5:10 yeah i would like a video about implications of this solution in physical world. And thank you so much for this video, i do a lot of debates and when the other can't explain something they use the problem of induction to entertain their fantasy ideas. Now i will improve on this Thanks a lot ❤
You got it! I have a video on another subject coming up, but after that one, I will try to work on an episode concerning natural properties! I'm glad you enjoyed the video. Thanks! 😀
i strongly recommend the work of John Norton, i believe he presented the most powerful resolution to the problem of induction that doesn't depend on any metaphysical theory
I reckon that Trope Nominalism solves the problem of induction. The problem is caused by misdefining your trope. You talk about "swans" but do not say how "swan" is defined? What is a swan and what is not a swan? I reckon two tropes should not be allowed to have different colors by definition, or you are not allowed to make universal statements about them since they posses variety. You can't say any universal statement beyond the definition of a thing. The problem of induction is just another way of figuring that lesson out. Only a fool would try to say anything universal beyond the definition of a thing. A swan is what can produce fertile offspring together. Saying anything at all beyond that is wrong. You are not allowed to comment on the color of a swan, because that is irrelevant to the definition. That's it. All swans produce fertile offspring together. That's it. Nothing else universal is allowed. You can't know what can reproduce and what can't, trying to guess would make you a fool.
I believe that the problem of induction remains within trope-theory. In order to solve the problem, the properties instantiated has to be exactly the same. But all tropes are different, none of them are the same. So the problem remains. But a universal is the same property instantiated in different times and places. I consider an electron to be a universal property for instance since it is exactly the same property instantiated at different times and places. Not sure whether David Armstrong was a functionalist, but an electron could then be defined according to it's functional role. I admit that the talk of swans is a bit misleading. I used it because it is a classic example, but we can't talk really talk about any 'swan universal'. Sure Plato did, but I think that theory is flawed. I believe that universals only occur on atomic and sub-atomic levels. Hope that made sense. Thank you so much for you're comment! I appreciate the effort.
@soundandsophia It actually does make sense, since subatomic particles are the only indistinguishable things in reality that I am aware of. Those are the only things which can be said to be actually universal. I think these particles can also be used to ground an Aristotelian realist philosophy of Peano Arithmetic (but nothing more) because of this, since numbers seem to be universals and natural numbers seem to be the universal of indistinguishable particles. Since subatomic particles cannot be distinguishable, there is no risk of induction by sublating over subatomic paeticles. Anyway the idea I had in mind with Trope Theory is that because all tropes are particulars only, there is no problem of induction because nothing is induced. All you have are individual observations, and it is only descriptive of those specific particulars -- all of which are distinguishable. The way I see the problem of induction is that it is caused by realist (non-abstract) universals of distinguishable things. If you accept universals as real and reject platonism (as Aristotle does), then you cause the problem of induction by generalizing a particular of distinguishable things when it is actually physically impossible to check the entire universe to make sure you aren't wrong when you do that. So solving the problem of universals is equivalent to solving the problem of induction as long as Platonism is rejected in both cases (presumably on epistemic and ontological grounds). That's why the traditional square of opposition was revised into the "modern square of opposition." Non-abstract realist universals cause a problem of induction, thus sublation can be flawed by just one counter example in the entire universe that someone was previously unaware of. That's why modern logic drops existential import on universals. But then we can have platonist epistemic problems, thus it seems like both Aristotle and Plato were wrong. To me, trope theory is the only other viable alternative if like me you reject platonism as a fallacy of reification. Which basically seems to mean that nothing can be deduced without decisive evidence of everything in question *before* trying deduction. Which seems like nothing real can be learned from deduction that cannot better be learned by empirical observation. The modern square of opposition, then, seems like a way to hypothetically reason absent of all the evidence by making no assertion of exiatential import on universals so that later if any evidence of them is found then they can be dusted off and used and if not they can be permanently shelved except for personal entertainment purposes. Thus modern logic seems to be epistemic rather than physical, but traditional logic is very much *not* hypothetical and is literally physical. Thus, the problem of induction occures when universals have exiatential import and does not occur when universals do not have existential import. Mathematics, then, beyond peano arithmentic (according to my argument) falls into the hypothetical (fictional) category until or if decisive evidence is found to support its actual existence -- such as if physics finds out if space is discrete or continuous. Fyi, I think Quine was wrong for suggesting that evidence of usefulness is evidence for *existence.* I think that's Quine commiting the fallacy of reification. Imo, only direct hard physical evidence can support the existence of something in reality. I also think Quine was right that no sentence is not subject to revision, I think all things are subject to revision according to the evidence -- including mathematics and logic. Quine was just too much of a coward to say math (beyond peano arithmetic) doesn't necessarily exist. If space is continuous, then that would be evidence for Aristotelian realism of real analysis. But if space is discrete, then that would cement real analyais as fiction. Since empty space seems to be indistinguishable everywhere. So I guess the take away of all this is that existential import on universals is only sound for indistinguishable things and nothing else. In other words, sublation holds only for indistinguishable things and the problem of induction is just the invalidity of sublation for distinguishable things. Interestingly, sublation is also exactly what's needed for the realism of mathematics (without platonism). So, indistinguishable things are what are necessary for mathematical realism (and this is what platonic forms *are,* but as a nominalist I think anything nonphysical is fake. Thus, actual realism requires actual indistinguishable things like electrons and possibly empty space).
5:10 yeah i would like a video about implications of this solution in physical world.
And thank you so much for this video, i do a lot of debates and when the other can't explain something they use the problem of induction to entertain their fantasy ideas. Now i will improve on this Thanks a lot ❤
You got it! I have a video on another subject coming up, but after that one, I will try to work on an episode concerning natural properties! I'm glad you enjoyed the video. Thanks! 😀
i strongly recommend the work of John Norton, i believe he presented the most powerful resolution to the problem of induction that doesn't depend on any metaphysical theory
Interesting! Thank you so much for the tip.
Can't watch the video right now but there is a misspelling in the title! "Induciton"
Ouch, big thanks for correcting me! I really appreciate it.
I reckon that Trope Nominalism solves the problem of induction. The problem is caused by misdefining your trope. You talk about "swans" but do not say how "swan" is defined? What is a swan and what is not a swan? I reckon two tropes should not be allowed to have different colors by definition, or you are not allowed to make universal statements about them since they posses variety.
You can't say any universal statement beyond the definition of a thing. The problem of induction is just another way of figuring that lesson out. Only a fool would try to say anything universal beyond the definition of a thing. A swan is what can produce fertile offspring together. Saying anything at all beyond that is wrong. You are not allowed to comment on the color of a swan, because that is irrelevant to the definition. That's it.
All swans produce fertile offspring together. That's it. Nothing else universal is allowed. You can't know what can reproduce and what can't, trying to guess would make you a fool.
I believe that the problem of induction remains within trope-theory. In order to solve the problem, the properties instantiated has to be exactly the same.
But all tropes are different, none of them are the same. So the problem remains. But a universal is the same property instantiated in different times and places. I consider an electron to be a universal property for instance since it is exactly the same property instantiated at different times and places. Not sure whether David Armstrong was a functionalist, but an electron could then be defined according to it's functional role.
I admit that the talk of swans is a bit misleading. I used it because it is a classic example, but we can't talk really talk about any 'swan universal'. Sure Plato did, but I think that theory is flawed. I believe that universals only occur on atomic and sub-atomic levels.
Hope that made sense.
Thank you so much for you're comment! I appreciate the effort.
@soundandsophia It actually does make sense, since subatomic particles are the only indistinguishable things in reality that I am aware of. Those are the only things which can be said to be actually universal. I think these particles can also be used to ground an Aristotelian realist philosophy of Peano Arithmetic (but nothing more) because of this, since numbers seem to be universals and natural numbers seem to be the universal of indistinguishable particles. Since subatomic particles cannot be distinguishable, there is no risk of induction by sublating over subatomic paeticles.
Anyway the idea I had in mind with Trope Theory is that because all tropes are particulars only, there is no problem of induction because nothing is induced. All you have are individual observations, and it is only descriptive of those specific particulars -- all of which are distinguishable. The way I see the problem of induction is that it is caused by realist (non-abstract) universals of distinguishable things. If you accept universals as real and reject platonism (as Aristotle does), then you cause the problem of induction by generalizing a particular of distinguishable things when it is actually physically impossible to check the entire universe to make sure you aren't wrong when you do that. So solving the problem of universals is equivalent to solving the problem of induction as long as Platonism is rejected in both cases (presumably on epistemic and ontological grounds). That's why the traditional square of opposition was revised into the "modern square of opposition." Non-abstract realist universals cause a problem of induction, thus sublation can be flawed by just one counter example in the entire universe that someone was previously unaware of. That's why modern logic drops existential import on universals. But then we can have platonist epistemic problems, thus it seems like both Aristotle and Plato were wrong.
To me, trope theory is the only other viable alternative if like me you reject platonism as a fallacy of reification. Which basically seems to mean that nothing can be deduced without decisive evidence of everything in question *before* trying deduction. Which seems like nothing real can be learned from deduction that cannot better be learned by empirical observation. The modern square of opposition, then, seems like a way to hypothetically reason absent of all the evidence by making no assertion of exiatential import on universals so that later if any evidence of them is found then they can be dusted off and used and if not they can be permanently shelved except for personal entertainment purposes. Thus modern logic seems to be epistemic rather than physical, but traditional logic is very much *not* hypothetical and is literally physical. Thus, the problem of induction occures when universals have exiatential import and does not occur when universals do not have existential import.
Mathematics, then, beyond peano arithmentic (according to my argument) falls into the hypothetical (fictional) category until or if decisive evidence is found to support its actual existence -- such as if physics finds out if space is discrete or continuous. Fyi, I think Quine was wrong for suggesting that evidence of usefulness is evidence for *existence.* I think that's Quine commiting the fallacy of reification. Imo, only direct hard physical evidence can support the existence of something in reality. I also think Quine was right that no sentence is not subject to revision, I think all things are subject to revision according to the evidence -- including mathematics and logic. Quine was just too much of a coward to say math (beyond peano arithmetic) doesn't necessarily exist.
If space is continuous, then that would be evidence for Aristotelian realism of real analysis. But if space is discrete, then that would cement real analyais as fiction. Since empty space seems to be indistinguishable everywhere. So I guess the take away of all this is that existential import on universals is only sound for indistinguishable things and nothing else. In other words, sublation holds only for indistinguishable things and the problem of induction is just the invalidity of sublation for distinguishable things. Interestingly, sublation is also exactly what's needed for the realism of mathematics (without platonism). So, indistinguishable things are what are necessary for mathematical realism (and this is what platonic forms *are,* but as a nominalist I think anything nonphysical is fake. Thus, actual realism requires actual indistinguishable things like electrons and possibly empty space).