The whole idea, as i see it with this show is that we don't use the alternative news. Max's family are USA Govt, for god sake. even the scott ritters are getting debunked donkeys ago
@@willowwoods7343 Sometimes, those who stand back and look from a distance see more. While some of his arguments are compelling, most are flawed or unsupported by evidence, relying heavily on speculation without substantiation. His claim that all rebel factions accepted the agreement under the Ministry of Defense solely due to cash incentives and promises from the United States is unsubstantiated. If financial motivations were decisive, Assad-who had access to significant resources-could have made similar deals long ago. This argument also neglects other plausible reasons for factional agreement, such as a genuine desire among some groups to repair and stabilise Syria after years of conflict. The main enemy was Assad; he is gone. The comparisons between Afghanistan and Syria are problematic. In Afghanistan, the U.S. pursued nation-building efforts (albeit poorly) rather than attempting deliberate fragmentation. There is no credible evidence suggesting that the U.S. is now trying to fragment Syria either; instead, its actions appear focused on supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and countering adversaries such as ISIS and Iranian-backed militias. The discussion on the newly unified Syrian military force doctrine is speculative. There is no clear indication of what this doctrine might entail or how it would reconcile the ideological diversity among factions. Without such clarity, it seems unlikely that a cohesive military strategy will emerge soon. Much will depend on what sort of state forms in Syria. The assertion that the U.S., Israel, and Turkey aim to keep Syria weak and divided oversimplifies their respective interests and lacks sufficient evidence: - Israel’s primary concern is mitigating security threats from Hezbollah and Iranian proxies while securing its borders and removing Syria's chemical weapons. - Turkey’s focus is on preventing Kurdish autonomy near its borders. - U.S. policy appears confused but seems more concerned with countering ISIS. These goals are tactical rather than part of a strategy to keep Syria weak. Despite Syria's limited control over major territories or resources, Russia has engaged with Abu Muhammad al-Julani. The prediction that al-Julani will be assassinated by external powers is highly speculative. Leaders often face such fates. Even if he is assassinated, it could just as easily result from local forces. The argument that factional agreements are unlikely to last due to ideological divides is possible but not inevitable. Historical examples like Lebanon’s post-civil war peace agreement demonstrate that despite deeply divided factions, it can work. Finally, I disagree with his critique of international media focusing on superficial aspects of al-Julani’s reforms. Media coverage has primarily emphasised Assad’s crimes. In conclusion, while some points merit further exploration, many arguments lack evidence and/or rely heavily on speculation.
@@willowwoods7343 Sometimes, people who stand back see more!!! Now, some of his arguments are compelling; most are flawed and/or unsupported by evidence, relying heavily on speculation without substantiation. His claim that all rebel factions accepted the agreement under the Ministry of Defense solely due to cash incentives and promises from the United States is unsubstantiated. If financial motivations were decisive, Assad-who had access to significant resources-could have made similar deals long ago. This argument also neglects other plausible reasons for factional agreement, such as a genuine desire among most for peace and to repair and stabilise Syria. The comparisons between Afghanistan and Syria are problematic. In Afghanistan, the U.S. pursued nation-building efforts (albeit poorly) rather than attempting deliberate fragmentation. There is no credible evidence suggesting that the U.S. is now trying to fragment Syria either; instead, its actions appear to be wait-and-see, supporting allies like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and countering their adversaries such as ISIS and Iranian-backed militias. The discussion on the newly unified Syrian military force doctrine is speculative. There is no clear indication of what this doctrine might entail or how it would reconcile the ideological diversity among factions. Without such clarity, it seems unlikely that a cohesive military strategy will emerge soon. This will probably depend on what sort of Syria we get. The assertion that the U.S., Israel, and Turkey aim to keep Syria weak and divided lacks sufficient evidence: - Israel’s primary concern is mitigating security threats from Hezbollah and Iranian proxies, securing its borders and removing Assad's weapons of mass destruction. - Turkey’s focus is on preventing Kurdish autonomy near its borders. - U.S. policy appears confused but seems more concerned with countering ISIS. These goals are tactical rather than part of a coordinated strategy to keep Syria weak. Russia has attempted to engage with Abu Muhammad al-Julani despite his limited control over major territories or resources. The prediction that al-Julani will be assassinated by external powers is highly speculative. While leaders often face such fate, this claim has no concrete basis. He could be killed by local forces, too. Or he could survive for years. The argument that factional agreements are unlikely to last due to ideological divides is possible but not inevitable. Historical examples like Lebanon’s post-civil war peace agreement demonstrate that deeply divided factions can unite and make peace. Finally, I disagree with his critique of international media focusing on superficial aspects of al-Julani’s reforms. Media coverage has primarily emphasized Assad’s crimes. In conclusion, while some points merit further exploration, many arguments lack evidence and rely heavily on speculation
Great interview, once again. This channel should literally have a million subs. YT must be suppressing it no doubt.
This is my favorite channel of all time
thank you for another great interview!
The gentleman would be good in voice-overs, like Ali Risk. Excellent prediction analysis. Retweeted so this will get impact.
Very interesting to observe this forecasting of heads to roll. Another piece of the furniture of interviewees, who went further with analysis.
Very good interview 100% 💯
The smart Farah, so insightful as usual. ❤❤
Regarding “domination” as was mentioned, see good reference point regarding the Iraq war the new book “deadly betrayal” by dennis fritz
GOD BLESS
They took Al Juliani off the US State Dep list maybe 5 days ago I think. There is no more reward for sure and I cant see his name anymore.
Julani will be gone by sept 2025--he is a useful tool of the Russian-Israeli alliance
Farah you look great in every outfit
great work , thank you
Dr. Ali is completely correct. Stop listening to the news media, he speaks accurately. Listen to Max Blumenthal, he is saying the same thing
Max Blumenthal is an ashkenazi man. He is controlled opposition. Beware.
The whole idea, as i see it with this show is that we don't use the alternative news. Max's family are USA Govt, for god sake. even the scott ritters are getting debunked donkeys ago
this guy he knows nothing
What part do you find as incorrect or sufficiently accurate ?
He lives there and I'm sure he knows alot more than you do.
@@willowwoods7343 Sometimes, those who stand back and look from a distance see more. While some of his arguments are compelling, most are flawed or unsupported by evidence, relying heavily on speculation without substantiation.
His claim that all rebel factions accepted the agreement under the Ministry of Defense solely due to cash incentives and promises from the United States is unsubstantiated. If financial motivations were decisive, Assad-who had access to significant resources-could have made similar deals long ago. This argument also neglects other plausible reasons for factional agreement, such as a genuine desire among some groups to repair and stabilise Syria after years of conflict. The main enemy was Assad; he is gone.
The comparisons between Afghanistan and Syria are problematic. In Afghanistan, the U.S. pursued nation-building efforts (albeit poorly) rather than attempting deliberate fragmentation. There is no credible evidence suggesting that the U.S. is now trying to fragment Syria either; instead, its actions appear focused on supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and countering adversaries such as ISIS and Iranian-backed militias.
The discussion on the newly unified Syrian military force doctrine is speculative. There is no clear indication of what this doctrine might entail or how it would reconcile the ideological diversity among factions. Without such clarity, it seems unlikely that a cohesive military strategy will emerge soon. Much will depend on what sort of state forms in Syria.
The assertion that the U.S., Israel, and Turkey aim to keep Syria weak and divided oversimplifies their respective interests and lacks sufficient evidence:
- Israel’s primary concern is mitigating security threats from Hezbollah and Iranian proxies while securing its borders and removing Syria's chemical weapons.
- Turkey’s focus is on preventing Kurdish autonomy near its borders.
- U.S. policy appears confused but seems more concerned with countering ISIS.
These goals are tactical rather than part of a strategy to keep Syria weak.
Despite Syria's limited control over major territories or resources, Russia has engaged with Abu Muhammad al-Julani.
The prediction that al-Julani will be assassinated by external powers is highly speculative. Leaders often face such fates. Even if he is assassinated, it could just as easily result from local forces.
The argument that factional agreements are unlikely to last due to ideological divides is possible but not inevitable. Historical examples like Lebanon’s post-civil war peace agreement demonstrate that despite deeply divided factions, it can work.
Finally, I disagree with his critique of international media focusing on superficial aspects of al-Julani’s reforms. Media coverage has primarily emphasised Assad’s crimes.
In conclusion, while some points merit further exploration, many arguments lack evidence and/or rely heavily on speculation.
@@arimagoo4687 I have already answered that here in detail.
@@willowwoods7343 Sometimes, people who stand back see more!!!
Now, some of his arguments are compelling; most are flawed and/or unsupported by evidence, relying heavily on speculation without substantiation.
His claim that all rebel factions accepted the agreement under the Ministry of Defense solely due to cash incentives and promises from the United States is unsubstantiated. If financial motivations were decisive, Assad-who had access to significant resources-could have made similar deals long ago. This argument also neglects other plausible reasons for factional agreement, such as a genuine desire among most for peace and to repair and stabilise Syria.
The comparisons between Afghanistan and Syria are problematic. In Afghanistan, the U.S. pursued nation-building efforts (albeit poorly) rather than attempting deliberate fragmentation. There is no credible evidence suggesting that the U.S. is now trying to fragment Syria either; instead, its actions appear to be wait-and-see, supporting allies like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and countering their adversaries such as ISIS and Iranian-backed militias.
The discussion on the newly unified Syrian military force doctrine is speculative. There is no clear indication of what this doctrine might entail or how it would reconcile the ideological diversity among factions. Without such clarity, it seems unlikely that a cohesive military strategy will emerge soon. This will probably depend on what sort of Syria we get.
The assertion that the U.S., Israel, and Turkey aim to keep Syria weak and divided lacks sufficient evidence:
- Israel’s primary concern is mitigating security threats from Hezbollah and Iranian proxies, securing its borders and removing Assad's weapons of mass destruction.
- Turkey’s focus is on preventing Kurdish autonomy near its borders.
- U.S. policy appears confused but seems more concerned with countering ISIS.
These goals are tactical rather than part of a coordinated strategy to keep Syria weak.
Russia has attempted to engage with Abu Muhammad al-Julani despite his limited control over major territories or resources.
The prediction that al-Julani will be assassinated by external powers is highly speculative. While leaders often face such fate, this claim has no concrete basis. He could be killed by local forces, too. Or he could survive for years.
The argument that factional agreements are unlikely to last due to ideological divides is possible but not inevitable. Historical examples like Lebanon’s post-civil war peace agreement demonstrate that deeply divided factions can unite and make peace.
Finally, I disagree with his critique of international media focusing on superficial aspects of al-Julani’s reforms. Media coverage has primarily emphasized Assad’s crimes.
In conclusion, while some points merit further exploration, many arguments lack evidence and rely heavily on speculation
Nice outfit Farah!