I read Viktor Suvorov's book with the perspective of a former Marine officer. Without question given the facts as set forth by Suvorov, the German OKW would have been idiots for NOT believing the Soviets were planning to invade Germany. For example, the Soviets: 1) had massed 150 divisions on the German frontier; 2) built and populated hundreds of airfields less than 50km from the border; 3) stockpiled fuel and ammo in the same area; 4) were not building any defensive structures; 5) flew countless reconnaissance flights over German lines; 6) invaded and occupied southern Romania, a stone's throw away from Germany's main source of oil; 7) invaded and garrisoned Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania with over 500K troops, effectively pinching Germany's eastern flank; and 8) moved countless artillery pieces and tanks towards Germany. In an age where just mobilizing is tantamount to a declaration of war, moving and positioning millions of troops on the German frontier would be rightfully considered aggressive and provocative. If a guy was pointing a loaded weapon at me, I'm not going to wait until he shoots to decide he has bad intentions. The idea that Stalin's personality should be taken into account because "he's not a gambler" goes beyond military malpractice into the territory of dereliction.
Just so. And the writing had been on the wall for some time. When the French and British were attempting to form an agreement with the Soviet Union during the summer of 1939, the talks in Moscow were conducted not by the Soviet foreign minister but, tellingly, by Marshal Voroshilov. The sticking point was the Soviet insistence upon being granted free passage through Poland in the event of war with Germany. In the initial stages of Barbarossa, German generals, notably Heinrici, noted in their diaries the shocking signs of Soviet preparations for offensive operations on a grand scale. Naturally, men who recorded their impressions in personal diaries at that time had no thought that their jottings would later be published. It is astonishing to witness the Suvorov/Rezun 'theory' being dismissed so airily by McMeekin. But, of course, the cost of propounding this theory is high. The idea, put forward by McMeekin in this discussion, that these huge concentrations of troops and matériel had been put in place 'just in case' is, of course, ludicrous. The suggestion is that McMeekin has not read Suvorov's books ('Icebreaker' and the more recent 'The Chief Culprit'). Suvorov has done the staff work - in terms of explicating the significance of a mobilisation on such a huge scale (with its inevitable impact on the Soviet economy), and the technical and doctrinal developments that presaged a planned Soviet offensive, and his conclusions are solid.
Also remember the Hitler was in Mien Kampf had advocating destroying USSR and gaining "living space." So Stalin rightfully suspicious of Hitler. I think Stalins ultimate plan was hoping that Germany and UK and France would wear each other out..and he would invade and pick up the pieces.
Much of those terriorial gains towards Germany were after the Non-Agression Pact with Hitler gave Stalin the upper hand in negotiations. Soviet Union was Germany's primary grain and oil source, in exchange for German war technology. Of course, Stalin was no saint and given the chance he would, like any Communist, have liked to establish a Socialist government in every European capital, and he wouldnt have said no to war if he thought he could get away with it. But there isnt enough evidence that he wanted to take on the German army on his own. As for having the Army on the border, I dont think any power worth its name could have assented to being found with their pants down when a hostile army was on their doorstep. Stalin wanted war of course, he just wanted the imperialists to fight it for him.
Prior to 1939 the two blood thirsty regimes having high death tolls were the USSR (mostly its own people, then those from Eastern Europe after the Red Army advanced in '39 and '40) and Japan (Chinese). The Anglo-Polish Pact of Mutual Assistance included a secret annex stating the words 'European power' mentioned in the pact was only Germany. Re the sitzkrieg/phoney war, this was true for land. But at sea it was a different story. The first u-boat attack was on 3 Sep '39. The Royal Navy imposed a blockade and was implementing the navicert system to deal with neutral shipping and cargo being delivered to countries like Spain and (still neutral) Italy. The Royal Navy was pursuing German commerce raiders and fought the Graf Spee in Dec '39 after it sank 9 merchant ships in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. In April '40 the North Sea/North Atlantic heated up with battles involving Admiral Hipper, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau. . A focus of the Admiralty in late '39 was chartering many of Norway's oil tankers. Norway had the world's 4th largest merchant marine including 260 oil tankers. Britain secured 150 of them by the end of '39 and picked up almost all the remainder as well as the dry-bulk vessels after Germany invaded Norway - more than 1000 ships. Britain would go on the pick up the service of many of Europe's other merchant fleets by mid '40. If you read _Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War_ (History of the Second World War United Kingdom Civil Series) by C B A 'Betty' Behrens, it reveals from Sep '39 to late 1940 Britain's Ministry of Supply was a shambles due to the severe disruption of merchant shipping that knocked on to rail service as well as an inability of British companies to provide accurate estimates of their wartime needs - most everyone was overstating resource requirements. Further, the disruption to the world's merchant shipping cascaded to the Commonwealth, and Britain decided it had to sustain this service. Moreover, with the fall of France much of Britain's coastal shipping that handled trade with the continent was made inactive whilst the requirement for deep water merchant vessels to supply Britain from across the Atlantic increased. For about the first year of the war Britain was grappling with its production requirements and allocating shipping and rail cars. It had to get its logistics and production woes sorted to have a framework able to support the military.
Because Roosevelt was a communist sympathizer and Churchill was deeply corrupt. The book that opened my eyes to the absurdity of the European front was The Phony Victory by Peter Hitchens. He discusses the abject hypocrisy of the Western Allies in their treatment of Germany vs. USSR. The invasion of Poland was just a pretext for Britain to declare against Germany because Britain had no intention of offering any assistance. Not one bullet, soldier, rifle, or rowboat was sent to Poland to fight its invaders. In the end, Poland was carved up by Germany and the USSR and suffered another humiliation when it was enslaved by the USSR in 1945, all with the tacit approval of the Allies.
I think neither the US nor Britain had the appetite to force the issue backed up by military force. The US was planning to redeploy US forces from Europe to the Pacific for the invasion of Japan, and Britain was to aid this. After the atom bombs were dropped on Japan and there was no need to move forces from Europe the US could have pressed the issue somewhat, but it had only one bomb on hand and would have no more than seven by the end '45. I think also there was concern about Soviet ambitions in Asia. Would it retain Manchuria? Would it land troops on Hokkaido? Would it intervene on behalf of Mao?
@@maxn.7234 _'Not one bullet, soldier, rifle, or rowboat was sent to Poland to fight its invaders.'_ Kinda sorta. Since 1936 France had provided 2 billion francs to Warsaw for it to build up is military. I think time was not on Britain and France's side - due to their repeated indecision over the yeats. The treaty came into force on 25 August and Germany was crossing the border on 1 September. How many men and how much material could be moved to Poland and establish a secure presence in a week? And how secure would be the lines of communication from Britain and France to Poland? Very insecure. Since 1934, British rearmament had been predicated on long-term deterrence rather than imminent conflict, based on the Treasury doctrine that economic stability was the fourth arm of defence. By February 1939 this had changed. But how much more could be constructed and shipped to Poland? And how much time would the Poles have to train on this new equipment? Remember, Britain historically maintained a large navy and small army during peacetime, and half of Britain's army was overseas. At the beginning of the war with Poland, the Germans had 1,850,000 soldiers, 11,000 artillery pieces, 2,800 tanks, and 2,000 aircraft. Poland had half of that number of soldiers (950,000 after mobilisation), less than half that number of artillery (4,800), a quarter the number of tanks (700), and a fifth the number of aircraft (400). The advantage the Germans had along the main lines of attack was even greater than that. There was no way Britain and France could make up Poland's deficit to shore up defences. I see the Anglo-Franco 'defence guarantee' to Warsaw as being no more than a threat to Berlin that if Poland was attacked, Germany would see war on its western frontier. But by late August '39 Berlin had seen a repeated pattern of Anglo-Franco protests, inaction, and acceptance.
I think D.M. Giangreco has the wider view on logistical problems to do with an invasion of Japan preventing any further advancement eastward by US troops in Europe. Not knowing if atomic weapons even worked, at the time, they were on a timeline that pretty much ruled out going into Berlin. Giangreco tells it better than I in the TH-cam video: "D.M. Giangreco on the Invasion of Japan, Lend Lease & much more". I find myself agreeing with McMeekin on much of his views on contemporary foreign policy. As far as Nationalist China went I also agree that Stilwell complained about everybody and every entity he had to cooperate with.. China having it's tax base parts of the country occupied had the worst affects on the Nationalists along with taking the overwhelming bulk of attrition.
I read Viktor Suvorov's book with the perspective of a former Marine officer. Without question given the facts as set forth by Suvorov, the German OKW would have been idiots for NOT believing the Soviets were planning to invade Germany. For example, the Soviets: 1) had massed 150 divisions on the German frontier; 2) built and populated hundreds of airfields less than 50km from the border; 3) stockpiled fuel and ammo in the same area; 4) were not building any defensive structures; 5) flew countless reconnaissance flights over German lines; 6) invaded and occupied southern Romania, a stone's throw away from Germany's main source of oil; 7) invaded and garrisoned Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania with over 500K troops, effectively pinching Germany's eastern flank; and 8) moved countless artillery pieces and tanks towards Germany. In an age where just mobilizing is tantamount to a declaration of war, moving and positioning millions of troops on the German frontier would be rightfully considered aggressive and provocative. If a guy was pointing a loaded weapon at me, I'm not going to wait until he shoots to decide he has bad intentions. The idea that Stalin's personality should be taken into account because "he's not a gambler" goes beyond military malpractice into the territory of dereliction.
Just so. And the writing had been on the wall for some time. When the French and British were attempting to form an agreement with the Soviet Union during the summer of 1939, the talks in Moscow were conducted not by the Soviet foreign minister but, tellingly, by Marshal Voroshilov. The sticking point was the Soviet insistence upon being granted free passage through Poland in the event of war with Germany.
In the initial stages of Barbarossa, German generals, notably Heinrici, noted in their diaries the shocking signs of Soviet preparations for offensive operations on a grand scale. Naturally, men who recorded their impressions in personal diaries at that time had no thought that their jottings would later be published.
It is astonishing to witness the Suvorov/Rezun 'theory' being dismissed so airily by McMeekin. But, of course, the cost of propounding this theory is high. The idea, put forward by McMeekin in this discussion, that these huge concentrations of troops and matériel had been put in place 'just in case' is, of course, ludicrous. The suggestion is that McMeekin has not read Suvorov's books ('Icebreaker' and the more recent 'The Chief Culprit'). Suvorov has done the staff work - in terms of explicating the significance of a mobilisation on such a huge scale (with its inevitable impact on the Soviet economy), and the technical and doctrinal developments that presaged a planned Soviet offensive, and his conclusions are solid.
Also remember the Hitler was in Mien Kampf had advocating destroying USSR and gaining "living space." So Stalin rightfully suspicious of Hitler. I think Stalins ultimate plan was hoping that Germany and UK and France would wear each other out..and he would invade and pick up the pieces.
Thank you both for your great comments. Indeed it's blatant that the Soviets were about to invade Germany.
Much of those terriorial gains towards Germany were after the Non-Agression Pact with Hitler gave Stalin the upper hand in negotiations. Soviet Union was Germany's primary grain and oil source, in exchange for German war technology. Of course, Stalin was no saint and given the chance he would, like any Communist, have liked to establish a Socialist government in every European capital, and he wouldnt have said no to war if he thought he could get away with it. But there isnt enough evidence that he wanted to take on the German army on his own. As for having the Army on the border, I dont think any power worth its name could have assented to being found with their pants down when a hostile army was on their doorstep. Stalin wanted war of course, he just wanted the imperialists to fight it for him.
Prof McMeekin is one of the greatest scholars and eyes opener.
Great Book and great summary of the book- I agree it is really myth breaking!
I bought the HARDCOVER book. Highly recommend! 👍👍👍👍👍👍
very nice presentation
Prior to 1939 the two blood thirsty regimes having high death tolls were the USSR (mostly its own people, then those from Eastern Europe after the Red Army advanced in '39 and '40) and Japan (Chinese).
The Anglo-Polish Pact of Mutual Assistance included a secret annex stating the words 'European power' mentioned in the pact was only Germany.
Re the sitzkrieg/phoney war, this was true for land. But at sea it was a different story. The first u-boat attack was on 3 Sep '39. The Royal Navy imposed a blockade and was implementing the navicert system to deal with neutral shipping and cargo being delivered to countries like Spain and (still neutral) Italy. The Royal Navy was pursuing German commerce raiders and fought the Graf Spee in Dec '39 after it sank 9 merchant ships in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. In April '40 the North Sea/North Atlantic heated up with battles involving Admiral Hipper, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau. .
A focus of the Admiralty in late '39 was chartering many of Norway's oil tankers. Norway had the world's 4th largest merchant marine including 260 oil tankers. Britain secured 150 of them by the end of '39 and picked up almost all the remainder as well as the dry-bulk vessels after Germany invaded Norway - more than 1000 ships. Britain would go on the pick up the service of many of Europe's other merchant fleets by mid '40.
If you read _Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War_ (History of the Second World War United Kingdom Civil Series) by C B A 'Betty' Behrens, it reveals from Sep '39 to late 1940 Britain's Ministry of Supply was a shambles due to the severe disruption of merchant shipping that knocked on to rail service as well as an inability of British companies to provide accurate estimates of their wartime needs - most everyone was overstating resource requirements. Further, the disruption to the world's merchant shipping cascaded to the Commonwealth, and Britain decided it had to sustain this service. Moreover, with the fall of France much of Britain's coastal shipping that handled trade with the continent was made inactive whilst the requirement for deep water merchant vessels to supply Britain from across the Atlantic increased. For about the first year of the war Britain was grappling with its production requirements and allocating shipping and rail cars. It had to get its logistics and production woes sorted to have a framework able to support the military.
never understood why eastern Europe was given to that dictatorship soviet union
It wasn’t “given” to the Soviet Union, the Red Army took it by force of arms and there wasn’t a damn thing that we could do about it.
Because Roosevelt was a communist sympathizer and Churchill was deeply corrupt. The book that opened my eyes to the absurdity of the European front was The Phony Victory by Peter Hitchens. He discusses the abject hypocrisy of the Western Allies in their treatment of Germany vs. USSR. The invasion of Poland was just a pretext for Britain to declare against Germany because Britain had no intention of offering any assistance. Not one bullet, soldier, rifle, or rowboat was sent to Poland to fight its invaders. In the end, Poland was carved up by Germany and the USSR and suffered another humiliation when it was enslaved by the USSR in 1945, all with the tacit approval of the Allies.
I think neither the US nor Britain had the appetite to force the issue backed up by military force. The US was planning to redeploy US forces from Europe to the Pacific for the invasion of Japan, and Britain was to aid this. After the atom bombs were dropped on Japan and there was no need to move forces from Europe the US could have pressed the issue somewhat, but it had only one bomb on hand and would have no more than seven by the end '45.
I think also there was concern about Soviet ambitions in Asia. Would it retain Manchuria? Would it land troops on Hokkaido? Would it intervene on behalf of Mao?
@@maxn.7234 _'Not one bullet, soldier, rifle, or rowboat was sent to Poland to fight its invaders.'_
Kinda sorta. Since 1936 France had provided 2 billion francs to Warsaw for it to build up is military. I think time was not on Britain and France's side - due to their repeated indecision over the yeats. The treaty came into force on 25 August and Germany was crossing the border on 1 September. How many men and how much material could be moved to Poland and establish a secure presence in a week? And how secure would be the lines of communication from Britain and France to Poland? Very insecure.
Since 1934, British rearmament had been predicated on long-term deterrence rather than imminent conflict, based on the Treasury doctrine that economic stability was the fourth arm of defence. By February 1939 this had changed. But how much more could be constructed and shipped to Poland? And how much time would the Poles have to train on this new equipment? Remember, Britain historically maintained a large navy and small army during peacetime, and half of Britain's army was overseas.
At the beginning of the war with Poland, the Germans had 1,850,000 soldiers, 11,000 artillery pieces, 2,800 tanks, and 2,000 aircraft. Poland had half of that number of soldiers (950,000 after mobilisation), less than half that number of artillery (4,800), a quarter the number of tanks (700), and a fifth the number of aircraft (400). The advantage the Germans had along the main lines of attack was even greater than that. There was no way Britain and France could make up Poland's deficit to shore up defences.
I see the Anglo-Franco 'defence guarantee' to Warsaw as being no more than a threat to Berlin that if Poland was attacked, Germany would see war on its western frontier. But by late August '39 Berlin had seen a repeated pattern of Anglo-Franco protests, inaction, and acceptance.
I think the Red Army had something to do with it.
I think D.M. Giangreco has the wider view on logistical problems to do with an invasion of Japan preventing any further advancement eastward by US troops in Europe. Not knowing if atomic weapons even worked, at the time, they were on a timeline that pretty much ruled out going into Berlin. Giangreco tells it better than I in the TH-cam video: "D.M. Giangreco on the Invasion of Japan, Lend Lease & much more".
I find myself agreeing with McMeekin on much of his views on contemporary foreign policy. As far as Nationalist China went I also agree that Stilwell complained about everybody and every entity he had to cooperate with.. China having it's tax base parts of the country occupied had the worst affects on the Nationalists along with taking the overwhelming bulk of attrition.
interesting
10/10
Roosevelt decided we had to fight the moment France fell
WW2 was just a sequel of WW1 which was started by Serbians, which were encuraged by Brits, and then trained and paid by Russians.
E
Smith Steven Lopez Jeffrey Johnson Robert
War is never good.
Compared to the coming Third World War the second was a joke
Where will the first battle be? Is this location b/c of the timing or b/c of which forces are there? Why won't diplomats rewind it?
@@MRCKify they will blow up the usa the mop up the basea
@@MRCKify That war is already being fought. It's just not being fought with bullets and bombs...
McMeekin doesn't know the history. Don't listen to him.
[Citation needed]
Are you saying that no archive backs up any of his claims?
Translation: McMeekin has said something I don't agree with.
Yes the professor of history doesn't know history but you know enough to know he doesn't, sure thing youtube rando lol.
Langley gives its most delicious goyslop to its strongest shills