Very well explained! I really appreciate how you went through text and discussed each important aspect. One suggestion: it would be very helpful if you can put videos in order or mention numbers of sequence.
From 7:19 onward, I found the discussion about the 'puzzle' the most interesting in this first zeta chapter. How I read this was that the thing that is is that which does/moves. It is that which generates the action, state, disposition, and that 'doing/moving' would give an additional characteristic to substance (an accident). Similarly, as you mention this notion of separability would give independence in reality of the substance over actions, dispositions, and states (circa 10:40). So this underlying thing is that which because of having a defined structure is separable from what is predicated because it itself generates doing/moving? To make this grammatical, the subject generates the doing/moving, but also as the most important in the sentence, is the reference for anything being predicated to it and thus whatever comes after it is strictly dependent on the subject. Should we think the subject/substance as initiator of all things, therefore, as that which is primary? Or is this a erroneous view? I say initiator but a close definition would be the 'bearer' which Aristotle uses. In a sense, if there were no substance, nothing would occur. This is more of a clarification question.
The grammatical account of substance as the subject and the accident as the predicate is interesting. It seems to suggest that you can’t really speak to the substance, but only to the accidental qualities because description requires predication. Is this a legitimate problem in trying to give an account of a substance? What could you say about the substance, beyond pointing out its "thisness"?
At 6:45 I couldn't help but wonder how Aristotle's claims would look in the original Greek - especially considering the nature of Greek as an inflected language and the many shapes the verb "εἰμί" (to be) takes.
I think there is a misunderstanding about what is meant by "quality." In this context, it means "qualitative attribute" (e.g., color), as opposed to "quantitative attribute" (e.g., magnitude). The atomists tried to account for the qualitative differences of things in terms of the quantitative. (See my video on Fifth-Century Atomism for a fuller account of this.)
Very well explained! I really appreciate how you went through text and discussed each important aspect.
One suggestion: it would be very helpful if you can put videos in order or mention numbers of sequence.
In description
From 7:19 onward, I found the discussion about the 'puzzle' the most interesting in this first zeta chapter. How I read this was that the thing that is is that which does/moves. It is that which generates the action, state, disposition, and that 'doing/moving' would give an additional characteristic to substance (an accident). Similarly, as you mention this notion of separability would give independence in reality of the substance over actions, dispositions, and states (circa 10:40). So this underlying thing is that which because of having a defined structure is separable from what is predicated because it itself generates doing/moving? To make this grammatical, the subject generates the doing/moving, but also as the most important in the sentence, is the reference for anything being predicated to it and thus whatever comes after it is strictly dependent on the subject. Should we think the subject/substance as initiator of all things, therefore, as that which is primary? Or is this a erroneous view? I say initiator but a close definition would be the 'bearer' which Aristotle uses. In a sense, if there were no substance, nothing would occur. This is more of a clarification question.
This is very helpful, thank you a lot!
You're welcome! I appreciate the feedback.
The grammatical account of substance as the subject and the accident as the predicate is interesting. It seems to suggest that you can’t really speak to the substance, but only to the accidental qualities because description requires predication. Is this a legitimate problem in trying to give an account of a substance? What could you say about the substance, beyond pointing out its "thisness"?
At 6:45 I couldn't help but wonder how Aristotle's claims would look in the original Greek - especially considering the nature of Greek as an inflected language and the many shapes the verb "εἰμί" (to be) takes.
If you can read Greek, by all means, I encourage you to read the Metaphysics in the original!
But the matter imagined by Democritus does have some qualities. Who ever imagined matter to be something bereft of all qualities?
I think there is a misunderstanding about what is meant by "quality." In this context, it means "qualitative attribute" (e.g., color), as opposed to "quantitative attribute" (e.g., magnitude). The atomists tried to account for the qualitative differences of things in terms of the quantitative. (See my video on Fifth-Century Atomism for a fuller account of this.)
Too complicated to for normal people!