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No, there's no mention of Peleliu as the unnecessary bloodbath that it was; however, that subject is completely irrelevant to Jon's presentation, and doesn't represent a contradiction to the Nimitzian operating mode as Trent describes it in his presentation. You'd have to watch all of Trent's piece to see why that's so. The short answer is that he's not out to worship at the Nimitz altar; rather, he shows that Nimitz's approach evolved as a complex adaptive system.

That was never an issue. Nagumo made the decision to launch a "grand scale" (meaning two- wave) attack in the 1030- 1100 time- frame. See the Nagumo Report.

Three of the carriers each had approximately 20 aircraft on their flight decks. Only one (Akagi) still had all of her attack aircraft in her hangars- and she had 6 zeros at the fantail in the process of taking off. See the USSBS statements of Soryu's executive officer and Kaga's air officer. The brief 20- minute time gap between the end of the dive bomber attack and the beginning of launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike- and the last landing time of aircraft on her flight deck- shows conclusively that Hiryu's first wave strike was also on her flight deck when the dive bomber attack began.

@manilajohn0182 I don't believe that, not even for a minute. Sounds like made up BS to me. Japanese XO's telling somebody something doesn't mean it's true.

@@kennethdeanmiller7324 Okay, if you don't want to believe the statements of officers whose primary responsibility involved knowing the status of their ship's air group, then don't. Just know that their statements mesh exactly with the after- action reports of both McClusky and Shumway, and that their primary source (Senshi Sosho) is not the official history that they claim it to be. Know also that the two authors left those USSBS statements out of their book, and that those statements knock the bottom out from under the central revelation of their book. Know also that the two authors interviewed former pilots who were in their 70s and 80s (and a couple in their 90s, I believe)- whose primary job did 'not' involve knowing the status of their ship's air group, whose statements were largely conditional, and none of whom provided a time of observation or a point of view of the flight deck. Lastly- know that the two authors passed over in silence the 20- minute gap between the end of the dive bomber attack and the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike- meaning that Hiryu's attack aircraft could not possibly have been in the ship's hangar decks when the dive bomber attack began.

Their work should be read with extreme caution. Their primary source is 'not' the official history which they claim it to be (and it represents the view of Japanese veterans rather than historians anyway), and they omitted key statements from senior Japanese officers aboard the carriers at the battle which directly contradict the central "revelation" in their book. Buyer beware.

@@manilajohn0182 I've read many histories of Midway and have found some enlightening things in this book and with their methodology. I'd need something more than an anonymous TH-cam comment to disparage any "buyer beware" warnings about the book.

@@chipsawdust5816 Okay, here are a few items to start. 1. Their primary source- Senshi Sosho- is 'not' the official Japanese history which they claim it to be. 2. The central 'revelation' of their work- that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began- is false. The claim relies on conditional statements from former Japanese pilots who were in their 80s and even 90s. 3. They ignored after- action report statements of U.S. dive bomber pilots and gunners (from three squadrons aboard two carriers) that Japanese aircraft cluttered the flight decks of Kaga and Soryu, stating that they were telling "lurid tales" for which they can be "forgiven". They suggest that some U.S. pilots and gunners contradicted this when actually, none did. 4. They ignored the USSBS statement from the executive officer of Soryu (Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara) that her first wave strike for the attack on the U.S. carriers was on Soryu's flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked- even though he's repeatedly mentioned in the book. 5. They ignored the USSBS statement from Kaga's air officer (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai) that Kaga had about 30 aircraft in her hangars, 6 fighters in the air, and the rest (about 20+ aircraft) on her flight deck when the ship was attacked- even though he's repeatedly mentioned in the book. 6. The gloss over in silence the short 20- minute gap between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the beginning of the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory attack on the U.S. carriers because the authors’ own criteria for spotting and launching a strike shows that Hiryu’s strike had to have been on her flight deck when the dive bomber attack began. 7. They state that repeated U.S. attacks and the rearming and launching of Japanese CAP fighters prevented the Japanese from spotting a strike in the early morning. In fact, the Naguno report makes clear that the Japanese planned a “grand scale” (two- wave) strike to be launched in the 1030- 1100 time frame. Additionally, both photographic and filmed interview evidence shows that the Japanese could and often did launch CAP fighters from abreast carriers’ islands. 8. They present as a fact that Yamamoto ordered Nagumo to retain half of his aircraft in reserve. In fact, this is a claim from ‘one’ man- who was a former member of Yamamoto’s staff. No evidence exists to support this claim.

Mitscher believed that the Japanese had split their force into two task groups. He was so firmly convinced of that fiction that he ordered the "flight to nowhere", in direct contradiction of his orders. Then he falsified his After Action Report to cover his ayuss. I think Nimitz knew that Mitscher was being "economical with the truth" in his AAR, so he unplugged him from active command of any carrier group until 1944, where he redeemed himself.

On "Battle 360" they show where USS Enterprise uses 9-10 torpedo planes to attack Japanese merchant ships at Kwajalen(spelling idk??)Harbor & NONE of their torpedoes exploded. And that is previous to Midway, I do believe. At that Harbor a Scout/dive bomber hit a merchant tanker in the channel leaving the lagoon. It trapped the other ships in the lagoon. And NONE of the torpedoes sent after these "sitting ducks" exploded. And they had to send dive bombers to do the job instead. Which leads me to think that at Midway they should have NEVER sent their torpedo planes towards the Japanese. That it was basically SUICIDE! And that's why Hornets air group had the infamous "flight to no where" MAYBE. Or at least part of their torpedo planes!

The answer to that is Senshi Sosho.

@@manilajohn0182 Please Clarify.

Senshi Sosho- the authors' primary source- is 'not' the official history that the authors claim it to be. The 102- volume series generally represents the view not of Japanese historians, but of Japanese veterans (a number of them worked on the series). A tendency in the series is to avoid that which might smear the officer corps of the Imperial Army or Navy. Regarding Midway for example, much of the responsibility for the defeat at Midway is placed onto the shoulders of a petty officer, while the fact that Japanese fighter exhibited poor aerial discipline and left the air above their carriers wide open to a dive bomber attack is glossed over. The reality is that the Japanese were overconfident and attempted too much with too few aircraft (the squadrons aboard the carriers were operating at from 10- 20% under authorized strength, and the ships carried no reserve aircraft). These are some of the likely reasons why the series was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese government. Additionally, the authors left out statements from the Executive officer of Soryu and the Air officer of Kaga which directly contradict their claim that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began (the former stated that the ship's strike of 21 aircraft was on the flight deck awaiting the order to launch, while the latter stated that the ship had what amounted to approximately 20 aircraft on her flight deck. They also pass over in silence the short 20- minute time gap between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the beginning of the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike at 1050 on the U.S. carriers- which makes it clear that Hiryu's attack aircraft could not possibly have been in the ship's hangars. Lastly, the authors never provided any evidence that Fuchida was lying. He was actually a prime candidate for PTSD, as his personal memoirs contain a number of errors of no historical significance at all- and Lt. Best corroborated much of Fuchida's statements regarding the U.S. attack on Akagi anyway. A likely reason why some Japanese don't like Fuchida is that he "slept with the enemy". He left Japan, moved to the U.S., and adopted Christianity after the war- so many Japanese likely see him as a turncoat of sorts. The work has a great deal of information regarding the details of Japanese carrier operations which can't be found in any other single volume- but the author's analysis of the battle is greatly flawed. The authors did establish however, that there was no strike 5 minutes away from launch. Genda stated postwar that they were about 15 minutes out- and based on performance of Japanese flight deck crews in early 1942, they were likely half an hour out at least. The aircraft of CarDiv 2 were ready for launch (they had no torpedo rearming issue), Kaga had approximately 20 of her 27- aircraft strike on her flight deck but with few if any spotted, and all of Akagi's strike aircraft were in her hangars. Cheers...

@@manilajohn0182 Interesting points. Thanks for the info. Over confidence or Victory Disease, was one of the final conclusions the IJN General Staffs conclusions why the defeat at the battle occurred. Also, as Fuchida mentions, many of the Pilots were suffering from Combat exhaustion, which would be understandable considering they had been through extensive operations in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia region, which I also believe led to the lack of CAP discipline by the pilots. As for the below authorized strength levels of the Carrier squadrons, that is new to me, thanks for that. I suspect that was the case both because of extensive operational history, I mentioned in the previous paragraph, and the IJN's policy with regards to keeping squadrons and pilots assigned to the same carrier, and the slow replacement of both planes and pilots to those squadrons. As for the rest of your comment, I agree with your assessment of the book.

@@coleparker You're welcome. The difference in individual squadron strengths between Pearl Harbor and Midway was small in number, but the percentage is accurate. No reserve aircraft for the squadrons was significant however, because of the different procedure for repairing damaged aircraft in the Imperial Navy.

His definition of carrier “dominance” is that those carriers are used as “offensive” weapons. Lead strike approach. What you are describing with the two mid size Aleutian carriers is a “support” role. You even label it Carrier Protection Force. And again why are you taking a close minded presentation with your suggestions. Ryujo and Junyo and the light carriers Zuiho and Hosho were not exactly carrying the proper planes as a “protection” force. It’s clearly obvious you saw my other reply to you but for whatever reason this channel chose to hide it. Now you better understand what the US Naval War College stated. While they are only disclosing the better usage of surface ships from the get go others have to simply understand in how the IJN could have devised a much better battle plan for Midway. Had the surface ships been put up front in various task forces and then had the carriers initially as a “protection” force then the IJN would have changed the plane mixture and this would have allowed more planes overall per carrier. I’ll continue further in a separate comment to better explain.

Before continuing, did you watch the vid from Brighten Enlightenment. Do you think Parshall himself has watched it. I find it amazing that the vid has been out there for nearly 15 years and it doesn’t have much views but yet it’s a declassified film from the US Naval War College. So now back to the details related to the IJN carriers. Fighter planes are smaller and lighter than bomber planes. Less bombers means less bombs to carry also. Instead of 2/3 bombers just flip it where its 2/3 fighters for all 4 main carriers or perhaps just 2. There are endless combinations. Example: Akagi and Kaga could have been kept 2/3 bombers. Hiryu and Soryu switched to 2/3 fighter planes and Zuiho and Hosho done as the same. Or another option was to keep the 4 main carriers as 2/3 bombers but decide to bring Zuikaku and load her with all fighter planes or 2/3. The IJN could have still attacked the Aleutians but waited until after they took Midway and finished off the US Task Force. The bottom line is that the IJN had 9 carriers available along with 11 battleships, 22 cruisers and 64 destroyers. It don’t really matter what the US had because whatever it was it would be a lot smaller than what the IJN had. Everybody knew it. One war/battle strategy is look big but in reality small or look small but in reality big. The latter was the ticket for the IJN at Midway. Out of all the IJN vessels, one force which could have been assembled is an IJN “Expedition” Force. Their mission is to locate the enemy vessels which should be close by to Midway. This force is necessary to engage in vessel vs vessel combat. It has to be a fast “mobile” force with carrier support/CAP but it also has to have some “range/distance”. So instead of the Kido Butai which is Mobile Force consisting of 4 main carriers, it only has two which are Junyo and Ryujo. That’s around 90 planes. One fast Kongo class battleship plus 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers with subs up front. A separate carrier support trail force can be provided 100 miles back. Akagi and Kaga. The “Main” Force can be the Midway Atoll attack force. There is a night and day force. The night force approaches Midway at night. The remaining 3 Kongo class fast battleships along with Battleship Yamato shell Midway at night. The other 6 battleships are used in reserve when no threat of CAP exists. Carriers Zuikaku, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuiho, and Hosho provide CAP for the surface ships. So explain what the US carrier planes do. All they know is that they spotted the alt “Main” Force one day earlier. They didn’t expect the attack to open at night. Even when the US carrier planes launch the first body of vessels they would spot is the lead expedition force which has Carriers Junyo and Ryujo. It’s the US torpedo planes also. They would no doubt go after the expedition force. But waves of IJN fighter planes come in from Akagi and Kaga. She’s armed 2/3 fighter planes. Now the IJN knows the US carriers are close by. Please note the US Midway planes were taken out by the battleships shelling. So as more US carrier planes launch where would they go. They know about the expedition force and know Midway is being shelled by battleships. The US doesn’t know where the IJN main carriers are other than they must be further west behind what they know/seen. Battle of Cora Sea should have taught the IJN a valuable lesson. US anti aircraft fire is good. It was even described as such by the IJN pilots and thus the new strategy should have been where fast surface ships chase down “wounded” US carriers. Bombers from Ryujo and Junyo would have been the first wave. Next would have been the much larger 2nd wave from Akagi and Kaga. All 3 US carriers would have been founded and hit. All would have slowed to 20 knots at best. The IJN destroyers and cruisers could do 35-36 knots. Even the Kongo class battleships could do 30 knots. The IJN planes would have bombed the US carriers and pushed them west on a collision course with the IJN vessels. The IJN long lance torpedos probably would have finished off the US Task Force.

@@f430ferrari5 The Aleutian Carriers were in the Offensive Roles as would have been the Zuiho. The downside of the three carriers would have been slow speed for the Ryujo and Junyo and limited Airplane capacity for all three. That is why I put them in the support role for a theoretical second strike. In fact, Yamamoto did recall the two Aleutian Carriers to protect the fleet. As for Hosho, its primary mission was anti submarine protection. But lets take a second point. Nagumo was in a tough decision making situation, especially since he was not a Carrier man per se. As you know, his group was tasked with both reducing Midway's Air Force and other defenses, with the idea of destroying the US Navy when it came out. This forced Nagumo to divide his operational air fleet, so that he could achieve the two objectives in one day if it should happen. Now both know that intelligence failure, and indecision at a critical moment cost the Japanese Navy the victory. My contention is that since Yamamoto's primary objective was to destroy the American fleet, he should have stress that to Nagumo who could have acted accordingly. Second, Yamamoto could have included the three Carriers I mentioned to attack the Midway defenses, while leaving the 4 fleet Carriers free to roam and seek out the USN Carriers.

@@coleparker you continually demonstrate you can’t think outside of the box. You conveniently do so because in your biased mindset you can’t accept the IJN winning at Midway. This is despite the massive vessel advantage the IJN had over the US at Midway. And you’re wrong about primary objective because the American fleet may not show up. The “goal” was to destroy the American Fleet but the only known objective since Midway Atoll can’t move is capture it or at least attempt to do so and see if this lures in the American fleet. That is why I present to you the alt scenario “Expedition” Force. It’s small enough in size to lure the American fleet into battle. I am not sure why you repeat what I already know and have been trying to tell others. This is why the IJN battle plan for Midway was flawed. Yamamoto blew it not Nagumo. Had the Main Force which included battleships taken out Midway then the IJN Carrier Force could still serve two roles but one is supporting which is CAP. The other of course is aerial bombing the US carriers to at least slow them down until the IJN fast vessels can catch up. Think of the positioning. The Expedition Force would have been 100 miles non top of Midway and heading east. Point Luck was 300 miles NE of Midway and the US Task Force was well north west of Pearl Harbor. And no I don’t agree that any carrier planes are dedicated to initial bombing of Midway. That’s what the surface ships are for. The IJN carriers are needed for CAP. The US carrier pilots are now in the dilemma as to whom to go after. Battleships or “look” for carriers. The IJN fighter pilots are to take out as many US planes as possible. Just look at it this way: 1. Akagi 91 66+25 spare 2. Kaga 90 72+18 spare 3. Hiryu 73 4. Soryu 72 5. Zuikaku 84 6. Junyo 45 7. Ryujo 45 8. Zuiho 30 9. Hosho 15 In order or “maximize” the capacity more fighter planes were necessary. That’s why the 2/3 fighter plane mixture overall was necessary. Safe distance was also necessary so the planes could launch and provide CAP. Do the math. That’s 545 planes. 2/3 fighters equals 360 fighter planes. Hosho could only carry up to 15 A5M’s but they were good enough to shoot down 3 SBD dive bombers in Feb 1942 in the Marshall Island battle. The main purpose of the battleship shelling on Midway is to ensure no US planes can take off or land on it. Neutralizing it or softening it up for troop invasion is just gravy at this point of the battle. Your flawed approach is that you’re risking 4 fleet carriers to roam and seek out US carriers. That didn’t need to happen and you’re risking the 4 IJN carriers to attack which is exactly what happened. The alt plan only has Junyo and Ryujo at risk. The IJN bomber planes would eventually catch up to Task Force 16 and 17 no matter where they are positioned. Most understand that the US very well could have lost at Midway had the IJN utilized the right battle plan. Remember. What is next if that occurred. There are no battles down south. The IJN has captured Midway and they may have used their carrier bomber planes to hit certain isolated spots but continuous shelling would have take place day and night to ensure easier take over of the Atoll. Please note that any invasion/occupation force would have been further west at a safe distance until victory was ensured. So timing wise this works out. They key now is “patrolling” Midway and with what. The IJN had around 30 oil tankers of which around at least 16 were Kawasaki Fleet oilers which meant they had decent speed and could refuel vessels at sea. The IJN already had Truk and Wake Island. The IJN already had a supply line running and with the IJN now having Midway it was impossible for any US subs to travel down south. So the Battle of Hawaii is now looming. Remember that Shokaku was repaired by July 1942. Carrier Hiyo was completed also. 53 planes. So now the IJN has 11 carriers plus 3 escort carriers to move planes on to Midway. Medium range bombers. Battleship Musashi was completed in August 1942. So why would the IJN change any strategy at this point. Just lead with the surface ships with subs out front. Carriers again behind. Are you going to claim Hawaii can be defended. If yes then explain in detail how. Which vessels. The US doesn’t have much left in 1942. This is why the war lasted until 1945. Yes the US was furiously trying to build vessels but only destroyers were being pumped out and those were dedicated to the Atlantic to deal with the German U-boats. We should all just be happy that the IJN blew it at Midway. There is a reason why it’s called the Miracle at Midway.

@@f430ferrari5 And I am totally amazed how you have misinterpreted my comment. I am saying that IJN could have won the battle of Midway even with the sinking of 4 carriers. My Comment was also pointing out the flaws in the initial strategy and tactics by Yamamoto and Nagumo, which could have been negated by some of the proposed actions that I mentioned. As for your other points, about the Defense of Hawaii and a theoretical attack on it by the IJN. The big flaw in their Capture of Midway, would have been to support the Island Garrison, which even the Japanese general Naval staff, was doubtful it could do, Given the islands Proximity to Bombers from Hawaii as well as submarine Attacks etc, and the arrival of sections of the Atlantic Fleet, and battleships still on the West coast. Also do not forget that the USN and USAAF had been training pilots since 1940. As for the War lasting Until 1945, that was primarily due to the Germany first Policy, which prioritized material being sent to North Africa and Europe.

According to his account, he climbed out of sick bay because he didn't want to be cooped up

Fuchida wasn't lying, and a careful reading of their work will reveal that the authors never presented any evidence that he actually was. As his personal memoirs contain a number of errors of no historical consequence whatsoever, a solid case can be made that Fuchida was suffering from PTSD (a.k.a. shell shock or battle fatigue) and conflated the launch of two CAP sections with the launch of the strike which he knew was being prepared). His statement regarding the attack on Akagi is in fact partially accurate. He correctly recorded the (unusual) number of aircraft (3) which attacked Akagi, the number of hits which the Japanese recorded, and the fact that A6Ms were launching from the ship (one of which was seen by Lt. Best through his bombsight). It's worth pointing out that Senshi Sosho (the author's primary source) is 'not' the official history which they claim it to be (it predominantly represents the viewpoint of Japanese veterans, and not historians), and that "Japanese sources" do not universally support the authors' contention that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began. In fact the senior surviving officers of both Kaga and Soryu (whose jobs involved actually knowing the status of the ship's aircraft) both directly contradict this. They state that Kaga had approximately 20 aircraft on the flight deck in the process of being spotted and that Soryu's strike was awaiting the order to launch. Lastly, the short time gap of 20 minutes between the end of the dive- bombing attack and the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike shows clearly enough that Hiryu's strike was likewise on her flight deck awaiting the order to launch.

I have seen both; the 1970s one when it first came out (that is how old I am). Just take these into account when you see the earlier one; first there was no CGI back then, so much of the film relied on stock footage from earlier movies and thus there are a lot of plane inaccuracies. Second, as Charlton Heston states; a number of the actual participants were still alive when they made the movie, so they had to be careful in how they portray them, and last they had to make a fictional backstory to keep the movie entertaining.