When you are so German, you change the pronounciation of GroNaBo to GröNaBo... *If you enjoyed this video, please support upcoming projects here* www.patreon.com/join/Bismarck
Great video. History can be both simple and complex when you start looking carefully and deeply at a particular topic. Much of modern history is shaped by mere several pages of papers like a treaty or a military assessment.
@Jonathan Perry Sir B. H. Liddell Hart said the Germans didn't have enough fuel to power their existing machinery, much less four engined bombers. Good job.
They turned out to be right to use short range bombers because bombing beyond fighter range turned out to be a mistake, with the possible exception of the Mosquito. Long range bombing only became effective with the deployment of good, long range fighters, which the Germans didn't have.
@Jonathan Perry The ability to replace bombs with fuel bladders usually makes heavy bombers long range, but heavy, tactical, short range, carpet bombing under fighter escort had some success. My point is that it was usually pointless to try to bomb beyond fighter range and the Germans were right not to try much and not to deploy bombers designed to do the nearly impossible.
"The difficult relationship that Germany has with France in the 1920's.... and of course the 1930's... and it actually didn't get much better after that either..." DRY HUMOUR IS BEST HUMOUR.
@@mortkebab2849 Yes it was it.made Germany elect an Austrian born Chancellor. But thank God he was an idiot and didn't listen to his General s who knew how to wage War.
@@mortkebab2849 Better their woman crying over their body than mine over my body. Only the good die Young I want to live for ever. If not then put on my Stone " I came and I went died in the saddle".
The very fact you discussed WW1 and the interbellum period before NASDP (Nazi) took power is massively critical to explaining why this happened. For some silly reason almost all books on Luftwaffe seem to start in 1933, with the LW to seeming appear out of thin air, when in fact Germany had a very real secret air force. What I found most striking is in 1920's Germany saw France (no surprise) and Poland and Czechoslovakia (both surprise) as their greatest threats. Still, heavy bombers where surprisingly common and well known during this time, even in Germany as research efforts. A Thumbs up!
Also when you watch Gregs Airplanes and Automobiles Channel he talks about the up into the thirties all nations shared aeronautical research and all those NACA airwings where known to every avation nation.
Poland was a de facto dictatorship and as a continuation of their war of independence they led several aggressive and expansionist campaigns to gain land they wanted, including against Czechoslovakia and USSR, so they were back then seen as a potent threat to any country around them. It is only postwar myth that has them being the little innocent country between two tyrants.
@@bofoenss8393 also, if you just look at polish history... Polish people spent a lot of time beating the living shit out of anyone they deemed their enemy. That's why Stalin hated them so much. They beat the shit out of him.
@@bofoenss8393 you are forgetting that there was continuous clashes against Germany immediately after the 1st WW by Poland developing a deep hatred against this country. Those clashes forced to permit irregular paramilitary military forces, namely the various right-wing Freikorps composed of veterans of the war which also Röhm came from that will create the SA infamously called the Brownshirts, all this to defend the borders against the Polish but they unwittingly created the basis of the nazi power. In truth Poland was hated by all the neighbouring countries....
Simple. They did not envision a long drawn out campaign where a strategic long range bombing campaign was needed. They also did not have the fuel to supply such a force. The Luftwaffe did not even have the needed transport planes available on the eastern front to supply troops out of reach of the train depots. If they had a long range bomber fleet this would have exacerbated their fuel problem, and would have cut into transport plane production. The entire Third Reich was already at a point of shortage in food, fuel, etc and having a strategic bomber force would have been another drain on an already diminishing economic situation. It would have gained them nothing to be able to bomb the factories on the eastern side of the Urals, the Soviets would have taken that into account and just moved them to a point beyond the effective range of those type of bombers. The Luftwaffe did not have the pilots available, ground crew, etc. The whole invisionment of that type of force would have been beyond what they were capable of doing.
Back as far as 1934, they did envision a strategic long-range bombing campaign against the soviet union based on Soviet efforts to relocate industrial production deeper within the country. But their first efforts at prototypes failed for lack of an appropriate engine. Then they built (but horribly mis-designed) the He-177. If the He-177 program had better requirements and a less troubled design history, they would have had a heavy bomber.
That Germany went from having to worry about Belgium and having no air force to fighting the majority of the developed war in like a decade or less is just insane.
Excellent episode. You mentioned Junkers in Sweden, AB Flygindustri. This was in Limhamn, just south of Malmö. After they moved back to Germany, my father "stole" the name for his company. The company was later renamed Malmö Flygindustri, MFI, and was eventually bought by Saab. However there were several Germans working at MFI after the war. One of them was Hans Pancherz. He had been a "Versuchflieger" (roughly a Chief Test Pilot). I grew up knowing him. He was the Chief Test Pilot of the Ju 390, the 6 engine aircraft, that was one of the potential America bombers. He did test flights from Germany to central Africa and back again, nonstop. He actually used one of the life rafts from these aircraft when he fled to Sweden after the war (with the help of a fishing boat, he bribed the crew). He was mentioned by name on another TH-cam channel that he probably flew the Ju 390 to Capetown. America bomber? Still tricky.
Pancherz is famous for the first ejection as a test pilot of an aircraft when the Ju 90/290 he was testing in high speed flutter dive tests started to break up and he needed to get out fast. The Germans had conducted successful flight refuelling experiments in 1939 (between light twin engined aircraft) and again in 1942 when Ju 290 and Ju 252 were used. The Ju 290 and Ju 252 both had a trappoklappe rear loading ramp like a C130 Hercules and so this made it easy to fit the hose and drogue. This is detailed in Manfred Griehls “Luftwaffe over Amerika”. The He 177A1 reconnaissance versions were actually ordered with refueling kits but the aircraft itself was unsatisfactory and the kits put on hold till the aircraft was reliable for the planned 9600km reconnaissance missions. The Schwann Luft radar homing buoys could have been used to organise rendevezvous. The German Hose and drogue System had the receiver with the hose and the tanker aircraft below and behined pumping fuel up to the bomber.
@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs Hi! Thank you for your answer. I am a little unsure on the flutter test. As I remember it was some kind of trial to set a record. Here after, I do not remember the order of filming or timing malfunctioning. Anyway, during these tests on one attempt the filming failed. On another attempt the timing failed. On the last run Hans Pancherz was a bit irritated and went a little to fast or pulled up to hard.... The tail broke of and the aircraft did a bunt (inverted loop). As Hans didn't trust the ejection seat, he had secured it preflight. Beause of the negative G:s the ejection of the seat started. However the sequence was not initiated...... I think Hans told that he thought there was some gas bottle that came loose with the negative Gs. The sequence is: 1. Canopy 2. Steering wheel 3. Seat. Number 1 and 2 did not happen. Hans Panherz landed in a field and was a worn and torn. Here comes the funny part (according to Hans Pancherz): After a while there landed a Fi 156 Storch with a quite fat (dicke Bäuche) military doctor. The doctor wanted Hans to come with them in the Storch. Hans Pancherz was quite beaten up but, not worse than he could assess the fat doctor and pilot plus the tree curtain at the end of the field. He refused to with the Storch. The doctor became angry and treated Hans Pancherz with Iodine on the level that he got some kind of Iodine chock. He then watched the airplane take off and they barely made the tree curtain... maybe 1 meter. In 1945 Hans Pancherz was expected to go through the sound barrier, but that is another story! PS. Hans Pancherz ejection was the second one in the world ever.
@@pineapplethief4418 Hi! Thanks. I sometimes after all these years think that I have to be a little careful with new friends when I tell these history moments. So long time has passed and young ones don't know that much about the war anymore. My point is that it might be easy for someone new to write me off as a "mythomaniac". Told here is only a fraction of what I "sit" on.
@@rudolfabelin383 please write it all down. Who cares if some don't believe you. Your openness may persuade others with similar stories to come forward, or direct someone where to dig for supporting evidence.
Complex reasons basically boils down to two points: 1. They didnt think they would need a Heavy Bomber as they thought strategic bombing was a waste of resources and tactical bombers were a cheaper substitute. 2. Even if they had thought they would need a Heavy Bomber they didnt have the resources in each of aluminium, aircraft engine production, fuel and finance to build a bomber fleet. Each heavy bomber built would have been the equivalent in resources of over half a dozen fighters and they couldnt afford a production rate sufficient to replace losses, never mind later in the war when their transport fleet suffered heavy casualties at Crete and in the supplying of North Africa.
3. Ernst Udet was fixated on the concept of Dive Bombing, so even when the Luftwaffe finally did start trying to develop a heavy long range bomber, it simply had to be capable of dive bombing. One of the many trials and tribulations of the He-177 program. ;)
Perhaps the best observation I've seen so far, conveying the gist of the German air force in ww2: Christoph: "The empirical pattern. repeats itself. The Luftwaffe seeks to destroy the enemy's airforce, and after that it supports the army and only then it attacks the industry and the stockpiles if necessary..." And the principal reason against prioritising strategic bombing: Koehler on L.Dv. 16: "...actions against the enemy's war industry and the supply infrastructure to the front lines could drastically influence the outcome of the war in itself but the resulting impact on the actual fighting (...) would be delayed(!) for too long..."
And during the Battle of Britain, we see the result when the Luftwaffe failed to destroy the enemy air force. Perhaps analogous to the failure in the first World War to break through the Low Countries into France: Both failures leading to extended an extended war of attrition (aerial and ground).
It nearly worked against the USSR, too. In 1941, the LW destroyed thousands upon thousands of Soviet aircraft on the ground and in the air. Unfortunately for them, Soviet leadership had been aware that their airforce was out of date, and had already made considerable progress towards designing, and preparing to build, a new generation of planes, so the considerable efforts and sacrifices of the LW (approx. 10% of the LWs forces on the Eastern Front were lost in the campaign to suppress the Soviet airforce in 1941, and with increasing demand from other fronts for more air support, LW air commitment generally decreased over time in the East - how 'bout dem LW infantry divisions, tho?) were mostly in vain, as the newer stuff the USSR was building was generally superior to the machines that were destroyed in 1941. It's not until 1943 that the Soviet Airforce really gets the upper hand consistently, as 1942 aircraft production was often much lower than it should have been, due to the combined effects of relocating many aircraft factories, and the newer aircraft requiring more skilled (qualitavely AND quantitatively) labour than the USSR had available, and the general downward trend of LW commitment to the East
@@TysoniusRex I think the issue of the Battle of Britain is that it was a fairly new setting and the German assumptions of effect of their air force proved to be wrong. Neither radar antennas nor airstrips could be effectively neutralised, since their repair takes less than expected resources. Assaulting English coast simultaneously with all military assets was probably the only way to win that battle, but it carried unknown risk with it. German air force would have to neutralise RAF, as well as engage the British navy. I suppose this would work, but the losses could be high.
As a student of history, and I have not delved very deeply into aviation history, I have not heard such a deep and comprehensive discourse on Germany's rebuilding of its airforce. I am always impressed with your content.
The presenter does not mention that the Germans did, in fact, develop four-engine long-range bombers during the 1930s, and I am not referring to the Focke-Wulf Fw200, which was really nothing more than a modified commercial airliner. During 1938 the German aircraft industry produced no less than two separate types of four-engine long-range bombers: the Dornier Do19 and Junkers Ju89. Of the two designs the Ju89 was by far the larger, more powerful and more sophisticated design, and far more worthy of further development. Both aircraft were developed at the instigation of General Wever, of whom the presenter makes mention. However, General Wever, who was head of the German Air Ministry, was killed in an air crash in 1936. Wever was replaced at the Air Ministry by Ernst Udet, who was an enthusiastic proponent of dive-bombing and had no interest in large multi-engine bombers. As a result, both the Do18 and the Ju89 were cancelled after their respective prototypes were test-flown in 1938. Of the two aircraft, the Ju89 was developed into the better-known Ju90 long-range commercial airliner, and it's later derivatives. Although only three Ju89 prototypes were ever built, it is interesting to speculate what might have happened if the Luftwaffe had persevered with the development of the Ju89, rather than cancelling it outright in 1938. For instance, it probably would have been a much more formidable maritime patrol bomber than the Fw200.
Was that what they call the "Bomber B" program? I remember hearing about and seeing some grainy photos of prototype bombers. They clearly intended to have newer bombers, but they never materialized. Still, it seemed their biggest problem was providing protective escorts, not the range of the bombers themselves.
Yes. And Ernst Udet didn't hang around too long after the war began. He died in 1940 or '41. It may have been suicide. I don't remember. He was a World War I Ace and was a friend of Eric Brown, the famous pilot and test pilot from the UK. whom he'd inspired to be a pilot, during peacetime.. At the time of his death, Udet wasn't enthusiastic. about how things were heading in Germany.
The Ju89 vs Fw200 comments are interesting. I had a quick and dirty look at the stats for both aircraft. Fw200 had more range but this is for the production version developed into a long range aircraft while the Ju89 were still prototypes. So yeah, a developed Ju89 probably would have made a very good long range maritime aircraft, but only in hindsight. In historical context I don't think anyone would have guessed they would be an need to fly out of occupied French airbases to combat British merchant shipping in the middle of the Atlantic. But yes, some good points :)
Probably nothing would happen. As is mentioned in the video, the problem was both political and doctrinal. This permeates through entire German Armed forces from that era. Germany didn’t built an army for conquest of Europe. It built a light, mobile force who’s goal was to rapidly overwhelm and defeat anyone who attempted to invade Germany in a first place. It was then used by Hitler differently and only combination of actual German tactical brilliance, lack thereof on the Allied side and some other (mostly political) factors lead to it’s massive success in the opening stages of the war. But as soon as 1942, it’s actual lack of strategic assets started to show badly.
Maybe I'm just a pedant, but I generally find that very few simple questions have simple answers no matter the topic. Edit: Additionally, focusing your strikes against industry and other logistical targets is only a good strategy if you expect to be able to hold out long enough for the enemy to "wither on the vine." Conversely, the German focus on destruction of the enemy airforce is a good opening gambit that allows your forces more freedom of movement and action. But against a more economically powerful opponent, this initial advantage dwindles with time as they replace losses faster than you can.
I haven’t watch it to the end yet, but it’s Quite a Masterpiece, as always! You and Dr Felton (Mark Felton Productions) Are my Favourite TH-camrs for the Both wars! (And the aftertime) Greetings from Germany!
And I want to Thank you guys, but you don’t Need to Like, i just wanted to say that this Video is/was a Masterpiece (as always) So, no Need to Like Greetings!
Thanks for a great video. There's a great deal in it and I'll have to watch it again. In his autobiography "He-1000" Ernst Heinkel argues that the Treaty of Versailles failed to seriously damage Germany's aeronautical engineering capabilities and its ability to build competitive air frames. The remarkable rejuvenation of its post WW1 industry with aircraft like the Do-X, the Junkers G-38, the Heinkel 70 'Blitz' then the He-111, Dornier 17 /Do-217, Messerschmitt Bf-109 and Bf-110 and the Focke-Wulf FW-200 'Condor' appear to bear this out. (I was surprised that Wever's Do-19 and especially the Ju-89 didn't get a mention in the above discussion - the latter was especially promising and led to the Ju-90/290/390). While developing the He-70 Heinkel did however conclude the Treaty of Versaiilles had indeed compromised Germany's aero engine development and this was one of the reasons he pioneered development of the first jet engines and purpose designed jet (He-78) and liquid fuel rocket (He-76) powered aircraft to fly. It may also explain why the Jumo-222 on which the Bomber-B program was predicated began development in 1937 yet failed to show up until near the end of the war, killing the program. I remain of the view that the principal failings of the Luftwaffe stemmed from RLM and higher mismanagement and not from her aeronautical industry which was remarkably ingenious in many ways. I'll look forward to your video on the sad tale of the Heinkel 177. IMHO it has interesting parallels to the Avro Manchester/Lancaster that illustrate how differently the British and the Germans dealt with failed high powered engine concepts. Had Goering run the British Air Ministry the Lancaster might never have happened. Had he not overseen development of the He-177, Heinkel might have proceeded with his 4 nacelle He-177B / He-277 / He-274 and Germany might have indeed possessed a formidable heavy bomber. But that's another story.
His English is great. French used to be the international language of business and diplomacy, but it's been replaced by English in the last 50 years. So, just like people used to take French in school in many countries, if they were going into international business, diplomacy, or were going to be jet setters hanging out in Nice, France, now they take English instead . But this time, it's not only jet setters, diplomats, and international businessmen, it's part of the standard curriculum in many countries. In fact in some countries, they take 10 years of English. So many TV shows and movies are in English really helps them hone their skill and both understand and use it's idioms, sayings, and slang.
Ah yes. Everyone who you disagree with is illiterate. I thought Republicans were childish with their partisan gobbledygook, but then you just went out and took the cake and ate it, too! Also, nice political comment on a plane channel. I bet you feel like a big boy.
The global super-power that still occupies much of Europe is English-speaking. Hence they typically have great emphasis on learning English so they can simplify communication. Wouldn’t wanna find yourself unable to converse with someone who you’re gonna be seeing every other day, right?
@@lowlandnobleman6746 That's certainly part of it, but English is a requirement in many school curriculums Worldwide. Of course, it has to do w/ the US as a super power, but also goes back to the influence of the British Empire. The attractiveness and proliferation of American culture, through movies, music, and other media contributes as well.
I had forgotten that the Halifax's, (and Sterling's), first flights were 1939 before war broke out. For some reason I never could shake the belief that these aircraft like the Lancaster were completely wartime designs.
The Lancaster itself was actually a development of a 2 engined machine that hit problems, the Avro Manchester, that entered service in 1940. The Rolls Royce Vulture engines had serious reliability issues so a minor redesign was made to incorporate 4 x Merlins and - voila!
Logical, well presented points. Other books I have read indicated the steep hill Germany had to climb financially and in their need to obtain raw materials in the 1930's. Interesting also, your comments that Germany did not immediately consider another conflict with England, or extending to Russia. It makes me think that any conflict involving the United States would therefore have been an even more remote, or even non-existent thought. If this were true, I wonder how such thinking would have been influenced by the fact the the United States in the 1930's did not have a very ambitious military and that many citizens there were leaning toward pacifism, so Germany would not have considered the U.S. a significant threat. Perhaps Germany thought that the strategy they eventually adopted would be enough to succeed in Europe before the U.S. would wake up and become involved. In spite of that, I think it would have been prudent to consider how much industrial potential existed across the ocean and what the implications might be. Other questions come to mind, like whether the allies' Lend-Lease program came as a shock to Germany, if they saw that coming. Also, how did the Germans react to the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor as an impetus for the U.S. to become involved in Europe earlier? Did Germany know Japan was going to do this? A lot of questions.
Hey, glad that you enjoyed it. As for Germany's take on a war with the UK and the Soviet Union, it's worthwhile to differentiate between short term and long-term perspectives, as well as the difference between the military realities and ideological fantasies. It is not a secret that Hitler and Nazi Germany wanted to expand eastwards but if they couldn't defend themselves against their immediate neighbours (i.e. France and Poland), then it makes no sense to plan for a war against the UK or the Soviet Union hence why during the build up, the focus - at least with the Luftwaffe - lay on establishing dominance in the central European area. This also fits into the general German trend of seeing itself as a continental army. As for the German take on the US during that time, I think MHV has an older video that covers part of this here: th-cam.com/video/EnfvGMAPCko/w-d-xo.html
Hilter knew he was going into the USSR, surely long ranger bombers were essential - plethora of 2 engine tactical bombers - zero working 4 engine long range bombers = ....short sighted .. :D
@@RemusKingOfRome So...what does he give up to get those bombers? This is something I frequently see overlooked when people make suggestions about what the Germans "should" have built/built more of. Implicit in their arguments is that whatever this thing is they're supposed to build, it's _in addition_ to what they actually did build, and typically they don't explain where, exactly, the additional resources to do so come from. If you can't figure out how to conjure up extra personnel, materiel, and production capacity, then you have to explain what Germany had to take a pass on so that they _don't_ have available compared to what they historically did. Also what tends to be ignored is the potential opponent's reaction to this change. If Germany suddenly starts the process of building long range bombers in the mid to late 1930s so they have a reasonable number when the war starts, both the UK and Soviet Union are going to take a long, hard look at that. Maybe the reaction to the Czechslovakian situation is different because the UK knows they need to stomp on Hitler _now_ because he's clearly preparing a weapon system that looks suspiciously like one that would carry on what the Germans had been doing in WW1 with zepplins, namely long-range bombing. Perhaps the RAF puts more emphasis on fighters than they did, reassigning resources meant for their own big bombers, and thus can field a larger force that has enough capacity to forward base a significant force in France, which then effects the Luftwaffe's ability to get air dominance in support of the Heer.
@@keith6706 ummmm ..don't build Dornier tactical bombers, they already have Ju88s and He 111s. Use Dornier resources to build 50% of 4 engine long range bombers . use strategic bombers to destroy / paratroop drop on, rail lines from moscow to Ural industry. Or supply German spear heads ?
@@RemusKingOfRome v2 is like 10x more expensive than v1 from research to construction. The damn thing is not interceptable but the cost, labor and effect is far less impactfull than v1s. Tho I do not know the exact reasoning why they choose such decision, we have to remember that we have the knowledge of the outcome of the war and they did not. So the best they can do is to react according to the situation in the field and predict the future using whatever resources they can potentially muster, which is also another rabbit hole if you think about it
Each of the major combatants and technology leaders had their own priorities, much of which was dictated by geography. The Germans had potential enemies on both sides of them - so they concentrated on their Army and designs for quick wars, knocking out one threat so they could swiftly switch to the other. Their Air Force was to destroy the enemy air force - then enable them to use their army to defeat one enemy and then the other. I didn't know it until your video - but - of all of them - the Germans had a more correct understanding of how long it would take to do in an enemy's economy and couldn't wait that long to win. France - with it's Colonies and Italy in the Med. needed a good navy. With Germany to the east - it needed both a good Air Force and a Good Army. It had to put money into all of them - and ended up with mediocre results all around. As Eric said, to late they began to modernize and were desperately trying to buy aircraft but many of their purchases were never deployed before they were over run. IF the Belgians had been an active ally and let the British and French come in and set up - they might have gotten away with it - but Belgium clung to their neutrality, the Germans went through a largely undefended Ardennes and circumvented all the money put into the Maginot Line. Britain - as with France had been traumatized by the losses of the first war. It had the Channel though - and the Best Navy In The World. Strategic Bombers would allow it to hurt an enemy from it's splendid isolation but ... while Fighter Command worked out well - daylight bombing didn't work out well - and thus their design and training in navigation rather than formation flying - made bombing at night the only choice. It wasn't accurate at hitting specific targets - but - it did allow them to hit back ... that and eventually kill a lot of U-Boats. For the Russians ... it's difficult to say what they might have done had not Stalin decapitated their Armed Forces. They did beat up on a lot of small countries and did build massive numbers of planes and tanks but - while they could build things like that - they were hurting in electronics and didn't have the Radios and Radar Britain, Germany and the US had. Because of this - their Command, Control and Communications ... weren't that good. The Italians weren't terrible. Their problem was that technologically they were a little bit behind the Germans and the British and - they paid for it. The Japanese were in a similar position to the Italians technologically. This and a strategic plan of creating a string of Barrier Island Fortresses and Air Bases - dictated that their aircraft be light and have a stunning amount of range. Starting WWII against the Chinese in 1937 they had more combat experience than anyone, a very good Navy (including their Carrier Force) and highly trained personnel. They could not replace any of it to speak of though. The US coming out of the isolation it thought it could afford because of it's two Oceans (and not wishing to participate in yet another of those European squabbles that went back to the Pax Romana) - would not have had a Strategic Bomber force - but - for the fact that Congress had been sold on those long range bombers as a way of defending the nation against any one trying to cross those watery borders. That and an industrial base that let them out produce every one else. Unfortunately their Fighters were somewhat crippled by the Bomber Mafia running their Air Force (who for one thing forbade the development of drop tanks as that would imply that the Bombers needed escorting ...). They also had a good, if inexperienced Navy (with good carrier forces) that was eventually the most powerful armada there ever was. Eh ... that's an extremely simplistic survey of the major combatants and why they were as they were. Just as with Germany - each had it's own history and reasons (good or bad ...) for doing what it did. .
Bob Smith - This is an intriguing summary of the Continental armed service's mind set prior to WW II. It has added a lot to my perspective of what followed.
@Bob Smith Your coverage of the American "Bomber Mafia" and lack of drop tank development for fighters smacks of the TH-cam channel "Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles." He presents very long form presentations on highly technical subjects and I well remember some of his deep dives: the B-17 could carry as many bombs as the Lancaster(!), the P-47 had nearly equal range to the P-51 (with a lot of coverage of drop tank development in that thesis), the fabulous engineering of the FW-190, the advantages the Allies enjoyed due to their plentiful supply of very high octane aviation fuel, the development of turbochargers and superchargers, Merlin vs DB601 development, and so on. Like me, he also has a real soft spot for Alfa Romeo cars. Highly recommended.
Hitler was the strategist with a sick mind, he never planned war against the UK or US. He needed resources that were obtainable in the East, he was comfortable with land warfare and when he miscalculated, pushed too far with Poland before Germany was ready for war and had amazing successes with Blitzkreig, he made many, many bad decisions and ignored the saner military heads. When assailing France, supported by the UK, his Wehrmacht took on a superior force and comprehensively beat them with tactics and combined arms, a new form of warfare. But really, horse-drawn troops and supplies, light tanks against heavy tanks, an amazing victory over stupidity. Hitler expected peace with the UK, things like the airpower battle of Britain were nothing but a negotiating ploy, Hitler never planned an invasion of the UK, he wanted the UK as allies. So land warfare by the German approach was centred on mobility, communication and co-ordination, combined arms of air, artillery, tanks and infantry to bring "immense" firepower at a critical point against a numerically superior and often better equipped force that is badly led. Long range strategic heavy bombers did not feature.
Thank you for clearing up the idea of the "Uralbomber" using Koehler and Hummel's work. It was never certain whether this term was historical for the time or not.
I wonder if there was ever any collaboration on bomber development between the Soviet Union and Germany. The Tupolev TB-1 and TB-3, the primary pre-war Soviet strategic bombers, are heavily based on Junkers construction techniques (especially the corrugated metal skin).
The TB-1 and TB-3 were both created during the era of German-Soviet military cooperation (prior to 1933). They somewhat represent what Germany might have built (especially the TB-1) in that era if they had been allowed to build bombers.
Thank you for another great video Bismarck. The more you look into stuff like this the more apparent it becomes that Germany did not expect the quick victory they had over France and the planners probably thought that a long range strategic bomber would be rather pointless since their current bomber force can hit the French industry. And if France is not defeated: any bomber force would have to brave the patrols of two air forces, the journey over the Channel, the anti air defenses at their target and get back. And good portions of that journey may be without fighter support as the Luffewaffe would have to fight both the French and British Air Forces.
Excellent presentation! It should also be added that because the treaty prevented Germany from building large aircraft they never established the industrial base needed to produce bombers. England and America were both building large passenger carrying aircraft soon after WW1 and thus had an established industrial base to expand into bombers. This base also included ground personnel such as radio operators and mechanics. The science of weather prediction came of age with the advent of oceanic travel. Of extreme importance, was the development of powerful, yet economical engines that could be cheaply manufactured. America had several different companies building planes, engines and parts which were easily expanded for the War.
I love that you not only pride yourself on clear presentation, but also 100% thorough research. I found you a few years ago watching Bo's videos and have been subbed to you since. Keep up the great work Bis!
A hastely take-off in 1936 changed history. The first commander of the german Luftwaffe was General Wever. He was in favour of long range heavy bombers. But on the 3rd of June 1936 he was late for a meeting. As an airforce commander he used to fly his plane himself. But when he took of the plane suddenly rolled on its top and crashed, Wever was killed. The investigation figured out that during the preperation for the take off he missed to unlock the roll-ailerons.
Just want to compliment on the fluency/pronunciation of the English language, really well done. I hope your old English teacher from high school sees this presentation. Awesome topic, well covered, btw, not often touched on.
Very interesting; looking at the perspectives of the time is so important and often ignored. Well done. By the way, although clearly a German speaker, your grasp of idiomatic English is impressive; it is a pleasure to listen to you.
Interesting presentation. What's hard to appreciate about military aviation in the 30s is the speed with which fundamental technologies developed - as there wasn't really a "status quo" to analyze. The XB-17 on paper was a world beater in 1936 - in practice it had to be remade to be a useful weapon - and that was the best of the lot. Most bombers of the mid-30s were dead-ends. But no one really knew that. It wasn't clear at all that fighters would have substantial speed differences over bombers - it was after the Spit and BF-109 were flying by the late 30s. Obviously in a world without radar any bomber force looked dangerous. Especially if you went on the assumption that poison gas would be in the mix for use against civilians (implicit in Mitchell-Douhet was the fragility of political will on the part of the civilian population - an extraordinary error in retrospect). But no one was able to sit down and do a deep analysis of what measures would be required to cripple, much less destroy, a civilian economy. So you can chalk up a lot of the air power nuts enthusiasm as just another attempt to keep armies out of the trenches in a future war. (People like DeGaulle and JFC Fuller thought tank armies would do the trick.) For Germany, the US and to an extent the UK lack of money (or political shackles) actually helped. Countries like Italy and the USSR rearmed too fast leaving them with forces that were "modern" for a war to be fought in 1936-38. (The USSR had the resources to build another military during 1941, but paid a heavy price for having bad weapons & bad men in them.) It was a tricky balance. In retrospect, the French delayed rearmament a year too long. The Brits hit the timing better and put resources into some of the right places, especially fighter command. (The RN did not see the U-boat menace coming because of ASDIC - luckily for them, neither did Germany.) Germany got to pick when to start fighting and had good weapons for a land war and an undoubtedly superior morale/leadership core. Of course economically they were on a shoestring (see Adam Tooze, "Wages of Destruction" for essential details). Isolationism had seriously endangered the US, but the naval lobby and the shock waves of 1940 allowed the US to turn potential power into reality - but probably a year after it should have been done. As far as the LW and strategic bombing goes, it strikes me that Goering had just as much faith in the ability of German bombs to drive England to its knees as the RAF did of their bombers to do the same to Germany. But it really was only a kind of faith. The BoB fit the script to destroying enemy air power first - as outlined above - and that, hopefully, would have been enough to bring down Churchill and trigger a compromise peace without invasion and without city bombing. But when the Blitz began it was very clear very fast that the LW didn't have a clue concerning how many missions, dropping how many bombs would shake the UK much less defeat it. But remember, when the allies began strategic bombing in late 1942 they didn't know either. Eventually strategic bombing was worth the candle against Germany (still wonder if Ike didn't make a serious blunder stopping 8th AF from attacking the Ruhr before D-Day) but it did so only after employing thousands of planes, flying tens of thousands of sorties dropping God-knows how many bombs. The sheer weight of the effort required was simply not anticipated. To appreciate WWII one should always realize how poorly anyone could see the future. That explains why military operations so rarely went "according to plan." It also makes study of that war endlessly fascinating.
Your point about speed is very important. When the Bristol Blenheim first flew, it was the fastest aircraft out there. By the time it entered service it was essentially already obsolete.
The B-17 turned out to be quite useful as a bomber (or "fighter bait" as some more recent historians have contended), but was quite useless for its original mission of sinking ships at sea. Douhet's misunderstanding of political will is hard to grasp considering the experience of the American Civil War. In spite of ample destruction, four years of economic restrictions, an horrendous death toll, and so on, the newly minted nation of "The Confederacy" only surrendered after its capital and the bulk of its land mass had been occupied by the USA. It was the first industrial war with factories, rifles, rifled artillery, armored warships, railroads, and a six month trench warfare campaign in its waning days (Petersburg). Centuries of the rise of nationalism should also have better informed opinions about the durability of the modern nation state. Given the absurd levels of self-sacrifice evidenced on the fighting fronts in World War I, a similar resilience by the civilian populations of those same nations twenty years later should have been only a mild surprise. Ironically, Roosevelt and Churchill's determination to avoid trench warfare on the soil of Europe ended up moved into the skies a few kilometers above the soil of Europe. In "push" after "push" (the Thousand Plane Raid on Cologne, Hamburg Firestorm, Schweinfurt-Regensburg, the "Dambusters", Big Week, etc), the Western Allies sought to outlast their German opponents via "Round the Clock bombing" of German and German-occupied cities. Instead of trenches, the soldiers were confined to aluminum tubes, but the results and casualties were similar. The odds of survival for air crew of both sides were cumulatively small as they dashed through cannon and machine gun fire with a bare minimum of armored protection. As for the "Ural Bomber," it was nearly on par with the Amerika Bomber fantasy. Kiev to Stalingrad (modern Volgograd) is 1200 km, roughly the distance from Yorkshire to Berlin. Kiev to Chelyabinsk (World War II's "Tankograd" that produced an enormous stream of T-34 tanks) is 2400 km or 4800 km round trip, not including any rerouting to avoid flak concentrations or to mislead the Soviet ground controllers. For the British to have attempted something similar in WWII without having face any Treaty of Versailles restrictions, they would have needed the capability of waging a strategic bombing campaign against Soviet targets in the Southern Ukraine; roughly double the range required for bombing Berlin. When you consider the range and logistics involved, the Luftwaffe would have faced the enormous challenges of establishing suitable bases for four-engined bombers in the Ukraine, as well as maintaining their considerable stocks of aircraft, fuel, and bombs. The aircraft would have to have been at least on par with the Boeing B-29 Superfortress given the enormous distance from say Kiev to the Soviet factory cities near the Ural Mountains. Bomb and fuel loads would have been enormous to justify the effort. It's hard to imagine a German fighter aircraft that could have provided such a long-range escort, especially given that Red Air Force squadrons could have harassed their opponents at many points along the bombing routes, pushing up German fuel consumption and thereby reducing effective bombloads. Even after all this effort, at the expense of the Kriegsmarine, the Army's tanks and artillery, and so on, just how effective would bombs delivered by this "Ural Bomber" have been? The Soviets would doubtless have engaged in considerable countermeasures - flak, smoke, fighter interception, deception, searchlights, dispersal, and so on, very much like their German counterparts in the Ruhr Valley. The "Ural Bomber" was a fantasy and German decision makers were fully justified in dropping the idea.
There was a bomber known as the Condor, which had a very long range. Apparently it was somewhat vulnerable, and was used largely in attacking shipping in the North Atlantic, or as reconnaissance of shipping to pass info on to the U-boats.
A friend who was in the Air Force wrote his master's thesis on what if the Allies had used Mosquito bombers instead of heavy bombers to concentrate on more tactical bombing, bombing of supply lines and finished products instead of factories. A Mosquito had only 2 crew members instead of 10 like the B-17 and could out run most German fighters. It was an impressive document and he got his masters.
@@alfnoakes392 One of the things he pointed out is that Mosquitoes were may of wood and there were millions of trees in England and when a 20mm shell hit wood it did not explode.
What is payload between a Mosquito and Liberator,Marador both light bombers and Lancaster and B-17 heavey bombers. Remember we are talking dum bomb not smart bombs with Norton bomb sight.
This gives me an idea for some special episodes. If you think about it, it may be cool to have some episodes where you do these as a War Game report in Alternate Potential History...
The Luftwaffe had to be built from scratch and long range heavy bombers are a huge investment. The need more crew and more engines this would have made the Luftwaffe much smaller in 1939 and the force wouldn't have been able to support the ground forces.
The problem in 1934-35 was a lack of appropriate engine technology in Germany for a heavy bomber. A couple years later, that was solved. But the test results done with heavy bomber prototypes pointed to their limited accuracy as a weapons system and caused the Germans to implement "dive bombing" capacity to make up for it. The "dive bombing" issue lead to delays, mechanical problems and limitations in their "heavy bomber" project (The He 177). There are other considerations. Strategic bombing on the allied side was more of a mixed bag that most people will admit to. It tended not to be all that accurate, it tended to suffer heavy losses without fighter cover and it was expensive in terms of the return on investment. The 1942-43 strategic bombing campaign did not go all that well. Long-range strategic bombing in general never returned the results predicted. And many of the problems in strategic bombing were eventually solved by producing large numbers of the weapons. They made up for the lack of accuracy and the loss rate to bombers by simply throwing more bombers at the problem. They were able to do that because of the resources available to them (Germany didn't have those kind of resources). But if in the long run it was the best use of those resources is an open question.
@chris younts It certainly forced a massive diversion of resources to air defense. Every AA gun barrel was a barrel not used for artillery/AT or on an armoured vehicle. Long-range strategic bombing didn't really limit German operations (shorter range bombing later in the war however did). The oil campaign only started to have an effect in late 1944 when the bombing campaign became less of a long-range strategic bombing and more of a fighter escorted bombing campaign. The biggest anti-oil long-range "strategic" operation was "Operation Tidal Wave" in 1943 against oil production in Romania. 53 out of 162 bombers that reached the target were destroyed. 55 additional bombers were significantly damaged. The bombing campaign overall was absolutely a success. But long-range bombing without fighter escort was more of a mixed bag.
@chris younts Started from zero? What? They stole basically all UK technological progress so far (Churchill was stupid enough to offer all of it unconditionally like a beggar) jumping their research easy 10-20 years, especially on radars and jet engines, then could work on it in peace as Soviets and UK were keeping nazis busy and USA unmolested. Even then germans handed USA their arse so many times despite being massively outnumbered it's not even funny. I even read a memoir from german soldiers stating if US forces weren't commanded by experience-less idiots, but by Soviet officers, they would be in Paris 3 weeks after D-day landing, and on the Rhine by September, the advantage was literally that big...
@chris younts The man responsible for much of what went wrong was General Ira Eaker. He was a fanatic about unescorted daylight bombing. The "stand down" finished him and they finally removed him a couple months later at the end of 1943. And the mission totals were mathematically designed to "use up" the crews. The tour was 25 missions but the average survival rate was 12 missions or less. And right after the propaganda stunt with the Memphis Belle, I believed they raised the mission totals for tours. Things got better for the crews in 1944, but things happened in 1943 that never should have happened. And worst of all, they passed a special law to give Ira Eaker a fourth star in the 1980s. Like alot of bad generals, he never lost his "political" friends in Washington.
Congratulations--you are a good historian and a first-rate teacher. I am a former university professor of history and find these videos a pleasure to watch for your craftsmanship as well as their content.
@Badger WTF? I was simply stating a fact that OPPOSED TO every other AF at the time, the Luftwaffe's primary purpose was to assist their ground forces. Of course they had an immense tactical advantage in 1940 since they were flying out of bases close by. The Spitfire was an interceptor, not a bomber or a strafer. And the RAF was holding them back for defense of Britain
Piston aircraft (especially of this era) I find richly fascinating. More so the diesel. The US had early development of diesel power-plants. The early German ones can be seen on You Tube. The Junkers Jumo 205, 206, 207, & 208s can be identified by the rather tall relatively narrow orientation instead of the round nacelles used interchangeably with gas burners in Ju-86s. It is unfortunate that the Nazis felt a need to destroy most of it's film archives of Luftwaffe although clearly it's commercial fleet was a Luftwaffe masquerading as such. Looking forward to you next video.
Chris i´ve been following you since the time you started as "Bimarck" almost 10 years ago. Being also an old flight sims fan, and WW2 history enthusiast, this is one one my favourite discussions - why the old lame duck 111 remained till the end. It was not for lack of try - Me 264, TA-400, HE 277, Ho 18, who knows what more. Had General Wever not been killed in the mid thirties and perhaps things would have run quite differently. Clearly the German Industry and aviation designers lacked the capacity and knowledge to develop such an aircraft, as they were to poisoned with the obssetion for the tactical role since the very beginning. It was a problem of mentality, and Udet bore is share of guilt, no mistake. He later realized it - i believe that´s the major reason for his suicide. To build heavies Germany needed the Industrial capacity available, wich she never had, then 10 years of aircraft design study - not two our three - and finally testing and trials for at least two years to perfect the weapon. Everything should be ready by 1948, so to speak. Cheers and congrats for your excellent content.
Big and dive are mutually exclusive when it comes to bombers. Coupling two engines to a common propeller system has caused problems for almost a century (the V-22 Osprey has grief (and a number of fatalities) from this). The Manchester bomber had problems at the same time (and the four engines of the Lancaster were the quick and dirty fix).
I think this plane was called Greif (German for Griffin) Or as the German pilots called it "Reichsfeuerzeug" because this plane used to lit up like a christmas tree when you tried to dive bomb (Who exactly came up witht hat idea? This is not Warthunder). On another note Germany had big planes that could operate as long range bombers like the FW-200 but those were only used sparingly and not produced en mass)
Because the Germans had signed up for the Geneva convention where carpet bombing residential areas is utterly forbidden and as Christians the very idea was /is ungodly...instead the NSDAP had battlefield bombers and troop carrier's
Excellent analysis on why Germany never developed a four-engine heavy bomber, great to hear this question answered from a german viewpoint, certainly the best explanation I've heard. Great channel and narrator.
Sorry, but 4 engine aircraft ARE necessarily complicated and difficult to engineer and manufacture. You also have to consider cockpit workflow, durability/reliability, safety from fire, etc. in the deal. More engines = more problems.
Great show, as usual. As a youth I remember reading a quote from a senior WWII Luftwaffe officer. It might have been Goering himself, but it's been decades since so my memory fades. Anyway, he stated that Hitler had asked for an air force to defeat Europe proper and that is what they delivered. The Luftwaffe, as he described it, was a revolutionary weapon based on close coordination with army and green-water naval operations, NOT the long range, heavy lifter required of an invasion of the U.S.S.R. or a sustained attack on Great Britain. As we would say in the USAF, I was in flight line maintenance, 'give us the right tools for the job at hand.' The Luftwaffe bomber fleet WAS the right tool for conquering Poland and Western Europe, anything more was a dangerous gamble.
@@Forodir Nope, the death of the man responsible for strategic bombing and Germany's strategic bomber design and his replacement by someone who required all planes to support ground forces has absolutely nothing relevant to the issue.
@@kamaeq There were a ton of different reasons why the Luftwaffe choose the way it did. Funny enough very well explained in that Video. The doctrine and equipment of the different branches are the collaboration of a lot of people and competing ideas. It is the same with Gen. Guderian is not the one and only guy in germany who shaped the Panzerwaffe. So, yes even if he would stayed in charge the outcome had be the same because of the bigger picture and the german way of wagering a war.
@@ForodirNo, it wouldn't have stayed the same. Look at the US perspective and you see a similar situation. You appeal to Guderian doesn't work because there were multiple generals who also shaped the doctrine. We could start with Rommel and go from there, because you are looking at the field grade officers from WW1 who were now general officers and knew what worked, including not letting the enemy settle into defenses. It wasn't a new thing, the German storm troopers of WW1 used similar tactics, but found it impossible to out march trucks and trains. I've read political, military and economic texts on WW2 from both sides, including both West Point and Annapolis textbooks over the decades and this is one of many key points that led to Allied victory in as short a term as it did. Yes, yes, yes, one can point to many factors, but the one key one that shifted everything was the death of one general who had the ear and trust of Hitler and his replacement being of a totally different mindset. In the end, Germany could have fielded four engine long range bombers, not in the numbers the US did, but enough to change the Battle of Britain. It would have cost them a decent chunk of their aviation resources, but the effectiveness of them would have changed many things, potentially in their favor.
@@kamaeq "You appeal to Guderian doesn't work because there were multiple generals who also shaped the doctrine." So you think the doctrine of the Luftwaffe is the work of one Person? You just don't get it that the Luftwaffe was shaped technological and in doctrine before the Nazis even reached power. There was no changing in Mindset. Maybe you read a lot of text (as I did and still do but don't weirdly brag about), but your conclusions are way off, I really start to think you do not understand these books. The possession and use of long range Bombers would not change the outcome of the Battle of Britain at all. There are other reasons why the Germans lost that battle, but the Bombers were not the problem, with the Airstrips in the Netherlands and Belgium they had enough range. I just hate to see that someone made a very informed and informative Video with a lot of sources and then someone strolled by and push his unsolicited opinion, and it seems that person did not even watch that video before he commented.
The Luftwaffe did build the Ju-290, 4 engine bomber/transport of which had double the range of the He-111 and the prototype Me 264 (V3) of which had great range but handling was in question. Kurt Tank also designed the 6 engine Focke Wulf Ta-400 with 2 Jumo jet engines added for take off but only the model was built but it was intended to be very fast. excellent range and heavy payload.
Actually that would be Leigh Mallory and Douglas Bader during battle of britain, when they experimented with big wings. Keith Park insisted that the 12th group had to intercept and shoot down as many bombers as possible BEFORE they reached his airfields, with 12th group failing to aid in airfield defense several times.
Keith Park was commanding 11th group, though. Leigh-Mallory and Douglas Bader used that defense tactics critics to get rid of Hugh Dowding and Keith Park after the battle of Britain was over.
Little minor of errors, Germany did have a long range bomber, the Condor. The condor was able to carry bombs and able to defend itself, always operated in 1 or 2 they would fly out pass Iceland where they would bomb and attack merchant shipping convoys, they would also send signals out to subs in the area to give the location of the convoy, To help combat this the first world war idea of launching planes of the decks of ships using ski ramps came about, but instead of the seaplanes, Sea hawks was used for one trip to attack the condor/s and then ditch in the sea. Also, military controls on countries did happen, ships was limited, planes etc, just that they were worse for Germany
@@howardchambers9679 nah, everyone knows that after the fall of France bomber command did nothing but sit on its airfields and refuse to fly, it's not like the tactics used by the 8th airforce had been learnt the bloody hard way by bomber command in the early years of the war, and we all know that night raids never made a difference, nor the mossies daylight precision raids. Oh wait.....
This is extraordinarily high quality analysis. To see things in the context of the time at which they occur is vital for a deeper understanding. Thanks for giving so generously.
Hi there 🙂. The Italian's had a three engined bomber. But the Italian's just couldn't build engines of the same quality as the Germans. While four engine bombers were indeed expensive and time consuming to build, three engine bombers wouldn't present such difficulties. And would have given the planes better range, but would it have been enough???
Fantastic research ! I'd say the German air warfare's staff that studied this greatest analytical flaw was that they planned for WWII based on WWI strategies & technologies. Technology was changing rapidly, therefore how an adversary will fight changes as well and add to that new generals now directing the fight as well as a the USA's super massive industrial explosion and the German planners plan doesn't hold up, as Germany found as the Allies bombing campaign shows you can halt Germany's tanks & planes just by taking out ball bearing factories.
A very interesting video, thanks Chris, very thought provoking as to how Germany viewed the long range four engined bomber question. I look forward to the video on the FW200 Condor!
This is the most comprehensive discussion I've seen of the background to Germany's development of essentially only medium bombers. While I have read about the early development of the Ju-88, for example, those other pieces only complement what you provided here. One can clearly understand why Germany had no long range bombers when the Battle of Britain started as a result. Thanks very much!
German bombers had no range. German fighters had no range. Even German tanks had no range and had to pull a fuel trailer behind them. But my PORSCHE 944 had a phenomenal range with a built-in red-light reserve and my von BRAUN shaver goes on forever between recharges...
The first chief of Lutwaffe Walther Wever died in June 1936, he had plans for long range bombers. His successors Jeshconnek and Ernst Udet were infatuated with dive bombers and focused on the development on them and ignored long range bombers. One of Wever's ideas was the "Ural Bomber" and it went to the grave with him! Wever's five points, read them carefully and you see a clear need for a long range bomber: 1. To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets. 2. To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces 3. To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e, armored forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations. 4. To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles 5. To paralyze the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories.
Quality production, thought provoking and well researched. Your ability to pronounce German words and phrases with proper native inflections is an added bonus. On Gregg's excellent channel he doesn't even try instead referring to complex words as, "strange German word." I do have one question though. Why maintain well known German terms in translations to English? It's my understanding that "Luftwaffe" would typically translate to "air force" (just as U-boat, or more properly U-Boot, would translate to submarine). It would seem that to you would set a more scholarly tone if you dispensed with common foreign references and translated all words and names to English. This would place the term Luftwaffe in its proper context, as the German term for Air Force. This is not a criticism as I find your work exceptional. Think it more as an esoteric discussion regarding translation protocol.
When it comes to the pronounciation of German words, I have the advantage that I am German. And we do have many strange words ;) Luftwaffe is retained as such as in my experience this is usually easier for the viewers especially in videos where multiple different countries play a role. Granted, not the case in this particular video.
Mate every one knows the terms the man uses i think u are a bit a knob for that reply .He should just change all the titles of every bit of armary for you to understand . Get a grip ma man ffs.
Proper names are not translated in modern historical works. So for "scholarly tone" you would not translate the names of military arms in general. Though the Japanese often don't seem to be accorded this respect. Ranks and units is something which is questionable either way. Then there is non direct translations. Panzer is not a direct translation of tank (The Germans never disguised them as water tanks). U-boat is English, it is not a direct translation of submarine but an English term for a German submarine. So it is simpler to say "U-boat" than "German submarine". Ironically it is most wrong to have Germans of the time talking about U-boats (it would be U-boot or translated to submarine) but it makes sense for either English speakers of the time or Historians using English after the fact to use the term. Panzershiffe would only lead to confusion if directly translated. Doctrines is another that is questionable. If you just replaced "Schwerpunkt" with its direct translation would you still get the military idea behind it? Of course translation the other way would also get complicated. The Luftwaffe and the Italienische Luftwaffe were fighting the Britische Luftwaffe....
Gotha, Coburg & Saxe are places and was Prince Albert's last name. Also the last name of George V. Anti- German sentiments caused him to take on the alias of Windsor, a castle.
@@leondillon8723 Yes ,Mountbatten sound far more English than Battenburg.Some thought Britain should have been fighting the French and not her natural allies..
Thanks--this is an interesting, useful, informative video. It helps to show how Germany was a prisoner of interwar history as well as tactical doctrine and such. Generally speaking, Germany planned very effectively for wars against France, Poland, and other near neighbors, with close and effective support to land armies from air power. But German bomber types were already stretched to their limits in the Battle of Britain ( as well as fighter types, which also didn't have sufficient operational range or time in the air even for that campaign). Basically, Germany, in turning from successful fights against its immediate neighbors to a much wider, continental war, had a scale problem: the sorts of aircraft types that were quite suitable for fighting France were not sufficient even to take on Britain, let alone to keep control of the Mediterranean region, and especially not to deal with the vast expanses of Russia. So the German inability to successfully bomb Moscow, or especially military buildups east of Moscow, as well as the German inability to supply Stalingrad, were expressions of this fundamental scale problem. Anyway, your very useful video helps to address where this scale problem originated, and why Germany's failure to deal with it earlier was quite sensible in the time before their ambitions grew much too large. [And German pilots and aircraft types did a remarkably good job of trying to compensate for the fact that they were, fundamentally, conceptually inadequate in terms of range and other capacities. Sort of like how the Ju-87 Stuka still managed to do a pretty good job over Russia even after it was very out of date. Sort of reminds me of the Japanese Mitsubishi Zero: very good in 1940 and 1941, still in 1942; having trouble keeping up in 1943, but still effective in the hands of good pilots .... ]
@@kieranh2005 whether it was a converted airliner or not, It was still developed into a 4 engine Long Range Bomber. Many WWII aircraft on both sides were taken from pre war technologies and designs.
+MilitaryAviationHistory *The only operational four-engine bomber the Luftwaffe (DEU) executed under **_Nazionalſozialiſmus_** was the Focke-Wulf 200,* a mailplane-turned-patrol bomber that packed 7.92x57mm machine guns and could carry a two-ton internal stores load of bombs and torpedoes. Ernst Heinkel never got the bugs out of the He 177, and the He 274 didn't get past the wind tunnel prior to the retaking of France.
Germany had a four engine long range bomber. The Focke-Wulf Fw200. They were used primarily sea patrol aircraft. Few were built. It was originally built as airliner but converted for military use.
OP I'm sure you have heard of Walther Wever, an important and influential Luftwaffe General that believed very strongly in 4 engine bombers with long range, and if he'd lived - he was killed in an aircraft crash in 1936 - there might actually have been a strong heavy bomber fleet. By the time Germany realized they needed a whole bunch of them and started trying to rectify the situation it was far too late. When asked the main reason for the Luftwaffe's biggest mistake, Feldmarschall Erhard Milch said "140,000 unbuilt fighter aircraft!"
It should be noted that due to severe technical difficulties with the two linked V12 engines in the wings of the He-177 Grief, there was a proposed redesign with a more coventional wing with two engines per wing side by side. I'm kinda surprised Germany did not use a two engine inline puller-pusher arrangement per wing. This would have provided the four engines and reduced frontal area they were looking for.
Germanyy’s merchant marine kept some sailing ships going through the 20s and into the 30s. I mean big ass sailing ships with no engines even for auxiliary power. It was the Flying P Liners of the Laisez Line. I always wondered if they were, 1) Using this to train young sailors about wind with flight in mind. 2) functioned as a defacto training for the Kreigmarine..in the manner of navies preserving sailing vessels for training cadets. But I could be imagining it all. Because in 1932, some of the ships were sold or stopped service. They mostly carried nitrate from Chile to Europe around Cape Horn.
You might be interested to read Eric Newby's book "The Last Grain Race", which is about sail-powered mechant ships taking grain from Australia to Europe, set just before WW2.
This is a very informative and thought-provoking discussion of the major question. I wonder how the German military experience in Spain influenced their air power decisions? Did it reinforce the idea of tactical bombing, despite the results of the Guernica raid?
Very good arguments and info. I would like to add that it was argued that two engine designs, that were faster than contemporary fighters, like the Do-17 at her time, needed no armor or weapons. Of course with a bomb load they became much slower and vulnerable. Since the Legion Condors success using dive bombing everything had to be a dive bomber, which was the reason the Greif was a two prop machine that was thus so flammable that is was called "Reichsfeuerzeug". Also Göring is belived to have said about building the Luftwaffe: "The Führer won't ask, how big the planes are, he'd only want to know how many." Therefore the political sort of bickering was also a factor.
The Germans didn't even need a long range bomber -- until they invaded the USSR. Even then, no-one, absolutely no-one, comprehended that Stalin had built up a war industry beyond the Urals. Auxiliary fuel tanks would've sufficed for a campaign over Britain. BTW, bombing Britain was not a Long Range project. The Luftwaffe almost got away with using a tactical air force for a strategic aim. Of course, the whole project was doomed from the start. Adolf's ONLY shot at getting Britain out of the war was via Parliament deposing Churchill. Adolf needed to re-create the Gallipoli dynamic -- in North Africa. To pull this off, he needed to entirely drop his Barbarossa fantasy. But, then again, Barbarossa -- himself -- never made it to his objective -- the Holy Land. What a revealing operational name. Barbarossa drowned in a river -- a stream, really. Hitler drowned in the Russian mud -- which killed off his horses -- to go into the bellies of his infantry. After such a loss of mobility, the Heer never could possibly prevail. Of course, his object was criminal, immoral in the extreme. For Adolf didn't intend to conquer territory -- rather he wished to exterminate entire nations. OKH and OKW should've been hanged. Most beat the noose via suicide.
I read that Heinkel found the continuous engine problems with the He177 reason to secretly develop the He177B where a new wing was designed to simply utilise four separate engines. Constant conflicts with the Air Ministry and Goering delayed any real progress on a workable four engined bomber that promised modern performance capabilities until the He274 but, by the time this project began to show promise the war situation had deteriorated to an extent where fighters were needed far more than bombers.
Avro Manchester was a 2 engine bomber, Britain stuck 2 more engines on it, extended the wing, it became the Lancaster, and the rest is history. Meanwhile the germans were doing crap like the the 288 or whatever with the usual over-complex designs with 2 engines in one pod, that failed, but bizarrely the wehrburros always saythe germans were better engineers. Hmm. I'm an engineer and I don't see complex failure > simple success, quite the opposite!
They were good engineers. Too good. They always went to new and fancy invention and did not care about fact that cutting edge technology tends to be unreliable.
Suggestion: how large supplies of 115-145 octane aviation fuel from the US gave the Allies a huge advantage in aero engine performance. Specifically - pre-war fuels chemistry development and refinery investment, and the efforts of Major Jimmy Doolittle.
Walther Wever was killed in a crash 1936 silencing his voice and theories of long range strategic bombing. His 5 points of air strategy were ironically used against Germany by the allies.
I absolutely love your fact-filled discourses on aviation history, especially from a German about Germany's air power of WWII, most of which outperformed American aircraft even early on. Since my youth, and I am 74 yrs old, I have admired German engineering and daring in spite of deeply hating Nazis and what they did to the world. Keep up the good work, I tune you in all the time and envy your linguistic skill. BTW, are you by chance a professor or an engineer?
For those of us who don't recognise the photos at @5:16, we have Giulio Douhet (top right), Amedeo Mecozzi (lower right), Hugh Trenchard, 1st Viscount Trenchard (top left), Sir John Cotesworth Slessor (lower left).
As it happens, I have just finished re-reading my copy of "The Life and Death of the Luftwaffe" by Werner Baumbach. He ended the war (WW2), at the age of 29, as the General of Bombers. In this book he discusses, amongst much else, the question of the lack of German four-engined bombers. His conclusions are the same as those you describe. Thanks for an informative video.
Heard a historian mention that Germany (in WWII) was thinking in terms of 'border' wars, it felt it only had to conquer neighbors so to speak..seems they missed the boat on total war as it was.
The Billy Mitchel bombing of obsolete warships at anchor and not firing back was blown out of proportion by the press then just as the press now. Later in the war of the Pacific, B-17s had a horrible record when attacking fast maneuvering Japanese warships at sea. The only success Army Airforce bombers had was when medium bombers adopted skip bombing techniques against Japanese shipping. Again, not against warships for the most part. Only Navy and Marine divebombers and torpedo bombers could be counted on to attack fast, nimble warships. I think the Germans studied US Navy divebombers before the war and developing the JU-87. It’s interesting to me that the JU-88 was developed to also have dive bombing capability. I know this is off topic of the lack of German development of a long range 4 engine bomber, but you explained that in this video to a degree that I have nothing to add to that subject. Cheers!
Remember that the point of the tests involving Mitchell was to evaluate damage done to such warships by various aircraft bombs. There were supposed to be various pauses for naval personnel to board the target ships and evaluate what the weapons had done, and this did in fact happen on the first day. It was on the second day that Mitchell brought his bombers in lower than specified and dropped a series of 2,000 lb bombs into the water next to the Ostfriesland to warp hull plates and create massive leaks below the waterline. By doing so, he thwarted the final stages of the test but got the "airplanes sinking battleships" headline that he wanted. Also, while the Ostfriesland was an older Helgoland class battleship laid down in 1908, it's a stretch to call it obsolete. The ship was commissioned in August 1911 and sunk less than 10 years later in July 1921, and it had an armored deck 2.5" thick, which was more than sufficient to protect the ship from significant damage from even the 1,000 lb bombs dropped from the altitude Mitchell's force from operating at.
@@kemarisite where did all this lead us? To overconfidence in level, high altitude bombing being able to protect against navies. Even the Prince of Wales and Renown were sunk by land based IJN aircraft among which, were twin engine Betty bombers that trained and were equipped with torpedoes. Those warships had totally inadequate anti air weapons compared with what large equivalent warships were equipped with by mid war. Yes, Mitchel proved what destruction could be caused to anchored warships like at Pearl Harbor, but it was a very different thing to attacking warships at sea.
A very good report. On your site plans you show four steel transmitter aerials 360 feet tall 180 feet apart, in a line. A few hundred metres away there were also four wooden receiver aerials 240 feet in a line. All facing the coast and incoming air attacks. The 3 gaps between the 4 TX or 4 RX towers held arrays of metal antenna dipole and reflector cables.
Vielen Dank! This was so informative! I love when you explained your translation, it is quite helpful for those of us learning the language. Absolutely amazing content from this channel.
When you are so German, you change the pronounciation of GroNaBo to GröNaBo...
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Im swiss with the same problem lol
Great video. History can be both simple and complex when you start looking carefully and deeply at a particular topic. Much of modern history is shaped by mere several pages of papers like a treaty or a military assessment.
@Jonathan Perry Sir B. H. Liddell Hart said the Germans didn't have enough fuel to power their existing machinery, much less four engined bombers. Good job.
They turned out to be right to use short range bombers because bombing beyond fighter range turned out to be a mistake, with the possible exception of the Mosquito. Long range bombing only became effective with the deployment of good, long range fighters, which the Germans didn't have.
@Jonathan Perry The ability to replace bombs with fuel bladders usually makes heavy bombers long range, but heavy, tactical, short range, carpet bombing under fighter escort had some success. My point is that it was usually pointless to try to bomb beyond fighter range and the Germans were right not to try much and not to deploy bombers designed to do the nearly impossible.
"The difficult relationship that Germany has with France in the 1920's.... and of course the 1930's... and it actually didn't get much better after that either..." DRY HUMOUR IS BEST HUMOUR.
So is dry martini with twist whole The Olive.
France was a mistake.
@@mortkebab2849 Yes it was it.made Germany elect an Austrian born Chancellor. But thank God he was an idiot and didn't listen to his General s who knew how to wage War.
@@sammuller8331 So, you're a modern, deracinated, bugman German?
@@mortkebab2849 Better their woman crying over their body than mine over my body. Only the good die Young I want to live for ever. If not then put on my Stone " I came and I went died in the saddle".
The very fact you discussed WW1 and the interbellum period before NASDP (Nazi) took power is massively critical to explaining why this happened. For some silly reason almost all books on Luftwaffe seem to start in 1933, with the LW to seeming appear out of thin air, when in fact Germany had a very real secret air force. What I found most striking is in 1920's Germany saw France (no surprise) and Poland and Czechoslovakia (both surprise) as their greatest threats.
Still, heavy bombers where surprisingly common and well known during this time, even in Germany as research efforts.
A Thumbs up!
Thank you!
Also when you watch Gregs Airplanes and Automobiles Channel he talks about the up into the thirties all nations shared aeronautical research and all those NACA airwings where known to every avation nation.
Poland was a de facto dictatorship and as a continuation of their war of independence they led several aggressive and expansionist campaigns to gain land they wanted, including against Czechoslovakia and USSR, so they were back then seen as a potent threat to any country around them. It is only postwar myth that has them being the little innocent country between two tyrants.
@@bofoenss8393 also, if you just look at polish history... Polish people spent a lot of time beating the living shit out of anyone they deemed their enemy. That's why Stalin hated them so much. They beat the shit out of him.
@@bofoenss8393 you are forgetting that there was continuous clashes against Germany immediately after the 1st WW by Poland developing a deep hatred against this country. Those clashes forced to permit irregular paramilitary military forces, namely the various right-wing Freikorps composed of veterans of the war which also Röhm came from that will create the SA infamously called the Brownshirts, all this to defend the borders against the Polish but they unwittingly created the basis of the nazi power. In truth Poland was hated by all the neighbouring countries....
Simple. They did not envision a long drawn out campaign where a strategic long range bombing campaign was needed. They also did not have the fuel to supply such a force. The Luftwaffe did not even have the needed transport planes available on the eastern front to supply troops out of reach of the train depots. If they had a long range bomber fleet this would have exacerbated their fuel problem, and would have cut into transport plane production. The entire Third Reich was already at a point of shortage in food, fuel, etc and having a strategic bomber force would have been another drain on an already diminishing economic situation. It would have gained them nothing to be able to bomb the factories on the eastern side of the Urals, the Soviets would have taken that into account and just moved them to a point beyond the effective range of those type of bombers. The Luftwaffe did not have the pilots available, ground crew, etc. The whole invisionment of that type of force would have been beyond what they were capable of doing.
You would have thought the Chinese would have been pushing for German to make them one, so they could bomb Japan if it came to war with them.
Back as far as 1934, they did envision a strategic long-range bombing campaign against the soviet union based on Soviet efforts to relocate industrial production deeper within the country. But their first efforts at prototypes failed for lack of an appropriate engine. Then they built (but horribly mis-designed) the He-177. If the He-177 program had better requirements and a less troubled design history, they would have had a heavy bomber.
Marko Uremovic China was at war with Japan from 1936...
Jim Tuner and still no fuel
@@allangibson8494 : No, 1937. Although the Japanese threat to China was apparent from the early 1920’s.
That Germany went from having to worry about Belgium and having no air force to fighting the majority of the developed war in like a decade or less is just insane.
yes. I can pretend to understand the German rational until the start of the Battle of Britain. After that... Not so much.
@@StandbyCymbalist Germany started to wonder where Germany was headed after operation sea lion never came to fruition.
Indecision, is a fate unto itself.
If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.
@@d.t.4523 i never get tired of hearing or seeing that advice whenever i encounter it
@@YoungPadawan85 The songwriter was a smart man! 👍
Excellent episode.
You mentioned Junkers in Sweden, AB Flygindustri. This was in Limhamn, just south of Malmö. After they moved back to Germany, my father "stole" the name for his company. The company was later renamed Malmö Flygindustri, MFI, and was eventually bought by Saab.
However there were several Germans working at MFI after the war. One of them was Hans Pancherz. He had been a "Versuchflieger" (roughly a Chief Test Pilot). I grew up knowing him. He was the Chief Test Pilot of the Ju 390, the 6 engine aircraft, that was one of the potential America bombers. He did test flights from Germany to central Africa and back again, nonstop. He actually used one of the life rafts from these aircraft when he fled to Sweden after the war (with the help of a fishing boat, he bribed the crew). He was mentioned by name on another TH-cam channel that he probably flew the Ju 390 to Capetown. America bomber? Still tricky.
Pancherz is famous for the first ejection as a test pilot of an aircraft when the Ju 90/290 he was testing in high speed flutter dive tests started to break up and he needed to get out fast. The Germans had conducted successful flight refuelling experiments in 1939 (between light twin engined aircraft) and again in 1942 when Ju 290 and Ju 252 were used. The Ju 290 and Ju 252 both had a trappoklappe rear loading ramp like a C130 Hercules and so this made it easy to fit the hose and drogue. This is detailed in Manfred Griehls “Luftwaffe over Amerika”. The He 177A1 reconnaissance versions were actually ordered with refueling kits but the aircraft itself was unsatisfactory and the kits put on hold till the aircraft was reliable for the planned 9600km reconnaissance missions. The Schwann Luft radar homing buoys could have been used to organise rendevezvous. The German Hose and drogue System had the receiver with the hose and the tanker aircraft below and behined pumping fuel up to the bomber.
@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs Hi!
Thank you for your answer. I am a little unsure on the flutter test. As I remember it was some kind of trial to set a record. Here after, I do not remember the order of filming or timing malfunctioning. Anyway, during these tests on one attempt the filming failed. On another attempt the timing failed. On the last run Hans Pancherz was a bit irritated and went a little to fast or pulled up to hard.... The tail broke of and the aircraft did a bunt (inverted loop). As Hans didn't trust the ejection seat, he had secured it preflight. Beause of the negative G:s the ejection of the seat started. However the sequence was not initiated...... I think Hans told that he thought there was some gas bottle that came loose with the negative Gs.
The sequence is:
1. Canopy
2. Steering wheel
3. Seat.
Number 1 and 2 did not happen. Hans Panherz landed in a field and was a worn and torn.
Here comes the funny part (according to Hans Pancherz):
After a while there landed a Fi 156 Storch with a quite fat (dicke Bäuche) military doctor. The doctor wanted Hans to come with them in the Storch. Hans Pancherz was quite beaten up but, not worse than he could assess the fat doctor and pilot plus the tree curtain at the end of the field. He refused to with the Storch. The doctor became angry and treated Hans Pancherz with Iodine on the level that he got some kind of Iodine chock. He then watched the airplane take off and they barely made the tree curtain... maybe 1 meter.
In 1945 Hans Pancherz was expected to go through the sound barrier, but that is another story!
PS. Hans Pancherz ejection was the second one in the world ever.
@@rudolfabelin383 OMG, this is so interesting. Thank you for your comments
@@pineapplethief4418 Hi! Thanks.
I sometimes after all these years think that I have to be a little careful with new friends when I tell these history moments. So long time has passed and young ones don't know that much about the war anymore. My point is that it might be easy for someone new to write me off as a "mythomaniac". Told here is only a fraction of what I "sit" on.
@@rudolfabelin383 please write it all down. Who cares if some don't believe you. Your openness may persuade others with similar stories to come forward, or direct someone where to dig for supporting evidence.
Complex reasons basically boils down to two points:
1. They didnt think they would need a Heavy Bomber as they thought strategic bombing was a waste of resources and tactical bombers were a cheaper substitute.
2. Even if they had thought they would need a Heavy Bomber they didnt have the resources in each of aluminium, aircraft engine production, fuel and finance to build a bomber fleet. Each heavy bomber built would have been the equivalent in resources of over half a dozen fighters and they couldnt afford a production rate sufficient to replace losses, never mind later in the war when their transport fleet suffered heavy casualties at Crete and in the supplying of North Africa.
3. Ernst Udet was fixated on the concept of Dive Bombing, so even when the Luftwaffe finally did start trying to develop a heavy long range bomber, it simply had to be capable of dive bombing. One of the many trials and tribulations of the He-177 program. ;)
Perhaps the best observation I've seen so far, conveying the gist of the German air force in ww2:
Christoph: "The empirical pattern. repeats itself. The Luftwaffe seeks to destroy the enemy's airforce, and after that it supports the army and only then it attacks the industry and the stockpiles if necessary..."
And the principal reason against prioritising strategic bombing:
Koehler on L.Dv. 16: "...actions against the enemy's war industry and the supply infrastructure to the front lines could drastically influence the outcome of the war in itself but the resulting impact on the actual fighting (...) would be delayed(!) for too long..."
And during the Battle of Britain, we see the result when the Luftwaffe failed to destroy the enemy air force. Perhaps analogous to the failure in the first World War to break through the Low Countries into France: Both failures leading to extended an extended war of attrition (aerial and ground).
It nearly worked against the USSR, too. In 1941, the LW destroyed thousands upon thousands of Soviet aircraft on the ground and in the air. Unfortunately for them, Soviet leadership had been aware that their airforce was out of date, and had already made considerable progress towards designing, and preparing to build, a new generation of planes, so the considerable efforts and sacrifices of the LW (approx. 10% of the LWs forces on the Eastern Front were lost in the campaign to suppress the Soviet airforce in 1941, and with increasing demand from other fronts for more air support, LW air commitment generally decreased over time in the East - how 'bout dem LW infantry divisions, tho?) were mostly in vain, as the newer stuff the USSR was building was generally superior to the machines that were destroyed in 1941. It's not until 1943 that the Soviet Airforce really gets the upper hand consistently, as 1942 aircraft production was often much lower than it should have been, due to the combined effects of relocating many aircraft factories, and the newer aircraft requiring more skilled (qualitavely AND quantitatively) labour than the USSR had available, and the general downward trend of LW commitment to the East
@@TysoniusRex I think the issue of the Battle of Britain is that it was a fairly new setting and the German assumptions of effect of their air force proved to be wrong. Neither radar antennas nor airstrips could be effectively neutralised, since their repair takes less than expected resources. Assaulting English coast simultaneously with all military assets was probably the only way to win that battle, but it carried unknown risk with it. German air force would have to neutralise RAF, as well as engage the British navy. I suppose this would work, but the losses could be high.
As a student of history, and I have not delved very deeply into aviation history, I have not heard such a deep and comprehensive discourse on Germany's rebuilding of its airforce. I am always impressed with your content.
Please study more than a whitewashed version of "his story."
@@toolbaggers what
The presenter does not mention that the Germans did, in fact, develop four-engine long-range bombers during the 1930s, and I am not referring to the Focke-Wulf Fw200, which was really nothing more than a modified commercial airliner. During 1938 the German aircraft industry produced no less than two separate types of four-engine long-range bombers: the Dornier Do19 and Junkers Ju89. Of the two designs the Ju89 was by far the larger, more powerful and more sophisticated design, and far more worthy of further development. Both aircraft were developed at the instigation of General Wever, of whom the presenter makes mention. However, General Wever, who was head of the German Air Ministry, was killed in an air crash in 1936. Wever was replaced at the Air Ministry by Ernst Udet, who was an enthusiastic proponent of dive-bombing and had no interest in large multi-engine bombers. As a result, both the Do18 and the Ju89 were cancelled after their respective prototypes were test-flown in 1938. Of the two aircraft, the Ju89 was developed into the better-known Ju90 long-range commercial airliner, and it's later derivatives. Although only three Ju89 prototypes were ever built, it is interesting to speculate what might have happened if the Luftwaffe had persevered with the development of the Ju89, rather than cancelling it outright in 1938. For instance, it probably would have been a much more formidable maritime patrol bomber than the Fw200.
Was that what they call the "Bomber B" program? I remember hearing about and seeing some grainy photos of prototype bombers. They clearly intended to have newer bombers, but they never materialized. Still, it seemed their biggest problem was providing protective escorts, not the range of the bombers themselves.
Yes. And Ernst Udet didn't hang around too long after the war began. He died in 1940 or '41. It may have been suicide. I don't remember. He was a World War I Ace and was a friend of Eric Brown, the famous pilot and test pilot from the UK. whom he'd inspired to be a pilot, during peacetime.. At the time of his death, Udet wasn't enthusiastic. about how things were heading in Germany.
The Ju89 vs Fw200 comments are interesting.
I had a quick and dirty look at the stats for both aircraft. Fw200 had more range but this is for the production version developed into a long range aircraft while the Ju89 were still prototypes.
So yeah, a developed Ju89 probably would have made a very good long range maritime aircraft, but only in hindsight. In historical context I don't think anyone would have guessed they would be an need to fly out of occupied French airbases to combat British merchant shipping in the middle of the Atlantic.
But yes, some good points :)
they might have won the eastern front if they actually had the bombers to bomb soviet supply lines/industry
Probably nothing would happen. As is mentioned in the video, the problem was both political and doctrinal. This permeates through entire German Armed forces from that era. Germany didn’t built an army for conquest of Europe. It built a light, mobile force who’s goal was to rapidly overwhelm and defeat anyone who attempted to invade Germany in a first place. It was then used by Hitler differently and only combination of actual German tactical brilliance, lack thereof on the Allied side and some other (mostly political) factors lead to it’s massive success in the opening stages of the war. But as soon as 1942, it’s actual lack of strategic assets started to show badly.
Maybe I'm just a pedant, but I generally find that very few simple questions have simple answers no matter the topic.
Edit: Additionally, focusing your strikes against industry and other logistical targets is only a good strategy if you expect to be able to hold out long enough for the enemy to "wither on the vine." Conversely, the German focus on destruction of the enemy airforce is a good opening gambit that allows your forces more freedom of movement and action. But against a more economically powerful opponent, this initial advantage dwindles with time as they replace losses faster than you can.
I haven’t watch it to the end yet, but it’s Quite a Masterpiece, as always!
You and Dr Felton (Mark Felton Productions) Are my Favourite TH-camrs for the Both wars! (And the aftertime)
Greetings from Germany!
And I want to Thank you guys, but you don’t Need to Like, i just wanted to say that this Video is/was a Masterpiece (as always)
So, no Need to Like
Greetings!
Thanks for a great video. There's a great deal in it and I'll have to watch it again.
In his autobiography "He-1000" Ernst Heinkel argues that the Treaty of Versailles failed to seriously damage Germany's aeronautical engineering capabilities and its ability to build competitive air frames. The remarkable rejuvenation of its post WW1 industry with aircraft like the Do-X, the Junkers G-38, the Heinkel 70 'Blitz' then the He-111, Dornier 17 /Do-217, Messerschmitt Bf-109 and Bf-110 and the Focke-Wulf FW-200 'Condor' appear to bear this out. (I was surprised that Wever's Do-19 and especially the Ju-89 didn't get a mention in the above discussion - the latter was especially promising and led to the Ju-90/290/390).
While developing the He-70 Heinkel did however conclude the Treaty of Versaiilles had indeed compromised Germany's aero engine development and this was one of the reasons he pioneered development of the first jet engines and purpose designed jet (He-78) and liquid fuel rocket (He-76) powered aircraft to fly. It may also explain why the Jumo-222 on which the Bomber-B program was predicated began development in 1937 yet failed to show up until near the end of the war, killing the program. I remain of the view that the principal failings of the Luftwaffe stemmed from RLM and higher mismanagement and not from her aeronautical industry which was remarkably ingenious in many ways.
I'll look forward to your video on the sad tale of the Heinkel 177. IMHO it has interesting parallels to the Avro Manchester/Lancaster that illustrate how differently the British and the Germans dealt with failed high powered engine concepts. Had Goering run the British Air Ministry the Lancaster might never have happened. Had he not overseen development of the He-177, Heinkel might have proceeded with his 4 nacelle He-177B / He-277 / He-274 and Germany might have indeed possessed a formidable heavy bomber. But that's another story.
I'm astonished by the grasp and liveliness of your English. The accent is there of course, but your vocabulary doesn't limit your expression at all.
His English is great.
French used to be the international language of business and diplomacy, but it's been replaced by English in the last 50 years. So, just like people used to take French in school in many countries, if they were going into international business, diplomacy, or were going to be jet setters hanging out in Nice, France, now they take English instead . But this time, it's not only jet setters, diplomats, and international businessmen, it's part of the standard curriculum in many countries. In fact in some countries, they take 10 years of English. So many TV shows and movies are in English really helps them hone their skill and both understand and use it's idioms, sayings, and slang.
Hell, it's much better than half of the U.S. population. Well, a specific 30% that jabber about "fake news, y'all"! LOL!
Ah yes. Everyone who you disagree with is illiterate. I thought Republicans were childish with their partisan gobbledygook, but then you just went out and took the cake and ate it, too! Also, nice political comment on a plane channel. I bet you feel like a big boy.
The global super-power that still occupies much of Europe is English-speaking. Hence they typically have great emphasis on learning English so they can simplify communication. Wouldn’t wanna find yourself unable to converse with someone who you’re gonna be seeing every other day, right?
@@lowlandnobleman6746 That's certainly part of it, but English is a requirement in many school curriculums Worldwide. Of course, it has to do w/ the US as a super power, but also goes back to the influence of the British Empire. The attractiveness and proliferation of American culture, through movies, music, and other media contributes as well.
I had forgotten that the Halifax's, (and Sterling's), first flights were 1939 before war broke out. For some reason I never could shake the belief that these aircraft like the Lancaster were completely wartime designs.
They were indeed but neither entered service until later - the Stirling in very late 1940 and the Halifax in 1941
The Lancaster itself was actually a development of a 2 engined machine that hit problems, the Avro Manchester, that entered service in 1940. The Rolls Royce Vulture engines had serious reliability issues so a minor redesign was made to incorporate 4 x Merlins and - voila!
Logical, well presented points. Other books I have read indicated the steep hill Germany had to climb financially and in their need to obtain raw materials in the 1930's. Interesting also, your comments that Germany did not immediately consider another conflict with England, or extending to Russia. It makes me think that any conflict involving the United States would therefore have been an even more remote, or even non-existent thought. If this were true, I wonder how such thinking would have been influenced by the fact the the United States in the 1930's did not have a very ambitious military and that many citizens there were leaning toward pacifism, so Germany would not have considered the U.S. a significant threat. Perhaps Germany thought that the strategy they eventually adopted would be enough to succeed in Europe before the U.S. would wake up and become involved. In spite of that, I think it would have been prudent to consider how much industrial potential existed across the ocean and what the implications might be. Other questions come to mind, like whether the allies' Lend-Lease program came as a shock to Germany, if they saw that coming. Also, how did the Germans react to the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor as an impetus for the U.S. to become involved in Europe earlier? Did Germany know Japan was going to do this? A lot of questions.
Hey, glad that you enjoyed it. As for Germany's take on a war with the UK and the Soviet Union, it's worthwhile to differentiate between short term and long-term perspectives, as well as the difference between the military realities and ideological fantasies. It is not a secret that Hitler and Nazi Germany wanted to expand eastwards but if they couldn't defend themselves against their immediate neighbours (i.e. France and Poland), then it makes no sense to plan for a war against the UK or the Soviet Union hence why during the build up, the focus - at least with the Luftwaffe - lay on establishing dominance in the central European area. This also fits into the general German trend of seeing itself as a continental army. As for the German take on the US during that time, I think MHV has an older video that covers part of this here: th-cam.com/video/EnfvGMAPCko/w-d-xo.html
Hilter knew he was going into the USSR, surely long ranger bombers were essential - plethora of 2 engine tactical bombers - zero working 4 engine long range bombers = ....short sighted .. :D
@@RemusKingOfRome So...what does he give up to get those bombers?
This is something I frequently see overlooked when people make suggestions about what the Germans "should" have built/built more of. Implicit in their arguments is that whatever this thing is they're supposed to build, it's _in addition_ to what they actually did build, and typically they don't explain where, exactly, the additional resources to do so come from. If you can't figure out how to conjure up extra personnel, materiel, and production capacity, then you have to explain what Germany had to take a pass on so that they _don't_ have available compared to what they historically did.
Also what tends to be ignored is the potential opponent's reaction to this change. If Germany suddenly starts the process of building long range bombers in the mid to late 1930s so they have a reasonable number when the war starts, both the UK and Soviet Union are going to take a long, hard look at that. Maybe the reaction to the Czechslovakian situation is different because the UK knows they need to stomp on Hitler _now_ because he's clearly preparing a weapon system that looks suspiciously like one that would carry on what the Germans had been doing in WW1 with zepplins, namely long-range bombing. Perhaps the RAF puts more emphasis on fighters than they did, reassigning resources meant for their own big bombers, and thus can field a larger force that has enough capacity to forward base a significant force in France, which then effects the Luftwaffe's ability to get air dominance in support of the Heer.
@@keith6706 ummmm ..don't build Dornier tactical bombers, they already have Ju88s and He 111s. Use Dornier resources to build 50% of 4 engine long range bombers . use strategic bombers to destroy / paratroop drop on, rail lines from moscow to Ural industry. Or supply German spear heads ?
@@RemusKingOfRome v2 is like 10x more expensive than v1 from research to construction. The damn thing is not interceptable but the cost, labor and effect is far less impactfull than v1s.
Tho I do not know the exact reasoning why they choose such decision, we have to remember that we have the knowledge of the outcome of the war and they did not. So the best they can do is to react according to the situation in the field and predict the future using whatever resources they can potentially muster, which is also another rabbit hole if you think about it
Each of the major combatants and technology leaders had their own priorities, much of which was dictated by geography.
The Germans had potential enemies on both sides of them - so they concentrated on their Army and designs for quick wars, knocking out one threat so they could swiftly switch to the other. Their Air Force was to destroy the enemy air force - then enable them to use their army to defeat one enemy and then the other. I didn't know it until your video - but - of all of them - the Germans had a more correct understanding of how long it would take to do in an enemy's economy and couldn't wait that long to win.
France - with it's Colonies and Italy in the Med. needed a good navy. With Germany to the east - it needed both a good Air Force and a Good Army. It had to put money into all of them - and ended up with mediocre results all around. As Eric said, to late they began to modernize and were desperately trying to buy aircraft but many of their purchases were never deployed before they were over run. IF the Belgians had been an active ally and let the British and French come in and set up - they might have gotten away with it - but Belgium clung to their neutrality, the Germans went through a largely undefended Ardennes and circumvented all the money put into the Maginot Line.
Britain - as with France had been traumatized by the losses of the first war. It had the Channel though - and the Best Navy In The World. Strategic Bombers would allow it to hurt an enemy from it's splendid isolation but ... while Fighter Command worked out well - daylight bombing didn't work out well - and thus their design and training in navigation rather than formation flying - made bombing at night the only choice. It wasn't accurate at hitting specific targets - but - it did allow them to hit back ... that and eventually kill a lot of U-Boats.
For the Russians ... it's difficult to say what they might have done had not Stalin decapitated their Armed Forces. They did beat up on a lot of small countries and did build massive numbers of planes and tanks but - while they could build things like that - they were hurting in electronics and didn't have the Radios and Radar Britain, Germany and the US had. Because of this - their Command, Control and Communications ... weren't that good.
The Italians weren't terrible. Their problem was that technologically they were a little bit behind the Germans and the British and - they paid for it.
The Japanese were in a similar position to the Italians technologically. This and a strategic plan of creating a string of Barrier Island Fortresses and Air Bases - dictated that their aircraft be light and have a stunning amount of range. Starting WWII against the Chinese in 1937 they had more combat experience than anyone, a very good Navy (including their Carrier Force) and highly trained personnel. They could not replace any of it to speak of though.
The US coming out of the isolation it thought it could afford because of it's two Oceans (and not wishing to participate in yet another of those European squabbles that went back to the Pax Romana) - would not have had a Strategic Bomber force - but - for the fact that Congress had been sold on those long range bombers as a way of defending the nation against any one trying to cross those watery borders. That and an industrial base that let them out produce every one else. Unfortunately their Fighters were somewhat crippled by the Bomber Mafia running their Air Force (who for one thing forbade the development of drop tanks as that would imply that the Bombers needed escorting ...). They also had a good, if inexperienced Navy (with good carrier forces) that was eventually the most powerful armada there ever was.
Eh ... that's an extremely simplistic survey of the major combatants and why they were as they were. Just as with Germany - each had it's own history and reasons (good or bad ...) for doing what it did.
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To add to my previous post at the bombing of Dresden the RAF dropped 750,000 fire bombs in ten minutes. Not a happy thought.
Simplistic but entertaining...
Bob Smith - This is an intriguing summary of the Continental armed service's mind set prior to WW II. It has added a lot to my perspective of what followed.
@Bob Smith Your coverage of the American "Bomber Mafia" and lack of drop tank development for fighters smacks of the TH-cam channel "Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles." He presents very long form presentations on highly technical subjects and I well remember some of his deep dives: the B-17 could carry as many bombs as the Lancaster(!), the P-47 had nearly equal range to the P-51 (with a lot of coverage of drop tank development in that thesis), the fabulous engineering of the FW-190, the advantages the Allies enjoyed due to their plentiful supply of very high octane aviation fuel, the development of turbochargers and superchargers, Merlin vs DB601 development, and so on. Like me, he also has a real soft spot for Alfa Romeo cars. Highly recommended.
Hitler was the strategist with a sick mind, he never planned war against the UK or US. He needed resources that were obtainable in the East, he was comfortable with land warfare and when he miscalculated, pushed too far with Poland before Germany was ready for war and had amazing successes with Blitzkreig, he made many, many bad decisions and ignored the saner military heads. When assailing France, supported by the UK, his Wehrmacht took on a superior force and comprehensively beat them with tactics and combined arms, a new form of warfare. But really, horse-drawn troops and supplies, light tanks against heavy tanks, an amazing victory over stupidity.
Hitler expected peace with the UK, things like the airpower battle of Britain were nothing but a negotiating ploy, Hitler never planned an invasion of the UK, he wanted the UK as allies.
So land warfare by the German approach was centred on mobility, communication and co-ordination, combined arms of air, artillery, tanks and infantry to bring "immense" firepower at a critical point against a numerically superior and often better equipped force that is badly led.
Long range strategic heavy bombers did not feature.
Thank you for clearing up the idea of the "Uralbomber" using Koehler and Hummel's work. It was never certain whether this term was historical for the time or not.
I wonder if there was ever any collaboration on bomber development between the Soviet Union and Germany. The Tupolev TB-1 and TB-3, the primary pre-war Soviet strategic bombers, are heavily based on Junkers construction techniques (especially the corrugated metal skin).
The TB-1 and TB-3 were both created during the era of German-Soviet military cooperation (prior to 1933). They somewhat represent what Germany might have built (especially the TB-1) in that era if they had been allowed to build bombers.
19:24 there is a phrase usually ascribed to different Soviet generals: "the best air defence is our tanks on their airfields".
Thank you for another great video Bismarck. The more you look into stuff like this the more apparent it becomes that Germany did not expect the quick victory they had over France and the planners probably thought that a long range strategic bomber would be rather pointless since their current bomber force can hit the French industry. And if France is not defeated: any bomber force would have to brave the patrols of two air forces, the journey over the Channel, the anti air defenses at their target and get back. And good portions of that journey may be without fighter support as the Luffewaffe would have to fight both the French and British Air Forces.
Excellent presentation! It should also be added that because the treaty prevented Germany from building large aircraft they never established the industrial base needed to produce bombers. England and America were both building large passenger carrying aircraft soon after WW1 and thus had an established industrial base to expand into bombers. This base also included ground personnel such as radio operators and mechanics. The science of weather prediction came of age with the advent of oceanic travel. Of extreme importance, was the development of powerful, yet economical engines that could be cheaply manufactured. America had several different companies building planes, engines and parts which were easily expanded for the War.
This looks like it will be a great video as always, thank you for posting such high quality content!
Hope you enjoy it!
I love that you not only pride yourself on clear presentation, but also 100% thorough research. I found you a few years ago watching Bo's videos and have been subbed to you since. Keep up the great work Bis!
Hello Chris. You always say hello and no one ever says it back. So, Hello.
R Slikker
Dork
A hastely take-off in 1936 changed history. The first commander of the german Luftwaffe was General Wever. He was in favour of long range heavy bombers. But on the 3rd of June 1936 he was late for a meeting. As an airforce commander he used to fly his plane himself. But when he took of the plane suddenly rolled on its top and crashed, Wever was killed. The investigation figured out that during the preperation for the take off he missed to unlock the roll-ailerons.
Just want to compliment on the fluency/pronunciation of the English language, really well done. I hope your old English teacher from high school sees this presentation.
Awesome topic, well covered, btw, not often touched on.
Very interesting; looking at the perspectives of the time is so important and often ignored. Well done. By the way, although clearly a German speaker, your grasp of idiomatic English is impressive; it is a pleasure to listen to you.
Interesting presentation. What's hard to appreciate about military aviation in the 30s is the speed with which fundamental technologies developed - as there wasn't really a "status quo" to analyze. The XB-17 on paper was a world beater in 1936 - in practice it had to be remade to be a useful weapon - and that was the best of the lot. Most bombers of the mid-30s were dead-ends. But no one really knew that. It wasn't clear at all that fighters would have substantial speed differences over bombers - it was after the Spit and BF-109 were flying by the late 30s. Obviously in a world without radar any bomber force looked dangerous. Especially if you went on the assumption that poison gas would be in the mix for use against civilians (implicit in Mitchell-Douhet was the fragility of political will on the part of the civilian population - an extraordinary error in retrospect). But no one was able to sit down and do a deep analysis of what measures would be required to cripple, much less destroy, a civilian economy. So you can chalk up a lot of the air power nuts enthusiasm as just another attempt to keep armies out of the trenches in a future war. (People like DeGaulle and JFC Fuller thought tank armies would do the trick.)
For Germany, the US and to an extent the UK lack of money (or political shackles) actually helped. Countries like Italy and the USSR rearmed too fast leaving them with forces that were "modern" for a war to be fought in 1936-38. (The USSR had the resources to build another military during 1941, but paid a heavy price for having bad weapons & bad men in them.) It was a tricky balance. In retrospect, the French delayed rearmament a year too long. The Brits hit the timing better and put resources into some of the right places, especially fighter command. (The RN did not see the U-boat menace coming because of ASDIC - luckily for them, neither did Germany.) Germany got to pick when to start fighting and had good weapons for a land war and an undoubtedly superior morale/leadership core. Of course economically they were on a shoestring (see Adam Tooze, "Wages of Destruction" for essential details). Isolationism had seriously endangered the US, but the naval lobby and the shock waves of 1940 allowed the US to turn potential power into reality - but probably a year after it should have been done.
As far as the LW and strategic bombing goes, it strikes me that Goering had just as much faith in the ability of German bombs to drive England to its knees as the RAF did of their bombers to do the same to Germany. But it really was only a kind of faith. The BoB fit the script to destroying enemy air power first - as outlined above - and that, hopefully, would have been enough to bring down Churchill and trigger a compromise peace without invasion and without city bombing. But when the Blitz began it was very clear very fast that the LW didn't have a clue concerning how many missions, dropping how many bombs would shake the UK much less defeat it. But remember, when the allies began strategic bombing in late 1942 they didn't know either. Eventually strategic bombing was worth the candle against Germany (still wonder if Ike didn't make a serious blunder stopping 8th AF from attacking the Ruhr before D-Day) but it did so only after employing thousands of planes, flying tens of thousands of sorties dropping God-knows how many bombs. The sheer weight of the effort required was simply not anticipated. To appreciate WWII one should always realize how poorly anyone could see the future. That explains why military operations so rarely went "according to plan." It also makes study of that war endlessly fascinating.
Your point about speed is very important.
When the Bristol Blenheim first flew, it was the fastest aircraft out there.
By the time it entered service it was essentially already obsolete.
Sparky Puddins in
B
Well said sir. Would you happen to be Mr. Bergerud of Lincoln University?
The B-17 turned out to be quite useful as a bomber (or "fighter bait" as some more recent historians have contended), but was quite useless for its original mission of sinking ships at sea. Douhet's misunderstanding of political will is hard to grasp considering the experience of the American Civil War. In spite of ample destruction, four years of economic restrictions, an horrendous death toll, and so on, the newly minted nation of "The Confederacy" only surrendered after its capital and the bulk of its land mass had been occupied by the USA. It was the first industrial war with factories, rifles, rifled artillery, armored warships, railroads, and a six month trench warfare campaign in its waning days (Petersburg). Centuries of the rise of nationalism should also have better informed opinions about the durability of the modern nation state. Given the absurd levels of self-sacrifice evidenced on the fighting fronts in World War I, a similar resilience by the civilian populations of those same nations twenty years later should have been only a mild surprise.
Ironically, Roosevelt and Churchill's determination to avoid trench warfare on the soil of Europe ended up moved into the skies a few kilometers above the soil of Europe. In "push" after "push" (the Thousand Plane Raid on Cologne, Hamburg Firestorm, Schweinfurt-Regensburg, the "Dambusters", Big Week, etc), the Western Allies sought to outlast their German opponents via "Round the Clock bombing" of German and German-occupied cities. Instead of trenches, the soldiers were confined to aluminum tubes, but the results and casualties were similar. The odds of survival for air crew of both sides were cumulatively small as they dashed through cannon and machine gun fire with a bare minimum of armored protection.
As for the "Ural Bomber," it was nearly on par with the Amerika Bomber fantasy. Kiev to Stalingrad (modern Volgograd) is 1200 km, roughly the distance from Yorkshire to Berlin. Kiev to Chelyabinsk (World War II's "Tankograd" that produced an enormous stream of T-34 tanks) is 2400 km or 4800 km round trip, not including any rerouting to avoid flak concentrations or to mislead the Soviet ground controllers. For the British to have attempted something similar in WWII without having face any Treaty of Versailles restrictions, they would have needed the capability of waging a strategic bombing campaign against Soviet targets in the Southern Ukraine; roughly double the range required for bombing Berlin. When you consider the range and logistics involved, the Luftwaffe would have faced the enormous challenges of establishing suitable bases for four-engined bombers in the Ukraine, as well as maintaining their considerable stocks of aircraft, fuel, and bombs. The aircraft would have to have been at least on par with the Boeing B-29 Superfortress given the enormous distance from say Kiev to the Soviet factory cities near the Ural Mountains. Bomb and fuel loads would have been enormous to justify the effort. It's hard to imagine a German fighter aircraft that could have provided such a long-range escort, especially given that Red Air Force squadrons could have harassed their opponents at many points along the bombing routes, pushing up German fuel consumption and thereby reducing effective bombloads. Even after all this effort, at the expense of the Kriegsmarine, the Army's tanks and artillery, and so on, just how effective would bombs delivered by this "Ural Bomber" have been? The Soviets would doubtless have engaged in considerable countermeasures - flak, smoke, fighter interception, deception, searchlights, dispersal, and so on, very much like their German counterparts in the Ruhr Valley. The "Ural Bomber" was a fantasy and German decision makers were fully justified in dropping the idea.
There was a bomber known as the Condor, which had a very long range. Apparently it was somewhat vulnerable, and was used largely in attacking shipping in the North Atlantic, or as reconnaissance of shipping to pass info on to the U-boats.
A friend who was in the Air Force wrote his master's thesis on what if the Allies had used Mosquito bombers instead of heavy bombers to concentrate on more tactical bombing, bombing of supply lines and finished products instead of factories. A Mosquito had only 2 crew members instead of 10 like the B-17 and could out run most German fighters. It was an impressive document and he got his masters.
That would make Very interesting reading. And a good subject for a Military Aviation History video perhaps ...
@@alfnoakes392 One of the things he pointed out is that Mosquitoes were may of wood and there were millions of trees in England and when a 20mm shell hit wood it did not explode.
What was payload of Nat to B17 or Lancaster . Tracer and incenterammo. Effects of both on wood.
What is payload between a Mosquito and Liberator,Marador both light bombers and Lancaster and B-17 heavey bombers. Remember we are talking dum bomb not smart bombs with Norton bomb sight.
Payload tonnage of bombs carried
This gives me an idea for some special episodes. If you think about it, it may be cool to have some episodes where you do these as a War Game report in Alternate Potential History...
The Luftwaffe had to be built from scratch and long range heavy bombers are a huge investment. The need more crew and more engines this would have made the Luftwaffe much smaller in 1939 and the force wouldn't have been able to support the ground forces.
@Greg nelson The Luftwaffe probably wouldn't have even had the fuel available to sustain long ranger operations either.
The problem in 1934-35 was a lack of appropriate engine technology in Germany for a heavy bomber. A couple years later, that was solved. But the test results done with heavy bomber prototypes pointed to their limited accuracy as a weapons system and caused the Germans to implement "dive bombing" capacity to make up for it. The "dive bombing" issue lead to delays, mechanical problems and limitations in their "heavy bomber" project (The He 177).
There are other considerations. Strategic bombing on the allied side was more of a mixed bag that most people will admit to. It tended not to be all that accurate, it tended to suffer heavy losses without fighter cover and it was expensive in terms of the return on investment. The 1942-43 strategic bombing campaign did not go all that well. Long-range strategic bombing in general never returned the results predicted.
And many of the problems in strategic bombing were eventually solved by producing large numbers of the weapons. They made up for the lack of accuracy and the loss rate to bombers by simply throwing more bombers at the problem. They were able to do that because of the resources available to them (Germany didn't have those kind of resources). But if in the long run it was the best use of those resources is an open question.
@chris younts It certainly forced a massive diversion of resources to air defense. Every AA gun barrel was a barrel not used for artillery/AT or on an armoured vehicle. Long-range strategic bombing didn't really limit German operations (shorter range bombing later in the war however did). The oil campaign only started to have an effect in late 1944 when the bombing campaign became less of a long-range strategic bombing and more of a fighter escorted bombing campaign.
The biggest anti-oil long-range "strategic" operation was "Operation Tidal Wave" in 1943 against oil production in Romania. 53 out of 162 bombers that reached the target were destroyed. 55 additional bombers were significantly damaged.
The bombing campaign overall was absolutely a success. But long-range bombing without fighter escort was more of a mixed bag.
@chris younts Started from zero? What? They stole basically all UK technological progress so far (Churchill was stupid enough to offer all of it unconditionally like a beggar) jumping their research easy 10-20 years, especially on radars and jet engines, then could work on it in peace as Soviets and UK were keeping nazis busy and USA unmolested. Even then germans handed USA their arse so many times despite being massively outnumbered it's not even funny. I even read a memoir from german soldiers stating if US forces weren't commanded by experience-less idiots, but by Soviet officers, they would be in Paris 3 weeks after D-day landing, and on the Rhine by September, the advantage was literally that big...
@chris younts The man responsible for much of what went wrong was General Ira Eaker. He was a fanatic about unescorted daylight bombing. The "stand down" finished him and they finally removed him a couple months later at the end of 1943. And the mission totals were mathematically designed to "use up" the crews. The tour was 25 missions but the average survival rate was 12 missions or less. And right after the propaganda stunt with the Memphis Belle, I believed they raised the mission totals for tours.
Things got better for the crews in 1944, but things happened in 1943 that never should have happened.
And worst of all, they passed a special law to give Ira Eaker a fourth star in the 1980s. Like alot of bad generals, he never lost his "political" friends in Washington.
Congratulations--you are a good historian and a first-rate teacher. I am a former university professor of history and find these videos a pleasure to watch for your craftsmanship as well as their content.
Thank you, Robert
The Luftwaffe was a tactical air force dedicated in supporting the armored spearheads.
Explain Britain
@@davidj.3441 ??? The British had no good ground support tactics in the beginning of WW 2
@Badger WTF? I was simply stating a fact that OPPOSED TO every other AF at the time, the Luftwaffe's primary purpose was to assist their ground forces. Of course they had an immense tactical advantage in 1940 since they were flying out of bases close by. The Spitfire was an interceptor, not a bomber or a strafer. And the RAF was holding them back for defense of Britain
@Badger I think there is a misunderstanding between us.
@@DawnOfTheDead991 the Luftwaffe was supposed to be part of a combined arms offensive (Blitzkrieg) actually
Piston aircraft (especially of this era) I find richly fascinating. More so the diesel. The US had early development of diesel power-plants. The early German ones can be seen on You Tube. The Junkers Jumo 205, 206, 207, & 208s can be identified by the rather tall relatively narrow orientation instead of the round nacelles used interchangeably with gas burners in Ju-86s. It is unfortunate that the Nazis felt a need to destroy most of it's film archives of Luftwaffe although clearly it's commercial fleet was a Luftwaffe masquerading as such. Looking forward to you next video.
I learn more on youtube, than I did in my University.
Chris i´ve been following you since the time you started as "Bimarck" almost 10 years ago. Being also an old flight sims fan, and WW2 history enthusiast, this is one one my favourite discussions - why the old lame duck 111 remained till the end.
It was not for lack of try - Me 264, TA-400, HE 277, Ho 18, who knows what more.
Had General Wever not been killed in the mid thirties and perhaps things would have run quite differently.
Clearly the German Industry and aviation designers lacked the capacity and knowledge to develop such an aircraft, as they were to poisoned with the obssetion for the tactical role since the very beginning. It was a problem of mentality, and Udet bore is share of guilt, no mistake. He later realized it - i believe that´s the major reason for his suicide.
To build heavies Germany needed the Industrial capacity available, wich she never had, then 10 years of aircraft design study - not two our three - and finally testing and trials for at least two years to perfect the weapon.
Everything should be ready by 1948, so to speak.
Cheers and congrats for your excellent content.
"Why did Germany not develop and produce long range strategic bombers?"
HE 177 Grief:*cries in the corner*
A strategic bomber with a lot of mechanical problems and also a dive bomber ???!!!
what the fuck was the luftwaffe thinking
Big and dive are mutually exclusive when it comes to bombers. Coupling two engines to a common propeller system has caused problems for almost a century (the V-22 Osprey has grief (and a number of fatalities) from this).
The Manchester bomber had problems at the same time (and the four engines of the Lancaster were the quick and dirty fix).
Herman Goering is still trying to figure out how to change the spark plugs on the twinned engine.
I think this plane was called Greif (German for Griffin) Or as the German pilots called it "Reichsfeuerzeug" because this plane used to lit up like a christmas tree when you tried to dive bomb (Who exactly came up witht hat idea? This is not Warthunder). On another note Germany had big planes that could operate as long range bombers like the FW-200 but those were only used sparingly and not produced en mass)
Because the Germans had signed up for the Geneva convention where carpet bombing residential areas is utterly forbidden and as Christians the very idea was /is ungodly...instead the NSDAP had battlefield bombers and troop carrier's
Excellent analysis on why Germany never developed a four-engine heavy bomber, great to hear this question answered from a german viewpoint, certainly the best explanation I've heard. Great channel and narrator.
21:58 'Four engines machines made development difficult
*Roy Chadwick entered the chat*
WW I Gotha Giants were 4 engine.
Sorry, but 4 engine aircraft ARE necessarily complicated and difficult to engineer and manufacture. You also have to consider cockpit workflow, durability/reliability, safety from fire, etc. in the deal. More engines = more problems.
Roy Chadwick would have hung himself if he had a boss like Goering.
Great show, as usual. As a youth I remember reading a quote from a senior WWII Luftwaffe officer. It might have been Goering himself, but it's been decades since so my memory fades. Anyway, he stated that Hitler had asked for an air force to defeat Europe proper and that is what they delivered. The Luftwaffe, as he described it, was a revolutionary weapon based on close coordination with army and green-water naval operations, NOT the long range, heavy lifter required of an invasion of the U.S.S.R. or a sustained attack on Great Britain. As we would say in the USAF, I was in flight line maintenance, 'give us the right tools for the job at hand.' The Luftwaffe bomber fleet WAS the right tool for conquering Poland and Western Europe, anything more was a dangerous gamble.
Simple answer. General Walther Wever died in a plane crash and was replaced by Udet.
Simple answers are seldom true, and this is a good example.
@@Forodir Nope, the death of the man responsible for strategic bombing and Germany's strategic bomber design and his replacement by someone who required all planes to support ground forces has absolutely nothing relevant to the issue.
@@kamaeq
There were a ton of different reasons why the Luftwaffe choose the way it did. Funny enough very well explained in that Video. The doctrine and equipment of the different branches are the collaboration of a lot of people and competing ideas. It is the same with Gen. Guderian is not the one and only guy in germany who shaped the Panzerwaffe.
So, yes even if he would stayed in charge the outcome had be the same because of the bigger picture and the german way of wagering a war.
@@ForodirNo, it wouldn't have stayed the same. Look at the US perspective and you see a similar situation.
You appeal to Guderian doesn't work because there were multiple generals who also shaped the doctrine. We could start with Rommel and go from there, because you are looking at the field grade officers from WW1 who were now general officers and knew what worked, including not letting the enemy settle into defenses. It wasn't a new thing, the German storm troopers of WW1 used similar tactics, but found it impossible to out march trucks and trains.
I've read political, military and economic texts on WW2 from both sides, including both West Point and Annapolis textbooks over the decades and this is one of many key points that led to Allied victory in as short a term as it did.
Yes, yes, yes, one can point to many factors, but the one key one that shifted everything was the death of one general who had the ear and trust of Hitler and his replacement being of a totally different mindset. In the end, Germany could have fielded four engine long range bombers, not in the numbers the US did, but enough to change the Battle of Britain. It would have cost them a decent chunk of their aviation resources, but the effectiveness of them would have changed many things, potentially in their favor.
@@kamaeq
"You appeal to Guderian doesn't work because there were multiple generals who also shaped the doctrine." So you think the doctrine of the Luftwaffe is the work of one Person? You just don't get it that the Luftwaffe was shaped technological and in doctrine before the Nazis even reached power. There was no changing in Mindset.
Maybe you read a lot of text (as I did and still do but don't weirdly brag about), but your conclusions are way off, I really start to think you do not understand these books.
The possession and use of long range Bombers would not change the outcome of the Battle of Britain at all. There are other reasons why the Germans lost that battle, but the Bombers were not the problem, with the Airstrips in the Netherlands and Belgium they had enough range.
I just hate to see that someone made a very informed and informative Video with a lot of sources and then someone strolled by and push his unsolicited opinion, and it seems that person did not even watch that video before he commented.
The Luftwaffe did build the Ju-290, 4 engine bomber/transport of which had double the range of the He-111 and the prototype Me 264 (V3) of which had great range but handling was in question.
Kurt Tank also designed the 6 engine Focke Wulf Ta-400 with 2 Jumo jet engines added for take off but only the model was built but it was intended to be very fast. excellent range and heavy payload.
An excellent presentation. Thank you so much.
Thank, Lars!
What an excellent, no-nonsense discussion. Well done.
"The bomber will get through? Okay, we'll shoot 'em down on the way back!" - Keith Park.
Actually that would be Leigh Mallory and Douglas Bader during battle of britain, when they experimented with big wings. Keith Park insisted that the 12th group had to intercept and shoot down as many bombers as possible BEFORE they reached his airfields, with 12th group failing to aid in airfield defense several times.
Keith Park was commanding 11th group, though. Leigh-Mallory and Douglas Bader used that defense tactics critics to get rid of Hugh Dowding and Keith Park after the battle of Britain was over.
Kiwi Keith! He’s the man! Won the Battle of Britain then was fired a week later.
Little minor of errors, Germany did have a long range bomber, the Condor. The condor was able to carry bombs and able to defend itself, always operated in 1 or 2 they would fly out pass Iceland where they would bomb and attack merchant shipping convoys, they would also send signals out to subs in the area to give the location of the convoy, To help combat this the first world war idea of launching planes of the decks of ships using ski ramps came about, but instead of the seaplanes, Sea hawks was used for one trip to attack the condor/s and then ditch in the sea.
Also, military controls on countries did happen, ships was limited, planes etc, just that they were worse for Germany
You should go the restauration of the FW 200 going on in Germany, that would make for a great video!
They're making it into a restaurant? Cool!
You are a very thorough and accomplished historian, may you endeavour to perserve. Congratulations I watch and support.
"Destroy them on the ground" yep that certainly worked...
It did though.
Just not for the Luftwaffe.
The Eighth Air Force take a more effective approach: Destroy the air force on the way of destroying the entire industry.
Almost worked
@@陳奕釩-i4c which was something the British helped them with wasn't it?
@@howardchambers9679 nah, everyone knows that after the fall of France bomber command did nothing but sit on its airfields and refuse to fly, it's not like the tactics used by the 8th airforce had been learnt the bloody hard way by bomber command in the early years of the war, and we all know that night raids never made a difference, nor the mossies daylight precision raids. Oh wait.....
This is extraordinarily high quality analysis. To see things in the context of the time at which they occur is vital for a deeper understanding. Thanks for giving so generously.
Hi there 🙂.
The Italian's had a three engined bomber. But the Italian's just couldn't build engines of the same quality as the Germans. While four engine bombers were indeed expensive and time consuming to build, three engine bombers wouldn't present such difficulties. And would have given the planes better range, but would it have been enough???
The Italians had a four-engined heavy bomber, the Piaggio P-108, but only built 35 of them.
Always an outstanding video and presentation. Thank you.
Is it Luftwaffe pirates? I bet it is Luftwaffe pirates.
No, the British are the pirates. Ask the Argentines.
Hi Chris. Your videos are always superb.
Thank you.
you need to have a war thunder channel, some more solo cup raps ! LOL
Fantastic research ! I'd say the German air warfare's staff that studied this greatest analytical flaw was that they planned for WWII based on WWI strategies & technologies. Technology was changing rapidly, therefore how an adversary will fight changes as well and add to that new generals now directing the fight as well as a the USA's super massive industrial explosion and the German planners plan doesn't hold up, as Germany found as the Allies bombing campaign shows you can halt Germany's tanks & planes just by taking out ball bearing factories.
Had NO Long Range, but lots of Rage ...
A very interesting video, thanks Chris, very thought provoking as to how Germany viewed the long range four engined bomber question. I look forward to the video on the FW200 Condor!
they were too busy spending all that metal on heavier and heavier tanks
Uh, wot? By then they had Pz III and IV, which were pretty light tanks all things considered...
This is the most comprehensive discussion I've seen of the background to Germany's development of essentially only medium bombers. While I have read about the early development of the Ju-88, for example, those other pieces only complement what you provided here. One can clearly understand why Germany had no long range bombers when the Battle of Britain started as a result. Thanks very much!
German bombers had no range. German fighters had no range. Even German tanks had no range and had to pull a fuel trailer behind them. But my PORSCHE 944 had a phenomenal range with a built-in red-light reserve and my von BRAUN shaver goes on forever between recharges...
A very good discussion of the issue. The only thing not mentioned was the Dornier Do-19 four engine bomber project of 1936.
The first chief of Lutwaffe Walther Wever died in June 1936, he had plans for long range bombers. His successors Jeshconnek and Ernst Udet were infatuated with dive bombers and focused on the development on them and ignored long range bombers. One of Wever's ideas was the "Ural Bomber" and it went to the grave with him!
Wever's five points, read them carefully and you see a clear need for a long range bomber:
1. To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets.
2. To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces
3. To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e, armored forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations.
4. To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles
5. To paralyze the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories.
Thank you for another great & informative Video. I cannot afford to support this channel financially right now, but I always spread the word about it.
Thank you!
"a fly by" :)
;)
Cool. Answers a few questions I didn't even know to ask. Thanks for the information, good sir.
Quality production, thought provoking and well researched. Your ability to pronounce German words and phrases with proper native inflections is an added bonus. On Gregg's excellent channel he doesn't even try instead referring to complex words as, "strange German word."
I do have one question though. Why maintain well known German terms in translations to English? It's my understanding that "Luftwaffe" would typically translate to "air force" (just as U-boat, or more properly U-Boot, would translate to submarine). It would seem that to you would set a more scholarly tone if you dispensed with common foreign references and translated all words and names to English. This would place the term Luftwaffe in its proper context, as the German term for Air Force. This is not a criticism as I find your work exceptional. Think it more as an esoteric discussion regarding translation protocol.
When it comes to the pronounciation of German words, I have the advantage that I am German. And we do have many strange words ;)
Luftwaffe is retained as such as in my experience this is usually easier for the viewers especially in videos where multiple different countries play a role. Granted, not the case in this particular video.
Mate every one knows the terms the man uses i think u are a bit a knob for that reply .He should just change all the titles of every bit of armary for you to understand . Get a grip ma man ffs.
Proper names are not translated in modern historical works. So for "scholarly tone" you would not translate the names of military arms in general. Though the Japanese often don't seem to be accorded this respect. Ranks and units is something which is questionable either way.
Then there is non direct translations. Panzer is not a direct translation of tank (The Germans never disguised them as water tanks). U-boat is English, it is not a direct translation of submarine but an English term for a German submarine. So it is simpler to say "U-boat" than "German submarine". Ironically it is most wrong to have Germans of the time talking about U-boats (it would be U-boot or translated to submarine) but it makes sense for either English speakers of the time or Historians using English after the fact to use the term. Panzershiffe would only lead to confusion if directly translated.
Doctrines is another that is questionable. If you just replaced "Schwerpunkt" with its direct translation would you still get the military idea behind it?
Of course translation the other way would also get complicated. The Luftwaffe and the Italienische Luftwaffe were fighting the Britische Luftwaffe....
@@MilitaryAviationHistory as an English speaker we all know what the Luftwaffe is. And what a U Boat is. Translating that is just pointless
MAH - this is one of the best & cogent I have seen online in a long time. I’m impressed. Keep up your good work. 🐻🇨🇦👍😎
Gotha, "I really scared those Londoners", Lancaster," Hold my beer".
Gotha, Coburg & Saxe are places and was Prince Albert's last name. Also the last name of George V. Anti- German sentiments caused him to take on the alias of Windsor, a castle.
@@leondillon8723 Yes ,Mountbatten sound far more English than Battenburg.Some thought Britain should have been fighting the French and not her natural allies..
Thanks--this is an interesting, useful, informative video. It helps to show how Germany was a prisoner of interwar history as well as tactical doctrine and such. Generally speaking, Germany planned very effectively for wars against France, Poland, and other near neighbors, with close and effective support to land armies from air power. But German bomber types were already stretched to their limits in the Battle of Britain ( as well as fighter types, which also didn't have sufficient operational range or time in the air even for that campaign). Basically, Germany, in turning from successful fights against its immediate neighbors to a much wider, continental war, had a scale problem: the sorts of aircraft types that were quite suitable for fighting France were not sufficient even to take on Britain, let alone to keep control of the Mediterranean region, and especially not to deal with the vast expanses of Russia. So the German inability to successfully bomb Moscow, or especially military buildups east of Moscow, as well as the German inability to supply Stalingrad, were expressions of this fundamental scale problem. Anyway, your very useful video helps to address where this scale problem originated, and why Germany's failure to deal with it earlier was quite sensible in the time before their ambitions grew much too large. [And German pilots and aircraft types did a remarkably good job of trying to compensate for the fact that they were, fundamentally, conceptually inadequate in terms of range and other capacities. Sort of like how the Ju-87 Stuka still managed to do a pretty good job over Russia even after it was very out of date. Sort of reminds me of the Japanese Mitsubishi Zero: very good in 1940 and 1941, still in 1942; having trouble keeping up in 1943, but still effective in the hands of good pilots .... ]
No long range 4 Engine Bombers.... FW-200 Condor: "Am I a joke to you?"
Not a bomber design, more of a converted airliner
It was more of a stopgap measure.
@@kieranh2005 whether it was a converted airliner or not, It was still developed into a 4 engine Long Range Bomber. Many WWII aircraft on both sides were taken from pre war technologies and designs.
winston churchill called the fw-200 "scourge of the Atlantic"
Excellent presentation. I've studied WW2 for 50 years and never got this level of insight. Well done.
Always high quality research and delivery...keep up the great work!
They had long range bombers but didn't bother to developed it. The FW 200 Condor four engines 3000km range.
+MilitaryAviationHistory *The only operational four-engine bomber the Luftwaffe (DEU) executed under **_Nazionalſozialiſmus_** was the Focke-Wulf 200,* a mailplane-turned-patrol bomber that packed 7.92x57mm machine guns and could carry a two-ton internal stores load of bombs and torpedoes. Ernst Heinkel never got the bugs out of the He 177, and the He 274 didn't get past the wind tunnel prior to the retaking of France.
Germany had a four engine long range bomber. The Focke-Wulf Fw200. They were used primarily sea patrol aircraft. Few were built. It was originally built as airliner but converted for military use.
OP I'm sure you have heard of Walther Wever, an important and influential Luftwaffe General that believed very strongly in 4 engine bombers with long range, and if he'd lived - he was killed in an aircraft crash in 1936 - there might actually have been a strong heavy bomber fleet. By the time Germany realized they needed a whole bunch of them and started trying to rectify the situation it was far too late. When asked the main reason for the Luftwaffe's biggest mistake, Feldmarschall Erhard Milch said "140,000 unbuilt fighter aircraft!"
It should be noted that due to severe technical difficulties with the two linked V12 engines in the wings of the He-177 Grief, there was a proposed redesign with a more coventional wing with two engines per wing side by side. I'm kinda surprised Germany did not use a two engine inline puller-pusher arrangement per wing. This would have provided the four engines and reduced frontal area they were looking for.
Germanyy’s merchant marine kept some sailing ships going through the 20s and into the 30s. I mean big ass sailing ships with no engines even for auxiliary power. It was the Flying P Liners of the Laisez Line. I always wondered if they were, 1) Using this to train young sailors about wind with flight in mind. 2) functioned as a defacto training for the Kreigmarine..in the manner of navies preserving sailing vessels for training cadets. But I could be imagining it all. Because in 1932, some of the ships were sold or stopped service. They mostly carried nitrate from Chile to Europe around Cape Horn.
You might be interested to read Eric Newby's book "The Last Grain Race", which is about sail-powered mechant ships taking grain from Australia to Europe, set just before WW2.
This is a very informative and thought-provoking discussion of the major question. I wonder how the German military experience in Spain influenced their air power decisions? Did it reinforce the idea of tactical bombing, despite the results of the Guernica raid?
Very good arguments and info. I would like to add that it was argued that two engine designs, that were faster than contemporary fighters, like the Do-17 at her time, needed no armor or weapons. Of course with a bomb load they became much slower and vulnerable. Since the Legion Condors success using dive bombing everything had to be a dive bomber, which was the reason the Greif was a two prop machine that was thus so flammable that is was called "Reichsfeuerzeug". Also Göring is belived to have said about building the Luftwaffe: "The Führer won't ask, how big the planes are, he'd only want to know how many." Therefore the political sort of bickering was also a factor.
The Germans didn't even need a long range bomber -- until they invaded the USSR. Even then, no-one, absolutely no-one, comprehended that Stalin had built up a war industry beyond the Urals. Auxiliary fuel tanks would've sufficed for a campaign over Britain. BTW, bombing Britain was not a Long Range project. The Luftwaffe almost got away with using a tactical air force for a strategic aim. Of course, the whole project was doomed from the start.
Adolf's ONLY shot at getting Britain out of the war was via Parliament deposing Churchill. Adolf needed to re-create the Gallipoli dynamic -- in North Africa. To pull this off, he needed to entirely drop his Barbarossa fantasy. But, then again, Barbarossa -- himself -- never made it to his objective -- the Holy Land.
What a revealing operational name. Barbarossa drowned in a river -- a stream, really. Hitler drowned in the Russian mud -- which killed off his horses -- to go into the bellies of his infantry. After such a loss of mobility, the Heer never could possibly prevail.
Of course, his object was criminal, immoral in the extreme. For Adolf didn't intend to conquer territory -- rather he wished to exterminate entire nations. OKH and OKW should've been hanged. Most beat the noose via suicide.
I read that Heinkel found the continuous engine problems with the He177 reason to secretly develop the He177B where a new wing was designed to simply utilise four separate engines. Constant conflicts with the Air Ministry and Goering delayed any real progress on a workable four engined bomber that promised modern performance capabilities until the He274 but, by the time this project began to show promise the war situation had deteriorated to an extent where fighters were needed far more than bombers.
Avro Manchester was a 2 engine bomber, Britain stuck 2 more engines on it, extended the wing, it became the Lancaster, and the rest is history.
Meanwhile the germans were doing crap like the the 288 or whatever with the usual over-complex designs with 2 engines in one pod, that failed, but bizarrely the wehrburros always saythe germans were better engineers. Hmm. I'm an engineer and I don't see complex failure > simple success, quite the opposite!
They were good engineers. Too good. They always went to new and fancy invention and did not care about fact that cutting edge technology tends to be unreliable.
As always a well researched and informative video.
Suggestion: how large supplies of 115-145 octane aviation fuel from the US gave the Allies a huge advantage in aero engine performance. Specifically - pre-war fuels chemistry development and refinery investment, and the efforts of Major Jimmy Doolittle.
Walther Wever was killed in a crash 1936 silencing his voice and theories of long range strategic bombing. His 5 points of air strategy were ironically used against Germany by the allies.
I absolutely love your fact-filled discourses on aviation history, especially from a German about Germany's air power of WWII, most of which outperformed American aircraft even early on. Since my youth, and I am 74 yrs old, I have admired German engineering and daring in spite of deeply hating Nazis and what they did to the world. Keep up the good work, I tune you in all the time and envy your linguistic skill. BTW, are you by chance a professor or an engineer?
Very informative, thank you.
For those of us who don't recognise the photos at @5:16, we have Giulio Douhet (top right), Amedeo Mecozzi (lower right), Hugh Trenchard, 1st Viscount Trenchard (top left), Sir John Cotesworth Slessor (lower left).
As it happens, I have just finished re-reading my copy of "The Life and Death of the Luftwaffe" by Werner Baumbach. He ended the war (WW2), at the age of 29, as the General of Bombers. In this book he discusses, amongst much else, the question of the lack of German four-engined bombers. His conclusions are the same as those you describe.
Thanks for an informative video.
Until this video, I didn't know that Germany didn't have a true bomber in the Luftwaffe. Great video, will support you on Patreon.
Looking forward to the FW-200 video. I don't know why, but I've always loved that plane.
Heard a historian mention that Germany (in WWII) was thinking in terms of 'border' wars, it felt it only had to conquer neighbors so to speak..seems they missed the boat on total war as it was.
Scholarly work well presented. Thank you.
The Billy Mitchel bombing of obsolete warships at anchor and not firing back was blown out of proportion by the press then just as the press now. Later in the war of the Pacific, B-17s had a horrible record when attacking fast maneuvering Japanese warships at sea. The only success Army Airforce bombers had was when medium bombers adopted skip bombing techniques against Japanese shipping. Again, not against warships for the most part. Only Navy and Marine divebombers and torpedo bombers could be counted on to attack fast, nimble warships. I think the Germans studied US Navy divebombers before the war and developing the JU-87. It’s interesting to me that the JU-88 was developed to also have dive bombing capability. I know this is off topic of the lack of German development of a long range 4 engine bomber, but you explained that in this video to a degree that I have nothing to add to that subject. Cheers!
Remember that the point of the tests involving Mitchell was to evaluate damage done to such warships by various aircraft bombs. There were supposed to be various pauses for naval personnel to board the target ships and evaluate what the weapons had done, and this did in fact happen on the first day. It was on the second day that Mitchell brought his bombers in lower than specified and dropped a series of 2,000 lb bombs into the water next to the Ostfriesland to warp hull plates and create massive leaks below the waterline. By doing so, he thwarted the final stages of the test but got the "airplanes sinking battleships" headline that he wanted. Also, while the Ostfriesland was an older Helgoland class battleship laid down in 1908, it's a stretch to call it obsolete. The ship was commissioned in August 1911 and sunk less than 10 years later in July 1921, and it had an armored deck 2.5" thick, which was more than sufficient to protect the ship from significant damage from even the 1,000 lb bombs dropped from the altitude Mitchell's force from operating at.
@@kemarisite where did all this lead us? To overconfidence in level, high altitude bombing being able to protect against navies. Even the Prince of Wales and Renown were sunk by land based IJN aircraft among which, were twin engine Betty bombers that trained and were equipped with torpedoes. Those warships had totally inadequate anti air weapons compared with what large equivalent warships were equipped with by mid war. Yes, Mitchel proved what destruction could be caused to anchored warships like at Pearl Harbor, but it was a very different thing to attacking warships at sea.
A very good report. On your site plans you show four steel transmitter aerials 360 feet tall 180 feet apart, in a line. A few hundred metres away there were also four wooden receiver aerials 240 feet in a line. All facing the coast and incoming air attacks. The 3 gaps between the 4 TX or 4 RX towers held arrays of metal antenna dipole and reflector cables.
Vielen Dank! This was so informative! I love when you explained your translation, it is quite helpful for those of us learning the language. Absolutely amazing content from this channel.