involved in the battle? I'd be interested in hearing more if so. i'm an army vet, my dad was a navy vet during vietnam. i cherish our military oral history.
there is one problem with "second Surigao" idea - Oldendorffs BBs are almost out of ammo, and what few shells they have remaining are High Explosives loaded for the shore bombardment ... And against 18 inch shells from Yamato, it would be likely that old BBs would end up being Hooded. And crossing the T would provide scores of IJN DDs ideal target for the long lances.
It's always exciting to hear historians mention USS Pennsylvania, BB-38, in discussions of these battles. My Grandfather, CDR Charles Jackson was the Executive Officer of Pennsy at this time. I like to say that all but one of the officers and men (that being the CO) aboard reported to him. Pennsy was one of the first to receive targeting radar, so her radar was one of the most ancient of the fleet. That is credited to be a reason that in the epic crossing of the T engagement she didn't fire a shot. In spite of that, Pennsy fired more rounds than any other BB for the entire war.
Great discussion of the battle but I was expecting more about the logistics per se. How close were the resupply ships? Were there oilers? What was the fuel situation on both sides? When Halsey was returning from finishing off the decoys, was he low on fuel? Thanks anyhow for the great discussion of tactics.
The USS Canberra CAG-2 during WW2 was the USS Canberra CA-70. The ship took part in the Battle of the Philippine Sea 19-20 June 1944. After the war she was mothballed. She was resurrected along with the USS Boston CAG-1 to become the World's first and second guided missile ships. I was a Gunner's Mate Missiles (18 years old, working on the launchers and delivery system) sailor onboard during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Presidential Flagship for President Kennedy. We went to Bermuda when Kennedy was there. He was scheduled to return on the ship, but was called home for a health emergency his dad was having, so he flew back instead.
Task Force Taffy-3 put on the single most amazing fight in the entire history of the US Navy. Adm. Sprague made the absolutely best choices possible under the circumstances, and then the epic actions of Commander Ernest Evans aboard the USS. Johnston, Lt.Cmdr Robert Copeland aboard the USS. Samuel B. Roberts (And hasn't THAT turned into a storied name.) and the other captains of the escorts as well as the amazing actions of the pilots attacking with everything, and sometimes, nothing, This battle deserves to be remembered for all of time, for amazing heroics and some incredible lessons to be learned.
The action of Taffy-3 was so brave and insane that the japanese sailors didin't dare to shoot american survivors, and they even salute them in ave and admiration.
I'm sorry but you may be missing the point. Taffy-3 fought a magnificent and famouse action and that was brilliant. Sal points out that Taffy-3 was out of position, and because of that, an opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat on the Japanese Center Force was missed.
A great post. When I saw the title though I thought you'd be speaking about the massive supply undertaking that enabled TF38 to remain at sea for so song. Would make a great post with your experience in that field.
I agree -- that is what I was expecting. Twenty years later, I served on an oiler off Viet Nam that had just arrived in the Pacific as the preparatory operations mentioned by Sal were starting.
The Princeton was a light carrier. Not a fleet carrier. No Essex class was lost some pretty badly damaged. But the crews damage control was second to non by 1944. And it shows in the battle off of Lattye Gulf and later off of Okinawa in 1945.
Sal: Thank you for the great presentation. I am going to break this into several responses. As far a Taffy 3 positioning: Interesting but I don't' believe the Jeep Carriers (as opposed to the light carriers) were configuration for Ship Attack in their munitions load outs. No Dive bombers and worse, I don't believe they had any Torpedoes. Taffy 2 attacks sunk nothing and they would have been able to select if they had torpedoes and the Avengers crews may not have even been trained for that as they were Anti Sub and bombing.
An excellent overview of the battle. So many narratives get so caught up in the details, as important though they are, that it is hard to see the forest for the trees. Showing the separate actions superimposed along the tallies of the ships present and lost is extremely helpful. And many narratives also tend to give the impression that if it were not for Taffy 3, Force A would have simply swept in unopposed which you point out would not necessarily have been the case. Thank you for this video.
Re:Taffy 3 and their position and Kurita Attack in Leyte Gulf itself. Firstly, it was assumed TF34 had been formed and was guarding San Bernardino Strait. That CVE were launching local anti sub and recon/search patrols for Sibuyan Sea is probably one of the reasons they were where they were. 2. The map doesn't really show it, but Taffy is just 20 miles to SE of Taffy 3 at 7am, start of the battle. So both Taffy were in the area, that's 12 carriers. By 830, Haruna had become the eastern most ship and was firing on Taffy 2. Natoma Bay launched a strike of 3 Avengers to specifically attack the Haruna which scared her off with some close torpedo near misses 3. Across the day, these 2 escort carriers groups had launched 440 sorties against the Japanese ships, the most by any carrier force in the history of naval warfare (and record still stands today). 4. Task Force 38.1, the detached fast carrier force despatched for rest/maintenance turned around and launched 100 planes, about 300miles out, the furthest US carrier strike attack on IJN during the war, which arrived at 1330 over the Japanese. So this unit was still within range on the 25th to lend assistance if it was required (which it was obviously). 5. Three of Oldendorf old battleships were out of armour piercing. The 2 BBs that didn't fire at Force C had old radar sets and shell splashed from other BBs were confusing their operators. So in case of a battle vs Kurita they could at least fire something that could hurt Kurita's ships. The 3 other BBs only had high explosive or anti personel shells. Useless against even Kongos. The old BBs were stocked for shore bombardment not naval combat. The fact 3 BBs expended their Armour piercing stock against 1 old battleship over 15minutes doesn't bode well for prolong engagement vs Yamato and Nagato. 4. Yamato and Nagato had at least a 4 knot speed advantage over the standards, so in theory, could stand off and shell the old BBs until they ran out of shells themselves. Lastly, if Japanese were to retreat, their plan was to head south either force Surigao Strait or go around Mindanao if they were that far south. Japanese only retreated through San Bernardino because there was no US forces present there and it was closer after Kurita turned north to reform at 910am. PS: thank you for using Japanese parlance - Force A and B (in 1st Diversionary Attack Force, not Center Force) and Force C and 2nd Diversionary Attack Force (5th Fleet) as well as Main Body for the carriers. These names help cloud the judgement of the codebreakers on the staff in the fleet and confusing the Americans on what specific roles the ships/admirals would be playing in the Sho Plan. Too many US source dumb in down to make a confusing battle more understandable. The Japanese names makes the confusion by USN in 1944 more understandable too
I recently watched “The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War”’s multi-part discussion of Leyte Gulf. Somehow you added some vital elements to the picture (wasn’t aware of MacArthur’s instructions to Halsey pre-battle, nor the dispositions of Taffy 3, for example). Great job! My uncle was serving aboard the patrol frigate USS Muskogee of the 7th Fleet (manned by a US Coast Guard crew), patrolling the entrance of Leyte Gulf that morning. But for the valor of Taffy 3, he might have had the unpleasant experience of witnessing the IJN center force bearing straight down at his ship!
G.A.F. Task Force was so close into shore off Samar because they were providing G.S. to the U.S. troops ashore on Leyte and could not effectively conduct Flight-Ops in the crowded area of Leyte Gulf which was full of all the transports, supply ships and surface units conducting NGFS in support of the landings. CV Captains also have to always keep their mind on being in an area where they can go full speed and turn into the wind in order to be able to launch the airplanes of the day. If you were to superimpose the positions of all the landing ships, supply transports and associated ships that were crowded into the Leyte Gulf area, then you would see how impossible CV Operations would have been there. But still you did a great review of this combinations of battles. 👍
Thanks for the added dimension of our discussion about what if.... New aspects to the battle I had not considered, now have I heard anyone else bring them up.
I love the idea of doing a wargame like Sal suggested, where the escort carriers are off to the side, and Oldendorf's BB's come in from the South. Yamato would have kicked the crap out of the old battleships. But adding that all 18 of the escort carriers would have been able to coordinate their strikes..... Thanks, for the idea, Sal!
Thank you Prof. for your thought-provoking logistics behind the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Saul your so right, "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" is fantastic, I made the mistake of thinking I would read a chapter before going to sleep, next thing I knew the sun was rising.
I appreciated the analysis. The US battleships were not top of the line battleships, which is why they US purposely avoids using them in battle against ships until Surigao. Those battleships had a finite number of armor piercing rounds and wouldn't have had enough to defeat Kurita's force had it been tasked to take it on. Especially during daylight. Sprague is where he is to support the landings. The closef he is to shore, the longer his aircraft can provide cover for the invasion. 3rd Fleet was supposed to be watching the straits while 7th focused on the invasion. You are right in that the logistics are often forgotten about the battle, especially all of the supply ships dropping off supplies that were the intended target for Kurita.
Actually you are misinformed about the old battleships. With the exception of the Yamato, they were better than any of the Japanese battleships. Two, the Kongo and Haruna, were only battlecruisers and did not have the armor plate of real battleships. Add to that several of the old battleships had new SG radar. The part about the AP rds but they would not have needed many to destroy the battlecruisers and then concentrate on the Nagato and Yamato. Not to mention there were LOTS of destroyers and they still had a lot of torpedoes left; and since they had been fixed they showed what they could do in Surigao Strait. So it is very unlikely Kurita would have broken through them even after the losses that the other Taffy's would have inflicted.
Thank you. A PoV I hadn’t considered. As always wonderful material. I wonder how the proposed second battleship did in a wargame (someone must of done it in the past 80 years). I was expecting a discussion on the importance of fleet oilers along with the USN developing replenishment at sea.
One issue with the escort carriers and the old standard class battleships is they just didn’t have much anti shipping ordinance loaded. They were setup for ground attack and anti submarine work. Torpedos would have needed to work overtime to take down Yamato.
My father was there on a mine sweeper. He talked about bombs that were dropped close to the ship. He joked that one sailor said " look at the fish.." another answered that's not fish it's bombs. He and none of the crew were injured.
Hey ... I had a great friend who was at the Battle ... He was on a ship in between the beach... He watched the American infantry try to scale The cliffs and get beat back... He saw the first ever kamikaze come over the ridges and head over his head out to the ships at sea... Then he went in and built Bridges all the way to manila... Then they went around to Luzon and went down to Manila again that way
His name was Willis Mann. He became an engineer and innovator at IBM... He was a genius thinker and craftsman and really the very last frontiersman going back to his days in Missouri growing up... The difficulties of his life and his resourceful perseverance through those difficulties brings to mind the saying "A lesser son of greater sires am I" Among his other wartime accomplishments included working with native guides down river working on the infamous Canol pipeline, befriending a tribal chief and hunting with his son and nephew for "pigeons" on Papua New Guinea and seeing the Princess of a remote allegedly cannibalistic tribe in full regalia on a bluff overlooking his company's march toward Manila from the North... When Will asked his Phillipino guide if they could encounter the tribal peoples his guide said "if you see them, when you wake up and roll over your head won't roll with you."
I love this stuff and particularly from someone with sea experience. The thing about alternative history is that you are always right. Regarding a BB vs. BB contest had Kurita continued I think too much credit is given to BB gunnery. At Surigao Strait the BBs landed one, maybe two hits out of the hundreds of shells fired and none were fatal. The real damage was by torpedoes from DDs, etc. As in earlier surface battles since 1942, the Japanese, for all their aggressive training, always seemed to withdraw when confronted with opposition (Surigao excepted).
From the title of this video “logistics” I thought you were going to focus more on the resupply of carriers and other ships bc of their constant deployment. I’ve read several books about the fatigue the pilots and crews endured during their long deployment and may have contributed to some mistakes. Perhaps you should make a video about how all the bombs, torpedos, 100 octane aircraft fuel, oil for ships, anti aircraft ammunition, food and clothing got from the US West coast to the supply depots in the Pacific Theater by Liberty ships and the sailors on them who weren’t on the more glamorous war ships. When I was in the US Army I was told NEVER piss off the supply sergeant!
Leyte is a complex and deeply interesting battle to study. So glad you came at it from the logistics angle as you can’t move or fight without supplies.
Absolutely. I was a gunnersmate on an auxiliary AFS with the Ab Lincoln CVBG, 7th Fleet, back in 93. An observation I witnessed was the constant frequency of UNREP operations that we were carrying out. Now that I think of it, it would be cool to see the astounding numbers of ordnance, fuel, medical, and repair logistics consumed and required during the entire battle.
Im not a mariner, but as a 20 year Army Armor veteran, i can tell you first hand, the size and strength of your force is made or broken by logistical sustainability.
The Germans in WW2 delivered a master class in how to get logistics wrong and the Japanese weren’t any better (they lost more soldiers to starvation than direct enemy action).
Everytime I hear about Taffy 3, I get goosebumps. Those sailors are genuinely heros. They went up against a huge force, that on paper they had zero chance of winning. Yet do to heros like Lt. Cmr. Ernest E Evans (DD557 USS Johnston), charging into battle launching torpedoes, and firing the 5" batteries. Thise. Led the other DDs and DEs to attack as well, convincing the Japanese that they were leading the main battle force! I am so proud of our US Navy and its brave sailors!
Excellent arguments about the positioning of Taffy 3 and potential for Oldendorf to take on Kurita's force. Many of Oldendorf's battleships also had the advantage of excellent radar-controlled siting.
Glad to hear you about the old battleships waiting at Surigao Strait. The radar both best and previous best, and a steaming forest of massive doom barrels, and an opera ensemble from PT's, destroyers, cruisers. As a departing wave to the mighty battleship, it is a worthy signal. And after naval history, it's auxiliary interest is naval logistics. Something like domestic accounting, distateful in expectation but after which follows a certain satisfied serenity.
I will always wonder what would have happened if an Iowa Class battleship would have gone up against the Yamato. Sal, thanks for the great presentation. Probably one of the best perspectives I've seen in a while.
Very interesting! I'm sure The Battle of Leyte Gulf is also one of the most studied naval battles in history, but you present some fine facts and analyses. When you mentioned "Logistics" I was sure you would point out that most of the Japanese fleet was coming up from the south, in their bases in, what was it, Borneo (then called something different, I can't remember off the top of my head). But, not only were they short of pilots at that point, they were short of oil. Oil was their limiting factor for entering the war, and was also the reason for this one last desperate gamble I thought I read. Fuchida's book, or maybe it was Prange's book about Fuchida, but he says that the IJN was willing to throw everything into this one last gamble in an attempt to, as you said, force America to the peace negotiations table. Obviously, it didn't work. The other aspects of the battle are all attributable to the "Fog of War". All the light carrier task groups had ground support missions to carry out, and some began earlier in the day. Was was CAF Sprague in so close, I thought I remembered reading that he was in early to get started on his ground support missions, and was "Surprised" with reports of the Center Force having turned about and proceeded back to Leyte Gulf. Kinkaid's battleships could easily have been used, had they been needed. As you said, most still had plenty of ammunition.
A great piece on the Battle of Leyte Gulf. I think on par with EB Potter and I was fortunate to learn of the Battle from him (and my Dad with at Leyte in the Army). And yes the heroics of Taffy 3. I need to listen to the Victory at Sea episode now. Nice description of the probs of logistics and ship overhaul. That might be a good historical piece in the future. Tks!
Trivia time: 5 of those old battleships were at Pearl Harbor, but only 2 (West Virginia & California) actually sank into the mud. The other 3 were damaged but in less than 3 months were back at sea, at which point the US had more battleships available than did Japan.
I'd love to hear your analysis of the role logistics played in Halsey running his fleet straight into Typhoon Cobra, as well as the decision-making more generally (as you did in this video). I've read "Halsey's Typhoon," but I'd love to learn more. :)
"Grey Steel and Black Oil" by Thomas Wildenberg is a good book about the development of US UNREP from 1912 to 1995. It is out of print, but is available online for free. It has some good information on how the fleet oilers and logistics ships were part of the maritime strategy of War Plan Orange and how the procurement of these ships was integrated into the various legislative acts, as well as the technical aspects of the ships and equipment.
@wgowshippng I also echo your endorsement of Hornfishcher's "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors." His "Neptune's Inferno" about the campaign around Guadalcanal is equally riveting. Have you put out a video or list of recommended reading?
Sal, great content! I think it is generally assumed that 7th fleet was running low on consumables, as they had been involved in the shore bombardment the previous day. I'm replying at 22:42, so I'm sure you will cover the conflicting & confused orders coming out of 3rd fleet concerning the perception, by 7th Fleet & PACCOM, that their fast BBs had been detached to cover the approaches to Leyte; which we now know, never happened.
Thank you Sal. I always get chills when I hear about the Battle of Leyte. I was a Sailor on the USS Conserver in the early 90’s . I never saw combat but i thought I was a bad ass. But after reading Last Stand of the Tin Can sailors I find myself wondering if I could have been brave enough to stand shoulder to shoulder with those true world class badasses of Taffey 3. Thank you for a more nuanced explanation of the battle.
A great video and analysis as usual ! Please correct if I am wrong but I don't think the escort carriers in the Taffy groups were equipped with armor piercing rounds. They mostly (if not exclusively) had high explosive and anti personnel bombs which are not effective against battleships and cruisers. I know some of the planes without bombs or torpedoes were strafing the bridges of the Japanese vessels.
I have read several accounts that stated the same thing. The escort carriers were not stocked with heavy armor piercing bombs. Also read one account that the 7th Fleets battleships were carrying mostly high explosive shells for shore bombardment and had 25% (or less) armor-piercing rounds. I wonder how many of that 25% had already been expended at Surigao Strait?
They carried torpedoes and were expended straight away. What is forgotten us Taffy 2 was just 20 mes away to the SE, and it was them launching attack after attack on Japanese ships. Haruna had some token pit shots at them at 830am but after a Natoma attack by 3 torpedo Avengers, joined up with Kurita's force again in pummelling Taffy 3. Taffy 2 and 3 launched 440 plane sorties across the day, the most ever by any USN carrier force against Japanese Navy on any given day.
Your enthusiasm for navy history is contagious, but for us land lubbers, it was a lot to take in and keep up with on all the different things going on. The graphics were helpful, but animations would have been super helpful to understand and digest the different battles. Just something to think about as the channel continues to grow and get stronger. How can this additional capability be brought to bear…not all the time, but for certain videos?
“The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…” "Amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics" Sal, you are in good company. 2 minutes in, and you are already conjuring Sun Tzu and Bradley in my mind. Can't wait to see the remaining 29:30!
Terrific episode, Sal. Although from the title I was expecting you to talk about fuel and ammo supplies low, or not, and why not, and so forth. 🙂 The efforts of the "Taffy's" would have been even more effective if there had been some way to get more anti-ship munitions to their escort carriers quickly. Still hoping you'll be able to get to the WSJ report the Russians have been providing the Houthis with satellite data....
Interesting analysis. I think the big question, that isn’t knowable, is when the combatants sight each other if in different positions and how good the communications might have been.
The rate of fire from Oldendorf's force is substantial. While they were short on armor piercing rounds, they could certainly range their fire with HE rounds.
At 17:38, on the map of Surigao Strait it shows the left flank cruisers. The middle ship shown is the USS. Minneapolis, my dad's ship! I'd love to take a cruise through that area and see what it's like today. I wouldn't have to travel far since I live in Subic Bay. There's a lot of WW2 history on these islands.
West Virginia was the lowest with 107 rounds of AP and 175 HE on board. Pennsylvania had 360 AP and 93 HE. Also, Kurita would have expanded rounds in fighting Taffy 3, including AP as they thought they had run into TF38.
I think you answered your own question there Sal. The thing was if he was out at sea where you've said, I'm not sure he'd have the intel advantage, recon, time to effectively intercept Kurita's force. Also the turnaround time for aircraft, they have to get back as well. They could have harried the force, I'm not sure they could have disabled it by air alone. I don't think they could have had the massed strike to guarantee effective kills. At best they could have delayed and that would have been at noted risk, if not cost for the carrier groups. Sure, it would have allowed Oldendorf's battleships into that fight and it would have made a world of difference there. Communications, time to just get messages out and around? That takes time. At situations like this? I try not to project too much onto them. Less forward with their knowledge, not looking back with our knowledge. We're not psychic, we can't guess other people's intention. We can see what they do. I can appreciate the stories, I can even enjoy parts of the stories. The worst thing I can do is put myself in the stories, thinking that I would have been able to make better decisions. I really wish more of the PT boats in Surigao Strait was known. Those boys? Sailors? They did some amazing work. How masterfully the Japanese force was tracked up the strait? It's also been a while since I really deep dived into this. I may have some detailed confused.
I'm guilty. I get drawn into the epic story of the Johnston every time. I always argue that the names of John Paul Jone's ships should always been in the fleet,( Ranger and Bonhomme Richard). I would add the Johnston to that list. Thanks as always for the video Sal.
Some points. This was a Hail Mary play by the IJN. Which completely failed. The level of surprise achieved by the IJN is on a December 7th level. The US Navy was reacting to Japanese naval threats. It wasn’t being proactive.
My Dad served aboard USS Tangier AV-8. E-2 Seaman at Pearl Harbor 1941 - E-8 Aviation Ordinance 1946 Discharged. Primary duty, 50 cal Browning maintenance +++ for PBYs Operated out of Northern New Guinea, July - Sep 1944, prior to Layete Gulf. Night Air Recon, SAR + whatever 7th Fleet called.😊
Check out the Unauthorized History of the Pacific War episodes on the sequence of battles leading to Leyte Gulf. Halsey was in charge and, well…”the world wonders.”
Home of the Fighting Camels? Man, I'd like to see that - real camels fighting. Or ... maybe not ...Good luck to your team, Sal. Cheers Gosh, these were great men who fought these incredible battles with a pretty formidable enemy. I wonder, does America have such men anymore? Does anyone?
Naval history, interesting stuff. I did a little short of a month at sea for Carrier Quals aboard Lexington CV16 in the very early 70's. Much respect for all WWII sailors and "The Blue Ghost" doing her part during Leyte Gulf. USN PR2 1971-75
Maybe my information has been superseded but I learned that Oldendorf’s BBs shot most of their heavy ammunition at Surigao and had to replenish the next morning, so were not available when Kurtis appeared off Samar.
No. They were not replenishing but they were not at full loads. However 6 BBs crossing the T as the Japanese approach the Gulf in single file in daylight would have been an intersting target. Also, the Japanese fleet was there to bombard the anchorage so also had a mixed load of shells.
The old standard battle ships didn't have much anti-ship ammo to have done battle with the Central Force. Also, the escort carriers' planes were setup for attacking land targets verse having armored piercing ammo or torpedoes.
well, Sal, in regards to the shirt; my mama always said that if you didnt have anything nice to say dont say anything at all, so and the history was pretty good too I guess
Everyone but Halsey did their job and his was a phenomenal blunder. Mariannes proved the Japanese carriers had not ability to affect a US fleet. The KNEW Japan as on its last leg Naval Aviators via attack , they had seen it. Blind obsession by a sick Haley and possibly aided by Nimitz. Mitscher did exactly what he should have, protect the Invasion Fleet and Nimitz was part of that decision if not driving it. The only change was Halsey in charge and he hosed it. They knew from Guadalcanal on you had to protect the Invasion fleet not go skylarking.
I just had my 80th birthday on October 12 2024 my father was at the battle of Layte Gulf on the USS Perserver ARS 8 a minesweeper that was bombed that went down the smokestack that didn’t go off my father retired a CBM in 1962
I'm not sure if any or all 3 of my uncles in the Pacific in WW2 were there or close. All 3 mentioned Ulithi atoll being the center of their life lines, then Hawaii.
one of the things ive come to appreciate about the US military and US super-power superpowers, is the ability to have complex worldwide logistics. learning about WW2 and the Pacific War especially. poor Japan also probably had its biggest failure, and biggest indirect cause of their soldiers deaths, from a failure of logistics. 🤔🤔🤔👀👀👀👀
Just wondering about detection of Center Force if Taffy group at been 50 miles out. Combat air patrol... maybe? The mis-identification of the Taffy group as fast carriers by the Japanese had CF commit to an engagement that took up 1.5 hours or so (?). Without that "distraction" from their main objective, how far into Leyte Gulf might CF intruded? Enough to seriously damage the landing force, even if Oldendorf annihilated them on the way out with support from the other Taffy air groups?
Sal, this retired U. S. Naval Officer immensely enjoyed and appreciated your presentation. Well done!
Thank you! I am glad you enjoyed it.
Your channel is one of the few I trust and always enjoy viewing. My father served as a Navy corpsman during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Thanks!
involved in the battle? I'd be interested in hearing more if so. i'm an army vet, my dad was a navy vet during vietnam. i cherish our military oral history.
there is one problem with "second Surigao" idea - Oldendorffs BBs are almost out of ammo, and what few shells they have remaining are High Explosives loaded for the shore bombardment ...
And against 18 inch shells from Yamato, it would be likely that old BBs would end up being Hooded.
And crossing the T would provide scores of IJN DDs ideal target for the long lances.
Love the WW2 history! As per usual I learn much each time I watch an episode.
Thanks for watching!
I love your passion on Naval and Maritime issues old and new.
Don't forget another great channel. "The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War". Always a great conversation.
Love those guys
Not always, but occasionally, dep on the guest ...
Enjoyable and informative. One point about Oldendorf's BBs, IIRC, their ammunition mix was along the lines of 90% HC and 10% AP.
It's always exciting to hear historians mention USS Pennsylvania, BB-38, in discussions of these battles. My Grandfather, CDR Charles Jackson was the Executive Officer of Pennsy at this time. I like to say that all but one of the officers and men (that being the CO) aboard reported to him. Pennsy was one of the first to receive targeting radar, so her radar was one of the most ancient of the fleet. That is credited to be a reason that in the epic crossing of the T engagement she didn't fire a shot. In spite of that, Pennsy fired more rounds than any other BB for the entire war.
Great discussion of the battle but I was expecting more about the logistics per se. How close were the resupply ships? Were there oilers? What was the fuel situation on both sides? When Halsey was returning from finishing off the decoys, was he low on fuel? Thanks anyhow for the great discussion of tactics.
The USS Canberra CAG-2 during WW2 was the USS Canberra CA-70. The ship took part in the Battle of the Philippine Sea 19-20 June 1944. After the war she was mothballed. She was resurrected along with the USS Boston CAG-1 to become the World's first and second guided missile ships. I was a Gunner's Mate Missiles (18 years old, working on the launchers and delivery system) sailor onboard during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Presidential Flagship for President Kennedy. We went to Bermuda when Kennedy was there. He was scheduled to return on the ship, but was called home for a health emergency his dad was having, so he flew back instead.
Task Force Taffy-3 put on the single most amazing fight in the entire history of the US Navy. Adm. Sprague made the absolutely best choices possible under the circumstances, and then the epic actions of Commander Ernest Evans aboard the USS. Johnston, Lt.Cmdr Robert Copeland aboard the USS. Samuel B. Roberts (And hasn't THAT turned into a storied name.) and the other captains of the escorts as well as the amazing actions of the pilots attacking with everything, and sometimes, nothing, This battle deserves to be remembered for all of time, for amazing heroics and some incredible lessons to be learned.
The action of Taffy-3 was so brave and insane that the japanese sailors didin't dare to shoot american survivors, and they even salute them in ave and admiration.
I'm sorry but you may be missing the point. Taffy-3 fought a magnificent and famouse action and that was brilliant.
Sal points out that Taffy-3 was out of position, and because of that, an opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat on the Japanese Center Force was missed.
A great post. When I saw the title though I thought you'd be speaking about the massive supply undertaking that enabled TF38 to remain at sea for so song. Would make a great post with your experience in that field.
I agree -- that is what I was expecting. Twenty years later, I served on an oiler off Viet Nam that had just arrived in the Pacific as the preparatory operations mentioned by Sal were starting.
Me 3 ...
The Princeton was a light carrier. Not a fleet carrier. No Essex class was lost some pretty badly damaged. But the crews damage control was second to non by 1944. And it shows in the battle off of Lattye Gulf and later off of Okinawa in 1945.
Sal, please explain micro-logistics on how the oilers and supply ships --resupplied all the task forces to accomplish the victory!
Check out my Six Oilers video.
th-cam.com/video/gv6lfke6lEY/w-d-xo.htmlsi=bDFOWl1CCPYLsI6J
Sal: Thank you for the great presentation. I am going to break this into several responses. As far a Taffy 3 positioning: Interesting but I don't' believe the Jeep Carriers (as opposed to the light carriers) were configuration for Ship Attack in their munitions load outs. No Dive bombers and worse, I don't believe they had any Torpedoes. Taffy 2 attacks sunk nothing and they would have been able to select if they had torpedoes and the Avengers crews may not have even been trained for that as they were Anti Sub and bombing.
An excellent overview of the battle. So many narratives get so caught up in the details, as important though they are, that it is hard to see the forest for the trees. Showing the separate actions superimposed along the tallies of the ships present and lost is extremely helpful. And many narratives also tend to give the impression that if it were not for Taffy 3, Force A would have simply swept in unopposed which you point out would not necessarily have been the case. Thank you for this video.
Re:Taffy 3 and their position and Kurita Attack in Leyte Gulf itself.
Firstly, it was assumed TF34 had been formed and was guarding San Bernardino Strait. That CVE were launching local anti sub and recon/search patrols for Sibuyan Sea is probably one of the reasons they were where they were.
2. The map doesn't really show it, but Taffy is just 20 miles to SE of Taffy 3 at 7am, start of the battle. So both Taffy were in the area, that's 12 carriers. By 830, Haruna had become the eastern most ship and was firing on Taffy 2. Natoma Bay launched a strike of 3 Avengers to specifically attack the Haruna which scared her off with some close torpedo near misses
3. Across the day, these 2 escort carriers groups had launched 440 sorties against the Japanese ships, the most by any carrier force in the history of naval warfare (and record still stands today).
4. Task Force 38.1, the detached fast carrier force despatched for rest/maintenance turned around and launched 100 planes, about 300miles out, the furthest US carrier strike attack on IJN during the war, which arrived at 1330 over the Japanese. So this unit was still within range on the 25th to lend assistance if it was required (which it was obviously).
5. Three of Oldendorf old battleships were out of armour piercing. The 2 BBs that didn't fire at Force C had old radar sets and shell splashed from other BBs were confusing their operators. So in case of a battle vs Kurita they could at least fire something that could hurt Kurita's ships. The 3 other BBs only had high explosive or anti personel shells. Useless against even Kongos. The old BBs were stocked for shore bombardment not naval combat. The fact 3 BBs expended their Armour piercing stock against 1 old battleship over 15minutes doesn't bode well for prolong engagement vs Yamato and Nagato.
4. Yamato and Nagato had at least a 4 knot speed advantage over the standards, so in theory, could stand off and shell the old BBs until they ran out of shells themselves.
Lastly, if Japanese were to retreat, their plan was to head south either force Surigao Strait or go around Mindanao if they were that far south.
Japanese only retreated through San Bernardino because there was no US forces present there and it was closer after Kurita turned north to reform at 910am.
PS: thank you for using Japanese parlance - Force A and B (in 1st Diversionary Attack Force, not Center Force) and Force C and 2nd Diversionary Attack Force (5th Fleet) as well as Main Body for the carriers. These names help cloud the judgement of the codebreakers on the staff in the fleet and confusing the Americans on what specific roles the ships/admirals would be playing in the Sho Plan.
Too many US source dumb in down to make a confusing battle more understandable. The Japanese names makes the confusion by USN in 1944 more understandable too
I recently watched “The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War”’s multi-part discussion of Leyte Gulf. Somehow you added some vital elements to the picture (wasn’t aware of MacArthur’s instructions to Halsey pre-battle, nor the dispositions of Taffy 3, for example). Great job! My uncle was serving aboard the patrol frigate USS Muskogee of the 7th Fleet (manned by a US Coast Guard crew), patrolling the entrance of Leyte Gulf that morning. But for the valor of Taffy 3, he might have had the unpleasant experience of witnessing the IJN center force bearing straight down at his ship!
G.A.F. Task Force was so close into shore off Samar because they were providing G.S. to the U.S. troops ashore on Leyte and could not effectively conduct Flight-Ops in the crowded area of Leyte Gulf which was full of all the transports, supply ships and surface units conducting NGFS in support of the landings. CV Captains also have to always keep their mind on being in an area where they can go full speed and turn into the wind in order to be able to launch the airplanes of the day. If you were to superimpose the positions of all the landing ships, supply transports and associated ships that were crowded into the Leyte Gulf area, then you would see how impossible CV Operations would have been there. But still you did a great review of this combinations of battles. 👍
Thanks for the added dimension of our discussion about what if.... New aspects to the battle I had not considered, now have I heard anyone else bring them up.
I love the idea of doing a wargame like Sal suggested, where the escort carriers are off to the side, and Oldendorf's BB's come in from the South. Yamato would have kicked the crap out of the old battleships. But adding that all 18 of the escort carriers would have been able to coordinate their strikes..... Thanks, for the idea, Sal!
Thank you Prof. for your thought-provoking logistics behind the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
Saul your so right, "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors" is fantastic, I made the mistake of thinking I would read a chapter before going to sleep, next thing I knew the sun was rising.
The book is badly outdated and a lot of the details, and even much of the overall narrative, has been debunked by more recent American scholarship.
My Dad and 4 of his brothers and a brother-in-law were all participants in the operation.
Excellent! I'm delighted to be a new subscriber.
I got to go SCUBA diving at Truk a couple years ago and that was the experience of a lifetime. Operation hailstone.
I appreciated the analysis. The US battleships were not top of the line battleships, which is why they US purposely avoids using them in battle against ships until Surigao. Those battleships had a finite number of armor piercing rounds and wouldn't have had enough to defeat Kurita's force had it been tasked to take it on. Especially during daylight. Sprague is where he is to support the landings. The closef he is to shore, the longer his aircraft can provide cover for the invasion. 3rd Fleet was supposed to be watching the straits while 7th focused on the invasion. You are right in that the logistics are often forgotten about the battle, especially all of the supply ships dropping off supplies that were the intended target for Kurita.
Actually you are misinformed about the old battleships. With the exception of the Yamato, they were better than any of the Japanese battleships. Two, the Kongo and Haruna, were only battlecruisers and did not have the armor plate of real battleships. Add to that several of the old battleships had new SG radar. The part about the AP rds but they would not have needed many to destroy the battlecruisers and then concentrate on the Nagato and Yamato. Not to mention there were LOTS of destroyers and they still had a lot of torpedoes left; and since they had been fixed they showed what they could do in Surigao Strait. So it is very unlikely Kurita would have broken through them even after the losses that the other Taffy's would have inflicted.
@@johnhallett5846 HEAVEN KNOWS , Mr Allison ..
Great, great video about a heroic effort. Well done!
Thanks for the history episode.
Thank you. A PoV I hadn’t considered. As always wonderful material. I wonder how the proposed second battleship did in a wargame (someone must of done it in the past 80 years). I was expecting a discussion on the importance of fleet oilers along with the USN developing replenishment at sea.
Sal, Your passion for history is epic. Again, your students are fortunate to have your guidance.
Awesome stuff
Thanks Sal
Such good narration 👍👍
One issue with the escort carriers and the old standard class battleships is they just didn’t have much anti shipping ordinance loaded. They were setup for ground attack and anti submarine work.
Torpedos would have needed to work overtime to take down Yamato.
Thanks!
Welcome!
Great episode… love the military focus. Please do more military style episodes; again, great job!
What a great channel, news, updates, industry explainations & history, so much quality information.
My father was there on a mine sweeper. He talked about bombs that were dropped close to the ship. He joked that one sailor said " look at the fish.." another answered that's not fish it's bombs. He and none of the crew were injured.
Great analogy yours was a good job my friend. Keep them coming. Thank you,Sal very interesting
History lecture enjoyable, thank you.
Also see that you have Morison's histories on your book shelves. Great sources.
My Father was there, as an artilleryman waiting to go ashore.
Hey ... I had a great friend who was at the Battle ... He was on a ship in between the beach... He watched the American infantry try to scale The cliffs and get beat back... He saw the first ever kamikaze come over the ridges and head over his head out to the ships at sea... Then he went in and built Bridges all the way to manila... Then they went around to Luzon and went down to Manila again that way
His name was Willis Mann. He became an engineer and innovator at IBM... He was a genius thinker and craftsman and really the very last frontiersman going back to his days in Missouri growing up... The difficulties of his life and his resourceful perseverance through those difficulties brings to mind the saying "A lesser son of greater sires am I"
Among his other wartime accomplishments included working with native guides down river working on the infamous Canol pipeline, befriending a tribal chief and hunting with his son and nephew for "pigeons" on Papua New Guinea and seeing the Princess of a remote allegedly cannibalistic tribe in full regalia on a bluff overlooking his company's march toward Manila from the North...
When Will asked his Phillipino guide if they could encounter the tribal peoples his guide said "if you see them, when you wake up and roll over your head won't roll with you."
I love this stuff and particularly from someone with sea experience. The thing about alternative history is that you are always right.
Regarding a BB vs. BB contest had Kurita continued I think too much credit is given to BB gunnery. At Surigao Strait the BBs landed one, maybe two hits out of the hundreds of shells fired and none were fatal. The real damage was by torpedoes from DDs, etc.
As in earlier surface battles since 1942, the Japanese, for all their aggressive training, always seemed to withdraw when confronted with opposition (Surigao excepted).
Thanks for sharing your knowledge Sal!
From the title of this video “logistics” I thought you were going to focus more on the resupply of carriers and other ships bc of their constant deployment. I’ve read several books about the fatigue the pilots and crews endured during their long deployment and may have contributed to some mistakes. Perhaps you should make a video about how all the bombs, torpedos, 100 octane aircraft fuel, oil for ships, anti aircraft ammunition, food and clothing got from the US West coast to the supply depots in the Pacific Theater by Liberty ships and the sailors on them who weren’t on the more glamorous war ships. When I was in the US Army I was told NEVER piss off the supply sergeant!
Love your stuff, Sal. Also, shout out to the Kings and Generals channel for their great vids on the war in the Pacific.
Leyte is a complex and deeply interesting battle to study. So glad you came at it from the logistics angle as you can’t move or fight without supplies.
Supply is a critical element in any war and especially in this one.
Absolutely.
I was a gunnersmate on an auxiliary AFS with the Ab Lincoln CVBG, 7th Fleet, back in 93.
An observation I witnessed was the constant frequency of UNREP operations that we were carrying out.
Now that I think of it, it would be cool to see the astounding numbers of ordnance, fuel, medical, and repair logistics consumed and required during the entire battle.
Im not a mariner, but as a 20 year Army Armor veteran, i can tell you first hand, the size and strength of your force is made or broken by logistical sustainability.
The Germans in WW2 delivered a master class in how to get logistics wrong and the Japanese weren’t any better (they lost more soldiers to starvation than direct enemy action).
Everytime I hear about Taffy 3, I get goosebumps. Those sailors are genuinely heros. They went up against a huge force, that on paper they had zero chance of winning. Yet do to heros like Lt. Cmr. Ernest E Evans (DD557 USS Johnston), charging into battle launching torpedoes, and firing the 5" batteries. Thise. Led the other DDs and DEs to attack as well, convincing the Japanese that they were leading the main battle force! I am so proud of our US Navy and its brave sailors!
Outstanding, Sal. Mahalo!
Thanks for these............... these are GREAT!
An excellent, slightly unusual view on this huge naval battle.
Excellent arguments about the positioning of Taffy 3 and potential for Oldendorf to take on Kurita's force. Many of Oldendorf's battleships also had the advantage of excellent radar-controlled siting.
Glad to hear you about the old battleships waiting at Surigao Strait. The radar both best and previous best, and a steaming forest of massive doom barrels, and an opera ensemble from PT's, destroyers, cruisers.
As a departing wave to the mighty battleship, it is a worthy signal.
And after naval history, it's auxiliary interest is naval logistics. Something like domestic accounting, distateful in expectation but after which follows a certain satisfied serenity.
I will always wonder what would have happened if an Iowa Class battleship would have gone up against the Yamato. Sal, thanks for the great presentation. Probably one of the best perspectives I've seen in a while.
Very interesting! I'm sure The Battle of Leyte Gulf is also one of the most studied naval battles in history, but you present some fine facts and analyses. When you mentioned "Logistics" I was sure you would point out that most of the Japanese fleet was coming up from the south, in their bases in, what was it, Borneo (then called something different, I can't remember off the top of my head). But, not only were they short of pilots at that point, they were short of oil. Oil was their limiting factor for entering the war, and was also the reason for this one last desperate gamble I thought I read. Fuchida's book, or maybe it was Prange's book about Fuchida, but he says that the IJN was willing to throw everything into this one last gamble in an attempt to, as you said, force America to the peace negotiations table. Obviously, it didn't work.
The other aspects of the battle are all attributable to the "Fog of War". All the light carrier task groups had ground support missions to carry out, and some began earlier in the day. Was was CAF Sprague in so close, I thought I remembered reading that he was in early to get started on his ground support missions, and was "Surprised" with reports of the Center Force having turned about and proceeded back to Leyte Gulf. Kinkaid's battleships could easily have been used, had they been needed. As you said, most still had plenty of ammunition.
A great piece on the Battle of Leyte Gulf. I think on par with EB Potter and I was fortunate to learn of the Battle from him (and my Dad with at Leyte in the Army). And yes the heroics of Taffy 3. I need to listen to the Victory at Sea episode now. Nice description of the probs of logistics and ship overhaul. That might be a good historical piece in the future. Tks!
Great episode Sal. Thoroughly enjoy these history episodes. Many thanks
Trivia time: 5 of those old battleships were at Pearl Harbor, but only 2 (West Virginia & California) actually sank into the mud. The other 3 were damaged but in less than 3 months were back at sea, at which point the US had more battleships available than did Japan.
I'd love to hear your analysis of the role logistics played in Halsey running his fleet straight into Typhoon Cobra, as well as the decision-making more generally (as you did in this video). I've read "Halsey's Typhoon," but I'd love to learn more. :)
"Grey Steel and Black Oil" by Thomas Wildenberg is a good book about the development of US UNREP from 1912 to 1995. It is out of print, but is available online for free. It has some good information on how the fleet oilers and logistics ships were part of the maritime strategy of War Plan Orange and how the procurement of these ships was integrated into the various legislative acts, as well as the technical aspects of the ships and equipment.
@wgowshippng I also echo your endorsement of Hornfishcher's "Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors." His "Neptune's Inferno" about the campaign around Guadalcanal is equally riveting.
Have you put out a video or list of recommended reading?
Sal, great content! I think it is generally assumed that 7th fleet was running low on consumables, as they had been involved in the shore bombardment the previous day. I'm replying at 22:42, so I'm sure you will cover the conflicting & confused orders coming out of 3rd fleet concerning the perception, by 7th Fleet & PACCOM, that their fast BBs had been detached to cover the approaches to Leyte; which we now know, never happened.
Thank you Sal. I always get chills when I hear about the Battle of Leyte. I was a Sailor on the USS Conserver in the early 90’s . I never saw combat but i thought I was a bad ass. But after reading Last Stand of the Tin Can sailors I find myself wondering if I could have been brave enough to stand shoulder to shoulder with those true world class badasses of Taffey 3. Thank you for a more nuanced explanation of the battle.
Great as usual. Keep it up.
A great video and analysis as usual ! Please correct if I am wrong but I don't think the escort carriers in the Taffy groups were equipped with armor piercing rounds. They mostly (if not exclusively) had high explosive and anti personnel bombs which are not effective against battleships and cruisers. I know some of the planes without bombs or torpedoes were strafing the bridges of the
Japanese vessels.
I have read several accounts that stated the same thing. The escort carriers were not stocked with heavy armor piercing bombs. Also read one account that the 7th Fleets battleships were carrying mostly high explosive shells for shore bombardment and had 25% (or less) armor-piercing rounds. I wonder how many of that 25% had already been expended at Surigao Strait?
They carried torpedoes and were expended straight away.
What is forgotten us Taffy 2 was just 20 mes away to the SE, and it was them launching attack after attack on Japanese ships. Haruna had some token pit shots at them at 830am but after a Natoma attack by 3 torpedo Avengers, joined up with Kurita's force again in pummelling Taffy 3.
Taffy 2 and 3 launched 440 plane sorties across the day, the most ever by any USN carrier force against Japanese Navy on any given day.
Your enthusiasm for navy history is contagious, but for us land lubbers, it was a lot to take in and keep up with on all the different things going on. The graphics were helpful, but animations would have been super helpful to understand and digest the different battles. Just something to think about as the channel continues to grow and get stronger. How can this additional capability be brought to bear…not all the time, but for certain videos?
Excellent video. Would like it if you would do more battle analysis vidros
My late Father was a LtJg and XO of LSM-99 at Leyte.
I need to get that book you recommended.
Thank you.
“The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…”
"Amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics"
Sal, you are in good company. 2 minutes in, and you are already conjuring Sun Tzu and Bradley in my mind. Can't wait to see the remaining 29:30!
Terrific episode, Sal. Although from the title I was expecting you to talk about fuel and ammo supplies low, or not, and why not, and so forth. 🙂
The efforts of the "Taffy's" would have been even more effective if there had been some way to get more anti-ship munitions to their escort carriers quickly.
Still hoping you'll be able to get to the WSJ report the Russians have been providing the Houthis with satellite data....
Working on the latter
@@wgowshipping Cool! Good to see you are feeling better!
Thanks Sal
Interesting analysis. I think the big question, that isn’t knowable, is when the combatants sight each other if in different positions and how good the communications might have been.
The rate of fire from Oldendorf's force is substantial. While they were short on armor piercing rounds, they could certainly range their fire with HE rounds.
At 17:38, on the map of Surigao Strait it shows the left flank cruisers. The middle ship shown is the USS. Minneapolis, my dad's ship! I'd love to take a cruise through that area and see what it's like today. I wouldn't have to travel far since I live in Subic Bay. There's a lot of WW2 history on these islands.
Read somewhere that Ohlendorf'' battleships were low on / out of armor piercing ammunition after Surigao action. True?
West Virginia was the lowest with 107 rounds of AP and 175 HE on board. Pennsylvania had 360 AP and 93 HE.
Also, Kurita would have expanded rounds in fighting Taffy 3, including AP as they thought they had run into TF38.
I think you answered your own question there Sal.
The thing was if he was out at sea where you've said, I'm not sure he'd have the intel advantage, recon, time to effectively intercept Kurita's force. Also the turnaround time for aircraft, they have to get back as well.
They could have harried the force, I'm not sure they could have disabled it by air alone. I don't think they could have had the massed strike to guarantee effective kills. At best they could have delayed and that would have been at noted risk, if not cost for the carrier groups.
Sure, it would have allowed Oldendorf's battleships into that fight and it would have made a world of difference there.
Communications, time to just get messages out and around? That takes time. At situations like this? I try not to project too much onto them. Less forward with their knowledge, not looking back with our knowledge. We're not psychic, we can't guess other people's intention. We can see what they do.
I can appreciate the stories, I can even enjoy parts of the stories. The worst thing I can do is put myself in the stories, thinking that I would have been able to make better decisions.
I really wish more of the PT boats in Surigao Strait was known. Those boys? Sailors? They did some amazing work. How masterfully the Japanese force was tracked up the strait?
It's also been a while since I really deep dived into this. I may have some detailed confused.
I'm guilty. I get drawn into the epic story of the Johnston every time. I always argue that the names of John Paul Jone's ships should always been in the fleet,( Ranger and Bonhomme Richard). I would add the Johnston to that list. Thanks as always for the video Sal.
Makes you wonder about the PRC's enormous merchant fleet and it's utility for EW, decoys etc.
Some points. This was a Hail Mary play by the IJN. Which completely failed. The level of surprise achieved by the IJN is on a December 7th level. The US Navy was reacting to Japanese naval threats. It wasn’t being proactive.
empress augusta anniversary is november 1st, you should cover that too. good work. god bless!!!
Roll Humps! Lots of Campbell grads in my wife's family plus a divinity scholarship by her grandparents.
Throughly enjoyed your perspective on the battle of Leyte Gulf. Thank you Sal!
Refueling the aircraft carriers for both Japanese and Americans played a significant tactical and psychological effects during the war.
My Dad served aboard USS Tangier AV-8.
E-2 Seaman at Pearl Harbor 1941 - E-8 Aviation Ordinance 1946 Discharged.
Primary duty, 50 cal Browning maintenance +++ for PBYs
Operated out of Northern New Guinea, July - Sep 1944, prior to Layete Gulf.
Night Air Recon, SAR + whatever 7th Fleet called.😊
Both my Dad and my uncle John were there. RIP 😢
Check out the Unauthorized History of the Pacific War episodes on the sequence of battles leading to Leyte Gulf. Halsey was in charge and, well…”the world wonders.”
Home of the Fighting Camels? Man, I'd like to see that - real camels fighting. Or ... maybe not ...Good luck to your team, Sal. Cheers
Gosh, these were great men who fought these incredible battles with a pretty formidable enemy. I wonder, does America have such men anymore? Does anyone?
Naval history, interesting stuff. I did a little short of a month at sea for Carrier Quals aboard Lexington CV16 in the very early 70's. Much respect for all WWII sailors and "The Blue Ghost" doing her part during Leyte Gulf. USN PR2 1971-75
Maybe my information has been superseded but I learned that Oldendorf’s BBs shot most of their heavy ammunition at Surigao and had to replenish the next morning, so were not available when Kurtis appeared off Samar.
No. They were not replenishing but they were not at full loads. However 6 BBs crossing the T as the Japanese approach the Gulf in single file in daylight would have been an intersting target. Also, the Japanese fleet was there to bombard the anchorage so also had a mixed load of shells.
Wow, thanks.
The old standard battle ships didn't have much anti-ship ammo to have done battle with the Central Force. Also, the escort carriers' planes were setup for attacking land targets verse having armored piercing ammo or torpedoes.
well, Sal, in regards to the shirt; my mama always said that if you didnt have anything nice to say dont say anything at all, so
and the history was pretty good too I guess
Everyone but Halsey did their job and his was a phenomenal blunder. Mariannes proved the Japanese carriers had not ability to affect a US fleet. The KNEW Japan as on its last leg Naval Aviators via attack , they had seen it. Blind obsession by a sick Haley and possibly aided by Nimitz. Mitscher did exactly what he should have, protect the Invasion Fleet and Nimitz was part of that decision if not driving it. The only change was Halsey in charge and he hosed it. They knew from Guadalcanal on you had to protect the Invasion fleet not go skylarking.
I just had my 80th birthday on October 12 2024 my father was at the battle of Layte Gulf on the USS Perserver ARS 8 a minesweeper that was bombed that went down the smokestack that didn’t go off my father retired a CBM in 1962
The Japanese navy loved it’s “decisive battle” doctrine. What would Admiral Mahan think?
I’ve read there a sailors who hadn’t had any liberty time off in over a year
I'm not sure if any or all 3 of my uncles in the Pacific in WW2 were there or close. All 3 mentioned Ulithi atoll being the center of their life lines, then Hawaii.
one of the things ive come to appreciate about the US military and US super-power superpowers, is the ability to have complex worldwide logistics. learning about WW2 and the Pacific War especially. poor Japan also probably had its biggest failure, and biggest indirect cause of their soldiers deaths, from a failure of logistics. 🤔🤔🤔👀👀👀👀
Just wondering about detection of Center Force if Taffy group at been 50 miles out. Combat air patrol... maybe? The mis-identification of the Taffy group as fast carriers by the Japanese had CF commit to an engagement that took up 1.5 hours or so (?). Without that "distraction" from their main objective, how far into Leyte Gulf might CF intruded? Enough to seriously damage the landing force, even if Oldendorf annihilated them on the way out with support from the other Taffy air groups?
Taffy 3 , The Alamo , Custers last Stand .
1 out of 3 ain't bad .
Santa Ana had the last laugh after mosquitoes beat his army in San jacinto... He invented the modern idea of chewing gum.
The one part of WW2 history that needs a very well-done movie.
October 25. Saint Crispins day.
Angicourt
Charge of the light brigade
Battle off Samar (Taffy 3)
Two out of three