What is Naturalism?

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  • เผยแพร่เมื่อ 6 ต.ค. 2024
  • This video lecture discusses the meaning, nature, and dynamics of naturalism. Naturalism is a philosophical doctrine which holds the belief that “matter” is the ultimate reality. Thus, naturalism believes that the material world is the only real world and that it is governed by natural laws.
    Please note that the content of this video lecture is different from the content of the video lecture titled "Naturalism in Education".
    ***
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ความคิดเห็น • 56

  • @broccolinyu911
    @broccolinyu911 ปีที่แล้ว +6

    As a Naturalist myself, I commend you for a well-explained video.

  • @darrenrichards3100
    @darrenrichards3100 2 ปีที่แล้ว +8

    Im taking an exam this Friday and I have to admit y'all explain this better than my instructor

    • @PHILOnotes
      @PHILOnotes  2 ปีที่แล้ว

      Thanks for the compliment :)

  • @asgharsufipakfaujkosalam8587
    @asgharsufipakfaujkosalam8587 4 ปีที่แล้ว +6

    Madam Sahiba what a knowledgeable and idea based video of Philosiphy i am thankful to you for uploading such great videos.
    Sufi Muhammed Asghar M.A Philisophy Gujranwala Pakistan

    • @PHILOnotes
      @PHILOnotes  4 ปีที่แล้ว +2

      Thanks heaps for the positive feedback, Asghar. Cheers!

  • @eugenegravel9376
    @eugenegravel9376 3 ปีที่แล้ว +5

    Great presentation! Your bullet points were solid!

    • @PHILOnotes
      @PHILOnotes  3 ปีที่แล้ว

      thank you so much, mate!

  • @mimmim-vr2ed
    @mimmim-vr2ed 3 ปีที่แล้ว +5

    Thank a lot, it really helped in my exam ❤️

    • @PHILOnotes
      @PHILOnotes  3 ปีที่แล้ว

      No worries, mate. Glad it helps!

  • @JumaIdriss
    @JumaIdriss 3 หลายเดือนก่อน

    The video lecture discusses about the constructivism and Naturalism it is well explain theories agreed that materials world is real

  • @mihajlohranisavljevic6412
    @mihajlohranisavljevic6412 3 ปีที่แล้ว +1

    This video changed my life.

    • @leithbk3971
      @leithbk3971 3 ปีที่แล้ว

      Ur overrating

    • @najmaijaz4581
      @najmaijaz4581 3 ปีที่แล้ว

      @@leithbk3971 cirrect ur spaling

    • @leithbk3971
      @leithbk3971 3 ปีที่แล้ว

      @@najmaijaz4581 u too

  • @PEYTTT28
    @PEYTTT28 5 หลายเดือนก่อน

    0:40
    1:11
    1:43
    2:33
    3:04
    3:19

  • @benshapiro5474
    @benshapiro5474 3 ปีที่แล้ว +2

    Idealism is why the entertainment industry has the success that it does

    • @PHILOnotes
      @PHILOnotes  3 ปีที่แล้ว

      Thanks for sharing your thoughts!

  • @maximusgarahan2066
    @maximusgarahan2066 3 ปีที่แล้ว +2

    Commendable presentation, thank you.
    Argument against Naturalism:
    1. If Naturalism is true, then intentional states cannot exist
    2. Intentional states DO exist
    3. Therefore, Naturalism is false.
    No one will be as silly as to deny P2, thus we shall focus on P1. Intentional states are normative concepts, which means that they imply a notion of oughtness. A desires is an intentional state which identifies something that you 'ought' to pursue more or less. However, it's ironically a 'naturalistic fallacy' to derive such an OUGHT from a mere IS. And since on naturalism, things merely ARE the case, we can't derive any notion of 'oughtness' and thus can't have intentional states such as wants, beliefs, and desires. Since the natural sciences don't study anything aside from causal dispositions, the only way to make sense of intentional states is to turn them into irreducible non-natural properties, which falsifies naturalism.

    • @PHILOnotes
      @PHILOnotes  3 ปีที่แล้ว

      Thanks too, Maximus. Cheers!

    • @Hy-jg8ow
      @Hy-jg8ow 3 ปีที่แล้ว +5

      Non-reductive materialism can explain the mind as a strongly emergent system-property of the brain's chemistry (irreducible to the components of that chemistry - see: systems theory, emergentism), where the abstract symbolic operations using sings and symbolic systems such as language coalesces into a natural "software" running on and enabled by the "hardware" of the brain, programmed by the environment (and evolution).
      This "software" gradually evolved from simple reactive sense-organs (avoidance of pain psychology) to complex scheming organs such as brains, which proved able to process information using abstract representations of reality, thus able to synthesize conceptual objects (model reality according to regularities and commonalities) and decipher the relational possibilities and impossibilities between them (logic).
      As such, naturalism can explain the nature of intentionality as a derived feature of the brain-dependent mind, which evolved as part of an animal psychology to successfully navigate the world. Intentional states are on a basic organic level merely states of deprivations, spawning primitive "wants" - a mechanism by which nature elicits organisms to move about and avoid unpleasant stimuli and acquire pleasant stimuli - with the increasing diversity and complexity of the biosphere, more and more complex "mechanisms" of want spurred the evolution of complex brains. This primitive organic 'want' is translated then into intentional states of the mind, where "wants" can be directed at abstract objects, rather than merely physical objects.
      [The ability of our mind to reason (and conceive of concepts such as truth) and thus its ability to produce non-essential knowledge or even uncover knowledge conflicting with the blind forces of evolution, is a byproduct of its evolutionary useful (survival-driven) features.]
      [The link between the purely physical and the abstract/conceptual is language. Language is both physical (consists of sounds, or signs such as in sign-language) and abstract (can carry meaning, can symbolize, point towards something real, stand in stead of the object itself as a placeholder). From the beginning, the brain, the mind and language evolved in tandem in case of humans. From primitive gestures of agreement/disagreement, pointing to things and uttering a sound - to poetry, art, philosophy and science.]
      [The purely conceptual is not mater, but its neither "spiritual matter" - it exists as "meaning", as useful fiction in the field of abstraction created by language. As such its existence is not independent, but solely dependent on the mind, which in turn is dependent on the brain, which in turn is dependent on the laws and precedence of the material world.]
      Learning via abstractions follows the same problem-solving functional goal as more primitive learning via direct experience did on a more basic level. The mind is nothing mystical, spiritual or supernatural, but very much the natural, emergent problem-solving and learning software, which evolved as a tool of survival under evolutionary pressures. Thus, since naturalism (non-eliminative physicalism) can explain the mind and its features such as intentionality within its framework, the first premise of your syllogism is mistaken, and the conclusion is false.
      1. Intentional states of mind exist.
      2. Naturalism can explain them as a function of the naturally evolved mind (an emergent property of the brain).
      3. Therefore the existence of intentional states of mind is fully consistent with naturalism.

    • @maximusgarahan2066
      @maximusgarahan2066 3 ปีที่แล้ว +1

      @@Hy-jg8ow Cordial greetings,
      Thank you for the thoughtful response.
      I'd argue that the non-naturalist can reasonably reject P2 of your argument like thus:
      So the basic idea by the NRM here is an assertion
      of an a posteriori identity of intentional states with dispositions, on the model of other a posteriori identities such as water=H2O or Hesperus=Phosphorus? If so, These identities, being
      a posteriori, turn not on the meaning or definition or ‘sense’ of the terms involved (‘water’, ‘Hesperus’, etc) but on their reference, usually elaborated in the last forty years or more in causal-theoretic terms. At this stage, a non-naturalist can invoke a Fregean argument...
      Someone can deny that intentional states
      are dispositions (or, better, deny that some particular intentional state is some particular set of dispositions -even when it is identical with it) without being inconsistent or irrational (see Frege puzzles). But if that is so, then to account for the fact that such a person’s mind represents a completely consistent state of affairs, the terms on each side of the equation being denied will need to have a sense over and above a reference. If one restricts oneself to the reference or extensions of the terms, the person would seem to be inconsistent. But we know that he is not. He merely lacks some information, he fails to know a worldly identity. So just as the terms ‘water’ and ‘Hesperus’ would need to have a sense if we were to make it come out that someone who denied that water=H2O or denied that Hesperus=Phosphorous was not being irrational and inconsistent, we will need to posit that the intentional term in the identity or equation being denied by him has a sense. But this raises the question: what is the sense of the intentional term expressing?
      Here we have a choice in answering this question, a choice that
      amounts to a dilemma for the naturalist who wants to equate the intentional state with a naturalistic property like a disposition. Either it is expressing a naturalistic property or it is expressing a non-naturalistic property. If it is expressing the latter, then of course, it straightforwardly undermines naturalism. Presumably the naturalist will
      insist on the other option and claim that it is expressing a (further) naturalistic property. If it is
      the sense (or meaning or definition) that is given in terms of the naturalistic property, then one can appeal to a Moorean open question consideration. Moore’s argument, is geared to target definitional reductions.
      one can always non-trivially ask: ‘‘I have all these dispositions to x, but
      ought I to x?’’ If this is a genuinely non-trivial question, if it is not like asking, say, ‘‘Here is a bachelor, but is he unmarried?’’, then that would suggest that intentional states such as beliefs and desires are internal oughts (commitments) not to be reduced to first order dispositions.
      Thus a Moorean argument, supplemented by a Fregean argument (or contrarywise),
      together construct a pincer effect against the naturalistic equation of intentional states with dispositions. One starts with Moore, then introduces Frege to deal with a posteriori identities, which in turn returns us to the Moorean argument, if the naturalist appeals to senses that express naturalistic properties. And the effect of such a pincer argument is to make room for the assumption that intentional states are internal ‘oughts’ or commitments, not dispositions.
      Thoughts?

    • @kleenex3000
      @kleenex3000 3 ปีที่แล้ว +2

      >>>Intentional states DO exist>since on naturalism, things merely ARE the case, we can't derive any notion of 'oughtness'

    • @sundeutsch
      @sundeutsch 2 ปีที่แล้ว

      What a week argument! It sounds like ontological argument for existence of gods. State is a system made by the people who are the products of natural matter. The very thinking ability of humans is also a function of organs made from material.

  • @countryside-nature8687
    @countryside-nature8687 3 ปีที่แล้ว +2

    Nice

  • @Vinaycvk
    @Vinaycvk 4 ปีที่แล้ว +7

    There is only one world and one natural world.

    • @PHILOnotes
      @PHILOnotes  4 ปีที่แล้ว +1

      yeah, thanks Vinay.

    • @aclark903
      @aclark903 3 ปีที่แล้ว

      Prove it!

    • @Vinaycvk
      @Vinaycvk 3 ปีที่แล้ว +1

      @@aclark903 You have to prove supernatural world

    • @aclark903
      @aclark903 3 ปีที่แล้ว

      @@Vinaycvk So you say.

    • @Vinaycvk
      @Vinaycvk 3 ปีที่แล้ว +3

      @@aclark903 I'm saying there's no evidence for supernatural world

  • @ThePathOfEudaimonia
    @ThePathOfEudaimonia 2 ปีที่แล้ว

    I think most naturalists are physicalists, and not materialists. That is an important (and essential) distinction to make.

  • @peytonmagi9337
    @peytonmagi9337 2 ปีที่แล้ว

    thanks

  • @kimiayolo7753
    @kimiayolo7753 2 ปีที่แล้ว

    so niceee

  • @kynjainongkynrih6296
    @kynjainongkynrih6296 3 ปีที่แล้ว

    What are the objectives of naturalism?

    • @PHILOnotes
      @PHILOnotes  3 ปีที่แล้ว

      will do that soon

  • @nodical802
    @nodical802 2 ปีที่แล้ว

    Not entirely true. I am a naturalist I believe in multiple worlds but the reality in which matter exist is governed by natural laws

  • @alinebaruchi1936
    @alinebaruchi1936 2 ปีที่แล้ว

    It isn't
    We should all be dead by now
    We are alive

  • @maavet2351
    @maavet2351 2 ปีที่แล้ว

    Yeah that's me I guess

  • @NestortheArgonaught
    @NestortheArgonaught 2 ปีที่แล้ว

    Naturalism isn’t opposed to idealism. It is opposed to realism.

  • @MikeDiaz-mf4jz
    @MikeDiaz-mf4jz 7 หลายเดือนก่อน

    You didn’t explain it thoroughly 🙄🥵🥵🥵🙄🙄🙄

  • @darshh.poetry2193
    @darshh.poetry2193 2 ปีที่แล้ว

    Nice

  • @WawayG
    @WawayG 3 ปีที่แล้ว

    Thanks

    • @PHILOnotes
      @PHILOnotes  3 ปีที่แล้ว

      No worries, Joshua!