How to Respond to Reverse Ontological Arguments (Dr. Ben Arbour)
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 21 ส.ค. 2024
- Reverse Ontological Arguments pose a serious threat to Modal Ontological Arguments. In this clip, Dr. Ben Arbour gives his preferred response to RMOA's and even touches on some of his work in the area as a philosopher.
This video is an excerpt from this interview: • Is the Ontological Arg...
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#OntologicalArgument #Apologetics #God
RIH Ben Arbor and his beautiful wife Meg 🙏🏼
For contingent entities, we favor the possibility premise over necessity or impossibility because there existence seems to have nothing to do with logic itself. It's safe to assume that a world with a pink sky is logically possible because it isn't even conceivable that the rules of logic could say anything about pink skies. For nonlogical statements, we should tend to assume that the laws of logic don't say anything about the statement (they are nonlogical after all). Thus, the laws of logic do not say that the statement is true (this would make it necessary) or that it is false (this would make it impossible).
This reasoning completely breaks down when we discuss logical statements though (a logical statement is any statement that, if true, is true by necessity). We should *never* assume that a logical statement is possible just because we haven't proved it impossible. If we did, we could prove every mathematical conjecture by assuming that they are possible and concluding that, since they are possible, they must be necessary. You can make an exact analog to the MOA using ang mathematical conjecture: It is possible that the Reimann hypothesis is true. Therefore, the Reimann hypothesis is true in some possible world. If the Reimann hypothesis is true in some possible worlds, it is true in all possible worlds. Therefore, it is true in all possible worlds, including the actual world. (I noticed that you didn't address this parody version of the MOA in the clip on parodies, instead going after the much weaker version of a "maximally great pizza").
Assuming logical statements to be possible also leads to contradictions, since we can assume their negations to also be possible. This is why the reverse MOA exists in the first place.
It follows from the obvious fact that we cannot assume that logical statements are possible that we cannot assume that a maximally great being is possible. This is because the statement "An MGB exists" is a logical statement. Since an MGB is, by definition, necessary, the statement "An MGB exists" is equivalent to "It is necessary that an MGB exists". In fact, all modal statements qualify as logical statements. You can never assume that any statement in modal logic is logically possible unless you have already proven it to be so.
This video is framed as "Should we favor the existence claim or the nonexistence claim as logically possible". This way of framing it is a false dichotomy. We should not assume either one to be logically possible without a good reason to believe that it is, in the same way that we don't assume either the truth or the falsehood of the Reimann hypothesis to be logically possible until we can determine which one it actually is via s mathematical proof.
I do happen to have reasons to believe that an MGB is impossible, but I wouldn't even need those in order to reject the ontological argument.
"It's safe to assume that a world with a pink sky is logically possible because it isn't even conceivable that the rules of logic could say anything about pink skies. "
-Just stop. You're writing a whole bunch, but as the Bible says you're "proclaiming your folly".
Here, the rules of logic (Modus Ponens) says something about pink skies. If you are in fact observing a pink sky, then by the law of logical non-contradiction, it cannot be black.
1) If a sky is pink, then it is not black.
2) The sky I am observing is pink.
3) Therefore the sky I'm observing is not black.
Please, before commenting at such length about subjects, especially when you're trying to do it as you are, as some sort of authority who is teaching a PHD the error of his ways, do some more research.
@@truebeliever6440 "especially when you're trying to do it as you are, as some sort of authority who is teaching a PHD the error of his ways"
PhD's can be wrong, especially when they have a strong bias in favor of the conclusion they're reaching.
The Ontological argument can (I think) be set up in such a way that it starts by having nothing to say on whether a MGB exists necessarily. For example, WLC's ontological argument:
(MGB's definition will include the idea that there is no being greater than it, as that greater being would actually be the MGB)
1. A maximally great being is logically possible
2. A maximally great being exists in some possible world
3. A maximally great being that exists in every possible world would be greater than one that only exists in one possible world
4. So, a maximally great being exists in every possible world
5. Existing in every possible world entails existing in the real world
6. So, a maximally great being exists in the real world
This argument, so far as I can tell (if I am wrong I would like to know), does not set up "A maximally great being could exist" is a logic statement. It is merely saying that it is at least coherent to think of a description of reality in which a MGB exists.
It is steps 3 and 4 that demonstrate why a MGB would exist in every possible world, not because it is assuming a priori that a MGB exists necessarily, but on the premise that a MGB that exists in every possible world is greater than the one that only exists in a handful of worlds.
I would like to hear some constructive criticism on this, as I am trying to understand the Ontological Argument to its fullest.
Also, I am curious to hear your reasons why you think a MGB is impossible. Have you considered the position that if an attribute of a MGB is shown to be logically impossible, then that means the MGB does not have that attribute, as opposed to the entire MGB then being logically impossible?
@@truebeliever6440 You seem to be missing the point about the pink sky. The only statements that are ruled out by the laws of logic are ones that violate logic due the form of the statement (such as "P and not-P") or that can be translated into such statements by using the definitions of certain words (like "This bachelor is married.") So while the laws of logic can prove that it is impossible for a sky to be both pink and not pink, that tells you nothing about pink skies. The same statement could be made about red skies, or green water, or purple ground.
But perhaps more importantly, your comment never even attempts to address the actual argument I made in my comment. All you did was nitpick about the first paragraph, where I wasn't even presenting my counter-argument to the MOA, as presented in the video, yet. The first paragraph was just an attempt to find some common ground and to throw some light on the intuition we usually have for assuming that things are logically possible.
So all you have done is argue against on the one point that I somewhat agree with the original video on, and then you pretend to have shown my rebuttal of the video to be "folly".
And no, the fact that the person in this video has a PhD does not mean that his arguments can't be criticized. That is a weak defense that he himself surely would not make.
So, special pleading?
It's not special pleading if it's a necessary exception because of the nature of "GOD".
It would be special pleading if it was for a baseball.
@@TimGraceAndFaith thanks, I forgot my religion logic 101 handbook
@@Thrawnmulus You mean basic logic?
@@Thrawnmulus tips fedora *
Logical possibility is nothing to do with your internal psychological conviction. It's about whether there is any logical contradiction within the God concept.
There's a far easier way to debunk the reverse arguement: apply its logic to other things. "A computer doesn't exist in one possible world, therefore it doesn't exist in any possible world." Is what it is basically saying. Not that I really like the Ontological Argument. I think there are far stronger ones - which he alludes to here. The Teliological argument, for example.
If you're going to run a (modal) Ontological Argument (OA) for the existence of something, or a Reverse Ontological Argument (ROA) against the existence of something, you need to make sure your 1st premise includes that the thing you are arguing for is "necessary". So an OA has as its first premise "it is possible that a necessary X exists", and an ROA has as its first premise "it is possible that a necessary X does not exist". If you leave off the word "necessary", both the OA and the ROA fail since the premise "if X exists (or does not exist) in one possible world, then it exists (or does not exist) in any possible world" becomes invalid.
So, a ROA for a computer would be "it is possible that a necessary computer does not exist". In possible world semantics, this statement is translated as "there is a possible world in which a computer that exists in all possible worlds does not exist". But that's just a wordy way of saying that a computer that exists in all possible worlds (i.e. a necessary computer) doesn't exist. Which is an uncontroversial conclusion.
OA's and ROA's are both equally valid. One just starts with the premise "it is possible that a necessary X exists", the other will start with the premise "it is possible that a necessary X does not exist". Since they are both equally valid, the question is which is more sound? Is it more reasonable to accept the premise "it is possible that a necessary X exists" vs the premise "it is possible that a necessary X does not exist"?
I think defenders and detractors of the OA for God would agree the premise "it is possible that a necessary X does not exist" is the usually the favored premise for most things you could plug in for "X" (for example, if X is a computer, a lion, an island, a pizza, etc.). You could argue that those sorts of things aren't the kind of things that can be "necessary" and to suggest so is a category error. The question is though, what if we say that X is just a "being"? The 1st premise of the OA is "it is possible a necessary being exists", and the 1st premise of the ROA is "it is possible that a necessary being does not exist". Which premise do you think is more reasonable? Defenders of the OA would argue that if you say ROA premise is bettter, what you are saying is that there is no "entity" can be necessary. This is a stronger claim than the parody arguments, where you only have to say that things like a "computer" can't be necessary, and so probably demands at least some justification.
That said, I would still argue that the ROA is still the sounder argument, even if X is just a "being". I think that saying that ANY concrete object is "necessary" is a category error for exactly the same reasons saying a "computer" could be is. It's hard to rigorously prove that (although it's equally hard to prove otherwise), but I would ask "what would it mean for a thing to be ontologically necessary?". If you say an object is necessary, that seems to mean you're saying that if I offer a description of the world that leaves that object out, doing so doesn't just make my description (potentially) not the correct description, you're saying my description itself can no longer even be sensibly considered or entertained. I just don't understand how that could ever be the case for a concrete object.
@@leighhargreaves4104 Wow, you really thought that through. Thanks for the detailed response! I admit my original point was put very simplistically, and not in an exactly worded form like you used. Partly because I didn't expect many people to read it, but also because I've never met an ROA in the wild and I suspect they would be amazingly simple if I did (not an insult - just that arguements tend to get dumbed down as they spread across the internet). My main thought was that the ROA seems to have a few critical flaws - for example, if you assume a being is necessary then I think it's safe to say it must exist. If not, the thing that requires it would be broken or not exist. So you can say a processor is necessary for a computer. The processor might not exist, but in that case neither does the computer in any functional sense. To weight whether a thing is necessary or not would likely require you to add other arguments to the one being used - which means that a pure Ontological argument that functions on its own doesn't work. It would need to follow on from an argument that shows a being is necessary. However, I think it's stronger than the ROA, because the ROA is invalidated by a single necessary being existing in any universe. In other words, the OA says that in some universe somewhere a being exists. But the ROA must bet on it existing nowhere in any given universe - and that's not a bet I'd be willing to take! Well, that's how I see it anyway. Feel free to criticise my logic as that last post was a very interesting read.
It doesn't sound to me like the ontological argument would have much value if the only way to make it go through is to have a bunch of other arguments for the existence of God that are sound. It almost makes the ontological argument circular since in that case you'd be beginning with your conclusion almost. All the ontological argument would do is give you a few more attributes, but God's existence will have already been established.
Also, these other arguments can't do anything to prop up the ontological argument unless they are sound. But as long as it's possible they are not sound, then God's non-existence is also possible, so the reverse ontological argument will go through. So it doesn't seem like it would take much for a person to resist the force of the ontological argument even when it's being propped up by other theistic arguments.
Nailed it
This dudes entire argument boils down to “god exists therefore god exists”
Wow. Good job. Have a cookie.
Let's go down the list...
1:20 Special pleading. There is no reason to favor positive *or* negative for the purposes of MOA. The whole point of the RMOA is to show how bad of an argument MOA is.
3:20 Defining god into existence does not make god actually exist.
5:00 Kalam doesn't get you a being. It gets you a cause. A contingent cause. And even that isn't guaranteed.
5:45 There are no moral truths. There are behaviors ("morals") that are advantageous for survival of a species. For example, not killing other members of the species.
6:20 You can just as easily point to a list of reasons why a god *doesn't* exist.
8:15 That is *not* what "possible" means in the context of MOA.
It's concerning that believers need to cling to hard rationalization and logic, rather than being able to talk or see their God, a God who, according to their scriptures, was heavily involved into the daily lives of our ancestors, participating in battles and sending angels and other mythical creatures on Earth.
Don't think I'm convinced of his two responses to the reverse ontological argument. And it seems the atheist could make the exact same moves (e.g., by arguing that problem of evil, etc., boosts credence in the premise '"It is possible God doesn't exist"). I like the onto argument for the conditional "If God exists, God necessarily exists" but I don't like it as a standalone argument for theism and I don't think it gets any better when conjoined with the other theistic arguments.
There seems to be a crucial missing piece here. Do the (unnamed) arguments he refers to as establishing the possibility of God’s existence actually establish the possibility of a “maximally great“ God’s existence? Or just some generic god? That is pretty important, given that those arguments are used in and strategy to get us to the ontological argument by establishing the possibility of a maximally great being. Big oversight?
You need to watch other videos on these channels to get the references. Look for videos titled The ___ argument.
He didn't name them probably because they are highly numerous. A full list would be impractical, but the major ones are at least a dozen or so.
For an argument to support the proposition "a maximally great being exists", the argument does not need to conclude with a maximally great being. It needs to conclude with a being that is consistent with a maximally great being.
If you can show, for example, that there is a being who is necessary, extremely powerful, and extremely intelligent, that gives you reason to think a maximally great being is possible in the absence of ay good reasons to think this being could not additionally be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
I think an analogy would help:
Suppose a crime has been committed, and the police know the attributes of the suspect. They know he is 6ft tall, Hispanic, skinny, has brown hair, and is wearing a red jumper and black trousers.
Now suppose they get a call from a concerned citizen who claims they have seen the suspect. The witness describes the person in question by saying they saw a Hispanic man wearing a red jumper, black trousers, had brown hair and was skinny in build.
Would the police respond by saying "you have given me no reason at all to think that the person you saw is the suspect, because you did not recount every detail of the suspect."?
Of course not.
This partial description of the suspect, that is consistent with the suspect, would indeed give the police reason to think that the witness possibly saw the suspect.
Likewise, an argument for God's existence which concludes with a being consistent with a maximally great being supports the first premise of the modal ontological argument, that a maximally great being's existence is possible.
@@jackplumbridge2704 Your analogy is flawed. We know that 6ft tall people exist. We know that Hispanic people exist. We know that skinny people with brown hair exist, and we know that red jumpers and black trousers exist. However, we do not know that a "maximally great being exists". We don't know if there is a necessary being, or even if there *could* be a necessary being.
To fit this into your analogy: the police have a suspect that they merely assume has invisible hair that is as long as the solar system. Now suppose they get a call from a concerned citizen who claims to have seen the suspect with the extra long invisible hair. Would the police respond by saying "Sounds good!"? Of course not. Since it has never once been shown that invisible hair as long as the solar system even could exist, the police would (or at least *should* ) say "I think we're both mistaken."
We've never been shown evidence for the existence of a being that is consistent with any of the important/relevant traits of a maximally great being, so we don't know that this type of being exists.
To further explore your analogy: you're basically saying that since you saw a guy with something that looked kinda like a red jumper (might have been more orange-ish), then you have definitely seen the suspect. You're assuming that since you assume that there must be a necessary being, then therefore there is a god. This is flawed logic.
How does the Kalam get you to a being let alone a really powerful being or a personal being?
You haven't established moral truths are a thing but couldn't an OmniMalevolent being be the basis for morality or the basis for immorality at least? Without even going into the Euthyphro dilemma.
How is this not a case of either special pleading or defining god into existence?
If "God" is the most powerful being which is more powerful: A thing that can do everything or a thing that can do everything while simultaneously not existing?
I still don't see how you can justify saying that "if a god exists in one possible universe then it must be able to exist in all by definition" is sound while saying that "if god doesn't exist in a possible universe, then the god that exists in all universes doesn't exist by definition" is unsound.
Wow. I never thought of Kalam as an argument for a necessarily existent thing. It kind of is, depending on if you think of the universe and a world as the same thing. I think that might be conflation though. I could define a possible universe of absolutely nothing and that doesn't instantiate a necessary thing. In fact, that would be a logical contradiction.
It isn't unsound.
It seems to me that he isn't placing both possibilities on equal ground. His mistake is that he thinks that the possibility of a god existing is a stronger case by default. Thats another argument within itself. Its like when an argument is made in favor of a thing and it is equally as plausible to argue the opposite.
It amazes,me how twisted these people are.
The lies just keep coming..
You have to watch the whole video that this was culled from. It lies in the definition of God as being a "maximally powerful" being, which is the Christian conceptualization of God. When you take the "maximally powerful" label, then it makes sense. However I would encourage you to note that these arguments don't stand on their own and they are a whole pack of arguments.
At 3:15, Dr. Arbour is attempting to use what is actually a restatement of Anselm's original ontological argument to justify the first premise of the modal ontological argument, but this fails for the same reason that Anselm's original argument fails. When Dr. Arbour claims that a maximally great being exists by necessarity because that is true by definition, he is failing to understand how definitions actually work. Just because you define something as existing by necessity doesn't mean that it actually does. What it means is that *if it exists,* it exists by necessity. That's how definitions work. You can *NEVER* define God into existence just by defining him to be logically necessary, but this is exactly what Anselm's ontological argument and Arbour's restatement of it do (technically Anselm's argument actually does even less than that since Anselm didn't specifically state that his greatest conceivable being exists *by necessity,* but it does work the same way as Arbour's argument here).
We can see how Arbour's and Anselm's logic fails by applying it elsewhere. If I define a "shmorse" as "a winged horse that exists by necessity", I could claim, using Arbour's/Anselm's logic, that it is a contradiction to say that a shmorse does not exist because it is defined to exist by necessity, so by saying it doesn't exist, I would, according to this logic, be saying that it both is and isn't necessary. Have I just proven that pegasi exist?
Another way that this logic could be applied: A werewolf is defined as a human that turns into a wolf during a full moon. Consider the statement "Werewolves don't exist". In order for someone to turn into a wolf during the full moon, they must exist. Therefore, the statement "Werewolves don't exist" implies that werewolves don't turn into wolves during the full moon. This is a contradiction, right? By Dr. Arbour's logic, yes, but in reality, no. It is only a contradiction to say "Werewolves don't turn into wolves during the full moon" if you already know that werewolves exist.
The same thing applies to an MGB. It is only a contradiction to say that a necessary being doesn't exist by necessity if you already know that one exists. But this makes the ontological argument circular.
The fallacy of this argument comes from a sloppy use of language. When Dr. Arbour says that it is a contradiction to say "The being that exists in all possible worlds does not exist", this is only because he is using colloquial language rather than rigorous, formal language to make it look like a contradiction. When you say that "X does not exist" in colloquial language, what you are actually saying is "It is not the case that X exists". This is a very important distinction. To say that anything does not exist is technically a contradiction in formal language. Even saying "Unicorns do not exist" is a contradiction because, by using "unicorns" as the subject of a sentence, I am ascribing properties to unicorns, and therefore assuming that they exist. It is a contradiction to assign the property of nonexistence to any object because any object, by definition, exists. Nothing has the property of nonexistence. However, most people know better than to act like this is what people actually mean when they say "X does not exist". Everyone knows that when I say "Bigfoot does not exist", I don't mean that there actually is some being called Bigfoot that has the property of not existing. What I mean is that it is not the case that Bigfoot exists. The same thing goes for God. If I say "A maximally great being does not exist", I don't mean "There is a maximally great being that has the property of not existing". I mean "It is not the case that there exists a maximally great being." Realize this fact, and the ontological argument falls to pieces.
What you stated here is wrong. It may be you don't understand the concept. You're not defining God "into existence", your defining God, then deducing if God exists or not. It's logical inference.
Sort of like physicists will mathematically infer something or mathematically model something. They aren't "mathing it into existence". Does it necessarily mean that it's sound? No. But the fact remains, if it is logically possible that God exists, then God exists. It's deduction.
And no, your example does not mean the OA "falls to pieces". The greatest mathemetician and logician in human history, Kurt Godel thought the exact opposite, and thought it was sound.
Sorry, you can have your opinions, but absolutely nothing you are going to conceive here is going to demonstrate that the Ontological Argument "falls to pieces".
@@truebeliever6440 "You're not defining God "into existence", your defining God, then deducing if God exists or not. [..] if it is logically possible that God exists, then God exists."
.. because of your definition of god. Therefore, you're defining god into existence.
@@osmosis321 No your not. God is defined as a maximally great being. Using logic, when can decide whether such a being can exist. If it can exist, it must exist. It does not however, possibly exist. The first premise states this. If it is possible that god exists, than he must exist. It could be impossible that god exists, and the OA would fail.
@@Terry-nr5qn "If it is possible that god exists, than he must exist."
Why should I believe that?
It is possible that, one day in the far and distant future, a sufficiently advanced civilization will understand the nature of the universe and they will travel back in time and create it. No god required.
The problem is that beysian statistics is not a good epistemology for ontology.
If we assume that possibly God doesn't exist , then we have to figure out what stands behind Kalam's argument, Contingency argument, Fine tuning for life argument, Moral argument etc. It seems that assumed possibility that God doesn't exist, falls right there as unsupported and unacceptable proposition.
To address Dr. Arbour's second point:
First of all, the Kalam cosmological argument does not get you a personal being or a necessary being. It only gets you a cause for the Universe. You have no justification whatsoever for claiming that this cause is an intelligence and especially not for claiming that it is something that exists by necessity. In fact, if we accept the Kalam cosmological argument, it follows that the being proven to exist by the Kalam actually has to be contingent because the Universe is contingent. A necessary being cannot cause a contingent universe because anything that is caused by a necessary being is, by definition, necessary. This is because, if A causes B, then by definition, A implies B, and anything implied by a necessary truth is also necessary.
Secondly, even if all of those other arguments were sound (which I don't accept - I think that the moral argument and the argument from numbers are terrible arguments), it still wouldn't justify the possibility premise. Proving that something that shares a few of the properties of a maximally great being exists still says nothing about whether something with all of the properties of a maximally great being is logically possible.
And this also ignores that there are many good arguments against God, like the problem of evil, the contradictions in the attributes of God, the existence of a Universe that does not appear to be created with any purpose (being barely able to support life, hostile to life that does exist, bound by a maximum speed that means it will be almost impossible to explore and that all but an infinitesimal fraction of it is causally cut off from us forever, and destined to suffer a heat death after which nothing meaningful will ever be able to happen again), and the sheer absurdity of any actual being existing by necessity.
if A causes B, then by definition, A implies B,
So if I create something which is not alive by definition it must be alive?
" A necessary being cannot cause a contingent universe because anything that is caused by a necessary being is, by definition, necessary."
-Where on earth did you contrive that??? Necessary simply means 1) The thing itself has no cause. 2) It is not dependent upon something else for its existence.
How did you possibly come to "Necessary being cannot create a contingent universe"? That seems to come way out of left field.
Also, the concept of the cause having a mind is implicit. Things don't just eternally remain in a current state, and then "decide" to change, unless the thing can actually decide to change.
In other words, an abstract or necessary being that had no mind, would have no power to create a universe without deciding to do so, which implies a mind. It'd be like claiming I painted a picture in my head, but have no mind to decide to do it. It makes no sense.
And the arguments "against God" have all been addressed, and none really work. I mean really, you're going to try to make an argument like "If God exists, then he would allow me to explore every galaxy I want. God does not allow me to explore every galaxy I want, therefore God does not exist"?
I could make an equally compelling argument that "If God exists, and we are His special creation, then He would make a vast universe just to show us how special we are". Your opinions about what God "should and shouldn't do" are not really arguments.
These so-called arguments against God just don't work. That's why a vast majority of atheists will get into a lengthy "burden of proof" argument, because if they have to try to support these kind of arguments, they just don't work.
But there are lots of arguments against a conscious benevolent being, so the reverse ontological argument is just as likely.
Believing in god, not coming from good evidence, but from simply human belief, just like the creation of a super hero, its is all anthropocentric as in Genesis to Revelation, not mysterious nor supernatural about it..
There's no possible argument for or against the existence of god ! Admit it and SHUT UP !
This argument is so dumb
Continue great work
He says that God has to exist therefore the OA is right because it says god exists. Embarrassing
That’s actually not what he’s saying.
@@theautodidacticlaymanI may be wrong. Can you summarize it for me?
@@alanrosenthal6323 4:37 If you will, let me know if that still doesn’t make sense to you. His summary ends at 6:27.
@@theautodidacticlaymanthe kalam does not get you to a god. It only suggests that the universe had a cause. The moral argument only says that some people want there to be a law giver because they are taught that humans can not make their own judgements. The OA starts out saying that a max great being is possible but skips over the implication that a max great being might also be impossible.
@@alanrosenthal6323 That is a popular objection to the first half of the Kalam. The Kalam most are working with now is a two-stage argument. The first half aims to establish a necessary cause, then the second half analyzes what that cause must be like. One trait that it pulls out is that any effect from the First Cause must not be caused by anything besides the First Cause, or else the thing that causes the First Cause to act would become the First Cause, ad infinitum. So in order for the First Cause to be the First Cause, it must have volition, which means it must be personal.
As far as I’m aware, arguments from moral realism acknowledge that humans _can_ make moral judgments because they have access to moral facts, but these facts are not merely the judgments of humans, so they must have a source beyond humans.
Any proponent of the Reverse Ontological Argument has to commit to the claim that the existence of God is _impossible._ That’s a huge feat. It’s also worth noting that the Modal Ontological Argument discussed in this video uses Modal Logic, which I need to learn more about.