Poles.
If you're referring to his dismissal of the aerial photograph of German tanks near Arnhem, he was correct to dismiss it because the photo was located in a Dutch archive in 2014 and found to show obsolete Mark III and early Mark IV models ruling out a 1944 panzer division and belonged to a training unit that was not even in the Arnhem area during the landings. Cornelius Ryan made the mistake of basing this story on one person's account after Browning had passed away and unable to defend himself, and the RAF had donated all their aerials of the Netherlands to the Dutch government after the war and could not be located.
If you're referring to his decision to move the transport of his Corps HQ to Groesbeek from the 2nd to the 1st lift, it was a last minute change to the glider schedule and not a pre-planned ego trip. Browning was unable to object to changes Brereton made to his COMET and proposed outline SIXTEEN for the final MARKET plan, because he had already threatened to resign over Brereton's operation LINNET II plan scheduled at too short notice to print and distribute maps. That operation was thankfully cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident, but Browning knew Brereton had planned to accept his resignation letter and replace him with Matthew Ridgway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation. Browning could do nothing about the changes, except advance his transport to the 1st lift and try to influence events once he was on the ground in the Netherlands.
If you're referring to the Poles being blamed for the failure of MARKET GARDEN, that's a ridiculous slur. At no point could the Poles be blamed since they arrived late on D+4, and long after the operation had already been compromised by the Americans (most likely the source of this slur) at Nijmegen on D-Day. But it is an undisputed fact that General Sosabowski was difficult to work with and was insubordinate to General Horrocks at the Valburg conference on 24 September. The Polish troops were also reported to be ill-disciplined when they had a chance to fight the Germans - perhaps understandably - but when you get complaints even from the SS about the Poles firing on their medics trying to retrieve wounded from the battlefield, then you have a unit that falls below the disciplinary standard expected in the British Army. Montgomery initially wrote to Socabowski to praise him and his brigade for their efforts and to request recommendations for awards, but after receiving reports from Browning and Horrocks he changed his tune and asked the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to have the Polish Brigade removed from Browning's command and perhaps sent to Italy. At no point to my knowledge did any of these officers blame the Poles for the failure of the operation, and if you have a reference that does, then I would be grateful if you could provide it.
I'm a bit troubled by the notion that Market Garden's failure can be limited to a single factor. There's no doubt the failure to secure the Nijmegen bridge on the first day was a killer, but to assume that the entire operation would have succeeded ignores the other elements that contributed to the failure. I appreciate your thoroughness on this topic, but I don't know if it can be boiled down to one decision.
Ray Barata
Market Garden failure to achieve 100% success *can* be put down to one failure - the failure to seize Nijmegen bridge immediately. If that bridge was not seized immediately the daring operation was bound not to be a 100% success. It was key.
John Burns Respectfully, that's a broad assumption to make. I agree that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge contributed to the failure of the operation but the timely capture of the bridge did not guarantee the success of the operation as a whole. 1st Para Div only had one battalion anywhere near the bridge. The rest was strung out kilometers away. And even seizure of the Arnhem bridge by XXX Corps did not mean that the narrow corridor would remain open to ensure the breakthrough Field Marshal Montgomery envisioned. Subsequent months after MG saw the Germans break the line several times.
Ray Barata I would concur with your assessment. Of course all this discussion is conducted with perfect hindsight, as usual. "If this had been done, that would have happened," etc. Frost's battalion dropped about as far from its objective as the 82nd was from Nijmegen; if the Germans had had troops to secure the northern end of Arnhem bridge quickly you would have seen a replay of Nijmegen there, more or less nullifying a successful early crossing of the Waal by XXX Corps if that bridge had been taken right away. It seems obvious to me at least that one battalion should have been dropped south of and very close to Arnhem bridge and one battalion north of Nijmegen bridge, with the mission of taking both bridges immediately in a coup de main. This standard airborne tactic had been proven time and time again to work. It was employed successfully by the 82 AB at Grave bridge during this operation. If it was decided to keep the 1 Para and 82 AB drop zones that far from the objectives, then assigning these drops to the Polish Brigade would have been the natural choice.
I have read the details of many battles and sadly often a single simple error can make all the difference. "For want of a shoe nail, a battle was lost". Someone failing to push enough or pushing to far, taking a right turn instead of a left, failing to call in for support when support was available...results, battle lost.
Ray Barata
First of all the operation was a success, in creating a 60 mile salient (protection buffer) into German territory protecting the vital port of Antwerp and eliminating V rocket sites which were firing at London. And they did use the north of the salient to turn east into Germany. They just never got over the Rhine.
The operation needed *all* the bridges secured *immediately.* All were secured at the end of the 1st day except Nijmegen. TIK in his 1st video blamed Gavin of the 82nd for not immediately moving towards the Nijmegen bridge. I agreed with that conclusion and still do.
Browning did not drop into the zone with the troops near the bridge. He was way east on the German border, unlike Gavin who was near the bridge. Gavin was supposed to move on the bridge immediately, specifically Colonel Lindquist of the 508th who were to "move without delay", as ordered by Gavin. Gavin was not monitoring progress close enough as Lindquist dawdled. When Browning saw that the bridge was not secured he told Gavin to move to the bridge.
Browning was no angel for sure. But! He had no part in the delay in not securing the vital Nijmegen bridge *immediately* on dropping. That falls 100% on General Gavin. If that bridge was seized immediately, XXX Corps would have run over it and onto Arnhem.
Another point is that despite a delay in running over a Bailey bridge at Son, as the US 101st did not seize the bridge with the Germans destroying it, XXX Corps made up the time and got to Nijmegen *ahead of schedule* only to see the bridge in German hands. As TIK states, XXX Corps had to take the town _and_ the bridge. That vital initial delay, by Gavin (Lindquist), allowed German troops to pour south over the bridge into Nijmegen. There was only about 18 German troops on the bridge when the 82nd dropped. A 82nd 508 patrol took the guards, and their gun, prisoner on the south of the bridge for an hour, then left letting them go when no reinforcements arrived. When Lindquist's main bridge force, led by Colonel Warren, did get to the bridge it was swarming with Germans who had also set up shop in the park south of the bridge and were all over Nijmegen.
Happy Arnhem Day......R.I.P. those who fell.
Kinda odd Browning felt the that the threat of German armor was greater in the Reichswald than in the vicinity of Arnhem.
True, although he did dismiss the intelligence officer (who was called Brian Urquhart - not Roy Urquhart who commanded 1st Airborne Division). Perhaps he didn't actually know how much armour was actually in the Arnhem area.
The possible threat must have grown and grown in the back of his mind until he became fixated on it.
TIK there was no armour in Arnhem at the time of the drop.
Even so, an armored threat at Arnhem was just as credible as an armored threat in the Reichswald.
Reconnaissance blunders were wide spread in this operation. Air recon photos which established the presence of Panthers(I do not recall confirmation of Tigers) but this was not confirmed by the resistance. The Reichswald would have been the absolute logical place for a tank force intent on rapid deployment to either Nijmegen or Arnhem from a forest between the two rivers. Senior staff had nightmares that if a significant armored force lay in wait in the Reichswald and 30 Corps was smashed in the rear when approaching Nijmegen, that could have resulted in a catastrophe.
Well - not exactly. Many other elements of various units also made into Arnhem, including parts of other Parachute battalions, glider pilots, and even a couple of airborne anti-tank guns.
The blowing up of the Son bridge near Eindhoven caused a 36 hour delay from the near-start too, when 30 Corps linked up with the 101st there.
The plan was flawed because it over optimistically assumed all the many bridges along the corridor would be taken intact and without delay.
The German tiny battle groups that quickly blocked the north and center routes into Arnhem was another critical blow to the plan.
Browning is to blame, definetly. He ORDERED Gavin to secure the heights first before taking the bridge. So Gavin can't really get any blame, because he was just following his orders.
@John Cornell The 18th "The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment defended against German attacks in Horst, Grafwegen and Riethorst. Early in the day, German counterattacks seized one of the Allied landing zones where the Second Lift was scheduled to arrive at 13:00. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment attacked at 13:10 and cleared the landing zone by 14:00, capturing 16 German flak pieces and 149 prisoners."
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden#82nd_Airborne_zone
Monty's grand idea so ultimately Monty is to blame. However Browning is the fool that had priorities wrong not Frost. Such is war when individual wants override the needs of the operation meaning the bridge at Nijmegan. Having spent time in this exact area I can clearly understand that the bridge is key. This is mostly low farm land which tanks would never be able to drive across. Thanks for the analysis...
Fun2 Drive All plans are speculations and I for one don’t believe those who devise the plan should be blamed on the basis that it didn’t succeed per se. And bear in mind the commanders believed the plan could work on the basis of their knowledge and trust of their own troops’ ability so in the end if a plan fails every senior commander responsible for every moving part of the plan has responsibilities. But yes perhaps Boy Browning was more at fault than Monty to have misappropriated priorities and as a result the troops weren’t able to fulfill their objectives.
Gavin did order one of his battalion commanders to go to the bridge immediatly after landing before the operation started. Lt-Col Roy Lindquist, 508thPIR. He instead followed his operational order and secured his assinged areas and only left after Gavin personnaly went to him that evening ordering him to go. Gavin said he had verbally given this order shortly before the start of the operation. lt-Col linquist said later he did not have any recollection of any pre jump instructions. Although some other officers do remember Gavin giving this pre-jump instructions. Gavin also said that due to the lack of aircraft he had a lack of troops. So you could also blame Lt-General Brereton for not allowing the IX troop carrier command to do 2 flights during the day.
Jim Omaha
You are getting to it. Linquist was ordered to go to the bridge immediately by Gavin. There is a case that Gavin was not clear and specific enough - miscommunication. But Gavin did not check on Linquist's progress on the most vital part of his tasks - seizing the bridge. If he had he would have ordered them to the bridge earlier when seeing they were not moving to the bridge. So, Gavin was the blame for not seizing the bridge immediately.
Or the 38 planes absorbed by Browning's HQ, and Browning's specific orders to focus on the Heights so he could piss into the Reichswald.
A very good overview of Operation Market Garden where my dad lost his brother defending the area. So sad to read what happened and knowing if a few changes had been made our family would not have lost my dads brother there Daun Rice. Love how hard Maggie led the 82nd under such hard conditions. Sad very sad as our family had and has lost a critical member of the family there.
RIP
Sorry for your family's loss Vaughn. I hope you can all take solace and immense pride in that those who fought so valiantly ( even acknowledged by their German opponents) have their names and deeds immortalised in the history of our nation. One of the most tragic consequences of war is the loss of the most brave and selfless individuals who could then set an example to the young. We will never forget them. God rest Daun.
Sorry about your loss.
The basic plan was doomed to failure from it's inception. With a only single axis of advance, and the airborne landings marking this axis out for the Germans as clear as day, the Germans could concentrate their defenses on that single line of advance. Even had the allies seized each bridge on schedule, this single line of operation would have met a concentrated defense. Unless you have overwhelming superiority, such a single line of advance almost always fails.
The single line advance could have succeeded with SURPRISE, but surprise was lost when US General Brereton (along with US General Jackson of the Airborne support) did not allow two drops on the first day. Surprise is the airborne trump card, but it was lost because many of the ONLY drop on day one were obliged to defend the landing zones for the other drops scheduled for day two - not only too few landed on day one, but also many who were landed on day one could not use surprise. Obviously the US Generals (who owned the transport aircraft) did not want their valuable planes flying straight and low to give German AA gunners a shooting gallery, and so insisted the first part of the initial drop day was spent on flak suppression by allied fighter bombers.
Whoever decided that lightly armed airborne units would better defend relatively open terrain against tanks than defend against tanks in an urban environment may not have known of the lessons learned by the Soviets. Give me an RPG against a tank and a building to hide in, and I stand a fair chance of taking out a tank, even if the tank has infantry support. In open terrain with infantry support, tanks win, especially when 6 pounders were left out of the defenses in favor of a Corps headquarters. I only hope Browning's headquarters arrived with mimeograph machines at the ready.
They airborne men were not supposed to fight against tanks. No tanks were there on the jump day. However they did take along anti-tank guns.
Monty even admitted it you waterhead.Have the nurses take you for a walk in the court yard
The problem was not one minor engagement or other lost or delayed but the overarching supply situation. The Allies were at the end of their supply lines, Antwerp was taken too late, the French rail network was previously destroyed by the Allies who needed it now and the trucks just were not enough to supply the Allied armies ... there was simply not enough logistics capability to mount such an offensive at that point. "Home by Christmas" was too optimistic and too grand in scope. I would blame Montgomery not the smaller local commanders on the ground.
Andras Libal
The Scheldt was not taken at the time of MG. Eisenhower delayed it for MG. Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust. The operation was under resourced, as Monty emphasised, with only *one* corps above Eindhoven. Monty wanted multiple crossings of the Rhine, there was only one and at Arnhem where he did not want it. Monty came out with the concept, and stood back. Mainly Americans planned it, Monty had no part in its execution. After, all he ever said of MG was that is was under resourced. He never mentioned the operation again.
Einsehower never had a grip on Bradley and Patton who were stealing supplies from Hodges First Army, with some of his divisions initially to be a part of the operation. Lack of resources precluded Hodges from MG.
Best analysis I heard yet. The whole plan was flawed.
1:29 - Ha! Just realised the US paratrooper pictured on the map of Nijmegen here is Lt. Kelso C. Horne, commander of 1st Platoon, 'I' Company 508th PIR, who was wounded in Normandy and actually missed MARKET GARDEN. It's a well-known photo and appears in many books, including the front cover of the Osprey book on US Airborne Divisions in the ETO 1944-45.
The battle in which Horne was wounded was the battle for Hill 95 (Saint Catherine) on 4 July, described in Chapter 8 ("We Practically Got Annihilated") of Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012), and it was one of Colonel Lindquist's worst mistakes before he failed to move quickly on the Nijmegen bridge in operation MARKET, and Gavin had to go to the 508th CP to chew him out and get him moving, unfortunately too late. Nordyke's principal witness in both instances was Captain Chet Graham, who was acting 2nd battalion commander at Hill 95, due to officer casualties, and 508th liaison officer to Division HQ in MARKET.
Great follow-up to your Market-Garden video. It seems that like in many military operations, every CO involved has their own version of the events. As for Gavin self-incriminating memoirs you have to take one thing into account that was not mentioned in your previous video: Some officers have a sense of self accountability: They had a mission to carry out, they failed. It's their burden to carry and no one else's. Gavin's own words certainly have some of that in them. Even as the full picture of the battle unfolds as the reports come in, he refuses "an easy way out" as to put the blame on their superior officers or their own staff. I was born into a four-generation military family, had a brief stint in the military myself(drafted, then stayed in for a bit longer) and had seen quite a bit of that-and the exact opposite-in my time in. If you read the declassified reports of Operation Gothic Serpent(The "Black Hawk Down" incident of Hollywood fame) you'll see a lot of that in Task Force Ranger's CO, Brigadier General William F. Garrison's account of the raid(He took full responsibility for the raid's outcome) At the same time, the 160th SOAR's force commander's report and the excellent "Black Hawk Down" book by Mark Bowden(Itself considered the most accurate non-military account of the operation, even by the military) paint a different picture of the same events(political pressure, ignoring previous warning signs, forcing a daytime operation in enemy controlled territory, previous military actions resulting in civilian casualties, growing civilian discontent with the TFR)What I mean with all this is that we have a lot of Gavin's personal perception of his actions tainted with his sense of failure and his tendency to take the burden of the defeat for not being able to succeed against the personal experience of other field commanders. Just by saying "I am to blame" doesn't make it the absolute truth. Anyway, keep up the good work!
General Horrocks in his auto-biography says that the operation was doomed anyway, because Monty ( understandably, after the ease of advance in the previous few weeks) underestimated the ability of the Germans to resist, and that the British did not have the forces to defend a single bridgehead on the Eastern side of the Rhine.
It seems a strange thing for Monty to underestimate, considering he got his fame in Africa, where he was very familiar with the back and forth nature of war as supply lines shrank and extended. I tend to feel that he came up with the plan and his input from that point was limited. For me, its enough blame to go around between Browning and Gavin.
The reason Nijmegen bridge wasn't taken on D-Day is because Browning told Gavin to not take it until the Groesbeek heights were secured. He also dropped them near the German border, which was naturally crawling with reinforcements.
I believe had Ridgway been in command of operation Market, things may have gone better. In Guy LoFaro's book; 'The Sword of St. Michael; the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II,' Ridgway was the prime candidate to lead the operation. The US had more Airborne divisions committed to the operation, Ridgway had more combat experience, etc. But in the end, Brereton chose Browning which shocked Ridgway, who had been his rival since North Africa and the 'Red Beret incident.' This isn't my biased opinion as an American either, Ridgway was just a more capable leader.
So it seems unfair when people blame Gavin and the 82nd for the failure of the operation, when they were only acting under orders. Also, the reason they didn't split up on D-Day to take both the heights and the bridge, is because the Division was going to be dropped over the course of several days, due to the lack of enough planes to get them there all at once.
_" it seems unfair when people blame Gavin and the 82nd for the failure of the operation, when they were only acting under orders."_
Gavin was ordered not to go for the bridge?
@@johnburns4017 At 0:40 of this video.
@@nickdanger3802
Frost is wrong. When Gavin found out no one had moved towards the bridge, he was in a rage, ordering them to the bridge immediately. By then it was too late. By the time they launched an attack the Germans had poured men onto the bridge and into Nijmegen - accessing Nijmegen via the bridge. If they moved to the bridge on landing the fight in Nijmegen town would not have happened.
Browning was in the air when the 82nd should have been moving towards the bridge. When Browning found out the bridge had not been seized he was concerned, ordering Gavin to seize it.
@Duglife
The US, British and Polish paras were all in the same army. Browning was highly experienced being involved in paras way before any American, that is why he was in the First Allied Airborne Army.
@Duglife
Gavin was ordered to take the bridge with _thunderclap surprise._ Not hang about looking for 1,000 tanks that were not there.
One factor often overlooked is disconnect between planning expectations for the accuracy of delivery of airborne troops and the capability to do so. I gather the assumption was that this would be at least as accurate as was achieved during Overlord however, either through lack of training or actual degrading of capability, the same was not achieved, too many troops were unable to play an effective part in operations as a result.
@Mathew
WHERE did you come up with this brain fart?
The British loved gliders precisely because they could be flown to a virtually pin point landing.
After action photos show that very few gliders ever went astray. They cracked-up, but they weren't astray. Most were in such good shape they could've been reused - but for the tender mercies of the Germans - who were very much into bonfires.
The utter absence of German ground troops meant that no parachutist failed to simply march on to where he was supposed to be.
This was totally unlike D-Day, where every guy was lost in the dark and Krauts were just about everywhere.
Your thesis lies bleeding -- no it's dead.
in fact market garden paradrops were too accurate so the german was able to pinpoint dropzone.
One thing we have to agree on is command really underestimated the strength of the German Army in Holland.
Intelligence stunk.
Actually they didn't, there were not such a large number present that it ought to have affected planning.
What they underestimated was the ability of the German commanders on the scene to adapt, build scratch Kampfgruppe and to pull the right sort of heavy duty reinforcements from Germany itself and get them to the right places necessary to choke the operation.
Mistakes on the ground, ie Urquhart/Lathbury's and Browning/Gavin's on 17th, were committed as they took no account of how fast the German forces could build a perimeter to stop the Allied Airborne forces.
Add starting XXX corps advance at 2:30 in the afternoon with strict instructions not to advance after sunset and you have all the ingredients necessary to introduce enormous delays into receiving relieving forces and create a self made disaster.
If you can, you might do something about the complete disregard for Dutch underground intelligence immediately before and during the battle. I know they had infiltration difficulties during the war, but I don't see that as an obstacle in this instance.
We're seeing a lot of comments regarding Browning's weaknesses as a Corps commander and I would agree with most of them to be honest. However, perhaps we're not being entirely fair given the fact that 1st Allied Airborne Army represented the largest joint allied command of the war (one could make the case that 1st Canadian Army with all the commonwealth formations was a joint command, but I'm talking about merged American/UK formations). Browning had to balance a tremendous political football. 21st AG would get 9th US Army under its command, but that formation remained largely homogeneous. Brownings command was integrated at the division level. MG required 1st AAA to function seamlessly given the complexity and timing of the plan. Browning may have been flawed as a Corps commander and made poor decisions, but the nature of the command was a difficult proposition. It leads to American/British blame games.
I don't think this series of vids is excuse making for one side or another. It's analyzing an interesting battle that was unique in the integrated nature of the allied participants.
The plan was flawed at the outset. No one item caused the failure.
I agree. Browning and Gavin. You can tell Frost is livid, and he should be. It was an ambitious plan, and there were other factors. But it actually should've worked.
According to Ryan, Browning also both ignored intelligence that should have affected commencement of the plan and had the intel officer responsible for identifying the potential threats basically dismissed from the operation.
he was trying to sell a book
No armour in Arnhem on the jump day.
@@terrysmith9362 ...trying to sell a book in the US
@@andym9571 yep
The "ignored" intelligence was the main reason why the airborne operation was expanded from the initially planned 2 divisions up to 3 divisions (1st British Airborne, US 82nd, 101st) and the Polish Brigade.
While Browning and Gavin get a lot of blame in this series (and by those seeking to fix some sort of parochial attachment to whether it was a British or US failure), the nuances of the command decision set is fascinating to me. Why, for example, do we not mention that 1st Allied Airborne Army was actually under the command of US Lt. Gen Lewis Brerton, who'd recently been commander of the 9th Air Force (he was a USAAF officer) and was someone universally disliked by both US and UK field commanders for his poor performance on the close air role. Brerton was asked repeatedly to run two sorties on D-Day in order to double the number of troops dropped in the various landing zones. He refused based on crew weariness, but had done two airlifts to support the Dragoon landings. High commands seemed fixated on using 1st AAA in some way, with over 40 operations canceled prior to MG. MG was conceived and executed in less than a week, and relied on something never done with Airborne troops in the past, namely putting the farthest command 60 miles deep in enemy territory. The operation relied on the capture of no less than 19 bridges in terrain that did not facilitate overland travel with the lowlands, dikes and poulters endemic of Dutch countryside. Most of all, it almost ignored the Germans as a factor in the planning. As I've said before, we can make a reasonable assertion of the tactical failure vis a vis Browning/Gavin and the Nijmegen Bridge, but the strategic planning and conception of this was haphazard, at best.
Ray Barata
_"the strategic planning and conception of this was haphazard, at best."_
The operation was daring and succeed in its prime aims. It was only 7 miles short of its objective, after covering around 65 miles in a few days.
The AAA was itching to get in as all their operations were cancelled as the landing zones were overrun by ground troops. MG was derived from Comet. Monty let them all do it and stood back.
Well Monty did have to get his portrait finished.
Market Garden, like so many other military operations was lost before it started. The entire operation was plagued with false assumptions and an over optimistic view of the outcome. (The Germans are defeated and we can do this in 3 days) Clearly there were more, but everything was founded on those.
In the US Army we did many war gaming exercises as part of officer training. Market Garden was one such exercise. After we did this several times we had one clear takeaway. If they ever war gamed this before they tired it, they never would have done it.
In 4 of 5 tries the operation failed and the 5th just barely succeeded. What we learned was there were just too many critical points where things could go wrong. If not at one bridge, then at another. The Germans only had to create enough difficulty at one point anywhere along the route for the whole thing to fail. Granted, we were just a bunch of Captains and Majors, but this was our job to learn.
Preach. These gamer dudes talking about combat hurts my head. If there is any blame it is on the fools that approved it.
@@akgeronimo501 They keep forgetting the enemy gets a vote...
@@johnsorge3034 He gets a big one, especially if he is as capable as the German Army. They were absolutely deadly, I remember General McCaffery saying that they were the most effective Army in history. He may have been right. I think the problem with most of these commentators is that they do not appreciate terrain. They think the world is a two dimensional game board.
Lets say against all odds half those Allies made it to Arnhem then what?They had no supply at all and back up only if weather permitted.And Model has the Ruhr right there and all the 88s,Tigers,Panzer IVs and Stugs at his beckoning by rail and in force - Dunkirk II - The Rhine
@@bigwoody4704 I have thought the same about the 82nd. Even if Gavin had mad dashed to the bridge over the Waal he would probably have lost his DZs and certainly been unable to hold the North end of the bridge, it probably would have been a disaster. In many way it came very close as it was, without the intervention of British tanks he would have lost the bridges vicinity Mook on Wednesday morning. It would have made the fight for the Waal river bridges moot.
I certainly wouldn't even dream of arguing with John Frost.
However, as a layman I believe the loss of the radios was 'the beginning of the end for 1st Airborne at Arnhem.
Good communication in any battle is vital for success!
Murphy's law of war: All plans go to hell after the first round is fired. The Market garden operation was doomed to failure because it required precise timing and movement.
It also required everyone to stick to the plan rather than decide not to take the bridge they needed and instead go after a small rise in the terrain.
Very good video and good point
@@TheImperatorKnight Like 1st AB stuck to the plan by not taking one bridge (out of three) until 2000 and with around 800 men? The only high ground between two river valley's and also the glider landing zone for the next lift less than 24 hours away ...and the place Browning had picked for his HQ, brought in by 36 of 1st AB's gliders.
Monty was an idiot,even the Russians used the Broad front thrust.
*British author of Military History, Max Hastings, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495* “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force eighty miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armor, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance. The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation
*The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer
The failure was ultimately down to Brereton who refused to commit all of the necessary transport aircraft to the operation, making it impossible to land all of the airborne troops in one landing on the first day as the original concept required. This was the critical decision that doomed the operation, if all the airborne troops had been landed as intended, they would have been able to secure all objectives.
On Day 1 there were 1,545 transport aircraft and glider tugs.
1,049 C-47s dropped paratroops. There were 478 gliders.
www.ww2f.com/threads/exactly-numbers-of-aircraft-used-in-operation-market-garden.47416/
Ultimately Montgomery because it was a singular thrust and hence “easy” to stop with the movement of reserves. I use the term “easy” with notation because it is relative given the nature of war. The assumption the the Germans (pronounced Gerr-mans, like Sosabowski) were unable to react was a grave underestimation of the enemy and can be compared to Operation Shingle which took place approximately 100 days earlier. (more on that later)
But given the nature of the question who was responsible for the failure within the operational boundaries of market garden it would be the delays encored to XXX corps and the drop sites given to 1st Airborne and even the 82 Airborne. Dropping the entire 1st Airborne south of Arnhem bridge and dropping one half of the 82nd north of Nijmegen would have placed them in a Cul-de-sac defensible and placed the supply drops for both divisions in the center. Not that they needed a defensible position but it would’ve made it easy to attack directly across both bridges with the entire division in the British case and if the Americans had dropped 1/2 North and 1/2 south of the bridge they would have taken it on the first day. I Do you understand that splitting the division 1/2 north and 1/2 of South of the river the Americans would have entailed risk but that would have allowed the taking Nijmegen bridge first and Grave bridge second. Nijmegen bridge was irreplaceable the Grave bridge was replaceable. The concerns About the flag at Arnhem bridge and the terrain south of Arnhem must ring hollow because it’s exactly were they dropped the Poles. Also the dispersement available transport was botched because they should have allocated priority to the first airborne. It was far out on the limb and therefore should have been dropped all at once with in the 101st being given less transport because it was closer to XXX corps.
Yes the 82nd airborne should’ve taken the bridge it was assigned on D day (the 17th) but ultimately it’s delay was only 24 hours. If it has been standing there with bridge in hand when XXX corps rolled up on the 19th on time the Irish guards armor would not have been able to make it to Arnhem because the 43rd division was still 24 hours behind and the armor was not going to operate independently without infantry divisional support, Especially in between Nijmegen and Arnhem.
The end around amphibious landings at Anzio show how adept the Germans were at planning and movement of reserves. As a result general Lucas said afterwards “Never try and supply a corps up a single road”
Stalin, Zhukov and Rokossovsky were planning the destruction of army group center And Rokossovsky said he wanted to attack at two places. Stalin said to Rokossovsky “One strong blow is better than two weak blows” R Rokossovsky Corrected Stalin which must’ve took some balls and said t”Two strong blows are better than one strong blow.”
So in closing your supposition that market garden failed because of the 82nd airborne is demonstrably false because of the delays suffered XXX corps even if the Vanguard had made it there on time ultimately it would’ve been delayed because I didn’t all arrive there at one time.
One thing you fail to mention Is that if 82nd airborne had gone straight to the Neimegan bridge and taking it or attempted to take it the explosives would have gone off they were set it was only the battle of the river crossing that caused the disconnect of explosive charges. It is problematic I understand but if the 82nd airborne had attempted to take the bridge on time and/ or was close to successful the Germans would’ve blown the bridge. as it is the delay caused the bridge not to be blown And the delay was the only thing that kept the bridge standing
I also think that putting the blame on one person mostly (Gavin) to save the honour of the British generals, as the author does here, is too narrow-minded and leads to false conclusions. Your informations show that there were even more obstacles and shortcomings in the planning and execution of the plan.
Imagine: What would have happened, if the Nimwegen bridge had been taken on the first day. As you have pointed out, the "cavalry" wouldn't have arrived in time anyway. But let's say, they would have arrived earlier and reached the Arnheim bridge on the first or second day. The bridgehead, established by Frost's small group, was very small. And the tanks reinforcement would have had to fight it's way through the narrow streets of Arnhem. German anti-tank guns, tank destroyers, panzerfausts etc. would have been hastily concentrated to block the advance of the Allied tanks. Even if they would have managed to conquer the whole city, the Allied would have been surrounded by more and more German forces and all next fighting would have been a bloody mess.
A successful Allied attack required overwhelming forces so that they could take Arnhem and expand on sufficient terrain on the other side of the Rhine on the first two days.
The whole operation relied too much on airborne troops alone who work best as a surprise in combination with a major attack. This was one teaching which led to a better use of paratroopers in operation varsity when the Allied crossed the Rhine at Wesel and dropped the airborne troops simultaneously to the advance of the main forces.
There were too many "ifs" in this operation. Remember: Strategic management should not rely on that what should happen but what could happen.
@John Cornell Those events are mutually exclusive
Browning *did not* prioritize the Heights over the bridge. He gave them *equal* priority. Gavin de-prioritized the bridge after he failed to seize it, ordering *all* his men out of Nijmegen town.
_"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it-for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend."_
- Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH.
The American post war version of events is one that attempts to whitewash their failure at Nijmegen, to capture the bridge on the first day. The film _A bridge Too Far,_ made when Browning had already died, only cemented the false narrative in the minds of the public. Since then many researchers have uncovered the real facts.
The 508th did launch some patrols into Nijmegen. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion almost reached the bridge. Three stragglers from the patrol of 40 men took prisoner seven of the 18 guards prisoner, including their cannon guarding the southern end of the bridge. If the 82nd had bothered to turn up at the bridge two hours earlier rather than hanging around DePloeg they would have hopped and skipped onto the bridge whistling Dixie.
When Gavin found out the 508th were not moving to the bridge, he was livid, expecting them to be moving to the bridge, if there was no opposition. The 508th did send a recon patrol. According to Phil Nordyke’s Put Us Down In Hell (2012) three lead scouts of the troop of 40, were separated making it to the vicinity of south end of the road bridge approaches, not the main steel span. They captured seven Germans and also their small artillery gun. They waited about an hour for reinforcements that never arrived, having to withdraw then observed the 9.SS-Panzer recon battalion arriving from Arnhem.
These few scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge just before the 9th SS recon, reached the bridge about an hour before the 9th SS. Joe Atkins in The 508th said, _"at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge."_ That was the 9th SS arriving.
US Official History, page 163:
_Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol_
After around 4.5 hours after landing a _patrol_ of 40 men were sent.
_Colonel Warren directed Companies A and B to rendezvous at a point just south of Nijmegen at_ *_1900_* _and move with the Dutch guide to the bridge. Company C, a platoon of which already had gone into the city as a patrol, was withheld in regimental reserve. Although Company A reached the rendezvous point on time, Company B "got lost en route." After waiting until about 2000, Colonel Warren left a guide for Company B and moved through the darkness with Company A toward the edge of the city._ *_Some seven hours after H-Hour, the first real move against the Nijmegen bridge began._*
_As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight._
_As Company A formed to attack, the men heard the noise of an approaching motor convoy emanating from a side street on the other side of the traffic circle. Enemy soldiers noisily dismounted (the 9th SS now in the town)_
_No one could have said so with any finality at the time, but the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of mostly_ *_low quality troops_* _encountered at most other places on D Day._
The irony is, that by having his HQ in the Groesbeek Heights, Browning had a front row seat to the door being slammed shut on 30.Corps. So he can't even say it was some sort of miscommunication, you could argue that this is the part of the operation he could monitor in almost real time and he would be able to have the most influence over. I would be curious to know how much airlift the Corps HQ took up, if instead they had maybe, brought another regiment, or even a battalion to Njiamagen that could have taken the bridge in a coup de maine.
Brownings HQ used 38 planes
@@michaeldmcgee4499 That number just hurts to read
Within 82 airborne, there is a discrepancy about events. Gen Gavin says he VERBALLY told his Brigade commander Lundquist to take the Nijmegen bridge soon after landing, while Lt Colonel Lundquish produces his written order saying his Brigade was to hold the landing grounds for subsequent air drops. The 82nd did not take the bridge, and did not seal off roads from western Holland, which allowed German troops from the west to cross the Nijmegen bridge to assist in the defence of the north bank of the Waal. Several hours were wasted, losing the airborne trump card of surprise, and evening attacks on the bridge were repulsed.
My father was at the bridge with Jonny, All 2 para veterans that I met said it was a suicidal mission. Frost had to do what he did and the men respected him for that.
After all that you said I am glad you are keeping this historic event alive and who is blame is an interesting point of view. Thank you .
7j😮
Absolutely correct. The failure to secure the bridge by the 82nd as the death blow to the entire operation. Whether the blame rests with Browning or Gavin is irrelevant, as the both failed to indentify the real importance or necessity to secure the bridge. The aim of the operation was "to secure the bridges" to allow a passage of lines by 30 Corps all the way to Arnhan. Hence not securing the brigde on day one was contrary to the plan.
No second lift was planned, but if one had been planned it would not have gone off because the fog didn't lift in England until around 0930.
"In Nijmegen, the arrival of British armour had raised the intensity and scale of the fighting. Extensive fires had broken out, marking the progress of the XXX Corps advance. Combined Sherman and infantry attacks during the early night hours of 20 September had been halted by accurate artillery fire around the traffic circle south of the Hunner park. SS-Captain Krueger of 21 Battery had personally directed the fire. At 0130 two Shermans remained with sheared tracks after the attack had been repelled. During the course of the morning three more combined arms attacks were concentrated upon the gradually shrinking 10SS perimeter defending the southern bank of the Waal."
- It Never Snows in September, by Kershaw, page 192.
"At 1500, 40 Sherman tanks plus artillery and air support began firing to cover the advance of Cook's 3rd Battalion as they crossed the Waal in boats.
- Kershaw, P196.
But resistance inside Nijmegen continued for quite some time after the famous actions to take the bridges. Bittrich (commander of IISS Corps) reported at 2330 on September 20th that "nothing [had] been heard from the Nijmegen garrison for two hours" and that he could "only assume the German units had been destroyed".
- Kershaw, page 212.
Just because nothing had been heard for two hours at 2330, didn't mean that Nijmegen was cleared of German units. It just meant that they hadn't been in contact. Some units continued to fight on. Kampfgruppe Euling were still holding their positions at 2230, although they then made a break for it in the dark some time afterwards."
- It Never Snows in September, by Kershaw, page 213
"The Guards Armoured Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the Airborne division. This left but two armoured groups to go across the Waal [Nijmegen road bridge]. Even those did not make it until next day, D plus 4, 21 September, primarily because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings."
- The Battle for the Rhine 1944, Neillands
_At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced by eleven tanks, another infantry battalion, two batteries of 88mm guns, 20 20mm anti-aircraft guns and survivors of earlier fighting in Nijmegen._
"American readers should note that the above comments come from the US Official History, where the notion that Lord Carrington and his five tanks could have penetrated this screen and got up to Arnhem on the night of D plus 3 - even supposing such a move was ever suggested - is revealed as a delusion."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Monty mucked it,did not have the dignity to even show up.Field Marshall?HA! that'd be Model
@@bigwoody4704
Rambo, a quiz.
Name the bridge the US *failed* to seize at Nijmegen, with the British having to take it for them?
20 points for the correct answer.
Ladies and gentlemen... I would like to give you Exhibit A of "why you don't do drugs when you're pregnant" because unfortunately you may spawn something like whatever it was that just responded to my comment
@@bigwoody4704
*BZZZZZZZZZT!* Wrong answer.
Rambo, the name the bridge the US 82nd *failed* to seize at Nijmegen, with the British having to take it for them was the....
🍾🎊🎈 *WAAL bridge* 🍾🎊🎈
Zero points Rambo. Zero.
stop wearing sis's knickers and holding your breath till you pass out
I saw a woman get off a bus in North Creek New York one summer day. She wore a light blue cotton dress that fell just below her knees and her skin was like warm milk chocolate. She had light blonde hair tied in a long pony tail and she took her shoes off and walked on the shady part of the grass by the river's edge, just beneath the tall trees.
If I ever regret my life for a moment, if I forget to be thankful for living, I'll remember that gal and be happy that I saw her.
Imagine you've jumped out the Dakota side door and are floating over Arnhem with 25K other paratroopers, what do you think they're thinking at that moment? I know I'd be thinking of this woman, the one I never spoke to but wish I did. Some guys might be thinking of the Germans and what they'll do when they hit the ground, not me, I'm a dreamer.
I like your videos and I think your research is well done. If Boy Browning had not been present at Nijmegen on that first day, I would definitely say that Gavin was at fault. But as Browning was there from the first drop... how could he not be to blame? Even if Gavin had gone "rogue" and decided to take the heights completely on his own, Browning was right there too... and Browning was in charge. At any point he could have said... "who's taking the bridge? why aren't we taking the bridge? Gavin, get your butt and your men on that bridge now!" And that would have been that.
Browning was not amongst the 1st drop. He was in the air when 82nd men should have been advancing towards the bridge.
91 views in the first 26 minutes... not bad, TIK. ;)
I think that it wasn't a single variable or person that led to defeat. The operation had lots of moving parts, and both good and bad decisions were made. And no decision-making was made in a vacuum.
Thanks for uploading! :D
It isn't bad at all. Good to see you were one of the first though :)
I'm not so sure I agree with you. I know the operation had a lot going on, but if 30 Corps had stalled for 36 hours at Son Bridge, the 82nd may have been in trouble too by the time it got there. Blocking the road to Arnhem is ultimately what stopped the Allies from winning. And holding onto the bridge at Nijmegen was the biggest roadblock that needed to be overcome. If that hadn't happened and 30 Corps had been at Arnhem on day 3, or even day 4, the outcome of the battle may have changed.
Aw, thanks. :) I feel so special.
One of the other factors that could have made a huge difference was a second drop on the 1st day by the Polish paras. It could have made the British toehold on the Arnham bridge stronger, and maybe helped them last longer.
Another thing that could have been tried was to have 30th Corps spearheaded by their engineering companies, in case any bridges needed to be repaired or bypassed. The paras wouldn't have engineers when they seized the bridge, and the 30th Corps wouldn't be expecting a fight beyond the initial breakthrough of the German lines. The order of march was every bit as critical as the need to move the sheer mass from point A to B. Almost like a reverse Dunkirk, lol.
I haven't got the foggiest who was to blame for this operation to have not been fully successful. Judging by the never ending and longstanding debates on the subject I conclude that no one else knows either.
Honesty is awesome :) this is why this is a historical debate, and a controversial topic. It's left to interpretation. This is why for many history is classed as an 'art' (some may not agree with that statement) - because when it comes down to it, it's about interpretating the facts and weighing up the different sides of the argument. Yes, science can prove there is paint on the canvas, but how you perceive that paint changes your view on the events.
TIK My comment was a bit tongue in cheek, but you are right. All the debates, could haves, should haves and might have beens help to make it a fascinating subject. As for me, my father was an RAF code and cypher clerk attached to Montgomery’s HQ that advanced from the beaches right up to the surrender of the opposing German forces on Luneberg Heath. He would have received and sent out many of the signals during those momentous times.
Every single video you create is a gem my friend.....
I want to tell you that it’s a CRIME that you don’t have a million subscribers.
So insightful and informative..... as a WW2 enthusiast myself, most everything you talk about, I already know..... however, you still manage to always teach me something new with every topic.
Keep up the outstanding work. I wish you all the best, and I will be becoming a patreon supporter of yours this week.
It’s very true that there is plenty of blame to go around especially at the core and army levels of command. The more I research market garden, incidentally it’s the most interesting battle to look into, the more it baffles me how these commanders actually thought this could succeed. It would only take one thing to go wrong to cause failure. It just so happens almost everything goes wrong and thus you have this disaster.
you do wonder some times! complicated plans that require every part to succeed. i was thinking in many ways though obviously not in the battles themseves how similar it was to the us armies campaign against the sioux in 1876.my point is they made the plans with no one seeming to say well what happens if this fails! 3 columns with no communication diverging on an unreconoittered sioux village travelling huge distances but expecting to arrive at the same time! same thinking as market garden! crook gets stopped on the yellowstone unknown to the rest making the objective now impossible.custer goes in half cocked against much heavier odds than he thought and gets wiped out.much the same planning at gallipolli well send ships in to wipe out the shore batteries whilst landing troops and turkey will fall! what if the ships cant get there as happened and the troops get dumped miles further back than anticipated ! that cant happen oh it has ! time and again in history commanders blind themselves to the real situation in the hope their great plan will succeed.sadly as at arnhem it normally involves ignoring the enemy potential problems with the terrain and normally as with operation market garden making the attempt which needed the maximum of equipment supplies vehicles etc to win with considerably less and hoping to luck! dieppe was another such fiasco!
From Monty, The Field Marshall by Nigel Hamilton:
General Student, in a statement after the war,considered the ‘Market Garden’ Operation to have been proved to be a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of the vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of the war.
Not in Allied condition in 1944. Gain territory didn't help anyway help Allied in 1945 in ending the war. Much better was give this resources and manpower to Patton and his 3rd Army.
Horatio82
Market Garden, which was under resourced and which Montgomery wasn’t heavily involved in the planning of, was partially successful. Over 50 miles of German held territory was taken. The towns of Eindhoven and Nijmegen were liberated. It protected the only port taken intact, Antwerp.It prevented the Germans from operating V rocket from that part of holland.it isolated a whole German army.Troops from Nijmegen turned East into Germany.
If you’re looking for someone to blame for why it wasn’t a 100% success, that can largely be laid at the feet of Lieutenant General James Gavin of the US 82nd Airboune Division who didn’t move to take the bridge in Nijmegen immediately.
But it was partially successful. The Market Garden salient acted as a buffer, one of its prime objectives and proving it’s worth when the Germans rammed through through US lines in the Bulge. It stood between the advancing Germans and the German 15th Army. It prevented any German attempt to re-take Antwerp directly as the Germans had to try and get to Antwerp the long war round via the Ardennes in December. Keeping the 15th Army isolated was a real part of the operation.
Market Garden prevented that vital German link up with the 15th Army. The salient was vital.
The most direct and easiest route to Antwerp was via Venlo. It would have been easier for the Germans to go via Venlo from the Ruhr area but the British were in their way. Going through the Ardennes was one third longer at least in more difficult terrain, for an army desperately short of fuel the extra miles mean a lot, as was proven. They could go through Venlo if they liked but the British in the Market Garden salient between the Germans and Antwerp would have seen the build up and been prepared. The Germans refrained from attacking directly through British defended front lines after 1943. They avoided it and chose to attack through American lines instead. General Blummentritt said the British were next to impossible to dislodge once they were ensconced in defence but the Americans were prone to not defend so stubbornly.
Market Garden almost certainly blocked an easier routed German counter attack on Antwerp.
From Wikipedia:
the Allies did possess a deep salient into German occupied territory that was quickly reinforced. Milton Shulman observed that the operation had driven a wedge into the German positions, isolating the 15th Army north of Antwerp from the First Parachute Army on the eastern side of the bulge. This complicated the supply problem of the 15th Army and removed the chance of the Germans being able to assemble enough troops for a serious counterattack to retake Antwerp. Chester Wilmot agreed with this, claiming that the salient was of immense tactical value for the purpose of driving the Germans from the area south of the Maas and removing the threat of an immediate counterattack against Antwerp.
Brian Urquhart who was privy to some of the initial planning before he was sacked, said they were considering taking huge parts of Southern Holland Eisenhower’s broad font meant there was not enough resources to do this. In fact, German General Blummmetritt said that had Eisenhower given Montgomery the resources he wanted in September it would have been all over for the Germans at that point.
Under Monty the allies moved 400 miles in just 3 months from June to September 1944. Under Eisenhower the allies didn’t move 100 miles in 7 months from September 1944 to March 1945.
Wikipedia:
Blumentritt disagreed with the Allies′ strategy in the west, discussing the precarious nature of the German position with its meager one armoured division against the twelve of the Allies, and he stated that had Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group been unleashed earlier for a concentrated armoured assault (as he had wished) rather than fighting on a broad front, "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."
Even with its’s problems and lack of resources, Market Garden would probably have been 100% successful if Gavin had followed his orders.
It wasn’t the plan that was flawed, it was the failure to adhere to the plan.
The biggest mistakes historians make is to glorify and narrow mindedly concern themselves with Arnhem and Oosterbeek. The Allies were stopped in the south just north of Nijmegen- that is why Arnhem turned out as it did.
-SS Major-General Heinz Harmel, 1987
@@Phantomrasberryblowe All that point can't cover two facts:
1) MG operational goal was to cross the Rhine and in that Operation MG failed, rest is just covering failure with excuses,
2) MG was grave to any plans to cross Rhine in 1944 or even try to push in different region. Gained territory in anyway cover losses of supply and mapower.
Plus any significant German forces weren't destoryed or even weakened. No real operational or startegic succeses was gained. Allied stuck on Rhine line to 1945 thanks to Monty's arrogance. Whole MG plan was full of holes.
To optimistic timetable. Underestimating enemy and poor executed inteligence. Lack of planes to transport troops. Problems with communications. ETC, etc. From start this operation was more gamble than professional military work. All typical for Monty style. All lessons from operation Overlord was basicly forgotten by Montgomery and his staff.
Horatio82
Wasn’t a 100% success largely because of Gavin of the US 82nd Airborne Division
@@Phantomrasberryblowe Plan was full of holes. Maybe Gavin just make it bigger failure. But still I am convinced that Montgomery and Browning are fathers of failure called Market-Garden.
And in anyway MG was succses.
MG was Monty's "child", but once it began, he seems to have vanished. What sort of commanding is that? Browning and his HQ required how many dozen gliders on the vital first day? They could have brought in more allied troops and weapons, which surely would have better effected success. Browning had never before commanded troops in combat, knew the war was nearly over and likely wanted to enhance his career record. Actually, Browning was second in command of 1st AAA to the American general Louis Brereton...why did command fall to Browning! Once again in warfare, ego and "victory disease" in the very top ranks doom good soldiers to frustration, defeat, and needless deaths.
Jkdm 76
Market Garden came out of Comet. It morphed. Monty did not plan or execute it. He left it to the others to do.
You reminded me that it was Brereton who directed Gavin to 'take the bridge with thunderclap surprise'. So really it was Brereton rather than Monty who Gavin directly disobeyed. And Brereton allowed Gavin to get away with it - so he is culpable as well! It's interesting that Brereton is usually left out of the MG narrative and he seems to get off lightly. Indeed Brereton seems to have gone AWOL after giving Gavin those orders which he subsequently ignored.
SuperCaratacus
Any close analysis always falls onto Gavin.
SuperCaratacus
_" So really it was Brereton rather than Monty who Gavin directly disobeyed."_
Correct. Gavin was in the First Allied Airborne Army and was answerable to its leaders. Monty was in charge of an army group, a general over generals. Monty would have no contact with the likes of Gavin.
@@Caratacus1 It was also Brereton who refused to commit all of the necessary transport aircraft to the operation, making it impossible to land all of the airborne troops in one landing on the first day as the original concept required. This was the critical decision that doomed the operation, if all the airborne troops had been landed as intended, they would have been able to secure all objectives.
As Corps Commander, it was Brownings responsibility to ensure the correct tasks were correctly prioritised in order for the timetable to work as planned - therefore if a subordinate commander[Gavin] wanted to deviate from the assigned task, it was Browning's responsibility to identify what was the immediate priority - and wether a deviation was necessary and justifiable within the context of the stated aims and timings. It was Brownings job to make the right decision and he failed, badly. The subsequent delay of 36 hours cannot be justified if there was no evidence whatsoever of a potential German threat. I find it ironic that real evidence of German Panzers near Arnhem was brushed aside whilst a rumour was treated with such "concern". Still, Browning didn't get as many men killed as some of his WW1 predecessors did......but he is mostly responsible for the "Heroic Failure" that killed so many brave and determined men. GUILTY
Oh gosh, I've just written a long reply to someone else on the same point - if you don't mind a copy and paste job:
The concern was that II.SS-Panzerkorps was known to be in northeastern Netherlands with two shattered SS-Panzer-Divisions under command - the 9.'Hohenstaufen' and the 10.'Frundsberg' Divisions. The Dutch resistance had only identified elements of the 9.SS-Panzer among the scattered troops billeted in the area between Arnhem-Apeldoorn-Deventer-Ruurlo, and they had identified a divisional headquarters at Ruurlo, but not which division it belonged to.
The Allied intelligence assessment (the latest before the operation was SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary #26, dated 16 September 1944) was that these divisions were each reduced to a regimental battlegroup with few if any tanks, and that they were refitting by drawing new tanks from a depot thought to be in the Kleve area just across the German border southeast of Nijmegen. There was a fear that the Reichswald could be hiding up to 1,000 tanks - hyperbole that started a silly rumour the tanks were actually there, and Gavin was told the excellent Dutch army barracks facillites in Nijmegen may have a regiment of SS troops in them.
This in turn created the concern over the Groesbeek heights - an area of woodland ridge line that was a natural defensive position between the drop zones and the city of Nijmegen with its bridges. It was for this reason the 508th PIR had to seize three initial objectives on the ridge at De Hut (2nd Battalion), De Ploeg (1st Battalion), and Berg-en-Dal (3rd Battalion), but as soon as this was achieved the 508th were expected to send 1st Battalion into the city to seize the highway bridge as soon as possible, and this is where things went wrong - the precise details of which are the answer to another question and not the one you're asking here, so that's a discussion for another comment.
Browning's dismissal of the tanks photographed by reconnaissance Spitfire on 12 September in the Deelerwoud north of Arnhem, was based on his view that the tanks were obsolete models and probably not even serviceable. This story rested on Browning's Corps Intelligence Officer, Major Brian Urquhart (name changed to 'Fuller' in the film A Bridge Too Far), who connected these tanks to the Dutch resistance reports and gave his story to Cornelius Ryan in an interview for his 1974 book, A Bridge Too Far. The 1977 film is based on the book and is highly controversial, not least because Browning's widow and actor Dirk Bogarde both objected to the portrayal of Browning in the film, but Bogarde didn't opt to turn down the part and seems (in my personal opinion watching the film) to have sought to mitigate the script by playing the character as somewhat conflicted. I presume it was all he could do, or pass and have someone else play the role. By the way, Bogarde served in the war as an RAF photo interpreter working on Dempsey's 2nd Army staff, selecting bombing targets during the European campaign, including Operation Market Garden. He knew all the key personalities, including Montgomery and Browning.
The problem with Major Brian Urquhart's testimony is that Browning was no longer alive to give his side of the story, and the photo in question was no longer available... until 2015. The photo (Frame 4015 taken 12 Sep 44 by 541 Sqn), along with the RAF's entire library of images, was donated to the Dutch government after the war to help with reconstruction and land use surveys, and only came to light when the Dutch government digitised their archives and put them online. The key photo frame was identified and studied by the RAF's Air Historical Branch, and under magnification the tanks can be determined to be Mark III and older Mark IV models (with the short 7.5cm gun), ruling out a 1944 panzer division as the likely owner. The study is available as a free pdf called 'Arnhem: The Air Reconnaissance Story' (2nd Ed, 2019) on the RAF MoD site.
So, we now know which unit the tanks belonged to, because the only unit in the Netherlands with those vehicles at the time (before Market Garden started) was the Reserve Panzer Kompanie of Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', the training unit for the Luftwaffe's only panzer division currently fighting the Soviets in Poland. The Regiment was based in Utrecht and the Reserve Panzer Kompanie in Harderwijk on the Zuider Zee coast.
During the crisis in the west in September 1944, the 1.Fallschirm-armee was formed to plug the gap in the line in Belgium. The 'HG' Regiment transferred to it from LXXXVIII Korps (Netherlands occupation forces), and the three training Abteilungen (infanterie/panzer/artillerie) were mobilised and sent south to fight British 2nd Army on the Albert canal. The Reserve Panzer Kompanie was mobilised on 7 September and sent to Hechtel in Belgium to join II.Abteilung, but only three tanks completed the journey without breaking down, and were destroyed with much of the battalion at Hechtel by Guards Armoured Division on 12 September, the same day the remainder were photographed near Deelen undergoing maintenance (turrets were turned to allow engine hatches to be opened) at a supply dump in the woods near Fliegerhorst Deelen, the largest German airbase in the Netherlands.
On 17 September, the day Market Garden was launched, these tanks were laagered at Wolfswinkel, near Son north of Eindhoven, and they attempted to fire on the drop zone of the 506th PIR (101st Airborne) during the landings, but were shot up by escorting fighter bombers. Two Mark III tanks escaped, one ran the gauntlet of 502nd troopers in St Oedenrode but was only hit by unprimed bazooka rounds, and they both by-passed the 501st at Veghel to bump the E/504th (82nd Airborne) roadblock at Grave. Some casualties were caused to troopers climbing out of their foxholes, in the belief the tanks were the British arriving early, and they then turned tail were not seen again.
So, Browning's dismissal of the tanks in the photo appears to have been good judgement on his part, and history proves that he was right to be more concerned about the unknown location of 10.SS-Panzer-Division - it was not known that the Ruurlo headquarters was the 10.SS-Panzer-Division's, the 9.SS-Panzer were headquartered at Beekbergen near Apeldoorn.
You continue to completely ignore a vital point. If the 82nd did take the bridge on the first day, what happens when Grabner's SS troops arrive? They either take the bridge back or they set up defensive positions on the other side. The SS reinforcements including the self propelled guns and 88s continue to arrive either way. Say the 82nd continues to hold the bridge against Grabner and his arriving reinforcements. Now the British have to come across one bridge into the fully prepared SS. Judging from how long it took for the British army to move up the road (against almost no opposition) after the bridge was open, they wouldn't have gotten there any quicker fighting the SS in the open up the one-lane high dike road. Actually, I think bringing the SS into Nijmegen did the British army a big favor.
As may things as went wrong during Market Garden, trying to pin blame on any one thing or person is unfair. Browning certainly is my leading candidate as he used us so many resources to add nothing to the battle except a distraction for the 82nd airborne. It was ultimately his decision to secure the Grosbeak heights although that was a sound decision. There is blame from Monty on down but my biggest 'blame' is ignoring TWO SS divisions at Arnhem. If those two divisions are not there, this battle is won by the allies easily, hands down, war is over by Christmas.
Valid points, thanks for commenting :) I'll address most of these in my Browning video (will be out in a couple weeks). The fact that 10th SS Panzer could just park itself north of Nijmegen and block the route there is a good counter argument, and one which very few people have so far suggested. I wish more were capable of coming to that conclusion rather than simply dismissing the facts and blaming "Monty" or "the British".
Here's one for you: Have you considered that Browning and Montgomery got a lot of flak over the fact that there were two depleted SS Panzer Divisions in the Arnhem area, but zero flak about the perceived threat of 1,000 Panzers in the Reichswald forest? They reacted to that by placing part of one parachute division on a gentle slope, which they hoped would stop the equivalent of an Army Group's worth of panzers.
I think they were more worried about controlling the Groesbeek heights for the terrain feature. Yes, it's a gentle slope but it's the highest point of ground and dominates the highway north. Any German presence there could easily cut the highway with artillery called in from batteries safely in Germany. In my research, I've never seen any evidence they truly thought or had intelligence to suggest armored forces there. However, the did know the 9th and 10th SS had disappeared from the battlefield and perhaps assumed the Reichswald forest as the place they most likely were.
In most research I've done, both Gavin and Browning agreed the heights must be captured and controlled as well as the nearby landing zones which were needed on the following days. This was actually their agreed on #1 priority. Much like the British in Arnhem, they had to leave a significant force behind. They had three reasons for doing so: a) control the high ground b) Protect Browning's headquarters he established there and c) protect the drop and glider landing zones for the following day.
I should also point out an error in your previous Market-Garden film. You stated one of the 101st Airborne gliders crashed near Student's headquarters with the entire Market-Garden plans. Only one glider from the 101st crashed in enemy territory with those aboard killed. The other six that landed in enemy territory ended up with their men and cargo reporting to the division on D+1 or D+2. The glider that did crash with loss of life was from the 101st Airborne Signal company and sure would not have had complete plans for the entire operation. As a matter of fact, I doubt Maxwell Taylor had (or had even seen) a copy of the complete plans. However, one of the gliders carrying Browning's headquarters (coming in in American gliders with the 82nd) did crash near Student's headquarters and that is where the entire plan of Market Garden fell into German hands. The 101st documentation on gliders can be found here: www.benning.army.mil/library/content/Virtual/Documents/Hardcopy/paper/D731.1_E91_no419.pdf
I am currently working on a documentary about the Battle at Best. Did you know only two men won the Medal of Honor for the 101st airborne in the entire WW2? Did you know both died within 24 hours of each other at Best? Did you know the company commander tasked with capturing the Best bridge went on to survive the massacre at Chosin reservoir in the Korean war or that later on in life, he was the intelligence officer in Texas charged with keeping an eye on Lee Harvey Oswald who assassinated President Kennedy? Really interesting stuff in that Battle at Best.
Thanks for replying and look forward to more debate!
What about the fact they had to use boats to cross the river to attach the bridge from the other side. The boats took forever to reach the bridge by trucks for the soldiers to cross. The narrow road and driving through the liberated town's caused a major delay to deliver the boats. That was a suicide mission for the 82nd airborne to cross the river.
I feel this was more of a strategic failure than a tactical failure. The plan for 30 Corps to be in Arnhem within a day was far too ambitious. Clearly the Germans weren't done fighting at that point. And the questionable landing area for the British airborne was just suicidal. 7 miles from the objective? Even if they had tanks on hand that's still too much ground for a light infantry unit to cover. Great video
It was Brereton who was in charge of the air drops.
Ray Barata's comment that there were a host of issues dooming Market Garden from the start aside, in this particular 'scene', Browning as senior commander to Gavin should have ordered the taking and securing of the bridge as the #1 priority, with a small scout force to occupy the heights as a precaution against flank/envelopment. Gavin should have been roasted as well in American command for not prioritising the bridge.
Thanks for putting these video's together, by the way. Good job, all 'round.
I do not understand your desire to blame Gavin. Browning was there, and the superior officer. If he wanted the bridge taken day one he was in position to make it happen.
browning, according to several people, did tell gavin to secure groesbeek heights before proceeding to the nijmegen bridge. but this was only a small part of a plan that had little, if any, chance of success, and ultimate blame must go to the man who dreamed it up and pretty much forced it into being, montgomery.
Gavin was ordered by Browning to take the hill BEFORE taking the bridge:
"...This hill mass went up to one hundred meters and dominated the countryside for many miles. It had been used as a maneuver area by both the Dutch and Germans and was well known. It is the only high ground in all of the Netherlands. At a conference at the headquarters of the British Airborne Corps on September 16 (D minus 1) General Browning directed the CG of the 82nd
>>> "not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished and the Groesbeek-Bergendahl high ground was firmly in our hands."
@Grisha wrote:
_"Gavin was ordered by Browning to take the hill BEFORE taking the bridge"_
Browning did no such thing.
yes he did he in fact orderd it - it's friday better get the mop ready at the adult theater Puddles
@@bigwoody4704
Hi Rambo!
@@johnburns4017 you must be exhaused from the double feature
@@bigwoody4704
Hi Rambo!
I think that the plan for operation Market Garden was good, it wasn't an impossible mission. The problem was the 36 hours delay, otherwise they could succeed
If the landing zones were closer and they could have sent everyone in faster perhaps Frost could have held out longer.
What I would want to know is this: Even if the operation had succeeded, and Arnhem bridge taken intact by XXX Corps, then what? Did the Allies really have the strength and supplies to attack the Ruhr region, given the immense difficulties they were having just holding their supply corridor? The Allied intelligence about the German strength was wildly inaccurate, and I doubt they would have had the momentum left to fully exploit the strategic opportunity.
I'm reading through A Bridge Too Far now, and the supply situation of the Allied armies was miserable.
I have often wondered the exact same thing about Market Garden. If the Allies could barely "maintain" the corridor, how in the world could they possibly have pushed through to the Ruhr and shut down German Military production. Surely, Monty and Ike and Brereton and all the other high level leadership of the western Allies. I have always suspected there must have been a different goal for Market Garden... just a goal that since the operation failed, they never felt the need to let people know just how badly they had failed.
In another video TiK clearly showed that the objective was not the Ruhr. The objective was reaching the sea and closing of the pocket so that the Canadians could open up the port of Antwerp. That would have allowed for major resupply of all Allied armies and would then in a second large operation have allowed an attack into the Ruhr. However for Market Garden the objective was the sea. Encircling a huge number of German troupes, crossing the Rhine and making it 'easy' to opening up the biggest port, all with one operation seem to me well worth doing. Specially if you have large numbers of Paras waiting for an operation.
As for the supply situation, you must consider that the Germans were in just as bad a supply situation, usually far worse.
Did the Ground troops ever make it to Arnhem?
@@ppumpkin3282 To the best of my knowledge, no XXX Corps troops reached Arnhem itself during the battle. Some, however, did reach the north bank of the Rhine at Oosterbeek. Notably, parts of 4th battalion of the Dorsetshire regiment, part of 43 Wessex Infantry Division, which in turn was part of XXX corps. They were sent across the Rhine in small boats on 24 september to reinforce the Oosterbeek pocket and assist in the evacuation of 1st Airborne.
Also, while they did not cross the Rhine themselves, the XXX Corps artillery made an impact in the last few days of the battle, giving heavy fire support to the Paras in Oosterbeek.
The idea was to consolidate their bridgehead over the Rhine, for a later attack on the Ruhr together with the US First Army to the south.
Were Browning and Gavin to blame for the failure ? The Market Garden plan was 'signed off' by Brereton. He was responsible for the 1st Allied Airborne Army. He knew that all the bridges had to be taken with 'thunderclap surprise' so why did he okay a plan that relegated the Nijmegen bridge to the lowest priority ? It was Brereton who approved the flight plan of General Williams that so hamstrung the Airborne commanders and ignored all the Airborne tactics.
At the least "A bridge too far" was a great movie!
@frankandersson76 I like some aspects of it, but I think the movie is responsible for a lot of myths people take as fact. And unquestionably blames the wrong people, except perhaps Browning.
My dad said that the RAF liaison was completely ignored when he explained that VHF radio sets would not work with that much surface water around, leading to the supply drops ending up in the wrong place.
Who was in command?
Monty.
Who failed?
Monty.
richard suggs
_"Who was in command? "_
Eisenhower.
Seems like you try to find opportunities at every turn to disparage the U.S. military. Lets face it, while the British have maintained a very impressive army throughout history it has for the most part been quite small in comparison to mainland European armies and has relied upon its colonies and smaller allies to supplement itself and furthermore in any major war it has required a few major allies to piggy-back off of, but just because the British army was so good does not mean that others were so bad. On the whole I find that many of your common talking points are often irrelevant and duplicitously cynical.
TheNightFox
No. I put into place those who distort history. The US armies were not bad armies, just unexceptional. Facts prove that.
The prime defence of Britain has traditionally been the navy, then supplemented by the RAF, which was the case even in 1939. The British army was small and highly mobile, because it need not be large. It was always very mobile having to deploy quickly to far off regions. Look at the amazing quick response to the Falklands invasion. The Soviets changed their tactics towards NATO because of it.
John Burns the British would never have been able to invade the falklands without the US. The US provided the army with night vision and also promised to replace an aircraft carrier if lost.
The Royal Navy has been the primary weapon in Britain's arsenal, successfully defending her from the risk of invasion by the "large armies" of other countries, and projecting British power
I definitely feel like Market Garden wasn't a case where a single factor doomed the operation...to a point. Perhaps its a personal variant of the "rotten plan, poorly executed" idea: the whole operation Market Garden battleplan reminds me of some of the Imperial Japanese Navy battle plans, where everything only works as long as the enemy obligingly cooperates and steams to its doom. Gavin certainly deserves blame for not securing the bridge. I will not deny that. I just feel like some of the arguments, like saying he flew in guns to pound mythical tanks, are made with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight which was not available at the time. the fact that the corps commander dropped in to the heights doesn't help either because obviously, you don't want to leave your corps HQ exposed to attack (even though now we know that on day one there were no forces that could threaten it...it's never a good idea to assume the enemy isn't there). Gavin may have felt that he needed to heavily fortify the HQ position and this would've left him short-handed to take the bridge.
The moral of the story is there's enough blame to go around--Gavin, Browning, Urquhart, hell even Monty to some extent (it was after all his operation). The only part I don't necessarily agree with in the "rotten plan" idea is that 30 corps dawdled...it didn't. Let us not forget that the Germans were fighting off well-trained paratroopers at Arnhem with reserve units for the most part...thus the "German Victory" view is sort of right as well. Perhaps, when everything is said and done, all 3 views on why Market Garden failed are correct to varying degrees.
Sayer AWR
_"I definitely feel like Market Garden wasn't a case where a single factor doomed the operation"_
In fact one single factor did doom the operation. The operation was relying on each crossing being seized immediately.
The plan was ridiculous- the execution mediocre. Browning was the husband of Daphne du Maurier who claimed he was haunted by the failure of this operation post war.
Nijmegen wasn't the only issue - the drop zones for Arnhem were 8 miles from the bridge. It was amazing 2 Para even got there with a Panzer division resting in the town.
Absolutely, I agree it wasn't the only issue. However, the point was that there's no point even dropping at Arnhem if Nijmegen bridge isn't taken. The 36 hour delay at Nijmegen killed the operation more than the drop zones at Arnhem (even though they were bad).
@@TheImperatorKnight the problem with the operations was no one airborne division commit whole on day One
An airborne operations to capture bridges but no airborne bridge equipment with the division if thing go wrong
So browning wanted to setup his corps HQ on the Groesbeek Heights? Maybe he prioritized the heights because wanted to be sure his HQ was secure. There are numerous examples throughout history of commanders prioritizing their own security over the success of the mission
@John Cornell Thats too many objectives for such a small force. Securing the drop zone, the heights and the bridge on day one was wishful thinking, they needed to prioritize the objectives and the bridge was more vital to the operations success. remember, less than 1/3 of Market's total force made it to their drop zones on day one, the rest of the force would come in the next two days. they could have secured the heights on day two when they got reinforcements.
@John Cornell agreed, it was the multi day drop that really doomed MG
@John Cornell "oh yeah we'll get three straight days of good weather, in England, in September"- Monty (probably)
They say not to speak ill of the dead but it's extremely difficult when Browning is mentioned. So many troops killed wounded and captured and all to satisfy his public school vanity.
There were many different personalities involved in the failure, and Browning was not the main one as Tik reveals in a following video.
Were the Allies so logistically strapped that no units could be deployed to advance and protect the flanks of XXX Corps spearhead?
TIK has a follow-up presentation that addresses this.
th-cam.com/video/6GgokduUvQ8/w-d-xo.html
One Yank's opinion: Browning was senior to Gavin; if he indeed ordered Gavin to secure the Groesbeek Heights before going for the Nijmegen Bridge, or if Gavin was indecisive and Browning did not say in effect "Jim, go for the bridge now; we're secure enough here", Browning has to accept a major share of the responsibility for Nijmegen Bridge not being taken on the first day.
Your commentaries are very interesting. Have you evaluated the claim reported by Ryan that Col. George Chatterton, commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment, recommended a coup-de-main on the south approach of the Arnhem Bridge not unlike what was achieved at the Caen Canal bridge ("Pegasus Bridge") by Maj. John Howard's command on 5-6 June?
Mikey300
In the pre-drop briefing it was clear Gavin had to go for the bridge immediately.
is there supporting evidence for this assertion, or is this only your opinion?
Mikey300
Lost at Nijmegen by Poulussen.
It never Snows in September by Kershaw (the German view)
Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Magry (a Dutchman) - the best.
From here:
clickamericana.com/eras/1940s/stories-from-wwii-nijmegen-holland
_"Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible, as the bridge was the key to the division’s contribution to the success of the operation."_
_`After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me - let’s get him moving.” On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”`_
Lindquist said that Gavin was not specific in his instructions to him in the pre-drop briefing.
John Burns thanks John; I shall search for those references.
Mikey300
The events on the evening of the 82nd's first day :-
Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared to move towards the Nijmegen bridge at all.
- Lost at Nijmegen by Poulussen.
Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what information the underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen road bridge.
- Lost at Nijmegen by Poulussen
It was also around *21.00,* 6 hours after landing, when "A" Company left to attempt to capture the Waal [Nijmegen] bridge. "B" Company was not with them because they had split being night and "visibility was less than ten yards".
- Poulussen
The attacks were resisted by the Germans until the next day. Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge yet, another attack was about to go in. Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter. Then at around 11.00, Warren was ordered to withdraw from Nijmegen completely by Gavin.
- Poulussen
We know that the Germans failed to blow up the bridge after its capture was imminent due to wires that were disconnected at some point in the battle. If the 82nd had been close to capturing the bridge on day one, would the destruction mechanism been intact? We don't know. If the bridge had been blown on day one, the situation would have far worse.
Wellthe bridge would not have been blowed if they took the bridge on day 1 since due to the infantry shooting the germans that where guarding the bomb would have been shot down and with the force of their dead bodies it disconnected the bomb.
@@Aesthelica Since the Germans who had their trigger finger on the detonator were on the opposite side of the river from the paratroop landing and since the paratroopers would have had to go through the town, there would have been plenty of time for the Germans to blow the bridge.
TIK why don t u blame Monty for it? is Monty such gold star in your books? or he had no flaws? right... cause Monty was the man how wanted this OP in the first place? sure Browning Command 1st Airborne Corps and overall command of the ground operations, but it was Eisenhower how approved it before it started and Monty how "worked it out, with its flaws" which resulted in the backfire mission called Operation Market-Garden. sure blame Gavin for it, he was tasked first to secure and hold Nijmegen Bridge and 2nd task could have been Groesbeck Heights, so it was an error of decisions there, it didn t affect the Wars outcome, but the loss of life still, was shambles and should be blamed on Monty and him alone.
The premise is that the plan could have worked as it was, if they'd taken Nijmegen Bridge on Day 1 as ordered. I'm reserving my assessment of Montgomery until I get to him - that's why I'm working my way through the North Africa Campaign, so that I can assess him compared to what came before. I've already said Churchill was a poor military leader (although good politician) so I have no problem laying criticism on Montgomery. And he may be the worst general ever, but I'm not so such Market Garden was as bad a plan as people make out. I do think it could have worked, had Gavin decided that a hill was more important than one of the main objectives. And that's the point, Gavin's task was to take the bridge - but he chose to go for the secondary objective first, costing the operation.
TIK my response I hope wast to aggressive at all, I merely would like to hear your point on Monty, I think he was excellent General and Commander, but underestimate your opponents and "we will be home before Christmas" and poor intelligence or lack of trust towards the Dutch resistance? I have seen it or read it so many times how an operation goes south when you doubt your enemies capabilities, underestimate your opponent cause some or majority of the German forces in France were in full retreat, panicked or cause of several others possibilities if "what if or why". I am surprised my self why did Gavin posses the hights overtaking the bridge? was it possible he knew or feard that "if the Germans did have enough panzers in reichswald forest or were gathering forces for a Counterattack from it? or simple thought the heights were more important, in case another encirclement happened around the 82nd around Nijmegen? as it happened to 1st airborne at Arnhem and around osterbeeke? " if that's the case, or just the bad planning, no or very little intel on German forces and German possibilities in late 1944/1945? the overall command was Monty and planning was Monty, overall command during this operation was Browning, overall Unit commanders were Horrocks, Gavin, Taylor, and Urquhart, the Poles came in late "cause of four in England or that UK leadership still in late 1944 didn t trust or whatever reason didn t want the Poles in on it ? or why delay to deploy the Polish brigade at all? why? cause of losing "transport planes?" which could be made and shipped from the United States of America, in a risk of the war in EU to still be on in 1945 or 1946? or that "What if The Germans did do well in stopping the Market Garden plan, also which could have lead to a totally or slight difference in "Battle of Bulge" a few months later? was it even possible at the later stage for the Germans than to gain something of peace? and then able to use whatever German forces and resources to stop or halt the Soviet invasion? I know this is too much information or may opnion in the matter, Market Garden was important stepp in what lead as I bellive in that how the Germans manged to, with what they had left to do a small or very short counter offensive during the Battle of Bulge.
The Northern Warrior What is often forgotten (a bit of the benefit of hindsight I know) is that if XXX Corp had reached the Zuider Zee and then advanced in a pincer movement with the Americans to isolate the West Wall and the German industrial heartland the Ruhr would the thousands of Allied soldiers have been killed and wounded at the Battle of the Bulge, The Hurtgen Forest and the Rhine Crossing. Harmel of the 10SS is quoted as saying '...if crossing at Nijmegen had been secured on the first day it would have been all over for us. Even if we had lost it on the second day, we would have had difficulty stopping them....'
All plans of War are risky. Nothing is a dead cert. Take Operation Overlord. It is arguable that the only reason why the 6th Airborne Division was not destroyed by the formidable 21 Panzer Division was because no one would wake up Hitler from his slumbers and give orders to attack the British. The Overlord planners could never have factored that into their plans. In total contrast the Germans, unshackled, acted swiftly and decisively during Market Garden. Some point out and argue that the Market Garden plan was drawn up too hastily, with some justification I acknowledge but how much time do you need to plan. Operation Overlord (including its predecessor) took over 12 months in the planning but they didn't have a plan for the Normandy Bocage with its sunken lanes. Although the Americans practised sea borne landings in Devon I'm not aware that any of their tanks ventured down the Devon country lanes because if they had I'm sure they would have come up with a solution.
considering how important antwerp and its docks were at this time, why was market garden given permission to go ahead
tik: i had a short discussion with you about a year ago on this battle. ("it's the Americans' fault. spoken like good Brit.") just saw "a bridge too far (Not!) Horrock, Carrington refuse" which touches on our discussion.
i've done a passing study on kursk. the russian and german historians have spilt almost as much ink refighting the battle as the soldiers originally spilt blood. unless it is a clear cut victory or defeat i really don't know how one can evaluate battles. local leaders will exaggerate their success and downplay their failures all the way up the line to the generals. eyewitness testimony is equally unreliable. military history is a really difficult area to determine truth.
One thing's for sure it's not because XXX corps were too busy drinking tea and following orders as the film and Band of brothers (both great btw) imply.
That bit didn't happen
I agree with Frost that Browning was at fault for Market Gardens failure.
My understanding is that the allies didn't believe the Dutch underground's info, or trust them. For example the telephones were all still operating and at one point the Dutch using the phone to call someone in the next town to find out whatever info they had on the German army, and only then did they start to take notice but it was far too late
Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division, was a newbie in Airborne Operations, and so when he asked for drop zones closer to the bridge, was turned down on the pretext that it was impossible to drop people there. The spirit of the D-Day Landings (and in this, I am INCLUDING the Airborne Landings) where anything and everything was possible was long gone, and Market-Garden was a failure pretty much from the get-go. With the American Army it might have succeeded, but with the British Army it was never going to succeed. (Incidentally, I'm talking about the British Army of 1944-45, when more then one officer was reminded of the casualties in World War One, and most especially during the Battle of the Somme.)
David Briggs
The US army in 1944-45 was nowhere near the quality of the British. The only allied retreat in 1944-45 was the Americans. When the Germans attacked at the Bulge the US 1st and 9th armies were put under British command, the 9th stayed under British command until the end of the war. Look at the US debacles at Metz (Patton move 10 miles in 3 months) and the Hurtgen Forest defeat.
American armour was not up to it either.
David Briggs
I'd be VERY interested to know the basis of your point of view.
The U.S. Army of 1944-1945 was nowhere near the quality of the British? Really! The British DURING OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN paused their advance for no apparent reason, with no opposition in front of them and with their infantry readily available To the Americans, it sometimes seemed as if the British soldiers stopped, sometimes at the drop of a hat, to brew up some tea. Look at what the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions did in Brittany after the breakout from the Contention Peninsula, where they drove some 15-30 miles a day (if not more), running off their maps in some cases. Did the British achieve anywhere near that rate of advance outside of North Africa at all during the war? Nope! You state that the only retreat in 1944-45 was the American's, but that was when the thinly held front lines under the Americans was hit by very strong German forces (American Divisions faced numerous German Divisions alone), and even there the Americans held the line and prevented the Germans from making a much deeper penetration, and only two Divisions (the 106th and 28th) suffered being overrun, and then only partly. Look at the actions of the 99th Infantry Division to the north, which held their position despite it being the target of one of the German advances; the Germans were forced to go around the 99th. You talk about the Battle of Metz (where my father first saw combat) and Hurtgen Forest as being American debacles, but you are forgetting something very important, the Third Army was VERY short on gasoline, having been diverted to the British up north. As a result, Patton was basically forced to hold in place (except for a few minor attacks) until Antwerp was opened up and the gasoline situation improved. THAT'S why it took Patton 3 months to take Metz, the lack of gas, not the lack of ability by the Americans. Once the gasoline situation improved, Patton, with only four Divisions (5th, 90th and 95th Infantry and the 10th Armored Divisions) was able to take Metz in only around 3 WEEKS.
And with regard to the 1st and 9th Armies being placed under British command, that was because the German Ardennes Advance tore the 1st Army in two, and Eisenhower felt that the Commander of the First Army could not adequately control the elements of his Army to the north. The First Army returned to Bradley's command late in December or early in January, AS DID THE NINTH ARMY. The war in Europe ended in MAY 1945, and the 9th Army was returned back to Bradley's command in FEBRUARY 1945, several months before the end of the War. The biggest problem with Market-Garden was it was almost a completely British affair (except for the America Parachute Divisions), and the British Army was not up to the job, period. Read some history books about the subject, or perhaps watch the movies a Bridge Too Far and Patton for a better idea about the American and British Armies in 1944-45.
Have you read any books on the subject? British Historian John Keegan makes some very good points about the failures of the British in 1944-45, as does the book by Corneliius Ryan (I think), the author of “A Bridge Too Far”. While I might have been wrong about the reasons for the turning down the drop sites, the fact remains that the drop sites Urquhart request WERE turned down.
David Briggs
XXX Corps in Market Garden *did not* pause their advance for no apparent reason at all. You have been watching that infactual film A Bridge Too Far. Hollywood history.
The Yanks went into Brittany with few German troops there and never captured a port. A waste of time. Patton diverted a third of his force on a wild goose chase.
The British moved from Normandy to Belgium in a matter of days.
It is a fact that the only allied army retreat in 1944-45 was the Americans. The US 1st and 9th armies had to be put under British control - *fact.* *The US 9th army stayed under British control until the end of the war,* well about 2 weeks from the end when it was all over bar the shouting as the Germans had about 30 operational tanks.
*All* armies in Normandy were under British control.
No gasoline was diverted to the British up north from the US 3rd army. None. Patton fought a 3rd rate army full of units of deaf & dumb men - literally. He moved 10 miles in 3 months, losing 55,000 men. 40,000 lost at the Hurtgen Forest defeat. Gasoline was being brought from Ostend as a pipe from England was run over well before Antwerp was operational.
_"watch the movies a Bridge Too Far"_
Oh he did watch the film! My oh my! LOL. And he watched the film Patton as well. Hollywood history at its best. LOL.
*You were wrong on every point.* Read my posts on Market Garden on this video.
Sean Connery at first did not wish to cooperate with the making of "A Bridge Too Far." He was concerned it would be promoted as a blatant 'Glorious Defeat' whereas he was of the opinion it was just a collossal failure. So it wasn't just the director who had a low opinion of certain top Allied commanders. I mean, come one General Urquhart... Getting lost for a full day by getting stuck between enemy forces? He should have properly informed his back-up that, should anything happen to him (Urquhart), his back-up would have free reign in command of the operation.
Had Browning stayed in the UK on the first day he could shrug off responsibility on Gavin. However since he was in direct face to face contact with Gavin he should have ordered Gavin to secure the bridge following the original plan. Some could say that he was not paying attention to what Gavin was doing specifically while he was gathering the full picture of the battle. However he would have to rely of radio intelligence from all other units which could understandably be delayed in reporting while he should have expected reports from Gavin commands progress in real time and should have been curious why he had not heard that the bridge had been taken or what was going on with it. However it is claimed he knew nothing was going on with the bridge so he can not even claim that he did not know. Yes, Gavin fails directly but Browning fails for not over riding him. Frankly the way Gavin reports that he made the decision but his commander ok'd it, makes me wonder if Gavin was shielding Browning by shifting the brunt of the blame on to himself.
@Donald Hill
You've found the acorn.
Keep in mind that Gavin received his second star promptly after MG.
He HAD done exactly as ordered: save Browning at any cost.
Browning in SS hands would be a tortured LtG - a man who knew too much about ALL Allied airborne operations.
If MG had been a success, Browning would certainly be given his fourth star -- and a life peerage -- like the other British greats.
He was a PREMIER general in the eyes of all of his peers. How many guys can EVER claim to have founded a essential arm of the Service? That only happens about three times in a millennia.
Gavin's personal bravery is beyond question. In this event, he's wiping clean the stain that Browning put on his own record. He should absolutely NOT have landed with his troops. He was far too valuable.
@Donald Hill
Of course he was.
At the end of the day, Gavin gets his second start,
Browning disappears from WWII history.
During Varsity, everything Browning did wrong is reversed.
Gavin goes on to glory.
That's some screw-up there.
Heh.
Second STAR
Donald Hill
Browning was still in the air when the 508th should have been marching towards the bridge.
and do what? wait over 2 days while your boys south of Valkenswaard who made it a whole 7 miles finally join the operation
MG airways felt like an extreme high-risk op to me. Too many single points of failure to succeed.
Inability to capture any of these bridges leads to failure of the operation.
I am Canadian and I often defend Monty in talks with Americans. I think Normandy was his finest hour in my books. His failure to capture the Scheldt when it was an easier catch was his worse hour. That said for market garden I think the buck has to stop with him. He should have overseen the plan and made sure Browning knew his job and the job of the 82nd. I agree Browning doesn't impress me but unless he by passed Monty's orders then the blame has to at least partly lay on Monty.
Peorhum
The Scheldt was flooded by the Germans and the river to Antwerp was mined with wrecks littering the narrow river. The idea was to take only coastal channel ports for supplies. The Canadians and Czechs failed to seize Dunkirk, with delays in getting Ostend and Bologne operational. Inconvenient Antwerp, 40 miles inland, was taken intact so had to be used despite not on the initial list of ports. The mines and wrecks had to be removed. Ships moving up to Antwerp needed protection all along the length with AA guns.
Market Garden was a daring and sound plan. Eisenhower, who approved it, even in the late 1950s said it was well worth the effort and risk. Monty had no say in the execution of the operation. The created Market Garden salient did act as an essential buffer for Antwerp as was shown when the Germans scythed through US lines in the Bulge. British forces moved down from the salient to stop the German advance.
The Schedlt was put on hold by *Eisenhower,* on on 6 October did he instruct Montgomery to clear the Scheldt, which he had started anyhow.
Actually I have read detailed books on the Scheldt and it was one nasty battle. There was a point after 30 corp took Antwerp that the Scheldt would have been a relatively easy catch but Monty ignore it despite increasing pressure by Ramsey and Eisenhower for him to clear it. Not saying market garden should not have happened but I am saying Monty failed to give the Scheldt the priority it needed both before and after market garden. It wasn't until Monty was about to be fired that he finally put enough resources into the Scheldt...again despite both Ramsey and Ike being on his case. Monty kept telling them he will make it his top priority yet kept working on plans to put him over the Rhine.
As for Canadians and Czechs failing to take Dunkirk and some of the other canal ports, it was due to them being fortresses and all in all very hard to take. The Canadian army had basically 2 corps and with those 2 corps were expected to push on 2 axis, one towards Falaise and the other one along the Canal taking the ports. These operation were given little support by Monty, while Ramsey helped all he could. Knowing how long it would take to take, then make operational the canal ports Monty should have known the importance of the Scheldt yet ignored it until he was forced too act. He kept saying it would be his top priority but gave the Canadian forces he set to clearing it no support, all the while expecting them to clear or hold the other canal ports as well. In the end when forced he then give the support needed which lead to it's relatively quick clearing. Many historians who know of the Scheldt details, share my opinion that it was Monty's greatest failing. It almost cost him his job as head of British forces in Europe, as Ike was about to get him sacked but he then did what he was told to do and saved his job.
Peorhum
_"Antwerp that the Scheldt would have been a relatively easy catch but Monty ignore it despite increasing pressure by Ramsey and Eisenhower for him to clear it."_
Montgomery approached the US leaders of the First Allied Airborne Army about a drop on the Scheld but they said no. It was also expected that the Canadians and Czechs would have taken Dunkirk, but they never. It took the Canadians 2 weeks to take Boulogne and Calais, ports much superior to Antwerp being on the coast. It was expected they would be taken in a few days like LeHavre. Only Admiral Ramsay was screaming to take the the Scheld immediately after seizing Antwerp intact. The Germans had over 100,000 troops there so Boulogne and Calais looked better bets. There was no delay in taking the Scheldt because the priority was Boulogne and Calais for obvious reasons.
I have read a fair amount of detail meetings between Ike, Ramsey and Monty and the ports were top priority from the start and sure once Antwerp was taken that is when the real pressure was applied to Monty to clear the Scheldt and Monty kept doing lip service only, as he had his mind elsewhere. Don't forget the Cdn army had to push along the coast taking the ports while pushing to Falaise, and when Falaise was done, half the army had a few days rest then was sent either to help with the ports or sent to Belgium to begin clearing the pocket and pushing out of Antwerp. Actually Antwerp was not really taken by 30 corp, just part of it was, the Belgium underground and Cdn forces had to clear the Germans completely out. I read how at 1st it was like a 9-5 work day where Cdn troops would take the trams to fight the Germans like they were heading off to work. Anyways, Monty delayed clearing the Scheldt as much as he could by not giving proper support to the Cdn Army which just did not have the resources to clear the Scheldt quickly like Ike and Ramsey wanted.
I just got one of my books out and found the chapter about Monty putting off doing what was needed to clear the Scheldt. I wish i could copy and paste it for you. In a letter of Oct 9 to Ike, Monty stated he saw the Ruhr "a definite and clear cut military objective" that could be taken only with one commander in charge...HIM and he did not mention the Scheldt at all. In response Ike wrote...he acknowledged Monty's comments then said "That the real issue is Antwerp" The parlous supply state was "why I keep reverting again and again to the matter of getting Antwerp into workable condition. I have been informed by both the chief of imperial staff(Brooke) and chief of staff of US army(Marshall) that they seriously considered giving me a flat order that until the capture of Antwerp and it's approaches were fully assured, this operation(clearing the Scheldt) should take precedence over all others" Ever since the failure of market garden, "I have been ready to furnish additional troops from US sources for the purpose, provided that you desired them, and that gotten to you and supplied...I do not mean to be repeating myself about something well known to us both. The reason for restating it, however, is that the Antwerp operation does not involve questions of command in the slightest degree. Everything that can be brought in to help no matter of what nationality, belongs to you."
That was just one of many letters and minutes on the subject made after market garden between Ike and Monty. Monty was fixated on getting himself into Germany!! This debate between Ike and Monty finally ended on Oct 16th, a month after Market garden started. In the meanwhile the Canadians had a hard fight with limited resources in France and in clearing the scheldt. Monty wanted to be the hero in Germany and HE wanted command like he had in Normandy and I think his delay in clearing the scheldt was part of his power struggle with Ike.
Here is a quote from Ramsey "I lambasted him for not having Antwerp the immediate objective of highest priority, and I let fly with all guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Our forces were practically grounded for lack of supply, and now we got Antwerp and not the corridor(Nijemgen bridgehead) we should be in a far better position for launching the knock out blow. CIS Brooke told me after the meeting that I had spoken his thoughts and it was high time someone expressed them."
From Brooke "I feel that Mont's strategy for once is at fault. In stead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place...Ike nobly took all the blame on himself as he approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem."
on and on it goes...Monty did not care about clearing the Scheldt and had to be pushed to give it the resources needed. I had details of talks with Ike about Monty being removed of command for not doing as told but it is late and I don't have time to find it.
Peorhum
*Montgomery was in a dilemma:*
• Antwerp was taken intact, but it was up a 40 mile narrow river that was mined also with some wrecks in it that would take quite a time to clear. Not ideal.
• 100,000 German troops had moved north from Belgium and France onto the Scheldt, so difficult to shift such a large body of men in such terrain.
• LeHavre was taken in a few days which was only 107 miles south of Boulogne, so supply was improving.
• Boulogne and Calais were superior ports than Antwerp being on the coast, not up a 40 mile river with slow moving ships vulnerable to air attack along its length.
• Germany was not that far away and Monty knew the Germans were capable of launching a counter attack towards the coast hitting at the Allied supply.
• V rockets were dropping on London from launch sites in Holland.
*What do you do?*
• You try and seize Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. Which Monty did.
• You put in buffer in southern Holland to prevent the Germans getting to the coast and eliminate the V rocket launch sites. Monty did with Market Garden.
Now. Monty never thought it would take *two weeks* to take Calais and Boulogne and fail to seize Dunkirk. If he thought it was take so long to seize Bolougne and Calais he would have acted on the Scheldt earlier.
Imagine if Monty put all resources into the Scheldt in a big fight and ignored Bolougne and Calais? He would have been castigated as LeHavre was taken in only a few days. Even if the Scheldt was taken earlier the 40 mile river had to be cleared of mines and wrecks and parts of the port itself needed putting back into action as parts of it were under constant bombing. Taking the Scheldt earlier would not have made much difference to the opening of the port of Antwerp. More V rockets were targeted at Antwerp than London.
Nobody is to blame. It was a worthwhile gamble that had a slim chance of paying off hugely. Blaming anyone on the field is like blaming the dice for losing the bet.
Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander and land forces commander by September 1944. He bares the final blame.
Ultimately it was Montgomery’s fault. Where was he? It was his plan.
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower, approved and under-resourced the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed - they were the prime planners. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a *whisker.* It was Brereton and Williams:
♦ Who ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practiced and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, however rarely seen at Market Garden;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of _"possible flak"._ The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said _'thunderclap surprise'._ Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 *seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges.* They arrived at 2200, *eight hours after being ready to march.* Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, *five hours after the jump.* The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film _'A Bridge Too Far'_ is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corps' Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm
The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
Shut your lying hole even his Boss Alan Brooke and SHAEF blamed him.Get a life you poor trampled leaf
@@johnburns4017 Correct. The operation was killed by wrong planning by the air commanders.
Monty handed the idea over to the air commanders Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst, Gavin, Taylor and Urquhart as he had zero jurisdiction over any air units.
@@lyndoncmp5751
Despite bad planning the operation was nearly a 100% success. Why? Because the Germans were in total disarray. Still in shock after being chased from Normandy.
@@johnburns4017 Indeed. And Monty only came up with the idea because earlier that same day, September 4th, the SHAEF intel summary assured him the Germans facing his 2nd British Army were "disorganised, demoralised and short of equipment and arms".
Monty immediately sent communication to Eisenhower to get his idea approved but it took the best part of a week for Eisenhower just to get back to him. What on earth was Eisenhower doing?
how experienced was he? as far as i am aware british paras had not that much experience in combat jumps prior to D-day ,though some had jumped in desert operations.
What experience did US paras have before D-Day?
@@thevillaaston7811 82nd were at Sicily and Italy
I would lay the blame on a poor plan cooked by Browning and Montgomery. There was no effort to allow for things to go wrong such as bad weather in England. Also, I have often been puzzled by the relative drop weights of 3 divisions. The 1st Paras should have been dropped in its entirety on the first day along with the Polish brigade. The gives the most weight at Arnhem when the Germans are scrambling and best chance of capturing the bridge. The 82nd has the next task in importance. If there is one division that could be lightened it would 101st as they were the closest to XXX Corps and would reinforced/relieved first. Depending on weather and flow of the battle the rest of the airborne reinforcements (mostly 101 in this scenario) could be dropped to reinforce the 1st Paras or 82nd if needed. There was too much operational rigidity combined with not focusing on the key objectives that had to be taken for the operation to be a success.
I tend to subscribe to theory bad plans are almost never saved by brilliant execution and I thing the MG plan was rather poor. Also, Dutch staff officers commented that they would fail anyone who came with the MG plan in staff school; they were never consulted in the planning from what I have read.
Ever since I watched these dokus by Tik, I wondered wether landing the main force in between Arnhem and Nijmegen would have been better. That way, imaginary tanks would not have been such a threat to the 82 and the British and Americans could have supported each other better. Also, there would have been a safer dropzone for reinforcements and supply.
Twas gavin and Brownings fault
Seven days to plan an operation like this was crazy. Too many things not thought out.
Browning and Montgomery to blame? Did the US General Brereton command the whole operation? Monty was Field Marshall, and Browning commanded all three airborne divisions involved, there was another layer of command between them. The film has to avoid blaming any US generals, to protect the $$$ which could be earned in the USA, but what mistakes did Brereton (or US General Paul L Williams of troop carrier command) make? Troop carrier chose many landing grounds, insisting drops were not made in areas likely to meet heavy anti aircraft fire (so frequently far from the objectives). Film director Attenborough was a weasel, mocking the British armed forces so he could gross huge amounts of money from the USA audience.
@@keithhallam1155 As many have stated, there's plenty of blame to go around and Bereton certainly gets some. That being said, the focus on Browning is for a specific tactical decision that erroneously get's laid at Gavin's feet by many Brits protecting their own national pride. The blame Monty gets is because he was the primary architect of the operational design, which was ludicrous.
It is true he wanted more resources than he got from Eisenhower, but they wouldn't have been decisive. XXX Corps wasn't going to get up that road any faster than they did, and weather is weather no matter how many planes you have. The plan was too optimistic and inflexible, and those men in Arnhem paid a terrible price for it.
Where were the British & US Air Forces to provide close air support?
It seems that the German units could easily move during the daytime.
Douglas Strother indeed, it is clear there was a problem with airforce command and its resistance to risk more during this critical battle. It is now, years latter utterly astonishing this wasn’t a priority given the fact that this was to be a drive to end the war in Europe early.
Bad weather in the Uk, I believe
Well I would have thought that the fact the RAF did not give all of it attention to the operation would have been a big factor too. I would have thought with full typhoon support the German tank divisions would have been fucked good and proper
The lack of air support for 1st Airborne has always struck me as odd. The air resupply was getting through (on the wrong drop zones), so where were the Typhoons? But my major objection to the official story is 1st Airborne's radios going duff. What, all of them? And the excuse given both in Ryan's book and the movie: "Wrong crystals" and "It worked fine in the desert" is bollocks. 1st Airborne had been using its radios on training schemes in Britain for more than a year after North Africa. The whole thing stinks to high heaven.
Likely more fear of friendly fire, both on allied troops and civilians, kept the tactical air force away from supporting airborne units.
VHF radios do not work with that much surface water, a feature of the Netherlands.
There was no specific targets given to the RAF to aim at - radio problems. Also the weather closed in.
@Peorhum: Caen was leveled by Bomber Command in Operation Charnwood, and this was in part in support of British 6th Airborne. Collateral damage was not an issue in July. @Howard Payne: There's a whole lot of surface water in the Lakes District of Britain, where 1st Airborne exercised. @John Burns: So the weather closed in to block radio, but did not block air re-supply to the German-held drop zones?
its perfect timing with this video since i just rewatched your documentary on operation marked garden. It´s still great.
I blame Monty for ignoring intelligence reports that hinted at the possibility of a great failure.
I never imagined I would hear such a different perspective on the failure to hold the Arnhem Bridge, and since that perspective comes from the commander of the only cohérent unit to reach and deny it to the Germans for any length of time, it is important.
God bless the heroes of 1st British Airborne Division.
And when 4 tanks show up late then sit it wasn't going to either.They would have been blasted back into the Rhine,the Gerries where bringing in tons of armor from the Ruhr right around the corner..Monty being the amatuer and braggart missed the chance to open Antwerp as was 1st directed by SHAEF.The Wehr macht had an actual Field Marshall and the Allies unfortunately had......Monty.Who got played like a cheap violin
XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three and "back on schedule" having averaged just over one mile per hour. If it had continued at that pace it would have arrived at the German held end of Arnhem bridge at about the same time Frosts' men ran out of ammunition and made for the pocket.
Browning was to blame. It's what happens when politicians wear uniforms. No reasonable soldier would've thought the heights, and head quarter tents were a priority.
I agree.Even though Gavin came with the idea; Browning - as his superioir approved.That - and that alone - makes him responsible.As the superior officer, he should have kept to the priorities of mission.
Browning was a junior field officer who fought for two years in the trenches. He was hardly a politician.
@@markgroothuis8569
Browning was in the air when 82nd men should have been advancing on Nijmegen bridge.
I read that it took 33 planes to bring over his headquarters. Certainly hope they weren't in the first wave. Also another 7 planes for his signal corp. I read elsewhere they couldn't communicate because they were not on the same wavelength.
Given that the brave John Frost was not privy to communication between Lieutenant General Browning and Major General Gavin, and given that Major General Gavin himself "*admits it was his decision*" (see at 5:00) to not assign crucial priority to the capture of the Nijmegen Bridge, one could reasonably conclude that Major General Gavin was the one at fault here. Still, there could be nonetheless something that John Frost knows about that we do not know about.
Herman47
Personal accounts do conflict.
Footnote: Although given command on the 82nd ABN, Gavin was still a mere brigadier. Not promoted to Major General until October, 1944. Unlike his counterpart, Maxwell Taylor, Gavin never got the coveted fourth star. Even in the inflated, wartime Army of the United States.
The only person to blame was General Monty that put so many resources to a futile plan that was doomed for failure from the get-go.
George Hiotis
You need to do some heavy reading on Market Garden.
you have not been paying attention have you? That fallacy has been debunked time and again.
@Matt
MG died with the drop zone selection.
The loss of the southern end of the Arnhem bridge doomed MG.
From that location, the SS could blow the bridge sky high at ANY TIME.
Both bridges were built with integral explosive charges - pre-wired with detonation cables -- as from Day One the Dutch expected to be invaded by Nazi Germany.
Both bridges ran the detonation circuits to the far side -- in the case of Arnhem that was the south side... the end that the SS controlled... the end that was never in British hands -- because Urquhart's request to land near the bridge was turned down FLAT.
Ditto for Gavin's request to land near the north side of Nijmegen bridge.
The failure to land paras on the island sealed the doom for MG.
John Burns, et, al. are dreaming.
Monty can't prevail if the Arnhem bridge is in the river.
To re-emphasize -- the Arnhem bridge was pre-wired to be blown up by the Dutch. All that the SS had to do was double check the installation and then slam the plunger.
David pearry there was only one road to arheim.That alonf doomed MG.Not american cowardice.
John Burns MG was a doomed to fail from to get go.
Horrocks said in "World at War" that he wanted to start as soon as humanly possible, when it was credibly verified that all that was defending the area was "The Stomach Brigade", and not II SS Panzer Corps. Of course, UK Bureaucracy of the time, won out
Montgomery ultimately was to blame he was only glory seeking to make a name for himself he wanted to be Knowles as the one who ended the war in Germany if you dig deeper he was jealous of General George Paton a devised market Garden he as far as I'm concerned gave no thought about the loss of life this operation. Would glean
'if you dig deeper he was jealous of General George Paton'
Why would he be? He was in different army, at the other end of the Front and was higher up the chain of command.
of course you missed this little tid bit in your "research" because it makes the bits look bad, so it must be ignored
Ridgway also had a negative perspective about the GARDEN force
leadership. “I have always felt, and I still feel, that the sluggish actions of the ground
armies in that campaign were inexcusable. A more vigorous command supervision from
the top could have driven that armored force through.”55 He personally observed a
situation which formed this perspective. On 20 September, D+3, he was moving through
the battlefield near Eindhoven. He was alone but for his jeep, driver, and two aides.
[W]e came up with the advance elements of British armor. There a junior officer stopped me and told me I could go no further because the road in front was swept with small arms fire. So we stopped a minute to watch how good our British comrades would take out this resistance. They had the muzzles of their tank guns pointing down the road toward where the enemy was supposed to be, but not a shot was being fired. It was a demonstration of caution. . . .I had seen it, and dealt with it many times before. . . .I couldn’t order this tank commander to move on down the road. So, after waiting about forty minutes, and seeing no visible effort being made to outflank this resistance. . .we (Author’s note: “we” means Ridgway and his aides) started walking down the ditch along the side of the road. We went a mile and a half, perhaps, with every sense alert, but not a shot was fired at us. . . .We moved on until we found General Max Taylor at the CP of the 101st Division.56
So Ridgway with his lone jeep was able to move along while the ground force did not
Just a little note, if you want to learn about Napoleonic history, the book "Redcoat" by Richard Holmes is brilliant. Very informative
I have to ask whether taking Nijmegan Bridge would have been truly decisive. The armored thrust along the many-bridge route was being hampered by tough German resistance; unless the follow up assault reached Nijmegan, taking the bridge would have counted for nothing. I have to say again that Market Garden was flawed because too many things had to go perfectly. Of course, if for some reason the Germans' confused retreat hadn't been brought under control in time, the plan might had had a chance of success. But that's a big "if."
Murphy's law: What can go wrong will go wrong.
Were they there to capture a hill or a bridge? Gavin screwed up, and of course Browning being a British general in the airborne, WTF was he thinking? Was he jealous of Frost, and left him and his men there to die?
Understand your analysis on “ weakest link” of the operation, but is this perhaps more about whether the plan should have stopped one or more bridges before. Maybe at Nijmegen.
Seems a bit that reactions are around what happened, not what would have been the better plan. What do you think?
the point's on your head it was blown apart pretty much everywhere much like your arguements. One elevated lane with no room for maenuver is the idea of an idiot - so I can see why you like it
@@bigwoody4704 seems you are calling me an idiot. Clever and interesting language. Very productive too. Have a nice day.
@@nemecec01 um no that'd be the pratt right below you,who has deleted his comment
@@bigwoody4704 ok. Have a nice day, wherever you are.
I definitely can't wait to see your video on Browning
I can't wait to see it either!
True...Browning is to blame....and yes..his treatment of that great general, MGen Stanislaw Sosabowski was horrendous
Why? And I mean why with regard to both points. Both can be debunked by education. The more you look into Browning and Montgomery's roles, the more sympathetic you can become to their positions. A lot of people simply don't want to know.
On the treatment of Brig.Gen. Sosabowski, he was rightly criticised for being difficult to work with, and for being insubordinate to Lt.Gen. Horrocks at the Valburg conference on 24 September, for which he immediately apologised at the latter incident. Montgomery initially wrote to Sosabowski to praise him and his Brigade for their actions at Arnhem, and to ask for recommendations for awards. It was only later he got reports from British officers about the difficulties they had with him, and that was why Montgomery then wrote to Alan Brooke (CIGS) that he was unhappy having the Poles under his command and wanted them removed (the relationship was always awkward because they were attached to the British Army but under Polish Government-in-exile control).
Somehow, these documented facts got conflated into a suggestion that 'the British' blamed the Poles for the failure of the operation, which is a ridiculous notion to anyone familiar with the timeline. Sosabowski and most of his Brigade arrived late on D+4, too late to influence the outcome of an operation that had already failed, and in fact contributed greatly to saving the remnants of the British 1st Airborne Division by enabling its final evacuation across the Rijn on 25/26 September.