In the context of international security, "securitization" refers to the process of framing certain issues or challenges as security threats, which often triggers extraordinary measures or policies. It involves convincing audiences, such as the public or policymakers, that specific issues require urgent and exceptional responses for the sake of security. This concept is associated with the field of security studies and is used to analyze how non-traditional security concerns, like climate change or migration, can be framed and addressed as security issues on a global scale.
Great contribution. I think especially today we see several securitization failures with the pandemic, which try to be uncovered with new securitization moves, and are eroding our democracies dangerously. Just a comment on a thesis I'm writing at the moment. I think the securitization moves can in fact be dangerous, and policymakers are taking the widening agenda far too lightly
Just as the word 'terrorist" is ambiguous, so is the objectives/aims of the 'war on terror'. I sorta agree with 'this guy' (referencing Phillipe Belanger) the theorist behind securitisation,i.e.: that both are arguably 'social or nationalist constructs'…re international relations critical theory.
'Securitisation theory' A company creates an ad hoc entity. It transfer the ownership of some of its assets, (for instance, the accounts receivable) to that ad hoc entity. The entity uses the assets to get financings on financial market. This is n short the concept of securitization.
That was pretty bad. A simpler alternative explanation is that people rationally refer to events as security threats and take more drastic actions simply *because* the events in question become more dangerous. This guy has provided zero arguments as to why it should be the other way around.
Philippe Belanger You know it was 'this guy' that came up with securitisation theory? And people dont rationally refer to events as security threats, because the referent object is different in all cases, you couldnt say that there is a rationalisation in securitisation of islamic terrorism by the UK because it is hardly a threat, in fact car accidents kill more people every year, or smoking - but these are not dealt with outside the politiscised zone because the referent object holds them to be a problem of internal society. The UK never went through the same securitisation of IRA terrorism during the troubles either in the same way they have reacted against islamic terrorism today, theres much more to it than that.
MotheredANiMaL It is doubtlessly the case that people are irrational in their judgments of risks; fearing planes more than cars, etc. But again, they will refer to these objects as threats because of their statistically false beliefs. We are justified in assuming that referring expressions are always a consequences of beliefs on grounds of parsimony. Assuming that some beliefs are formed as a consequence of referring acts radically complicates the picture, so it better yield big gains in explanatory power; this guy provides none. That is, unless you believe that beliefs are *always* formed as a consequence of acts of reference, but surely no academic is that devoid of common sense.
Securitization theory is not about what events are more or less of a threat, but about which threats are prioritized relative to the actors'\audiences' values. Some security threats, as you say, are obvious and must be dealt with immediately without the need for securitization to occur (eg, an invading army, ebola outbreaks, etc). Others, however, can linger in political realms and might not be addressed. Securitization is basically a way of constructing security, even when an issue is not conventionally interpreted as a security issue. An actor labels something as a security threat and makes a claim and suggested response. If the audience accepts that justification that the claim and response are reasonable, then it removes the issue from the political realm and allows immediate action or "special handling". Also, as he says, just using the word "security" is not enough to turn something into a security issue. It must in someway be part of a wider political or social debate. The 2nd Iraq war is a good example of securitization... there was no obvious evidence that Saddam Hussein was an immediate threat, but the claim was made that he was, and in the wider context of the war on terror the US and Britain were able to convince a broader audience (voters, other coalition country leaders) that there was a security threat... thereby enabling them to take action that would have otherwise been unlikely in the context of normal political debate. If they didn't securitize it, there would have been a political cost (or an "Audience Cost" to borrow from Fearon). You can try thought experiments of it yourself on a smaller scale. I often use securitization to justify to myself that I need to do\eat\buy something because not doing so would be a threat to my general happiness, thereby opening myself to depression and risk health consequences. Hope that helps.
This guy is Ole Waver. One of the theorists of the Copehagen School in International Relations. I strongly recommend you to read his work, if you have not done so yet. He writes along with Barry Buzan, another scholar of the Copehagen School. Start with Regions and Power - the structure of international security. Cheers!
+Nick Holmes Nice explanation overall. However, your final example doesn't work, as you are simultaneously referent, securitizing actor and audience. You would have to convince others that your health warrants exceptional measures beyond the normal rules of the political game. In his seminal article "Securitization and De-securitization", Waever actually argues against analysis of the individual level on account of the seeming infinity of referent objects. Only referent objects that have a chance of being successfully securitized are relevant to analysis. There are a couple of exceptions, such as "human security", but this is more of a general principle on the international level to justify humanitarian intervention than an actual individual-level referent.
![เปิด อาณาจักร หมื่นล้าน "สาระตั้ม" l [Nickynachat]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/3XE0nPF4YkQ/mqdefault.jpg)
In the context of international security, "securitization" refers to the process of framing certain issues or challenges as security threats, which often triggers extraordinary measures or policies. It involves convincing audiences, such as the public or policymakers, that specific issues require urgent and exceptional responses for the sake of security. This concept is associated with the field of security studies and is used to analyze how non-traditional security concerns, like climate change or migration, can be framed and addressed as security issues on a global scale.
Damn you said it a lot better ,you should've been in the video lol
Much clearer and much more succinct.
I would love to set in the same room with this amazing person and just listen to this work of art.
Great contribution. I think especially today we see several securitization failures with the pandemic, which try to be uncovered with new securitization moves, and are eroding our democracies dangerously. Just a comment on a thesis I'm writing at the moment. I think the securitization moves can in fact be dangerous, and policymakers are taking the widening agenda far too lightly
Just as the word 'terrorist" is ambiguous, so is the objectives/aims of the 'war on terror'. I sorta agree with 'this guy' (referencing Phillipe Belanger) the theorist behind securitisation,i.e.: that both are arguably 'social or nationalist constructs'…re international relations critical theory.
This is so relevant to governments dealing with COVID
My Bachelor-Thesis Topic lol
@@Mo-iz5zk Good luck with that !
@@mathilde2115 Thanks a lot!
'Securitisation theory'
A company creates an ad hoc entity. It transfer the ownership of some of its assets, (for instance, the accounts receivable) to that ad hoc entity.
The entity uses the assets to get financings on financial market.
This is n short the concept of securitization.
Some buddy noticed the 4 on his forehead ?
how the....
I did...
came to find a comment referring to that number 4, cause wtf?
When I listen to Ole Wæver, I think how right Mearsheimer was.
security construction, desecuritise, necessity, extraordinary measures
this is sooo interesting!
Reminds us of the Enabling Act of 1933 in the Reichstag
Even his bug theory is now valid
Thanks you very much.
opps, or state constructs… just a theory… get it??
it's a constructivist theory....Could be called sub theory
Its a delusion...
State of exception
3:19 3:22
Do you think unemployment should no longer be seen as a normal social problem
1:13
Oh... come on... this is the same as when somebody say: there is no ugly people...
did he just try justify torture :-0
no, he explained how people come to tolerate things they otherwise wouldn't.
He said so much and could explain so little. Complicating the otherwise easy topics.
That was pretty bad. A simpler alternative explanation is that people rationally refer to events as security threats and take more drastic actions simply *because* the events in question become more dangerous. This guy has provided zero arguments as to why it should be the other way around.
Philippe Belanger You know it was 'this guy' that came up with securitisation theory? And people dont rationally refer to events as security threats, because the referent object is different in all cases, you couldnt say that there is a rationalisation in securitisation of islamic terrorism by the UK because it is hardly a threat, in fact car accidents kill more people every year, or smoking - but these are not dealt with outside the politiscised zone because the referent object holds them to be a problem of internal society. The UK never went through the same securitisation of IRA terrorism during the troubles either in the same way they have reacted against islamic terrorism today, theres much more to it than that.
MotheredANiMaL It is doubtlessly the case that people are irrational in their judgments of risks; fearing planes more than cars, etc. But again, they will refer to these objects as threats because of their statistically false beliefs. We are justified in assuming that referring expressions are always a consequences of beliefs on grounds of parsimony. Assuming that some beliefs are formed as a consequence of referring acts radically complicates the picture, so it better yield big gains in explanatory power; this guy provides none. That is, unless you believe that beliefs are *always* formed as a consequence of acts of reference, but surely no academic is that devoid of common sense.
Securitization theory is not about what events are more or less of a threat, but about which threats are prioritized relative to the actors'\audiences' values. Some security threats, as you say, are obvious and must be dealt with immediately without the need for securitization to occur (eg, an invading army, ebola outbreaks, etc). Others, however, can linger in political realms and might not be addressed.
Securitization is basically a way of constructing security, even when an issue is not conventionally interpreted as a security issue. An actor labels something as a security threat and makes a claim and suggested response. If the audience accepts that justification that the claim and response are reasonable, then it removes the issue from the political realm and allows immediate action or "special handling".
Also, as he says, just using the word "security" is not enough to turn something into a security issue. It must in someway be part of a wider political or social debate.
The 2nd Iraq war is a good example of securitization... there was no obvious evidence that Saddam Hussein was an immediate threat, but the claim was made that he was, and in the wider context of the war on terror the US and Britain were able to convince a broader audience (voters, other coalition country leaders) that there was a security threat... thereby enabling them to take action that would have otherwise been unlikely in the context of normal political debate. If they didn't securitize it, there would have been a political cost (or an "Audience Cost" to borrow from Fearon).
You can try thought experiments of it yourself on a smaller scale. I often use securitization to justify to myself that I need to do\eat\buy something because not doing so would be a threat to my general happiness, thereby opening myself to depression and risk health consequences.
Hope that helps.
This guy is Ole Waver. One of the theorists of the Copehagen School in International Relations. I strongly recommend you to read his work, if you have not done so yet. He writes along with Barry Buzan, another scholar of the Copehagen School. Start with Regions and Power - the structure of international security. Cheers!
+Nick Holmes Nice explanation overall. However, your final example doesn't work, as you are simultaneously referent, securitizing actor and audience. You would have to convince others that your health warrants exceptional measures beyond the normal rules of the political game. In his seminal article "Securitization and De-securitization", Waever actually argues against analysis of the individual level on account of the seeming infinity of referent objects. Only referent objects that have a chance of being successfully securitized are relevant to analysis. There are a couple of exceptions, such as "human security", but this is more of a general principle on the international level to justify humanitarian intervention than an actual individual-level referent.
8:37