Very interesting discussion, Matt. I’d like to add that it involves a trace of naive realism even to believe that there are other agents who have any consciousness at all (not only may their “green” not be identical to my “green”, but they may have no consciousness at all, that is, what I call “other agents” may be nothing more than mere perceptions that exist nowhere but in my own thoughts); in other words, assuming that the people you perceive in your field of experience have their own experiences and consciousness is residual naive realism (it is naive realism “smuggled in through the back door” as it were). You mention that naive realism “is built into our very nature”, which is true-it seems a very natural tendency of the mind to reify its perceptions as if they were or could be things-in-themselves (or even other-minds-in-themselves)-but to really fully call into question naive realism would mean also acknowledging that the persons I interact with (like all objects I interact with) are perceptions in my mental activity which may or may not have any connection to anything beyond my mental activity. In short, even the belief that there are other minds (or other “agents”) is residual naive realism-after all, it is possible that what I call “other agents” are ultimately nothing more than mere perceptions existing nowhere but in my thoughts.
I don't have a satisfactory answer to this, other than to say I just "know" other minds exist, and I'm happy with that position, even if it turns out I'm wrong. Guess it's a kind of Pascal's wager, only over other minds rather than God. As with many metaphysical positions, I don't think it's actually possible to prove anything at all about "the external world" - and even if "real objects" do exist independently of my mind, facts about them remain contingent I'd venture. I do pay attention to your writings and find your position fascinating, and quite compelling - obviously its quite provocative, and irks some folk. I think you're onto something, but even then - it's okay to have speculative views - and some are more "possibly correct" than others. To say everything is mind is probably more convincing than, for example, to say everything is bicycles.
@MattGray_Chelsoph Kant’s solution to the dilemma is to distinguish between speculative and practical reason. By speculative reason we endeavor to describe reality (which, for Kant and the Critical Philosophy, is, as far as I can possibly know, the synthesis of my thoughts as representations in me), by practical reason we concede a regulative worth to ideas of reason. What is unique about the Critical Philosophy is that it acknowledges that I cannot possibly have knowledge in regard to these questions (questions about transcendental reality, questions about a reality independent of my thoughts), but it also leaves room for belief (in the practical moral sphere) in the ideas of God, of immortality, of Providence, and even of independent subjects apart from myself.
@MattGray_Chelsoph Thank you for replying, Matt. My question: Why do do not simply contend that you “believe” that other minds exist? After all, if you claim to “know” that other minds exist, the question immediately arises of “how” you do or can know this-and you leave yourself wide-open to skeptical objections, because the skeptic can always doubt any argument you bring forward for any alleged knowledge of transcendental reality (a reality beyond one’s own sphere of consciousness). Also, it would be inconsistent to say that “I know that x is the case” while acknowledging that “I could be wrong that x is the case”-if one knows that ”x is the case”, then one knows that x is apodeictic/necessary. But, if one “knows” that x is the case while, at the same time, acknowledging that one could be wrong about x being the case, what that turns out to mean is that he “believes” that x is the case. Therefore, Matt, I am curious, why not say you believe that other minds exist? When you claim to “know” other minds exist then it becomes incumbent for you to provide a proof, demonstration, or deduction of the existence (transcendental reality) of other minds (but such a proof, demonstration, or deduction will always be subject to the skeptic’s doubts). Also, I am curious what your stance is on the Kantian critical approach to philosophical method. Do you see the method of Critical Philosophy as a healthy middle-ground between the extremes of dogmatism and skepticism, or does the Critical Philosophy approach not satisfy in your view?
This is definitely something that needs to be talked about more. You captured it well. Well done!
Thanks Mike appreciated!
Yes, brother! You nailed it here. There are still many who subscribe to it and they should listen to this. 👌🏻
Cheers dude!
Very interesting discussion, Matt.
I’d like to add that it involves a trace of naive realism even to believe that there are other agents who have any consciousness at all (not only may their “green” not be identical to my “green”, but they may have no consciousness at all, that is, what I call “other agents” may be nothing more than mere perceptions that exist nowhere but in my own thoughts); in other words, assuming that the people you perceive in your field of experience have their own experiences and consciousness is residual naive realism (it is naive realism “smuggled in through the back door” as it were).
You mention that naive realism “is built into our very nature”, which is true-it seems a very natural tendency of the mind to reify its perceptions as if they were or could be things-in-themselves (or even other-minds-in-themselves)-but to really fully call into question naive realism would mean also acknowledging that the persons I interact with (like all objects I interact with) are perceptions in my mental activity which may or may not have any connection to anything beyond my mental activity.
In short, even the belief that there are other minds (or other “agents”) is residual naive realism-after all, it is possible that what I call “other agents” are ultimately nothing more than mere perceptions existing nowhere but in my thoughts.
I don't have a satisfactory answer to this, other than to say I just "know" other minds exist, and I'm happy with that position, even if it turns out I'm wrong. Guess it's a kind of Pascal's wager, only over other minds rather than God. As with many metaphysical positions, I don't think it's actually possible to prove anything at all about "the external world" - and even if "real objects" do exist independently of my mind, facts about them remain contingent I'd venture. I do pay attention to your writings and find your position fascinating, and quite compelling - obviously its quite provocative, and irks some folk. I think you're onto something, but even then - it's okay to have speculative views - and some are more "possibly correct" than others. To say everything is mind is probably more convincing than, for example, to say everything is bicycles.
@MattGray_Chelsoph Kant’s solution to the dilemma is to distinguish between speculative and practical reason. By speculative reason we endeavor to describe reality (which, for Kant and the Critical Philosophy, is, as far as I can possibly know, the synthesis of my thoughts as representations in me), by practical reason we concede a regulative worth to ideas of reason. What is unique about the Critical Philosophy is that it acknowledges that I cannot possibly have knowledge in regard to these questions (questions about transcendental reality, questions about a reality independent of my thoughts), but it also leaves room for belief (in the practical moral sphere) in the ideas of God, of immortality, of Providence, and even of independent subjects apart from myself.
@MattGray_Chelsoph Thank you for replying, Matt. My question: Why do do not simply contend that you “believe” that other minds exist?
After all, if you claim to “know” that other minds exist, the question immediately arises of “how” you do or can know this-and you leave yourself wide-open to skeptical objections, because the skeptic can always doubt any argument you bring forward for any alleged knowledge of transcendental reality (a reality beyond one’s own sphere of consciousness).
Also, it would be inconsistent to say that “I know that x is the case” while acknowledging that “I could be wrong that x is the case”-if one knows that ”x is the case”, then one knows that x is apodeictic/necessary. But, if one “knows” that x is the case while, at the same time, acknowledging that one could be wrong about x being the case, what that turns out to mean is that he “believes” that x is the case.
Therefore, Matt, I am curious, why not say you believe that other minds exist? When you claim to “know” other minds exist then it becomes incumbent for you to provide a proof, demonstration, or deduction of the existence (transcendental reality) of other minds (but such a proof, demonstration, or deduction will always be subject to the skeptic’s doubts).
Also, I am curious what your stance is on the Kantian critical approach to philosophical method. Do you see the method of Critical Philosophy as a healthy middle-ground between the extremes of dogmatism and skepticism, or does the Critical Philosophy approach not satisfy in your view?
@@OuroboricIdealism yeah I'm happy to replace know with believe. That's fair.