1:10:00 I'm also not very convinced that ordinary discourse tells us a lot about philosophy or science for that matter. Especially science is basically the history of unlearning our intuitions, I don't see why ordinary intuitions about meta-ethics should be any more reliable.
Regarding your distinction between disagreements about what's true and disagreements about what to do, the emotivist CL Stevenson makes what I think is the same point by distinguishing between disagreements in belief and disagreements in attitude. There's a section on this in the Stanford entry on Stevenson. But yeah, seems like a pretty obvious point when you think about it.
35:35 When he uses the example of discussing what night of the week it is, I couldn't help but laugh. He brought it up because there is an underlying "fact of the matter", but ironically days of the week are social constructs that have no objective cause -- the example undermined the argument.
I'd guess that a very large chunk of those philosophers claiming to accept moral realism are not realists on your conception anyway, but rather theistic subjectivists with God as the subjective decider.
I've interacted with some people who actually believe that disagreements over courses of action *are* disagreements about objective "oughts". As in, they believe that whenever a person consciously chooses to pursue some course of action, that automatically means he *believes* that this action is the "objectively right" thing to do. Now, this person may *also* at the same time believe that there are no "objectively right" things to do, but that would just mean that he believes contradictory things. He'll still have to live with his beliefs about objectively right things, just with an added burden of also believing the opposite. You can provocatively summarize this position as: "An antirealist is just a realist with cognitive dissonance."
1:13:14 Example statement: "I actually believe some things dont actually matter." This could be said where either "actually" is left out. When done... it destroys the ability to know what is being said. The issue in many statements people make is that a term may be assumed to refer to one thing or another thing. This is a case of ambiguous reference. Often people confuse even themselves when doing so. Their statements match their mind. This means even in their mind the reference is ambiguous which allows the concept to be in a sort of superposition. This ambiguous reference problems happens an enormous amount in the philosophy field and philosophy conversations. Trying to pin down term dependencies in the statements becomes a horrible guessing game.
This is all so silly. The only ‘evidence’ for moral realism is the same as that for the Loch Ness Monster - namely that some people believe it is real.
1:10:00 I'm also not very convinced that ordinary discourse tells us a lot about philosophy or science for that matter. Especially science is basically the history of unlearning our intuitions, I don't see why ordinary intuitions about meta-ethics should be any more reliable.
I'm not sure that Andrew has ever spoken to a moral antirealist
I think his argument was bad and actually bad. I also feel massively confused.
Regarding your distinction between disagreements about what's true and disagreements about what to do, the emotivist CL Stevenson makes what I think is the same point by distinguishing between disagreements in belief and disagreements in attitude. There's a section on this in the Stanford entry on Stevenson. But yeah, seems like a pretty obvious point when you think about it.
35:35 When he uses the example of discussing what night of the week it is, I couldn't help but laugh. He brought it up because there is an underlying "fact of the matter", but ironically days of the week are social constructs that have no objective cause -- the example undermined the argument.
I'd guess that a very large chunk of those philosophers claiming to accept moral realism are not realists on your conception anyway, but rather theistic subjectivists with God as the subjective decider.
@@indef2def Yea probably.
congrats on the new position.
Welcome back 🔥
I've interacted with some people who actually believe that disagreements over courses of action *are* disagreements about objective "oughts". As in, they believe that whenever a person consciously chooses to pursue some course of action, that automatically means he *believes* that this action is the "objectively right" thing to do. Now, this person may *also* at the same time believe that there are no "objectively right" things to do, but that would just mean that he believes contradictory things. He'll still have to live with his beliefs about objectively right things, just with an added burden of also believing the opposite.
You can provocatively summarize this position as: "An antirealist is just a realist with cognitive dissonance."
@@СергейМакеев-ж2н I've seen this a lot. Never seen any good reasons to think it's true.
1:13:14
Example statement: "I actually believe some things dont actually matter."
This could be said where either "actually" is left out. When done... it destroys the ability to know what is being said.
The issue in many statements people make is that a term may be assumed to refer to one thing or another thing.
This is a case of ambiguous reference.
Often people confuse even themselves when doing so. Their statements match their mind. This means even in their mind the reference is ambiguous which allows the concept to be in a sort of superposition.
This ambiguous reference problems happens an enormous amount in the philosophy field and philosophy conversations.
Trying to pin down term dependencies in the statements becomes a horrible guessing game.
Damn cornell. good job
This is all so silly. The only ‘evidence’ for moral realism is the same as that for the Loch Ness Monster - namely that some people believe it is real.