I think factors like terrain and geography also somewhat effected the battle of Falaise, it was an extremely narrow area with not much room for flanking, far from the Steppes of Russia and the vast Deserts of North Africa. On August 8th, confident that VII Corps would contain the German attack at Mortain and with Eisenhower visiting his HQ, Bradley phoned Montgomery and suggested that Instead of driving towards the Seine, 12th Army Group wheel north and attack towards Domfont and Sees while the British and Canadians continued attacking towards Conde and Falaise (Operation TOTALIZE) encircling the Germans west of Argentan and Falaise. Montgomery agreed, reserving the option for the deeper encirclement should the Germans escape.
an armored division sent to plug the gap would have been over run by the mass of 100k germans trying to breakout in reverse. Monty wouldn't knowingly give such an order.
I'm still haunted by the image of an infant Bradley in a tiny US helmet throwing his teddy out of the pram. Seriously, a very thought provoking discussion. Thanks to both.
The Prof gave us an excellent presentation today mentioning so many salient facts and analysis. I appreciated his objectivity about a controversial matter. He gave me much to ponder about the developing rift between Monty and Bradley. Poor General Eisenhower trying to keep the kettle from boiling over eh? Our hindsight isn't really fair to those involved in such a fluid situation.
The understatement in Monty's language is typical of British upper-class language of the time, often misunderstood by American officers who spoke much more directly. The best example is when British officers who were at the point of being overrun would radio to headquarters that things were 'a bit sticky' which US commanders thought meant that things were a bit difficult but ok. It is funny, that while XV Corps were racing away from Falaise to take Paris, you had a simultaneous situation with Clark in Italy, abandoning the plan to trap the German Army at Anzio and racing off to Rome, all in the name of glory.
What a great episode Paul & Woody. The maps really helped. Having a magnified focused attention on the events from the Allied side regarding the Falaise campaign was very useful. Thanks again men.x
I am a decades-long fan of the WW2 Polish Armed Forces. My book No Greater Ally on the expatriate military is currently on loan to a local friend of Polish heritage.
Superb presentation...like a dubious undergraduate again locked in by the brilliance of a deeply researched and analytical expert. An inspiration to look beyond simple narratives to understand better the world as it truly is... well done Sir. Unfortunately i currently work for an entity where analysis is focussed solely on the next quarterly profit margins. In 1944 they would have happily never left England...delighted with the array of material assembled 🙄
While quite different, there are nevertheless interesting parallels to Leyte Gulf and the issues/outcomes created by divided command. And Leyte was by and large (with all due respect to the Royal Australian Navy) an exclusively American endeavor!
Interesting presentation that sort of reinforced some of my own general feelings about the Falaise pocket (so it must be correct). In hindsight it does seem like a missed opportunity. Why weren’t the German 7th Army and 5th Panzer Army encircled and destroyed like the 6th Army at Stalingrad? It seems like the dynamics of coalition warfare almost prevented any single action dramatic event like some of those achieved by the Soviets. The one real attempt at that was Market/Garden which, though American divisions were involved, was really run by 21st Army Group. The value of the functioning coalition was more critical than any single dramatic action in the end.
Smithsonian Magazine During World War II, the Liberation of Paris Saved the French Capital From Destruction WEB Aug 23, 2024 · In August 1944, an uprising by French resistance fighters forced the Allies to intervene Adolf Hitler wanted Paris razed. Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted his troops to stay out of the city. In August 1944, an uprising by French resistance fighters forced the Allies to intervene.
This was excellent. To me Montgomery's language strikes me as a bit of British understatement, which I think was much more common at the time, plus an unwillingness to be too direct towards Bradley, who he knew that in reality he was not in a position to give orders to.
@@WW2TV Really? Montgomery, later on, wasn't unwilling to attempt to virtually give orders to Eisenhower. Montgomery treated Eisenhower patronizingly and, at times, with utter disdain. It's hard to believe that he was reluctant to give orders to Bradley especially since during "Falaise" Montgomery served as overall ground commander. I am amused by this absolute refusal to criticize Montgomery for failing to act responsibly as a coalition commander. His disdain for Americans was only matched by his disdain for Canadians. Montgomery the spoiled child actor to whom everybody had to differ. Montgomery was a competent general but not so brilliant that everybody had to defer to his arrogance and pseudo-superiority in order to be led by his genius. Let's get real here.
I have never said Monty was a perfect commander. Was there ever a perfect commander? If Monty was a "spoiled child actor" then he was one of several British and American Generals who were very similar
@@WW2TV Of course there were prima donna Americans and "characters", but they were not the Ground Commander in Normandy and responsible for a force of coalition armies. Once again, you will only criticize Montgomery by saying "Yeah but there were others like him." There were no others like him and the others were not Ground commander. Just suck it up for once and admit it. Montgomery was in charge and any failures are on him. If Bradley was in charge then I'd blame him. By the way Beetle Smith stated after the war that one of the biggest mistakes he and Ike made was having an overall Ground Commander for Overlord/Normandy instead of having both Bradley and Montgomery in a structure reporting directly to Ike as Supreme Allied Commander .
I have criticised Monty on several occasions, but at the end of the day, I have an opinion and I'm broadly speaking a Montyphile, not a Montyphobe. I don't think Monty was particularly at fault for Falaise, for me Bradley takes that share. But of course Monty has to shoulder much of the blame for Market Garden, but definitely not all. As Paul Latawski said in this show, often blame can be shared by many.
I suggest the Falaise Pocket operation might have been Eisenhower's poorest showing in WWII. Having HQ in England instead of the continent, although creating cumbersome communications, is not reason enough to excuse his performance. Overall, Eisenhower did a very good job. This was another outstanding podcast. I am running out of superlatives and have become redundant. :)
Had we bickering allies bagged the hole German army, wouldn’t we still have run into a revitalized west wall at about the same places?Were the escaping Germans more effective at manning bunkers with mg 42’s than whatever troops the Germans would have thrown together? I think this was still a big win. Germans rendered mission incapable, Monty had a plan for Normandy and it worked. Interesting show!
Excellent Paul, great guest. I'm half way through Al's book and also just caught a presentation on Leyte Gulf. Its funny how command problems and commander personalities seem to chime throughout. Its almost as if beforehand the top fella should have taken everyone out for a beer and a curry and get to know everyone. ps First class Q&A. I actually tend to avoid commenting if I catch a presentation live, I just find it distracting. You do a great job with keying up the guest, commenting on the side bar and then coming up with great questions of your own
For Market Garden, it was one road. Falsaise was not managed by one tactical commander. Anchor the Canadians and Poles. Let 3rd Army do an uppercut and fleeing German army runs into the dug in British. Let Monty and Bradley stick to logistics and strategy. Patton, Collins, and Rose keep pushing to block the Seine. But there's no do overs when the cork isn't pushed in the bottle. There is too much interference from on high, bad political decisions from generals that aren't on scene. Ce Damage, It's too bad. Now, like Messina, Jerry got away again, and they were ours if the Allies were decisive.
Patton's Gap was well explained, Bradley sent Patton off to Paris for a photo shoot, but at least he admitted he had no intention of closing the gap and encircling German 7th Army. I never though the Americans had a "command style", it was more a case of throwing men at the objective until it fell. My regret is that in doing so American casualties were horrific. Bradley was getting 100.000 replacements per month yet by November 1944 was writing complaining to Eisenhower he was critically running out of troops!
By winter his GI's were losing 70,000 men to their boot design giving those numbers Trench foot in the rain,mud ,snow. Its his own countries equipment failures. The way they lost men in Brest/Hurtgen and Wherever was going through them as well
@@WW2TV I agree with Paul. Words matter. Lee's orders to Ewell regarding Culp's Hill on Day 1: " . . . carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable."
Pretty well much every (non-trivial) argument over anything boils down to an argument about semantics. If everything is clear, then where's the argument? It's when things are not clear, and capable of bring interpreted in different ways, that you get into an argument.
An absolutely outstanding presentation by Prof. Latawski! He outlines clearly the major issues, and his conclusions are convincing based on the evidence he presents. Thank you, Paul, for acquainting us with another brilliant WW2 historian.
Where was 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade during this operation? The maps show 4th Canadian Armoured Division and 1st Polish Armoured Division. Was 2nd Armoured brigade parcelled out to support Canadian infantry battalions of 2nd and 3rd Division as in the case with the destruction of Worthington Force?
Totally engrossing presentation. As I stated on sidebar, a) fascinated in the deployment of such an attack, b) saddened by the brutality all round of war, c) infuriated by lack of command structure, decision making etc that cost lives. We have 80 years of hindsight to make these evaluations, and I thought they were explained expertly.
Good to see that while Mark Clark is in Italy herding his donkeys, in spirit he's fully behind the first American general named after an armored personel carrier, Omar Bradley. Bradley sees a shiny capitol and in the best Clarksion tradition he just has to have it. As the saying above the West Point souvenir shop says: "War is a continuation of real estate development by other means."
But there is reading it, and the interpretation. Just like doing literature at school. You read a passage then the prof discusses what is meant - same thing here
Woody, I can but point out that Dr. Cirilo the other day said that the Germans abandoned 20,000 vehicles for lack of fuel. Dr. Latawski says they got 28,000 vehicles back across the Seine. He had noted Montgomery’s claim that every bridge over the Seine was blown. How to figure that in I don't know. In re XV U.S. Corps heading for Paris. I'm pretty sure that a deeper envelopment was discussed. In any case Patton was always going to fill the unforgiving minute with sixty seconds run. Lastly, Montgomery was one of the most bloody generals of all time. The way he conducted operations was always going to generate a bloodbath among his own men. His ideas never advanced beyond World War One.
As a General, Montgomery had a lower casualty ratio while facing Germany’s BEST. Patton had a higher casualty ratio while facing Germany’s WORST. Even the the German commander in the Lorraine, Herman’s Balck said it was the worst army he ever took charge of. It still stoped Patton in the Lorraine, inflicting 55,000 casualties on him, which was DOUBLE that of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group casualties in autumn 1944 in the Netherlands and the Scheldt campaigns combined. Montgomery’s Scheldt campaign was the only Allied campaign of autumn 1944 to succeed in its objectives.
P.s. You do realise that Operation Chariot succeeding was nothing short of a miracle? It was a suicide mission and if it hadn’t succeeded, it would’ve had zero value or point. The risks were far too great, for very little actual strategic advantage, other than boosting morale.
Whether or not Chariot was worthwhile is another subject though. It had no bearing on Normandy or OMG 2 years later. For a start, only 265 Commandos took part in Chariot not 500 and the total number of deaths was 169, including RN. If Chariot had not occurred, those same Commandos would have been used elsewhere in 1942 anyway. Indeed No. 2 Commando rebuilt and fought on in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Yugoslavia. So even if Chariot doesn't take place, No. 2 Commando never become an asset that could have been used in Normandy or Market Garden, as they were busy fighting in the MTO. So I'm sorry but your point makes absolutely no sense whatsoever
I think factors like terrain and geography also somewhat effected the battle of Falaise, it was an extremely narrow area with not much room for flanking, far from the Steppes of Russia and the vast Deserts of North Africa. On August 8th, confident that VII Corps would contain the German attack at Mortain and with Eisenhower visiting his HQ, Bradley phoned Montgomery and suggested that Instead of driving towards the Seine, 12th Army Group wheel north and attack towards Domfont and Sees while the British and Canadians continued attacking towards Conde and Falaise (Operation TOTALIZE) encircling the Germans west of Argentan and Falaise. Montgomery agreed, reserving the option for the deeper encirclement should the Germans escape.
I really like listening to paul talk. I learned so many new and interesting facts that i'd never thought about before. thank you
an armored division sent to plug the gap would have been over run by the mass of 100k germans trying to breakout in reverse. Monty wouldn't knowingly give such an order.
I'm still haunted by the image of an infant Bradley in a tiny US helmet throwing his teddy out of the pram. Seriously, a very thought provoking discussion. Thanks to both.
Thanks gentlemen. Balanced, thorough, and objective. I feel privileged to have seen and walked a fair bit of this ground. What say, Dennis P?
The Prof gave us an excellent presentation today mentioning so many salient facts and analysis. I appreciated his objectivity about a controversial matter. He gave me much to ponder about the developing rift between Monty and Bradley. Poor General Eisenhower trying to keep the kettle from boiling over eh? Our hindsight isn't really fair to those involved in such a fluid situation.
The understatement in Monty's language is typical of British upper-class language of the time, often misunderstood by American officers who spoke much more directly. The best example is when British officers who were at the point of being overrun would radio to headquarters that things were 'a bit sticky' which US commanders thought meant that things were a bit difficult but ok. It is funny, that while XV Corps were racing away from Falaise to take Paris, you had a simultaneous situation with Clark in Italy, abandoning the plan to trap the German Army at Anzio and racing off to Rome, all in the name of glory.
Not just Monty though, as we said in the show, Ike's directives could be equally ambiguous
Outstanding presentation.
Excellent - enjoyed the presentation and more and this subject. Thank you gentlemen.
What a great episode Paul & Woody. The maps really helped. Having a magnified focused attention on the events from the Allied side regarding the Falaise campaign was very useful. Thanks again men.x
I am a decades-long fan of the WW2 Polish Armed Forces. My book No Greater Ally on the expatriate military is currently on loan to a local friend of Polish heritage.
Superb presentation...like a dubious undergraduate again locked in by the brilliance of a deeply researched and analytical expert. An inspiration to look beyond simple narratives to understand better the world as it truly is... well done Sir. Unfortunately i currently work for an entity where analysis is focussed solely on the next quarterly profit margins. In 1944 they would have happily never left England...delighted with the array of material assembled 🙄
While quite different, there are nevertheless interesting parallels to Leyte Gulf and the issues/outcomes created by divided command. And Leyte was by and large (with all due respect to the Royal Australian Navy) an exclusively American endeavor!
Interesting presentation that sort of reinforced some of my own general feelings about the Falaise pocket (so it must be correct). In hindsight it does seem like a missed opportunity. Why weren’t the German 7th Army and 5th Panzer Army encircled and destroyed like the 6th Army at Stalingrad? It seems like the dynamics of coalition warfare almost prevented any single action dramatic event like some of those achieved by the Soviets. The one real attempt at that was Market/Garden which, though American divisions were involved, was really run by 21st Army Group. The value of the functioning coalition was more critical than any single dramatic action in the end.
Excellent Presentation. Thank you
A marvellous discussion. Fascinating.
Smithsonian Magazine
During World War II, the Liberation of Paris Saved the French Capital From Destruction
WEB Aug 23, 2024 · In August 1944, an uprising by French resistance fighters forced the Allies to intervene Adolf Hitler wanted Paris razed. Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted his troops to stay out of the city. In August 1944, an uprising by French resistance fighters forced the Allies to intervene.
Yep, we did shows on this last month
Someone was asking about a book. It’s Ruckzug by Jocahim Ludewig.
yeah good talk-but I think bradley took his eye of the ball and missed the closure opportunity
Excellent and detailed high level look at the battle of Falaise. Thanks Dr. Latawski, Paul!
A very interesting presentation with an even look at the issues and responsibility.
This was excellent. To me Montgomery's language strikes me as a bit of British understatement, which I think was much more common at the time, plus an unwillingness to be too direct towards Bradley, who he knew that in reality he was not in a position to give orders to.
I agree
@@WW2TV Really? Montgomery, later on, wasn't unwilling to attempt to virtually give orders to Eisenhower. Montgomery treated Eisenhower patronizingly and, at times, with utter disdain. It's hard to believe that he was reluctant to give orders to Bradley especially since during "Falaise" Montgomery served as overall ground commander. I am amused by this absolute refusal to criticize Montgomery for failing to act responsibly as a coalition commander. His disdain for Americans was only matched by his disdain for Canadians. Montgomery the spoiled child actor to whom everybody had to differ. Montgomery was a competent general but not so brilliant that everybody had to defer to his arrogance and pseudo-superiority in order to be led by his genius. Let's get real here.
I have never said Monty was a perfect commander. Was there ever a perfect commander? If Monty was a "spoiled child actor" then he was one of several British and American Generals who were very similar
@@WW2TV Of course there were prima donna Americans and "characters", but they were not the Ground Commander in Normandy and responsible for a force of coalition armies. Once again, you will only criticize Montgomery by saying
"Yeah but there were others like him." There were no others like him and the others were not Ground commander. Just suck it up for once and admit it. Montgomery was in charge and any failures are on him. If Bradley was in charge then I'd blame him.
By the way Beetle Smith stated after the war that one of the biggest mistakes he and Ike made was having an overall Ground Commander for Overlord/Normandy instead of having both Bradley and Montgomery in a structure reporting directly to Ike as Supreme Allied Commander .
I have criticised Monty on several occasions, but at the end of the day, I have an opinion and I'm broadly speaking a Montyphile, not a Montyphobe. I don't think Monty was particularly at fault for Falaise, for me Bradley takes that share. But of course Monty has to shoulder much of the blame for Market Garden, but definitely not all. As Paul Latawski said in this show, often blame can be shared by many.
I suggest the Falaise Pocket operation might have been Eisenhower's poorest showing in WWII. Having HQ in England instead of the continent, although creating cumbersome communications, is not reason enough to excuse his performance. Overall, Eisenhower did a very good job. This was another outstanding podcast. I am running out of superlatives and have become redundant. :)
Ike's HQ was in Normandy
Come on Shakespeare - you have more superlatives, I just know it!
@@WW2TV My mistake. I heard Dr. Latawski mention Ike's HQ being in Britain. I missed/forgot he moved his HQ @ a week before the Pocket battle.
Had we bickering allies bagged the hole German army, wouldn’t we still have run into a revitalized west wall at about the same places?Were the escaping Germans more effective at manning bunkers with mg 42’s than whatever troops the Germans would have thrown together? I think this was still a big win. Germans rendered mission incapable, Monty had a plan for Normandy and it worked. Interesting show!
Interesting point of view - thank you
Excellent Paul, great guest. I'm half way through Al's book and also just caught a presentation on Leyte Gulf. Its funny how command problems and commander personalities seem to chime throughout. Its almost as if beforehand the top fella should have taken everyone out for a beer and a curry and get to know everyone.
ps First class Q&A. I actually tend to avoid commenting if I catch a presentation live, I just find it distracting. You do a great job with keying up the guest, commenting on the side bar and then coming up with great questions of your own
Yes, Paul really multitasks well!
@@ToddSauve He does, usually leaves me thinking "Why didn't I think of that"
Learned a lot! Cheers to a wonderful presentation
Hope you also cover Stillwell's command problems
Maybe one day
Oh lord. That would take volumes!
Totally fascinating as usual. Looking forward to watching it again.
As usual, very good presentation, great talk. Enjoyed this one a lot!
For Market Garden, it was one road. Falsaise was not managed by one tactical commander.
Anchor the Canadians and Poles. Let 3rd Army do an uppercut and fleeing German army runs into the dug in British.
Let Monty and Bradley stick to logistics and strategy. Patton, Collins, and Rose keep pushing to block the Seine. But there's no do overs when the cork isn't pushed in the bottle.
There is too much interference from on high, bad political decisions from generals that aren't on scene. Ce Damage, It's too bad. Now, like Messina, Jerry got away again, and they were ours if the Allies were decisive.
Patton's Gap was well explained, Bradley sent Patton off to Paris for a photo shoot, but at least he admitted he had no intention of closing the gap and encircling German 7th Army. I never though the Americans had a "command style", it was more a case of throwing men at the objective until it fell. My regret is that in doing so American casualties were horrific. Bradley was getting 100.000 replacements per month yet by November 1944 was writing complaining to Eisenhower he was critically running out of troops!
By winter his GI's were losing 70,000 men to their boot design giving those numbers Trench foot in the rain,mud ,snow. Its his own countries equipment failures. The way they lost men in Brest/Hurtgen and Wherever was going through them as well
@@Rusty_Gold85 Temporary medical conditions such as Trench Foot are not included in battle casualties sustained in combat.
Fk i just missed the Live!!!
17 minutes in I think your arguing semantics
Err, that's the point exactly. What was Monty saying? The wording has massive implications
@@WW2TV I agree with Paul. Words matter. Lee's orders to Ewell regarding Culp's Hill on Day 1: " . . . carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable."
@@davidk7324 Exactly what I thought of when seeing Montgomery's directives.
Pretty well much every (non-trivial) argument over anything boils down to an argument about semantics. If everything is clear, then where's the argument? It's when things are not clear, and capable of bring interpreted in different ways, that you get into an argument.
The world was a lot smaller back then and people had their own biases.
An absolutely outstanding presentation by Prof. Latawski! He outlines clearly the major issues, and his conclusions are convincing based on the evidence he presents.
Thank you, Paul, for acquainting us with another brilliant WW2 historian.
I meant to say, Thank you WOODY. 🤦♂️😉
Where was 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade during this operation? The maps show 4th Canadian Armoured Division and 1st Polish Armoured Division. Was 2nd Armoured brigade parcelled out to support Canadian infantry battalions of 2nd and 3rd Division as in the case with the destruction of Worthington Force?
Yes it was used, broken up attached to infantry units
We have hindsight they had American Generals wanting Photo Ops and Fame
Plenty of British Generals wanted photos and fame too
Totally engrossing presentation. As I stated on sidebar, a) fascinated in the deployment of such an attack, b) saddened by the brutality all round of war, c) infuriated by lack of command structure, decision making etc that cost lives.
We have 80 years of hindsight to make these evaluations, and I thought they were explained expertly.
Good to see that while Mark Clark is in Italy herding his donkeys, in spirit he's fully behind the first American general named after an armored personel carrier, Omar Bradley.
Bradley sees a shiny capitol and in the best Clarksion tradition he just has to have it. As the saying above the West Point souvenir shop says: "War is a continuation of real estate development by other means."
Where is Dr. Latawski from? His bio says he's British but he doesn't sound British at all. If anything he sounds more Canadian that anything.
He's Polish/British
@@WW2TV Remarkable that he simply does not sound British! Nor Polish!
Not sure I like presenters reading slides three minutes after I finished reading it...
But there is reading it, and the interpretation. Just like doing literature at school. You read a passage then the prof discusses what is meant - same thing here
@@WW2TV - Exactly. I read, he interprets. Business 101. 🤷♂️
Just an observation.
Woody, I can but point out that Dr. Cirilo the other day said that the Germans abandoned 20,000 vehicles for lack of fuel. Dr. Latawski says they got 28,000 vehicles back across the Seine. He had noted Montgomery’s claim that every bridge over the Seine was blown. How to figure that in I don't know. In re XV U.S. Corps heading for Paris. I'm pretty sure that a deeper envelopment was discussed. In any case Patton was always going to fill the unforgiving minute with sixty seconds run.
Lastly, Montgomery was one of the most bloody generals of all time. The way he conducted operations was always going to generate a bloodbath among his own men. His ideas never advanced beyond World War One.
Are you American Walter?
As a General, Montgomery had a lower casualty ratio while facing Germany’s BEST. Patton had a higher casualty ratio while facing Germany’s WORST. Even the the German commander in the Lorraine, Herman’s Balck said it was the worst army he ever took charge of. It still stoped Patton in the Lorraine, inflicting 55,000 casualties on him, which was DOUBLE that of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group casualties in autumn 1944 in the Netherlands and the Scheldt campaigns combined. Montgomery’s Scheldt campaign was the only Allied campaign of autumn 1944 to succeed in its objectives.
And yet Monty was never referred to by soldiers as "Blood and Guts" so perhaps he wasn't as bloody.
If they didn’t waste 500 commandos at the Saint Nazaire raid, the Operation Chariot, they could’ve been better utilised at the Falaise pocket.
I'm beginning to think you're just trolling now, what are you on about?
Either Operation Chariot or Market Garden was bonkers, or both, take your pick. I’m sick of hearing excuses.
P.s. You do realise that Operation Chariot succeeding was nothing short of a miracle? It was a suicide mission and if it hadn’t succeeded, it would’ve had zero value or point. The risks were far too great, for very little actual strategic advantage, other than boosting morale.
But Chariot in 42 has zero impact on events in 44. Absolutely zero
Whether or not Chariot was worthwhile is another subject though. It had no bearing on Normandy or OMG 2 years later. For a start, only 265 Commandos took part in Chariot not 500 and the total number of deaths was 169, including RN. If Chariot had not occurred, those same Commandos would have been used elsewhere in 1942 anyway. Indeed No. 2 Commando rebuilt and fought on in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Yugoslavia. So even if Chariot doesn't take place, No. 2 Commando never become an asset that could have been used in Normandy or Market Garden, as they were busy fighting in the MTO. So I'm sorry but your point makes absolutely no sense whatsoever