For viewers who may be confused about Balaguer's notion of "possible" and "analytic" truth, it really seems like all he means is that anything that is non-contradictory is logically (and modally) possible. And anything self-contradictory is logically impossible, and so also modally impossible. Thus, these things are "analytic" because their possibility depends only on being non-contradictory which is a logical concept. Note, I don't necessarily agree with this view because I think logic itself can only he justified synthetically (aka, I'm not a rationalist). So I especially think it is a mistake to use something like non-contradiction as a benchmark for modal possibility. For example, what if the laws of physics were different in some possible world and there contradiction was possible? So I can't agree with his view on analyticity but I can explain it. Hope this helps people understand this interview and Balaguer's views and book. I adopt a more Quinean view about analyticity that there is no analytic-synthetic distinction, and so for this reason if there were a world with different physics that allowed contradictions then contradiction is possible -- and I believe that is the case.
Really looking forward to this. I enjoyed his book a lot, especially the chapter on his scientistic approach to conceptual analysis.
Yeah I very much enjoyed this interview (and his book). He stayed for over 2.5 hours and we discussed some great stuff.
@@Friction Well, that did not disappoint. Thanks for doing the interview.
You HAVE to get Theodore Sider on to talk about realism and metaphysics
Ahhh, I can't wait to watch this...
For viewers who may be confused about Balaguer's notion of "possible" and "analytic" truth, it really seems like all he means is that anything that is non-contradictory is logically (and modally) possible. And anything self-contradictory is logically impossible, and so also modally impossible. Thus, these things are "analytic" because their possibility depends only on being non-contradictory which is a logical concept.
Note, I don't necessarily agree with this view because I think logic itself can only he justified synthetically (aka, I'm not a rationalist). So I especially think it is a mistake to use something like non-contradiction as a benchmark for modal possibility. For example, what if the laws of physics were different in some possible world and there contradiction was possible? So I can't agree with his view on analyticity but I can explain it. Hope this helps people understand this interview and Balaguer's views and book.
I adopt a more Quinean view about analyticity that there is no analytic-synthetic distinction, and so for this reason if there were a world with different physics that allowed contradictions then contradiction is possible -- and I believe that is the case.
Great. If I could recommend a guest for the future : Nick Trakakis
I like the concept of FAP truth, not psyched about the name though
It’s a good name if you think analytic metaphysics amounts to intellectual masturbation