My father flew paratroopers into Operation Market Garden. He talked very little about his experiences during the war, but he did speak about watching paratroopers cut down in the air or tangling in their chutes. He was shot down behind enemy lines close to Grave and was picked up by the Dutch Underground, spending eight days hiding by day and moving at night. He remembers hiding in a ditch and watching German troops march by. He said he could have touched their boots. At one point a little brass band greeted them at a barn where they were hiding. The local people thought they had been liberated. He finally made it back to friendly territory, at the very end finding himself and his driver running through a tank battle, and was reunited with his crew. Amazingly none had died. My father could never speak highly enough of the Dutch people who saved so many at such risk to themselves. He never knew the names of the people who sheltered him or the Underground operators who guided him, but he always told me that I owed my life to the Dutch people because without them, I never would have been born.
Thanks for sharing your dad’s story. Fascinating! I love personal accounts like this. Thanks for your father’s service. Each and every serviceman made huge sacrifices to defeat fascism. We will always owe them a huge debt of gratitude.
@@kittiwhieldon4329 My dad landed in a drainage ditch and when he finally untangled from his parachute and got out of the water he found himself staring at a farmer with a pitchfork. The farmer thought he was German. Dad tried talking but the farmer didn’t speak English. Then dad remembered something, stuck his hand in his jacket and brought out a pack of cigarettes, yelling “Lucky Strikes! Lucky Strikes!” By now a small crowd had formed and a policeman who could speak English got my dad away and eventually put him in touch with the Dutch Underground. The people who had gathered all agreed on the same story before the policeman took my dad away, the airman was gone when they got there and they hadn’t seen where he went. I doubt the Germans who were searching for him believed them, but they protected him.
Your father flew C-47s. They could carry 28 passengers but only 18-20 fully equipped Paratroopers ("Airborne" Troops). Airfields stretching from Southern England all the way into Scotland (it's the same island) loaded up Paratroopers, and or towed Gliders and/or carried supplies. It all began before Dawn and after takeoff, the aircraft had to form up as units. Anyone flying to the drop zones alone would be dropping troops alone as well as be easy pickings for fighters or ground AA Guns on the way there or back. Allied Fighter support was pushed to the limit in air support for Market Garden drops. The point that I'm making is that "Market", the air component of the invasion ("Garden" was the Allied ground forces) had an even larger air invasion component than D-Day, 3 months before. Allow the aircraft about a bit more than an hour to takeoff then form up, fly to drop zones all over the Netherlands, return, take their turns landing, refuel, load up more Paratroopers and equipment? Well, by then, you've run out of daylight on September 17th. England and the Netherlands are all North of NYC, USA and the sun sets earlier each day until just before Christmas. This fact is easy for others to calculate. The cruise speed of a C-47 and the distances from the UK to the Netherlands and up to Arnhem are easy for calculating a round trip in any wind conditions (what helps you in one leg of the journey, hurts you in the opposite direction. You can therefore calculate using calm winds). This video from Dan is fairly new but soon Trolls will show up here claiming for instance; that "a second drop on the first day was requested but denied". That's hogwash and despite that claim making it into a book or two, it's just blame displacement for a plan that was doomed to fail because such a narrow road separated "Garden" from the final objective. All facts about Market Garden are available using a Search Engine and taking care to use sites that have verifiable data. The commander of the UK's 1st Airborne Division is portrayed by Sean Connery in the movie "A Bridge Too Far". The actual General lacked experience, he was more of a political appointee. Robert Elliot "Roy" Urquhart had no extensive combat exposure and zero Airborne Troop experience. XXX Corps "Garden", did not advance any further than just past American held assets and Urquhart not only never commanded again but there was little left of the UK's 1st Airborne Division.
@@arcanondrum6543 Thank you so much for your write-up. Yes, my dad flew C-47s (usually the Skytrain) and was based somewhere in England. He did it all. Flew cargo, paratroopers, made hospital runs with wounded soldiers, was on the “team” that learned how to successfully tow wooden gliders, then towed the gliders in missions. (He also flew the Berlin Airlift, was in Korea, and later was tried out for the space program. Unfortunately, it turned out that once he had the helmet on…claustrophobia!) He did make more than one trip before he was shot down. He might have been close-mouthed about his war, but he never had a good word to say about the men who organized and ran Operation Market Garden. After bailing out, he landed in a canal on the outskirts of a small town. Upon fighting his way out of the parachute and climbing up the side of the canal, he was confronted by a man with a pitchfork. The man, who spoke no English, thought he was German. After frankly gabbling for a minute to prevent the man skewering him, he had a thought and thrust his hand into his jacket. Pulling out a pack of cigarettes, he yelled “Lucky Strikes! Lucky Strikes!” By now several other people had shown up. One was a policeman who spoke English. Minutes later the group had agreed on a simple story to tell the Germans: they hadn’t seen the airman, must have arrived on the scene just minutes after he left the area, and didn’t know where he’d gone. The policeman took him to a safe house, that of a doctor with a young family, and within 24 hours he was with the Dutch Underground. He made many attempts to find out the names of the people who helped him, but never did.
I paused this video to look up Sgt. Frank Ashleigh and was saddened to see he died last year. Please, if you have a few minutes, look up his story. I spent an hour or so reading accounts of his service and came across a video on the Taxi Charity youtube channel where Frank describes his training, time during the days following Market Garden held up in a church surrounded by Germans, and his eventual capture and time as a POW. It's only 18 minutes long, but he is a fantastic watch.
I know many, many French were very helpful to allied soldiers, but there were a lot who weren’t too. My grandfather brought some of his men to a farm house and asked the farmer for a glass of water for each of his men. The farmer kept refusing. My grandfather had to pull his pistol and said one last time “I’d like some water now”. He was a good man, for him to pull a his gun on a civilian was his absolute last resort. He’d recently lost his brother to a nazi sniper in the hedgerows, been fighting for days with no break and no water and he wasn’t about to leave that farm without him and his men getting the water they needed.
I’m Dutch and living in Arnhem, every year I’m learning more about the Battle of Arnhem and Market Garden. I walk every week in the city and I’m collecting also pictures from before september 44. At 06:06 I see a air picture and immediately it shows me how heavy the fighting must have been again. Thanks for sharing this documentary, really informative and interesting!
My grandfather fought with the 1st Light Airlanding Regiment at Oosterbeek. He was with Captain Peter Chard when the latter was hit by a flamethrower tank. He swam across the Rhine to escape when the Oosterbeek pocket was evacuated. I remember his war stories well and remember him fondly as a kind and gentle man.
Do you remember him mentioning random reinforcements arriving, such as the crash landed glider troops? I remember reading my relatives reports and he mentioned crossing a bridge near small village or town called Zuiberg or something similar beginning with 'Z' to join the fighting at Oosterbeek? Cheerio.
I pass through this bridge every day (13:07) for work as I live work in Nijmegen and studied in Arnhem. And most of the time I think of what happened there.
Yeah its sad we natives cant speak Dutch in our own towns anymore because of international students and expats massively migrating to here. If those soldiers on those bridges knew what the future would be they would reconsider
The biggest error of Market Garden was that in order to launch the operation, it meant that the resources were not available for the more important job of clearing the Scheldt estuary. This delayed the opening of the port of Antwerp, which severely hampered the resupply of the Allied armies. This was one of the principal reasons they had to pause their advance following the breakout from Normandy. Having to bring the supplies by road all the way by road from the beaches of Normandy was too slow a process for Eisenhower to keep the British, Canadian & US forces advancing. Market Garden was a gamble to shorten the war and, ironically, prioritising it over Antwerp may well have had the opposite effect
The purpose of Market Garden was to surround the Scheldt estuary and isolate the Germans still defending it. Once at Arnhem the plan was to turn left to reach the Zuiderzee not to turn right to go into Germany.
No, doing Market Garden first was the right order of operations. If the Scheldt had been cleared first, the Germans would simply blown every bridge across every waterway, leading to every single river and canal being a mini "Operation Varsity/Plunder" type scenario and would have boxed 21st AG into a dead end in the low lands. Doing Market Garden first liberated a signficiant amount of Dutch territory. What was incorrect was not resourcing it correctly, and for that, the finger needs to be pointed at Eisenhower for not ensuring the IX Troop Carrier Command was doing the very thing it was created to do, which was to ferry First Allied Airborne Army into battle. It was not created to be acting like FedEx just to keep Bradley happy, which is what it was doing! If they insisted on keeping half of the transport planes running errands, then at the very least, pressure should have been brought to bear on Williams to ensure that two drops were done on that first day. The RAF was prepared to do it, but as the junior partner in the logistics chain, they were overruled. Williams (USAAF) made that call, as well as not allowing for double-tow of the WACO gliders, which would have doubled the allocation of available transports on that first day and given 82nd AB sufficient critical mass. Also, if the US forces had taken their deep water ports along the Brittany coast, they would have been able to utilise the French railways which were still intact that far into France. It was only the railways along the Normandy coast that were obliterated and could not be rebuilt in a timely fashion to keep pace with the rapid advance.
There were no orders to capture Antwerp from allied high command . A general doesn't just go off and do what he fancies . Antwerp was actually captured ahead of schedule . This 20/20 hindsight is a great thing , shame its unavailable at the time .
@@bradp6452 The enemy was broken and mainly destroyed . the German army was in full retreat having left most of its equipment in Normandy . Where would the resources have been better used . Do you know more than the allied planners at the time ?
One of my favourite Arnhem stories isn’t Myrtle the ParaChick (a great story in itself), but comes from 1982 and the last big NATO exercise. The paras were having their annual parade there right before the exercise started, and when planning it with locals and other participants, the Para CO asked if anyone had invited the Germans To the parade as they were taking part in the exercise. When he was met with silence the CO said, “Well, they did win.”
@ have a read of ‘Try not to laugh sergeant Major’, the follow up book by two the journalists who wrote ‘don’t cry for me sergeant Major’. The later was about the Falklands war and about the men and NCOs in that conflict. The former was about the nato exercise in 1982 and it was told to them directly from the people they already knew who were in the room. Both are good books
Jeremy Clarkson did a documentary called "The Victoria Cross: For Valour", which covers this battle. It is about the Victoria Cross, Britain's highest military award, and tells the story of a major (I think) who dropped into Arnhem and fought like a madman to keep his soldiers alive. Along the lines of this story, Clarkson talks about other VC winners and the selflessness they showed by putting their own lives on the line to save others. It is a great documentary, even if you don't like Clarkson. He is genuine, respectful and enthusiastic without being like he is on Top Gear.
@@johnburns4017 Most VC winners never talk about it, just like the men of Easy Company only talked to each other. The crew for Band of Brothers did the veteran interviews at their homes and their entire family showed up. At first the crew though it was because of Hanks and Spielberg, but it was because that was the first time grandpa is going to talk about the war. Behind the camera's on those interviews is a packed room. As Harry Welsh said "war is hell".
Failure to take Nijmegen bridge - Day 1 & Browning wasting valuable air transportation moving his drinks cabinets (I'm being factitious) into the operation zone rather than something more useful, like, ALL of the Polish. ...but mainly it was the collosal time wasting exercise at Nijmegen 'It could have worked; it should have worked' - Professor Richard Holmes
"Failure to take Nijmegen bridge - Day 1" ??? It took all of "Day 1" for all of XXX Corps to cross the border into the Netherlands on that narrow road. Nijmegen was halfway to Arnhem. Seize the Bridge on Day 1? For whom? The 82nd Airborne had only a partial drop of the planned total (like all the others) in the limited available daylight. Meanwhile, General Gavin was protecting HIS Drop Zones but Urquhart was neither protecting his Drop Zones (a FATAL MISTAKE for more than 70% of his troops) nor seizing any Bridges. Frost and his company was only ever on just one side of that one bridge and, as you British keep insisting (unless it's Frost), "being on one side of the Bridge is not seizing it". Americans prevailed and seized their bridges giving safe passage to (AND from) for XXX Corps. So why didn't XXX Corps advance any further than just past the Americans? You tell me. The British promoted the unworthy Urquhart and Browning and you certainly never picked up any military strategy either.
@@arcanondrum6543 great post too many of the dweebs take to the novels spewed by their crown's comics.Britain did have good officers - Monty wasn't one of them - why they let monty continuously run operations into the sand after Sicily/Italy/Normandy made very clear he was a burden that happened to be on the winning side is anyone's guess
@@arcanondrum6543 Full of half truths I'm afraid. 1. The reason 30 Corps had to fight the first stage was because Brereton removed the airdrop of paratroopers near Valkensvaard and north of Eindhoven, so 30 Corps had to fight for the initial stage rather than having an airborne carpet in that sector. 2. They reached Nijmegen in 43 hours, just 9 miles from Arnhem. 3. The 82nd had 7,477 troops landed on Day One but only made a serious attempt to take Nijmegen Bridge on Day 3 when 30 Corps arrived. 4. 30 Corps actually took the Nijmegen road bridge, the 504th PIR took the railbridge during their heroic river crossing. Divisional US records prove that 504th were 1 km away when the British tanks completed the crossing and took the road bridge. 5. Totally accept that Frost only took one side of the Arnhem Bridge but it was the critical northern side and he decided not to split his battalion between both ends but instead cover all angles - the Germans twice tried to blow up the bridge at the southern end but were unable to do so, vindicating his strategy. 6. The British at Arnhem had less troops than the two American airborne divisions on Day One. Brereton was the one who decided no further drops on Day one, leading to the abandonment of coup de mains due to reduced forces available. RAF wanted to do two drops alone at Arnhem but Brereton refused them permission. 7. If you are referring to the evening of the 20th, both Burriss and Horrocks had the same orders from their superiors - to prepare for counterattack. 8. Where were the remainder of 30 Corps - stuck behind the breach of route 69 inbetween Veghel and Nijmegen. Oh, and two key elements the Coldstream Guards and Welsh Guards were under temporary command of Gavin to help the Americans at Beek, whilst the Irish Guards were sent back to help Taylor. That’s where the bulk of 30 Corps were - not sitting around drinking tea!
@@arcanondrum6543 Absolute rubbish. Its well documented, even by Gavin, that the road bridge wasn't seized as the mission warranted. They did take the railway bridge after the famous river assault, maybe Gavin thought XXXCorps were coming by train. Too many Yanks think the hollywoodesque A Bridge to Far was the true depiction of events....just like the fiction based on fact Battle of the Bulge. The first three tanks (only) to cross Nijmegan saw NO US SOLDIERS, and had to fight Germans still holding the bridge. No Robert Redford's waving at all. They headed onwards until reaching two antitank guns, and with no infantry support they stopped. The drinking tea myth DIDNT HAPPEN. One of the tank commanders became Lord Carrington a member of Thatchers government. As for Monty....it was his idea, but planning and execution was done by in order of importance, Brereton and then Browning. People really should separate movie fiction from reality.
All these stories and battles are fascinating. My young mind can’t comprehend that this actually happened and these me actually had the balls to do what they did. Remarkable if I could even put it in a word that would do them justice for there heroism. Great video thankyou very much.
He would have taken off from an airfield near me in the East Midlands of England. I’m helping my local council produce an Airborne Trail that includes airfields of the US IX Troops Carrier Command as well as the elements of the UK 1st Airborne Division and 1st Polish Parachute Brigade based in the District.
Easy! 82nd Airborne failed to get (or even really try) the Nijmegen bridges, which cost Market Garden a 3 to 4 day delay. Germans used those days to seal off Arnhem and did in the 1st Airborne. 82nd Airborne dropped the ball and did a tried and true FUBAR. End of story.
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was: *1)* the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear; *2)* there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally; *3)* there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen who were getting out fast; *4)* a few scattered about along the road; *5)* there was no armour in Arnhem. That was it. *i)* XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven; *ii)* 101st from Eindhoven to Grave; *iii)* 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen; *iv)* British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine; XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made _remarkable_ progress. The US 101st took *3-4 hours* to move about *2 km* to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around in the village. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it. _Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full_ *_two hours had passed before they emerged from the village._* _Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar._ - US Official History. XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed *10-12 hours* at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse. XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them *2hrs 45 mins* to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous _carpet_ for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. *The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.* Horrocks promised the 1st Airborne at Anhem XXX Corps would reach them within 48 hours. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820 hrs on d-day plus 2, on schedule making up for the delay at Zon, having seven hours left to travel 8 miles. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match. On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another *36 hours.* This was now a total delay of nearly *two days.* In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem. XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units *failed* to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed. According to the official American Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
Burns you bent freak you have lied once and that has been continuously.Monty was worse at commending than you commenting *There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸 *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command* 🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown* 🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* 🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved 🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November. The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones
@@thomasbernecky2078 He tried but the crayons kept breaking then it gets past his bed time when mum gets furios with him.He has lied once and that has been continuously The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones *There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸 *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command* 🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown* 🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* 🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved 🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
You're funny Burns,delusional & uneducated but funny. Johnny this being a no-brainer you specifically should understand. What Monty won - he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials, air supremacy and ULTRA. Then barely and poorly.But like you johnny and your family of frauds - he was nowhere around - MONTY GARDEN
My relative was a Horsa pilot in Operation Market Garden, the tow-rope broke just shy of the LZ and a seven year old local Dutch girl witnessed the crash landing and approached the glider. Initially she was put at gun point but then the soldiers asked if she wanted a sandwich, to which she accepted but later said she felt guilty for taking the soldier's rations. George Cawthray is his name.He also played cricket for England. I have a picture of them getting out of the side door with some locals surrounding, also have a few battle maps of Arnhem. In the paperwork I read through, the young local girl said they were accompanied by one American on-board the glider, which she thought strange, any ideas who he might have been? I saw the cargo itinerary too, they had a Willys jeep, a Norton motorcycle and some other bits, I believe a mini motorcycle/para bike also. My parent's sold everything at auction, including the Normandy Landings paperwork, which I never got to view, much to my regret. Contact me if you have any info or would like to view my battle maps or photograph. Cheerio everyone.
My grandpa went thought the whole war with his two best friends in Africa and France... and both his best friends died in the space of 2 days near that bridge. Both are buried in Oosterbeek War cemetery. he then went onto the be one of the first squads to liberate Bergen-Belsen concentration camp where Anne Frank died. He couldn't sleep for years, and I remember my Mum taking him, my Dad, myself and my brother and sister to the camp to change his memory of what happened there. It worked, and he was able to sleep.
The bravery of those young men is incredible. My father fought in WWII, but he refused to talk about anything except humourous vignettes. He did spend several days with my brother when he returned from Vietnam. And any occasion involving fireworks made him very uncomfortable.
In Eisenhower's own words in early September Antwerp was not the priority and that forces could advance on the Ruhr. Although he did prioritise Antwerp weeks later. Not one leading allied commander argued in the first half of September that the British Second Army should halt its pursuit of the Germans after it had just moved 400km in a week, and then stop to open Antwerp and clear the Scheldt. Clearing the Scheldt would have taken at least a month. In early September, SHAEF thought the Germans were nearly finished. No leader at the time said there should be a halt when it appeared a bridgehead over the Rhine could have been achieved and a buffer created to protect Antwerp when the port is online. The idea was to get across the Rhine, break through the Westwall and then halt to open up Antwerp, building up supplies for the next stage, the advance through Germany. Antwerp was never needed for the westwall battles. Supplies were coming via LeHavre, Mulberry harbours and Cherbourg. The allies were not moving anywhere fast so there was no need to get supplies to them from Antwerp to supply the advance quickly - because there was no advance. All the US operations of autumn 1944 were well equipped and well supplied. They did not fail because Antwerp was not opened. They failed because of poor US strategy and tactical decisions. An example, was in the Lorraine, with Patton too cautious and hesitant failing to correctly concentrate his forces suffering 55,000 casualties. Antwerp was fully operational in December. It never put the Germans off in scything through US lines in the Bulge attack. Antwerp was no panacea.
From memory Monty’s plan was very different to what was put into place. Didn’t General Browning push for more changes and a more radical plan. Didn’t the 82nd Airborne take too long to eventually capture the bridge at Nijmegen? When it could have been captured when they first landed?
Montgomery's original concept was COMET, a much more limited action and with much more limited resources allocated to it. The basic concepts were the same and the principal architect of the airborne element of COMET was actually Browning, and COMET included all of the essential elements of surprise that an airborne operation requires to be successful (such as the pre-dawn drops, the coup-de-main on the bridges, etc). It was Brereton (Browning's CO) and Williams who made the changes to MARKET. The 82nd never moved with any sense of urgency to take their primary objective, being the major bridges at Nijmegen. In fact, they NEVER took the road bridge at Nijmegen (despite what the film suggests or that most uneducated commentators assume!)
@@sean640307 Thanks for the info. I’ve always known that poor Monty gets the blame due to the horrible movie, A bridge too far, that some people take as history.
*Monty's amateur hour planning in reality that he ignored & discounted not only one elevated road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers.* The Germans had lot of practice doing this type of operation coming back from the Eastern Front then going to France. The German Divisions could be quickly reconstituted, refitted, and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. *As one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in that area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches accompanying them where armored columns couldn't go* *The Allies were advancing further and away from their supply centers with long supply lines meaning they were vulnerable to German counterattack or getting bogged down against a German defense in depth with dug in troops in fortifications. The Germans were experts at taking shattered divisions and rebuilding them quickly. SHAEF was right,the Port of ANTWERP should have been opened FIRST* *The Germans would have had the advantage of interior lines of communications, nearby supply depots, and urban centers to concentrate a counteroffensive against any single attack into northern Germany across the Rhine via Arnhem.* A successful attack across the Rhine could only be accomplished from MULTIPLE POINTS simultaneously. This action is exactly what happened in the spring of 1945. IKE's broadfront not monty's debacle of sandwiching a whole armored corp down one elevated lane.The idea you can make one long extended penetration with long extended supply lines into northern Germany, along one axis of advance is IDIOCY . The Wehrmacht still had plenty of infantry divisions, armored division with military resources and capacity to fight in the autumn of 1944. The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport for Bradley/Devers advances. The American 82nd and 101st airborne should have been used as regular infantry divisions to spearhead attacks in critical sectors. Most importantly, using the 82nd and 101st for American infantry attacks would have kept them far away from Montgomery which would have been better for everybody.
Several museums in the Netherlands are dedicated to Operation Market Garden, including the Freedom Museum in Groesbeek, Wings of Liberation Museum Park in Best (near Eindhoven) and Airborne Museum Hartenstein in Costerbreek. Annually there is a commemorative walk in Oosterbeek on the first Saturday of September which attracts tens of thousands of participants.
A Jeep with four British soldiers (gunners) rode south over the Nijmegen (Waal) bridge just in front of Grabners convoy totally unopposed. Private Atkins and two other men who were lost of a US 82nd patrol had the guards and their small artillery weapon on the south side of the bridge prisoner underneath the bridge approaches, unaware of the Jeep overhead. Atkins left as no 82nd men turned up. The four British gunners in the Jeep were hidden in a monastery until Nijmegen was liberated. If the 508 of the 82nd had bothered to go to the bridge instead of hanging around at DePloeg, they would have walked on it whistling Dixie.
A great book I would encourage people to read, albeit it is only published in Dutch, is "Een andere kijk op de Slag om Arnhem - de snelle Duitse reactie" (A different view of the Battle of Arnhem - The swift German reaction). It gives the German side and explains how the Germans were able to get into the battle as quick and effective as they did. One key element was Walter Model, who had upon arrival immediately begun reinforcing the lines around Overpelt/Neerpelt and stopped the haphazard retreat by the Germans and forged a fighting force out of all the personnel he could scrounge together, including Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe troops. By this, the Germans were able to almost immediately stop XXX Corps from the get-go. It also didn't help the Germans got their hands on the complete plans for Market Garden from a crashed Glider. To point to one or even a couple of points to say "That's why Market Garden failed" is foolish, it was a combination of events, including ill taken decisions as well as brilliant ones. While shortly mentioned, an oft overlooked key point on the German side was they had 1 thing in abundance, artillery. There was both a large amount of long range guns as well as munition that could reach from Arnhem to Nijmegen and beyond, which interdicted the corridor and wreaked havoc everywhere both for the troops present as well as those on the move towards Nijmegen and Arnhem. Arnhem was lost at Arnhem but equally as much before Arnhem. It's easy of course with decades of hindsight, but some decisions, like the positioning of the LZs, could have been helped with some additional critical reviewing.
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Wth is that man at the end is saying?It was a complete failure.And yes you learn lessons from failures, its a stable fact of life.He is basically saying, yeah we sacrificed thousands of people in a horrible plan ,to learn?
That's correct. The Germans correctly deduced that Nijmegen was the weakest point to attack MARKET GARDEN because the Allied divisions landed west of Arnhem and south of Nijmegen and not directly on the bridge objectives, so 10.SS-Panzer-Division was directed to Nijmegen and only made the mistake of not securing their own supply line across the Arnhem bridge.
@@davemac1197 If 1st AB had captured a bridge (instead of blocking a bridge), what would have been the main focus of the Germans ? How many bridges had to be captured intact for the op to be a success ?
Monty Garden Read the Germans version they blame the british buffonary,nothing to do on that Island Asylum but bad mouth the very country that pulled your chestnuts out of yet another debacle? The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The of course the poof didn't even show upThe ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones *There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸*The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command* 🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown* 🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* 🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved 🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November. *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command* 🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown* 🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* 🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved 🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
Brereton should take much of the blame. Brereton was a USAAF man, recently assigned to command First Allied Airborne Army and he sided with General Paul Williams, the USAAF Troop Carrier Command general who wouldn't fly double missions on day one because he didnt want Troop Carrier crews getting too tired. Brereton supported this decision. This was shameful. Brereton put USAAF Troop Carrier Command crews tiredness ahead of his own paratroopers wellbeing, dropped behind enemy lines. Post war Brereton blamed XXX Corps and British 1st Airborne. Never once accepted any responsibility himself. Eisenhower sat on his backside near Cherbourg and didn't involve himself. As Supreme Commander, Eisenhower could have overruled Brereton but seeing as Eisenhower had only just appointed Brereton to command the First Allied Airborne Army (the paras wanted an Airborne man in command not a USAAF man) he wasn't going to step on Brereton's toes.
@@nickdanger3802 - BS. Grade 'F' for your homework again. You're failing this entire course! It was the same distance as operation COMET, which had two lifts on D-Day, and also had dawn glider coup de main assaults planned for the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges. COMET was cancelled as men were loading their aircraft at 2 A.M., so this operation was going ahead until the intelligence situation changed. The outline for the upgraded operation SIXTEEN to replace COMET retained the double airlifts and glider raids, but USAAF General Brereton removed them for MARKET after he got his hands on the outline plan. Petty politics compromised operation MARKET, and it only cost the British an Airborne Division at Arnhem.
@@davemac1197 Here is some work fuk wit, you should try it. Theoretical Second Lift on Day One 17 September 1944 Actual first lift 0945 Take off begins 1350 Main jump over Arnhem begins Four hours back to home field Theoretical Second Lift Assume minimum of one hour for turn around 1850 Take off begins (Sunset Arnhem 17 Sept. 2024, 1945 DST Central European Time) 2255 Jump begins Britain was on Double Summer Time, two hours ahead of GMT.
@@davemac1197 Operation Deadstick Pilot training involved practice landings on a small strip of land, instrument flying using stopwatches for accurate course changes and fitting flight crew goggles with dark glass to get them used to night flying. By May 1944 they had carried out 54 training sorties, flying in all weathers both day and night. And there was no AA at those bridges.
@@nickdanger3802 - operation COMET, including the glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges, was going ahead and only cancelled at the last minute due to reports II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Netherlands. So what's your point? "Training is useful, but no substitute for experience" - Rosa Kleb, From Russia With Love 😉
whilst Browning is not completely blameless in what happened, he was not going to micromanage one of his senior commanders, and nor should he have had to. Browning still insisted that the bridge be taken before 30 Corps arrived. He wasn't going to tell Gavin what order to do it in, and didn't. This nonsense about Gavin being "ordered" to take the Groesbeek Heights first is just that - nonsense!! Gavin's own book, "On to Berlin", outline the sequence he intended to take.
@@sean640307 Browning clearly *_never_* _deprioritised_ the Waal bridge *before, during* or *after* the first failed 82nd attempts to seize the bridge. He was waiting for backup from XXX Corps, having told the 82nd not to make any further futile attempts on the bridge until XXX Corps arrived. Browning/Gavin just never had the might to take the bridge once the Germans occupied it The bridge was still _priority_ when XXX Corps arrived. Browning never told Horrocks to take his men to the Heights as that is now priority, he took him to the bridge. Gavin gave Nijmegen town back to the Germans by pulling all his men out after Browning said wait for XXX Corps to seize the bridge. This made matters more difficult when XXX Corps arrived having to clear them out.
@@johnburns4017 absolutely correct! If 82nd had taken Nijmegen bridge, the forces of 10th SS Panzer would have been sandwiched between them and Frost's men at Arnhem and would have been easy pickings. 30 Corps would not have had to fight through the town (alongside 505PIR).
@@sean640307 you have lied once and that has been continuously.Monty was worse at commending than you commenting. *There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸 *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command* 🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown* 🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* 🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved 🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November. The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones
My Gt Uncle was in the 21st Independent Para Reg (Pathfinders) and went in on the morning before the main drop to mark out the LZ'z & DZ's...God Bless Them All...
It failed because the Germans could connect dots. You can't drop airborne to take bridges and not have the enemy figure out precisely what the plan is. There was only one road the army could possibly come up. They couldn't get off that road even a little. So the plan was idiotic from the outset. Monty was a legend in his own mind.
Look, you're a confused, nationalistic British fanbois spitting out complete fantasy nonsense.Monty liked little boys and the Gerries ran him off the coninent.The USA and Russia were now dealing the cards.Stick to beating up Ghandi disciples or shoving around goat herders in the Falklands
@@louismccomack9524 Monty had nothing to do with the planning or execution of MG. as for XXX corps not getting there, they got to the Waal bridge 6 hours ahead of schedule sadly Gavin had not taken the bridge on landing..as for Patton at the time of MG he was getting his arse kicked by cooks and clerks at Metz.
@@johndawes9337you’re highly uneducated. Eisenhower and Patton were by far more competent than Monty. Monty lost battles Ike and Patton never did…stop lying to people with your fake history.
There were many reasons the operation failed but to cut the analysis to the bone there were two reasons. One, the failure to capture the entire bridge at Arnhem. Two, the failure of the 82nd airborne to secure and hold the bridge at Nijmegen. There were many other factors but these two were the death of the operation.
More british bullshit -get run out of every country in Europe then attempt to foist the blame on men who died attempting to save the operation of a bent freak bernard.The snails pace of the britsh armored column was supposed arrive in Nijmegen in 2 days - they showed up in 3 & 1/2 then stopped *There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸 *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command* 🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown*
🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved 🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
@@bigwoody4704 The sad truth Woody is that XXX Corps was smeared as too slow because of the falsehood of Gavin who claimed that XXX Corps was 36 hours late on reaching the bridge, which is clear nonsense as the operation had only started *42 hours before* XXX Corps reached the Nijmegen bridge, a distance of 50 miles. The fatal delay for this operation was at Nijmegan, not in the advance before then.
*ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.145* *The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards* had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ *"as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para* still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. *Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs* until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. *By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps* which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. *Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial* *Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.* *As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us* A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
*ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359* *as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move"* While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line. *ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer* ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. *Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair* *Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219* "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie
I loved a Bridge to far, but as usual the Jocks where hardly mentioned, trust me they did more than there fair share in Arnhem, just saying, the Jocks are the backbone of the British Army, and long may it continue 👊🇬🇧😎
It was a wonderful historical coverage video about market garden operations failure in 1944. Which was intelligence 🤔 failure besides other organization technical failures. Mainly polish 🇵🇱 airborne divisions were annihilated... thank you 🙏 ( history Hit) channel for sharing
The Market operation part of Market Garden used three Airborne divisions. The U.S. 101st Airborne Division and 82nd Airborne Division (about 8,500 men each), and the British 1st Airborne Division (about 12,000 men); With the 1st Polish Parachute _Brigade_ (about 2,000 men) in support of the British at Arnhem. The 1st Polish Parachute Brigade lost 23% (about 400) of its fighting strength at Arnhem.
The Poles suffered a way less casualty ratio than British 1st Airborne. The Polish Brigade had less than 100 men killed. To be exact just 92. British 1st Airborne had 1,174 dead. That's TWELVE TIMES as many.
Fun fact: every year on the 3th Saturday of september, there is a nemorial service held at the original landing zone. Followed by a re enactment of the mass drop, wich is done by several NATO countries, who supply cargo aircraft and parateoopers. These several thousand personel are dropped in multiple waves during the day, in front of a huge crowd. It is very impressive seeing 10 planes fly over and obe could only imagine what it must have felt like when it was hundreds of them.
Market-Garden was undoubtedly Montgomery's most audacious Operational plan during the War. In every other battle, he was sure and careful to build a total preponderance in force prior to initiating his campaign. El Alamein is a great example: The battle had a lull of several months between the Axis' inability to overcome the British defensive positions in July, and Monty's counterattack once he had his artillery and sappers in place in October to pin and defeat the Germans in detail, while also not creating a bloodbath for his own troops. This style of fighting was possible due to Allied supply and logistics superiority, as well as air supremacy in pretty much every theater from 1943 onwards, and had the added goal (seen as indispensable from the British perspective) of not turning these battles into WWI-style bloodbaths for the attacker. The initial invasion plan of Normandy was similar, as was the eventual capture of Caen (although this was by necessity, rather than by plan), the counterattack against the eponymous "Bulge" in the Ardennes, the crossing of the Rhine, and so on. Monty excelled at this type of battle (sometimes called the 'Grand Battle' doctrine), and the comparison to the different approach favored by the Americans, the Soviet Union (and the Germans) of speed and decisiveness of action while accepting the casualties this entails has been both loud and vitriolic over the years. The force structure, doctrine, capability and leadership of the British and Commonwealth Army, the American Army and the Red Army were fundamentally different, with different demographics, industrial base, and force projection capabilities lacking in the necessary overlap for such a comparison to be in any way meaningful. Except when it comes to Operation Market-Garden. I'm not going to comment on his plan's desired political affect within the Allied coalition, but the plan from a Military-Operational perspective was fundamentally flawed in a way that an experienced practitioner like Montgomery should have known better than to employ. He proposed an immediate offensive plan without the needed time to build up forces, but gambling on the disorganization of the German forces. The plan used daytime airborne drops to secure river crossings for a linear advance from a single point of origin (meaning you have to progress through one to get to the next - there are no other routes, and the furthest away must hold for the longest) along a single road that would require increasing supply the further you went (including the need to resupply the paratroops that had been surrounded since their airborne insertion), but had to drop all of the paratroopers at once instead of staggering them from south to north along with the advance. There was no preponderance of force in favor of the Allies because they didn't have or take the time to properly assess either the enemy, or their own capability in using such a novel approach to airborne and armored cooperation (which has literally never been tried before or since), with such slim margins for error and with such a massive strategic prize on the table. It was a reckless gamble, foolishly taken based on flawed assumptions of both sides' strengths and weaknesses. Market-Garden failed, and in retrospect there is little to recommend it as an Operational Plan (meaning even if some of the flawed assumptions on the Allied side, like German armored forces in the area, had not been incorrect there is still little indication that the three river crossings could have been affected by the forces available). The strategic fallout was that the flimsy supply lines reaching all the way back to the single functional artificial 'Mulberry' harbor in Normandy were insufficient for the Allies to continue their offensive into the Autumn and beyond. Had the forces and supplies wasted on Market-Garden been used in a more conventional manner - specifically clearing the Scheldt river estuary and opening Antwerp for Allied supplies to pour into Northwest Europe - it is far more likely that strategic solution would've yielded tangible benefits for the Allies. Finally, the ultimate failure of the Operation left an undeniable blemish on Monty's career as an allied general, opening the door for the criticisms that persist today over his competence. Whether deserved or not (his abrasive personality won him few supporters amongst his peers at the very top of Allied strategic leadership), Montgomery will always be seen as having lost the only major operation undertaken by the Allies following the end of 1943, and thus has had all of his performance questioned in a way that Monty himself would certainly not have desired.
@@johndawes9337 All of the flaws in the plan that I pointed out were (or should've been) apparent at the strategic level, and Monty backed the plan to Ike. Relying on a single axis of advance in an area where armor is totally road-bound, and dropping lightly armed paratroopers all at once (rather than staggering from south to north over several days, and giving the plan a much needed relief valve should 30 Corps get stalled) leaving them marooned in the event that any part of the plan fails, was a totally flawed premise to begin with. The potential downsides were considered acceptable when Monty pitched the plan to Ike, should the Allies get Armor over the Rhine in 1944. As a clear failure, it was a costly and foolhardy gamble that should never have been taken.
@@airborngrmp1 Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:
@@airborngrmp1 It’s myth that any petrol was taken from Patton for Montgomery. Patton was already at a standstill before planning for Market Garden even started. Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, (two weeks before MG) after a week’s excruciating pause” - Harry Yeide Market Garden only had priority in extra supply transport laid on. It didn’t take away any actual supplies from any US army. Nor did Market Garden stop all operations on the western front. Patton’s 3rd Army was still trying to take Metz and US 1st Army began its Hurtgen Forest campaign on September 19th, 2 days after Market Garden began. Did you know that the twin pronged US 1st Army attack in the Hurtgen Forest and Aachen in October 1944 used FOUR TIMES as many men and supplies as the ground element of Market Garden, which wasn’t even a full 2nd British Army attack? “ It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “ - CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. 1954..ty John Peate.
*A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198* Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. *"We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."* Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
The failure at Arnhem at least was the fast reorganisation of German ad hoc units, to counter the landings, and the Allies failure to realise this. Luftwaffe, Heer and even training units put together to form battlegroups, and once STUG Bde 280 arrived it was finished for 1st AB.
the German ability to make something out of nothing was certainly impressive. However, if Market Garden had been resourced correctly then all of the required airborne elements would have been on the ground in those first 6-8 hours and the piecemeal but effective blocking forces of Bittrich would have had no answer to it. Not having enough transports available for the first 24 hours underpinned the decisions of Urquhart and Gavin, with tragic results.
Brereton and Williams of the USAAF refusing double missions on day one and Hollinghurst of the RAF refusing to fly closer to Arnhem were the major factors. Caution by the two air forces.
@@Trust-me-I-am-a-dentistas far as the British units were concerned, they were not lightly equipped paratroopers. The majority of the British that were dropped were actually airborne infantry and for that first drop, Urquhart had made conscious decision to bring in all of his heavy gear, including all of the 17pdr and 6pdr AT guns, the 75mm howitzers, the 20mm Polsten AAA guns, the 3" mortar teams, and the Vickers HMG teams, arguably at the expense of additional troops. As for the 2 SS Panzer Divisions, they were "divisions" in name only, with neither of them being better than 30% strength and with no tanks of their own. The only tanks in the vicinity were those of the local school of armour. The tanks that turned the battle came from outside the area and most didn't arrive until D+4 (although the Stugs of Sg-280 arrived on D+2 from Denmark!)
Not one word about logistics. The British army was getting the bulk of their supplies from Normandy, 200 miles to the rear. All Allied armies were running out of gas across the front. With the capture of the intact port of Antwerp on Sep 3, the logical move would be to close off and secure the Beveland Peninsula and open the scheldt estuary to use Antwerp. Without Antwerp, adding another 60 miles (to Arnhem) to a 200 mile supply line and yet another 100-150 into Northern Germany was pure logistical fantasy. Eisenhower should have ordered Montgomery to open the estuary but Montgomery should have seen the urgent need for it himself. Sad waste of brave men.
A Rhine crossing at Arnhem was more urgent than the opening of Antwerp's port because it could be done quickly, while the Germans were still off balance after their withdrawal from Normandy and constructing their defence lines along the rivers and canals in the Netherlands. The German 15.Armee held the south bank of the Scheldt estauary and was starting the process of ferrying units over to the north bank. Ferrying operations could be interdicted by air during the day in good weather, but could not be stopped altogether. So, given that a Rhine crossing woud be needed to enter Germany and the 15.Armee was already occupying the Scheldt estuary, the logical choice was to strike north for Arnhem to achieve 1) the Rhine crossing and bridgeheads on the river Ijssel, 2) reaching the Ijsselmeer coast would cut off all German forces west of the corridor, including the 15.Armee, and 3) a new threat from the V-2 rockets launched from sites on the Dutch coast would also be dealt with by cutting their supply lines. Antwerp would take longer to open, and the Canadian 1st Army needed a few days to reposition themselves around Antwerp (taking over the sector from British 2nd Army units) before they would be ready to begin offensive operations. The logistical situation meant that both operations could not be conducted at the same time, so it makes sense to strike with the right (British 2nd Army) first for the Rhine, then with the left (Canadian 1st Army) to clear the Scheldt. I have some quotes: 'On the 9th September I received information from London that on the previous day the first V2 rockets had landed in England; it was suspected that they came from areas near Rotterdam and Amsterdam and I was asked when I could rope off those general areas. So far as I was concerned that settled the direction of the thrust line of my operations to secure crossings over the Meuse and Rhine; it must be towards Arnhem.' (The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, 1958 - Chapter 15: Allied strategy North of the Seine, p.247) Re scheduled meeting with Eisenhower on 10 September at Brussels airport to discuss logistics, strategy, and current operations (including presenting operation SIXTEEN, later called MARKET GARDEN, to replace the original Arnhem operation COMET cancelled that morning): 'I pointed out that Antwerp, and the approaches to the port which we had not yet got, lay behind the thrust on the left flank which I had advocated on the 23rd August - nearly three weeks ago. There were two possible plans - Bradley’s and mine… The quickest way to open up Antwerp was to back my plan of concentration on the left - which plan would not only help our logistic and maintenance situation but would also keep up the pressure on the stricken Germans in the area of greatest importance, thus helping to end the war quickly… It was obvious that he disagreed with my analysis. He repeated that we must first close to the Rhine and cross it on a wide front; then, and only then, could we concentrate on one thrust… But Eisenhower agreed that 21 Army Group should strike northwards towards Arnhem as early as possible, and he admitted that successful operations in that direction would open up wide possibilities for future action.' (The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, 1958 - Chapter 15: Allied strategy North of the Seine, p.247) 'In my - prejudiced - view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MARKET GARDEN’s unrepentant advocate.' (The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, 1958 - Chapter 16: The Battle of Arnhem, p.267)) 'Eisenhower was similarly unapologetic when he declared after the publication of Cornelius Ryan's best-selling account, A Bridge Too Far, “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.” '(Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015) - The point is that nobody would be saying Antwerp should have been opened first if MARKET GARDEN had succeeded, because a Rhine crossing first and clearing the Scheldt second was the logical sequence without the benefit of hindsight. If you're going to travel back in time and do something differently, I would switch the assignments of the more aggresssive and experienced 505th Regiment to the Nijmegen bridges and have the 508th guarding against a counter-attack from the Reichswald instead. This constant harping on about Antwerp is misdirection to draw attention away from the failure of operation MARKET at Nijmegen on D-Day and James Gavin's part in the destruction of 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem and the failure of the entire operation.
@@davemac1197 "Montgomery later admitted that he was wrong to assume the Canadians could open the approaches to Antwerp while his forces tried to reach Germany. But his timing was off. The Canadians began fighting around Antwerp in early October, after Market Garden had ended. So, our original question prompts another: Why did it take to the middle of October for Montgomery to support the embattled Canadians and make Antwerp a priority?" Legion Should Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery have tried to clear the Scheldt Estuary in September 1944?
Americans didn’t fail to do much during the war. Saving Britains butt* from losing the war to the nazis? They sure didn’t fail at that. Monty slapped together a sh!t plan and rushed it bc he wanted to look good in the papers. Everything Montgomery did was to get headlines. Should have let Patton plan it so it might have succeeded.
@@Andy_Babb patton said he would take Metz in 9 days but 3 months later and at a loss of 55k troops he failed and you think he was better than Monty..give your head a wobble mate..as for Gavin listen to what Dutch historian R G Poulussen has to say th-cam.com/video/ez4qNztWNGc/w-d-xo.html
@@Andy_Babb The US was a poor army. Monty had to take command of two shambolic armies in the Germans Bulge attack. Eisenhower, Hodges and Bradley should have been fired.
Look, you're a confused, nationalistic British fanbois spitting out complete fantasy nonsense.Monty liked little boys and the Gerries ran him off the coninent.The USA and Russia were now dealing the cards.Stick to beating up Ghandi disciples or shoving around goat herders in the Falklands
The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN
🔶 The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command 🔶 Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown 🔶 And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?* 🔶 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
a great book on Market Garden is "It Never Snows in September" from the German viewpoint. Makes a great case that MG was a German victory, not an Allied defeat. Like Sun Tzu said, every battle is won before it's fought.
What other rare gems have you two poltroons mined for the comment section Monty was like "Well I don't see how as the overall operational commander I could be responsible for all of that"
of all the books in my library on Market Garden, I find it to be the least compelling to read, with the exception of the coverage of the Winter Hunger. The rest of the book is just a rehash of Ryan's book "A Bridge Too Far". There are far, far better books on Market Garden than Beevor's. However, if you can only read one book, then it will have to do BUT do not get sucked into his criticism of the British and almost total disregard of the failures of the US forces that actually failed the operation. As an example, on page 124, he merely refers to the failure of Gavin to take the bridge at Nijmegen as being an opportunity "missed". No, it was not an opportunity missed, it was a complete abdication of his responsibilities in the operation - the entire purpose of the airborne units was to take their primary objectives with "thunderclap surprise" (Brereton's words to his airborne commanders), but somehow Gavin's thoughts were "the bridge can wait".
The document did not say anything about the fact that the English were not alone there. The Polish parachute brigade landed with the English. Due to the Germans occupying the landing zone, the Poles were dropped on the other side of the river in Driel. For 3 days they tried to cross the river under German fire to the English in the Osterbeek area. Finally, when the English decided to withdraw, the Poles stayed on the German side of the river until the end and covered the English retreat. Ultimately, the Poles were the last to leave. Gen. R.Urquhart (commander of the British 1st Airborne Division) recalled after the war that if it had not been for this, most likely no one would have managed to evacuate
Appreciate your comment and mostly correct, but the 1st Airborne Division was 'British' and not 'English'. Its personnel would include soldiers from all four home nations of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, plus a few Canadian officers who were loaned to the British Army in a scheme called 'CANLOAN' because of the shortage of junior officers. The Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade was attached to the Division operationally, although were under political control of the Polish Government-in-Exile based in London. The glider element landed on the north side of the river on D+2 as planned, but the parachute element was postponed by bad weather until D+4, and their drop zone on the south side of the Arnhem highway bridge had to be re-arranged to Driel, still on the south side of the river, because the planned zone was under German control.
The polish had the highest % and monty shit on them like he did the canadians and anyone else he could through under the bus.Except the big boys of course who put the pathetic pedo in his place
Although its not widely mentioned anymore in the media and many foreigners nowadays that live here have no clue about Market Garden, the Polish are still remembered by us natives. As a kid I was always remembered that we shouldnt forget the Polish soldiers that also fought for us Dutch people and Arnhem
Exactly - Monty shit on them pure and simple and later many British came forward pointing out monty attempting to relieve himself of any blame - or attempting to. The jerk above you had his YT deleted once already. The Poles had the highest casualty % of any Air Borne units during OMG
Market-Garden was so unlike Monty. He was a cautious commander in Africa, committing to something only when he had assured manpower to defeat Rommel. Market-Garden was so rushed. If I recall correctly, the operation was drawn within weeks, while Overlord took little over a year. 17.000+- casualties in 8 days. I'll never understand why Eisenhower allow such operation to take place, because he was also a tactician. This is just my opinion, feel free to disagree with me.
If you include the planning for Operation Comet, which would be the correct thing to do, they did it all the planning for the largest airborne attack in history in just 14 days. This is an incredible achievement. A number of generic decisions had to be made to do this which have been debated ever since. Eisenhower allowed it because the Allied advance was beginning to stall due to a lack of supplies. A narrow thrust by only a portion of the Allied ground forces, supported by 35,000 airborne troops that would arrive supplied from the air seemed a logical way of sustaining the advance and keeping the initiative away from the Germans. The Germans began their planning for the Ardennes offensive around this time. They were also aware that the Allied attack was losing its momentum.
" I'll never understand why Eisenhower allow such operation to take place," He allowed far more misguided operations to take place, such as the Hurtgen Forest, Metz, Alsace, as well as thinning the front in the Ardennes. Ouch.
@@JimWallace-dp4ty How many times do I have to write that it made sense only on a very large map That means it made sense for most there were few dissenters before the operation
one thing that everyone seems to forget, the airlift problem of getting the troops in was also affected the 101st and the 82nd, it taking 3 days for them as well. and, sorry, if you do not achieve your objective, the operation is a failure. i hate to say that, because so many brave men died, but there is no other way to describe it. the failure to realize the difficulties of the terrain, the enemy strength (one often overlooked detail is that the failure to isolate the scheldt estuary enabled the 15th army, most units at around half strength, for some units to reach the area by the 2nd day and after.) and the weather, which that time of year was seldom good for several days in a row. monty should have listened to 2nd army co dempsey, who suggested wesel, germany as the target, specifically because of better terrain.
@@johnlucas8479 no, half of IX Troop Carrier Command was unavailable for Market Garden because Eisenhower's policy of military operations by appeasement. This meant that in order to placate Bradley, who was against ANY airborne operations because he wanted the transports reserved for delivering supplies, insufficient planes were dedicated to Market Garden because the other half were still acting like they were FedEx. If Eisenhower was going to insist on maintain that policy, then he should have put pressure on Williams (USAAF) to either do two drops on that first day, or at the very least, then ensure that the WACO gliders were double-towed. Both Demspey and Montgomery originally wanted Wesel. The airforce commanders put a big, big NO to Wesel, so the next best alternative was Arnhem.
@@sean640307 Sean 1) half of IX Troop Carrier Command was unavailable for Market Garden: IX TCC fully strength as Operation Market Garden Now and Then page 45 50th, 52 and 53 Wings (14 Groups 64 Squadrons) 51st Wing was based in Italy. 1st Lift total aircraft 1,525 USAAF 1,167 RAF 358 1st British Airborne IX TCC Groups 314 and 61 (2) from 52nd Wing US 82nd Division IX TCC groups 313,316,315, from 52nd Wing 439,441,440, from 50th Wing total (6 Groups) US 101st Division IX TCC groups 442 from 50th Wing 434, 435, 436, 437, 438 from 53rd Wing (6 Groups) Clearly, you claim about half of IX TCCC was unavailable is incorrect. For Operation Comet only the 52nd Wing was request by RAF. 2) Your Statement "then ensure that the WACO gliders were double-towed." From Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market Garden (p. 197). "The inability of 9th TCC to match the projected Linnet turnaround timetable in Market Garden stemmed directly from the increased range involved in the Arnhem, Nijmegen and Eindhoven lifts. The longer transit between the English air bases and the three airborne objectives left far less time for the turnaround if the lifts were to be mounted in daylight and at full scale. The greater distance also substantially reduced the absolute amount of lift available, because 9th TCC’s Dakota tugs did not have sufficient endurance to double-tow gliders from the UK to the Market Garden corridor. IX TCC could not use the double tow because the DZ/LZ for Market Garden was beyond the range of C-47 with a double tow. 3) "Your Statement "Both Demspey and Montgomery originally wanted Wesel." From Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery . "On the 9th September I received information from London that on the previous day the first V2 rockets had landed in England; it was suspected that they came from areas near Rotterdam and Amsterdam and I was asked when I could rope off those general areas. So far as I was concerned that settled the direction of the thrust line of my operations to secure crossings over the Meuse and Rhine; it must be towards Arnhem." From amb, Richard. Montgomery in Europe: Success or Failure? (p. 241) "In the end, Montgomery decided on Arnhem, not Wesel, for his air landings on the banks of the Rhine." Also, Sean Operation Comet was target was Arnhem, with the operation schedule for 8th. Clearly, Arnhem was Montgomery decision.
@@johnlucas8479 I have those books, too. The page in "Operation Market Garden Then and Now" lists the make up of IX Troop Carrier Command from a nominal perspective, but that does not mean that all of it was made available for the operation. However, I am happy to concede that I was wrong as it seems that for the first lift, essentially the greater part of IX TCC was allocated. Same book, pg 97 says 424 transports sent 101st into battle & pg 132 states 480 sent 82nd into battle. The RAF sent 320 planes (358 if you include the 38 used by Browning's HQ) and yes, an additional 147 from the USAAF sent the 1st AB paratroops into battle. However, it doesn't change the fact that the original target was closer to Wesel and that both Monty and Dempsey wanted it. The 9th Sept was after the initial date of Comet (& yes, well aware that Comet also was aimed at Arnhem). Montgomery was not fixated on Wesel, itself, as the following shows: Directive M148 states (in part) "Second Army will advance from line BRUSSELS-ANTWERP on 6 Sep directed on WESEL and ARNHEM and passing around north side of the RHUR... Require airborne operation of one British Division and Poles on evening 6 Sep or morning 7 Sep to secure bridges over RHINE between WESEL and ARNHEM". So this clearly says that anywhere between the two was considered the best path, so it came down to which one. RAF reaction to the WESEL objective was "considerably influenced by the density of anti-aircraft fire in the vicinity of the RHUR" (Hamilton "Monty: The Final Years" pg 28 (Montgomery, in Wilmot papers, stated that "I chose Arnhem, not Wesel, because the air forces could not tackle the Wesel operation from Bases in England, and anyway, they were concerned about the fiercer enemy reaction which would have to be faced in that area" (ibid) That Montgomery received the information of the V weapons simply reinforced any decisions. This is further reinforced by M523, which discusses "one division, or if necessary, a Corps, to turn northwards towards ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM" once any target close to WESEL was ruled out. With regards to the double tow, I am well aware of what Ritchie wrote (once again, I have that book) but others have had the opinion that it could be done (and was done for ANVIL/DRAGOON over similar distances). I also seem to recall that it was done for VARSITY, too, but I can't confirm that at the moment.
And equal to Patton's. Most generals have large egos - that's how they get where they get. But, it wasn't ego which caused Monty to bid for Market Garden.
Market Garden was in fact a failure. The British Army does not pride itself on operations which lead to a population being subjugated albeit then relieved at the end of the wider conflict. Montgomery was flawed, my old dad used to say so, and he was a man who knew. So there. Nice one Dan and team! ⭐👍
Market Garden was not a defeat. It took 100km of German held ground. The Germans retreated and lost Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The allies later used Nijmegen to attack into Germany. Only Arnhem was a defeat but technically this was an all air operation. Planned by the air forces. Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:,,TY John Peate
It didnt succeed because the Supreme Commander and C-in-C of all ground forces, Eisenhower, sat with his feet up in a chateau near Cherbourg, some 600km from his armies and never had his finger on the pulse. He was out of touch and never got his hands dirty.
1) Too many variables that stacked upon each other. 2) The plan was made when it looked like the German army was in total shambles, barely a week later they were fighting back hard. 3) Not sending troops to take the bridges directly, but dropping them further away and in waves, forcing some units to sit on the landing grounds to guard them. 4) A massive problem with communications, both structural, and in terms of equipment, as well as training issues and unfavorable terrain. 5) The inability to get air support or even extra artillery for the Airborne troops. 6) Too many sidequests distracting from the main goal. The result is that the airborne units failed to achieve many of their goals (the bridges), XXX Corps failed to push through and tried to shore up any and every flank attack, slowly draining itself. A huge potential was wasted by dropping troops in packets over several days rather than one main wave that might have held until XXX did arrive. Montgomery trusted his officers too much. Brereton imposed the drop zones and two-day schedule. Browning and Gavin were too focused on the Reichswald and Horrocks never seems to have pushed beyond "We have to get to Arnhem at some point."
Too many sidequests indeed! Of the seven river/canal crossings the airborne troops were tasked with capturing, they only dropped on both sides of four of them, and two of these were last minute changes (Veghel and Grave), even though their doctrine stated they should attack from both sides. The other three crossings that were not attacked from both sides were blown up (Zon), held by the Germans for 4 days (Nijmegen), or re-captured by the Germans (Arnhem).
Monty Garden was unrealistically ambitious and just too many variables factoring in for things to go wrong. Ambition over reaching capability. This operation was condemned at it's inception and scarcely a trained military eye couldn't spot it. Attempting to shoehorn one armored Division down one elevated lane for 70 miles,surrounded by flooded fields,polder marshes and drainage ditches proved disastrous. It ate up time/men/materiel/machines and kept the port of Antwerp from being opened that was desperately needed for massive resupply should this debacle somehow make Arnhem
@@bigwoody4704 more nonsense. Only on "the Island" was the road elevated and that was AFTER the debacle of Nijmegen. Prior to then, the road proved no more problematic than any other path taken. 30 Corps were on time, having made up most of the time lost at Son only to find Niijmegen still in German hands. If the 82nd had taken their primary objective, which was the entire reason for the airborne forces being deployed in the first place, then 30 Corps would have rolled right on over it and carried on to Arnhem. Gavin did it at Grave, but elected not to do it at Nijmegen. He even states it in his book, "On to Berlin". Market Garden had to be done before clearing the Scheldt. It gave the opportunity to open up Rotterdam (and potentialy Amsterdam) and simultaneously cut off 15th Army as their end goal was the Isselmere. Doing it the other way around would not have opened Antwerp up substantially any sooner, and would have boxed 21AG in a corner with nowhere to go as the Germans would simply have blown all of the bridges across every waterway, making every estuary, river, canal and creek an amphibious crossing. No, Market Garden had to be attempted first.
And Monty never did a hurried thing in his life as evidenced by the fact the Failed Marshall couldn't inconvenience himself to show up for what HE himself demanded. And even with 8 decades of reflection and hindsight guys like you stick to the broken narrartives of a WW1 sargent that got driven from the continent when the odds were even. I expext that from door stops like Lyndon,Villa and Burns,foolishly I though you better read Not nonsense this why guys like you got brushed aside rather easily accepting idiocy like this.The single elevated road was easily defended,the HEER officers,mentioned this and were recorded stating that the better avenue was thru the SAAR,right where Bradley/Patton were stopped. FFS pull your head out of bernards backside and stick it in a book.34,400 go in 17,000 come out. The planners of Comet/Linnett cancelled that foreboding for very good reason.The yapping jackel monty adding 2 US divisions doesn't remove those obstacles and obvious setbacks. When the flight formations approached the coast all element of surprise was lost. The German Army well dug-in on Walcheren Island and the shores of the Scheldt estuary would simply radio back immediately to Wehrmacht Command of their approach giving Flak teams plenty of time to prepare Remember OVERLORD 2 months earlier was 30 miles across the channel,maybe another 20-30 miles inland these flights were almost 300 miles ONE WAY from air fields 50 miles west of London up into NE Netherlands around Arnhem. The Dutch Army who wasn't really consulted stated going right up highway 69 was one long choke point surrounded flood plains,polder marshes and drainage ditches - it had been war gamed before the war started. Also thousands of experienced, well-fortified enemy soldiers still had to be dislodged from key positions they inhabited. Fallschirmjäger General Kurt Student had dropped into that exact area in 1940 he was very familiar with the area and perhaps the best tactical commander on any front *The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north* .Like Patton they reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions". *General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted* The Dutch Army advisors even stated that there was better terrain west and north that would have better supported an advance of this size. And Monty never did a hurried thing in life evidenced by the fact the Failed Marshall didn't have the nuts to show up for what HEE himself demanded
At the end of this sing-along description of a British led disaster the speaker says Arnhem wasn't a failure nor was it a success. !😮 It was a fantastic failure, calling it anything else is whistling in the dark past the graveyard of the dead. Eisenhower handling control over to Montgomery to modify Montys bruised ego after the failure at Caen, that was one of Eisenhower's gravest errors. I'm just beginning to delve into the story of market garden I have Ryan's book A bridge too Far are there any others that folks would like to recommend to give a fair understanding of the events of that sad exploit. I'm especially interested in understanding the leadership snafus that explain how an otherwise good idea was so badly executed by the Brotish leadership sqabbles sadly Eiesenhower fell for Montgomery's relentless badgering. And where was Montgomery he was nowhere. 🤬
*Tim Saunders, The Island: Nijmegen to Arnhem ,Battleground Europe,p.43* "The terrain that the spearhead of XXX Corps now had to cross, was worse than anything experienced so far. *General Horrocks* summed up the military qualities of the ground: *‘With its dykes, high embankments carrying the road and deep ditches on either side it was most unsuitable for armoured warfare. It was perfect defensive country in which the anti-tank gun hidden in the orchard was always master of the tank silhouetted against the skyline.’* With the weather deteriorating daily, ground conditions on the Island would get worse." *The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north. Like Patton they reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions" General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted* An actual Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student were there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Montgomery who was nowhere around. Also ignoring the ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken & depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. *Montgomery discounted the basic logistical reality that he ignored not only one elevated road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers* The Germans had mastered this practice exiting the Eastern Front then proceeding to France. The German Divisions could be quickly refitted and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. *As one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in that area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches accompanying them where armored columns couldn't go*
@@bigwoody4704 General Eberbach cleary hasn't heard of the Schlieffen plan, the Germans historically always attacked through Belgium, they literally did it in WW1.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Britain and allied countries had created the Kingdom of Belgium from the French Duchy of Burgundy and the southern Netherlands states as a buffer state in the fallout from Waterloo 1815, as the Netherlands was the "dangerous flank" between France and the German states (unified under Prussian domination in 1871). The First World War was started by the Second German Reich created by Bismarck in 1871, and as you say invaded France through Belgium, although the Netherlands itself managed to remain neutral on that occasion. The Dutch were not so lucky in 1940 at the hands of the Third Reich.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy "These failed attempts to outflank Caen were an early demonstration of flaws in British tactics, as well as the debilitating effect of the confined Normandy landscape and the impressive fighting qualities of German forces. 7th Armoured Division's previous experience of mobile warfare in North Africa did not readily translate to a congested European battlefield. With its infantry left too far behind, it had been stopped in its tracks in terrain unsuitable for the large scale deployment of tanks."
1. Too complex and too depending on impossible time tables that didn't account for German resistance 2. No means for the Air Borne units to support each other 3. Too depending on very narrow roads and bridges that could be easily blown up/ 4. The failure of British Generalship who felt no need to move as fast as possible 5. Did not help Allies needs when all the resources devoted to that could have been thrown at Antwerp to open up the port to ease supply demands.
The plan was very simple really. A not bright child could see right through it. They were trying to make a mad dash across the Rhine into Germany. I can't imagine it took the Germans long at all to figure out precisely what was going on. Then they could carefully plan how to thwart it. 30 corps was going to take days to get up the road. Ultimately they never got up the road at all. Because it was too obvious what they were trying to do.
@@rankoorovic7904 the German assessment of the plan was that it was actually a very good plan, let down by not having all of the necessary airborne units on the ground on that first day. Had that happened, they stated that they would not have been able to stop it.
@@sean640307 Tanks need open fields and polders are not suited for tanks or support vehicles going through them What ruined the offensive is the fact that 30th corps had to go on a single road in a single file and not being able to spread their tanks
What total rubbish, read some actual history regarding all parts of market garden, not rubbish by Cornelius Ryan or worse Max Hastings or Anthony Beevor, the complexity was fed in by Brereton, williams and then Browning, none of who would listen to reason. Ike pushed for Market Garden after Montgomery had actually cancelled Comet. XXX Corps was only slightly delayed when it reached Nijmegen, the 82nd and Brownings delay caused XXX corps to have to take Nijmegen which delayed the whole operation, there were also units moving along paralel roads to the main thrust to draw forces away and to broaden the attack. If Market Garden had not been changed from Comet it may have worked better, as Comet was an Airborne operation based on Speed aggression surprise which is the mantra for all Airborne operations, a blanket of Airborne forces hitting the bridges in a coup de main glider assault not landing at drop zones up to 8 miles away( thanks Brereton and USAAF transport command). Then it was the delay at Nijmegen cost the Airborne forces at Arnhem dearly not as they would have you believe the British drinking tea instead of getting on, Infantry and armour were doing what should have been done 24 hours before. Sorry if this seems like a rant and i suppose it is but to many people denigrate the British when the blame can be shared among a lot of different people but not XXX corps.
There is some dramatic license there. I have also read the book by Stephen Ambrose. When my son reported to Fort Campbell 17 years ago with the 101st I needed to soak up the history. Thanks for your opinion tho. 🙄
The fact that the 82nd failed to take the Nijmegen bridge, is that not the most significant reason XXX corps couldn't make it in time? It took too long to kick the SS out and used up valuable ammunition?
It was Browning's vanity project and once he had convinced Monty, no-one had the power or authority to stop it. If Monty had been aware of a fraction of the issues beforehand, he would have pulled the plug on it immediately. He was the master of cautious planning, and Browning was a preening narcissist and was selective in the information he gave to him. Far too much evidence to go into here, I'm afraid, but there's enough scholarly works on the subject to arrive at the correct conclusion.
What’s bad about Britain is we reward incompetency. Didn’t browning get medals, titles and a promotion? Claim it as a great success even though thousands died for his ego.
Operation Market Garden failed because it was planned by Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery. Monty was not a great general but he was very good at projecting a heroic persona to the newspapers. Eisenhower wanted to sack him after Operation Goodwood but didn't because he felt it would be a public relations disaster with the English people. I have always wondered if part of Ike's motivation in approving Market Garden was to give Monty enough rope to hang himself. All those lives were lost to feed one man's ego.
Exactly the reason it was a bridge too far is Montgomery was a poor commander, poor planning, poor use of intelligence, poor logistics. He was awful, Terrible. As in, no fooking good. Also he didn't have the cajones to show up like Field Marshall Model & General Student who routed bernard's pathetic plan
The people on here arguing about Monty and Patton. 😂 Guys just accept that both were good and capable commanders but both had flaws and both made mistakes along the way. Its just easier.
Gavin did not tell Browning to take 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity about 1,000 infantry) to lift his useless HQ to Nijmegen and Gavin did not tell 1st AB to take 4 hours to travel 4 miles/6k to the rail bridge and arrive just in time to see it blown up and he did not tell 1st AB not to test their radios, apologies wireless sets.
I kind of think Prince Bernhard kind of say it best. when it comes to the sucsses of market garden. "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success," personaly I don´t know if the airborn units could afford it. I am not Dutch. But I don´t even want to know what a failure would have looked like if this was 90% sucsses.
*Poor documentary.* Badly researched. The US 82nd *NEVER* captured their prime objective. They *failed* to seize the Nijmegen (Waal) bridge on day 1. XXX Corps had to seize it for them. The 82nd failure put XXX Corps back *two* days. This delay was too great to relieve the British 1st Airborne at Arnhem. XXX Corps were just ahead of schedule when entering Nijmegen, expecting to roll over a captured bridge relieving Arnhem within hours. But found it was still in German hands. They then had to seize the bridge themselves.
They weren't going up that road anyways. Bridge or no bridge. The Germans picked the column off at will. That road was tantamount to a shooting gallery. Thinking you could push an army up it was ludicrous.
@@1pcfred nope, the Germans would not have picked off the column at will as there wouldn't have been any had the bridge been taken when it was supposed to be taken. Yes, there were German forces that crossed Arnhem bridge before Frost's men got to it. They would then have been trapped between the 82nd AB and 1st AB on "the Island" and would have been easy pickings for 2nd TAC, who COULD have been brought in for that purpose. The Germans were only able to pick off the British column later because of the reinforcements that they brought in on D+4 - they would NOT have been there, as 30 Corps would have been in Arnhem on D+2 and given those German reinforcements a welcome they would not have appreciated!
@@sean640307 you wouldn't have needed any reinforcements. Just a couple Germans and a single artillery piece. Which absolutely happened in the campaign. The road was a raised causeway. Any vehicle that tried to leave it was instantly lost. They were literally fish in a barrel on it. Even if they were on time the Germans still had days knowing where they were going. Expecting to capture every bridge intact was wishful thinking too. Just how incompetent do you think the Germans were? Very apparently.
@@1pcfred The state of play on the 17th, D day, was: *1)* the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear; *2)* there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally; *3)* there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen who were getting out fast; *4)* a few scattered about along the road; *5)* there was no armour in Arnhem. That was it. *i)* XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven; *ii)* 101st from Eindhoven to Grave; *iii)* 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen; *iv)* British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine; XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made _remarkable_ progress. The US 101st took *3-4 hours* to move about *2 km* to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around in the village. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it. _Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full_ *_two hours had passed before they emerged from the village._* _Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar._- US Official History. XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed *10-12 hours* at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse. XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them *2hrs 45 mins* to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous _carpet_ for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. *The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.* Horrocks promised the 1st Airborne at Anhem XXX Corps would reach them within 48 hours. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820 hrs on d-day plus 2, on schedule making up for the delay at Zon, having seven hours left to travel 8 miles. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match. On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another *36 hours.* This was now a total delay of nearly *two days.* In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem. XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units *failed* to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed. According to the official American Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
@@1pcfred only on the Island - the rest of the battle was barely inconvenienced by the "single road". That's why 43rd Wessex took the lead there, as it was a classic infantry engagement after that. The German guns were smashed at every single encounter. It's not a case of thinking the Germans were incompetent, it's knowing what they had and what the British had to counter it.
Its the flawed planning and the incredible ability of the Germans to resist even with second and third rate units cobbled in battlegroups that didnt exist just hours before the first airborne landed. BUT those units were led y competent commanders. Too much focus is put on 9th and 10th ss divisions as "tank divisions" at Arnhem those were at best light brigades with no tanks. Kampfgruppe Spindler and Von Tettau are far more important especially in the initial clashes around Arnhem. The main issue with the plan was that everything had to go perfect or it would be a failure, all objectives had to be taken and taken fast (so minimum resistance) and all bridges had to be intact.
The bridge at Son en Breugel was blown up, XXX Corps put up a Bailey bridge and srosed over then made up the time to Nijmegen, the US 82nd failure there is why XXX Corps couldn't rewach Arnhem in time to take over and defeat the Germans there.
And what was it all for?? A total waits of brave young lives. For less than a century later British is simply being given to a foreign culture, completely unrelated to anything or anyone British, they probably don't know what WWII was. Heart breaking 😅😢
*A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198* Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. *"We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."* Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth
34,500 go in 17,000 come out over 50% - do the math not the meth lyndon. Did bernard miss giving you THE FULL MONTY? Like he missed showing up in Arnhem? Ya Field Marshall
Well they took the lead in North Africa, Sicily and Normandy and they all suceeded. The Americans took the lead from September 1944......and everything came to a halt then they got themselves pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes. And had to go running back to Montgomery 😂
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Yep, it all went well and ahead of schedule when the British were in charge. Nobody expected to be out of France and liberating Belgium by early September. An amazing effort. Sadly it all went wrong once Eisenhower got his hands on ground strategy. Eisenhower was an excellent politician, diplomat and man manager but in the words of Montgomery he was "no soldier".
@@lyndoncmp5751 Yeah it wasn't right for him to take over as Ground force commander in September, Eisenhower didn't have the combat experience to fit that role, it's like a car with no wheels. Only Monty or Bradley could have done it.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Montgomery even told Eisenhower in August that if the C-in-C of all ground forces had to be an American due to public and political pressure then he should give the job to Bradley and he would gladly serve under him. Montgomery rightly didn't think one man should do both jobs, that of Supreme Commander AND the C-in-C of all ground forces. They were two different jobs. Eisenhower took over from Montgomery as C-in-C on 1st September yet remained out of touch of the battle, some 600km away from his ground forces in his château HQ in Granville near Cherbourg. He didnt even move to Versailles until later in September, still hundreds of km from his ground forces.
The plan, Montgomery's grand vision, was very poorly thought out. He obviously realised that the Arnhem bridge was going to be the hardest to hold as he allocated the 1st British Parachute Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade to it but then instead of giving air transport priority to those troops so they all landed together he planned a staggered landing over 3 days with the drop zone 8 miles out of town. The smart thing to do would have been to take the risk and drop the men on the town where the bridge was. The paratroops at the first bridge who had a higher transport priority could expect reasonably rapid reinfocement and relief from 30 Corp but the men at Arnhem could not so they needed to be strongest force and in the best position right from the start. This is something Montgomery and the commanders under him didn't appreciate. In fact once his grand vision was accepted he stepped back from the operational control no doubt so that if it failed he could deny it was his fault.
I think you'll find the airborne decisions were based on Browning's advice and were not overruled by Montgomery, who was not an airborne commander. Browning selected the original drop and landing zones, although some of these were later deleted by USAAF Generals Brereton and Williams of 1st Allied Airborne Army and US IX Troop Carrier Command respectively. They did the detailed planning for MARKET after being given the outline plan for provisional operation SIXTEEN devised by Browning and Montgomery, and approved by Eisenhower at his Brussels airport meeting with Montgomery on 10 September. Browning could not object to the changes made for MARKET after he had already threatened to resign over Brereton's previous operation LINNET II (Liege-Maastricht bridges), scheduled with too short notice to print and distribute maps to the troops. The operation was fortunately cancelled, but Brereton had planned to accept Browning's resignation and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation. Instead of causing mass injuries by jumping on the town and losing aircraft to the heavy flak around the cities, the original COMET and proposed SIXTEEN plans used dawn glider coup de main assaults to repeat the successful raids on the Orne bridges in Normandy on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges. In fact, the same glider pilots were to be involved. COMET was cancelled as the men were loading their aircraft, and the raids were deleted from the SIXTEEN proposal by Brereton and Williams, as was a double airlift on D-Day that would have delivered twice as many troops in the first 24 hours as the final MARKET plan.
@@davemac1197 Operation Deadstick Pilot training involved practice landings on a small strip of land, instrument flying using stopwatches for accurate course changes and fitting flight crew goggles with dark glass to get them used to night flying. By May 1944 they had carried out 54 training sorties, flying in all weathers both day and night. And there was no AA at those bridges.
@@nickdanger3802 - operation COMET, including the glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges, was going ahead and only cancelled at the last minute due to reports II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Netherlands. So what's your point? "Training is useful, but no substitute for experience" - Rosa Kleb, From Russia With Love 😉
The plan, Operation Comet was Montgomery's plan, Eisenhower insisted on Market Garden and left Montgomery out of the planning. Montgomery didn't step back, Eisenhower was in charge/ Of course it is easy to try to lay all the blame on Montgomery.
Give Montgomery the ability to plan an operation and this is what you get. He over estimated what could be accomplished, underestimated the German response. Not only did the troops pay the price of Montgomery’s hubris. The Danes were mercilessly attacked and bombed beyond belief.
Operation Market Garden was not the planning of Montgomery. The concept was his, but none of the planning was. If he'd planned it, it would have been meticulously planned and executed, just like Operation Overlord was, whereby the Allies achieved their objectives well inside the D+90 timeframe AND with 22% fewer casualties than expected. No, you're just trolling out the usual ignorant nonsense, slagging off at the most successful Allied commander in the ETO.
Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan IKE had already stopped Devers 6th Army Group and Bradley's 12th Army Group to supply/support Monty's advance. I suppose IKE should have asked the Field marshall Model if it wasn't too much trouble could they also stop to help Bernard out
@@bigwoody4704 geez you write a load of garbage at times. Ike stopped Devers because he loathed the guy, but even then that was AFTER Market Garden. 6th Army didn't exist until the19th of September, which also happened to be the same day that Bradley & Hodges launched their poorly thought out Hurtgen Forest attack, a complete waste of lives, time and resources. Patton was already stuck at Metz in a mire of his own making, so please tell me again HOW Eisenhower deprived Bradley's 12AG to support Montgomery's advance? It's a load of bovine excrement, as it never happened. The promises of supply were never fulfilled. The ONLY concession was that on the first lift, IX TCC was seemingly fully commited to Market Garden (but certainly not any time thereafter). Market Garden didn't deprive 12AG of any supplies. If anything, it was Eisenhower's insistence on placating Bradley with his half-baked strategy that deprived Market Garden of its chance of success as it underpinned the decisions of both Urquhart and Gavin. So remind us all again how brilliant Bradley was during Sept-Dec of '44.... How many casualties at Hurtgen Forest? 33K, wasn't it? And the Lorraine campaign? A mere handful of miles gained over three whole months with 56K casualties and achieved NOTHING. (I'll wait for your usual cut and paste of the nonsense about Montgomery and how Brooke criticised him, etc, etc.... )
Both Gavin and Browning are to blame. For whatever reason, they feared a massive armoured attack that would originate from the Reichswald, a forest area across the German border, just to the east of Nijmegen. If that German tank force had been a reality, the German tanks could have hit the Allies in the flank at Nijmegen. There were no tanks in the Reichswald. What tanks the Germans did have, were already around Arnhem, where they had been sent prior to Market Garden for their crews to rest and recuperate. When Gavin's 82nd Airborne Division reached Nijmegen, they did not immediately take the bridge but instead focused on creating a defense to deal with any armoured attack coming from the Reichswald. General Browning, Gavin's superior, also insisted on focusing on the defense of his headquarters at Nijmegen.
There's no evidence Browning is to blame. Montgomery had cancelled operation COMET at the last minute after receiving intelligence the II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Arnhem area and realised COMET was not strong enough. Browning and Montgomery's outline plan for an upgraded operation, provisionally called SIXTEEN, carried over the key components of operation COMET - a double airlift on D-Day and dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges - but added the two US Airborne divisions to secure the corridor. These key aspects were removed by USAAF Generals Brereton (1st Allied Airborne Army) and Williams (US IX Troop Carrier Command) after the SIXTEEN outline was handed over to 1st AAA for detailed planning, since the operation now involved most of their units. Browning was unable to object to the changes as he had already threatened to resign over a previous Brereton plan called LINNET II, which was scheduled with too short notice to print and distribute maps to the troops. Fortunately for all concerned, that operation was cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident, but Brereton had planned to accept Browning's resignation and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation. Browning knew he could not threaten resignation again, it would be pointless. In his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far, Gavin said he received "a British request" to drop a battalion on the northern end of the Nijmegen bridge to seize it by coup de main. He said he toyed with the idea, but eventually discarded it because of his experience with a scattered drop in Sicily, which left the division disorganised for days. Instead he planned for his three parachute regiments to drop together in a "power center" and have the battalions fan out towards their objectives. With this in mind, Gavin instructed the commander of the 508th to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge after landing, and misinterpreting his instructions Colonel Lindquist failed to do this promptly, allowing 10.SS-Panzer-Division to send units into Nijmegen and reinforce its bridges. What I think is a controversial decision and where Gavin really went wrong, was in assigning his weakest regimental commander, Roy Lindquist of the 508th PIR, to the critical Nijmegen mission, instead of the more aggressive and experienced 505th. The 505th were assigned instead the more defensive role of protecting the division's flank against the Reichswald. He was quite open with Cornelius Ryan that neither he or Matthew Ridgway (82nd CO in Normandy) trusted Lindquist in a fight. His decision was probably influenced by the uncertain location of the 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg', which had not been identified by the Dutch resistance in the Veluwe or Achterhoek regions northeast of Arnhem. Gavin was given a steer (stripped of unit IDs to protect 'Ultra' as a source) that "a regiment of SS" may be in Nijmegen, and possibly drawing tanks from a depot thought to be near Kleve, behind the Reichswald forest. The Frundsberg were actually at Ruurlo in the Achterhoek and the panzer depot was actually near Münster, deeper into Germany. I don't know what the source of the Kleve intel was, but it was false. Browning's original planning was sidelined, and after the LINNET II affair, he was politically neutralised and could do nothing about the changes. The Americans were in charge at 1st AAA - they had refused Browning's nomination to lead the 1st AAA and parachuted the more junior Lewis Brereton - a fighter pilot - into the position instead. Browning could only "request" Gavin drop a battalion on the bridge, and only a more senior officer in his own army like Ridgway or Brereton could overrule his decision to discard the request. Browning had done everything he could to ensure the success of MARKET, but was frustrated at every turn. The blame for compromising the operation lies in the chain of command Brereton-Williams-Gavin-Lindquist, and Gavin is very much at the centre of it.
British AO, British intel. It took 1st AB four hours to go 4 miles/6k from LZ Z to the rail bridge arriving just in time to see it destroyed. Before 1st AB got 740 men to the last intact bridge in Arnhem the 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave, one of the longest road bridges in Europe, and the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders.
@nickdanger3802 - "just in time to see it destroyed" - it was not destroyed on a schedule. The Oosterbeek rail bridge was prepared for demolition after the Normandy landings and a 'sprengkommando' stationed on it for months. They detonated the bridge as soon as British paratroops got on to it. Colonel Tucker of the 504th PIR insisted on a special drop zone south of the Grave bridge so it could be attacked from both ends, and he got it, from General Gavin. The same General Gavin who received "a British request" to drop a battalion at the north end of the Nijmegen bridge, and while he told Cornelius Ryan he had toyed with the idea, he said he eventully discarded it because of his experience in Sicily with a scattered drop. Instead, he assigned his weakest regimental commander to the Nijmegen mission and instructed him to send his 1st Battalion 508th directly to the bridge after landing. Colonel Lindquist failed to carry out this instruction, despite zero opposition on the initial objective at De Ploeg on the Groesbeek ridge, and despite receiving a personal report from Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men guarding the highway bridge. Meanwhile, Frost had marched to the Arnhem highway bridge and secured the far end after encountering machine-guns, mortars and armoured cars along his route. He held it for 80 hours with one parachute battalion and five anti-tank guns against heavy armoured counter-attacks. There's just no comparison. Browning's gliders were always Browning's gliders. I've explained this before - they did not 'belong' to 1st Airborne Division, and neither did the Glider Pilot Regiment that flew them - they were all a Corps asset and had flown 6th Airborne Division into Normandy and would do so again in the Rhine crossing at Wesel in 1945. All Browning had done was advance the transport of his Corps HQ to Groesbeek from the 2nd lift to the 1st lift, which thanks to Brereton and Williams were now scheduled on two separate days. What difference would 34 glider tugs remaining available for the 1st lift to Arnhem have made if the problem was always at Nijmegen? The units affected by the late change to the glider schedule were in the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery, mainly Z Troop's guns and the second line ammunition trailers and Jeeps for the other Troops, and events proved they were not needed on the first day. Browning was obviously concerned about Nijmegen, and he was absolutely right. Suggested reading: Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) Glider Pilots At Arnhem, Mike Peters and Luuk Buist (2009) The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery At Arnhem: A-Z Troop volumes, Nigel Simpson, Secander Raisani, Philip Reinders, Geert Massen, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts (2020-2022) An interesting story on Thursday 21st September: Lieutenant Howe [CO 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Seabourne Echelon] was told that a number of the Battery had landed to the north of Nijmegen and had been hidden in a monastery in the south of Nijmegen - 'I was shocked to see that it was Eustace [Lt McNaught of Z Troop] with his gunners. He told me his story of what happened to him and then said afterwards that he wasn't going to wait around so he was off looking for the nearest SAS section he could attach himself to. That was the last I saw of him and learnt that indeed he was involved with the SAS and after the war with MI6 as a military attaché.' 'Eustace had landed [in glider CN.1005 near Zetten on the 'island' between Nijmegen and Arnhem] and wasn't happy that they were short of where he should be. He took the Jeep and his gunners and left the Glider Pilots and other gun crew, telling them he was off to the Bridge. According to Eustace, he travelled down the main road and was shocked to find it empty with no German troops anywhere to be seen until he got pretty close to the Bridge. Then he saw in the distance a large German armoured force on the main road heading away from Arnhem and a lot of smoke in the distance. Eustace decided that there was no way he could get through and so they turned around the Jeep and decided to head for the Americans at Nijmegen. Again, the road was devoid of any German Troops and Eustace said by this time it was late and pretty dark when they arrived at the road Bridge at Nijmegen. He could hear fighting to the south so headed to the "sound of the guns". They cautiously crossed the Bridge and were completely unchallenged, that's what made him angry also, as why wasn't there any Americans to the north to take it also. He exclaimed "What a lost Opportunity!". Eustace then said he headed into the town and was suddenly flagged down by some Dutch Underground. He didn't know if they could be trusted or not, but they were insistent that a large force of Germans were on their way to the Bridge, and they must hide. Amongst them was a Padre who told them to follow him into his monastery where they could hide with the Jeep. So, Eustace went with "Guns loaded and ready", but it was perfectly ok and he received amazing hospitality. All he could do was wait, though they were able from their position to monitor German movements. Once he had been informed that we were in the area, he was out with his Jeep and off to find me. He told the gunners to stay with me and I was trying to form an anti-tank Battery as all was not going well. Off he went in the Jeep and that was the last I saw of him.' (p.116, A Lost Opportunity - Battery Z Troop, Nigel Simpson, Philip Reinders, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts 2022)
No it failed because the Americans spent to much time securing brownings hq and didn’t take the bridge while they had the element of surprise, there wasn’t any Germans on the bridges so they could of taken it easily like the British did, that’s the reason 30 armoured division couldn’t get through to the British in time
It was a "Bridge Too Far". 🤷♂️ One road? Mud. Ignore air recon? Ignore OTG intel? Drop too far from objective? None of what was done made sense. Everyone in the decision/planning chain failed. Every single one from Ike down.
While Montgomery proposed the idea it failed largely because of Frederick Browning and Lewis Brereton who were left to plan it. Just go and read who was in command of First Allied Airborne Army and the I Airborne Corps.
exactly. Montgomery had set up the idea for market garden but was then called off as he was needed elsewhere. The actual planning of the operation, intelligence gathering, aquiring planes and gliders and the execution was in the hands of Browning and Bereton who were the ones deciding they could take on the germans at Arnhem despite the warnings given before hand.
Planning wasn't a problem. Lawrence Wright, who chose the landing sites at Arnhem, was the most experienced planner in the RAF for airborne and glider landings. He chose the site because 2/3 of the British First Airborne were glider-borne troops. and gliders need room to land. It was literally the nearest landing zone to Arnhem big enough for all the gliders. They could have landed one of the parachute brigades south of the bridge in the polder, but you weren't landing more than 5-6 gliders there.
Look, you're a confused, nationalistic British guy spitting out complete fantasy nonsense.Bern ard admitted it and even his boss blamed him. The Euros know you got routed and left them as the BEF(Back Every Friday) boarded the boats This from a Euro - The Director Britain had a chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940. She failed utterly and miserably. From that point onward, whatever Britain does and regardless of what happens to her - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US. In that order
Nonsense. Where do you get this rubbish from? Monty sold MG to Eisenhower at the meeting on 10 September! And citing a single cause for MG's failure is simplistic in the extreme and fails to address the myriad factors involved. Keep reading....
@@ianprice9563 Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:ty John Peate.
@@ianprice9563 Operation Market Garden was planned by USAAF Generals Lewis Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army and Paul Williams of US IX Troop Carrier Command. Many of the key features in General Browning's original plan for Operation Comet and proposed upgrade in the provisional Operation Sixteen outline were removed by Brereton and Williams. The changes were notified to 21st Army Group too late for any further changes, and an intervention by Field Marshal Montgomery would have likely prompted General Lewis H. Brereton to cancel the operation altogether. Browning could not object after previously threatening to resign over Brereton's Linnet II operation, and knew he would be replaced by General Matthew Ridgway if he tried it again.
It was a failure. The fact that some lessons were learned from this failure did not make it a success. Monty wanted to be the hero who led the allies into the Ruhr and shortened the war. Poor planning, poor execution and (as the video said) a failure of intelligence processing meant that Market Garden was doomed to fail. My father was one of the fortunate few solders who were able to escape and avoid death, wounding or capture. Most of his comrades were not so lucky.
Market Garden was not a defeat. It took 100km of German held ground. The Germans retreated and lost Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The allies later used Nijmegen to attack into Germany. Only Arnhem was a defeat but technically this was an all air operation. Planned by the air forces. Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:TY John Peate
YAWNING,monty, didn't appear at Arnhem as 34,400 troops go into the Netherlands and 17,000 came out while he hid. And in Britain they call you a FIELD MARSHALL for that crap. Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved. Old Monty...at least the Japanese commanders had enough decency to disembowel themselves after failures like his
Yeah for real every person knows that market garden was a failure. Everyone trying to chalk it up as a win also thinks Dunkirk was a win and is a blatant piece of British propaganda
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-He was categorically a better field commander than Montgomery. Never underestimated the enemy and fought with the army he had. Not the one he wished he had.
Eisenhower was negligent. He should have directed Monty to clear Scheldt as this was the strategic objective. Market Garden was pointless without establishing supply base and critical mass. The allies reached Arnhem and could have forced a bridgehead. The point was they didn't have the resources or mass to cross into Germany. So arguing about whether the bridge could have been captured or not misses the point. Even if it had been 100% successful, Market Garden would have failed.
Another consequence of the decision to prioritise Market Garden over the Scheldt was the delay allowed the German 15th Army time to prepare their defences. This meant that when the operation was launched, casualties were much higher than they would have been had the attack been made sooner
@@davidsullivan7743 100% agree believe it was undefended at start of September. Eisenhower should have planned key objectives ahead of breakout from Normandy and delegated them to his commanders, not given them a free hand. Really a negligent decision.
Monty botched yet another one *Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river.* In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: *"Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine"* *Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."*
More britsh bullshit being the smallest least effective with the most humiliating defeats they pop off 80yrs later.They were ankle biters passing themselves off as head hunters.And fought to the last colonial - usually the Canadians
Not just Gavin but Browning (who dropped on 82nd position on day one) neither of those two decided to take the bridge, which was the objective, until late afternoon/early evening, by which time it was being held by a German battle group.
@@saxonwarrior3736 never even been to the American continent. What I have done though is learnt to read books without getting offended by the facts within simply for being critical of someone who was born in the same country as me more than a hundred years before I was.
Montgomery may have been a good general if he hadn't had his colossal ego and arrogance. That cost lives, not only round Arnheim, but even earlier in Africa.
@@Jeremy-y1t - that's an incredible statement. MARKET GARDEN was not even an invasion of Germany, for which the port of Antwerp's capacity was deemed to be required. It was a limited operation to get the British 2nd Army across the Dutch Rijn at Arnhem to establish a start line along the river Ijssel for future operations into Germany, as well as a secondary objective to cut off all German forces west of the corridor that may ease the opening of Antwerp for the Canadian 1st Army, and a tertiary objective of cutting the V-2 rocket supply lines to the launch sites on the Dutch coast. The operation also came close to the capture of Model's Army Group B headquarters at Oosterbeek near Arnhem, and Hans Kammler's Division zV headquarters controlling V-2 operations at Berg-en-Dal near Nijmegen - both were hurriedly evacuated, disrupting their operations. Not many military operations come close to killing five birds with one stone, and had it succeeded it would be acclaimed today as a brilliantly conceived idea and nobody would be talking about securing Antwerp first. Antwerp was needed to invade Germany, it wasn't needed to cross the Rhine. This is why, after Cornelius Ryan's misleading book was published, Eisenhower's estate felt they had to make a public statement setting the record straight: _Eisenhower was similarly unapologetic when he declared after the publication of Cornelius Ryan's best-selling account, A Bridge Too Far, “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.”_ (Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015)
This video seems to miss so many of the compounded reasons for failure which started before the operation commenced. An example being the failure to push on from Antwerp. Not clearing from there not only prevented resupply from the port but also allowed German troops to retreat that then formed part of defensive troops that slowed 30 corps.
Johnny Douche ring the nurses station your pants are filled again *A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198* Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. *"We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."* Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
Once Eisenhower and Brereton got wind of it, the operation was going ahead. Montgomery didn't have any jurisdiction to call or off. Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander and C-in-C of all ground forces. In fact Montgomery's original plan Comet was cancelled and replaced with Market Garden, which more than doubled the paratroop strength.
Bletchley Park knew NOTHING about the German ARMY units with armour that would be sent to engage Market Garden. These were all hundreds of km deep inside Germany when the paratroopers were dropping. Kompanie Mielke with Panzer IIIs and IVs. Schwere Kompanie Hummel with Tiger Is. Brigade 280 with Stug IIIs. Brigade 107 with Panthers and Jagdpanzer IV. Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 with King Tigers. Etc. Bletchley Park did not identify ANY of the above German army units which made the difference in Market Garden.
Lyndon you limp biscuit - he admitted it three posts up or is that just a little too complex for you? And Brooke,IKE,Ramsay,Tedder,Horrocks and Roberts all blamed the uppity little nothing. Go visit his statue in Arnhem - oh wait there isn't one ♦Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success."
So when Montgomery got the urgent message from the VCIGS on the 9th September, wanting to know what could be done to stop V2 rocket attacks on London, what shoul he have done?
@@thevillaaston7811 We know the American answer. Give everything to Patton so that Patton could carry on plodding in the Lorraine going nowhere of any importance.
@@anthonybatulis6516 The British and US chiefs were pushing IKE to use the 1st Airborne army, and Monty's plan was the ONLY one that was submitted. Ike himself said "I not only approved the plan, I insisted on it" Had no airborne operation been authorised, Monty still would have had to attack in the general direction of Arnhem, probably with far more casualties and far less progress.
Personally I'm not a fan of Montgomery. His biggest win was Al Alamein and that was because his predecessor was the one who built up all his troops and weapons, which way outnumbered the Germans. He also knew everything the Germans were doing through having their codes and reading their mail. He couldn't lose. If Rommel had as much equipment, ammunition and fuel as Monte did, it wouldn't be even close. After beating Rommel at Al Alamein, a battle which he couldn't lose, he did an awful job at Caan too. His final fiasco was Market Garden!
@@thevillaaston7811 Well, I just got a notification for a brand new video on the channel I subscribe to called Warsoftheworld and it's about why Montgomery is the greatest commander in WW2, so I'm going to watch it and maybe I'll change my mind. It's just weird at the timing of the video
@@John14-6... don't he was a propped up fraud you were right churchill had to save his political skin as he interferred with two successful commanders but then appoints a WW1 sgt bernard.Bradley was right he only won when Bernard had all the advantages. Hell even the unread like little villa could win under those conditions....well not him but most others. ReadBennet,Beevor,Hart,Hastings,Kershaw,Keegan,Barr,Barnett,Atkinson *Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated, demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so* not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public ,one that did immense harm to Anglo-American relations after the war.
@@thevillaaston7811 I'm not sure myself. He did help with the planning of D-Day so it could be that. There was another battle of the Normandy campaign called Operation Goodwood in which Montgomery was responsible for, which was a total disaster and he was almost sacked for it.
My father flew paratroopers into Operation Market Garden. He talked very little about his experiences during the war, but he did speak about watching paratroopers cut down in the air or tangling in their chutes. He was shot down behind enemy lines close to Grave and was picked up by the Dutch Underground, spending eight days hiding by day and moving at night. He remembers hiding in a ditch and watching German troops march by. He said he could have touched their boots. At one point a little brass band greeted them at a barn where they were hiding. The local people thought they had been liberated. He finally made it back to friendly territory, at the very end finding himself and his driver running through a tank battle, and was reunited with his crew. Amazingly none had died. My father could never speak highly enough of the Dutch people who saved so many at such risk to themselves. He never knew the names of the people who sheltered him or the Underground operators who guided him, but he always told me that I owed my life to the Dutch people because without them, I never would have been born.
Thanks for sharing your dad’s story. Fascinating! I love personal accounts like this. Thanks for your father’s service. Each and every serviceman made huge sacrifices to defeat fascism. We will always owe them a huge debt of gratitude.
@@kittiwhieldon4329 My dad landed in a drainage ditch and when he finally untangled from his parachute and got out of the water he found himself staring at a farmer with a pitchfork. The farmer thought he was German. Dad tried talking but the farmer didn’t speak English. Then dad remembered something, stuck his hand in his jacket and brought out a pack of cigarettes, yelling “Lucky Strikes! Lucky Strikes!” By now a small crowd had formed and a policeman who could speak English got my dad away and eventually put him in touch with the Dutch Underground. The people who had gathered all agreed on the same story before the policeman took my dad away, the airman was gone when they got there and they hadn’t seen where he went. I doubt the Germans who were searching for him believed them, but they protected him.
Your father flew C-47s. They could carry 28 passengers but only 18-20 fully equipped Paratroopers ("Airborne" Troops). Airfields stretching from Southern England all the way into Scotland (it's the same island) loaded up Paratroopers, and or towed Gliders and/or carried supplies.
It all began before Dawn and after takeoff, the aircraft had to form up as units. Anyone flying to the drop zones alone would be dropping troops alone as well as be easy pickings for fighters or ground AA Guns on the way there or back. Allied Fighter support was pushed to the limit in air support for Market Garden drops.
The point that I'm making is that "Market", the air component of the invasion ("Garden" was the Allied ground forces) had an even larger air invasion component than D-Day, 3 months before. Allow the aircraft about a bit more than an hour to takeoff then form up, fly to drop zones all over the Netherlands, return, take their turns landing, refuel, load up more Paratroopers and equipment? Well, by then, you've run out of daylight on September 17th. England and the Netherlands are all North of NYC, USA and the sun sets earlier each day until just before Christmas. This fact is easy for others to calculate. The cruise speed of a C-47 and the distances from the UK to the Netherlands and up to Arnhem are easy for calculating a round trip in any wind conditions (what helps you in one leg of the journey, hurts you in the opposite direction. You can therefore calculate using calm winds).
This video from Dan is fairly new but soon Trolls will show up here claiming for instance; that "a second drop on the first day was requested but denied". That's hogwash and despite that claim making it into a book or two, it's just blame displacement for a plan that was doomed to fail because such a narrow road separated "Garden" from the final objective. All facts about Market Garden are available using a Search Engine and taking care to use sites that have verifiable data.
The commander of the UK's 1st Airborne Division is portrayed by Sean Connery in the movie "A Bridge Too Far". The actual General lacked experience, he was more of a political appointee. Robert Elliot "Roy" Urquhart had no extensive combat exposure and zero Airborne Troop experience. XXX Corps "Garden", did not advance any further than just past American held assets and Urquhart not only never commanded again but there was little left of the UK's 1st Airborne Division.
@@arcanondrum6543 Thank you so much for your write-up. Yes, my dad flew C-47s (usually the Skytrain) and was based somewhere in England. He did it all. Flew cargo, paratroopers, made hospital runs with wounded soldiers, was on the “team” that learned how to successfully tow wooden gliders, then towed the gliders in missions. (He also flew the Berlin Airlift, was in Korea, and later was tried out for the space program. Unfortunately, it turned out that once he had the helmet on…claustrophobia!) He did make more than one trip before he was shot down. He might have been close-mouthed about his war, but he never had a good word to say about the men who organized and ran Operation Market Garden. After bailing out, he landed in a canal on the outskirts of a small town. Upon fighting his way out of the parachute and climbing up the side of the canal, he was confronted by a man with a pitchfork. The man, who spoke no English, thought he was German. After frankly gabbling for a minute to prevent the man skewering him, he had a thought and thrust his hand into his jacket. Pulling out a pack of cigarettes, he yelled “Lucky Strikes! Lucky Strikes!” By now several other people had shown up. One was a policeman who spoke English. Minutes later the group had agreed on a simple story to tell the Germans: they hadn’t seen the airman, must have arrived on the scene just minutes after he left the area, and didn’t know where he’d gone. The policeman took him to a safe house, that of a doctor with a young family, and within 24 hours he was with the Dutch Underground. He made many attempts to find out the names of the people who helped him, but never did.
He ran the gauntlet and made it back in one piece, bravo to your Grandad. Cheerio
I paused this video to look up Sgt. Frank Ashleigh and was saddened to see he died last year. Please, if you have a few minutes, look up his story. I spent an hour or so reading accounts of his service and came across a video on the Taxi Charity youtube channel where Frank describes his training, time during the days following Market Garden held up in a church surrounded by Germans, and his eventual capture and time as a POW. It's only 18 minutes long, but he is a fantastic watch.
My Dad was shot at Arnhem and looked after by a Dutch family who I met as a child in the 1960s
I know many, many French were very helpful to allied soldiers, but there were a lot who weren’t too. My grandfather brought some of his men to a farm house and asked the farmer for a glass of water for each of his men. The farmer kept refusing. My grandfather had to pull his pistol and said one last time “I’d like some water now”. He was a good man, for him to pull a his gun on a civilian was his absolute last resort. He’d recently lost his brother to a nazi sniper in the hedgerows, been fighting for days with no break and no water and he wasn’t about to leave that farm without him and his men getting the water they needed.
@@Andy_Babb The dutch are not french ............
@@michaelhawkins7389 Omg really?!
I shared a story. Never said the Dutch were French or the Arnhem was in France.
@@Andy_Babb oh my bad lol
@@michaelhawkins7389 no worries friend lol 🤝
I’m Dutch and living in Arnhem, every year I’m learning more about the Battle of Arnhem and Market Garden. I walk every week in the city and I’m collecting also pictures from before september 44. At 06:06 I see a air picture and immediately it shows me how heavy the fighting must have been again. Thanks for sharing this documentary, really informative and interesting!
My Grandad was in the relieve column. He said he had never seen men so emaciated and hungry as the airborne survivors.
Emaciated? I’m assuming you didn’t mean the “free and hungry airborne” lol
Thanks edited.
Most of us in the west, particularly the US, will never truly understand the horrors of war.
Emaciated? It was only an 8 day operation
@@garythomas3219 Go fast for the next 8 days with little to no water. Check in with us on day 9 on how you’re looking and feeling. 😉
My grandfather fought with the 1st Light Airlanding Regiment at Oosterbeek. He was with Captain Peter Chard when the latter was hit by a flamethrower tank. He swam across the Rhine to escape when the Oosterbeek pocket was evacuated. I remember his war stories well and remember him fondly as a kind and gentle man.
Do you remember him mentioning random reinforcements arriving, such as the crash landed glider troops? I remember reading my relatives reports and he mentioned crossing a bridge near small village or town called Zuiberg or something similar beginning with 'Z' to join the fighting at Oosterbeek? Cheerio.
@@Off-Grid-World I think he came in the second wave via glider. He never mentioned anything about random reinforcements to me.
I pass through this bridge every day (13:07) for work as I live work in Nijmegen and studied in Arnhem. And most of the time I think of what happened there.
Yeah its sad we natives cant speak Dutch in our own towns anymore because of international students and expats massively migrating to here. If those soldiers on those bridges knew what the future would be they would reconsider
tell them to piss off and leave then
You pass through the wrong bridge
The biggest error of Market Garden was that in order to launch the operation, it meant that the resources were not available for the more important job of clearing the Scheldt estuary. This delayed the opening of the port of Antwerp, which severely hampered the resupply of the Allied armies. This was one of the principal reasons they had to pause their advance following the breakout from Normandy. Having to bring the supplies by road all the way by road from the beaches of Normandy was too slow a process for Eisenhower to keep the British, Canadian & US forces advancing. Market Garden was a gamble to shorten the war and, ironically, prioritising it over Antwerp may well have had the opposite effect
Plan was to conservative to succeed unless the enemy was already broken and the resources would have been better invested elsewhere.
The purpose of Market Garden was to surround the Scheldt estuary and isolate the Germans still defending it. Once at Arnhem the plan was to turn left to reach the Zuiderzee not to turn right to go into Germany.
No, doing Market Garden first was the right order of operations. If the Scheldt had been cleared first, the Germans would simply blown every bridge across every waterway, leading to every single river and canal being a mini "Operation Varsity/Plunder" type scenario and would have boxed 21st AG into a dead end in the low lands.
Doing Market Garden first liberated a signficiant amount of Dutch territory. What was incorrect was not resourcing it correctly, and for that, the finger needs to be pointed at Eisenhower for not ensuring the IX Troop Carrier Command was doing the very thing it was created to do, which was to ferry First Allied Airborne Army into battle. It was not created to be acting like FedEx just to keep Bradley happy, which is what it was doing! If they insisted on keeping half of the transport planes running errands, then at the very least, pressure should have been brought to bear on Williams to ensure that two drops were done on that first day. The RAF was prepared to do it, but as the junior partner in the logistics chain, they were overruled. Williams (USAAF) made that call, as well as not allowing for double-tow of the WACO gliders, which would have doubled the allocation of available transports on that first day and given 82nd AB sufficient critical mass.
Also, if the US forces had taken their deep water ports along the Brittany coast, they would have been able to utilise the French railways which were still intact that far into France. It was only the railways along the Normandy coast that were obliterated and could not be rebuilt in a timely fashion to keep pace with the rapid advance.
There were no orders to capture Antwerp from allied high command . A general doesn't just go off and do what he fancies . Antwerp was actually captured ahead of schedule . This 20/20 hindsight is a great thing , shame its unavailable at the time .
@@bradp6452 The enemy was broken and mainly destroyed . the German army was in full retreat having left most of its equipment in Normandy . Where would the resources have been better used . Do you know more than the allied planners at the time ?
One of my favourite Arnhem stories isn’t Myrtle the ParaChick (a great story in itself), but comes from 1982 and the last big NATO exercise. The paras were having their annual parade there right before the exercise started, and when planning it with locals and other participants, the Para CO asked if anyone had invited the Germans To the parade as they were taking part in the exercise. When he was met with silence the CO said, “Well, they did win.”
there were plenty of 'big NATO exercises' after 1982! But, nice story. 🙂
@ have a read of ‘Try not to laugh sergeant Major’, the follow up book by two the journalists who wrote ‘don’t cry for me sergeant Major’. The later was about the Falklands war and about the men and NCOs in that conflict. The former was about the nato exercise in 1982 and it was told to them directly from the people they already knew who were in the room. Both are good books
Jeremy Clarkson did a documentary called "The Victoria Cross: For Valour", which covers this battle. It is about the Victoria Cross, Britain's highest military award, and tells the story of a major (I think) who dropped into Arnhem and fought like a madman to keep his soldiers alive.
Along the lines of this story, Clarkson talks about other VC winners and the selflessness they showed by putting their own lives on the line to save others. It is a great documentary, even if you don't like Clarkson. He is genuine, respectful and enthusiastic without being like he is on Top Gear.
The VC winner was Clarkson’s uncle
@@54mgtf22 Father in law, "who passed before [Clarkson] got a chance to meet him".
@@Yvolve You are correct
@@Yvolve
He never told his daughter he won a VC.
@@johnburns4017 Most VC winners never talk about it, just like the men of Easy Company only talked to each other.
The crew for Band of Brothers did the veteran interviews at their homes and their entire family showed up. At first the crew though it was because of Hanks and Spielberg, but it was because that was the first time grandpa is going to talk about the war. Behind the camera's on those interviews is a packed room.
As Harry Welsh said "war is hell".
Failure to take Nijmegen bridge - Day 1
&
Browning wasting valuable air transportation moving his drinks cabinets (I'm being factitious) into the operation zone rather than something more useful, like, ALL of the Polish.
...but mainly it was the collosal time wasting exercise at Nijmegen
'It could have worked; it should have worked' - Professor Richard Holmes
"Failure to take Nijmegen bridge - Day 1" ??? It took all of "Day 1" for all of XXX Corps to cross the border into the Netherlands on that narrow road. Nijmegen was halfway to Arnhem. Seize the Bridge on Day 1? For whom? The 82nd Airborne had only a partial drop of the planned total (like all the others) in the limited available daylight.
Meanwhile, General Gavin was protecting HIS Drop Zones but Urquhart was neither protecting his Drop Zones (a FATAL MISTAKE for more than 70% of his troops) nor seizing any Bridges. Frost and his company was only ever on just one side of that one bridge and, as you British keep insisting (unless it's Frost), "being on one side of the Bridge is not seizing it". Americans prevailed and seized their bridges giving safe passage to (AND from) for XXX Corps.
So why didn't XXX Corps advance any further than just past the Americans? You tell me. The British promoted the unworthy Urquhart and Browning and you certainly never picked up any military strategy either.
@@arcanondrum6543 great post too many of the dweebs take to the novels spewed by their crown's comics.Britain did have good officers - Monty wasn't one of them - why they let monty continuously run operations into the sand after Sicily/Italy/Normandy made very clear he was a burden that happened to be on the winning side is anyone's guess
@@arcanondrum6543 Full of half truths I'm afraid.
1. The reason 30 Corps had to fight the first stage was because Brereton removed the airdrop of paratroopers near Valkensvaard and north of Eindhoven, so 30 Corps had to fight for the initial stage rather than having an airborne carpet in that sector.
2. They reached Nijmegen in 43 hours, just 9 miles from Arnhem.
3. The 82nd had 7,477 troops landed on Day One but only made a serious attempt to take Nijmegen Bridge on Day 3 when 30 Corps arrived.
4. 30 Corps actually took the Nijmegen road bridge, the 504th PIR took the railbridge during their heroic river crossing. Divisional US records prove that 504th were 1 km away when the British tanks completed the crossing and took the road bridge.
5. Totally accept that Frost only took one side of the Arnhem Bridge but it was the critical northern side and he decided not to split his battalion between both ends but instead cover all angles - the Germans twice tried to blow up the bridge at the southern end but were unable to do so, vindicating his strategy.
6. The British at Arnhem had less troops than the two American airborne divisions on Day One. Brereton was the one who decided no further drops on Day one, leading to the abandonment of coup de mains due to reduced forces available. RAF wanted to do two drops alone at Arnhem but Brereton refused them permission.
7. If you are referring to the evening of the 20th, both Burriss and Horrocks had the same orders from their superiors - to prepare for counterattack.
8. Where were the remainder of 30 Corps - stuck behind the breach of route 69 inbetween Veghel and Nijmegen. Oh, and two key elements the Coldstream Guards and Welsh Guards were under temporary command of Gavin to help the Americans at Beek, whilst the Irish Guards were sent back to help Taylor. That’s where the bulk of 30 Corps were - not sitting around drinking tea!
@@arcanondrum6543 Absolute rubbish. Its well documented, even by Gavin, that the road bridge wasn't seized as the mission warranted. They did take the railway bridge after the famous river assault, maybe Gavin thought XXXCorps were coming by train. Too many Yanks think the hollywoodesque A Bridge to Far was the true depiction of events....just like the fiction based on fact Battle of the Bulge.
The first three tanks (only) to cross Nijmegan saw NO US SOLDIERS, and had to fight Germans still holding the bridge. No Robert Redford's waving at all. They headed onwards until reaching two antitank guns, and with no infantry support they stopped. The drinking tea myth DIDNT HAPPEN. One of the tank commanders became Lord Carrington a member of Thatchers government. As for Monty....it was his idea, but planning and execution was done by in order of importance, Brereton and then Browning. People really should separate movie fiction from reality.
@@arcanondrum6543
Not really
I live 10 minutes away from Arnhem, my grandfather (who died 12 years ago) used to tell me about this day allot
All these stories and battles are fascinating. My young mind can’t comprehend that this actually happened and these me actually had the balls to do what they did. Remarkable if I could even put it in a word that would do them justice for there heroism. Great video thankyou very much.
CHARMING AND VERY BEAUTIFUL DOCUMENTARY
My grandfather was an American glider pilot in the Nijmegen sector carried in the 82nd airborne on the 3rd day of market garden.
He would have taken off from an airfield near me in the East Midlands of England. I’m helping my local council produce an Airborne Trail that includes airfields of the US IX Troops Carrier Command as well as the elements of the UK 1st Airborne Division and 1st Polish Parachute Brigade based in the District.
Easy! 82nd Airborne failed to get (or even really try) the Nijmegen bridges, which cost Market Garden a 3 to 4 day delay. Germans used those days to seal off Arnhem and did in the 1st Airborne. 82nd Airborne dropped the ball and did a tried and true FUBAR. End of story.
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
*1)* the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
*2)* there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
*3)* there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen who were getting out fast;
*4)* a few scattered about along the road;
*5)* there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
*i)* XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
*ii)* 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
*iii)* 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
*iv)* British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made _remarkable_ progress. The US 101st took *3-4 hours* to move about *2 km* to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around in the village. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
_Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full_ *_two hours had passed before they emerged from the village._* _Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar._
- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed *10-12 hours* at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them *2hrs 45 mins* to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous _carpet_ for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
*The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.* Horrocks promised the 1st Airborne at Anhem XXX Corps would reach them within 48 hours. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820 hrs on d-day plus 2, on schedule making up for the delay at Zon, having seven hours left to travel 8 miles. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another *36 hours.* This was now a total delay of nearly *two days.* In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units *failed* to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official American Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
Burns you bent freak you have lied once and that has been continuously.Monty was worse at commending than you commenting
*There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸 *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command*
🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown*
🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved
🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones
Perhaps you need to write a thesis?
@@thomasbernecky2078 He tried but the crayons kept breaking then it gets past his bed time when mum gets furios with him.He has lied once and that has been continuously
The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones
*There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸 *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command*
🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown*
🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved
🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
@@bigwoody4704
Rambo, a quiz.
Name the US para unit that *failed* to seize the Waal bridge?
20 points for the correct answer.
You're funny Burns,delusional & uneducated but funny. Johnny this being a no-brainer you specifically should understand. What Monty won - he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials, air supremacy and ULTRA. Then barely and poorly.But like you johnny and your family of frauds - he was nowhere around - MONTY GARDEN
My relative was a Horsa pilot in Operation Market Garden, the tow-rope broke just shy of the LZ and a seven year old local Dutch girl witnessed the crash landing and approached the glider. Initially she was put at gun point but then the soldiers asked if she wanted a sandwich, to which she accepted but later said she felt guilty for taking the soldier's rations.
George Cawthray is his name.He also played cricket for England.
I have a picture of them getting out of the side door with some locals surrounding, also have a few battle maps of Arnhem.
In the paperwork I read through, the young local girl said they were accompanied by one American on-board the glider, which she thought strange, any ideas who he might have been?
I saw the cargo itinerary too, they had a Willys jeep, a Norton motorcycle and some other bits, I believe a mini motorcycle/para bike also.
My parent's sold everything at auction, including the Normandy Landings paperwork, which I never got to view, much to my regret. Contact me if you have any info or would like to view my battle maps or photograph. Cheerio everyone.
My grandpa went thought the whole war with his two best friends in Africa and France... and both his best friends died in the space of 2 days near that bridge. Both are buried in Oosterbeek War cemetery. he then went onto the be one of the first squads to liberate Bergen-Belsen concentration camp where Anne Frank died. He couldn't sleep for years, and I remember my Mum taking him, my Dad, myself and my brother and sister to the camp to change his memory of what happened there. It worked, and he was able to sleep.
The bravery of those young men is incredible. My father fought in WWII, but he refused to talk about anything except humourous vignettes. He did spend several days with my brother when he returned from Vietnam. And any occasion involving fireworks made him very uncomfortable.
In Eisenhower's own words in early September Antwerp was not the priority and that forces could advance on the Ruhr. Although he did prioritise Antwerp weeks later. Not one leading allied commander argued in the first half of September that the British Second Army should halt its pursuit of the Germans after it had just moved 400km in a week, and then stop to open Antwerp and clear the Scheldt. Clearing the Scheldt would have taken at least a month.
In early September, SHAEF thought the Germans were nearly finished. No leader at the time said there should be a halt when it appeared a bridgehead over the Rhine could have been achieved and a buffer created to protect Antwerp when the port is online. The idea was to get across the Rhine, break through the Westwall and then halt to open up Antwerp, building up supplies for the next stage, the advance through Germany.
Antwerp was never needed for the westwall battles. Supplies were coming via LeHavre, Mulberry harbours and Cherbourg. The allies were not moving anywhere fast so there was no need to get supplies to them from Antwerp to supply the advance quickly - because there was no advance.
All the US operations of autumn 1944 were well equipped and well supplied. They did not fail because Antwerp was not opened. They failed because of poor US strategy and tactical decisions. An example, was in the Lorraine, with Patton too cautious and hesitant failing to correctly concentrate his forces suffering 55,000 casualties.
Antwerp was fully operational in December. It never put the Germans off in scything through US lines in the Bulge attack.
Antwerp was no panacea.
Great summary -Danke
From memory Monty’s plan was very different to what was put into place. Didn’t General Browning push for more changes and a more radical plan. Didn’t the 82nd Airborne take too long to eventually capture the bridge at Nijmegen? When it could have been captured when they first landed?
Montgomery's original concept was COMET, a much more limited action and with much more limited resources allocated to it. The basic concepts were the same and the principal architect of the airborne element of COMET was actually Browning, and COMET included all of the essential elements of surprise that an airborne operation requires to be successful (such as the pre-dawn drops, the coup-de-main on the bridges, etc). It was Brereton (Browning's CO) and Williams who made the changes to MARKET.
The 82nd never moved with any sense of urgency to take their primary objective, being the major bridges at Nijmegen. In fact, they NEVER took the road bridge at Nijmegen (despite what the film suggests or that most uneducated commentators assume!)
@@sean640307 Thanks for the info. I’ve always known that poor Monty gets the blame due to the horrible movie, A bridge too far, that some people take as history.
*Monty's amateur hour planning in reality that he ignored & discounted not only one elevated road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers.* The Germans had lot of practice doing this type of operation coming back from the Eastern Front then going to France. The German Divisions could be quickly reconstituted, refitted, and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order.
*As one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in that area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches accompanying them where armored columns couldn't go*
*The Allies were advancing further and away from their supply centers with long supply lines meaning they were vulnerable to German counterattack or getting bogged down against a German defense in depth with dug in troops in fortifications. The Germans were experts at taking shattered divisions and rebuilding them quickly. SHAEF was right,the Port of ANTWERP should have been opened FIRST*
*The Germans would have had the advantage of interior lines of communications, nearby supply depots, and urban centers to concentrate a counteroffensive against any single attack into northern Germany across the Rhine via Arnhem.*
A successful attack across the Rhine could only be accomplished from MULTIPLE POINTS simultaneously. This action is exactly what happened in the spring of 1945. IKE's broadfront not monty's debacle of sandwiching a whole armored corp down one elevated lane.The idea you can make one long extended penetration with long extended supply lines into northern Germany, along one axis of advance is IDIOCY . The Wehrmacht still had plenty of infantry divisions, armored division with military resources and capacity to fight in the autumn of 1944.
The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport for Bradley/Devers advances. The American 82nd and 101st airborne should have been used as regular infantry divisions to spearhead attacks in critical sectors. Most importantly, using the 82nd and 101st for American infantry attacks would have kept them far away from Montgomery which would have been better for everybody.
@@bigwoody4704 I heard Dempsey mentioned that their was another route towards Wesel rather than Arnhem.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-yes there was It wasn't Dempsey it was the Dutch themselves
Several museums in the Netherlands are dedicated to Operation Market Garden, including the Freedom Museum in Groesbeek, Wings of Liberation Museum Park in Best (near Eindhoven) and Airborne Museum Hartenstein in Costerbreek. Annually there is a commemorative walk in Oosterbeek on the first Saturday of September which attracts tens of thousands of participants.
The march over the John Frost bridge each year with the massed pipes and drums is a sight to behold for sure!
A Jeep with four British soldiers (gunners) rode south over the Nijmegen (Waal) bridge just in front of Grabners convoy totally unopposed. Private Atkins and two other men who were lost of a US 82nd patrol had the guards and their small artillery weapon on the south side of the bridge prisoner underneath the bridge approaches, unaware of the Jeep overhead. Atkins left as no 82nd men turned up. The four British gunners in the Jeep were hidden in a monastery until Nijmegen was liberated.
If the 508 of the 82nd had bothered to go to the bridge instead of hanging around at DePloeg, they would have walked on it whistling Dixie.
Spot on
A great book I would encourage people to read, albeit it is only published in Dutch, is "Een andere kijk op de Slag om Arnhem - de snelle Duitse reactie" (A different view of the Battle of Arnhem - The swift German reaction). It gives the German side and explains how the Germans were able to get into the battle as quick and effective as they did. One key element was Walter Model, who had upon arrival immediately begun reinforcing the lines around Overpelt/Neerpelt and stopped the haphazard retreat by the Germans and forged a fighting force out of all the personnel he could scrounge together, including Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe troops.
By this, the Germans were able to almost immediately stop XXX Corps from the get-go. It also didn't help the Germans got their hands on the complete plans for Market Garden from a crashed Glider.
To point to one or even a couple of points to say "That's why Market Garden failed" is foolish, it was a combination of events, including ill taken decisions as well as brilliant ones.
While shortly mentioned, an oft overlooked key point on the German side was they had 1 thing in abundance, artillery. There was both a large amount of long range guns as well as munition that could reach from Arnhem to Nijmegen and beyond, which interdicted the corridor and wreaked havoc everywhere both for the troops present as well as those on the move towards Nijmegen and Arnhem.
Arnhem was lost at Arnhem but equally as much before Arnhem. It's easy of course with decades of hindsight, but some decisions, like the positioning of the LZs, could have been helped with some additional critical reviewing.
James M. Gavin.
A wonderful channel that deserves the best regards, appreciation, admiration and pride. It provides accurate and useful information. I thank you for all the beautiful words and sincere feelings for your distinguished posts. I wish you continued success and all the best. My utmost respect and appreciation
Wth is that man at the end is saying?It was a complete failure.And yes you learn lessons from failures, its a stable fact of life.He is basically saying, yeah we sacrificed thousands of people in a horrible plan ,to learn?
Except it wasn't a complete failure. It took 100km of German held ground and Eindhoven and Nijmegen were liberated.
We holiday at lepe on a regular basis, great to see who and what left from there to Normandy
The German battle report said the battle for Arnham was won on the banks of the Waal or you could say Nijmegen...?
That's correct. The Germans correctly deduced that Nijmegen was the weakest point to attack MARKET GARDEN because the Allied divisions landed west of Arnhem and south of Nijmegen and not directly on the bridge objectives, so 10.SS-Panzer-Division was directed to Nijmegen and only made the mistake of not securing their own supply line across the Arnhem bridge.
@@davemac1197 If 1st AB had captured a bridge (instead of blocking a bridge), what would have been the main focus of the Germans ?
How many bridges had to be captured intact for the op to be a success ?
82nd failing to go for the Nijmegen bridge on day one.
They didn't take it all.
@@desydukuk291Because they didnt attack the first day when the Germans only had a few dozen troops defending it
This. And odd that the video states they were 'on schedule' without mentioning that they were on schedule (mostly) only until they reached Nijmegen...
@@blackadder7949 after Nijmegen was still in German hands, the schedule went out the window.
Monty Garden Read the Germans version they blame the british buffonary,nothing to do on that Island Asylum but bad mouth the very country that pulled your chestnuts out of yet another debacle?
The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The of course the poof didn't even show upThe ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones
*There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸*The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command*
🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown*
🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved
🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November. *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command*
🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown*
🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved
🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
Brereton should take much of the blame. Brereton was a USAAF man, recently assigned to command First Allied Airborne Army and he sided with General Paul Williams, the USAAF Troop Carrier Command general who wouldn't fly double missions on day one because he didnt want Troop Carrier crews getting too tired. Brereton supported this decision. This was shameful. Brereton put USAAF Troop Carrier Command crews tiredness ahead of his own paratroopers wellbeing, dropped behind enemy lines.
Post war Brereton blamed XXX Corps and British 1st Airborne. Never once accepted any responsibility himself.
Eisenhower sat on his backside near Cherbourg and didn't involve himself. As Supreme Commander, Eisenhower could have overruled Brereton but seeing as Eisenhower had only just appointed Brereton to command the First Allied Airborne Army (the paras wanted an Airborne man in command not a USAAF man) he wasn't going to step on Brereton's toes.
Two lifts per day was not possible due to distance, 300 miles.
@@nickdanger3802 - BS.
Grade 'F' for your homework again. You're failing this entire course!
It was the same distance as operation COMET, which had two lifts on D-Day, and also had dawn glider coup de main assaults planned for the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges. COMET was cancelled as men were loading their aircraft at 2 A.M., so this operation was going ahead until the intelligence situation changed. The outline for the upgraded operation SIXTEEN to replace COMET retained the double airlifts and glider raids, but USAAF General Brereton removed them for MARKET after he got his hands on the outline plan.
Petty politics compromised operation MARKET, and it only cost the British an Airborne Division at Arnhem.
@@davemac1197 Here is some work fuk wit, you should try it.
Theoretical Second Lift on Day One 17 September 1944
Actual first lift
0945 Take off begins
1350 Main jump over Arnhem begins
Four hours back to home field
Theoretical Second Lift
Assume minimum of one hour for turn around
1850 Take off begins
(Sunset Arnhem 17 Sept. 2024, 1945 DST Central European Time)
2255 Jump begins
Britain was on Double Summer Time, two hours ahead of GMT.
@@davemac1197 Operation Deadstick Pilot training involved practice landings on a small strip of land, instrument flying using stopwatches for accurate course changes and fitting flight crew goggles with dark glass to get them used to night flying. By May 1944 they had carried out 54 training sorties, flying in all weathers both day and night.
And there was no AA at those bridges.
@@nickdanger3802 - operation COMET, including the glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges, was going ahead and only cancelled at the last minute due to reports II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Netherlands. So what's your point?
"Training is useful, but no substitute for experience" - Rosa Kleb, From Russia With Love 😉
Wow, learned a lot about an operation I thought I knew about
Why did it fail. Ask General Gavin, and his absurd Corps Commander “Boy” Browning.
If he was alive the would tell you the 82nd failed to seize their prime objective on the 1st day.
whilst Browning is not completely blameless in what happened, he was not going to micromanage one of his senior commanders, and nor should he have had to. Browning still insisted that the bridge be taken before 30 Corps arrived. He wasn't going to tell Gavin what order to do it in, and didn't. This nonsense about Gavin being "ordered" to take the Groesbeek Heights first is just that - nonsense!! Gavin's own book, "On to Berlin", outline the sequence he intended to take.
@@sean640307
Browning clearly *_never_* _deprioritised_ the Waal bridge *before, during* or *after* the first failed 82nd attempts to seize the bridge. He was waiting for backup from XXX Corps, having told the 82nd not to make any further futile attempts on the bridge until XXX Corps arrived. Browning/Gavin just never had the might to take the bridge once the Germans occupied it
The bridge was still _priority_ when XXX Corps arrived. Browning never told Horrocks to take his men to the Heights as that is now priority, he took him to the bridge.
Gavin gave Nijmegen town back to the Germans by pulling all his men out after Browning said wait for XXX Corps to seize the bridge. This made matters more difficult when XXX Corps arrived having to clear them out.
@@johnburns4017 absolutely correct! If 82nd had taken Nijmegen bridge, the forces of 10th SS Panzer would have been sandwiched between them and Frost's men at Arnhem and would have been easy pickings. 30 Corps would not have had to fight through the town (alongside 505PIR).
@@sean640307 you have lied once and that has been continuously.Monty was worse at commending than you commenting.
*There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸 *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command*
🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown*
🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved
🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones
My Gt Uncle was in the 21st Independent Para Reg (Pathfinders) and went in on the morning before the main drop to mark out the LZ'z & DZ's...God Bless Them All...
It failed because the Germans could connect dots. You can't drop airborne to take bridges and not have the enemy figure out precisely what the plan is. There was only one road the army could possibly come up. They couldn't get off that road even a little. So the plan was idiotic from the outset. Monty was a legend in his own mind.
Monty was by far the best general in the ETO..or do you think you can name a better one, if so who and why?
Look, you're a confused, nationalistic British fanbois spitting out complete fantasy nonsense.Monty liked little boys and the Gerries ran him off the coninent.The USA and Russia were now dealing the cards.Stick to beating up Ghandi disciples or shoving around goat herders in the Falklands
@@johndawes9337I have a counter argument. Why do you propose Monty should stay? General Patton could’ve done the job better
@@louismccomack9524 Monty had nothing to do with the planning or execution of MG. as for XXX corps not getting there, they got to the Waal bridge 6 hours ahead of schedule sadly Gavin had not taken the bridge on landing..as for Patton at the time of MG he was getting his arse kicked by cooks and clerks at Metz.
@@johndawes9337you’re highly uneducated. Eisenhower and Patton were by far more competent than Monty. Monty lost battles Ike and Patton never did…stop lying to people with your fake history.
Interesting video
There were many reasons the operation failed but to cut the analysis to the bone there were two reasons. One, the failure to capture the entire bridge at Arnhem. Two, the failure of the 82nd airborne to secure and hold the bridge at Nijmegen. There were many other factors but these two were the death of the operation.
More british bullshit -get run out of every country in Europe then attempt to foist the blame on men who died attempting to save the operation of a bent freak bernard.The snails pace of the britsh armored column was supposed arrive in Nijmegen in 2 days - they showed up in 3 & 1/2 then stopped
*There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN*
🔸 *The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command*
🔸 *Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at **2:35** in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown*
🔸 *And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day?* *That might have come in handy don't you think?* While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔸 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved
🔸 Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
@@bigwoody4704 The sad truth Woody is that XXX Corps was smeared as too slow because of the falsehood of Gavin who claimed that XXX Corps was 36 hours late on reaching the bridge, which is clear nonsense as the operation had only started *42 hours before* XXX Corps reached the Nijmegen bridge, a distance of 50 miles. The fatal delay for this operation was at Nijmegan, not in the advance before then.
It was killed by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst before it even began. Their caution was the major factor.
*ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.145*
*The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards* had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ *"as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. Yet Guards Armored did not move" German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para* still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. *Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points. And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs* until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. *By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps* which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. *Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial*
*Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.*
*As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea" the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us* A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
*ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,,p.359* *as LT Brian Wilson put it "the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move"* While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
*ARNHEM,The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden,by William Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try too hard despite the urgency of the situation. Lt-Col John Vandeluer* ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. *Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured. LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair*
*Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219* "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels" "Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie
I loved a Bridge to far, but as usual the Jocks where hardly mentioned, trust me they did more than there fair share in Arnhem, just saying, the Jocks are the backbone of the British Army, and long may it continue 👊🇬🇧😎
Tbey’re no more the backbone than the English, Welsh, Irish, commonwealth etc. No more, but no less.
What about the Welsh?
It was a wonderful historical coverage video about market garden operations failure in 1944. Which was intelligence 🤔 failure besides other organization technical failures. Mainly polish 🇵🇱 airborne divisions were annihilated... thank you 🙏 ( history Hit) channel for sharing
The Polish airborne BRIGADE was not annihilated it suffered 25% casualties , 590 men . still too many .
The Market operation part of Market Garden used three Airborne divisions. The U.S. 101st Airborne Division and 82nd Airborne Division (about 8,500 men each), and the British 1st Airborne Division (about 12,000 men); With the 1st Polish Parachute _Brigade_ (about 2,000 men) in support of the British at Arnhem. The 1st Polish Parachute Brigade lost 23% (about 400) of its fighting strength at Arnhem.
The Poles suffered a way less casualty ratio than British 1st Airborne. The Polish Brigade had less than 100 men killed. To be exact just 92. British 1st Airborne had 1,174 dead. That's TWELVE TIMES as many.
Ah,the lyndon library squawking bombast again, no they didn't The Polish had the highest casualty % of any allied AB Unit at the battle
Fun fact: every year on the 3th Saturday of september, there is a nemorial service held at the original landing zone. Followed by a re enactment of the mass drop, wich is done by several NATO countries, who supply cargo aircraft and parateoopers. These several thousand personel are dropped in multiple waves during the day, in front of a huge crowd.
It is very impressive seeing 10 planes fly over and obe could only imagine what it must have felt like when it was hundreds of them.
Market-Garden was undoubtedly Montgomery's most audacious Operational plan during the War. In every other battle, he was sure and careful to build a total preponderance in force prior to initiating his campaign. El Alamein is a great example: The battle had a lull of several months between the Axis' inability to overcome the British defensive positions in July, and Monty's counterattack once he had his artillery and sappers in place in October to pin and defeat the Germans in detail, while also not creating a bloodbath for his own troops. This style of fighting was possible due to Allied supply and logistics superiority, as well as air supremacy in pretty much every theater from 1943 onwards, and had the added goal (seen as indispensable from the British perspective) of not turning these battles into WWI-style bloodbaths for the attacker. The initial invasion plan of Normandy was similar, as was the eventual capture of Caen (although this was by necessity, rather than by plan), the counterattack against the eponymous "Bulge" in the Ardennes, the crossing of the Rhine, and so on.
Monty excelled at this type of battle (sometimes called the 'Grand Battle' doctrine), and the comparison to the different approach favored by the Americans, the Soviet Union (and the Germans) of speed and decisiveness of action while accepting the casualties this entails has been both loud and vitriolic over the years. The force structure, doctrine, capability and leadership of the British and Commonwealth Army, the American Army and the Red Army were fundamentally different, with different demographics, industrial base, and force projection capabilities lacking in the necessary overlap for such a comparison to be in any way meaningful.
Except when it comes to Operation Market-Garden. I'm not going to comment on his plan's desired political affect within the Allied coalition, but the plan from a Military-Operational perspective was fundamentally flawed in a way that an experienced practitioner like Montgomery should have known better than to employ. He proposed an immediate offensive plan without the needed time to build up forces, but gambling on the disorganization of the German forces. The plan used daytime airborne drops to secure river crossings for a linear advance from a single point of origin (meaning you have to progress through one to get to the next - there are no other routes, and the furthest away must hold for the longest) along a single road that would require increasing supply the further you went (including the need to resupply the paratroops that had been surrounded since their airborne insertion), but had to drop all of the paratroopers at once instead of staggering them from south to north along with the advance. There was no preponderance of force in favor of the Allies because they didn't have or take the time to properly assess either the enemy, or their own capability in using such a novel approach to airborne and armored cooperation (which has literally never been tried before or since), with such slim margins for error and with such a massive strategic prize on the table.
It was a reckless gamble, foolishly taken based on flawed assumptions of both sides' strengths and weaknesses. Market-Garden failed, and in retrospect there is little to recommend it as an Operational Plan (meaning even if some of the flawed assumptions on the Allied side, like German armored forces in the area, had not been incorrect there is still little indication that the three river crossings could have been affected by the forces available). The strategic fallout was that the flimsy supply lines reaching all the way back to the single functional artificial 'Mulberry' harbor in Normandy were insufficient for the Allies to continue their offensive into the Autumn and beyond. Had the forces and supplies wasted on Market-Garden been used in a more conventional manner - specifically clearing the Scheldt river estuary and opening Antwerp for Allied supplies to pour into Northwest Europe - it is far more likely that strategic solution would've yielded tangible benefits for the Allies.
Finally, the ultimate failure of the Operation left an undeniable blemish on Monty's career as an allied general, opening the door for the criticisms that persist today over his competence. Whether deserved or not (his abrasive personality won him few supporters amongst his peers at the very top of Allied strategic leadership), Montgomery will always be seen as having lost the only major operation undertaken by the Allies following the end of 1943, and thus has had all of his performance questioned in a way that Monty himself would certainly not have desired.
It was Monty's idea but not his plan...Brereton and Williams did the planning
@@johndawes9337 All of the flaws in the plan that I pointed out were (or should've been) apparent at the strategic level, and Monty backed the plan to Ike.
Relying on a single axis of advance in an area where armor is totally road-bound, and dropping lightly armed paratroopers all at once (rather than staggering from south to north over several days, and giving the plan a much needed relief valve should 30 Corps get stalled) leaving them marooned in the event that any part of the plan fails, was a totally flawed premise to begin with.
The potential downsides were considered acceptable when Monty pitched the plan to Ike, should the Allies get Armor over the Rhine in 1944. As a clear failure, it was a costly and foolhardy gamble that should never have been taken.
@@airborngrmp1 Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset.
♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet.
♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges.
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity.
♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“
From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:
@@airborngrmp1 It’s myth that any petrol was taken from Patton for Montgomery. Patton was already at a standstill before planning for Market Garden even started.
Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, (two weeks before MG) after a week’s excruciating pause”
- Harry Yeide
Market Garden only had priority in extra supply transport laid on. It didn’t take away any actual supplies from any US army. Nor did Market Garden stop all operations on the western front. Patton’s 3rd Army was still trying to take Metz and US 1st Army began its Hurtgen Forest campaign on September 19th, 2 days after Market Garden began.
Did you know that the twin pronged US 1st Army attack in the Hurtgen Forest and Aachen in October 1944 used FOUR TIMES as many men and supplies as the ground element of Market Garden, which wasn’t even a full 2nd British Army attack?
“ It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “
- CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. 1954..ty John Peate.
*A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198* Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. *"We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."* Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
Wouldve been nice to give a quick mention that bridge is now actually named the John Frost Bridge
The failure at Arnhem at least was the fast reorganisation of German ad hoc units, to counter the landings, and the Allies failure to realise this. Luftwaffe, Heer and even training units put together to form battlegroups, and once STUG Bde 280 arrived it was finished for 1st AB.
the German ability to make something out of nothing was certainly impressive. However, if Market Garden had been resourced correctly then all of the required airborne elements would have been on the ground in those first 6-8 hours and the piecemeal but effective blocking forces of Bittrich would have had no answer to it. Not having enough transports available for the first 24 hours underpinned the decisions of Urquhart and Gavin, with tragic results.
Landing on 2 battle hardened SS panzer Divisions probably wasn't that favorable for the light equipped paratroopers either.
Brereton and Williams of the USAAF refusing double missions on day one and Hollinghurst of the RAF refusing to fly closer to Arnhem were the major factors. Caution by the two air forces.
@@Trust-me-I-am-a-dentistas far as the British units were concerned, they were not lightly equipped paratroopers. The majority of the British that were dropped were actually airborne infantry and for that first drop, Urquhart had made conscious decision to bring in all of his heavy gear, including all of the 17pdr and 6pdr AT guns, the 75mm howitzers, the 20mm Polsten AAA guns, the 3" mortar teams, and the Vickers HMG teams, arguably at the expense of additional troops.
As for the 2 SS Panzer Divisions, they were "divisions" in name only, with neither of them being better than 30% strength and with no tanks of their own. The only tanks in the vicinity were those of the local school of armour. The tanks that turned the battle came from outside the area and most didn't arrive until D+4 (although the Stugs of Sg-280 arrived on D+2 from Denmark!)
Um no pull your dense head out of bernard's dirt box and read or rather have some history read to you
Not one word about logistics. The British army was getting the bulk of their supplies from Normandy, 200 miles to the rear. All Allied armies were running out of gas across the front. With the capture of the intact port of Antwerp on Sep 3, the logical move would be to close off and secure the Beveland Peninsula and open the scheldt estuary to use Antwerp. Without Antwerp, adding another 60 miles (to Arnhem) to a 200 mile supply line and yet another 100-150 into Northern Germany was pure logistical fantasy. Eisenhower should have ordered Montgomery to open the estuary but Montgomery should have seen the urgent need for it himself. Sad waste of brave men.
A Rhine crossing at Arnhem was more urgent than the opening of Antwerp's port because it could be done quickly, while the Germans were still off balance after their withdrawal from Normandy and constructing their defence lines along the rivers and canals in the Netherlands. The German 15.Armee held the south bank of the Scheldt estauary and was starting the process of ferrying units over to the north bank. Ferrying operations could be interdicted by air during the day in good weather, but could not be stopped altogether.
So, given that a Rhine crossing woud be needed to enter Germany and the 15.Armee was already occupying the Scheldt estuary, the logical choice was to strike north for Arnhem to achieve 1) the Rhine crossing and bridgeheads on the river Ijssel, 2) reaching the Ijsselmeer coast would cut off all German forces west of the corridor, including the 15.Armee, and 3) a new threat from the V-2 rockets launched from sites on the Dutch coast would also be dealt with by cutting their supply lines.
Antwerp would take longer to open, and the Canadian 1st Army needed a few days to reposition themselves around Antwerp (taking over the sector from British 2nd Army units) before they would be ready to begin offensive operations. The logistical situation meant that both operations could not be conducted at the same time, so it makes sense to strike with the right (British 2nd Army) first for the Rhine, then with the left (Canadian 1st Army) to clear the Scheldt.
I have some quotes:
'On the 9th September I received information from London that on the previous day the first V2 rockets had landed in England; it was suspected that they came from areas near Rotterdam and Amsterdam and I was asked when I could rope off those general areas. So far as I was concerned that settled the direction of the thrust line of my operations to secure crossings over the Meuse and Rhine; it must be towards Arnhem.'
(The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, 1958 - Chapter 15: Allied strategy North of the Seine, p.247)
Re scheduled meeting with Eisenhower on 10 September at Brussels airport to discuss logistics, strategy, and current operations (including presenting operation SIXTEEN, later called MARKET GARDEN, to replace the original Arnhem operation COMET cancelled that morning):
'I pointed out that Antwerp, and the approaches to the port which we had not yet got, lay behind the thrust on the left flank which I had advocated on the 23rd August - nearly three weeks ago. There were two possible plans - Bradley’s and mine… The quickest way to open up Antwerp was to back my plan of concentration on the left - which plan would not only help our logistic and maintenance situation but would also keep up the pressure on the stricken Germans in the area of greatest importance, thus helping to end the war quickly… It was obvious that he disagreed with my analysis. He repeated that we must first close to the Rhine and cross it on a wide front; then, and only then, could we concentrate on one thrust… But Eisenhower agreed that 21 Army Group should strike northwards towards Arnhem as early as possible, and he admitted that successful operations in that direction would open up wide possibilities for future action.'
(The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, 1958 - Chapter 15: Allied strategy North of the Seine, p.247)
'In my - prejudiced - view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MARKET GARDEN’s unrepentant advocate.'
(The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, 1958 - Chapter 16: The Battle of Arnhem, p.267))
'Eisenhower was similarly unapologetic when he declared after the publication of Cornelius Ryan's best-selling account, A Bridge Too Far, “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.” '(Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015)
- The point is that nobody would be saying Antwerp should have been opened first if MARKET GARDEN had succeeded, because a Rhine crossing first and clearing the Scheldt second was the logical sequence without the benefit of hindsight. If you're going to travel back in time and do something differently, I would switch the assignments of the more aggresssive and experienced 505th Regiment to the Nijmegen bridges and have the 508th guarding against a counter-attack from the Reichswald instead. This constant harping on about Antwerp is misdirection to draw attention away from the failure of operation MARKET at Nijmegen on D-Day and James Gavin's part in the destruction of 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem and the failure of the entire operation.
@@davemac1197 "Montgomery later admitted that he was wrong to assume the Canadians could open the approaches to Antwerp while his forces tried to reach Germany. But his timing was off. The Canadians began fighting around Antwerp in early October, after Market Garden had ended. So, our original question prompts another: Why did it take to the middle of October for Montgomery to support the embattled Canadians and make Antwerp a priority?"
Legion Should Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery have tried to clear the Scheldt Estuary in September 1944?
@@nickdanger3802
Not really
Because the Americans failed to take the Nijmegen bridge. How far were their DZ's (rally points) from Nijmegen bridge? Bloomin' miles.
Americans didn’t fail to do much during the war. Saving Britains butt* from losing the war to the nazis? They sure didn’t fail at that. Monty slapped together a sh!t plan and rushed it bc he wanted to look good in the papers. Everything Montgomery did was to get headlines. Should have let Patton plan it so it might have succeeded.
@@Andy_Babb patton said he would take Metz in 9 days but 3 months later and at a loss of 55k troops he failed and you think he was better than Monty..give your head a wobble mate..as for Gavin listen to what Dutch historian R G Poulussen has to say
th-cam.com/video/ez4qNztWNGc/w-d-xo.html
@@Andy_Babb
The US was a poor army. Monty had to take command of two shambolic armies in the Germans Bulge attack. Eisenhower, Hodges and Bradley should have been fired.
Look, you're a confused, nationalistic British fanbois spitting out complete fantasy nonsense.Monty liked little boys and the Gerries ran him off the coninent.The USA and Russia were now dealing the cards.Stick to beating up Ghandi disciples or shoving around goat herders in the Falklands
The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. The ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. An actual Field Marshall Walter Model was there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Bernard - that proved his new attempts at slithering about weren't any more successful than his previous ones
There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd 55 miles down the road. 34,400 go in and 17,000 come out.But in Britain they call you a Field Marshall for that tripe - MONTY GARDEN
🔶 The XXX Corp Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but a prime example of the clownish incompetence of Monty's command
🔶 Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border town of Neerpelt, until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon the 1st day? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown
🔶 And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?*
🔶 Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the Honger Winter in which 20-22,000 Dutch Citizens froze and or starved
Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November.
a great book on Market Garden is "It Never Snows in September" from the German viewpoint. Makes a great case that MG was a German victory, not an Allied defeat. Like Sun Tzu said, every battle is won before it's fought.
It is a very good book. However I think it is not critical enough of the Allies.
The Germans thought it was defeat.
Arnhem was a German victory. The rest of Market Garden including Eindhoven and Nijmegen were German defeats.
What other rare gems have you two poltroons mined for the comment section
Monty was like "Well I don't see how as the overall operational commander I could be responsible for all of that"
@@lyndoncmp5751
Yes. XXX Corps won Eindhoven and Nijmegen.
US forces isolated the British 1st AB at Arnhem handing victory to the Germans.
Currently reading Antony Beevor's Arnhem, highly recommended, great video guys.
Brilliant book that doesn’t hold back on the criticism.
It's a good read. Another one, from the German viewpoint is "It never Snows in September". Worth a look.
@@FelixstoweFoamForge Thanks I will check it out.
of all the books in my library on Market Garden, I find it to be the least compelling to read, with the exception of the coverage of the Winter Hunger. The rest of the book is just a rehash of Ryan's book "A Bridge Too Far". There are far, far better books on Market Garden than Beevor's. However, if you can only read one book, then it will have to do BUT do not get sucked into his criticism of the British and almost total disregard of the failures of the US forces that actually failed the operation. As an example, on page 124, he merely refers to the failure of Gavin to take the bridge at Nijmegen as being an opportunity "missed". No, it was not an opportunity missed, it was a complete abdication of his responsibilities in the operation - the entire purpose of the airborne units was to take their primary objectives with "thunderclap surprise" (Brereton's words to his airborne commanders), but somehow Gavin's thoughts were "the bridge can wait".
@@sean640307 Ryan's book is so accurate that monty didn't appear in it either,you 2nd rate power
The document did not say anything about the fact that the English were not alone there. The Polish parachute brigade landed with the English. Due to the Germans occupying the landing zone, the Poles were dropped on the other side of the river in Driel. For 3 days they tried to cross the river under German fire to the English in the Osterbeek area. Finally, when the English decided to withdraw, the Poles stayed on the German side of the river until the end and covered the English retreat. Ultimately, the Poles were the last to leave. Gen. R.Urquhart (commander of the British 1st Airborne Division) recalled after the war that if it had not been for this, most likely no one would have managed to evacuate
Appreciate your comment and mostly correct, but the 1st Airborne Division was 'British' and not 'English'. Its personnel would include soldiers from all four home nations of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, plus a few Canadian officers who were loaned to the British Army in a scheme called 'CANLOAN' because of the shortage of junior officers.
The Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade was attached to the Division operationally, although were under political control of the Polish Government-in-Exile based in London. The glider element landed on the north side of the river on D+2 as planned, but the parachute element was postponed by bad weather until D+4, and their drop zone on the south side of the Arnhem highway bridge had to be re-arranged to Driel, still on the south side of the river, because the planned zone was under German control.
Poles were to be the last to evacuate but no one told them when it was their turn.
@@nickdanger3802
Rubbish.
What about the polish airborne
They were massacred.
@Trust-me-I-am-a-dentist
No they weren't. They had less than a hundred fatalities. British 1st Airborne had over ten times the fatalities.
The polish had the highest % and monty shit on them like he did the canadians and anyone else he could through under the bus.Except the big boys of course who put the pathetic pedo in his place
Although its not widely mentioned anymore in the media and many foreigners nowadays that live here have no clue about Market Garden, the Polish are still remembered by us natives. As a kid I was always remembered that we shouldnt forget the Polish soldiers that also fought for us Dutch people and Arnhem
Exactly - Monty shit on them pure and simple and later many British came forward pointing out monty attempting to relieve himself of any blame - or attempting to. The jerk above you had his YT deleted once already. The Poles had the highest casualty % of any Air Borne units during OMG
Market-Garden was so unlike Monty. He was a cautious commander in Africa, committing to something only when he had assured manpower to defeat Rommel. Market-Garden was so rushed. If I recall correctly, the operation was drawn within weeks, while Overlord took little over a year. 17.000+- casualties in 8 days. I'll never understand why Eisenhower allow such operation to take place, because he was also a tactician. This is just my opinion, feel free to disagree with me.
If you include the planning for Operation Comet, which would be the correct thing to do, they did it all the planning for the largest airborne attack in history in just 14 days. This is an incredible achievement. A number of generic decisions had to be made to do this which have been debated ever since. Eisenhower allowed it because the Allied advance was beginning to stall due to a lack of supplies. A narrow thrust by only a portion of the Allied ground forces, supported by 35,000 airborne troops that would arrive supplied from the air seemed a logical way of sustaining the advance and keeping the initiative away from the Germans. The Germans began their planning for the Ardennes offensive around this time. They were also aware that the Allied attack was losing its momentum.
@@philipmoores4094
No problems with supplies. Hurtgen Forest defeat was launched at the same time.
" I'll never understand why Eisenhower allow such operation to take place,"
He allowed far more misguided operations to take place, such as the Hurtgen Forest, Metz, Alsace, as well as thinning the front in the Ardennes. Ouch.
The operation made sense only on a very large map
This why it failed
By a general who didn’t like to get his hands too dirty
@@Andy_Babb Backed by politicians that wanted to end the war before Christmas and the election
@@Andy_Babb you are referring to Gavin of course.
Says who ? You ? It made sense to the allied planners at the time .
@@JimWallace-dp4ty How many times do I have to write that it made sense only on a very large map
That means it made sense for most there were few dissenters before the operation
one thing that everyone seems to forget, the airlift problem of getting the troops in was also affected the 101st and the 82nd, it taking 3 days for them as well. and, sorry, if you do not achieve your objective, the operation is a failure. i hate to say that, because so many brave men died, but there is no other way to describe it. the failure to realize the difficulties of the terrain, the enemy strength (one often overlooked detail is that the failure to isolate the scheldt estuary enabled the 15th army, most units at around half strength, for some units to reach the area by the 2nd day and after.) and the weather, which that time of year was seldom good for several days in a row. monty should have listened to 2nd army co dempsey, who suggested wesel, germany as the target, specifically because of better terrain.
Troop transports were given to Bradley to use for taking parcels.
@@johnburns4017 John what transports, the whole of 9TCC was committed to Market Garden, but you know that from Operation Market Now and Then.
@@johnlucas8479 no, half of IX Troop Carrier Command was unavailable for Market Garden because Eisenhower's policy of military operations by appeasement. This meant that in order to placate Bradley, who was against ANY airborne operations because he wanted the transports reserved for delivering supplies, insufficient planes were dedicated to Market Garden because the other half were still acting like they were FedEx.
If Eisenhower was going to insist on maintain that policy, then he should have put pressure on Williams (USAAF) to either do two drops on that first day, or at the very least, then ensure that the WACO gliders were double-towed.
Both Demspey and Montgomery originally wanted Wesel. The airforce commanders put a big, big NO to Wesel, so the next best alternative was Arnhem.
@@sean640307 Sean
1) half of IX Troop Carrier Command was unavailable for Market Garden: IX TCC fully strength as Operation Market Garden Now and Then page 45 50th, 52 and 53 Wings (14 Groups 64 Squadrons) 51st Wing was based in Italy. 1st Lift total aircraft 1,525 USAAF 1,167 RAF 358
1st British Airborne IX TCC Groups 314 and 61 (2) from 52nd Wing
US 82nd Division IX TCC groups 313,316,315, from 52nd Wing 439,441,440, from 50th Wing total (6 Groups)
US 101st Division IX TCC groups 442 from 50th Wing 434, 435, 436, 437, 438 from 53rd Wing (6 Groups)
Clearly, you claim about half of IX TCCC was unavailable is incorrect. For Operation Comet only the 52nd Wing was request by RAF.
2) Your Statement "then ensure that the WACO gliders were double-towed."
From Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market Garden (p. 197).
"The inability of 9th TCC to match the projected Linnet turnaround timetable in Market Garden stemmed directly from the increased range involved in the Arnhem, Nijmegen and Eindhoven lifts. The longer transit between the English air bases and the three airborne objectives left far less time for the turnaround if the lifts were to be mounted in daylight and at full scale. The greater distance also substantially reduced the absolute amount of lift available, because 9th TCC’s Dakota tugs did not have sufficient endurance to double-tow gliders from the UK to the Market Garden corridor.
IX TCC could not use the double tow because the DZ/LZ for Market Garden was beyond the range of C-47 with a double tow.
3) "Your Statement "Both Demspey and Montgomery originally wanted Wesel."
From Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery .
"On the 9th September I received information from London that on the previous day the first V2 rockets had landed in England; it was suspected that they came from areas near Rotterdam and Amsterdam and I was asked when I could rope off those general areas. So far as I was concerned that settled the direction of the thrust line of my operations to secure crossings over the Meuse and Rhine; it must be towards Arnhem."
From amb, Richard. Montgomery in Europe: Success or Failure? (p. 241)
"In the end, Montgomery decided on Arnhem, not Wesel, for his air landings on the banks of the Rhine."
Also, Sean Operation Comet was target was Arnhem, with the operation schedule for 8th. Clearly, Arnhem was Montgomery decision.
@@johnlucas8479 I have those books, too. The page in "Operation Market Garden Then and Now" lists the make up of IX Troop Carrier Command from a nominal perspective, but that does not mean that all of it was made available for the operation. However, I am happy to concede that I was wrong as it seems that for the first lift, essentially the greater part of IX TCC was allocated. Same book, pg 97 says 424 transports sent 101st into battle & pg 132 states 480 sent 82nd into battle. The RAF sent 320 planes (358 if you include the 38 used by Browning's HQ) and yes, an additional 147 from the USAAF sent the 1st AB paratroops into battle.
However, it doesn't change the fact that the original target was closer to Wesel and that both Monty and Dempsey wanted it. The 9th Sept was after the initial date of Comet (& yes, well aware that Comet also was aimed at Arnhem). Montgomery was not fixated on Wesel, itself, as the following shows:
Directive M148 states (in part) "Second Army will advance from line BRUSSELS-ANTWERP on 6 Sep directed on WESEL and ARNHEM and passing around north side of the RHUR... Require airborne operation of one British Division and Poles on evening 6 Sep or morning 7 Sep to secure bridges over RHINE between WESEL and ARNHEM". So this clearly says that anywhere between the two was considered the best path, so it came down to which one.
RAF reaction to the WESEL objective was "considerably influenced by the density of anti-aircraft fire in the vicinity of the RHUR" (Hamilton "Monty: The Final Years" pg 28 (Montgomery, in Wilmot papers, stated that "I chose Arnhem, not Wesel, because the air forces could not tackle the Wesel operation from Bases in England, and anyway, they were concerned about the fiercer enemy reaction which would have to be faced in that area" (ibid)
That Montgomery received the information of the V weapons simply reinforced any decisions.
This is further reinforced by M523, which discusses "one division, or if necessary, a Corps, to turn northwards towards ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM" once any target close to WESEL was ruled out.
With regards to the double tow, I am well aware of what Ritchie wrote (once again, I have that book) but others have had the opinion that it could be done (and was done for ANVIL/DRAGOON over similar distances). I also seem to recall that it was done for VARSITY, too, but I can't confirm that at the moment.
Montgomery's ego...bigger than Jupiter itself...
Only an american could make such a stupid comment,
And equal to Patton's. Most generals have large egos - that's how they get where they get. But, it wasn't ego which caused Monty to bid for Market Garden.
Montgomery had a big ego, but he worked with his troops and gave them the leadership they needed.
Market Garden was in fact a failure. The British Army does not pride itself on operations which lead to a population being subjugated albeit then relieved at the end of the wider conflict. Montgomery was flawed, my old dad used to say so, and he was a man who knew. So there. Nice one Dan and team! ⭐👍
Market Garden was not a defeat. It took 100km of German held ground. The Germans retreated and lost Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The allies later used Nijmegen to attack into Germany.
Only Arnhem was a defeat but technically this was an all air operation. Planned by the air forces.
Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset.
♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet.
♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges.
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity.
♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“
From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:,,TY John Peate
@@johndawes9337 With respect to your scholarship, I did not describe the operation as a defeat, but as a failure. There is a difference, you know.
@@williamrobinson7435 ok Bill...happy days matey
@@johndawes9337 it was a bigger defeat than your social life and like you bernard was nowhere around
It didnt succeed because the Supreme Commander and C-in-C of all ground forces, Eisenhower, sat with his feet up in a chateau near Cherbourg, some 600km from his armies and never had his finger on the pulse. He was out of touch and never got his hands dirty.
1) Too many variables that stacked upon each other.
2) The plan was made when it looked like the German army was in total shambles, barely a week later they were fighting back hard.
3) Not sending troops to take the bridges directly, but dropping them further away and in waves, forcing some units to sit on the landing grounds to guard them.
4) A massive problem with communications, both structural, and in terms of equipment, as well as training issues and unfavorable terrain.
5) The inability to get air support or even extra artillery for the Airborne troops.
6) Too many sidequests distracting from the main goal.
The result is that the airborne units failed to achieve many of their goals (the bridges), XXX Corps failed to push through and tried to shore up any and every flank attack, slowly draining itself. A huge potential was wasted by dropping troops in packets over several days rather than one main wave that might have held until XXX did arrive.
Montgomery trusted his officers too much. Brereton imposed the drop zones and two-day schedule. Browning and Gavin were too focused on the Reichswald and Horrocks never seems to have pushed beyond "We have to get to Arnhem at some point."
Too many sidequests indeed! Of the seven river/canal crossings the airborne troops were tasked with capturing, they only dropped on both sides of four of them, and two of these were last minute changes (Veghel and Grave), even though their doctrine stated they should attack from both sides. The other three crossings that were not attacked from both sides were blown up (Zon), held by the Germans for 4 days (Nijmegen), or re-captured by the Germans (Arnhem).
Monty Garden was unrealistically ambitious and just too many variables factoring in for things to go wrong. Ambition over reaching capability. This operation was condemned at it's inception and scarcely a trained military eye couldn't spot it.
Attempting to shoehorn one armored Division down one elevated lane for 70 miles,surrounded by flooded fields,polder marshes and drainage ditches proved disastrous. It ate up time/men/materiel/machines and kept the port of Antwerp from being opened that was desperately needed for massive resupply should this debacle somehow make Arnhem
@@bigwoody4704 more nonsense. Only on "the Island" was the road elevated and that was AFTER the debacle of Nijmegen. Prior to then, the road proved no more problematic than any other path taken. 30 Corps were on time, having made up most of the time lost at Son only to find Niijmegen still in German hands. If the 82nd had taken their primary objective, which was the entire reason for the airborne forces being deployed in the first place, then 30 Corps would have rolled right on over it and carried on to Arnhem. Gavin did it at Grave, but elected not to do it at Nijmegen. He even states it in his book, "On to Berlin".
Market Garden had to be done before clearing the Scheldt. It gave the opportunity to open up Rotterdam (and potentialy Amsterdam) and simultaneously cut off 15th Army as their end goal was the Isselmere. Doing it the other way around would not have opened Antwerp up substantially any sooner, and would have boxed 21AG in a corner with nowhere to go as the Germans would simply have blown all of the bridges across every waterway, making every estuary, river, canal and creek an amphibious crossing.
No, Market Garden had to be attempted first.
And Monty never did a hurried thing in his life as evidenced by the fact the Failed Marshall couldn't inconvenience himself to show up for what HE himself demanded. And even with 8 decades of reflection and hindsight guys like you stick to the broken narrartives of a WW1 sargent that got driven from the continent when the odds were even. I expext that from door stops like Lyndon,Villa and Burns,foolishly I though you better read
Not nonsense this why guys like you got brushed aside rather easily accepting idiocy like this.The single elevated road was easily defended,the HEER officers,mentioned this and were recorded stating that the better avenue was thru the SAAR,right where Bradley/Patton were stopped. FFS pull your head out of bernards backside and stick it in a book.34,400 go in 17,000 come out.
The planners of Comet/Linnett cancelled that foreboding for very good reason.The yapping jackel monty adding 2 US divisions doesn't remove those obstacles and obvious setbacks. When the flight formations approached the coast all element of surprise was lost. The German Army well dug-in on Walcheren Island and the shores of the Scheldt estuary would simply radio back immediately to Wehrmacht Command of their approach giving Flak teams plenty of time to prepare
Remember OVERLORD 2 months earlier was 30 miles across the channel,maybe another 20-30 miles inland these flights were almost 300 miles ONE WAY from air fields 50 miles west of London up into NE Netherlands around Arnhem. The Dutch Army who wasn't really consulted stated going right up highway 69 was one long choke point surrounded flood plains,polder marshes and drainage ditches - it had been war gamed before the war started. Also thousands of experienced, well-fortified enemy soldiers still had to be dislodged from key positions they inhabited. Fallschirmjäger General Kurt Student had dropped into that exact area in 1940 he was very familiar with the area and perhaps the best tactical commander on any front
*The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north* .Like Patton they reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions". *General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted*
The Dutch Army advisors even stated that there was better terrain west and north that would have better supported an advance of this size. And Monty never did a hurried thing in life evidenced by the fact the Failed Marshall didn't have the nuts to show up for what HEE himself demanded
At the end of this sing-along description of a British led disaster the speaker says Arnhem wasn't a failure nor was it a success. !😮 It was a fantastic failure, calling it anything else is whistling in the dark past the graveyard of the dead. Eisenhower handling control over to Montgomery to modify Montys bruised ego after the failure at Caen, that was one of Eisenhower's gravest errors. I'm just beginning to delve into the story of market garden I have Ryan's book A bridge too Far are there any others that folks would like to recommend to give a fair understanding of the events of that sad exploit. I'm especially interested in understanding the leadership snafus that explain how an otherwise good idea was so badly executed by the Brotish leadership sqabbles sadly Eiesenhower fell for Montgomery's relentless badgering. And where was Montgomery he was nowhere. 🤬
*Tim Saunders, The Island: Nijmegen to Arnhem ,Battleground Europe,p.43* "The terrain that the spearhead of XXX Corps now had to cross, was worse than anything experienced so far. *General Horrocks* summed up the military qualities of the ground: *‘With its dykes, high embankments carrying the road and deep ditches on either side it was most unsuitable for armoured warfare. It was perfect defensive country in which the anti-tank gun hidden in the orchard was always master of the tank silhouetted against the skyline.’* With the weather deteriorating daily, ground conditions on the Island would get worse."
*The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north. Like Patton they reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions" General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted*
An actual Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student were there and directing operations during hostilities unlike Montgomery who was nowhere around. Also ignoring the ability of the Germans to respond and take a mishmash of broken & depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome.
The failure of Montgomery to heed the allied reconnaissance information during the planning was the biggest flaw. *Montgomery discounted the basic logistical reality that he ignored not only one elevated road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers*
The Germans had mastered this practice exiting the Eastern Front then proceeding to France. The German Divisions could be quickly refitted and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. *As one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in that area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches accompanying them where armored columns couldn't go*
"after the failure at Caen"
Caen was captured July 19th.
@@bigwoody4704 General Eberbach cleary hasn't heard of the Schlieffen plan, the Germans historically always attacked through Belgium, they literally did it in WW1.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Britain and allied countries had created the Kingdom of Belgium from the French Duchy of Burgundy and the southern Netherlands states as a buffer state in the fallout from Waterloo 1815, as the Netherlands was the "dangerous flank" between France and the German states (unified under Prussian domination in 1871). The First World War was started by the Second German Reich created by Bismarck in 1871, and as you say invaded France through Belgium, although the Netherlands itself managed to remain neutral on that occasion. The Dutch were not so lucky in 1940 at the hands of the Third Reich.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy
"These failed attempts to outflank Caen were an early demonstration of flaws in British tactics, as well as the debilitating effect of the confined Normandy landscape and the impressive fighting qualities of German forces. 7th Armoured Division's previous experience of mobile warfare in North Africa did not readily translate to a congested European battlefield. With its infantry left too far behind, it had been stopped in its tracks in terrain unsuitable for the large scale deployment of tanks."
1. Too complex and too depending on impossible time tables that didn't account for German resistance
2. No means for the Air Borne units to support each other
3. Too depending on very narrow roads and bridges that could be easily blown up/
4. The failure of British Generalship who felt no need to move as fast as possible
5. Did not help Allies needs when all the resources devoted to that could have been thrown at Antwerp to open up the port to ease supply demands.
The first problem is that the plan makes sense only on a really large map
The plan was very simple really. A not bright child could see right through it. They were trying to make a mad dash across the Rhine into Germany. I can't imagine it took the Germans long at all to figure out precisely what was going on. Then they could carefully plan how to thwart it. 30 corps was going to take days to get up the road. Ultimately they never got up the road at all. Because it was too obvious what they were trying to do.
@@rankoorovic7904 the German assessment of the plan was that it was actually a very good plan, let down by not having all of the necessary airborne units on the ground on that first day. Had that happened, they stated that they would not have been able to stop it.
@@sean640307 Tanks need open fields and polders are not suited for tanks or support vehicles going through them
What ruined the offensive is the fact that 30th corps had to go on a single road in a single file and not being able to spread their tanks
What total rubbish, read some actual history regarding all parts of market garden, not rubbish by Cornelius Ryan or worse Max Hastings or Anthony Beevor, the complexity was fed in by Brereton, williams and then Browning, none of who would listen to reason. Ike pushed for Market Garden after Montgomery had actually cancelled Comet. XXX Corps was only slightly delayed when it reached Nijmegen, the 82nd and Brownings delay caused XXX corps to have to take Nijmegen which delayed the whole operation, there were also units moving along paralel roads to the main thrust to draw forces away and to broaden the attack. If Market Garden had not been changed from Comet it may have worked better, as Comet was an Airborne operation based on Speed aggression surprise which is the mantra for all Airborne operations, a blanket of Airborne forces hitting the bridges in a coup de main glider assault not landing at drop zones up to 8 miles away( thanks Brereton and USAAF transport command). Then it was the delay at Nijmegen cost the Airborne forces at Arnhem dearly not as they would have you believe the British drinking tea instead of getting on, Infantry and armour were doing what should have been done 24 hours before. Sorry if this seems like a rant and i suppose it is but to many people denigrate the British when the blame can be shared among a lot of different people but not XXX corps.
This makes me want to rewatch Band of Brothers again for the US Abn part of this. Its been 20 years since the 1st viewing
If you want fiction then that is a good candidate.
There is some dramatic license there.
I have also read the book by Stephen Ambrose.
When my son reported to Fort Campbell 17 years ago with the 101st I needed to soak up the history.
Thanks for your opinion tho. 🙄
@@francineb7340
Ambrose!. Definitely fiction.
@@johnburns4017 whatever
@@francineb7340 Ambrose is not a very reliable source..
The fact that the 82nd failed to take the Nijmegen bridge, is that not the most significant reason XXX corps couldn't make it in time? It took too long to kick the SS out and used up valuable ammunition?
Yes. XXX Corps began linking up with the 82nd at Grave in 42 hours.
It was Browning's vanity project and once he had convinced Monty, no-one had the power or authority to stop it. If Monty had been aware of a fraction of the issues beforehand, he would have pulled the plug on it immediately. He was the master of cautious planning, and Browning was a preening narcissist and was selective in the information he gave to him. Far too much evidence to go into here, I'm afraid, but there's enough scholarly works on the subject to arrive at the correct conclusion.
What’s bad about Britain is we reward incompetency. Didn’t browning get medals, titles and a promotion? Claim it as a great success even though thousands died for his ego.
Operation Market Garden failed because it was planned by Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery. Monty was not a great general but he was very good at projecting a heroic persona to the newspapers. Eisenhower wanted to sack him after Operation Goodwood but didn't because he felt it would be a public relations disaster with the English people. I have always wondered if part of Ike's motivation in approving Market Garden was to give Monty enough rope to hang himself. All those lives were lost to feed one man's ego.
codswallop
You clearly have no idea at all.
Exactly the reason it was a bridge too far is Montgomery was a poor commander, poor planning, poor use of intelligence, poor logistics. He was awful, Terrible. As in, no fooking good. Also he didn't have the cajones to show up like Field Marshall Model & General Student who routed bernard's pathetic plan
The people on here arguing about Monty and Patton. 😂 Guys just accept that both were good and capable commanders but both had flaws and both made mistakes along the way. Its just easier.
Gavin caused the failure of Market Garden.
Gavin did not tell Browning to take 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity about 1,000 infantry) to lift his useless HQ to Nijmegen and Gavin did not tell 1st AB to take 4 hours to travel 4 miles/6k to the rail bridge and arrive just in time to see it blown up and he did not tell 1st AB not to test their radios, apologies wireless sets.
@@nickdanger3802 Gavin's inability to achieve his objectives caused the failure of Market Garden.
He was as bad as Mark Clark.
I kind of think Prince Bernhard kind of say it best. when it comes to the sucsses of market garden. "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success," personaly I don´t know if the airborn units could afford it. I am not Dutch. But I don´t even want to know what a failure would have looked like if this was 90% sucsses.
Ah yes that Nazi sympathiser. Who cares what that coward hiding in England said.
The same Prince Bernhard in the pay of the Nazi's ?
Even though it failed it showed the great fighting spirit of British paras. As there motto says ready for anything. Every man an Emperor.
It really was ‘a bridge too far’
*Poor documentary.* Badly researched. The US 82nd *NEVER* captured their prime objective. They *failed* to seize the Nijmegen (Waal) bridge on day 1. XXX Corps had to seize it for them. The 82nd failure put XXX Corps back *two* days. This delay was too great to relieve the British 1st Airborne at Arnhem.
XXX Corps were just ahead of schedule when entering Nijmegen, expecting to roll over a captured bridge relieving Arnhem within hours. But found it was still in German hands. They then had to seize the bridge themselves.
They weren't going up that road anyways. Bridge or no bridge. The Germans picked the column off at will. That road was tantamount to a shooting gallery. Thinking you could push an army up it was ludicrous.
@@1pcfred nope, the Germans would not have picked off the column at will as there wouldn't have been any had the bridge been taken when it was supposed to be taken. Yes, there were German forces that crossed Arnhem bridge before Frost's men got to it. They would then have been trapped between the 82nd AB and 1st AB on "the Island" and would have been easy pickings for 2nd TAC, who COULD have been brought in for that purpose.
The Germans were only able to pick off the British column later because of the reinforcements that they brought in on D+4 - they would NOT have been there, as 30 Corps would have been in Arnhem on D+2 and given those German reinforcements a welcome they would not have appreciated!
@@sean640307 you wouldn't have needed any reinforcements. Just a couple Germans and a single artillery piece. Which absolutely happened in the campaign. The road was a raised causeway. Any vehicle that tried to leave it was instantly lost. They were literally fish in a barrel on it. Even if they were on time the Germans still had days knowing where they were going. Expecting to capture every bridge intact was wishful thinking too. Just how incompetent do you think the Germans were? Very apparently.
@@1pcfred
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
*1)* the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
*2)* there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
*3)* there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen who were getting out fast;
*4)* a few scattered about along the road;
*5)* there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
*i)* XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
*ii)* 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
*iii)* 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
*iv)* British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made _remarkable_ progress. The US 101st took *3-4 hours* to move about *2 km* to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around in the village. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
_Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full_ *_two hours had passed before they emerged from the village._* _Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar._- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed *10-12 hours* at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them *2hrs 45 mins* to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous _carpet_ for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
*The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.* Horrocks promised the 1st Airborne at Anhem XXX Corps would reach them within 48 hours. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820 hrs on d-day plus 2, on schedule making up for the delay at Zon, having seven hours left to travel 8 miles. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another *36 hours.* This was now a total delay of nearly *two days.* In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units *failed* to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official American Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
@@1pcfred only on the Island - the rest of the battle was barely inconvenienced by the "single road". That's why 43rd Wessex took the lead there, as it was a classic infantry engagement after that. The German guns were smashed at every single encounter.
It's not a case of thinking the Germans were incompetent, it's knowing what they had and what the British had to counter it.
"Ah, amans reach should exceed his grasp or what's a heaven for ?...Bobby Browning.
Its the flawed planning and the incredible ability of the Germans to resist even with second and third rate units cobbled in battlegroups that didnt exist just hours before the first airborne landed. BUT those units were led y competent commanders.
Too much focus is put on 9th and 10th ss divisions as "tank divisions" at Arnhem those were at best light brigades with no tanks. Kampfgruppe Spindler and Von Tettau are far more important especially in the initial clashes around Arnhem.
The main issue with the plan was that everything had to go perfect or it would be a failure, all objectives had to be taken and taken fast (so minimum resistance) and all bridges had to be intact.
The bridge at Son en Breugel was blown up, XXX Corps put up a Bailey bridge and srosed over then made up the time to Nijmegen, the US 82nd failure there is why XXX Corps couldn't rewach Arnhem in time to take over and defeat the Germans there.
And what was it all for?? A total waits of brave young lives. For less than a century later British is simply being given to a foreign culture, completely unrelated to anything or anyone British, they probably don't know what WWII was.
Heart breaking 😅😢
Losing 75% off your men is a failure in my eyes
who did that then?
*A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198* Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. *"We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."* Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth
Nowhere near 75% of the forces employed in Market Garden were lost.
34,500 go in 17,000 come out over 50% - do the math not the meth lyndon.
Did bernard miss giving you THE FULL MONTY? Like he missed showing up in Arnhem? Ya Field Marshall
Wonder how many Airborne troops broke legs on those hard landings
The problem was letting the British take the lead ;)
Well they took the lead in North Africa, Sicily and Normandy and they all suceeded.
The Americans took the lead from September 1944......and everything came to a halt then they got themselves pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes. And had to go running back to Montgomery 😂
Who took the lead in Overlord? Last time I looked the 3 chiefs of the naval, air and ground forces were all British.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
Yep, it all went well and ahead of schedule when the British were in charge. Nobody expected to be out of France and liberating Belgium by early September. An amazing effort. Sadly it all went wrong once Eisenhower got his hands on ground strategy. Eisenhower was an excellent politician, diplomat and man manager but in the words of Montgomery he was "no soldier".
@@lyndoncmp5751 Yeah it wasn't right for him to take over as Ground force commander in September, Eisenhower didn't have the combat experience to fit that role, it's like a car with no wheels. Only Monty or Bradley could have done it.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
Montgomery even told Eisenhower in August that if the C-in-C of all ground forces had to be an American due to public and political pressure then he should give the job to Bradley and he would gladly serve under him.
Montgomery rightly didn't think one man should do both jobs, that of Supreme Commander AND the C-in-C of all ground forces. They were two different jobs.
Eisenhower took over from Montgomery as C-in-C on 1st September yet remained out of touch of the battle, some 600km away from his ground forces in his château HQ in Granville near Cherbourg. He didnt even move to Versailles until later in September, still hundreds of km from his ground forces.
The plan, Montgomery's grand vision, was very poorly thought out. He obviously realised that the Arnhem bridge was going to be the hardest to hold as he allocated the 1st British Parachute Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade to it but then instead of giving air transport priority to those troops so they all landed together he planned a staggered landing over 3 days with the drop zone 8 miles out of town. The smart thing to do would have been to take the risk and drop the men on the town where the bridge was. The paratroops at the first bridge who had a higher transport priority could expect reasonably rapid reinfocement and relief from 30 Corp but the men at Arnhem could not so they needed to be strongest force and in the best position right from the start. This is something Montgomery and the commanders under him didn't appreciate. In fact once his grand vision was accepted he stepped back from the operational control no doubt so that if it failed he could deny it was his fault.
I think you'll find the airborne decisions were based on Browning's advice and were not overruled by Montgomery, who was not an airborne commander. Browning selected the original drop and landing zones, although some of these were later deleted by USAAF Generals Brereton and Williams of 1st Allied Airborne Army and US IX Troop Carrier Command respectively. They did the detailed planning for MARKET after being given the outline plan for provisional operation SIXTEEN devised by Browning and Montgomery, and approved by Eisenhower at his Brussels airport meeting with Montgomery on 10 September.
Browning could not object to the changes made for MARKET after he had already threatened to resign over Brereton's previous operation LINNET II (Liege-Maastricht bridges), scheduled with too short notice to print and distribute maps to the troops. The operation was fortunately cancelled, but Brereton had planned to accept Browning's resignation and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation.
Instead of causing mass injuries by jumping on the town and losing aircraft to the heavy flak around the cities, the original COMET and proposed SIXTEEN plans used dawn glider coup de main assaults to repeat the successful raids on the Orne bridges in Normandy on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges. In fact, the same glider pilots were to be involved. COMET was cancelled as the men were loading their aircraft, and the raids were deleted from the SIXTEEN proposal by Brereton and Williams, as was a double airlift on D-Day that would have delivered twice as many troops in the first 24 hours as the final MARKET plan.
@@davemac1197 Operation Deadstick Pilot training involved practice landings on a small strip of land, instrument flying using stopwatches for accurate course changes and fitting flight crew goggles with dark glass to get them used to night flying. By May 1944 they had carried out 54 training sorties, flying in all weathers both day and night. And there was no AA at those bridges.
@@nickdanger3802 - operation COMET, including the glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges, was going ahead and only cancelled at the last minute due to reports II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Netherlands. So what's your point?
"Training is useful, but no substitute for experience" - Rosa Kleb, From Russia With Love 😉
The plan, Operation Comet was Montgomery's plan, Eisenhower insisted on Market Garden and left Montgomery out of the planning. Montgomery didn't step back, Eisenhower was in charge/ Of course it is easy to try to lay all the blame on Montgomery.
Give Montgomery the ability to plan an operation and this is what you get. He over estimated what could be accomplished, underestimated the German response. Not only did the troops pay the price of Montgomery’s hubris. The Danes were mercilessly attacked and bombed beyond belief.
He didn’t plan it. See my comment post.
Absolute rubbish.
Operation Market Garden was not the planning of Montgomery. The concept was his, but none of the planning was. If he'd planned it, it would have been meticulously planned and executed, just like Operation Overlord was, whereby the Allies achieved their objectives well inside the D+90 timeframe AND with 22% fewer casualties than expected.
No, you're just trolling out the usual ignorant nonsense, slagging off at the most successful Allied commander in the ETO.
Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan
IKE had already stopped Devers 6th Army Group and Bradley's 12th Army Group to supply/support Monty's advance. I suppose IKE should have asked the Field marshall Model if it wasn't too much trouble could they also stop to help Bernard out
@@bigwoody4704 geez you write a load of garbage at times. Ike stopped Devers because he loathed the guy, but even then that was AFTER Market Garden. 6th Army didn't exist until the19th of September, which also happened to be the same day that Bradley & Hodges launched their poorly thought out Hurtgen Forest attack, a complete waste of lives, time and resources.
Patton was already stuck at Metz in a mire of his own making, so please tell me again HOW Eisenhower deprived Bradley's 12AG to support Montgomery's advance? It's a load of bovine excrement, as it never happened. The promises of supply were never fulfilled. The ONLY concession was that on the first lift, IX TCC was seemingly fully commited to Market Garden (but certainly not any time thereafter).
Market Garden didn't deprive 12AG of any supplies. If anything, it was Eisenhower's insistence on placating Bradley with his half-baked strategy that deprived Market Garden of its chance of success as it underpinned the decisions of both Urquhart and Gavin.
So remind us all again how brilliant Bradley was during Sept-Dec of '44.... How many casualties at Hurtgen Forest? 33K, wasn't it? And the Lorraine campaign? A mere handful of miles gained over three whole months with 56K casualties and achieved NOTHING.
(I'll wait for your usual cut and paste of the nonsense about Montgomery and how Brooke criticised him, etc, etc.... )
Both Gavin and Browning are to blame. For whatever reason, they feared a massive armoured attack that would originate from the Reichswald, a forest area across the German border, just to the east of Nijmegen. If that German tank force had been a reality, the German tanks could have hit the Allies in the flank at Nijmegen. There were no tanks in the Reichswald. What tanks the Germans did have, were already around Arnhem, where they had been sent prior to Market Garden for their crews to rest and recuperate.
When Gavin's 82nd Airborne Division reached Nijmegen, they did not immediately take the bridge but instead focused on creating a defense to deal with any armoured attack coming from the Reichswald. General Browning, Gavin's superior, also insisted on focusing on the defense of his headquarters at Nijmegen.
There's no evidence Browning is to blame.
Montgomery had cancelled operation COMET at the last minute after receiving intelligence the II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Arnhem area and realised COMET was not strong enough. Browning and Montgomery's outline plan for an upgraded operation, provisionally called SIXTEEN, carried over the key components of operation COMET - a double airlift on D-Day and dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges - but added the two US Airborne divisions to secure the corridor. These key aspects were removed by USAAF Generals Brereton (1st Allied Airborne Army) and Williams (US IX Troop Carrier Command) after the SIXTEEN outline was handed over to 1st AAA for detailed planning, since the operation now involved most of their units.
Browning was unable to object to the changes as he had already threatened to resign over a previous Brereton plan called LINNET II, which was scheduled with too short notice to print and distribute maps to the troops. Fortunately for all concerned, that operation was cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident, but Brereton had planned to accept Browning's resignation and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation. Browning knew he could not threaten resignation again, it would be pointless.
In his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far, Gavin said he received "a British request" to drop a battalion on the northern end of the Nijmegen bridge to seize it by coup de main. He said he toyed with the idea, but eventually discarded it because of his experience with a scattered drop in Sicily, which left the division disorganised for days. Instead he planned for his three parachute regiments to drop together in a "power center" and have the battalions fan out towards their objectives. With this in mind, Gavin instructed the commander of the 508th to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge after landing, and misinterpreting his instructions Colonel Lindquist failed to do this promptly, allowing 10.SS-Panzer-Division to send units into Nijmegen and reinforce its bridges.
What I think is a controversial decision and where Gavin really went wrong, was in assigning his weakest regimental commander, Roy Lindquist of the 508th PIR, to the critical Nijmegen mission, instead of the more aggressive and experienced 505th. The 505th were assigned instead the more defensive role of protecting the division's flank against the Reichswald. He was quite open with Cornelius Ryan that neither he or Matthew Ridgway (82nd CO in Normandy) trusted Lindquist in a fight. His decision was probably influenced by the uncertain location of the 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg', which had not been identified by the Dutch resistance in the Veluwe or Achterhoek regions northeast of Arnhem. Gavin was given a steer (stripped of unit IDs to protect 'Ultra' as a source) that "a regiment of SS" may be in Nijmegen, and possibly drawing tanks from a depot thought to be near Kleve, behind the Reichswald forest. The Frundsberg were actually at Ruurlo in the Achterhoek and the panzer depot was actually near Münster, deeper into Germany. I don't know what the source of the Kleve intel was, but it was false.
Browning's original planning was sidelined, and after the LINNET II affair, he was politically neutralised and could do nothing about the changes. The Americans were in charge at 1st AAA - they had refused Browning's nomination to lead the 1st AAA and parachuted the more junior Lewis Brereton - a fighter pilot - into the position instead. Browning could only "request" Gavin drop a battalion on the bridge, and only a more senior officer in his own army like Ridgway or Brereton could overrule his decision to discard the request.
Browning had done everything he could to ensure the success of MARKET, but was frustrated at every turn. The blame for compromising the operation lies in the chain of command Brereton-Williams-Gavin-Lindquist, and Gavin is very much at the centre of it.
British AO, British intel.
It took 1st AB four hours to go 4 miles/6k from LZ Z to the rail bridge arriving just in time to see it destroyed.
Before 1st AB got 740 men to the last intact bridge in Arnhem the 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave, one of the longest road bridges in Europe, and the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders.
@nickdanger3802 - "just in time to see it destroyed" - it was not destroyed on a schedule. The Oosterbeek rail bridge was prepared for demolition after the Normandy landings and a 'sprengkommando' stationed on it for months. They detonated the bridge as soon as British paratroops got on to it.
Colonel Tucker of the 504th PIR insisted on a special drop zone south of the Grave bridge so it could be attacked from both ends, and he got it, from General Gavin. The same General Gavin who received "a British request" to drop a battalion at the north end of the Nijmegen bridge, and while he told Cornelius Ryan he had toyed with the idea, he said he eventully discarded it because of his experience in Sicily with a scattered drop. Instead, he assigned his weakest regimental commander to the Nijmegen mission and instructed him to send his 1st Battalion 508th directly to the bridge after landing. Colonel Lindquist failed to carry out this instruction, despite zero opposition on the initial objective at De Ploeg on the Groesbeek ridge, and despite receiving a personal report from Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men guarding the highway bridge.
Meanwhile, Frost had marched to the Arnhem highway bridge and secured the far end after encountering machine-guns, mortars and armoured cars along his route. He held it for 80 hours with one parachute battalion and five anti-tank guns against heavy armoured counter-attacks. There's just no comparison.
Browning's gliders were always Browning's gliders. I've explained this before - they did not 'belong' to 1st Airborne Division, and neither did the Glider Pilot Regiment that flew them - they were all a Corps asset and had flown 6th Airborne Division into Normandy and would do so again in the Rhine crossing at Wesel in 1945. All Browning had done was advance the transport of his Corps HQ to Groesbeek from the 2nd lift to the 1st lift, which thanks to Brereton and Williams were now scheduled on two separate days. What difference would 34 glider tugs remaining available for the 1st lift to Arnhem have made if the problem was always at Nijmegen? The units affected by the late change to the glider schedule were in the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery, mainly Z Troop's guns and the second line ammunition trailers and Jeeps for the other Troops, and events proved they were not needed on the first day. Browning was obviously concerned about Nijmegen, and he was absolutely right.
Suggested reading:
Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
Glider Pilots At Arnhem, Mike Peters and Luuk Buist (2009)
The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery At Arnhem: A-Z Troop volumes, Nigel Simpson, Secander Raisani, Philip Reinders, Geert Massen, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts (2020-2022)
An interesting story on Thursday 21st September:
Lieutenant Howe [CO 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Seabourne Echelon] was told that a number of the Battery had landed to the north of Nijmegen and had been hidden in a monastery in the south of Nijmegen - 'I was shocked to see that it was Eustace [Lt McNaught of Z Troop] with his gunners. He told me his story of what happened to him and then said afterwards that he wasn't going to wait around so he was off looking for the nearest SAS section he could attach himself to. That was the last I saw of him and learnt that indeed he was involved with the SAS and after the war with MI6 as a military attaché.'
'Eustace had landed [in glider CN.1005 near Zetten on the 'island' between Nijmegen and Arnhem] and wasn't happy that they were short of where he should be. He took the Jeep and his gunners and left the Glider Pilots and other gun crew, telling them he was off to the Bridge. According to Eustace, he travelled down the main road and was shocked to find it empty with no German troops anywhere to be seen until he got pretty close to the Bridge. Then he saw in the distance a large German armoured force on the main road heading away from Arnhem and a lot of smoke in the distance. Eustace decided that there was no way he could get through and so they turned around the Jeep and decided to head for the Americans at Nijmegen. Again, the road was devoid of any German Troops and Eustace said by this time it was late and pretty dark when they arrived at the road Bridge at Nijmegen. He could hear fighting to the south so headed to the "sound of the guns". They cautiously crossed the Bridge and were completely unchallenged, that's what made him angry also, as why wasn't there any Americans to the north to take it also. He exclaimed "What a lost Opportunity!". Eustace then said he headed into the town and was suddenly flagged down by some Dutch Underground. He didn't know if they could be trusted or not, but they were insistent that a large force of Germans were on their way to the Bridge, and they must hide. Amongst them was a Padre who told them to follow him into his monastery where they could hide with the Jeep. So, Eustace went with "Guns loaded and ready", but it was perfectly ok and he received amazing hospitality. All he could do was wait, though they were able from their position to monitor German movements. Once he had been informed that we were in the area, he was out with his Jeep and off to find me. He told the gunners to stay with me and I was trying to form an anti-tank Battery as all was not going well. Off he went in the Jeep and that was the last I saw of him.'
(p.116, A Lost Opportunity - Battery Z Troop, Nigel Simpson, Philip Reinders, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts 2022)
Operation Market Garden failed because the bridge in Arnheim was "a bridge too far."
No it failed because the Americans spent to much time securing brownings hq and didn’t take the bridge while they had the element of surprise, there wasn’t any Germans on the bridges so they could of taken it easily like the British did, that’s the reason 30 armoured division couldn’t get through to the British in time
@@sk8park08
It failed because, to paraphrase General Stanisław Franciszek Sosabowski, the enemy gets a vote.
It was a "Bridge Too Far". 🤷♂️
One road? Mud. Ignore air recon? Ignore OTG intel? Drop too far from objective? None of what was done made sense. Everyone in the decision/planning chain failed.
Every single one from Ike down.
While Montgomery proposed the idea it failed largely because of Frederick Browning and Lewis Brereton who were left to plan it. Just go and read who was in command of First Allied Airborne Army and the I Airborne Corps.
exactly. Montgomery had set up the idea for market garden but was then called off as he was needed elsewhere. The actual planning of the operation, intelligence gathering, aquiring planes and gliders and the execution was in the hands of Browning and Bereton who were the ones deciding they could take on the germans at Arnhem despite the warnings given before hand.
Planning wasn't a problem. Lawrence Wright, who chose the landing sites at Arnhem, was the most experienced planner in the RAF for airborne and glider landings. He chose the site because 2/3 of the British First Airborne were glider-borne troops. and gliders need room to land. It was literally the nearest landing zone to Arnhem big enough for all the gliders. They could have landed one of the parachute brigades south of the bridge in the polder, but you weren't landing more than 5-6 gliders there.
Look, you're a confused, nationalistic British guy spitting out complete fantasy nonsense.Bern ard admitted it and even his boss blamed him. The Euros know you got routed and left them as the BEF(Back Every Friday) boarded the boats
This from a Euro - The Director
Britain had a chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940. She failed utterly and miserably. From that point onward, whatever Britain does and regardless of what happens to her - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US. In that order
Leaving Holland in the hands of the Nazis until the end of the war was utterly shameful on our part
So what should have been done instead?
Let someone who wasn't a pedo direct objectives. O'Connor,The Auk ,Horrocks, Slim hell even Canadian Simmonds
Montgomery had nothing to do with Market Garden.
It was an American operation, and Gavin caused its failure.
Nonsense. Where do you get this rubbish from? Monty sold MG to Eisenhower at the meeting on 10 September! And citing a single cause for MG's failure is simplistic in the extreme and fails to address the myriad factors involved. Keep reading....
@@ianprice9563 Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset.
♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet.
♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges.
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity.
♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“
From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:ty John Peate.
@@ianprice9563 Operation Market Garden was planned by USAAF Generals Lewis Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army and Paul Williams of US IX Troop Carrier Command. Many of the key features in General Browning's original plan for Operation Comet and proposed upgrade in the provisional Operation Sixteen outline were removed by Brereton and Williams. The changes were notified to 21st Army Group too late for any further changes, and an intervention by Field Marshal Montgomery would have likely prompted General Lewis H. Brereton to cancel the operation altogether. Browning could not object after previously threatening to resign over Brereton's Linnet II operation, and knew he would be replaced by General Matthew Ridgway if he tried it again.
It was a failure. The fact that some lessons were learned from this failure did not make it a success. Monty wanted to be the hero who led the allies into the Ruhr and shortened the war. Poor planning, poor execution and (as the video said) a failure of intelligence processing meant that Market Garden was doomed to fail. My father was one of the fortunate few solders who were able to escape and avoid death, wounding or capture. Most of his comrades were not so lucky.
Market Garden was not a defeat. It took 100km of German held ground. The Germans retreated and lost Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The allies later used Nijmegen to attack into Germany.
Only Arnhem was a defeat but technically this was an all air operation. Planned by the air forces.
Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset.
♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet.
♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges.
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity.
♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“
From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:TY John Peate
YAWNING,monty, didn't appear at Arnhem as 34,400 troops go into the Netherlands and 17,000 came out while he hid. And in Britain they call you a FIELD MARSHALL for that crap. Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved.
Old Monty...at least the Japanese commanders had enough decency to disembowel themselves after failures like his
Monty "wanted to be a hero"? Monty was already a hero. Monty wanted to cancel the operation, then asked for a postponement. Ike insisted it go ahead.
I'm sorry but it clearly was a failure it didn't achieve it's objective they rushed it and got over confident.
That’s British people trying to rewrite history so Monty looks better. They’re just jealous they didn’t have Patton lol
Yeah for real every person knows that market garden was a failure. Everyone trying to chalk it up as a win also thinks Dunkirk was a win and is a blatant piece of British propaganda
Sorry Billy Bob ,but when the superpower lost to a collective of farmers,our experience would have worked.Where you ask! Vietnam,looser.
@Andy_Babb Why would the British be jealous of Patton? 🤨
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-He was categorically a better field commander than Montgomery. Never underestimated the enemy and fought with the army he had. Not the one he wished he had.
Eisenhower was negligent.
He should have directed Monty to clear Scheldt as this was the strategic objective.
Market Garden was pointless without establishing supply base and critical mass.
The allies reached Arnhem and could have forced a bridgehead. The point was they didn't have the resources or mass to cross into Germany. So arguing about whether the bridge could have been captured or not misses the point.
Even if it had been 100% successful, Market Garden would have failed.
Another consequence of the decision to prioritise Market Garden over the Scheldt was the delay allowed the German 15th Army time to prepare their defences. This meant that when the operation was launched, casualties were much higher than they would have been had the attack been made sooner
@@davidsullivan7743 100% agree believe it was undefended at start of September. Eisenhower should have planned key objectives ahead of breakout from Normandy and delegated them to his commanders, not given them a free hand. Really a negligent decision.
Monty botched yet another one
*Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river.* In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: *"Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine"*
*Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."*
More britsh bullshit being the smallest least effective with the most humiliating defeats they pop off 80yrs later.They were ankle biters passing themselves off as head hunters.And fought to the last colonial - usually the Canadians
Staaaand by for Britbongs blaming the 82nd airborne for ruining Monty’s flawless master plan!
So are you saying the Nijmegen bridge was taken by Mericans or Brits?
Not just Gavin but Browning (who dropped on 82nd position on day one) neither of those two decided to take the bridge, which was the objective, until late afternoon/early evening, by which time it was being held by a German battle group.
Staaaand by for yanks unable to take accountability for a mistake made on their part
@@saxonwarrior3736 Absolutely.
@@saxonwarrior3736 never even been to the American continent.
What I have done though is learnt to read books without getting offended by the facts within simply for being critical of someone who was born in the same country as me more than a hundred years before I was.
Walter Cronkite was in a glider at market garden.
Hate to tell ya buddy it was a complete failure
Hate to tell you that XXX Corps pushed 60 miles into German territory and accoding to Eisenhower it was 90 % successdul.
It was sadly a bridge too far
Montgomery may have been a good general if he hadn't had his colossal ego and arrogance. That cost lives, not only round Arnheim, but even earlier in Africa.
And your evidence for this compared to Patton other than prejudice is exactly what?
PS It's name is Arnhem.
“Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”
"no plan survives contact with the enemy"
Eisenhower should have been fired for allowing the operation, rather than focusing on securing Antwerp.
Securing Antwerp first makes crossing the Rhine harder, not easier.
@@davemac1197 Invading Germany was a huge mistake.
@@Jeremy-y1t - that's an incredible statement. MARKET GARDEN was not even an invasion of Germany, for which the port of Antwerp's capacity was deemed to be required. It was a limited operation to get the British 2nd Army across the Dutch Rijn at Arnhem to establish a start line along the river Ijssel for future operations into Germany, as well as a secondary objective to cut off all German forces west of the corridor that may ease the opening of Antwerp for the Canadian 1st Army, and a tertiary objective of cutting the V-2 rocket supply lines to the launch sites on the Dutch coast.
The operation also came close to the capture of Model's Army Group B headquarters at Oosterbeek near Arnhem, and Hans Kammler's Division zV headquarters controlling V-2 operations at Berg-en-Dal near Nijmegen - both were hurriedly evacuated, disrupting their operations. Not many military operations come close to killing five birds with one stone, and had it succeeded it would be acclaimed today as a brilliantly conceived idea and nobody would be talking about securing Antwerp first.
Antwerp was needed to invade Germany, it wasn't needed to cross the Rhine.
This is why, after Cornelius Ryan's misleading book was published, Eisenhower's estate felt they had to make a public statement setting the record straight:
_Eisenhower was similarly unapologetic when he declared after the publication of Cornelius Ryan's best-selling account, A Bridge Too Far, “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.”_
(Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015)
@@davemac1197 Eisenhower was war criminal. He should have been fired in 1944, and tried for his war crimes in 1945.
@@davemac1197 Eisenhower had died five years before "A Bridge Too Far" was published.
I looked up "debacle" in Websters. It read "see Operation Market Garden."
No you did not.
This video seems to miss so many of the compounded reasons for failure which started before the operation commenced. An example being the failure to push on from Antwerp. Not clearing from there not only prevented resupply from the port but also allowed German troops to retreat that then formed part of defensive troops that slowed 30 corps.
Get on with your knitting, pearl one stitch two, no bold risky strokes required.
Maybe if Montgomery listened to Bletchley Park and cancel Operation Market Garden, instead his ego kicked in.
Ike was the boss only he could call it off.. MG was Montys idea but not his plan..
Johnny Douche ring the nurses station your pants are filled again
*A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 198* Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. *"We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."* Here,Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
Once Eisenhower and Brereton got wind of it, the operation was going ahead. Montgomery didn't have any jurisdiction to call or off. Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander and C-in-C of all ground forces.
In fact Montgomery's original plan Comet was cancelled and replaced with Market Garden, which more than doubled the paratroop strength.
Bletchley Park knew NOTHING about the German ARMY units with armour that would be sent to engage Market Garden. These were all hundreds of km deep inside Germany when the paratroopers were dropping.
Kompanie Mielke with Panzer IIIs and IVs.
Schwere Kompanie Hummel with Tiger Is.
Brigade 280 with Stug IIIs.
Brigade 107 with Panthers and Jagdpanzer IV.
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 with King Tigers.
Etc.
Bletchley Park did not identify ANY of the above German army units which made the difference in Market Garden.
Lyndon you limp biscuit - he admitted it three posts up or is that just a little too complex for you? And Brooke,IKE,Ramsay,Tedder,Horrocks and Roberts all blamed the uppity little nothing. Go visit his statue in Arnhem - oh wait there isn't one
♦Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success."
Operation Market Garden was a disaster and it was not worth the risk.
It was 90% successful and was worth it far more than the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine debacles.
Hurtgen Forest was a horrible meat grinder.@@lyndoncmp5751
So when Montgomery got the urgent message from the VCIGS on the 9th September, wanting to know what could be done to stop V2 rocket attacks on London, what shoul he have done?
@@thevillaaston7811
We know the American answer. Give everything to Patton so that Patton could carry on plodding in the Lorraine going nowhere of any importance.
@@anthonybatulis6516 The British and US chiefs were pushing IKE to use the 1st Airborne army, and Monty's plan was the ONLY one that was submitted.
Ike himself said "I not only approved the plan, I insisted on it"
Had no airborne operation been authorised, Monty still would have had to attack in the general direction of Arnhem, probably with far more casualties and far less progress.
Personally I'm not a fan of Montgomery. His biggest win was Al Alamein and that was because his predecessor was the one who built up all his troops and weapons, which way outnumbered the Germans. He also knew everything the Germans were doing through having their codes and reading their mail. He couldn't lose. If Rommel had as much equipment, ammunition and fuel as Monte did, it wouldn't be even close. After beating Rommel at Al Alamein, a battle which he couldn't lose, he did an awful job at Caan too. His final fiasco was Market Garden!
Rubbish.
@@thevillaaston7811 Well, I just got a notification for a brand new video on the channel I subscribe to called Warsoftheworld and it's about why Montgomery is the greatest commander in WW2, so I'm going to watch it and maybe I'll change my mind. It's just weird at the timing of the video
@@John14-6... don't he was a propped up fraud you were right churchill had to save his political skin as he interferred with two successful commanders but then appoints a WW1 sgt bernard.Bradley was right he only won when Bernard had all the advantages. Hell even the unread like little villa could win under those conditions....well not him but most others. ReadBennet,Beevor,Hart,Hastings,Kershaw,Keegan,Barr,Barnett,Atkinson
*Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated, demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so* not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public ,one that did immense harm to Anglo-American relations after the war.
@@John14-6...
I wonder on what basis people would claim that 'Montgomery is the greatest commander in WW2'?
@@thevillaaston7811 I'm not sure myself. He did help with the planning of D-Day so it could be that. There was another battle of the Normandy campaign called Operation Goodwood in which Montgomery was responsible for, which was a total disaster and he was almost sacked for it.
Not enough fertiliser, too much water
There is a book "The traitors of Arnham " Tony Gosling. is an eye opener. ( You wouldnt believe me if i told you)