Is the Ontological Argument Sound? (Interview with Dr. Ben Arbour)
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 15 เม.ย. 2018
- Ben Arbour is a philosopher and expert on the Ontological Argument for God's existence. In this interview, we explore the version he thinks is best and cover several of the most popular objections.
Website: capturingchristianity.com
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R.I.P Ben Arbour, now worshiping the Lord in heaven along with his wife🙏🙏🙏
What he is dead? I never knew that. What happened, he looked young. Was it an accident or illness?
@@madelynhernandez7453 Car crash i believe. I think he was killed, with his wife, by a drunk driver.
CC did a fundraiser a while back to help out his 3 or 4 children.
He past away?
condolence to his & his wife's bereaved loved ones, most especially the 4 children they left behind 🎉
I love how Dr. Arbour explained his position(s) & how Camron knew how to ask the right questions. That's a skill he has in just about every interview I've seen that he's conducted, he's an excellent interviewer. Dr. Arbour is wearing a nice looking tie, that alone makes him right. 😉
Er, do you not realise that this is running to a script? Of course he asks all the right questions, they're the ones hes been told to ask and the ones they don't want to answer, the wrong questions, are cut from the script so there's no chance of embarassment over not being able to answer.
@@cliveadams7629 The saddest part is that you believe that.
@@Ahmathyah No. The saddest part is that you can't see it but then you're trained not to. Can't have members of the flock thinking for themselves or they'll start to see the bs for what it is. Doesn't look like you're going to cause the shepherds any concern, they'll be fleecing you for a goodly while yet.
@@cliveadams7629 You sound like you know from being an experienced sheep. I can smell all the grass on your breath from my home. I'd definitely say you're the one who's definitely reading from a script because you've been told what to think and was never taught how to think; case in point, you say they removed questions and purposefully gave softball ones, where's your proof? Were you the one behind the camera and you saw this happen? You have firsthand knowledge of this happening, how so if so? Tell me where I can find evidence of this. If you can't, then I suggest you go back to your pasture and leave the hard thinking to the rest of us.
@@Ahmathyah "you say they removed questions and purposefully gave softball ones,"
Please can you point me to where I say those words. Or are you just constricting a straw man? I can tell that any thinking comes hard to you, you can'#teven read the words that are written down without getting confused and inventing different ones which suit your purpose. Carry on avoiding the mint sauce.
May the soul of Ben Arbour and his wife through the mercy of God rest in peace. REQUIEM aeternam dona ei, Domine, et lux perpetua luceat ei. Requiescat in pace. Amen.
Thank you so much for making this channel! I very much appreciate it! :))
Loved his ending comments! I remember a while back I had a similar thought to Arbour's about the whole considering the other theistic arguments in favour of the possibility premise. It seems to me that either that, or the Maydolean/Leibnizian proving-the-possibility-premise idea, is the most promising line of argument for the MOA. This was a brilliant interview! :)
That way of applying the argument at the end to our devotional life was maximally great. Beautiful.
I am so glad that I’m just rapping up a college course in informal logic!! There are technical terms used here which I am not sure I would have understood beforehand.
I am a Christian, but the Ontological argument has never made any sense to me. You cannot overcome the word “possible” to make it = “must”. To me it’s as simple as this. If in a *possible* world God exists; *then* He must exist in that world and every other possible world. But if it is likewise *possible* that there is a possible world where He does not exist; then if that possible turns out to be the *actual* world, then He never exists to be existent in the actual world or any other possible world since-in point of fact-He simply does not exist at all. (Anywhere.)
It relies on the fact that it’s a necessity for god to exist in order to be the best possible thing, so if there is a possibility of him existing he will exist necessarily.
What should be noted here (and Christian philosophers have pointed this out) is that there is a difference between metaphysical possibility and epistemic possibility.
The laymen will take the word "possible" and think of it in the sense of epistemic possibility, that is to say, "for all we know, such and such is possible". However, with metaphysical possibility, which deals with the purely objective (unlike epistemology, which deals with what we perceive, what we can know, and having subjective perceptions OF objective reality) something is either possibe or impossible. In this argument, the terms "possible" or "possible worlds" are dealing with metaphysical possibility, not epistemic possibility".
So, if one were to use epistemic possibility, you can give a reverse ontological argument and it would be technically valid:
1) It's "possible" that a maximally great being doesn't exist.
2) If it's "possible" that a maximally great being doesn't exist, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in some "possible" world.
3) If a maximally great being doesn't exist in some "possible" world, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in all "possible" worlds.
4) If a maximally great being doesn't exist in all "possible" worlds, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in the actual world.
5) If a maximally great being doesn't exist in the actual world, then a maximally great being doesn't exist.
6) Therefore, a maximally great being doesn't exist.
However, the MOA is itself a metaphysical argument, it is not an epistemic argument. Therefore, it uses metaphysical possibility and possible worlds, and not epistemic possibility and possible world.
Ananalogy would be this: say you have a deck of cards, and I have 5 cards. Well it's "possible" that I have the king of hearts, but it's also "possible" that I don't have the king of hearts, and you can look to the the actual. This is epistemic possibility. Now with metaphysical possibility, which deals with the objective, it would be, "does there exist a way for there to be a king of hearts in his hand?". It is a "yes or no" question, regardless if you can know the answer or not, it's either, yes, there exists a way, or no, there does not exist a way. There's no "it's possible there exists a way" or "it's possible there doesn't exist a way" because that's going back to epistemic possibility again. The answer here, weather we can know it or not, is either it's possible or impossible. This is metaphysical possibility.
Now, as it pertains to the reverse ontological argument, it fails on the first premise, because it reverts back to epistemic possibility. In metaphysics, there exists the binary options about metaphysical possibility, yes or no, 1 or 0, and it doesn't matter what we can or can't know about the binary options. In metaphysics, there is no "it's possible that something doesn't exist" because that's epistemology. Rather, in metaphysics, it would have yo be "it's impossible for something to exist".
Thus, on the MOA, the atheist, if he is going to be a committed atheist, must show that the metaphysical possibility of God, is not. In other words, he must show that the very concept of a God is metaphysically impossible, not epistemically "possible not to be".
The ontological argument could be revised to include metaphysical possibility, to change "being" to "entity", and to change "possible world/s" to "metaphysically possible descriptions of reality". To highlight this, the ontological argument may have a revision that could look like this:
1) In metaphysics, something is either metaphysically possible or metaphysically impossible.
2) It's metaphysically possible that a maximally great entity exists.
3) If it's metaphysically possible that a maximally great entity exists, then a maximally great entity exists in some metaphysically possible description of reality.
4) If a maximally great entity exists in some metaphysically possible description of reality, then a maximally great entity exists in all metaphysically possible descriptions of reality.
5) If a maximally great entity exists in all metaphysically possible descriptions of reality, then a maximally great entity exists in the actual metaphysical description of reality.
6) If a maximally great entity exists in the actual metaphysical description of reality, then a maximally great entity exists.
7) Therefore, a maximally great entity exists.
Now this way here, the only controversial premise is premise 2, premises 3-7 are just restatements in modal logic, and the argument is irreversable because then premise 2 would be invalid in two ways: first, restating it as "It's metaphysically possible that a maximally great entity doesn't exist" would be straight up invalid, because it uses the epistemic sense of "possibility" while directly stating that it's metaphysical, and thus contradictory. Second, "It's metaphysically impossible that a maximally great entity exists" is flat out unsubstatntiated.
Now this revision is not becauae the MOA is invalid, it is only meant to politely accomodate for easy misconceptions.
@@Liberty_Sword
""It's metaphysically possible that a maximally great entity doesn't exist" would be straight up invalid, because it uses the epistemic sense of "possibility" while directly stating that it's metaphysical, and thus contradictory. "
False, there could be an infinite number of deities all one greater than the other, such that there is no finite maximum, and so no maximally great being.
"Second, "It's metaphysically impossible that a maximally great entity exists" is flat out unsubstatntiated."
The alternative is also flat out unsubstantiated.
" God is magnificent. And He Good, and He is True and He is Beautiful. And not just a little bit, but a lot, maximally so." 35:40
Hey Cameron,
Can you do more video discussions with other experts on the ontological argument? Would appreciate.
Sending my wishes to the Arbour family right now.
The irony is this level of deep thought is not required to know God exists.
@@Djblois1 that is not true
It's not about knowing, it's about being able to prove that God exists. These other easier ways that you are talking about to "know" that God exists, (say personal experience), they probably have serious problems (based on experience unless you have something totally new). If it were that easy no one would bother with all of this I think.
@@elawchess Someone like William Lane Craig has no issue with knowing God exists. It is, in his view, simply true that the inner witness of the Holy Spirit is self authenticating. Therefore, his arguments for faith are not for his own benefit but are actually for the purpose of explaining to others who have not experienced this why something personally known to be true is so. He cannot provide that self authenticating experience and so uses argumentation.
FogBo QuiZ yes I did say people can claim to know based on personal experience but that that is not sufficient to convince a second person hence the attempts at argumentation
@@elawchess The difference between us is simple. I do not state people can claim to know. I claim it is possible people can know. This is due to the possibility of a self-authenticating factor.
With regard convincing, it may not convince all, however, a properly basic belief based on witness testimony can be reliable, if not always. It can therefore be rational to believe based on the experience of another.
Argumentation fills the gap.
Moses' revelation at Mt. Horeb is our first introduction to an argument from ontology: "I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as God Almighty, but by My name LORD I was not known to them." (Exodus 6)
The capitalized form of "LORD" indicates the traditional translation in English of the ineffable Mosaic Hebrew theonym יהוה from the root verb "hayah" meaning "to be." That is, the Patriarchs understood God as the maximally great being "The Almighty", but Moses understood God as existence in and of itself or as Aquinas later writes, i.e.ipsum esse subsistens. Both Moses and the Patriarchs were correct, but Moses was more insightful.
Was praying for you and your family last night. Love you, brother!
My problem with the (modal) ontological Argument begins at the very first Word: "Imagine ..." -> Imagination is not a constant value like for example PI, so there might be different outcomes by *imaging* the greatest thing.
Second problem: defining the *greatest* . How can you prove something by using logic, when 'limited_by_the_laws_of_logic' doesnt fit the definition of the *greatest* (at least my definition).
Question: Is it possible to have 2 exact identical *greatest* things?
Nice and clear presentation of Plantinga's argument.
Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument, if roughly stated:
1: A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and
2: A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
3: It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)
4: Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists.
5: Therefore, (by axiom S5) it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
6: Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
Problem:
The same argument could be used to argue not only for the existence of a maximally great being which possesses a tri-omni nature, but for the existence of literally anything a person can imagine, which includes a maximally great being that is _not_ omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent. In other words, it can be employed to argue for an impossibility; it argues simultaneously for and against itself.
There are of course, many - far more noted - objections to the argument, which can quickly be found via a web search.
Your objection simply doesn't work.
You claim that the argument can be used to argue for a maximally great being that is not tri-omni, but this is a contradiction in terms. A maximally great being is, by definition, tri-omni. You even quoted the definition of a maximally great being in your comment so I find it baffling that you immediately contradict yourself.
What you probably meant to say is that the argument could be used to establish the existence of many other necessary beings, not just maximally great beings.
But this objection does nothing to refute the argument. The argument clearly demonstrates that if a maximally great being's existence is possible, then a maximally great being actually exists. So, the only question is whether premise 1 of the argument is true or not:
1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then a maximally great being exists in every possible world.
4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then a maximally great being exists in the actual world.
5) If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6) Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
If you want to refute the argument you will need to refute premise 1, as that is the only premise in question. The rest of the argument just follows logically from the truth of premise 1.
If you want to use the same logical structure to argue for some other necessary being, then you will need to defend the key premise in that new argument you would be presenting, namely "It is possible that X exists".
I am always amazed when anyone actually thinks the ontological argument has any value. It is so obviously spurious! There are so many straitforward refutations out there of every version of it that no-one should still be using it.
Matt Holton Give me one and let's discuss it. Since there are "many straitforward (sic) refutations" of the Modal Ontological Argument, perhaps you could summarize one that impressed you the most.
@@CCCBeaumont
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You cannot include necessity in the initial definition of God as that is a begging the question fallacy.
You cannot define something into existence without evidence.
@@Matthew_Holton, Jesus Christ. You guys aren't logicians; aren't you?
@@dazedmaestro1223 Actually I am a mathematician so I can appreciate the elegance of Godel's modal ontological argument while appreciating, as he did, that the axioms on which it is best are incoherent and the argument says nothing about the existence of God. Other versions of the argument, such as Plantinga's are pathetic in comparison, and even Plantiga, like Godel says his argument proves nothing.
@@Matthew_HoltonI think you misrepresent Plantinga. Plantinga states the issue with the argument is that whatever is held against God is going to be held against the first premise. That does not mean it proves nothing. It proves if the first premise is true then it is reasonable to conclude God exists. Many people have a properly basic belief concerning the first premise, for those people the argument is useful to resist the often confused rhetoric arguing God is not a reasonable belief.
I am SO sorry to hear about Ben and his wife and also the death of the driver. Such a loss! Rest In Peace!
Love his message of the gospel
Lovely ending. I need to replay this and take notes. I still am not convinced by this argument any more than I am by Craigs use of it in his debates. And I want to believe it!!!! I’m still at the beginning of studying it though. Even if I am convinced by it I couldn’t use it in a debate cause the average person is just not going to get it and that is who we need to convince.
Isn't that a very dishonest viewpoint to take? Why would you try to convince someone else of an argument you yourself do not find convincing?
@@samhunter1205 fair enough, answer me one question and it will answer yours in the process . Is it dishonest to hope a supernatural God exists so there will be an afterlife where we might continue to experience the love of family and friends? Yes or no? If yes please, please explain how that is dishonest If no, your question is addressed therein.
@@samhunter1205 plus I don’t use the argument cause i don’t believe it’s airtight, even Craig states that it doesn’t apply to a true atheist
@@todddweiner8070 apologies, I misread your original comment. I thought you said you would use this argument to try to convince people, even though you yourself do not believe it or are unconvinced by it. That was what I thought would be dishonest - of course hoping that a god exists isn't dishonest. Lesson - don't reply to TH-cam comments you have only read without your glasses on.
For what it is worth, I would avoid the ontological argument like the plague if you are trying to convince most people. Besides having some very serious flaws (I think most informed people consider the argument invalid, for good reason), it 'feels' wrong to most people on a first hearing. There are far more convincing arguments if you are looking to change people's minds.
P.S. At 16:08 Arbour says that anyone who denies the possibility of God's existence is merely "begging the question from the get-go." However, the ontological argument stipulates that God's possibility implies his existence so that (in this context) by saying "God is possible" one is actually saying "God exists." So when Arbour says "God is possible" he's begging the question in favor of theism, and his attempt to deny this fails for the reason just given.
What should be noted here (and Christian philosophers have pointed this out) is that there is a difference between metaphysical possibility and epistemic possibility.
The laymen will take the word "possible" and think of it in the sense of epistemic possibility, that is to say, "for all we know, such and such is possible". However, with metaphysical possibility, which deals with the purely objective (unlike epistemology, which deals with what we perceive, what we can know, and having subjective perceptions OF objective reality) something is either possibe or impossible. In this argument, the terms "possible" or "possible worlds" are dealing with metaphysical possibility, not epistemic possibility".
So, if one were to use epistemic possibility, you can give a reverse ontological argument and it would be technically valid:
1) It's "possible" that a maximally great being doesn't exist.
2) If it's "possible" that a maximally great being doesn't exist, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in some "possible" world.
3) If a maximally great being doesn't exist in some "possible" world, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in all "possible" worlds.
4) If a maximally great being doesn't exist in all "possible" worlds, then a maximally great being doesn't exist in the actual world.
5) If a maximally great being doesn't exist in the actual world, then a maximally great being doesn't exist.
6) Therefore, a maximally great being doesn't exist.
However, the MOA is itself a metaphysical argument, it is not an epistemic argument. Therefore, it uses metaphysical possibility and possible worlds, and not epistemic possibility and possible world.
Ananalogy would be this: say you have a deck of cards, and I have 5 cards. Well it's "possible" that I have the king of hearts, but it's also "possible" that I don't have the king of hearts, and you can look to the the actual. This is epistemic possibility. Now with metaphysical possibility, which deals with the objective, it would be, "does there exist a way for there to be a king of hearts in his hand?". It is a "yes or no" question, regardless if you can know the answer or not, it's either, yes, there exists a way, or no, there does not exist a way. There's no "it's possible there exists a way" or "it's possible there doesn't exist a way" because that's going back to epistemic possibility again. The answer here, weather we can know it or not, is either it's possible or impossible. This is metaphysical possibility.
Now, as it pertains to the reverse ontological argument, it fails on the first premise, because it reverts back to epistemic possibility. In metaphysics, there exists the binary options about metaphysical possibility, yes or no, 1 or 0, and it doesn't matter what we can or can't know about the binary options. In metaphysics, there is no "it's possible that something doesn't exist" because that's epistemology. Rather, in metaphysics, it would have yo be "it's impossible for something to exist".
Thus, on the MOA, the atheist, if he is going to be a committed atheist, must show that the metaphysical possibility of God, is not. In other words, he must show that the very concept of a God is metaphysically impossible, not epistemically "possible not to be".
The ontological argument could be revised to include metaphysical possibility, to change "being" to "entity", and to change "possible world/s" to "metaphysically possible descriptions of reality". To highlight this, the ontological argument may have a revision that could look like this:
1) In metaphysics, something is either metaphysically possible or metaphysically impossible.
2) It's metaphysically possible that a maximally great entity exists.
3) If it's metaphysically possible that a maximally great entity exists, then a maximally great entity exists in some metaphysically possible description of reality.
4) If a maximally great entity exists in some metaphysically possible description of reality, then a maximally great entity exists in all metaphysically possible descriptions of reality.
5) If a maximally great entity exists in all metaphysically possible descriptions of reality, then a maximally great entity exists in the actual metaphysical description of reality.
6) If a maximally great entity exists in the actual metaphysical description of reality, then a maximally great entity exists.
7) Therefore, a maximally great entity exists.
Now this way here, the only controversial premise is premise 2, premises 3-7 are just restatements in modal logic, and the argument is irreversable because then premise 2 would be invalid in two ways: first, restating it as "It's metaphysically possible that a maximally great entity doesn't exist" would be straight up invalid, because it uses the epistemic sense of "possibility" while directly stating that it's metaphysical, and thus contradictory. Second, "It's metaphysically impossible that a maximally great entity exists" is flat out unsubstatntiated.
Now this revision is not becauae the MOA is invalid, it is only meant to politely accomodate for easy misconceptions.
This was incredibly educational. For me, when it comes to the topic of God, i believe that it is possible for God to exist but it is also possible for God not to exist. It is not possible at this moment for us to identify whether God exists or not. It is why we *argue* for the existence of God. I am very much a sceptic and I aim to understand both sides of the arguments for and against God. I do have some questions.
Do you believe the Ontological argument is for the Christian depiction of God alone or do you believe it could be applied to the idea of multiple Gods such as the Greek Gods or Norse Gods?
I would start by saying I don't understand the full impact of the argument. But to the extent that it makes sense to me, I would say that it doesn't rule out a god foreign to the pages of Scripture.
However, when you add all the other natural theology arguments (cosmological argument, teleological argument, moral argument, etc, etc), you're pretty much stuck with the God of the Bible.
The ground of being-- that upon which all other realities are contingent and reducible to-- would indeed have to exist in every possible world. So, if this Ground of Being exists in some possible world, then yes, it exists in every possible world, including the actual world. But this necessarily-existing ground/foundation may or *may not* be conscious(ness). *That* would be the next step, and it's not clear that the ontological argument demands the involvement of consciousness.
I absolutely love the ontological argument!!! It is my favorite argument in all of natural theology. It actually lead me to classical theism with the quasi maximally great being objection.
Sage Seraphim You’ll love this interview :)
I want to like it but I get lost 😂
The ontological argument is terrible.
@@SimeonDenk Sir respectfully can you please explain why the argument is bad?
@@darrellb9665 I would be glad to. The argument is bad because there is no reason to suppose that any conditions of a possible world would have any bearing on the actual world.
Great and straightforward takedown of the simple-minded and fallacious logical positivism/verificationism that seems to have permeated modern culture.
Darth Vader, McEar, golfer, or island by definition are all beings or things in the universe. The greatest possible Darth Vader, McEar, golfer, or island would still be a being or thing in the universe. God by definition is not merely a being in the universe, nor even the highest being in the universe, but transcends the universe, and is Being itself.
Lol, McEar. Wasn't that Michael Martin's objection to this? Weak.
@Charlie But they don't want to listen, this whole discussion is aimed squarely at those who have no interest in listening but just want to be reassured that their baseless fairy story is backed by science and reason. How weird is that.
What does that even mean, “outside the universe”? Even the word “outside” begs the question of being located in space somewhere. To say that something exists “apart from space”, for example, is to say that there is no point or location in space that it exists, which is semantically equivalent to saying that it exists nowhere. It seems to me that you can’t make sense of existence or actions without presupposing a time and place for them to exist or occur. Otherwise, they’re indistinguishable from non-existence.
I know christian like to think god is somehow fundamentally different to all those fictional characters, but even according to the modal ontological argument, it’s only a matter of the definition you arbitrarily attribute to god (basically being the maximum of everything, which in itself is a logically contradictory concept). Using that game, any of those exemples can be defined into existence because they are « essential » and so must exist. At the end of the day the argument simply boils down to « god exist therefore god exist » which might work fine if you’re already swayed to deism but is not going to convince anyone with a functioning set of neurons.
You can make all kinds of definitions. The problem is when you accidentally assume that something fulfills the definition.
The modal ontological argument can be used to define anything non-contradictory into existence.
I don’t think we can argue for the existence of God with the laws of Logic if these laws were instituted by him ( suppose if a God exists ), actually what I mean to say is we cannot restrict God to the laws that he set in motion.
I think that the whole argument falls on the word great. What do we mean by that? It seems a bit arbitrary. By which measure? It leaves us with a word game. Back to square one. Sad to hear of his passing btw.
That was a fun video. I'm with Cameron on the reverse ontological argument "possibly God does not exist"
I don't think I would use "necessary existence" in the definition of God when I say that God is possible. I think there is a difference between self-existence and necessary existence (logically impossible to not exist).
How does the Kalam say anything about necessity?
I think the ontological argument is really saying that implicit to even being being able to conceive of an infinite being, is the necessity of it's existence.
Also, it is interesting to go from the ontological argument about an omnibenevolent being to Bible-believing. I would push back strongly on that point.
As for the MOA it has always struck me as problematic in that God's other divine attributes don't seem compossible with the attribute 'exist at every possible world.' There seem to be possible worlds that could exist that are uncaused, that contain gratuitous suffering, it seems possible that there are worlds where physicalism is true, worlds created by less than perfect non abstract beings (as Kane described). That is, worlds where some or all of the divine attributes could not be instantiated. I'm sceptical about what exactly makes God necessary at all worlds anyway- it seems stipulative to me. I can get why Universals would be, there's supposedly a correlation between them being truthmakers at the possible worlds where say the truths of mathematics holds. But for God, I don't buy the 'necessity' across all worlds other than if it's built in definitionally and then it just becomes question begging.
This is pretty much exactly how I see it. I think the argument is either begging the question, guilty of violating non-contradiction or reverses the burden of proof, depending on how it is formulated. I didn't really get the argument against negative existential claims - I can grant the possibility of the existence of a maximally great being, but unless I can prove that being does exist, I can't say that there is no possibility of that being not existing without begging the question. If there is the possibility of that being not existing, then it is contradictory to say that being must exist in all possible worlds. You can avoid the contradiction by saying that being is maximal to the greatest extent possible, where only contradictory things are impossible, but then the ontological argument collapses. It relies on His existing in every possible world, not every possible world except those where his existence would be contradictory. If you make that allowance, you end up with three categories of possible world:
1. Those where god must, by definition exist
2. Those where god may possibly exist, and therefore, by virtue of possessing the property of maximum possible existence, does
3. Those possible worlds where God cannot exist, by definition, due to the limitation of non-contradiction.
This leaves the ontological argument unable to say why our actual world fits into one of the first two categories, and not the third.
I think we look at the Ontological Argument the right way. The base form looks something like this ---- X exists in some possible world. X has the property of necessarily existing. X actually exists. ---- This is an obvious argument, almost a "duh argument". The question then becomes what can we hang on the premises of 1 and 2 to make X "God". If you try the maximally great pizza, we know it by definition that pizzas are created. If it is created, it cant be necessary, so it makes premise 2 incoherent. What about islands? Well, islands are made of sand and are contingent upon space and matter and energy to exist. Something cant be necessary and contingent, so it makes premise #2 incoherent. But then we can try and hang something like the number 3 on the argument structure and it seems to make its way through without any real incoherencies. And when we try God, the same is true. It passes through the argument just fine --- unless you take traditional arguments against the coherency of the concept of God as valid. So, there is a way to fight the ontological argument for God, but it isn't through parody. It is through saying that X is incoherent either in definition w/o considering necessity (premise 1) or in conjunction with necessity (premise 2).
What an ending. That was convicting... Amen!
Atheist here. I loved this interview, very interesting. While this argument certainly has its merits, it doesn't ever seem to be the reason any one person BELIEVES in God. It seems to be a way to confirm this belief through reason after that belief has been held (which is a fair thing to do). So I wonder how one would start to believe without this attempt at a proof. Do people who simply believe in God without these logical arguments in mind have any legitimacy? And does the idea of proving the idea of a god render faith unnecessary? Furthermore, even if one were to accept this argument and and its logical foundation, how would that lead us to theism? I so often hear this argument used to support one particular religion despite the fact that you could use it to support any religion. Therefore, how would it even impact us? Without proving who this god is, the existence of such a god is paradoxically irrelevant. As god is defined in this argument, nothing can be derived as to how we should morally act. I could, right now as an atheist, accept this argument, stop being atheist and nothing would change. This argument doesn't seem to have any implications...
I'm not a philosopher but I do think the argument has implications. I agree that this argument does not tell us which God is the true God specifically. However, I do think there is a strong base of sound logic that arises from Cosmological and Moral arguments which amass enough evidence for the possibility of God. While I am not an expert on how one would disprove the ontological argument, if the possibility of God does prove the existence of God, there are implications for that realization. An argument like this cannot capture what our exact response should be, but if it shows that there likely is a truly great being who created us, it would then make sense to try and know more about him, and do what he thinks is right for us to do, assuming his ways and knowledge is higher than ours. From this, one should then investigate the religions that claim to know the one true God. Then one would evaluate which of those people truly have evidence which shows they are right, something past Athiest Lee Strobel did which led Him to Christ.
A Christian would point to the cross and resurrection, the fulfillment of prophecy in the Old and New Testaments, and lastly the Holy Spirit working in their own lives. If there is a being which is higher and greater than what we can observe in the natural world, it makes perfect sense that our glimpses of his greatness would surpass the natural ways and laws of the world, resulting in what we define as miracles. And for miracles to be perceived as great, or better, they must not happen often, otherwise, we would count them as a natural experience.
I realize the end there moved a little off track from the ontological argument, but I wanted to demonstrate that knowing God at least is likely to exist does infer an intellectual honesty that we as humans should try and seek who that being is if that being is really the greatest thing, and possibly created us. It would be worse for us if we didn't know what that greatness manifested as precisely because we as humans need no help understanding that through our own failings we have brought immense suffering upon our fellow humans, animals, and now the environment we inhabit. We may be steadily improving but if there is something which is really really good, maybe that would save us from our wickedness.
@@natediemer1306 It doesn't have anything to do with gods if you get to the core of it. No more than the unexpected hanging paradox has to do with hangings or the two envelope problem has to do with envelopes.
You could as well state it as "consider a talking beaver that exists necessarily if it exists possibly".
The story of a god sacrificing himself to atone for the sins of humanity to which he created in the first place IS RIDICULOUS! An omnipotent BEING WOULD know that he cannot die and so therefore where is this great sacrifice ? And now he's in heaven with Yahweh his FATHER WAITING for the right time to fulfill his 2000 year promise of returning to earth and transforming it with his celestial kingdom which is long.....long overdue !
Waitasec! I know Dr. Arbour!!
I knew him when he was much younger.
Sorry I'm confused as to why Vader was discarded... Maybe I need to look that up
for me the ontological argument is just simple math, let pn be the probability of Gods existence in a possible world and p the possibility of Gods overall existence and n the number of independent possible worlds, therefore (1-p) = lim n-> inf: (1-pn)^n = 0, hence p=1
Since when did Ricky Gervais convert?
Wow! That's amazing!
While a believer, I think the Ontological argument is not convincing. I would argue that a maximum great God can't exist in some possible world because it then wouldn't be maximally great. If God exists then he exists, by definition, necessarily in all possible worlds.
Thank you so much for this interview. I learned so much. I really like Arbour's approach to dealing with the people who think it is not possible for God to exist. Mention all the other arguments first and then bring them back to the ontological argument at the end.
I really appreciate that you let this person speak on this subject but I don't appreciate that horrible lighting. Please add another light to your setup or at least bump your shadows in post
Arbour admits that greatness is a relative measure when he says that the females in a class would perceive the most beautiful person to be Brad Pitt whilst the males would choose someone like Jennifer Lawrence
1. God could possibly have created the Easter bunny as an ever present eternal being.
2. Therefore the Easter bunny exist in some possible world as an ever present being.
3. Since this Easter bunny is ever present it must therefore exist in all worlds.
4. Therefore the Easter bunny exist in our world.
See how easy it is when you use fallacy, misdirection and false linkage to fool people.
Try this argument without saying god created the Easter bunny as an ever present being
1.) the Easter bunny is an ever present being
2.) the Easter bunny can exist in a possible world
3.) since the Easter bunny is ever present it exists in all possible worlds
4.) the Easter bunny exists
What you are doing is just replacing the name of God with the name the Easter bunny.
It's the same thing with the Flying Spaghetti Monster objection. All they are doing is changing the name to make it seem absurd
@@weezy894
Yes. Exactly. It is absurd. The entire premise of a god is absurd, childish and depends on willful ignorance. That's exactly the point.
And the ontological argument was formed by Anselm to be used against ignorant, illiterate serfs during the dark ages. The fact that you can plug Count Chocula into the argument and it still works demonstrates how silly it is.
One problem is that the argument that is assumes that there is a greatest possible being, but it possible that it's not the case. There isn't a greatest possible number because you can always add one. And if you have two beings how do you determine which one of them is the greatest anyway?
This seems to me such a simple and obvious objection, and one that effectively undercuts the entire argument, that I cannot fathom how anyone *other than* an already established believer would accept the premises of the argument
"One problem is that the argument that is assumes that there is a greatest possible being, but it possible that it's not the case."
LOL, That's literally the premise. That's the base assumption. It leaves open the possibility that no MGB exists.
"There isn't a greatest possible number because you can always add one."
That's a category error. God being maximally great has nothing to do with a maximally great number, as such is impossible.
"And if you have two beings how do you determine which one of them is the greatest anyway?"
There can only be 1 maximally great being. 2 beings can't be maximally great by definition only one takes the role of maximal greatness.
These are the worst objections to the ontological argument ever. As a Christian, I don't believe the argument is logically sound, but these are just bad responses.
@@TheSpacePlaceYT I can define that there is only only maximally great being, but that may have noting to do with reality, it's like defining that there is one greatest snack.
Not granting a premise is not the same as denying the premise.
If I reject premise one, it's up to you to support it. Especially if premise one boils down to: God exists.
There's a bit of playing around with words in this argument. Colloquially we can talk about it being possible for God existing all day long. But in a syllogism we need to use more thorough in what we do and don't accept.
Dear Cam,
The “Maximally Great Darth Vader” argument utterly defeats Dr. Arbor’s (and St. Andelm’s) version of the argument. Within the video, as Dr. Arbour attempted to refute the “Maximally Great Darth Vader” argument, he needed to add qualifiers, such as omnibonevolence, as necessary qualities of such a maximally great being. But a Darth Vader who was at all benevolent would be less than the average Darth Vader... that is, benevolence is not a quality Darth Vader would have.
I am a believer, a Methodist pastor, but I object to any argument which attempts to define something into existence.
Love your stuff!!
Sorry for the spelling errors... typing with my thumbs on a phone. 😁
I think his arguement might be upheld. If a "Maximally Great Darth Vader" needed benevolence to be maximally great; it would not defeat their arguement, rather uphold it. You correctly said a "Maximally Great Darth Vader" with ultimate benevolence would disqualify him as 'Darth Vader,' but not defeat their premise. An ultimately benevolent being would turn out to be God, because the qualifiers for God are not specified beyond omnipotence, omnipresence, and ultimate benevolence; whereas the qualifiers for a "Maximally Great Darth Vader" are quite a bit more specified.
Something necessairy needs to be three things: uncomposite (something composite has parts therefore is contingent), immuable (something that change is contingent) and immobile (something that moves is not self sufficient therefore contingent)... Excepted ideas and God, nothing has those properties. You could say the idea of a maximally great darth vador existe in all possible world because ideas are necessary, but you cannot say the same thing about the thing in itself because it is composite, muable and mobile.
@@MegaDocalex it seems arbitrary to add God there as the only other thing besides ideas that can be necessary. How can you state that necessity needs to have these three atributes? Especially uncomposite, which seems hard to define.
RIP ☹️
(15:50) Dr. Arbour states that skeptics will not grant the possibility of God's existence, and are therefore being dishonest. Arbour is mistaken in his thinking. He is conflating a specialized conception of possibility with the casual understanding that we should keep an open mind about whether an argument may be successful. What the skeptic should do is grant the possibility of premise 1 being true. At that point, he should demand justification that premise 1 is true. Possibility of the existence of God must be shown to be true (or at least mutually agreed upon), just as with every premise of every argument ever.
Hello, I enjoyed listening to this video. Thanks for posting it. I've given a large amount of thought to Plantinga's modal ontological argument. I've recently put up a series of three videos going deeply into the topic, which I invite you to see if it interests you. They're on my channel. My position is that whether the MOA is sound or not, it cannot. be used as a persuasive argument for the existence of God.
If A then B. logically means exactly the same as 'if not B then not A'. 'If god is possible then god exists', means the same as 'if god doesn't exist then god is not possible. So any piece of evidence that god doesn't exist is evidence that a necessary god is not possible. Arguments like the problem of evil and divine hiddeness are arguments that a necessary god is not possible.
Here's why I don't think we should default to thinking something is possible. What if god had all the same properties being proposed here except the property of necessity. This god seems possible, so it exists in at least one possible world. In this possible world we can't have both gods existing together, so the necessary god doesn't exist in this world. A necessary god would exist in all possible worlds and since it doesn't exist in that world it cant exist in any and is not possible. Just because the non-necessary god exists in one world doesn't mean it exists in this one. So if we default to thinking something is possible it leads to contradiction because there is no reason to think that either god is not possible but we know that they both can't be possible. If they are both possible there is at least one possible world where both exist.
A God that does not exist by necessity is not God, the being you are describing is not God so you're doing nothing but playing a game of semantics. Secondly your first assertion is absolutely nonsensical, the MOA functions just like a mathematical proof statement, not a simple A - B level of reasoning. So by the logic of your first assertion, if I was to look at a trigonometric proof and decide it is possible that the equation before me is not true, it is follows that it it cannot be true which is insanity. Finally, your attempted reversal of the first premise fails in and of itself, for due to the fact that you attempted to say, "it is possible God does not exist," it still follows that it is possible for God to exist. Hence your argument fails on both fronts for if I replaced the first premise with, "it is possible for God not to exist" the original conclusion would still follow.
P1: It is possible that a maximally great necessary being does not exist.
P2: It then follows that it is possible for a maximally great necessary being to exist for P1 and P2 are not contradictory statements, but complimentary.
......other premises.....Conclusion: God exists.
@@jakobbogale2350 What you would chose to call that being is not relevant. I was explaining how assuming that something is possible until proven otherwise leads to contradiction.
I don't think you understood my reasoning at all because it does not follow you could decide if a mathematical proof is true or not. Maybe you could explain how it does. We don't prove mathematical statements by saying, It is possible that it is true and if its true in one possible world it is true in all possible worlds.
In modal logic it does not follow from 'it is possible God does not exist' that 'it is possible that God to exist'. If something is possible that is to say there is at least one possible world in which that statement is true. It doesn't follow that there is a world in which it is not true, it could be true in all possible worlds. If what you are saying was true it would follow from 'it is possible that a maximally great necessary being exists' that 'It is possible that a maximally great necessary being does not exist'. The second statement means there is at least one possible world in which that being does not exist, which contradicts the first statement given the definition of necessary.
The point of my first statement was to show why the ontological argument can't be used to raise the burden of proof of atheism from proving God does not exist to proving God is impossible.
The point of my second statement was to show that we should not believe that something is possible by default.
@@lukeanthony9904 Again, I disagree and I think you misunderstood me. To say something is impossible is to claim omniscience, unless of course, you are able to give good reason for saying that it is impossible you do in fact bear the burden of proof since you have absolutely no basis for that counter argument. If we begin with the statement that it is possible for a maximally great being to not exist we would in fact start with a possible world wherein a maximally great being does not, so I would agree with you. However, the point is this: non-existence does not bear the trait of neccesity in the same way as a maximally great being would. We know that non-existence is not a necessary trait because we exist, so it is in fact a failed counter objection seeing as the trait of non existence would not carry over into any other possible world. So unless you do infact begin with the premise "it is impossible" for a maximally great, necessary being to exist your point is moot because given the statement "it is possible for a maximally great necessary being not to exist" it still follows that that being exists in some other possible world thus making it irrelivant whether we begin in the world where the being exists or not. For the necessary being that exists in the alternative possible world, even if we begin with your attempted reversal would still therefore exist in all possible worlds. You do shoulder the burden of proof, and you do not get to claim impossibility if you cannot either give strong reason for said claim by means of showing the concept of God to be incoherent or prove that you know everything.
Again, a game of semantics does not factor out the necessity of a maximally great being for divine aseity requires that the being exist in and of itself, if you deny that the puny "god" you are talking about has the trait of necessity, it would then be a contingent thing dependant on the existence of other things, thus the leibnitz contingency argument would still apply to the non neccessary, and thus non eternal existence of that lower deity. Thus the truly maximally great God of gods that the ontological argument brings into all possible worlds would be the creator of that weak little contingent fairy.
@@jakobbogale2350 I didn't say that anything is impossible. I didn't say anything necessarily doesn't exist. 'given the statement "it is possible for a maximally great necessary being not to exist" it still follows that that being exists in some other possible world'. No it doesn't, that's what I was trying to explain in my previous comment. In possible world semantics, if something is possible it only means that that thing is true in at least one possible world, it does not entail that it is false in at least one possible world. For example the ontological argument starts by saying possibly God exists. That does not entail there is a possible world in which God does not exist.
I am NOT claiming anything is impossible, I am actually saying that the person saying x is possible holds the burden of proof that x is possible. Supporters of the ontological argument never try to support the premise that possible God exists. Dr. Arbour says that we should believe that something is possible by default until proven otherwise. I was pointing out the contradiction because you would have to believe by default that it is possible that God doesn't exist or that it is possible that a non-necessary God exists.
The contingency argument is a different topic and has it's own problems. The non-necessary God could exist by brute fact or be explained by a necessary law, you would have to prove these both impossible. You seem to be trying to prove a contingent God is impossible while also saying that to say something is impossible is to claim omniscience.
@@lukeanthony9904 A guilt until proven innocent mentality is not the mentality that holds ground in an honest search for the truth and it is indeed the guilty until proven innocent mentality that does bear the burden of proof. Which is why no honest court holds to it. A non-necessary God being explained away by external law entails that something outside of God caused the existence of God leading to something truly necessary via the law of pasimony to avoid an infinite regress. And to say that the existence of a non-necessary God could be explained away as "brute fact" is like tripping over something and saying that the thing you tripped over "just is," without being necessary, which is just laziness and metaphysical impossibility. Even so, one argument is not the be all end all, even if I disagree with your objections. More interesting to me at the moment is why it seems you do not want to believe in God because you do appear to be becoming rather passionate with the caps lock.
No, as it's either a tautology, or a circular argument.
Maybe it is just impossible to exist in all possible worlds. How would you know?
16:55
But that is exactly what the argument does. The argument successfully proves that possible existence is equivalent to actual existence, so the first premise literally becomes "God exists." Literally, the argument is:
1. God exists (by definition)
2. If God exists, then God exists
3. If God exists, then God exists
4. If God exists, then God exists
5. Therefore, God exists
Does anybody else see a problem with this?
Then you say that it's possible God exists rather then we now say with certainty that God exist.
Of course they see the problem, but their objective is not honest enquiry but sophisticated word games to keep the doubters on side. Keep 'em confused, keep 'em in the camp. If they were honest then they would see admit exactly what you're showing, that it's just defining god as existing which has no bearing on whether a god does exist. Only empirical evidence would demonstrate that and there is none, in fact the more you look at the world the less reason you see for a god being necessary.
@RetroMan Ha ha ha you want to play that game do you? There's no empirical evidence that there's a god of any kind, no historical record of a great religious teacher called Jesus who performed amazing miracles and preached to thousands much less the slightest historical hint that he was crucified and rose from the dead. And yet there are gullible fools called Christians who suck up the empty stories about him and think it makes him real when he's not even a good allegory.
Try occam's razor- god is superfluous, has no explanatory power and so can be cut away.
But here's the big news. Atheists simply believe there's no god, it's not a position on the age of the universe or abiogenesis. This is why the religious are stuck in their god rut, they simply can't understand simple science and find the world too complex to comprehend so they just say goddidit and that's the end of their need to think about anything. Carry on being gullible & lazy.
@Gilbert Well... no, it doesn't. The argument in no way proves that potentiality=actuality in itself, but that it does in God. And it doesn't start with this assumption. We start with a premise that it's possible that God exist and only then, by analysing God we come to the conclusion that God exist. It's in no way assumed in the begining.
@@letrewiarz Simply substitute "it's not possible for a god to exist" and you end up with a conclusion that god doesn't exist. Just as valid as your way. See the problem here?
You can't prove god with logic but you can disprove an omnipotent, omniscient god. Logically such a being cannot exist. Carry on being desperate.
If a maximally great being exist, whats to say he's the god described in the scripture?
Read my thread with insanity plus
The resurrection, which is an entirely different debate.
Special pleading.
It is not special pleading and even if it were, special pleading does not make an argument false + even if it did that would still not falsify the conclusion
@@Dennis1 Any argument that merely thinks a deity or anything at all into existence is by definition special pleading for that claim.There is nothing I can't think into existence with equal validity and soundness.
@@51elephantchang Right. It advice you to be a bit more respectful towards this argument. This is academic philosophy, and if I were you I would not want to say anything stupid. Read Plantingas books. This is not grabbed out of thin air, my friend.
@@Dennis1 I'm sorry if my ignorance and stupidity offends you.Perhaps you could condescend to explain where I am going wrong in general terms that even I might understand.
@Pragmaticist The special pleading is claiming to know what that necessary thing is and is not.
3 Questions:
1. How do you know its possible for god to exist? Isn't this the very thing we are trying to figure out?
2. How do you know that this (there could also be many more) universe has a creator, which happened not to be maximally great?
3. If you make the argument that a maximally great island or pizza can't exist, because its by definition not necessary or maximally great, then why can't you just define it to be maximally great the same way you're allowed to define the cause of the universe to be maximally great?
@Daniel U
1.) We don't know if it is possible or impossible for a maximally great being to exist - or do we? How do you know either or?
2.) No, I am simply stating that it is possible that this universe (there might be many) in fact does have creator - which however is not all powerful (but still very powerful), all knowing, timeless etc.
3.) I am saying that just like you have problems defining a maximally great pizza, I have problems defining a maximally great being. For instance one of the attributes of this "maximally greatness" might be timelessness (while we actually still don't really understand what this even means). There might be other attributes which we aren't simply aware of yet, which would be suitable for a maximally great being - maybe "dimension-n-lessness" ? Can we actually know what it means to be maximally great?
I can still also say that I find the idea of an all knowing god that doesn't act or demonstrate its existence rather creepy and morally objectionable and not at all "maximally great". While a maximally great pizza could easily be defined as the for everyone best tasting, never ending pizza or anything completely made up like that.
Apart from the fact that this argument just tries to define god into existence, I find its premises also very questionable.
Plantinga's argument rests on (at least) (1) the premise that there is a clear and definite demarcation between ontology and epistemology; otherwise, it is no better than Anselm's. (2) the consistency of the notion of possible worlds. While many of the contemporary philosophers believe (2), it is by no means consensus. It seems to me, all hinges on the person's inclination--toward theism or atheism. Mr. Arbour starts by doubting scientism, which has some resemblance to Logical positivism. But then why should we accept any axiom or any claim at all, if even the seemingly simple question of 2 apples + 2 apples is riddled with many philosophical assumptions? It seems to me he just followed his inclination, since to him even empirical evidence is not doubt-free. But then, everything is in flux: there is no Archimedean point. I see no difference between St Anselm's and Plantinga's, in the big picture. The latter's is more sophisticated, applying modal logic. But in the end, both are definitional: the starting point is to define what God is and the inferring there is the One. Science starts with hypotheses but it doesn't stop there. Experiments must follow to confirm the claim. Many people follow science for a reason: it delivers. Religion on the other hand asks us to wait/pray/fear for the omnipotent, all-knowing, all perfect etc. good luck!
think deeper
I think I agree. The core error seems to be the same in both cases: that it is assumed that a definition is fulfilled by something. Only the modal logic somewhat hides it.
Anyways a very interesting argument. I only wish some of it's absurd conclusions weren't used by apologists. I think then the discussion of it would be much more fruitful.
Despite all the detailed videos showing the many flaws in the Ontological argument I find it amazing that anyone is still using it or thinking it has any value.
@Caradoc g It is so epically stupid. It tries to define God into existence. The first premise is un-verifiable and thus the whole argument is meaningless. I have seen many logical arguments for the existence of God and they all get nowhere. I know of two logical arguments for the nonexistence f God that actually have traction.
The argument kant work.
I didn't know Greg Gunberg played a theologian. ;-) All kidding aside, this was a great informal discussion of the OA. It does seem though that contemporary formulations rely on modal reasoning and a Thomistic style argument from degree (~12:06) or a Platonic style argument of hierarchy in being, which if that analysis is accurate, then the key question for proponents of the OA is: how do you get necessity (of existence in all possible worlds) from degree (of greatness in existing)? It seems that Arbour's approach (23:27) begins with validating the possibility of God through other arguments (Kalam, Moral Argument, etc.). But I think if we're taking that approach, then the other arguments the possibility premise relies upon should (in my opinion) be of the modal variety (simply for harmony). If so, Kant is our go-to guy. His discussions in "The Only Possible Basis of Proof for Demonstrating the Existence of God" (1763) led him to consider that reality is predicated on something that exists both absolutely and by necessity (which he called "the most real being") that grounds the existence of all other possible beings. This to me seems like a fantastic starting point for the MOA.
No, it isn't. It's nonsense. Another easy question to answer.
@J w Not if they think this argument is anything more than theists wishing their god into existence.
@J w I wasn't making an argument, I was answering the question posed by this video. To clarify, just because you can imagine something doesn't make it real.
@J w This particular argument imagines gods into existence. There are other arguments that try to define gods into reality, some that special plead, others that are just massive appeals to ignorance, most are simply baseless assertions, none of them are in any way convincing. You're right, just because I don't believe doesn't mean a god doesn't exist . The complete lack of any evidence has more to do with demonstrating that none of the gods invented throughout human history exist in tangible reality than anyone's belief or lack thereof.
Here's a challenge for theists, name one real thing that needs a god to make it function.
@J w That's easy. Everything that isn't man made isn't the product of a mind.
Don't worry about the grammar, I understood.
But to be more specific, what mind created volcanoes, earthquakes, thunderstorms cyclones, Ebola, and that kind of thing? Or is it lots of little mindless events to create a large mindless event?
The quantity of apples does not take into account the quality (size, shape, rottenness, color, taste, edibility, worminess, etc.) that is, not all single apples are equal.
19:00 was a train wreck. I heard nothing convincing about his first reason for rejecting the reverse argument. His second makes me wonder the point of the argument. If you need other arguments the already prove God to make the first premise more plausible than not, why not just use the other arguments.
Great interview questions and skills by Cameron, but I feel InspiringPhilosophy gives a better overview in his playlist on the ontological argument.
If God existed in all possible worlds, then wouldn't some of the things in some of those possible worlds be abhorrent to him?
There is only one step that I struggle with in this argument: Is necessary existence a coherent property?
What explains the *category* of existence itself? Is there some aspect of existence that *must* be-- i.e. that could not fail to exist? If so, that aspect would be necessary existence, however we might want to expand upon that. If not, then all of existence (every aspect of existence) would be utterly contingent, i.e. existence itself may not have been. In the latter case, existence is "just there" for no reason and with no explanation whatsoever. This is largely a matter (er, an issue) of competing intuitions. Neither position can be definitively confirmed/denied.
If there were some possible world in which there was some aspect of existence that was necessary (i.e. couldn't fail to exist) then, yes, that aspect would exist in every possible world, including ours. *But* necessary existence doesn't automatically imply consciousness; there's nothing in this argument that shows why the necessary aspect has to be conscious(ness), which is required for theism to be true.
Fair point. I don't think existence is "just there" with no explanation whatsoever. Still less since we live in a universe that obeys rules. No one, if they discovered a bunch of objects moving around a room, and discovered they all had exactly the same speed, would say that they all have the same speed by accident. So why should we believe that about photons?
I like the ontological argument because it describes "how" God might exist. The idea of God _seems_ intuitive to me. The thing that bothers me is that some possible worlds would contain things abhorrent to God, even more than the actual world. Maybe that disproves God? Or maybe some suffering is impossible (exists in no possible world) since God exists in all possible worlds?
th-cam.com/video/k_5zELmun9E/w-d-xo.html
May the Lord grant him eternal rest.
I dont understand how ontological arguments hold up to this date. they are weak.
People tend to buy anything that confirms what they already think.
They believe it cuz they have to, not for its merits
can you say man-made. We make things up and then run it up the flag pole...... pick your flag pole?
a flaw with his "mutliple other arguments for god motivate the possibility premise"; those arguments argue equally for a God that isn't necessary, that maximally excellent in just this world. You can doubt the maximally great being definition while accepting a weaker, "maximally excellent" (ie perfect but only in one world) definition of God.
To all those who are unable to understand here is the clear cut version of it th-cam.com/video/jt2dywK1RZs/w-d-xo.html
So science is about studying reality. The whole scientific methods is about confirming if statements match, or don't match reality. And from that we gain knowledge about reality. Philosophy is not a a method of confirming a statement does or does not match reality to any degree of certainty. The question, might be Philosophical, but again Philosophy is not a method that confirms a statement, or a conclusion matches reality to any degree of certainty. That is what science, and the whole scientific method does. So you would still be doing science and using the scientific method to confirm if a conclusion does, or does not match reality to any degree of certainty. If supernatural things existed, and/or supernatural events occurred, and there was any way to study that, and confirm anything about it, that would be thru science, and use the whole scientific method. The question being Philosophical does not change that.
This helps to understand why even our best good works are like filthy rags in Gods sight.
Not because they aren't good but they cannot be infinitely good
There is no such thing.
We all know there are a family of ontological arguments, so a better title is, Is there a Version of the Ontological Argument Which is Sound?
Withholding agreement that God's existence is possible is not tantamount to stating that it is impossible that God exists.
17:05 "But starting with god possibly exists, I'm not stipulating from the onset that god does exist. That comes later when we define it..."
Yeah, that's dishonest. If it's baked into the definition, then you ARE trying assert from the get go that a god exists by definition. Additionally, someone saying they don't accept your premise that a exists-by-definition god is possible is NOT the same as claiming it is impossible. The premise simply remains unsupported until someone has evidence to put it in the 'possible' category or 'impossible' category.
Now imagine if I said:
1. It is possible in some world that Darth Vader exists.
And if you ask for evidence it's at least possible I claim you're being unreasonable and shift the burden of proof over to by saying that you're claiming it's impossible. So you tentatively accept it's possible for the sake of argument.
2. Vader is defined as the most terrifying sith lord.
3. It would be more terrifying if he was a real life danger rather than just a fictional character.
4. Therefore Darth Vader exists in all possible worlds, in fact, he exists in real life. There is no escape from him.
Do you now believe Darth Vader exists in real life? Why not? I mean, he's the MOST terrifying, and being the most terrifying implies existence, so you gotta admit he exists. He exists by definition, afterall.
The obvious problem with your argument is that being the most terrifying sith lord does not require he be maximally terrifying.
However, if you clear this up the argument still fails. By a possibility of a maximally excellent being Vader must be limited and so there is no reason for Vader to be essentially omnipotent. A Vader with omnipotence would render the maximally excellent being as not maximally excellent.
In other words, the maximally excellent being concept rules your argument out.
Please see 12:56 where this is discussed within the video.
@@fogboquiz5700
Quite the contrary, the most terrifying sith lord imaginable by definition would be more terrifying if even gods could not stop him. By definition, you wouldn't be terrified of a sith lord that a god could save you from, so you are imagining a lesser sith lord. So Vader rules out the maximally excellent being.
@@SusanmugenFirst and foremost you have post hoc added the property of being the most terrifying sith lord IMAGINABLE, which was not at all apparent in your argument which simply claimed he was the most terrifying sith lord.
None the less, you now are in the position to have to justify the properties of being terrifying as being maximally great.
worse still
"the most terrifying sith lord imaginable by definition would be more terrifying if even gods could not stop him . . ."
Is an incoherent statement.
The very nature of a maximally excellent being has the required unsurpassable properties which you for some reason claim are able to be reached beyond.
Put simply you are attempting to claim the impossible (to be greater than that which is unsurpassable) is possible rendering the possible (the unsurpassable being unsurpassable) impossible.
Your argument therefore fails.
@@fogboquiz5700
Nah, you don't have to justify the idea that being terrifying is great. It sure isn't great for us. Not great for any gods.
I'm definitely not claiming Vader to be great at all. It really really sucks that he exists, but we proved he does, so that's pretty terrifying.
If anything, you are the one claiming something impossible (to make the most terrifying imaginable less scary) is possible. You are trying to render the possible (lord vader) impossible.
A "maximally excellent" being who is both capable and interested in opposing Vader would limit how terrifying Vader is. Therefore such an 'excellent' being can not exist. Such an 'excellent' being couldn't possibly be both capable and interested in stopping terrifying things, or else there would be no serial killers, or student loan debt, or black widow spiders. There would be nothing terrifying at all. Yet there is.
So your argument fails. Vader exists necessarily in all possible worlds by definition.
@@Susanmugen"A "maximally excellent" being who is both capable and interested in opposing Vader would limit how terrifying Vader is. Therefore such an 'excellent' being can not exist. Such an 'excellent' being couldn't possibly be both capable and interested in stopping terrifying things, or else there would be no serial killers, or student loan debt, or black widow spiders. There would be nothing terrifying at all. Yet there is."
An argument from ignorance. Read Plantinga. A good and loving God is compatible with suffering and evil, however, the extent of which could be a possible defeater, however atheists have not met this burden of proof. In other words, God is compatible with the world but the world in which such a Vader exists would be an impossible world.
In other words, the Vader you describe is impossible.
The maximally excellent being is unsurpassable and you try to surpass him. Your argument collapsed and your response is very weak indeed.
The philosophy of mathematis is the most interesting issue at stake
I am a Christian but I am very skeptical of this argument because of the idea of a "Maximally Great" being can only apply if God already existed to define it. Perfect morality can only exist if objective morals exist, and objective morals can only exist if God exists, thus in order to buy the premise that a maximally great being might exist, you need to God in order to be able to describe maximal greatness in the first place. So the argument, I think at least, smuggles God into the first premise, because a being can only be maximally great if God exists anyway. If someone does not think that God exists, they will not be convinced by this argument because the idea of "Maximal Greatness" is fallacious to them in the first place, since greatness does not really exist. If the argument was reformulated with a better definition of "greatness", it might make more sense, but no one has satisfactorily clarified this term to my liking.
R.I.P
Ben was a brilliant thinker. May Lord rest his soul.
By begging the question and saying, if God possibly exists, then God exists...the ontological argument becomes:
1 If God exists, God exists
2 If God exists, God exists
Well, duh!
This is strawn manning the true argument. You should watch inspiring philosophy's video on the ontological argument where he breaks down each point
@@weezy894 I've watched IP's video. Built into the premis, "If God possibly exists, God exists" You can do a substitution into the ontological argument. You get:
1 If God exists, God exists
2 If God exists, God exists
The ontological argument is an analytic argument. It is just definitional. It tells us nothing about the world outside our heads.
Well done @Ben Arbour, you ran your race well!
15:30
21:00
When people say "there is no God" %99 of the time they are talking about the God of the Bible
And they say it because they hate Christians
@Trenton Exum, How is God generic?
@Trenton Exum, They don't argue for a god with unknown properties. They are arguing against God and what they disagree with about the God of the Bible. I believe that the reason people have the wrong perspective of God is because they apply modern terms and definitions to what is in the Bible. It's impossible to have the right perspective if a person does that. The language used then was and is still different than what we use today. Today, God isn't doing those things you mentioned but that doesn't mean it never happened.
If he doesn't exist and if there isn't enough evidence to warrant belief in God, why are they so bent on arguing against him?
@Charlie, No, I don't have the wrong view of the Bible. And who's telling children they deserve to be tortured forever? It sure isn't Christians.
@Charlie, No need to use a logical fallacy to make your point when there are more options than what you listed.
Please fill me in on the Christians who said that.
Paul Heyman?
Got lost on the injection of Darth Vader
Because a maximally great being is possible therefore it's necessary. That is so not persuasive.
19:40 The pink sky analogy doesn't work!
Sure it's possible that there is a possible world where the sky is pink but it isn't possible that there is a world where the sky is pink in all possible worlds.
Ontological argument is the most desperate argument. But This is what’s expected when there’s no empirical evidence of God.
The rock analogy seems to fail to hold ground within the ontological argument. If God is the maximally greatest being, then how can he make a rock that is to big/great for Him to pick up? The rock would have to be greater than him and if so, than He is not the maximally greatest being and therefore not God. I know that this argument can go much deeper, yet it also seems simple to me. Just my 2 cents.
So being great is synonymous to being heavy?
No. It's debunked so many times.
DJH316007 As for the Ontological Argument being debunked I'm not sure of what your definition of "debunked" is. You are aware that simply objecting to it doesn't debunk it, right?
@@CCCBeaumont Well unlike you, I have the ability to look into claims being made and there are plenty of places that show how it fails. Google isn't that hard to use.
@@DJH316007 I did that too and couldn't find one that actually "debunked" it. Funny how that works sometimes.
31:00 should not even be an argument for or against the existence of God, depends on how you use it. God is still omnipotent if he creates a rock he can’t move but he’s omnipotent so he can move it. Surely God is exempt from the laws of logic in a theoretical world that he creates them
Law of logic: A cannot both be A and Not A at the same time, in the same sense. So if God can violate this, would that mean it both exists and doesn't exist simultaneously?
The rock paradox illustrates the flaw in omnipotence. You and I can make an object, say a concrete block, so heavy that we cannot lift. There's no logic problem in making the block. There's no logical problem on our inability to lift it. The problem, therefore, is omnipotence.
Ha! Isn't this exactly what Descartes argued?
However, for those who believe in Logic, the ontological argument is a logical proof of Gods existence. As per Alvin Plantinga, the OA certainly provides adequate reason for a believer to know their belief is logical.
I see what you did there. In making accepting a possibility the default you've essential flipped the burden of proof.
The modal ontological argument is functionality useless. You're either being sneaky or disinterest in your definition of God including "necessary being" and more is granted in saying "it's possible God exists", or the person you're making the argument to actually does grant that God is a necessary being, in which case there's no use arguing whether or not God exists in the actual world. If the definition includes "exists in all possible worlds" agreement with the conclusion is entirely dependent on accepting that definition.
It is possible that some god exists. It is not possible that any necessary being exists. I can conceive of a coherent world without necessary beings, therefore necessary beings do not exist in all possible world, therefore necessary beings are not possible.
Also, properties given by some possible world are not transitive. In some possible world a version of me exists with green skin, but properties in that world are isolated to that world.
The key is “ All powerful “
@@kofibonsu8466 oh, it has magic powers. Well that changes everything.
All-powerful just guarantees paradoxes, which means "can't exist." That's where things like "can God create a rock so heavy he can't lift it" come in. No "all-powerful" being exists for the same reason and with the same certainty that no square circles exists. Impossible things do not and cannot exist in any possible world.
@@shgysk8zer0 do you think such logical contradictions apply to God, if he instituted them ? From my perspective I believe with good evidence that we’re immaterial beings constrained in a material for the system of the Christian faith. It’s quite silly to dismiss it as magical powers, I can only assume you think of God in the wavelengths of Santa Claus and Zeus
@@shgysk8zer0 I believe the True God ( I’ll say YHWH) so you’ll know specifically what I mean, is the only God that can constrain himself to such paradox and escape it. For example the death of God, how can an all powerful God, eternal God, die?
Just because things are contradictions to us of seek contradictory to us, arguably doesn’t mean it’s the same for God
@@kofibonsu8466 "how can an all-powerful, eternal God, die" isn't a paradox at all. An all powerful God that can't do something like die would be a contradiction though.
And saying God escapes a paradox doesn't make it so. It's pure intellectual laziness and dishonesty.
Ok, lets say you want to establish that God is maximally great in a conversation with an atheist. The atheist will not initally grant it is even possible God exists so you use the cosmological argument to get an atheist to grant in principle a "sufficiently" great being that is personal, non-temporal, non-spacial, and immaterial could be the cause but it still doesn't get you to maximal greatness. Anselm's premise that God is maximally great is an unproven premise in that just because you can conceive of something, it does not follow that it must exist or that it must exist as your conceive it. What if a person were to grant God could exist but not that He is maximal great but only sufficiently great to accomplish creation. Doesn't this defeat the Ontological Argument before it get started? If not, how do you get from sufficiently great to maximally great?
God actually existing in all possible worlds doesn’t add anything to the CONCEPT of god existing in all possible worlds. So this means I can still conceive the maximally greatest being as maximally great without having to say it actually exist necessarily. So because of this, I see no need to define god or a maximally great being as existing necessarily but rather existing hypothetically.
And if you try to say “but god is by definition a necessary being” and don’t give me reasons for why a maximally great being is one that exist necessarily and not hypothetically, then your just playing word games and making a circular argument. To say something is a necessary being is to claim it exist so that means that before the argument is finished you have already claimed god exist. But the argument is trying to prove gods existence in the first place so it’s begging the question, Unless you can give reasons for why god is a necessary being.
In simple form:
1. God can hypothetically exist in all possible worlds, we don’t have to say he actually exist in all possible worlds
2. Unless you can provide other reasons for why god is a necessary being or refute my first premise, defining god as a necessary being is circular and begging the question.
OK... so the Dr. is attempting to blur the line between real and imaginary. Take the counting apples analogy... two plus two objects equals four, it doesn't matter what the objects are it's still 4 objects. But the basic idea behind concluding 4 is the number is just a label. On some other planet the total of those objects might be called "oxnix". Even here on Earth different languages can call that number of objects something else. Numbers is just a method of counting objects whatever label they've been given. The important thing is they are Objects [apples in this case]. But the Dr. here is presenting a philosophical argument that blurs the line between the real and the imaginary. 🤐
Here is philosophical argument to christians. Can the infinite become finite? Or can the finite become infinite? Whr im going to is ..there is no way god can be man or man be god. No! God cannot do everything. God can do only godly thing. God can not be satan or god can not be sinned etc etc.