Time for a video on Lt Colonel Robert Blair "Paddy" Mayne. The founding father of special forces warfare and one of the most decorated soldiers of WW2 who was shamefully denied a Victoria cross by a bunch of cowards who barely knew how to use a rifle.
One small point, if I heard correctly, the Tunisian Campaign was not classed as in the European theatre of operations, it was part of the North African theatre of operations, but I might be wrong.
My Father fought alongside Monty in Middle East, pushing Rommel into the Ocean, He decorated my Father twice 🇬🇧Dad was a Sapper, who went ahead of our Tanks and Troops to locate and often destroy land mines and traps 🪤.
My mother, five or six years old, lived in Alexandria, Egypt and could literally hear the artillery of the Battle of El Amain. So our American family always held General Montgomery in high regard.🇬🇧
While Montgomery was stationed in England in 1942, he had a role in the planning for the raid at Dieppe, originally scheduled for June 1942. When the Germans discovered the raiding force as it was about to depart from the Solent, the raid was called off. As far as Montgomery was concerned that was the end of it. Then he was shipped off to the Middle East. With him out of the way Lord Mountbatten and Ian Fleming remounted the Dieppe Raid and launched it on Aug 19 1942. It was a disaster for the allies. The Germans were prepared and most of the raiding force was killed, wounded or captured. It is said Montgomery, if he had remained in England, would never have allowed the Dieppe Raid to be remounted because with the element of surprise lost he could foresee the slaughter it turned out to be. My father, a sergeant in the Canadian Army, was in that raid and was captured. He spent the rest of the war as a POW. Though he survived and returned home (he was an American actually), the experience scarred him for the remainder of his days, and he eventually succumbed to alcoholism. My father's life might've have been much different if Montgomery had not been sent to the Middle East in the summer of '42.
@@davidrox4591 Imagine calling a man who was a general in WW2 a coward. Montgomery was involved in the crucial parts of the war in 1944, show a bit of respect.
David Rox, What on earth are you talking about? Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2. The Americans even had to turn to Montgomery in their hour of need in the Ardennes when they found themselves in retreat. Montgomery had to make some very bold and very brave decisions. He was no coward. He was a real soldier and field commander, severely wounded in battle in WW1. The Germans were impressed with his command of 3rd Division before Dunkirk. Von Mellenthin wrote how skillfully Montgomery fought with 3rd Division by day and moved by night, getting his division back to Dunkirk more or less intact.
“Every soldier must know, before he goes into battle, how the little battle he is to fight into the larger fight fits into the larger picture, and how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole” Bernard Law Montgomery
A great late friend, an Aussie pilot seconded to the RAF in Egypt just before Alamein. He said everybody in the 8th Army loved and respected him as a truly great leader and soldier. He out-foxed the Desert Fox every time. My friend’s first experience of Monty’s leadership was to witness the execution of a British soldier who had fallen asleep while of sentry duty. Everybody agreed the death sentence was fully justified. Every soldier would do whatever Monty commanded. That was the spirit of his leadership.
he out foxed nothing he was given more men and materiel than either of his predecessors and Rommel.A propped up fraud really to cover for Churchill's meddling who later came to loathe bernard
I'm Australian, he was in command of our troops in North Africa. They sailed halfway around the world to fight a battle that we believed the allies must win. We all need to do our part. Hero of mine.
@@celter.45acp98 The days when "The Learning Channel" actually would teach you something. Now its only reality shows with Little people, the obese and the weird... And ppl wonder why the younger generations are dumb. As a kid, we has 1 tv and my dad kept it on the history channel. Its ironic to me now, but I use to hate WW2 documentaries. Now thats all I watch.
I've heard folks say that the two men would have been better suited in the other's theater: Slim was actually liked by the Americans and wasn't as provocative, while Monty's methods, according to them would have worked better in the Pacific. However, MacArthur was an even bigger egotist than Patton, so I'm not so sure.
That's just opinion. Apples and oranges. Different theatres, different enemies. Slim certainly didn't take on the best the Germans had. What is not opinion is that Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2.
Patton: According to some vets who served under him, he was despised by quite a few of his troops. None of them cited the slap in stories I heard as a child, but were more focused on things like the fact that he would ride into battle sitting in the top of an open tank firing his paired six shooters like he was an old west cowboy and apparently would openly negatively compare some divisions to "his old Roman troops" - the ones he felt he had commanded in a past life.
Well the soldier slapping occurred in Sicily in summer 1943 when he commanded 7th Army. There were plenty in 7th Army who disliked Patton for that. When he commanded 3rd Army in NW Europe from the second half of 1944 there wouldn't have been many troops who would have cared much what happened with other army over a year before I shouldn't think.
A aspect of Monty’s kindness though was his relationship with his step sons who he treated as his own and very much loved. A ass to be sure but a good father one at least.
Many years ago as a boy my father visited the motor museum whose newest display piece was the vehicle Monty used in North Africa. He was desperately upset that he couldn't take a picture when an elderly gentleman told him that it was ok he would keep an eye out whilst he snapped a picture. My grandparents were most amused only telling him after he had taken a picture an said thank you to the chap that it was Monty himself who was his partner in crime!
Ted Rex Which museum would that have been? His Humber staff car is in a museum in Coventry, presumable because of the Humber company being based there. His command tank is the Imperial War Museum.
The Americans instead of taking the bridge took the high ground,this led to the main failure of operation market garden, Eisenhower effectively with his broad front strategy cost 50,000 Americans their lives in the hurtegen forest
"Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands. Even so, the priorities of any airborne formation has to be the capture of its ultimate objectives, i.e. the bridges, and all other concerns are entirely secondary. Browning defended his decision long after the War, but it was a great mistake not to attach a higher priority to Nijmegen Bridge as, without it, the 1st Airborne Division would be cut-off behind two large rivers and 13 miles of hostile territory." Pegasus Archive Browning page
You can add in the 55,000 casualties in the Lorraine and the 90,000 in the Ardennes in addition to the Hurtgen Forest casualties......all a result of Eisenhower's broad front disaster.
The Hurtgen Forest battle lasted 4 months and lost 34,000.The Monty Garden debalcle lasted 9 days and lost 17,000 - - that's a loss. Do the math,not the meth - this has been pointed out to you wags ad nauseam. Metz had to be taken and Bernard couldn't even take Monty Garden - even if he had the balls to show up - which he didn't . Like an actual Field Marshall Walter Model There was simply no bypassing of Lorraine. It had to be conquered, cleared, and the German divisions defeated or pushed back. Metz was considered one of the most formidable citadels in the world with it's 43 reinforced concrete artillery equipped bunkers that were mined in the front by Gen Herman Balck. That the Britsh couldn't take in 1815 with out flooded rivers,land mines and 88 artillery
This is one of the only times I've seen Alan Brook referred to in a WW2 piece. I read his war diary decades ago and he's been basically invisible in every war doco i've seen since.
While we're on the subject of generals, maybe Biographics could do a video on Matthew Ridgway. He's probably the greatest general most folks have never heard of, and singlehandedly saved the entire Korean War. Plus, I believe he often fought alongside Montgomery's forces in World War II (since he was commander of the US Airborne Divisions), so there is a connection to this one you made here!
Him, John Monash and Arthur Currie are grossly under appreciated and deserve far larger reverence. All 3 far superior in every way to clowns like more famous McArthur.
Ridgway wrote Montgomery a letter in January 1945 as the Bulge was ending, thanking him for his guidance and personal cordiality and said he hoped to serve under him again. There was mutual respect and admiration between the two. General Gavin liked Montgomery too. Major Richard Winters of Band of Brothers fame said Montgomery was "the real deal, an example to follow".
@ayrshireman1314 Simpson said he'd never been better commanded than under Montgomery. Hasbrouck said Montgomery saved his US 7th Armored Division from annihilation at St Vith.
@Biograpics Suggestion for future video, Field Marshall William Slim, in charge of the "forgotten army", almost certainly stopped the Japanese from taking India. Could also fit in Warograpics. He turned a badly trained, demoralised army that was constantly retreating into a superb fighting force that could take on and beat the Japanese
Possibly in a little bias as I’m British and my family served under Monty, but I think the blame for Market Garden is very unfair. The Germans were still pushed back and vast areas of Holland liberated. The final objective was not taken true, but almost a quarter of the paras in Arnhem were successfully evacuated in good order. The thing is, as is so often the case, there’s a great deal of luck involved in war. Market Garden was a high risk operation, but it nearly worked and if it had, Monty would be considered the boldest allied general of WW2. To be fair, I think he was also right about Eisenhowers broad front advance being not necessarily the best idea. It’s hard to say for sure as we won the war, but if he had pushed all the western allies into the Ruhr like Monty wanted, I think it’s very likely Germany would have collapsed inside 1944. The knock on effects to events like the Cold War would have been vast. Instead, the soviets continued their bloody advance of attrition and the battle of Berlin was an utter slaughter for all involved. Taking the Rurh would have been bloody, basically a reverse battle of the bulge, but it would almost certainly have been successful and very likely have ended the war in Europe early and in so doing saved thousands of lives.
Gunther Blumentritt agreed with Montgomery that in September October 1944 the best cause of action for the allies would have been a strong concentrated push on the Ruhr instead of wasting men and resources in the Lorraine etc.
@@lyndoncmp5751 totally. Anecdotal account passed down my family from my great grandfather who was a tank commander in WW2. They had the Germans on the run and were about to peruse over a small river when they were ordered to halt because they had raced ahead of the Americans to the south. They had to hold position for three days in which time the Germans regrouped, dug in and set up overlapping fields of fire. The go ahead was given and two tanks were knocked out killing all inside before the Germans were overrun. Thanks Eisenhower.
Jacob Yes, Eisenhower allowed too many secondary campaigns to bog the allies down in autumn 1944, wasting men and material. The Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges. Instead of smashing down the door into Germany by kicking it in in one place, Eisenhower merely preferred knocking on the door all over the place. The result was that Germany was able to hold the western allies at bay for six months, and even pushed the Americans into a retreat in the Ardennes. Montgomerys idea of a powerful, concentrated 4 army (1 British, 1 Canadian and 2 American) advance across northern Germany, centred on Aachen then the Ruhr would have been far more successful, and easier to supply, than the broad front. What unit was your relative in? Do you know? Cheers.
Montgomery didn't argue to Eisenhower that he should remain in charge of all allied ground troops after Normandy. He met with Eisenhower in mid August and tried to dissuade Eisenhower descending from Supreme Commander into also becoming C-in-C of all ground forces. Montgomery said that if American public pressure insisted that an American be in charge of all ground forces that he should give the C-in-C job to Bradley and that he, Montgomery, would serve UNDER Bradley if it meant the concentrated northern thrust with 4 armies be chosen as the preferred strategy instead of the broad front strategy. Source :Monty and Patton Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds.
There are a few mistakes in this video. Normandy wasn't the largest amphibious landing of WW2, Sicily was. Though nearly 133,000 landed in Normandy, 150,000 landed in Sicily from 3000 ships. Also Pattons behaviour there was not what you would expect from an officer, apart from attacking his own soldiers and ordering POWs to be shot in cold blood. Also later Montgomery wanted him to encircle the German troops he had pinning down but Patton ignored his messages and went in the opposite direction to take the capital city of Palermo which was of no tactical importance and so, poorly defended. Later with Montgomery still pushing the Germans up the coastal road he asked Patton to use the only other road on his side of the island to head for Messina and come in behind the Germans and again cut off their retreat . However, by the time he got there, in fact just before the British and despite them fighting their way along the destroyed costal road, the Germans had gone. Patton later claimed he had won the 'Race to Messina' but there was no race Montgomery had asked him to take it, though Patton thought it was a trick, but it wasnt . Eisenhower relieved Patton of his command after Sicily and awarded Monty the highest miltary award he could bestow on a foreign commander. Also Market Garden was actualy proposed by Eisenhower though based on a previous idea of Montys that he had rejected.
More britsh tripe to cover for the effette bernard.When you pull your nose out of bernard's backside try sticking it in one of those books you've claimed to read
Princess already left facts that don't jibe with vague opinions - the crown lost an empire and the colonials weren't fond of being fodder. Go across the channel and ask the Euros - shouldn't take you 4 yrs like it did Monty/Brooke
Not a Monte fan but I think he was a great leader and key contributor to winning WWII. Glad he was in our side. IMO you can’t be great without a great ego.
Actually, you can. See: General Alan Simpson, who got along well with Monty, as an American Army leader (9th Army) and General. Held in high regard by Monty, Ike, AND Bradley. Health issues brought his career to a too early end, in 1948, I believe.
I'm an American and I've always preferred Montgomery and Patton over Eisenhower. You read bks about him & you see that Eisenhower wasn't a bad man but he was more a politician than general.
Yes. Eisenhowers broad front strategy got next to nowhere for half a year from September 1944 to February 1945, with even a retreat in the middle of it.
You're right George Marshall would have sacked the dithering the dolt Monty who had 4 yrs to cross a crummy Channel. FDR had to send the GIs 3500 miles and carry him across
@@DarkGlass824 every book I've read the avalanche of evidence is monty was mediocre at best - but his blatant lies were abundant. At Caen,Market Garden Even the Bulge he took credit that was never his and deflected blame that was
As a Canadian who is interested in history my opinion of Montgomery is pretty positive. Montgomery was not a nice guy but nice guys don't win wars. Montgomery was a brilliant tactician and leader who knew it.
Montgomerys largely Canadian Scheldt campaign was the ONLY western allied campaign in autumn 1944 to achieve its objectives and with 1/4 the casualties of Patton's Lorraine failure.
The piss poor Monty had no more men and the GIs fought thru to the Sigfreid Line Not the poof Monty.Propped up fraud didn't cross the rhine until 6 months after Monty Garden - with the 9th US Army seeing it thru. The Canucks were hung out to dry by Bernard at Both Dieppe and the Scheldt Estuary
@@karlketamine8172 Everything Montgomery achieved had tactical advantages. What didn't? Even Market Garden got British 2nd Army 100km closer to Germany (the British and Canadians advanced into Germany from the Nijmegen area taken in Market Garden) and created a protective buffer zone in front of Antwerp. Ironically the Germans diverting all those forces, particularly in armour to engage Market Garden 'should' have helped the Americans further south to get well beyond Aachen. It didn't. Getting thousands killed for no real tactical gain should be applied to Patton at Metz and Hodges in the Hurtgen Forest.
Monty was very clear prior to the BEF failure in France about how arrogant the command was in thinking that an outdated force would be successful just because they were british. He points out in his memoir that there wasn't even an evacuation plan. Aside from the fact that they had sinply sent Britain's entire fighting force based on the fact that they would win.
The BEF were about 9% of the Allied forces. Gort was out of his depth but the BEF fought well, even the Germans said so, for example holding off the Germans at the Ypres-Comines Canal. The problem was that the French and Belgians collapsed on their own territory exposing the flanks of the British.
The Germans were impressed with Montgomerys command of 3rd Division in France 1940. Von Mellenthin : "That Montgomery was probably the best tactician if not the best strategist of the war is undoubted. we knew his methods well, his ability to move a division across our front in 1940 fighting by day and moving through the night was because of his adherence to training his men"
Never said that tosser lyndon you better come with some new lies or people are just going to stop reading -Monty was promoted beyond his abilities and accomplishments.What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. Then barely.......and poorly. From a letter on exhibit at Wichita KS "Museum of World treasures" *Hasso Von Manteuffel 8018 Diessen am ammersee Mariahilfe Strasse 7.* Dec. 16. 1976 Dear Mr. Dellingatti; I thank you for your letter, attached you find a photo as you asked for. *In my opinion General Patton was a master of lightning warfare and the best commander in this reference! Evidence of his excellent command and control of an army are the campaign in Sicily, the break-out in Brittany 1944 and during the Battle of the Bulge Dec 1944. I agree with Ladislaw Farago first-rate book on Patton "Ordeal and Triumph"* - an excellent report! With very good wishes *Patton: Ordeal and Triumph, Ladislas Farago (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin* *General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him"*
i live in canada and we were taught that the canadians actually punched through further than expected, and their fierce fighting was seen as a way to win back some honour after the Dieppe disaster caused by poor British planning.
Yes. You can read the same claims by New Zealanders about their soldiers-and the same claims by Australian about their soldiers. It all hogwash and petty juvenile attempts at credit -grabbing.
@@michaelkenny8540 so I mean.. you are trying to say you were taught your country did better and so we are just credit hogging? Not any chance you are doing the same?
@@BulletHoleI Said nothing of the sort. I simply say this bollocks about 'my nation' being the best soldiers in (insert favourite conflict) is well, bollocks. I am Irish by the way.
2:15 - Chapter 1 - The tasmanian devil 4:05 - Chapter 2 - The darkest hour 6:35 - Chapter 3 - War in the desert 9:25 - Chapter 4 - Italian Interlude 11:30 - Chapter 5 - D day & beyond 15:05 - Chapter 6 - Disaster & disgrace 19:10 - Chapter 7 - End of the war PS: Can we have Gustave Courbet, that guy was pretty woke by the 1800's standards
Can you source your suggestion the 75% of troops were american in overlord? Based on the figures I've found repeatedly thats not even close to being accurate.
Again Lyndon or is John Cornell,quit switching in/out of accounts - since you evidently are to broke to pay attention here it is again from Britannica BTW. So we know who paid the Butchers Bill *Battle Casualties for the Normandy Campaign* *USA - 29,000 KIA ,106,000 wounded & missing* *UK- 11,000 KIA , 54,000 wounded & missing* Canada- 5,000 KIA , 13,000 wounded & missing France - 12,200 Killed & missing
Monty *did not plan Market Garden* coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery’s relations with the commander of Second TAF, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, were poor, and he was largely excluded from the planning process. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF. It was Bereton and Williams who: ♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. ♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. ♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. ♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. ♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Robin Neilland’s The Battle for the Rhine 1944: _”In early September **Montgomery had a plan ready for employing airborne forces-Operation Comet-and some details of Comet should be noted here. Comet called for the 1st Airborne Division and Sosabowski’s 1st Polish Parachute Brigade to seize the Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges, using gliders for coup de main attacks, landing close to the bridges, rather as Pegasus Bridge at Benouville had been taken by the 6th Airborne Division on D-Day._ _Once the bridges had been taken the parachute brigades would land on nearby DZs (drop-zones) and join up with the glider parties to hold the bridges until the ground forces arrived. In the Comet plan, Brigadier ‘Shan’ Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade was tasked to take the road bridge over the Maas at Grave, landing on a DZ just 1,000 yards from the north end of the bridge-which, hopefully, had just been taken by a force from the 1st Air Landing Brigade in four gliders landing at the south end of the bridge. Operation Comet was planned for 10 September; then it was called off and replaced one week later by Market Garden._ _The Comet plan stuck to the basic airborne rule-land as close to the objective as possible-and to the basic rule for capturing any bridge-take both ends at once. In view of the subsequent arguments over the deployment of 1st Airborne at Arnhem, one cannot but wonder why the Comet plans for taking the bridges with one reinforced British division, using glider coup de main tactics, were regarded as far too risky for an airborne assault by three Allied airborne divisions just one week later?_ _It has to be clearly understood that taking the bridges on the road to Arnhem was only a means to an end. The final aim was to establish Second Army just west of the Rhine, north of Arnhem, and just south of the Ijsselmeer (or Zuider Zee). Once there, having outflanked the West Wall, which petered out some distance to the south, Second Army could either turn south-east to outflank the Ruhr, or head due east towards Berlin. Any decision on its final destination would rest with General Eisenhower._ _Having elected to use the Airborne Army, Montgomery had first to decide where to cross the Rhine. His own preference was for a crossing east of Arnhem, close to the town of Wesel, and Wesel was also the choice of Dempsey in Second Army. Wesel lay just south “of the Ruhr and was the better option for Garden, with fewer canals and an easier approach to the river. However, Wesel lay within the Ruhr anti-aircraft gun flak belt and the airborne planners stated that low-flying and slow-moving glider-tugs and parachute aircraft would suffer severe losses if Wesel were chosen (readers should note that Wesel was chosen for the last airborne operation of the war, the Rhine crossing in March 1945, when the US 17th and British 6th Airborne Divisions were dropped around the town)._ _Therefore, since the air planners-specifically Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command-had the casting vote over the air element in Market, the decision was made for Arnhem, the target town for a thrust north from the narrow bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut canal east of Antwerp, a route that would require the crossing of some wide rivers or canals: the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, the Willems canal at Veghel, the River Maas at Grave, the Maas-Waal canal, the River Waal at Nijmegen and the Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn) at Arnhem (the Waal is the southern arm of the Rhine, which divides in two to form the Waal and Neder Rijn, some distance upstream of Arnhem). There were, in addition, any number of minor streams and canals restricting movement off the main north-south axis. “The point to note here is the destruction of the first Arnhem myth._ _The choice of drop zones was in the gift of the US Air Force commanders, not the airborne commanders - and the factor that governed the Air Force commanders’ choice of parachute drop zones ( DZs) or glider landing zones (LZs) was the presence, actual or feared, of anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges. Since the US Air Force commanders considered that these bridges would be surrounded by flak guns, they selected landing zones that were, in the main, well away from the bridges._ _This decision had some dire effects. The obvious one is that it gave some airborne units-most notably 1st Airborne-a long way to go through enemy territory before they even got to their prime objective. If that were all it would have been bad enough, but there was more. It also deprived the airborne soldiers of that other airborne asset, surprise. Once on the ground, airborne units lack mobility: instead of swooping from the sky onto their objectives in a matter of minutes, the men of 1st Airborne had to march there from distant DZs, and this took hours. Long before they reached the bridges over the Neder Rijn the enemy were fully alert._ _In addition, one of the other prime assets of an airborne division is that it can leap over obstacles that would hinder a ground force by landing on both sides of “a river bridge at once, which the 82nd Airborne did at the Grave bridge, but not at the Nijmegen bridge. At Arnhem both these assets were lost by the Air Force commanders choice of DZs, but the choice of the Arnhem drop and landing zones was not made by Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division._ _Nor was this the only error committed by the air planners. Another was their decision that ground-attack fighters were not to be sent over the battlefield while escort fighters were in the air protecting supply drops._ _This decision denied the airborne units the vital assistance that these ground-attack aircraft had been giving to the troops in Normandy just a month before, and a lack of air support exacerbated the problems of the airborne units. Among other tasks, these ground-attack aircraft could have taken on the flak positions around the bridges, those anti-aircraft guns the air planners were so wary of. But the truly dire effect was, as Julian Thompson relates: ‘that the 1st Airborne Division was denied the use of a weapon the Germans, after their Normandy experience, dreaded. The enemy was able to bring reinforcements into Arnhem in broad daylight, with impunity, a move which would have been fraught with risk in Normandy a few weeks earlier.’_ _….Ideally, an airborne force, be it battalion, brigade, division or corps, should be landed in one lift. For Market it was judged impossible to fly in all the Allied airborne units in one lift as there were not enough aircraft available. In fact, it was judged impossible to land any of the Allied Airborne divisions intact on the first day._ _This difficulty was put down to a shortage of transport aircraft and glider tugs, but the problem actually went further than that._ _The British transport commander, Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollinghurst of No. 38 Group, RAF Transport Command, wanted to solve the aircraft shortage by flying-in two lifts on D-Day. His colleague of the US IX Troop Carrier Command, Major-General Paul L. Williams, did not agree, believing that time was needed to service the aircraft and rest the crews-and this view prevailed at Allied Airborne HQ where Brereton supported it. Since the principal asset of an airborne operation is surprise, the two-to three-day deployment-an attack by instalments-was throwing this vital asset away. This decision would have some profound effects on the ground, most notably on Urquhart’s 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.”_ - The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands Continued…
Continued… From THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE 1944-1945. Rick Atkinson. _”General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in Dragoon the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.”_ On the failure of the US 101st Airborne to capture the Som bridge intact: _”Montgomery’s proposal was for the US 101st Airborne to be strung out like a kite string over a 30 mile stretch. Major General Maxwell Taylor, the commander of US 101st Airborne, protested against such an extreme dispersion of his division. Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery,who agreed to let the matter be settled by direct discussion Taylor and General Miles Dempsey, the commander of British Second Army. They met at Montgomery’s headquarters on September 12th.”_ -Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was *Brereton* who enforced them, *not* *Montgomery*. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning. They took and kept 100km of ground up that road i.e. 90% of it. They NEARLY did it. They were not stooped where they set off, or even halfway up it. They got 90% of the way, within touching distance. Had the operation been planned a bit better by the air commanders and with more resources it would have worked. Monty’s idea was actually a good one, as nearly all the relevant personnel involved agreed. Including the Americans. They (Eisenhower and Brereton) were the ones who had to agree with it and give it the go ahead. They very much liked the idea. Few people are aware that there were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions. It should be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had. Montgomery had also wanted to use Hodges 1st US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. But Bradley was stealing fuel and other resources from Hodges and giving it to Patton. Eisenhower: _”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”._ Eisenhower insisted it go ahead and Eisenhower under-resourced it. MG wasn’t even an army just a corps. The idea that Monty had been given everything for a thrust to Berlin is laughable. By this time Monty had given up on an immediate thrust into Germany and Berlin. Of course it was not 100% guaranteed to succeed but it had a good chance to succeed, if only certain things were executed a bit better, such as *the 82nd capturing the Nijmegen bridge early when only around 20 German troops were guarding it.* Beyond the initial broad outline, *Monty didn’t plan the operation and nor did he have any jurisdiction over the air forces. He can consult and discuss but he cannot give them orders.* Monty’s aides tried to persuade Brereton to double missions on the 17th but Brereton refused and as I just pointed out, Monty even went back on his idea for the 101st to be strung out over a long distance when a Taylor argued against it. Monty did not wish to step on the toes of the airborne commanders. He respected their views and he let them plan it. Also neither Montgomery nor Browning could dissuade the RAF from deciding to drop 1st Airborne so far way from the Arnhem bridge, which led to the vast majority of 1st Airborne not even reaching it. The orders of advice Marshall Hollinghurst could not be changed. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst are the ones who should be vilified, not Montgomery. It was their decisions that screwed the operation and prevented it from being a 100% success.
*MONTY GARDEN* This abortion of Monty's involved crossing three major rivers, three minor rivers, and criss-crossing canals, across terrain(polder marshes) where tanks couldn't maneuver away from the major roads without sinking. And we saw how that went even with complete surprise. Bernard planned the whole thing - IKE and everyone else wanted Antwerp open .Monty Garden was unrealistically ambitious and just too many variables factoring in for things to go wrong. Ambition over reaching capability. Ike knowingly kept the British relevant in order to keep them in the alliance so that American soldiers would not have to shoulder the entire casualty burden on the Western Front. D-Day had 30 miles flights across the Channel. Monty Garden had 300 mile flights to NE Netherlands D-Day had 900 flights.Monty Garden had 1600 Flights D-Day was June 6th.Monty Garden was September 17th And 2 hrs less daylight to do all that in So there were 700 MORE FLIGHTS than D-Day. They were 300 miles away in North East Netherlands not 30 miles across a channel. Oh there was 2 hrs less daylight to do it in. SMDH ♦You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road. ♦*Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown* ♦Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bring the whole column to a halt . *This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command.* ♦*And why did Monty and Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think while approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 4 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site* ♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November 🚑🚑
in Denmark(besides Bornholm which was taken by the red army but liberated on april 10th 1946) we see Monty as the man who liberated us from both Hitler and Stalin the russians was arround Rostock approxmatly 200 kilometers from the denish boarder on may 4th 1945 at 20.36 hours when the liberation message from Monty was announced in the radio
The plan *all along in Normandy* (ever since Monty’s revision of the COSSAC plan in January 1944) was for the British and Canadians to hold the Panzers on the eastern flank, forming a shield around Caen, constantly attack and grind up the German armour, and crucially, *suck in German reserves,* while US forces took Cherbourg, built up a vast arsenal of men and weapons too strong for the Germans to hold back and break out of the lodgement area.
John Peate Burns have the nurses left you out into the court yard lately,if not have them do so you need to go on a walk about - like Monty did during operations
It's pretty amazing what a good women can do to a man like Montgomery. My uncle was a hard man with a cruel side, due to the environment he grew up in. When he met his now wife and married her, he completely changed. I am not joking when it was really weird at first to always see him smile and genuinely content. He could have outbursts, but she always kept him in line with nothing more than love and care. The majority of women may have not had power or privilege like men. But the good women who were positive influences on some of the most powerful men in history cannot be understated.
@12:27 Actually there have been a bunch of invasions across the English Channel that were successful by the English. England has a long history of invading and occupying parts of France. It is the English who have never been conquered by a foreign power since William the Conqueror.
I feel that U.S. generals were far more numerous when it came to egos. Mark Clark's march into Rome, Joseph Stilwell inability to leave burma alone, and Douglas McArthur's decision to regulate Australian's to mop up duty.
No he took METZ on December 13. Where Monty's troops had to fall back and tak antwerp. Not their fault Winston assigned the spineless gummy bear to direct when he NEVER SHOWED UP during the battle
@@bigwoody4704 The only reason he attacked it because of it's History, Metz being the place Atilla the Hun conquered. Metz was a costly affair that could've been avoided by bypassing it and cutting off the German garrison.
@wk2k11 Blumentritt said Metz could easily have been masked. Patton was obsessed with Metz. It has no real military value. Should have been isolated and left behind. Patton's Lorraine campaign was the biggest failure of autumn 1944.
Really nice video! Would you make one about Antonin Artaud? Like, yes, he (actually) is not really famous and etc, but he is definitely an interesting person
In Ireland, Montgomery unleashed a scorched earth campaign of utter barbarism. "Personally," he said, "my whole attention was given to defeating the rebels but it never bothered me a bit how many houses were burnt". As far as he was concerned, even civilians were fair game, referring to them in derogatory terms. There was, perhaps, only one person who could put up with Monty’s abrasive personality. That was General Sir Alan Brooke, the head of the British Army. But at times, even he couldn’t stand Monty. He regularly complained about Montgomery in his diaries, writing, "I had to haul him over the coals for his usual lack of tact and egotistical outlook". Following WWII, Montgomery held a number of high-ranking positions, but he never quite exerted as much influence as he wanted to-and he only had himself and his own bad attitude to blame. As one of his detractors put it, "I have come to the conclusion that his love of publicity is a disease[...]and that it sends him equally mad". Towards the end of his life, Montgomery adopted controversial opinions that betrayed the fact that he had, maybe, outlived his usefulness. He was an outspoken supporter of apartheid in South Africa and an opponent of gay rights. He famously said, "this sort of thing [homosexuality] may be tolerated by the French, but we’re British-thank God".
Seeing as the allies in France etc didn't care how many houses they destroyed in getting the job done (look at Caen, St Lo etc) Ireland got off lightly.
I was there for two weeks in early 1996. It rained solid for two weeks, even though it was summer. I didn't get to see it properly, sadly. I couldn't even see the mountain around Hobart. Just rain clouds.
Monty (General Montgomery) told the Prime Minister (Churchill) that he neither drank nor smoked and was 100% fit. To which Churchill replied, “I both drink and smoke and am 200% fit!!”
Excellent well balanced and factual bio on 'Monty'. Did some good stuff but ultimately let down by his ego (market garden) and very difficult to work with. You should do General 'Bill' Slim, probably the best British front line commander in WW2.
The problem with Market Garden was that the air commanders took over the Market part. Brereton and Williams insisted on dispersed drops over a number of days. That is what killed Market Garden. Even Montgomery could not change their minds.
Marc van den Boogard, Where did you get that from regarding IKE? On 7th September Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery and told him "my initial intention is to occupy the Saar and the Ruhr". It was always IKE's intention to get to the Ruhr as quickly as they could. Source: Monty and Patton Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds. IKE should have opened up a diversionary attack towards Aachen by the US 1st Army to draw away German reinforcements from the Netherlands. Instead he foolishly allowed the US 1st Army to start probing into the Hurtgen Forest. Attacks into the Hurtgen Forest began just 2 days after Market Garden started.
Top work again Simon, I understand you get alot of request’s and its a shot in the dark but Albert Pike would be interesting he is a historical figure quite shrouded in mystery and quite controversial to today’s standads, his life is quite a story Brigadier General in the confederate army led the battle of pea ridge and 33 degree freemason he created their modern day Scottish rite and was an intellectual force turning down a honour role at harvard and many more events 😊
One of Mongomery's greatest talents was his ability to whip up a sure-fire recipe for success strategy. If one followed the plan, success was damn near inevitable. He tended to a conservative and cautious approach, but he never fell for the traps that Rommel tried to set for him -- as far as I know. His greatest blunder, Market Garden, was when he tried to out-Patton Patton. Obnoxious yes, but a gifted commander nevertheless.
Even Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. It took 100km of German held ground in 3 days. Patton barely took 100km of German held ground in 4 months down in the Lorraine.
The problem with Market Garden is that it was too complex. Too many different elements had to come together at the right time in order for the plan to work. Murphy's Law hit with full force, what with radios having the wrong crystals and weather breaking up the timing of the paratroop drops. Also, warnings from Dutch underground agents that Panzer units were in the area to be attacked were ignored. Once these problems started accumulating, the plan unraveled.
Chuck Messer, That could all have been overcome had Brereton and Williams not insisted on dispersed drops over a number of days. There were no panzers available in the area when the troops were dropping on the 17th. The German armour came on from Germany in the days that followed. Had more paras been dropped on the 17th, they would have been able to deal with the German reinforcements. Its very difficult to dislodge paras in ensconced positions. Still, Market Garden was 90% successful. 100km of German held ground was taken in 3 days.
A lot is said about SS panzers in the area but the truth is that the two Waffen SS panzer divisions (9th and 10th SS) resting and refitting in the area were only at 1/3 strength and didn't have any tanks operational and ready to throw at the paratroopers when they dropped on the 17th, or even the next day. The first German tank attack against the paras was not until late on the 18th when the German army's Kompanie Mielke arrived from Bielefeld, Germany. The Tigers of Kompanie Hummel arrived on the 19th, as did the Stug IIIs of Brigade 280. None of these German army units were in the Netherlands on the 17th. I believe if more paras were dropped on day one they could have taken more of Arnhem and stopped the Germans from getting close to the bridge. The RAF told Brereton they could fly double missions on the 17th but Brereton insisted on single missions, with the other drops spread over days. You're right about other things going wrong, but I would argue they weren't necessarily fatal. Cheers.
Thank you for your informative videos, as someone who loves history and understanding as much as I can about the world your videos are entertaining and informative. I would like to recommend for your next video J Edgar Hoover, I think that would be a interesting addition to your collection. At any rate, please continue to produce content, you have a earned a subscriber.
*Decision in Normandy, by Carlo D'este,p.80 HQ 21 Army Group,14 April 1944 ,B.L. Montgomery, CiC "the whole of aggressive tactics would be to retain the initiative ourselves and to cause alarm in the minds of the enemy To be successful, such tactics must be adopted on D-Day; to wait till D plus 1 would be to lose the opportunity, and also to lose the initiative*
Which is what Monty did. Retained the initiative by a series of repeated attacks on the German lines. Attacks which weakened the Panzer Divisions so much even Bradley managed to advance-slowly. Unable to keep to his promise to start COBRA on July 19 Bradley decided to wait a few days until Monty (GOODWOOD) took enough lumps out of the Germans that Bradley could safely attack. Once the Germans were battered Bradley thought he could manage the task he flunked on July 19.
@@bigwoody4704 your research method= Goggle' Monty is a bad man' and then copy and paste all results unfiltered. What do we expect from a nation that lists 'Q' as its main news outlet!
No thicko I read the books type out appropriate content and save them to file.Ask your handler to show you how when your done picking your nose use that finger to leaf thru just one of you 3500 books
Monty is not well remembered in the US because he questioned the legend of their great hero; Ike was the glamourous soldier who became US president. What Monty said in his books was not as controversial as people realise, he did not criticise Ike. He said that he had disagreed with him and would have done things differently. Monty had known what it was to be the young officer taking men over the top into battle in a way Ike (the career staff officer) never did. That mattered to Monty (and many other senior officers) more than most realise. BUT Monty did enjoy too much the fact that the way the war turned vindicated his concerns about how Europe would be divided up after the war. This was the real hot potato. To be fair however what the Americans said and what they did about Monty were two different things, both during and after the war they trusted Monty completely, both on the battlefield and more importantly when he was Deputy Supreme Commander at NATO.
Absolutely. Montgomery didn't like the idea of a desk general with zero battlefield command experience taking over the command of the war from very experienced and successful battlefield commanders such as himself. Montgomery was proven right because Eisenhower's strategy prolonged the war and caused unnecessary casualties.
Probably the greatest general of WW2. A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2: ♦ Battle of Alam Halfa; ♦ Alamein; ♦ Battle of El Agheila; ♦ Battle of Tripoli; ♦ Battle of Medenine; ♦ Battle of the Mareth Line; ♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit; ♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy; ♦ Battle of the Sangro River; ♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history; ♦ Operation Market Garden - took 60 miles of German held territory; ♦ Battle of the Bulge; ♦ Operation Veritable; ♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time. Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that. _Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign. The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of. Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And insisted it should be 3 airborne brigades to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key. The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. On Normandy: _That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed.._ _….and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton
Those are allied victories that monty somehow got mentioned in. Ike allowed the wag to tag along after he got Dunkirked then waiting 4 yrs to come back across 30 miles
@@tomjewell7759 he has multiple accounts and has been caught posting BS by many people.basically signing out then signing in as someone else to agree with himself - sure sign of mental illness Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
Whether you like Monty or not, and I think he was the best allied commander in the second world war, he totally retrained the Eight Army into the war winning force that it became and lead 21st Army Group for the rest of the war.
Montgomery, the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2. Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery. The Americans had to turn to him in their hour of need in the Ardennes to help get them out of their mess there.
Ya if they had a swim team,jump in the Channel Lyndon Monty will bring the loofah you can make like Lucien Trueb.Real Field Marshall - more like a failed marsh mellow
Yeah, because we all know it would have been so much better if the Nazis had won. Why else would you imply its a cowardly thing, or bad thing, to evacuate troops from a rapidly collapsing theater and unwinnable situation unless you were rooting for the Nazis?
The Germans said Montgomerys ability to fight by day and move by night before Dunkirk really impressed them and that it showed vigorous training and discipline in his men. It was the French and Belgians collapsing (they had ten times the number of soldiers as the British) which lead to the British having no option but to withdraw to Dunkirk and evacuate.
@@lyndoncmp5751 The British are Masters of rewriting history. While the Brits were running back to Merry old England with their tail between their legs. The Belgians delayed the Germans at a huge loss, and the French fought on for a month after the British ran away. Please stop your lies it is a huge insult to the soldiers who died delaying the Germans. So you people could run back home.
@@irishseven100 You DO know of there were British units holding the Germans back too, right? And the Royal Air Force prevented the Luftwaffe from attaining control of the skies. If not for the Royal Navy then nobody would have been evacuated, including over 100,000 French and Belgian troops. If the French and Belgians didn't collapse in the first place on either side of the BEF then there would have been no need for an evacuation at Dunkirk. The British were back fighting and dying in France and Belgium just 4 years later. Nearly a million Brits died in two worlf wars protecting French and Belgian soil.
@@irishseven100 So, again, you wanted the Nazi's to win. You hate the British so much you think it was a bad thing that they left a collapsing theater which had no hope of success so they could save their army to fight on and you would rather the Nazi's be masters of Europe unopposed.
I love the Monty story of how everyone in Southern Command in 1941 had to do a weekly x-country run. Several staff- officers said that it might kill them. Monty replied that it would be better if they died now, and created space for younger officers to rise, than to die later and leave confusion in combat. I can't imagine an American general laying down this kind of inclusive discipline. They loved their comfort.
Monty was dunkirked with the notable exception of the allies decisive November 1942 victory at El Alamein, where massive supply advantages, air cover & naval blockade of German supplies, factoring in ULTRA proved decisive. Bernard's battlefield records featured little to brag about. Monty got out commanded TOTALY in Sicily sat in Italy and absolutely stuck at CAEN, faffed up Falaise - then didn't show up in Arnhem for his own operation. Instead petting his canaries and bunnies back at his caravan as 34,400 troops go into the Netherlands and 17,00 come out and he conveniently wasn't around to share that fate. On top of that he lathered up little lads
@@bigwoody4704 Eisenhower: ‘General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander’. ‘I don’t know if we could have done it without him. It was his sort of battle (D-Day & Normandy). He got us there and he kept us there. General James Gavin of the US 82nd Airborne: "I took a liking to Montgomery which has not diminished over the years" Captain Richard Winters of the US 101st Airborne: "Montgomery was the real deal, an example to follow". General Robert Hasbrouck of the US 7th Armored Division: "Montgomery saved the 7th Armored Division" [at St.Vith in the Bulge]. General Günther Blumentritt: ‘Field Marshall Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse’ General Gerd von Rundstedt: ‘Generals are like race-horses. They are supposed to win, and Montgomery won most of the time.’ General Hasso von Manteuffel on the Bulge: ‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’. Patton on Monty: 'small, very alert, wonderfully conceited, and the best soldier - or so it seems - I have met in this war’. Major General Matt Ridgway, commander of the US XVIII Airborne Corps, 17 Jan 1945: "It has been an honored privilege and a very great personal pleasure to have served, even so briefly, under your distinguished leadership [Montgomery]. To the gifted professional guidance you at once gave me, was added to your own consummate courtesy and consideration. I am deeply grateful for both. My warm and sincere good wishes will follow you and with them the hope of again serving with you in pursuit of a common goal". The British 2nd Tactical Air Force in the Bulge took control of the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands from Vandenberg’s Ninth Air Force. The First Army’s hasty defense had been one of hole-plugging, last stands, and counterattacks to buy time. Although some were successful, these tactics had created organizational havoc within Hodges’ forces as divisional units had been committed piecemeal and badly jumbled. Ridgway wanted St. Vith’s defenders to stay east of the Salm, but Montgomery ruled otherwise. The 7th Armored Division, its ammunition and fuel in short supply and perhaps two-thirds of its tanks destroyed, and the battered elements of the 9th Armored, 106th, and 28th Divisions could not hold the extended perimeter in the rolling and wooded terrain. Meanwhile, Dietrich’s second wave of tanks entered the fray. The II SS Panzer Corps immediately threatened the Salm River line north and west of St. Vith, as did the LVIII Panzer Corps circling to the south, adding the 2d SS Panzer Division to its drive. Ordering the St. Vith defenders to withdraw through the 82d Airborne Division line to prevent another Schnee Eifel disaster, Montgomery signalled them that “they come back with all honor.” - Ardennes-Alsace by Roger Cirillo. US Army Center of Military History “I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”_ “I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Christmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...[Montgomery] was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...” - General Hasbrouck of 7th Armor - “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
Simon seems to delete posts that are accurate that he doesn't want to hear. This was from a poster on the the continent: Britain,Brooke and Bernard had a chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940. Before the USA/USSR started in on the Reich. She failed utterly and miserably. From that point onward, whatever Britain does and regardless of what happens to her - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US. In that order
@bigwoody4704 Sadly, the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty in 1940 aligned the French Communists and socialists to undermine French resistance, this combined with prevailing pacifism and cynicism about the French political establishment, made surrender popular among some sections of the French army. Indeed British troops fighting whilst their French counterparts conducted lightning retreats were often accused of prolonging the war. I am reminded of a recent obituary of a French Commando who remained in the UK to continue the war after the Brits evacuated over 200, 000 French men who demanded repatriation in order to surrender and serve Germany under Vichy: "I love France, but hate the French." There was a very good 1970s TV series about the French and Ww2 that exposed their tendency to blame everyone but themselves and their pro-German attitudes. We tend to forget that the French police volunteered to man the firing-squads that executed the Resistance and captured UK/US Jedburgh teams in 1944. Closterman noticed that the Vichy military establishment hated those who joined with the Brits to liberate France. French accounts of their history are often designed to persuade audiences of a simplified narrative designed to cloak a more complex social and regional conflict with roots in the late 18th century.
Not suprised to see that he and Patton didn´t see eye to eye. Two narcisists who couldn´t possibly understand how anyone could possibly be as much worth as each themself. Sad Rommel was on the wrong side.
Rommel wasnt really that amazing either, basically his book was "Rommel uses dash! It was super effective!" and when it failed, he collapsed like a wet paper bag. Good general mostly due to facing people that didnt know what they were doing/had way too many things they were trying to do at once or simply, didnt have the kit to deal with his force.
@@mitchverr9330 Rommel was actually very gifted especially on the defensive. His problem offensively was that he seemed to lose track of the big picture. He was far better as a regimental or division commander than a corp or army commander.
I think Patton and Montgomery shared more in common than we like to believe, except for tactics. I think Patton actually agreed with Montgomerys concentrated northern thrust into Germany. To hit the Germans heavily, with 4 allied armies sticking together, instead of dispersing them along a wider front which Eisenhower went for. As for Rommel, he was a great divisional or corps level armour tactician, but Montgomery was a superior army level grand strategist.
Geronimo is right you know less about military matters than anyone who's ever had a discussion on the matter .Monty's decision to launch his debacle reaching for glory is a deserved blot on his reputuation .The GIs fanned out and and marched into the Fatherland.Even letting the mutt monty tag along
I’ve always said the Allies would have had momentous success even in comparison to the momentous success they had. If they’d made patton and Montgomery a tandem. Monty an incredible planner and inspirational to his men, but probably a bit to “this is the plan” to change a lot in battle. Then you have patton an opportunist of supreme calibre and loved by his men. But to my knowledge not naturally gifted at large scale offensive planning. So to me Monty takes the training, the planning setting it in motion, patton does the actual on the ground command. I think things like getting stuck in bocage or market garden could be different if these great mens strengths were paired not split.
Yes, the one time Patton was responsible for a campaign/offensive featuring only his own army and no other army..... he failed. This was the Lorraine campaign. September to December 1944.
no lyndon,monty had his chance the Big Boys were now running the show. They had to fight thru unlike Monty who didn't even show up or carrington who stopped. But to lumps like you that makes a Field Marshall or a LORD 😂,can't make that shyt up . Go jump in the channel like Bernard i know he would approve
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- At Tehran Stalin and FDR told him to quit Stalling *Intelligence at the Top,by Sir Kenneth Strong* Montgomery was letting Bradley's Army lead the way out of Normandy because the Americans could replace their casualties and the British could not .PM Churchill also talked to Eisenhower about the problem the British were having. *Churchill called Eisenhower on the telephone and asked him ".....if it was possible Eisenhower to avoid too many British casualties"* *The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407* *Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters"* *The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.64-65* As Allied conferences continued,Russo-American solidarity seemed to coallesce while British influence wanned.The symptom of growing strength of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the diminishing power of Britain who refused to accept the reality. *The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p66* Although Britain and the USA would contribute equal forces in the initial phases of the Overlord invasion.The Americans eventually would far outnumber the British.Anvil was to be carried out mainly by the Americans and the French with merely token British representation *Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,pages 196-97 Montgomery was the main reason the Americans were stretched in the Ardennes.16 U.S. divisions were sent north of the Ardennes to compensate for manpower shortages within the 21st Army Group It was similar to Carentan,the Americans were again asked to shoulder the burden of offensive warfare in a sector that had been reserved for his majesty's forces.* Or as one American writer recalled Monty was judging 1st Army by the standards of the British 2nd Army,which had barely moved from November 7th to February 8th As a result only 4 U.S.Divisions were strung out in the Ardennes Sector .While in the north Monty accumulated 31 divisions 15 British/Canadians and 16 US.
I was posted to Alanbrooke barracks in paderborn and I always thought that was his full last name, not his first and second name combined. You do always learn something new everyday 😂
Hm, Not a Monty fan-boy by any stretch, but..... Market Garden was intended to open the Schelde estuary (be it in a roundabout way.) . It was specifically NOT intended to get into the Ruhr area. The idea was to push all the way to the IJsselmeer and thus cut off the majority of German forces in the Netherlands and forced to surrender. As a result the Schelde estuary and thus access to Antwerpen would likely be achieved. Market Garden failed because Gen Gavin (US) / Gen Browning (UK) failed to secure the Nijmegen bridges, which had been their primary assigned objective. Instead, they chose to believe some cockamamie rumour about 1000 panzers in the nearby Reichswald, which was factually impossible and on the first day already debunked by local intel-sources. The much derided and maligned 30th armoured corps arrived actually spot on time in Grave, but because the bridges in Nijmegen were not secured, it could not link up with 1st Airborne in Arnhem. Not Montgomery's fault, but squarely Gens. Gavin's / Brown's. Eisenhower intervened and got the blame switched to Montgomery.
I put the blame on Brereton and Williams for insisting on dispersed drops over a number of days and Hollinghurst of the RAF for refusing to fly closer to the Arnhem bridge. True enough about the goals of Market Garden. Had it achieved its goals on schedule the next stage would have been an advance north to the sea, to cut off Belgium and the western Netherlands. It was not intended to move immediately towards the Ruhr, and besides, the Americans would still have to advance past Aachen to link up with the British in the Ruhr as well.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Hm, assigning blame is a bit of an academic exercise by now, but of course you are correct with regards to the shoddy way the droppings were managed. That said, once on the ground this could have been overcome and for that the binding primary objectives were issued prior to lift-off. These objectives were ignored until too late and even then handled in a haphazard and insufficient fashion.
Well I like to blame Brereton especially ever since I saw footage of him in a tv interview from the 1960s where he specifically put the blame on British XXX Corps and 1st Airborne Division as accepted zero responsibility for any of his own decisions. He is fair game as far as I am concerned. He was out of his depth and the wrong man to command First Allied Airborne Army.
Sadly, even if the Nijmegen bridge was captured and ready for XXX Corps to roll across on the 19th, the Arnhem operation would still have gone wrong. The bridge was never in the hands of British 1st Airborne, just a section of the northern end and a few houses. The Germans always controlled the bridge exit ramp and 99% of Arnhem itself. Arnhem could only have suceeded had the bridge, and a sizeable portion of Arnhem itself been in the hands of British 1st Airborne, which it never had. XXX Corps would have been blocked from crossing the bridge by the wreckage of Grabners recon force which was strewn all over it and even had they got through that, there was no way off the bridge for them. They would have been sitting ducks. The Germans, by the 19th in better strength and now with the addition of Tiger Is from Kompanie Hummel and Stug IIIs from Brigade 280 they were in an excellent position to blast any British tanks trying to cross the bridge.
I remember hearing about Rommel fighting Montgomery in the desert 🏜 what they had a fight about I don't know. Maybe Montgomery called Rommel's mum a slag.
I am not sure what Montgomery did to offend the author of the script for your video but he clearly did something. Hardly balanced or fair coverage, and too many statements made without evidence to back them up.
Can we finally after how many years get a biographics on Sgt Marcus Phoenix...? One of the greatest heros Sera has ever known and author of one of the greatest quotes ever spoken. Its way pasted due by now.
A couple of points about Montgomery. He shouldn't be judged too harshly for the failure of Market Garden as it should be remembered that a) The entire plan fell into German hands at an early stage informing them of objectives, timetables, reinforcement schedules etc. b) Two Waffen SS panzer divisions were immediately deployed to crush the outgunned Paras. c) Allied intelligence had evidence of the SS presence courtesy of low level reconnaissance and Dutch resistance reports, but they were ignored by his intelligence staff. c) When the landings did come, there were German paratroopers in the area who were immediately mobilised to deal the British airborne threat, soldiers who would know exactly how to go about breaking up an airborne landing. Also I would have liked to have known more about his WW1 service as this was pivotal in developing his character and his military ethos which revolved around caution, careful planning and not sacrificing large numbers of troops for limited gains. Finally, Simon, do you have any control over the placement of adverts? Twenty seconds in, there were two ads back to back which completely ruined your introduction. Absolutely ridiculous.
And if Montgomery is judged harshly for Market Garden, then Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges and Patton should be judged even harsher for the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine failures and allowing the Germans to push them back into a retreat in the Ardennes. These three failures caused nearly 200,000 American casualties, for next to no real gains.
In August 1942, the Allies raided a Nazi-held port in France to see if a larger invasion was possible. The raid on Dieppe was a failure, costing the Allies hundreds of troops and scores of tanks and aircraft. So there was a pre D day invasion of France long after William the Conquer
17:55 onwards is complete fiction. Montgomery never 'gloated' or bragged he saved the day. It is clear the author of this video has done no research at all into the reasons why this 'distorted version of Monty's Press conference was taken as genuine when in fact he is railing against a German Propaganda Broadcast that put out a doctored version of Monty's words. This is easily checked by consulting US Newspaper reports in Jan 1945. The initial reports on Monty's Press Conference (Jan 7th) were 100% positive with all papers repeating Monty's praise for US troops. On Jan 8th the Newspapers reported rifts over claims he said negative things in a radio broadcast. On Jan11 the newspapers all reported that the negative comments were fake Nazi broadcasts and that they had got it wrong. Over the intervening decades EVERYONE repeats the claims made on Jan 8th but no one EVER mentions the retraction and apologies printed on Jan 11th. The claims made here are Nazi lies and even the most basic of checks would have revealed as much. I guess anything goes in the race to get clicks.
And the press conference was only held to support Eisenhower. Eisenhower was getting heavily criticised in the British press for the slow progress of his broad front strategy and the subsequent retreat in the Ardennes. He referred to Eisenhower as the captain of the team etc. He did not mention Bradley, but that was tit for tat because Bradley never mentioned or acknowledged Montgomery in any of his Ardennes press communications. In fact this got so bad that SHAEF had to issue a press release on 5th January 1945 stating that Montgomery was in command of US 1st (and 9th) Armies and had been since December 20th.
What he won - he won because of overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA,Naval Power and Air Superiority. Then barely.......and poorly.The evidence was the yodeling chode Monty again & again ran advantages into the sand with his unimaginative schemes,a gross under estimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain and unwillingness to move forward with anything resembling speed and very stunted results. Sounds like you two dregs in the comment section
@@bigwoody4704 Monty rode to Bradley's rescue twice. First by capturing Antwerp to make up for Bradley's utter failure to capture Brest as a working port. Monty was asked to provide a new US Supply port because they could not get one for themselves. Then when Bradley lost control of his Armies during The Bulge Monty was tasked by Ike with saving Bradley's arse. It seems saving Bradley's arse was something Monty was quite good at. Cue homophobic slurs from a demented Exceptionalist who suddenly realises he 'aint that exceptional after all.
How many times do you repeat the same bilge? what did I tell you last time thicko?never happened at all your pervo got thrown into the channel and you make crap up. Monty even groveled back to IKE and apologized. Because Monty got driven from the continent - the Germans had 4 yrs to wire all the docks/ports with explosives.Have your handler read to you - once the GIs got there Bernard never got bounced off again - you welcome,I should be charging you for this
@@bigwoody4704 Poor littlewoody. Can not stand finding out that Bradley was twice forces to ask Monty to pull him out of the merde. I guess if you grow up believing the world revolves around you and yours it will crush you to discover that rather than being the saviour you were the saved. Patton stuck on his arse outside Metz for 3 months and Bradley incapable of capturing a port to keep his army supplied. Then to have the Germans run rings around him during The Bulge. Monty was called upon to help Bradley and he obliged. He captured a port for Bradley and then saved his arse during The Bulge. Unlike arse-sitting Patton Monty got the job done.
Despite the fact he has an exceptional record of success from El Alamein up until the end of the war, and for the large part of the Western European front of WW2 he was commanding around 1/3 of all allied forces, including in many of the most important and hard fought campaigns, Montgomery seems to be very poorly regarded by history. Its always been a mystery to me, the man who won the war in North Africa, commanded all land forces during the invasion of Sicily, Italy and Normandy, commanded during Market Garden, the Battle of the Scheldt and the Rhine Crossing. He could well stake a claim to the title of most important general of the western allies during the war.
He was certainly the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2. Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery.
@@bigwoody4704 If you genuinely take a step back, Monty behaved no differently than Patton, Bradley, Clark etc. in most cases he behaved far less badly. its almost as if you need a certain personality type to be a successful general. But there is one difference between Monty and the others isn't there? I wonder what that difference might be.. maybe its just because he isn't a US general.
@@hardlyworking1351 I wouldn't invite either one to dinner . I don't care he was a braggart - he lied excessively - taking credit that belonged to other especially in the desert. He also denied responsibility and deflected his blunders. Patton was an ass but a mobile effectiv one
Yes Monty got up people's noses ..., but the people concerned were the stuffy, cavalry-bred oafs from the colonial days (who knew nothing of the newer mechanical warfare) and that was why he was so much more favoured by the ordinary men. Being vain isn't nevessarily a bad thing, when you consider most of the great generals (Patton, McArthur, even Powell and Swartzkopf)
And those under his command seemed to like an appreciate him including Americans like Simpson, Ridgway, Gavin, Hasbrouck and even Richard Winters of Band of Brothers fame.
On the topic of ww2 could you do Captain Charles Upham or Major Leslie Young? They are such badass individuals. I’d ask for Jack Churchill but I’m pretty sure you’ve already done a video of him. If anyone bothers to read my comment and is a history buff tell me your favourite badasses of history.
@@JanjayTrollface Came across him in the warehouse house. 'Searching for Charlie' couple year ago. Leslie is some badass British dude. I actually came across his book due to a podcast. The book is called 'Escaping With His Life; From Dunkirk To D-Day And Beyond.
@@AudieHolland Montgomery to Alanbrooke, 17 October 1944. referring to Arnhem: `Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you may like to send them to join other Poles in Italy.’ FYI: Alanbrooke is Field Marshal Alan Francis Brooke, at that time, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. That is quite different to blaming Polish forces for the outcome at Arnhem.
@@thevillaaston7811 Crooks never leave their exact intentions on paper. Informally, Montgomery had Sosabowski removed and fired from the Polish military. Anyone officially claiming the Polish Airbornes were unwilling to fight is a liar and should certainly not be in any official position himself. Brooke, Browning and Montgomery should all have been fired. Note that the Americans called for Monty's resignation/firing as early as the Battle of Normandy and during the Battle of the Bulge, Montgomery claimed 'he had saved the day' and that he should be made general commander of Allied forces in Europe. This led to the well known incident that almost broke the Alliance between the British and the Americans. Only after Eisenhower threatened to fire him, did Montgomery eat humble pie.
Do General Courtney Hodges, who was most responsible for Remagen Bridge and the Designated Commander for the final offensive in Japan before Japan surrendered.
Lazily regurgitating the idea that Market Garden was a disaster. I mean it was such a disaster that Monty launched Operation Gatwick from Nijmegen (taken during Market Garden) in October ‘44 to capture the Ruhr but had to call it off as the US forces hadn’t secured the right flank. The Allies later used Nijmegen to to launch Operation Veritable to advance into Germany. It was such a disaster that Hitler, in a special Fuhrer Directive issued on 25 September, had personally ordered the destruction of the allies in the Nijmegen - Arnhem area. For the German High Command regarded the allied bridgehead north of the Waal River as a severe threat and feared that the allies could still use the area as a springboard to the north to cut off the German Fifteenth Army in the western part of Holland and threaten the plains of North-Western Germany. It was such a disaster that Walter Model attempted to regain the Nijmegen salient which had been seized by the allies in an effort to contain the offensive and drive them off the Betuwe. For Model it was imperative to recapture the ground they had lost in the Betuwe in order to restore the situation by acting quickly, before the allied front had settled. Monty actually signaled Eisenhower’s headquarters postponing the operation. Eisenhower resurrecting it and a cable from the War office about V2s committed Montgomery to the operation. From Nigel Hamilton’s biography of Monty: _For Monty now to cancel the British part of ‘the main effort of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border. Moreover the Arnhem-Nijmegan axis had been Monty’s proposal, making it doubly hard to rescind._ _Eisenhower’s directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September - for during the afternoon a ‘Secret’ cable arrived from the War Office, sent by VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:_ _Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM._ _Will you please report urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared._ _By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to ‘rope off’ the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites._ Few people are aware that there were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions. It should be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had. Montgomery had also wanted to use Hodges 1st US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. But Bradley was stealing fuel and other resources from Hodges and giving it to Patton. Eisenhower: _”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”._ Eisenhower insisted it go ahead and Eisenhower under-resourced it. MG wasn’t even an army just a corps. The idea that Monty had been given everything for a thrust to Berlin is laughable. By this time Monty had given up on an immediate thrust into Germany and Berlin. The plan after Market Garden and getting a bridgehead over the Rhine wasn’t to go rushing off to Berlin but to stop and clear the Low Countries and open up a port. From Nigel Hamilton’s 3 volume biography of Monty: _”Again, Eisenhower’s biographer claimed that Monty proposed on 10th September to ‘make a single thrust thought Arnhem to Berlin’, and that Eisenhower refused to sanction this. _*_In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot:_* _I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] _*_that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before the winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year._* _Monty’s statement _*_is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself,_*_ when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:_ *_Monty had no idea of going on to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine._* _In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff ( Air-Marshal Portal ) immediately after the 19th September meeting, Tedder stated that_ _the advance to Berlin _*_was not discussed as a serious issue.”_* -Monty, The Field-Marshal 1944-1976. Nigel Hamilton. Notice the date: September 19th. _The evidence also suggests that certain necessary objectives on the road to Berlin, crossing the Rhine and perhaps even taking the Ruhr, were possible with the existing logistical set-up, provided the right strategy to do so was set in place. Montgomery’s popular and astute Chief of Staff, Freddie de Guingard, certainly thought so: ‘If Eisenhower had not taken the steps he did to link up at an early date with Anvil and had held back Patton, and had he diverted so released to the north, I think it possible we might have obtained a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter - but not more.’_ *_Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful - and much more than was actually achieved.dThis view was confirmed after the war in interviews with senior surviving German commanders, von Runstedt, Student, Blummentritt and Rommel’s former Chief of Staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944._ _…The evidence from the two previous chapters seems to suggest that, provided the right strategy was employed, getting to the Rhine by the end of 1944 was probable, seizing the Ruhr was possible-but taking Berlin was a pipe-dream, even if the Allies had opened Antwerp by, say, the end of September.”_ Robin Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 The territory taken during Market Garden protected Antwerp from counter-attack. The low-lying boggy grounds, rivers and canals between Arnhem and Nijmegen is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces directly back to Germany in perfect country for a counter-attack. Market Garden was the offensive SHAEF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans at the start of September were in disarray. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for a jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anytime at all- that is protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant was vital and was successfully seized. Fighting in low lying mud and waterways of the scheldt, which will take time, while the Germans are still holding Noord Brabant makes no sense at all. SHAEF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view. Unfortunately the US 82 failed to secure the Nijmegen bridge and therefore Arnhem couldn’t be seized. Market Garden: ♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces in Germany. Antwerp was the only port taken intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge attack right through US lines. The German went through a forest rather than the direct route, which would have been through the Market Garden salient. ♦ It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen, which was used. ♦ It limited V rocket launching sites aimed at London. ♦ It isolated the German 15th army in Holland. ♦ They reached the Rhine. ♦ The salient was fleshed out to the Meuse. ♦ The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken. OPERATION VICTORY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND 1947 Page 419 _’It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the _*_Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.'_* Continued…
Continued… And Monty was under pressure from London to do something about the V2 threat. A MOST ENIGMATIC WAR JAMES GOODCHILD Page 543 _’Speer recalled that he first rockets ‘fired at England’ were not, ‘as Hitler imagined, five thousand at one blow, but twenty-five, and then not, ‘as one blow but over a period of ten days. Twenty-six V2 rockets reached London during those 10 days, until Operation Market-Garden forced the rocket firing troops far enough eastward thereby negating the required range for the rockets to reach England.’_ The salient was then fleshed out. US 7th armor were sent into Overloon. They failed to take the town, were extracted snd British forces sent in to take it. Continued… The Germans never thought Market Garden was a failure. It punched a 60 mile salient right into their lines in a few days, right on their border. They saw it as a staging area to jump into Germany - which it was. In late '44/early '45, the longest allied advance was the 60 mile Market Garden advance. The only operation to fully achieve its goals in that time period was Monty's clearing of the Scheldt. The Market Garden salient was a buffer, one of its prime objectives. Proving it’s worth when the Germans rammed through through US lines in the Bulge. It stood between the advancing Germans and the German 15th Army. It prevented any German attempt to re-take Antwerp directly. The Germans had to try and get to Antwerp the long war round via the Ardennes in December. Market Garden prevented that vital German link up with the 15th Army. Keeping the 15th isolated was a real part of the operation. The salient was vital and proved its worth. The most direct and easiest route to Antwerp was via Venlo. It would have been easier for the Germans to go via Venlo from the Ruhr area but the British were in their way. Going through the Ardennes was one third longer at least in more difficult terrain, for an army desperately short of fuel the extra miles mean a lot, as was proven. They could go through Venlo if they liked but the British in the Market Harden salient between the Germans and Antwerp would have seen the build up and been prepared. The Germans refrained from attacking directly through British defended front lines after 1943. They avoided it and chose to attack through American lines instead. General Blummentritt said the British were next to impossible to dislodge once they were ensconced in defence but the Americans were prone to not defend so stubbornly. Market Garden almost certainly blocked an easier routed German counter attack on Antwerp. From Wikipedia: _the Allies did possess a deep salient into German occupied territory that was quickly reinforced. Milton Shulmanobserved that the operation had driven a wedge into the German positions, isolating the 15th Army north of Antwerp from the First Parachute Army on the eastern side of the bulge. This complicated the supply problem of the 15th Army and removed the chance of the Germans being able to assemble enough troops for a serious counterattack to retake Antwerp. Chester Wilmot agreed with this, claiming that the salient was of immense tactical value for the purpose of driving the Germans from the area south of the Maas and removing the threat of an immediate counterattack against Antwerp._ Brian Urquhart who was privy to some of the initial planning before he was sacked, said they were considering taking huge parts of Southern Holland Eisenhower’s broad font meant there was not enough resources to do this. In fact, German General Blummmetritt said that had Eisenhower given Montgomery the resources he wanted in September it would have been all over for the Germans at that point. Under Monty the allies moved 400 miles in just 3 months from June to September 1944. Under Eisenhower the allies didn’t move 100 miles in 7 months from September 1944 to March 1945. _Blumentritt disagreed with the Allies′ strategy in the west, discussing the precarious nature of the German position with its meager one armoured division against the twelve of the Allies, and he stated that had Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group been unleashed earlier for a concentrated armoured assault (as he had wished) rather than fighting on a broad front, "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."_ General Student, in a statement after the war actually considered the Market Garden Operation to have been proved to be a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of the vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of the war. It got 90% of the way. It gained the allies almost 100km of German held terrority and brought them to the German border British 2nd Army then fleshed out the salient with Operation Aintree and the Battle of Overloon. Historian Christer Bergson Operation Market Garden has written that at the time was at the time regarded as essentially a success. It was only due to the following development of events such as the battle at Overloon in October 1944 (where the US 7th Armoured suffered heavy casualties, failed to take the town, had to be pulled out and the British go in and take it for them) that meant that the strategic success of Operation Market Garden could not be utilized to end the war before the turn of the year 1944. The British would have had to take that corridor at some point anyway. They didn’t have to fight through the southern Netherlands in 1945 as they were already there due to Market Garden. The Allies later used Nijmegen to to launch Operation Veritable to advance into Germany. Most ground troops did not view the operation as a failure either. They just pounded over 60 miles through German lines in a few days. The Germans never considered the operation a failure either. They now had an army isolated on the coast and a buffer between them and the vital port of Antwerp. Also the Allies were just on the German border near the Ruhr. Even with its’s problems and lack of resources, Market Garden would probably have been 100% successful *if Gavin and the 82nd had captured the Nijmegen bridge.*
He did nothing for peate sake isn't that right John Burns What other gems have you mined for us you poltroon?None of the objectives were met ♦One would say Montgomery appeared lost & helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all ♦Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare ♦The V-2s were still being launched ♦The massive deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for suppliesfor an operation that size ♦Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost. ♦The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation,exposure and disease. ♦And all of the Netherlands live stock was sent/driven to the Reich as the Wehrmacht fell back. The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the Germans for assisting the allies. ♦Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as Montgomery boasted ♦Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army ♦400,000 Dutchmen - thu out the War were sent to work as slave laborers for the Reich in defense industry or on bunker/tunnel projects ♦Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later *"My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success
@@bigwoody4704 This would be why Monty launched Operation Gatwick to capture the Ruhr from Nijmegen but had to call it off as the Americans hadn’t secured the right flank.
John Burns Monty didn't capture the ruhr you misguided skragg.Bradley/Patton/Hodges did.Monty got 1,100 killed in one day trying desperately to get back in the headlines - he would have been removed in the U.S. Army,Shot in Germany/Russia *This from History Net Dot Com* - Operation Varsity, the Allied airborne assault over the Rhine River at Wesel, Germany, on March 24, 1945, is one of those military actions whose value has sometimes been questioned. American forces had already crossed the Rhine at two locations when British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery mounted his assault in the north. Some have speculated that the airborne phase of the assault may have been unnecessary for the success of the overall operation. *Montgomery has been accused of using the airborne troops to ‘put on a good show’ and to further his own reputation* The Americans, on the other hand, saw Montgomery as a pompous and overly conservative commander. *He sought to enhance his public image and tried to take credit for success even when it was not due him* For Operation Varsity, the northern route into the industrial heart of Germany was now wide open. The cost had been high. *The 6th Airborne had suffered 590 killed* and another 710 wounded or missing. Several hundred of the missing later turned up to rejoin their units, however. *The 17th Airborne had 430 killed,* with 834 wounded and 81 missing. Casualties among the glider pilots and the troop plane pilots and crews included *91 killed,* 280 wounded and 414 missing in action. Eighty planes were shot down, and only 172 of the 1,305 gliders that landed in Germany were later deemed salvageable. *A total of 1,111 Allied soldiers had been killed during the day’s fighting. In comparison, the 101st Airborne Division had lost 182 killed and the 82nd Airborne 158 on D-Day. Operation Varsity, March 24, 1945, was the worst single day for Allied airborne troops.* *Hodges 1st US Army got across at Remagen with a casualty count of 31 men Patton's 3rd US Army came across near Oppenheim "with the total loss of 28 men killed and wounded*
@@bigwoody4704 Monty was responsible for Garden, the ground part. XXX were got to Nijmegen on schedule, barely putting a foot wrong. The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans. The other two airborne units, both US, *failed* to seize their assigned bridges immediately. If they had taken their bridges XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on *d-day+*1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match. The Germans would not have known what had hit them. The *12 hour delay* caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical *time window* to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem. The longer the time delay the more Germans poured in, hence more resistance, hence a slower XXX Corps. Obvious. On top of the 12 hour delay, the 82nd not seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), caused an additional *36 hour delay.* This meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The extra 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the *two day time window in total* given to the Germans was far too long. The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine. The two US para units *failed* in theirs. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
Go to nordvpn.com/bio to get a 2-year plan plus 4 months for free with a huge discount!
Could you make a video about the life of Edson Arantes do Nascimento a.k.a "Pele"? Thank you!
Simon we need DTU March 8 1994 Michigan Please make it happen
Time for a video on Lt Colonel Robert Blair "Paddy" Mayne. The founding father of special forces warfare and one of the most decorated soldiers of WW2 who was shamefully denied a Victoria cross by a bunch of cowards who barely knew how to use a rifle.
One small point, if I heard correctly, the Tunisian Campaign was not classed as in the European theatre of operations, it was part of the North African theatre of operations, but I might be wrong.
Do Enver Hoxha next
My Father fought alongside Monty in Middle East, pushing Rommel into the Ocean, He decorated my Father twice 🇬🇧Dad was a Sapper, who went ahead of our Tanks and Troops to locate and often destroy land mines and traps 🪤.
My mother, five or six years old, lived in Alexandria, Egypt and could literally hear the artillery of the Battle of El Amain. So our American family always held General Montgomery in high regard.🇬🇧
While Montgomery was stationed in England in 1942, he had a role in the planning for the raid at Dieppe, originally scheduled for June 1942. When the Germans discovered the raiding force as it was about to depart from the Solent, the raid was called off. As far as Montgomery was concerned that was the end of it. Then he was shipped off to the Middle East. With him out of the way Lord Mountbatten and Ian Fleming remounted the Dieppe Raid and launched it on Aug 19 1942. It was a disaster for the allies. The Germans were prepared and most of the raiding force was killed, wounded or captured. It is said Montgomery, if he had remained in England, would never have allowed the Dieppe Raid to be remounted because with the element of surprise lost he could foresee the slaughter it turned out to be. My father, a sergeant in the Canadian Army, was in that raid and was captured. He spent the rest of the war as a POW. Though he survived and returned home (he was an American actually), the experience scarred him for the remainder of his days, and he eventually succumbed to alcoholism. My father's life might've have been much different if Montgomery had not been sent to the Middle East in the summer of '42.
There were more allies captured due to this man's cowardice than enemies defeated. He was a broken man after Dunkirk.
@@davidrox4591 Imagine calling a man who was a general in WW2 a coward. Montgomery was involved in the crucial parts of the war in 1944, show a bit of respect.
cap
David Rox,
What on earth are you talking about? Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2.
The Americans even had to turn to Montgomery in their hour of need in the Ardennes when they found themselves in retreat.
Montgomery had to make some very bold and very brave decisions. He was no coward. He was a real soldier and field commander, severely wounded in battle in WW1.
The Germans were impressed with his command of 3rd Division before Dunkirk. Von Mellenthin wrote how skillfully Montgomery fought with 3rd Division by day and moved by night, getting his division back to Dunkirk more or less intact.
@@davidrox4591 go back to the circus you clown.
“Every soldier must know, before he goes into battle, how the little battle he is to fight into the larger fight fits into the larger picture, and how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole”
Bernard Law Montgomery
A great late friend, an Aussie pilot seconded to the RAF in Egypt just before Alamein. He said everybody in the 8th Army loved and respected him as a truly great leader and soldier. He out-foxed the Desert Fox every time. My friend’s first experience of Monty’s leadership was to witness the execution of a British soldier who had fallen asleep while of sentry duty. Everybody agreed the death sentence was fully justified. Every soldier would do whatever Monty commanded. That was the spirit of his leadership.
he out foxed nothing he was given more men and materiel than either of his predecessors and Rommel.A propped up fraud really to cover for Churchill's meddling who later came to loathe bernard
I'm Australian, he was in command of our troops in North Africa. They sailed halfway around the world to fight a battle that we believed the allies must win. We all need to do our part.
Hero of mine.
Thanks to the National Geographic program generals at war i know about this legendary general. I miss the golden age of TV documentaries.
Aaah the good old days when history Channel actually had history shows & nat geo had good programming too. Gods I feel old
@@celter.45acp98 The days when "The Learning Channel" actually would teach you something. Now its only reality shows with Little people, the obese and the weird... And ppl wonder why the younger generations are dumb.
As a kid, we has 1 tv and my dad kept it on the history channel. Its ironic to me now, but I use to hate WW2 documentaries. Now thats all I watch.
I guess the hole left by those channels has been partly filled by Simon and his many TH-cam channels. And that's ok with me.
Aye, me too. Like back when History Channel was actually about History.
@@celter.45acp98 I know how you feel
Now you have covered Montgomery. You need to do a video on Field Marshal William Slim. Probably the best British commander of the 2nd World War.
Bit of a risk that 1, turns out he was a pretty major child rapist.
SOunds like a marshal worth a video.
I've heard folks say that the two men would have been better suited in the other's theater: Slim was actually liked by the Americans and wasn't as provocative, while Monty's methods, according to them would have worked better in the Pacific. However, MacArthur was an even bigger egotist than Patton, so I'm not so sure.
He was indeed brilliant
That's just opinion. Apples and oranges. Different theatres, different enemies. Slim certainly didn't take on the best the Germans had.
What is not opinion is that Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2.
Patton: According to some vets who served under him, he was despised by quite a few of his troops. None of them cited the slap in stories I heard as a child, but were more focused on things like the fact that he would ride into battle sitting in the top of an open tank firing his paired six shooters like he was an old west cowboy and apparently would openly negatively compare some divisions to "his old Roman troops" - the ones he felt he had commanded in a past life.
Well the soldier slapping occurred in Sicily in summer 1943 when he commanded 7th Army. There were plenty in 7th Army who disliked Patton for that.
When he commanded 3rd Army in NW Europe from the second half of 1944 there wouldn't have been many troops who would have cared much what happened with other army over a year before I shouldn't think.
But he got the results and lead from the front, more cherished him than despised him
Ah the Lyndon library try reading the Full Monty,evidently Bernard enjoyed lathering the lads
@@bigwoody4704
Don’t be smutty.
Read the truth - they have the letters and take it up with his biographer Nigel
A aspect of Monty’s kindness though was his relationship with his step sons who he treated as his own and very much loved. A ass to be sure but a good father one at least.
Many years ago as a boy my father visited the motor museum whose newest display piece was the vehicle Monty used in North Africa. He was desperately upset that he couldn't take a picture when an elderly gentleman told him that it was ok he would keep an eye out whilst he snapped a picture. My grandparents were most amused only telling him after he had taken a picture an said thank you to the chap that it was Monty himself who was his partner in crime!
Coventry museum of road transport??
Lovely story 😊
Ted Rex
Which museum would that have been?
His Humber staff car is in a museum in Coventry, presumable because of the Humber company being based there.
His command tank is the Imperial War Museum.
Great story, thanks for sharing :)
The Americans instead of taking the bridge took the high ground,this led to the main failure of operation market garden, Eisenhower effectively with his broad front strategy cost 50,000 Americans their lives in the hurtegen forest
"Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands. Even so, the priorities of any airborne formation has to be the capture of its ultimate objectives, i.e. the bridges, and all other concerns are entirely secondary. Browning defended his decision long after the War, but it was a great mistake not to attach a higher priority to Nijmegen Bridge as, without it, the 1st Airborne Division would be cut-off behind two large rivers and 13 miles of hostile territory."
Pegasus Archive Browning page
Dutch historian R G Poulussen disagrees with you
You can add in the 55,000 casualties in the Lorraine and the 90,000 in the Ardennes in addition to the Hurtgen Forest casualties......all a result of Eisenhower's broad front disaster.
The Hurtgen Forest battle lasted 4 months and lost 34,000.The Monty Garden debalcle lasted 9 days and lost 17,000 - - that's a loss. Do the math,not the meth - this has been pointed out to you wags ad nauseam. Metz had to be taken and Bernard couldn't even take Monty Garden - even if he had the balls to show up - which he didn't . Like an actual Field Marshall Walter Model
There was simply no bypassing of Lorraine. It had to be conquered, cleared, and the German divisions defeated or pushed back. Metz was considered one of the most formidable citadels in the world with it's 43 reinforced concrete artillery equipped bunkers that were mined in the front by Gen Herman Balck. That the Britsh couldn't take in 1815 with out flooded rivers,land mines and 88 artillery
@@bigwoody4704 The Lorraine campaign still remains a stain on Pattons record,and was criticised by the US army long after WW2.
This is one of the only times I've seen Alan Brook referred to in a WW2 piece. I read his war diary decades ago and he's been basically invisible in every war doco i've seen since.
While we're on the subject of generals, maybe Biographics could do a video on Matthew Ridgway. He's probably the greatest general most folks have never heard of, and singlehandedly saved the entire Korean War. Plus, I believe he often fought alongside Montgomery's forces in World War II (since he was commander of the US Airborne Divisions), so there is a connection to this one you made here!
Him, John Monash and Arthur Currie are grossly under appreciated and deserve far larger reverence. All 3 far superior in every way to clowns like more famous McArthur.
Ridgway wrote Montgomery a letter in January 1945 as the Bulge was ending, thanking him for his guidance and personal cordiality and said he hoped to serve under him again.
There was mutual respect and admiration between the two.
General Gavin liked Montgomery too.
Major Richard Winters of Band of Brothers fame said Montgomery was "the real deal, an example to follow".
bullshyt book and page number from either. Winters knew the operation was a debacle - he was in the middle of it
as did Simpson and Gen Clarke at St Vith.
@ayrshireman1314
Simpson said he'd never been better commanded than under Montgomery.
Hasbrouck said Montgomery saved his US 7th Armored Division from annihilation at St Vith.
@Biograpics Suggestion for future video, Field Marshall William Slim, in charge of the "forgotten army", almost certainly stopped the Japanese from taking India. Could also fit in Warograpics. He turned a badly trained, demoralised army that was constantly retreating into a superb fighting force that could take on and beat the Japanese
D Day was the largest SUCESSFUL amphib landing. Kublai Kahn's was almost triple the size of Overlord.
Possibly in a little bias as I’m British and my family served under Monty, but I think the blame for Market Garden is very unfair. The Germans were still pushed back and vast areas of Holland liberated. The final objective was not taken true, but almost a quarter of the paras in Arnhem were successfully evacuated in good order. The thing is, as is so often the case, there’s a great deal of luck involved in war. Market Garden was a high risk operation, but it nearly worked and if it had, Monty would be considered the boldest allied general of WW2.
To be fair, I think he was also right about Eisenhowers broad front advance being not necessarily the best idea. It’s hard to say for sure as we won the war, but if he had pushed all the western allies into the Ruhr like Monty wanted, I think it’s very likely Germany would have collapsed inside 1944. The knock on effects to events like the Cold War would have been vast. Instead, the soviets continued their bloody advance of attrition and the battle of Berlin was an utter slaughter for all involved. Taking the Rurh would have been bloody, basically a reverse battle of the bulge, but it would almost certainly have been successful and very likely have ended the war in Europe early and in so doing saved thousands of lives.
Gunther Blumentritt agreed with Montgomery that in September October 1944 the best cause of action for the allies would have been a strong concentrated push on the Ruhr instead of wasting men and resources in the Lorraine etc.
@@lyndoncmp5751 totally. Anecdotal account passed down my family from my great grandfather who was a tank commander in WW2. They had the Germans on the run and were about to peruse over a small river when they were ordered to halt because they had raced ahead of the Americans to the south. They had to hold position for three days in which time the Germans regrouped, dug in and set up overlapping fields of fire. The go ahead was given and two tanks were knocked out killing all inside before the Germans were overrun.
Thanks Eisenhower.
Jacob
Yes, Eisenhower allowed too many secondary campaigns to bog the allies down in autumn 1944, wasting men and material. The Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges.
Instead of smashing down the door into Germany by kicking it in in one place, Eisenhower merely preferred knocking on the door all over the place. The result was that Germany was able to hold the western allies at bay for six months, and even pushed the Americans into a retreat in the Ardennes.
Montgomerys idea of a powerful, concentrated 4
army (1 British, 1 Canadian and 2 American) advance across northern Germany, centred on Aachen then the Ruhr would have been far more successful, and easier to supply, than the broad front.
What unit was your relative in? Do you know?
Cheers.
Lyndon if you mean mismanagement then NOT SHOWING UP. then yes. He got 1,100 men killed in ONE DAY crossing the RHINE
Great presentation, and great commentary. A lot packed into 20 minutes. Thank you.
Montgomery didn't argue to Eisenhower that he should remain in charge of all allied ground troops after Normandy. He met with Eisenhower in mid August and tried to dissuade Eisenhower descending from Supreme Commander into also becoming C-in-C of all ground forces.
Montgomery said that if American public pressure insisted that an American be in charge of all ground forces that he should give the C-in-C job to Bradley and that he, Montgomery, would serve UNDER Bradley if it meant the concentrated northern thrust with 4 armies be chosen as the preferred strategy instead of the broad front strategy.
Source :Monty and Patton Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds.
Monty had 4 full years to cross a 30 mile channel - a failed marshmellow.Lucky to be on the side of 2 emerging World Powers
There are a few mistakes in this video. Normandy wasn't the largest amphibious landing of WW2, Sicily was. Though nearly 133,000 landed in Normandy, 150,000 landed in Sicily from 3000 ships. Also Pattons behaviour there was not what you would expect from an officer, apart from attacking his own soldiers and ordering POWs to be shot in cold blood. Also later Montgomery wanted him to encircle the German troops he had pinning down but Patton ignored his messages and went in the opposite direction to take the capital city of Palermo which was of no tactical importance and so, poorly defended. Later with Montgomery still pushing the Germans up the coastal road he asked Patton to use the only other road on his side of the island to head for Messina and come in behind the Germans and again cut off their retreat . However, by the time he got there, in fact just before the British and despite them fighting their way along the destroyed costal road, the Germans had gone. Patton later claimed he had won the 'Race to Messina' but there was no race Montgomery had asked him to take it, though Patton thought it was a trick, but it wasnt . Eisenhower relieved Patton of his command after Sicily and awarded Monty the highest miltary award he could bestow on a foreign commander. Also Market Garden was actualy proposed by Eisenhower though based on a previous idea of Montys that he had rejected.
Sources?
@@perm9352
Various military history books, these facts are not hard to find.
More britsh tripe to cover for the effette bernard.When you pull your nose out of bernard's backside try sticking it in one of those books you've claimed to read
@@bigwoody4704
What childish insults you throw about. However, nothing I have said can be disproved, because unlike your claims, mine are all factual.
Princess already left facts that don't jibe with vague opinions - the crown lost an empire and the colonials weren't fond of being fodder. Go across the channel and ask the Euros - shouldn't take you 4 yrs like it did Monty/Brooke
Not a Monte fan but I think he was a great leader and key contributor to winning WWII. Glad he was in our side. IMO you can’t be great without a great ego.
Actually, you can. See: General Alan Simpson, who got along well with Monty, as an American Army leader (9th Army) and General. Held in high regard by Monty, Ike, AND Bradley. Health issues brought his career to a too early end, in 1948, I believe.
"IMO you can’t be great without a great ego." You're definitely wrong about that
Thanks!
I'm an American and I've always preferred Montgomery and Patton over Eisenhower. You read bks about him & you see that Eisenhower wasn't a bad man but he was more a politician than general.
Yes. Eisenhowers broad front strategy got next to nowhere for half a year from September 1944 to February 1945, with even a retreat in the middle of it.
You're right George Marshall would have sacked the dithering the dolt Monty who had 4 yrs to cross a crummy Channel. FDR had to send the GIs 3500 miles and carry him across
@Big Woody I don't really agree with that but you are welcome to your opinion.
@@DarkGlass824 every book I've read the avalanche of evidence is monty was mediocre at best - but his blatant lies were abundant. At Caen,Market Garden Even the Bulge he took credit that was never his and deflected blame that was
@@bigwoody4704 hi Woody! Have you worked out who planned the Airborne elements of Market Garden, yet?
"Discipline strengthens the mind so that it becomes impervious to the corroding influence of fear"-Bernard Law Montgomery
As a Canadian who is interested in history my opinion of Montgomery is pretty positive. Montgomery was not a nice guy but nice guys don't win wars. Montgomery was a brilliant tactician and leader who knew it.
Montgomerys largely Canadian Scheldt campaign was the ONLY western allied campaign in autumn 1944 to achieve its objectives and with 1/4 the casualties of Patton's Lorraine failure.
The piss poor Monty had no more men and the GIs fought thru to the Sigfreid Line Not the poof Monty.Propped up fraud didn't cross the rhine until 6 months after Monty Garden - with the 9th US Army seeing it thru. The Canucks were hung out to dry by Bernard at Both Dieppe and the Scheldt Estuary
@@lyndoncmp5751isn't that kinda off set by his ego getting thousands killed on multiple occasions for no tactical advantage in pursuit of glory?
@@karlketamine8172
Everything Montgomery achieved had tactical advantages. What didn't? Even Market Garden got British 2nd Army 100km closer to Germany (the British and Canadians advanced into Germany from the Nijmegen area taken in Market Garden) and created a protective buffer zone in front of Antwerp.
Ironically the Germans diverting all those forces, particularly in armour to engage Market Garden 'should' have helped the Americans further south to get well beyond Aachen. It didn't.
Getting thousands killed for no real tactical gain should be applied to Patton at Metz and Hodges in the Hurtgen Forest.
@@lyndoncmp5751 also it's not tactical to almost get your much more powerful ally to stop being your ally
Monty was very clear prior to the BEF failure in France about how arrogant the command was in thinking that an outdated force would be successful just because they were british. He points out in his memoir that there wasn't even an evacuation plan. Aside from the fact that they had sinply sent Britain's entire fighting force based on the fact that they would win.
The BEF were about 9% of the Allied forces. Gort was out of his depth but the BEF fought well, even the Germans said so, for example holding off the Germans at the Ypres-Comines Canal. The problem was that the French and Belgians collapsed on their own territory exposing the flanks of the British.
No the British promising big things to the French and Poles then leaving...with distressing speed
The Germans were impressed with Montgomerys command of 3rd Division in France 1940.
Von Mellenthin :
"That Montgomery was probably the best tactician if not the best strategist of the war is undoubted. we knew his methods well, his ability to move a division across our front in 1940 fighting by day and moving through the night was because of his adherence to training his men"
Never said that tosser lyndon you better come with some new lies or people are just going to stop reading
-Monty was promoted beyond his abilities and accomplishments.What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. Then barely.......and poorly.
From a letter on exhibit at Wichita KS "Museum of World treasures" *Hasso Von Manteuffel 8018 Diessen am ammersee Mariahilfe Strasse 7.* Dec. 16. 1976 Dear Mr. Dellingatti; I thank you for your letter, attached you find a photo as you asked for. *In my opinion General Patton was a master of lightning warfare and the best commander in this reference! Evidence of his excellent command and control of an army are the campaign in Sicily, the break-out in Brittany 1944 and during the Battle of the Bulge Dec 1944. I agree with Ladislaw Farago first-rate book on Patton "Ordeal and Triumph"* - an excellent report! With very good wishes
*Patton: Ordeal and Triumph, Ladislas Farago (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc., 1964), p. 505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin*
*General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him"*
War changes people. The amount of cruelty a human being is capable of is extremelly sad and deranged.
i live in canada and we were taught that the canadians actually punched through further than expected, and their fierce fighting was seen as a way to win back some honour after the Dieppe disaster caused by poor British planning.
Yes. You can read the same claims by New Zealanders about their soldiers-and the same claims by Australian about their soldiers. It all hogwash and petty juvenile attempts at credit -grabbing.
@@michaelkenny8540 so I mean.. you are trying to say you were taught your country did better and so we are just credit hogging? Not any chance you are doing the same?
@@BulletHoleI Said nothing of the sort. I simply say this bollocks about 'my nation' being the best soldiers in (insert favourite conflict) is well, bollocks. I am Irish by the way.
@@BulletHole The Canadian commander in Normandy was quite poor and was removed in the end. Can’t remember his name.
@Jeremy fisher wow, you really seem cool
Make a video about some WW2 aces, Germany's Erich Hartmann and Hans-Joachim Marseille and USSR's Ivan Kozhedub
They actually have one on hartmann
2:15 - Chapter 1 - The tasmanian devil
4:05 - Chapter 2 - The darkest hour
6:35 - Chapter 3 - War in the desert
9:25 - Chapter 4 - Italian Interlude
11:30 - Chapter 5 - D day & beyond
15:05 - Chapter 6 - Disaster & disgrace
19:10 - Chapter 7 - End of the war
PS: Can we have Gustave Courbet, that guy was pretty woke by the 1800's standards
yay we really need more woke in the world...
Like everyone else, he had halos and warts! I always saw Monty and Patton as 2 generals cut from the same cloth!
Can you source your suggestion the 75% of troops were american in overlord?
Based on the figures I've found repeatedly thats not even close to being accurate.
Hollywood?
Again Lyndon or is John Cornell,quit switching in/out of accounts - since you evidently are to broke to pay attention here it is again
from Britannica BTW. So we know who paid the Butchers Bill
*Battle Casualties for the Normandy Campaign*
*USA - 29,000 KIA ,106,000 wounded & missing*
*UK- 11,000 KIA , 54,000 wounded & missing*
Canada- 5,000 KIA , 13,000 wounded & missing
France - 12,200 Killed & missing
Monty *did not plan Market Garden* coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery’s relations with the commander of Second TAF, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, were poor, and he was largely excluded from the planning process.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
♦ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset.
♦ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet.
♦ chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges.
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity.
♦Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“
From Robin Neilland’s The Battle for the Rhine 1944:
_”In early September **Montgomery had a plan ready for employing airborne forces-Operation Comet-and some details of Comet should be noted here. Comet called for the 1st Airborne Division and Sosabowski’s 1st Polish Parachute Brigade to seize the Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges, using gliders for coup de main attacks, landing close to the bridges, rather as Pegasus Bridge at Benouville had been taken by the 6th Airborne Division on D-Day._
_Once the bridges had been taken the parachute brigades would land on nearby DZs (drop-zones) and join up with the glider parties to hold the bridges until the ground forces arrived. In the Comet plan, Brigadier ‘Shan’ Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade was tasked to take the road bridge over the Maas at Grave, landing on a DZ just 1,000 yards from the north end of the bridge-which, hopefully, had just been taken by a force from the 1st Air Landing Brigade in four gliders landing at the south end of the bridge. Operation Comet was planned for 10 September; then it was called off and replaced one week later by Market Garden._
_The Comet plan stuck to the basic airborne rule-land as close to the objective as possible-and to the basic rule for capturing any bridge-take both ends at once. In view of the subsequent arguments over the deployment of 1st Airborne at Arnhem, one cannot but wonder why the Comet plans for taking the bridges with one reinforced British division, using glider coup de main tactics, were regarded as far too risky for an airborne assault by three Allied airborne divisions just one week later?_
_It has to be clearly understood that taking the bridges on the road to Arnhem was only a means to an end. The final aim was to establish Second Army just west of the Rhine, north of Arnhem, and just south of the Ijsselmeer (or Zuider Zee). Once there, having outflanked the West Wall, which petered out some distance to the south, Second Army could either turn south-east to outflank the Ruhr, or head due east towards Berlin. Any decision on its final destination would rest with General Eisenhower._
_Having elected to use the Airborne Army, Montgomery had first to decide where to cross the Rhine. His own preference was for a crossing east of Arnhem, close to the town of Wesel, and Wesel was also the choice of Dempsey in Second Army. Wesel lay just south “of the Ruhr and was the better option for Garden, with fewer canals and an easier approach to the river. However, Wesel lay within the Ruhr anti-aircraft gun flak belt and the airborne planners stated that low-flying and slow-moving glider-tugs and parachute aircraft would suffer severe losses if Wesel were chosen (readers should note that Wesel was chosen for the last airborne operation of the war, the Rhine crossing in March 1945, when the US 17th and British 6th Airborne Divisions were dropped around the town)._
_Therefore, since the air planners-specifically Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command-had the casting vote over the air element in Market, the decision was made for Arnhem, the target town for a thrust north from the narrow bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut canal east of Antwerp, a route that would require the crossing of some wide rivers or canals: the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, the Willems canal at Veghel, the River Maas at Grave, the Maas-Waal canal, the River Waal at Nijmegen and the Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn) at Arnhem (the Waal is the southern arm of the Rhine, which divides in two to form the Waal and Neder Rijn, some distance upstream of Arnhem). There were, in addition, any number of minor streams and canals restricting movement off the main north-south axis. “The point to note here is the destruction of the first Arnhem myth._
_The choice of drop zones was in the gift of the US Air Force commanders, not the airborne commanders - and the factor that governed the Air Force commanders’ choice of parachute drop zones ( DZs) or glider landing zones (LZs) was the presence, actual or feared, of anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges. Since the US Air Force commanders considered that these bridges would be surrounded by flak guns, they selected landing zones that were, in the main, well away from the bridges._
_This decision had some dire effects. The obvious one is that it gave some airborne units-most notably 1st Airborne-a long way to go through enemy territory before they even got to their prime objective. If that were all it would have been bad enough, but there was more. It also deprived the airborne soldiers of that other airborne asset, surprise. Once on the ground, airborne units lack mobility: instead of swooping from the sky onto their objectives in a matter of minutes, the men of 1st Airborne had to march there from distant DZs, and this took hours. Long before they reached the bridges over the Neder Rijn the enemy were fully alert._
_In addition, one of the other prime assets of an airborne division is that it can leap over obstacles that would hinder a ground force by landing on both sides of “a river bridge at once, which the 82nd Airborne did at the Grave bridge, but not at the Nijmegen bridge. At Arnhem both these assets were lost by the Air Force commanders choice of DZs, but the choice of the Arnhem drop and landing zones was not made by Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division._
_Nor was this the only error committed by the air planners. Another was their decision that ground-attack fighters were not to be sent over the battlefield while escort fighters were in the air protecting supply drops._
_This decision denied the airborne units the vital assistance that these ground-attack aircraft had been giving to the troops in Normandy just a month before, and a lack of air support exacerbated the problems of the airborne units. Among other tasks, these ground-attack aircraft could have taken on the flak positions around the bridges, those anti-aircraft guns the air planners were so wary of. But the truly dire effect was, as Julian Thompson relates: ‘that the 1st Airborne Division was denied the use of a weapon the Germans, after their Normandy experience, dreaded. The enemy was able to bring reinforcements into Arnhem in broad daylight, with impunity, a move which would have been fraught with risk in Normandy a few weeks earlier.’_
_….Ideally, an airborne force, be it battalion, brigade, division or corps, should be landed in one lift. For Market it was judged impossible to fly in all the Allied airborne units in one lift as there were not enough aircraft available. In fact, it was judged impossible to land any of the Allied Airborne divisions intact on the first day._
_This difficulty was put down to a shortage of transport aircraft and glider tugs, but the problem actually went further than that._
_The British transport commander, Air Vice Marshal Leslie Hollinghurst of No. 38 Group, RAF Transport Command, wanted to solve the aircraft shortage by flying-in two lifts on D-Day. His colleague of the US IX Troop Carrier Command, Major-General Paul L. Williams, did not agree, believing that time was needed to service the aircraft and rest the crews-and this view prevailed at Allied Airborne HQ where Brereton supported it. Since the principal asset of an airborne operation is surprise, the two-to three-day deployment-an attack by instalments-was throwing this vital asset away. This decision would have some profound effects on the ground, most notably on Urquhart’s 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.”_
- The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands
Continued…
Continued…
From THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE 1944-1945. Rick Atkinson.
_”General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in Dragoon the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.”_
On the failure of the US 101st Airborne to capture the Som bridge intact:
_”Montgomery’s proposal was for the US 101st Airborne to be strung out like a kite string over a 30 mile stretch. Major General Maxwell Taylor, the commander of US 101st Airborne, protested against such an extreme dispersion of his division. Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery,who agreed to let the matter be settled by direct discussion Taylor and General Miles Dempsey, the commander of British Second Army. They met at Montgomery’s headquarters on September 12th.”_
-Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry
These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was *Brereton* who enforced them, *not* *Montgomery*. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning.
They took and kept 100km of ground up that road i.e. 90% of it. They NEARLY did it. They were not stooped where they set off, or even halfway up it. They got 90% of the way, within touching distance. Had the operation been planned a bit better by the air commanders and with more resources it would have worked.
Monty’s idea was actually a good one, as nearly all the relevant personnel involved agreed. Including the Americans. They (Eisenhower and Brereton) were the ones who had to agree with it and give it the go ahead. They very much liked the idea.
Few people are aware that there were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions.
It should be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had.
Montgomery had also wanted to use Hodges 1st US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. But Bradley was stealing fuel and other resources from Hodges and giving it to Patton.
Eisenhower:
_”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”._
Eisenhower insisted it go ahead and Eisenhower under-resourced it.
MG wasn’t even an army just a corps. The idea that Monty had been given everything for a thrust to Berlin is laughable. By this time Monty had given up on an immediate thrust into Germany and Berlin.
Of course it was not 100% guaranteed to succeed but it had a good chance to succeed, if only certain things were executed a bit better, such as *the 82nd capturing the Nijmegen bridge early when only around 20 German troops were guarding it.*
Beyond the initial broad outline, *Monty didn’t plan the operation and nor did he have any jurisdiction over the air forces. He can consult and discuss but he cannot give them orders.* Monty’s aides tried to persuade Brereton to double missions on the 17th but Brereton refused and as I just pointed out, Monty even went back on his idea for the 101st to be strung out over a long distance when a Taylor argued against it. Monty did not wish to step on the toes of the airborne commanders. He respected their views and he let them plan it. Also neither Montgomery nor Browning could dissuade the RAF from deciding to drop 1st Airborne so far way from the Arnhem bridge, which led to the vast majority of 1st Airborne not even reaching it. The orders of advice Marshall Hollinghurst could not be changed. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst are the ones who should be vilified, not Montgomery. It was their decisions that screwed the operation and prevented it from being a 100% success.
*MONTY GARDEN*
This abortion of Monty's
involved crossing three major rivers, three minor rivers, and criss-crossing canals, across terrain(polder marshes) where tanks couldn't maneuver away from the major roads without sinking. And we saw how that went even with complete surprise.
Bernard planned the whole thing - IKE and everyone else wanted Antwerp open .Monty Garden was unrealistically ambitious and just too many variables factoring in for things to go wrong. Ambition over reaching capability. Ike knowingly kept the British relevant in order to keep them in the alliance so that American soldiers would not have to shoulder the entire casualty burden on the Western Front. D-Day had 30 miles flights across the Channel. Monty Garden had 300 mile flights to NE Netherlands D-Day had 900 flights.Monty Garden had 1600 Flights D-Day was June 6th.Monty Garden was September 17th And 2 hrs less daylight to do all that in So there were 700 MORE FLIGHTS than D-Day. They were 300 miles away in North East Netherlands not 30 miles across a channel. Oh there was 2 hrs less daylight to do it in. SMDH
♦You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road.
♦*Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:30 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown*
♦Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bring the whole column to a halt . *This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command.*
♦*And why did Monty and Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think while approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 4 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site*
♦Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden,and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same?Not in September, not in October and not in November
🚑🚑
Say what you like about Monty. He saved the Brits in N Africa and he destroyed the Germans in NE Europe from June 1944.
4:14 my dude's named like he's an orc boss fight in an RPG
40k;
Nob war boss-GORT
in Denmark(besides Bornholm which was taken by the red army but liberated on april 10th 1946) we see Monty as the man who liberated us from both Hitler and Stalin the russians was arround Rostock approxmatly 200 kilometers from the denish boarder on may 4th 1945 at 20.36 hours when the liberation message from Monty was announced in the radio
Indeed. If the Red Army had got to Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and then into Denmark they would have kept hold of them all.
Just remembered "Americans fight the war as they play football, regardless of troop condition or available supplies"
The plan *all along in Normandy* (ever since Monty’s revision of the COSSAC plan in January 1944) was for the British and Canadians to hold the Panzers on the eastern flank, forming a shield around Caen, constantly attack and grind up the German armour, and crucially, *suck in German reserves,* while US forces took Cherbourg, built up a vast arsenal of men and weapons too strong for the Germans to hold back and break out of the lodgement area.
John Peate Burns have the nurses left you out into the court yard lately,if not have them do so you need to go on a walk about - like Monty did during operations
It's pretty amazing what a good women can do to a man like Montgomery. My uncle was a hard man with a cruel side, due to the environment he grew up in. When he met his now wife and married her, he completely changed. I am not joking when it was really weird at first to always see him smile and genuinely content. He could have outbursts, but she always kept him in line with nothing more than love and care.
The majority of women may have not had power or privilege like men. But the good women who were positive influences on some of the most powerful men in history cannot be understated.
All factual, my Grandpa was said to be a little bit of a hard-ass aswell until he met his wife and softened up and became very-open.
@12:27 Actually there have been a bunch of invasions across the English Channel that were successful by the English. England has a long history of invading and occupying parts of France. It is the English who have never been conquered by a foreign power since William the Conqueror.
You missed the bit about 1 corps commander in normandy in1940 under alanbrooke as BEF commander
Been waiting for this one for a while.
Great job as always!
Oh, and he implemented shorts as non combat uniform when he got to the desert
I feel that U.S. generals were far more numerous when it came to egos. Mark Clark's march into Rome, Joseph Stilwell inability to leave burma alone, and Douglas McArthur's decision to regulate Australian's to mop up duty.
Patton had the biggest ego, BUT his effectiveness made it all worthwhile.
william west
Patton wasn't very effective in the Lorraine though. Failed to get out of it in 4 months of trying.
No he took METZ on December 13. Where Monty's troops had to fall back and tak antwerp. Not their fault Winston assigned the spineless gummy bear to direct when he NEVER SHOWED UP during the battle
@@bigwoody4704 The only reason he attacked it because of it's History, Metz being the place Atilla the Hun conquered. Metz was a costly affair that could've been avoided by bypassing it and cutting off the German garrison.
@wk2k11
Blumentritt said Metz could easily have been masked. Patton was obsessed with Metz. It has no real military value. Should have been isolated and left behind.
Patton's Lorraine campaign was the biggest failure of autumn 1944.
Really nice video! Would you make one about Antonin Artaud? Like, yes, he (actually) is not really famous and etc, but he is definitely an interesting person
Do the next video on Richard O Connor of the Desert campaign.
Great video Simon.
In Ireland, Montgomery unleashed a scorched earth campaign of utter barbarism. "Personally," he said, "my whole attention was given to defeating the rebels but it never bothered me a bit how many houses were burnt". As far as he was concerned, even civilians were fair game, referring to them in derogatory terms.
There was, perhaps, only one person who could put up with Monty’s abrasive personality. That was General Sir Alan Brooke, the head of the British Army. But at times, even he couldn’t stand Monty. He regularly complained about Montgomery in his diaries, writing, "I had to haul him over the coals for his usual lack of tact and egotistical outlook".
Following WWII, Montgomery held a number of high-ranking positions, but he never quite exerted as much influence as he wanted to-and he only had himself and his own bad attitude to blame. As one of his detractors put it, "I have come to the conclusion that his love of publicity is a disease[...]and that it sends him equally mad".
Towards the end of his life, Montgomery adopted controversial opinions that betrayed the fact that he had, maybe, outlived his usefulness. He was an outspoken supporter of apartheid in South Africa and an opponent of gay rights. He famously said, "this sort of thing [homosexuality] may be tolerated by the French, but we’re British-thank God".
Seeing as the allies in France etc didn't care how many houses they destroyed in getting the job done (look at Caen, St Lo etc) Ireland got off lightly.
to give some context, he detested the Black and Tans, and thought them a disgrace to the British army.
Back again after a long time watching your documentaries. Nice beard you got there Simon.
If you want to go to new Zealand and Australia but can't afford it, just go to Tasmania, it's stunning.
I was there for two weeks in early 1996. It rained solid for two weeks, even though it was summer. I didn't get to see it properly, sadly. I couldn't even see the mountain around Hobart. Just rain clouds.
History is so complex. Thanks for the video! 👍🏾👍🏾
Monty (General Montgomery) told the Prime Minister (Churchill) that he neither drank nor smoked and was 100% fit. To which Churchill replied, “I both drink and smoke and am 200% fit!!”
Been waiting for this one for a while.
Greenest job as always!
Excellent well balanced and factual bio on 'Monty'. Did some good stuff but ultimately let down by his ego (market garden) and very difficult to work with. You should do General 'Bill' Slim, probably the best British front line commander in WW2.
@Marc van den Boogaard Was not aware of that. Must admit I only beleived to be ego after I read Anthony Beevor's WW2 book.
Monty didn't plan Market Garden. Monty didn't run it.
@@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85 I stand corrected.
The problem with Market Garden was that the air commanders took over the Market part. Brereton and Williams insisted on dispersed drops over a number of days. That is what killed Market Garden. Even Montgomery could not change their minds.
Marc van den Boogard,
Where did you get that from regarding IKE? On 7th September Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery and told him "my initial intention is to occupy the Saar and the Ruhr".
It was always IKE's intention to get to the Ruhr as quickly as they could.
Source: Monty and Patton Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds.
IKE should have opened up a diversionary attack towards Aachen by the US 1st Army to draw away German reinforcements from the Netherlands. Instead he foolishly allowed the US 1st Army to start probing into the Hurtgen Forest. Attacks into the Hurtgen Forest began just 2 days after Market Garden started.
Great vid as usual. I’d like till see a video done on the ancient Assyrian King Sennacherib.
Top work again Simon, I understand you get alot of request’s and its a shot in the dark but Albert Pike would be interesting he is a historical figure quite shrouded in mystery and quite controversial to today’s standads, his life is quite a story Brigadier General in the confederate army led the battle of pea ridge and 33 degree freemason he created their modern day Scottish rite and was an intellectual force turning down a honour role at harvard and many more events 😊
I hope you do Orde Wingate at some point
One of Mongomery's greatest talents was his ability to whip up a sure-fire recipe for success strategy. If one followed the plan, success was damn near inevitable. He tended to a conservative and cautious approach, but he never fell for the traps that Rommel tried to set for him -- as far as I know. His greatest blunder, Market Garden, was when he tried to out-Patton Patton. Obnoxious yes, but a gifted commander nevertheless.
Even Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. It took 100km of German held ground in 3 days.
Patton barely took 100km of German held ground in 4 months down in the Lorraine.
The problem with Market Garden is that it was too complex. Too many different elements had to come together at the right time in order for the plan to work. Murphy's Law hit with full force, what with radios having the wrong crystals and weather breaking up the timing of the paratroop drops. Also, warnings from Dutch underground agents that Panzer units were in the area to be attacked were ignored. Once these problems started accumulating, the plan unraveled.
Chuck Messer,
That could all have been overcome had Brereton and Williams not insisted on dispersed drops over a number of days.
There were no panzers available in the area when the troops were dropping on the 17th. The German armour came on from Germany in the days that followed.
Had more paras been dropped on the 17th, they would have been able to deal with the German reinforcements. Its very difficult to dislodge paras in ensconced positions.
Still, Market Garden was 90% successful. 100km of German held ground was taken in 3 days.
A lot is said about SS panzers in the area but the truth is that the two Waffen SS panzer divisions (9th and 10th SS) resting and refitting in the area were only at 1/3 strength and didn't have any tanks operational and ready to throw at the paratroopers when they dropped on the 17th, or even the next day.
The first German tank attack against the paras was not until late on the 18th when the German army's Kompanie Mielke arrived from Bielefeld, Germany. The Tigers of Kompanie Hummel arrived on the 19th, as did the Stug IIIs of Brigade 280. None of these German army units were in the Netherlands on the 17th.
I believe if more paras were dropped on day one they could have taken more of Arnhem and stopped the Germans from getting close to the bridge. The RAF told Brereton they could fly double missions on the 17th but Brereton insisted on single missions, with the other drops spread over days.
You're right about other things going wrong, but I would argue they weren't necessarily fatal.
Cheers.
Interesting.
hey seymon, would love if make a video on konstantin rokkosvosky, the mastermind behind operation bagration, he was nearly purged in stalins purge
Rossokovsky*
Thank you for your informative videos, as someone who loves history and understanding as much as I can about the world your videos are entertaining and informative. I would like to recommend for your next video J Edgar Hoover, I think that would be a interesting addition to your collection. At any rate, please continue to produce content, you have a earned a subscriber.
*Decision in Normandy, by Carlo D'este,p.80 HQ 21 Army Group,14 April 1944 ,B.L. Montgomery, CiC "the whole of aggressive tactics would be to retain the initiative ourselves and to cause alarm in the minds of the enemy To be successful, such tactics must be adopted on D-Day; to wait till D plus 1 would be to lose the opportunity, and also to lose the initiative*
Which is what Monty did. Retained the initiative by a series of repeated attacks on the German lines. Attacks which weakened the Panzer Divisions so much even Bradley managed to advance-slowly. Unable to keep to his promise to start COBRA on July 19 Bradley decided to wait a few days until Monty (GOODWOOD) took enough lumps out of the Germans that Bradley could safely attack. Once the Germans were battered Bradley thought he could manage the task he flunked on July 19.
Sources? you'll be given no more lessons from me until you attempt some research
@@bigwoody4704 your research method= Goggle' Monty is a bad man' and then copy and paste all results unfiltered. What do we expect from a nation that lists 'Q' as its main news outlet!
No thicko I read the books type out appropriate content and save them to file.Ask your handler to show you how when your done picking your nose use that finger to leaf thru just one of you 3500 books
@@bigwoody4704 3500 WW2 related. 7,500 in total
Monty is not well remembered in the US because he questioned the legend of their great hero; Ike was the glamourous soldier who became US president. What Monty said in his books was not as controversial as people realise, he did not criticise Ike. He said that he had disagreed with him and would have done things differently.
Monty had known what it was to be the young officer taking men over the top into battle in a way Ike (the career staff officer) never did. That mattered to Monty (and many other senior officers) more than most realise. BUT Monty did enjoy too much the fact that the way the war turned vindicated his concerns about how Europe would be divided up after the war. This was the real hot potato.
To be fair however what the Americans said and what they did about Monty were two different things, both during and after the war they trusted Monty completely, both on the battlefield and more importantly when he was Deputy Supreme Commander at NATO.
Absolutely. Montgomery didn't like the idea of a desk general with zero battlefield command experience taking over the command of the war from very experienced and successful battlefield commanders such as himself.
Montgomery was proven right because Eisenhower's strategy prolonged the war and caused unnecessary casualties.
Yeah Jonathan Parshall calls Monty a wretched Human being for attacking his former superiors Auchinleck and Ike post-War with lies and lies to boot.
Also can we please get videos on Sir John Monash and Arthur Currie.
Probably the greatest general of WW2.
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
♦ Battle of Alam Halfa;
♦ Alamein;
♦ Battle of El Agheila;
♦ Battle of Tripoli;
♦ Battle of Medenine;
♦ Battle of the Mareth Line;
♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy;
♦ Battle of the Sangro River;
♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history;
♦ Operation Market Garden - took 60 miles of German held territory;
♦ Battle of the Bulge;
♦ Operation Veritable;
♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time.
Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that.
_Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_
-Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton
In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign.
The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of.
Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And insisted it should be 3 airborne brigades to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key.
The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy.
On Normandy:
_That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed.._
_….and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_
-Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton
Those are allied victories that monty somehow got mentioned in. Ike allowed the wag to tag along after he got Dunkirked then waiting 4 yrs to come back across 30 miles
@@bigwoody4704 dude sounds like monty's press agent.
@@tomjewell7759 he has multiple accounts and has been caught posting BS by many people.basically signing out then signing in as someone else to agree with himself - sure sign of mental illness
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@@bigwoody4704 wow.
Wonder if he is a family member...
The post has a weird vibe...
@@tomjewell7759 doubt it he's just a socially stunted rube hoping for a christmas miracle so play along for awhile
Please put biographics on Spotify so I can download it for while I'm on the go. I've watch all casual criminalists multiple times now
Whether you like Monty or not, and I think he was the best allied commander in the second world war, he totally retrained the Eight Army into the war winning force that it became and lead 21st Army Group for the rest of the war.
Yes, and German commanders like von Mellenthin and Blumentritt said the same thing.
Well. Got the job done.
You could have with massive advantage bernard had - and probably done a better job
Montgomery, the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2. Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery.
The Americans had to turn to him in their hour of need in the Ardennes to help get them out of their mess there.
Ya if they had a swim team,jump in the Channel Lyndon Monty will bring the loofah you can make like Lucien Trueb.Real Field Marshall - more like a failed marsh mellow
Monty was a real Hero especially at Dunkirk.
Yeah, because we all know it would have been so much better if the Nazis had won. Why else would you imply its a cowardly thing, or bad thing, to evacuate troops from a rapidly collapsing theater and unwinnable situation unless you were rooting for the Nazis?
The Germans said Montgomerys ability to fight by day and move by night before Dunkirk really impressed them and that it showed vigorous training and discipline in his men.
It was the French and Belgians collapsing (they had ten times the number of soldiers as the British) which lead to the British having no option but to withdraw to Dunkirk and evacuate.
@@lyndoncmp5751 The British are Masters of rewriting history. While the Brits were running back to Merry old England with their tail between their legs. The Belgians delayed the Germans at a huge loss, and the French fought on for a month after the British ran away. Please stop your lies it is a huge insult to the soldiers who died delaying the Germans. So you people could run back home.
@@irishseven100
You DO know of there were British units holding the Germans back too, right? And the Royal Air Force prevented the Luftwaffe from attaining control of the skies. If not for the Royal Navy then nobody would have been evacuated, including over 100,000 French and Belgian troops.
If the French and Belgians didn't collapse in the first place on either side of the BEF then there would have been no need for an evacuation at Dunkirk.
The British were back fighting and dying in France and Belgium just 4 years later. Nearly a million Brits died in two worlf wars protecting French and Belgian soil.
@@irishseven100 So, again, you wanted the Nazi's to win. You hate the British so much you think it was a bad thing that they left a collapsing theater which had no hope of success so they could save their army to fight on and you would rather the Nazi's be masters of Europe unopposed.
I love the Monty story of how everyone in Southern Command in 1941 had to do a weekly x-country run. Several staff- officers said that it might kill them. Monty replied that it would be better if they died now, and created space for younger officers to rise, than to die later and leave confusion in combat. I can't imagine an American general laying down this kind of inclusive discipline. They loved their comfort.
Monty was dunkirked with the notable exception of the allies decisive November 1942 victory at El Alamein, where massive supply advantages, air cover & naval blockade of German supplies, factoring in ULTRA proved decisive. Bernard's battlefield records featured little to brag about.
Monty got out commanded TOTALY in Sicily sat in Italy and absolutely stuck at CAEN, faffed up Falaise - then didn't show up in Arnhem for his own operation. Instead petting his canaries and bunnies back at his caravan as 34,400 troops go into the Netherlands and 17,00 come out and he conveniently wasn't around to share that fate. On top of that he lathered up little lads
@@bigwoody4704 Eisenhower:
‘General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander’.
‘I don’t know if we could have done it without him. It was his sort of battle (D-Day & Normandy). He got us there and he kept us there.
General James Gavin of the US 82nd Airborne: "I took a liking to Montgomery which has not diminished over the years"
Captain Richard Winters of the US 101st Airborne: "Montgomery was the real deal, an example to follow".
General Robert Hasbrouck of the US 7th Armored Division: "Montgomery saved the 7th Armored Division" [at St.Vith in the Bulge].
General Günther Blumentritt:
‘Field Marshall Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse’
General Gerd von Rundstedt:
‘Generals are like race-horses. They are supposed to win, and Montgomery won most of the time.’
General Hasso von Manteuffel on the Bulge: ‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Patton on Monty: 'small, very alert, wonderfully conceited, and the best soldier - or so it seems - I have met in this war’.
Major General Matt Ridgway, commander of the US XVIII Airborne Corps, 17 Jan 1945: "It has been an honored privilege and a very great personal pleasure to have served, even so briefly, under your distinguished leadership [Montgomery]. To the gifted professional guidance you at once gave me, was added to your own consummate courtesy and consideration. I am deeply grateful for both. My warm and sincere good wishes will follow you and with them the hope of again serving with you in pursuit of a common goal".
The British 2nd Tactical Air Force in the Bulge took control of the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands from Vandenberg’s Ninth Air Force.
The First Army’s hasty defense had been one of hole-plugging, last stands, and counterattacks to buy time. Although some were successful, these tactics had created organizational havoc within Hodges’ forces as divisional units had been committed piecemeal and badly jumbled.
Ridgway wanted St. Vith’s defenders to stay east of the Salm, but Montgomery ruled otherwise. The 7th Armored Division, its ammunition and fuel in short supply and perhaps two-thirds of its tanks destroyed, and the battered elements of the 9th Armored, 106th, and 28th Divisions could not hold the extended perimeter in the rolling and wooded terrain. Meanwhile, Dietrich’s second wave of tanks entered the fray. The II SS Panzer Corps immediately threatened the Salm River line north and west of St. Vith, as did the LVIII Panzer Corps circling to the south, adding the 2d SS Panzer Division to its drive. Ordering the St. Vith defenders to withdraw through the 82d Airborne Division line to prevent another Schnee Eifel disaster, Montgomery signalled them that “they come back with all honor.”
- Ardennes-Alsace by Roger Cirillo. US Army Center of Military History
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”_
“I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Christmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...[Montgomery] was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- General Hasbrouck of 7th Armor - “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
Simon seems to delete posts that are accurate that he doesn't want to hear. This was from a poster on the the continent: Britain,Brooke and Bernard had a chance to be relevant and help the French beat the Germans in 1940. Before the USA/USSR started in on the Reich. She failed utterly and miserably. From that point onward, whatever Britain does and regardless of what happens to her - the war ends the same way - with Germany crushed by the USSR and the US. In that order
@bigwoody4704 Sadly, the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty in 1940 aligned the French Communists and socialists to undermine French resistance, this combined with prevailing pacifism and cynicism about the French political establishment, made surrender popular among some sections of the French army. Indeed British troops fighting whilst their French counterparts conducted lightning retreats were often accused of prolonging the war. I am reminded of a recent obituary of a French Commando who remained in the UK to continue the war after the Brits evacuated over 200, 000 French men who demanded repatriation in order to surrender and serve Germany under Vichy: "I love France, but hate the French." There was a very good 1970s TV series about the French and Ww2 that exposed their tendency to blame everyone but themselves and their pro-German attitudes. We tend to forget that the French police volunteered to man the firing-squads that executed the Resistance and captured UK/US Jedburgh teams in 1944. Closterman noticed that the Vichy military establishment hated those who joined with the Brits to liberate France. French accounts of their history are often designed to persuade audiences of a simplified narrative designed to cloak a more complex social and regional conflict with roots in the late 18th century.
Free French With Devers 6th Army Group got to the Siegfried faster than any combo of Ami-Anglo
Wish you had mentioned ME Clifton James, an actor whose resemblance to Montgomery was strategically used to confuse the Germans…
History's full of great military commanders who were pompous asses. Monty was one of those men.
Not suprised to see that he and Patton didn´t see eye to eye. Two narcisists who couldn´t possibly understand how anyone could possibly be as much worth as each themself. Sad Rommel was on the wrong side.
Rommel wasnt really that amazing either, basically his book was "Rommel uses dash! It was super effective!" and when it failed, he collapsed like a wet paper bag. Good general mostly due to facing people that didnt know what they were doing/had way too many things they were trying to do at once or simply, didnt have the kit to deal with his force.
@@mitchverr9330 Rommel was actually very gifted especially on the defensive. His problem offensively was that he seemed to lose track of the big picture. He was far better as a regimental or division commander than a corp or army commander.
@@mitchverr9330 True, though my thoughts were more in terms of personal integrity.
I think Patton and Montgomery shared more in common than we like to believe, except for tactics. I think Patton actually agreed with Montgomerys concentrated northern thrust into Germany. To hit the Germans heavily, with 4 allied armies sticking together, instead of dispersing them along a wider front which Eisenhower went for.
As for Rommel, he was a great divisional or corps level armour tactician, but Montgomery was a superior army level grand strategist.
Geronimo is right you know less about military matters than anyone who's ever had a discussion on the matter .Monty's decision to launch his debacle reaching for glory is a deserved blot on his reputuation .The GIs fanned out and and marched into the Fatherland.Even letting the mutt monty tag along
WW2 generals are so interesting
I’ve always said the Allies would have had momentous success even in comparison to the momentous success they had. If they’d made patton and Montgomery a tandem. Monty an incredible planner and inspirational to his men, but probably a bit to “this is the plan” to change a lot in battle. Then you have patton an opportunist of supreme calibre and loved by his men. But to my knowledge not naturally gifted at large scale offensive planning. So to me Monty takes the training, the planning setting it in motion, patton does the actual on the ground command. I think things like getting stuck in bocage or market garden could be different if these great mens strengths were paired not split.
Yes, the one time Patton was responsible for a campaign/offensive featuring only his own army and no other army..... he failed. This was the Lorraine campaign. September to December 1944.
no lyndon,monty had his chance the Big Boys were now running the show. They had to fight thru unlike Monty who didn't even show up or carrington who stopped. But to lumps like you that makes a Field Marshall or a LORD 😂,can't make that shyt up . Go jump in the channel like Bernard i know he would approve
@@bigwoody4704 "the Big Boys were now running the show."
Churchill was included in the Big Three at the table.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- At Tehran Stalin and FDR told him to quit Stalling
*Intelligence at the Top,by Sir Kenneth Strong* Montgomery was letting Bradley's Army lead the way out of Normandy because the Americans could replace their casualties and the British could not .PM Churchill also talked to Eisenhower about the problem the British were having. *Churchill called Eisenhower on the telephone and asked him ".....if it was possible Eisenhower to avoid too many British casualties"*
*The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407* *Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters"*
*The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p.64-65* As Allied conferences continued,Russo-American solidarity seemed to coallesce while British influence wanned.The symptom of growing strength of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the diminishing power of Britain who refused to accept the reality.
*The Battle of the Generals,by Martin Blumenson,p66* Although Britain and the USA would contribute equal forces in the initial phases of the Overlord invasion.The Americans eventually would far outnumber the British.Anvil was to be carried out mainly by the Americans and the French with merely token British representation
*Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,pages 196-97 Montgomery was the main reason the Americans were stretched in the Ardennes.16 U.S. divisions were sent north of the Ardennes to compensate for manpower shortages within the 21st Army Group It was similar to Carentan,the Americans were again asked to shoulder the burden of offensive warfare in a sector that had been reserved for his majesty's forces.*
Or as one American writer recalled Monty was judging 1st Army by the standards of the British 2nd Army,which had barely moved from November 7th to February 8th As a result only 4 U.S.Divisions were strung out in the Ardennes Sector .While in the north Monty accumulated 31 divisions 15 British/Canadians and 16 US.
I was posted to Alanbrooke barracks in paderborn and I always thought that was his full last name, not his first and second name combined.
You do always learn something new everyday 😂
I was up at Barker. Used to go to the gym in Allanbrooke😂.
Hm, Not a Monty fan-boy by any stretch, but.....
Market Garden was intended to open the Schelde estuary (be it in a roundabout way.) . It was specifically NOT intended to get into the Ruhr area. The idea was to push all the way to the IJsselmeer and thus cut off the majority of German forces in the Netherlands and forced to surrender. As a result the Schelde estuary and thus access to Antwerpen would likely be achieved.
Market Garden failed because Gen Gavin (US) / Gen Browning (UK) failed to secure the Nijmegen bridges, which had been their primary assigned objective. Instead, they chose to believe some cockamamie rumour about 1000 panzers in the nearby Reichswald, which was factually impossible and on the first day already debunked by local intel-sources.
The much derided and maligned 30th armoured corps arrived actually spot on time in Grave, but because the bridges in Nijmegen were not secured, it could not link up with 1st Airborne in Arnhem. Not Montgomery's fault, but squarely Gens. Gavin's / Brown's.
Eisenhower intervened and got the blame switched to Montgomery.
I put the blame on Brereton and Williams for insisting on dispersed drops over a number of days and Hollinghurst of the RAF for refusing to fly closer to the Arnhem bridge.
True enough about the goals of Market Garden. Had it achieved its goals on schedule the next stage would have been an advance north to the sea, to cut off Belgium and the western Netherlands.
It was not intended to move immediately towards the Ruhr, and besides, the Americans would still have to advance past Aachen to link up with the British in the Ruhr as well.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Hm, assigning blame is a bit of an academic exercise by now, but of course you are correct with regards to the shoddy way the droppings were managed.
That said, once on the ground this could have been overcome and for that the binding primary objectives were issued prior to lift-off. These objectives were ignored until too late and even then handled in a haphazard and insufficient fashion.
Well I like to blame Brereton especially ever since I saw footage of him in a tv interview from the 1960s where he specifically put the blame on British XXX Corps and 1st Airborne Division as accepted zero responsibility for any of his own decisions. He is fair game as far as I am concerned. He was out of his depth and the wrong man to command First Allied Airborne Army.
Sadly, even if the Nijmegen bridge was captured and ready for XXX Corps to roll across on the 19th, the Arnhem operation would still have gone wrong. The bridge was never in the hands of British 1st Airborne, just a section of the northern end and a few houses. The Germans always controlled the bridge exit ramp and 99% of Arnhem itself.
Arnhem could only have suceeded had the bridge, and a sizeable portion of Arnhem itself been in the hands of British 1st Airborne, which it never had.
XXX Corps would have been blocked from crossing the bridge by the wreckage of Grabners recon force which was strewn all over it and even had they got through that, there was no way off the bridge for them. They would have been sitting ducks. The Germans, by the 19th in better strength and now with the addition of Tiger Is from Kompanie Hummel and Stug IIIs from Brigade 280 they were in an excellent position to blast any British tanks trying to cross the bridge.
Correct corvus the idgit ignored HQs directives
I remember hearing about Rommel fighting Montgomery in the desert 🏜 what they had a fight about I don't know. Maybe Montgomery called Rommel's mum a slag.
😂
I am not sure what Montgomery did to offend the author of the script for your video but he clearly did something. Hardly balanced or fair coverage, and too many statements made without evidence to back them up.
Exactly.
Can we finally after how many years get a biographics on Sgt Marcus Phoenix...? One of the greatest heros Sera has ever known and author of one of the greatest quotes ever spoken. Its way pasted due by now.
Yes, let us never forget the time Churchill declared "It's time we gave Rommel's backside a stiff dose of Monty's python!"
A couple of points about Montgomery. He shouldn't be judged too harshly for the failure of Market Garden as it should be remembered that a) The entire plan fell into German hands at an early stage informing them of objectives, timetables, reinforcement schedules etc. b) Two Waffen SS panzer divisions were immediately deployed to crush the outgunned Paras. c) Allied intelligence had evidence of the SS presence courtesy of low level reconnaissance and Dutch resistance reports, but they were ignored by his intelligence staff. c) When the landings did come, there were German paratroopers in the area who were immediately mobilised to deal the British airborne threat, soldiers who would know exactly how to go about breaking up an airborne landing. Also I would have liked to have known more about his WW1 service as this was pivotal in developing his character and his military ethos which revolved around caution, careful planning and not sacrificing large numbers of troops for limited gains. Finally, Simon, do you have any control over the placement of adverts? Twenty seconds in, there were two ads back to back which completely ruined your introduction. Absolutely ridiculous.
And if Montgomery is judged harshly for Market Garden, then Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges and Patton should be judged even harsher for the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine failures and allowing the Germans to push them back into a retreat in the Ardennes.
These three failures caused nearly 200,000 American casualties, for next to no real gains.
"Rule one on page one of the book of war, is: 'Do not March on Moscow." -- Bernard Montgomery
He didn't march on anywhere else for that matter. If he did he had massive advantages - then barely....and poorly
Very diplomatic portrayal. I put Monty above Patton, personally, and I am American.
and unread in military matters
In August 1942, the Allies raided a Nazi-held port in France to see if a larger invasion was possible. The raid on Dieppe was a failure, costing the Allies hundreds of troops and scores of tanks and aircraft. So there was a pre D day invasion of France long after William the Conquer
17:55 onwards is complete fiction. Montgomery never 'gloated' or bragged he saved the day. It is clear the author of this video has done no research at all into the reasons why this 'distorted version of Monty's Press conference was taken as genuine when in fact he is railing against a German Propaganda Broadcast that put out a doctored version of Monty's words. This is easily checked by consulting US Newspaper reports in Jan 1945. The initial reports on Monty's Press Conference (Jan 7th) were 100% positive with all papers repeating Monty's praise for US troops. On Jan 8th the Newspapers reported rifts over claims he said negative things in a radio broadcast. On Jan11 the newspapers all reported that the negative comments were fake Nazi broadcasts and that they had got it wrong. Over the intervening decades EVERYONE repeats the claims made on Jan 8th but no one EVER mentions the retraction and apologies printed on Jan 11th. The claims made here are Nazi lies and even the most basic of checks would have revealed as much. I guess anything goes in the race to get clicks.
And the press conference was only held to support Eisenhower. Eisenhower was getting heavily criticised in the British press for the slow progress of his broad front strategy and the subsequent retreat in the Ardennes. He referred to Eisenhower as the captain of the team etc.
He did not mention Bradley, but that was tit for tat because Bradley never mentioned or acknowledged Montgomery in any of his Ardennes press communications. In fact this got so bad that SHAEF had to issue a press release on 5th January 1945 stating that Montgomery was in command of US 1st (and 9th) Armies and had been since December 20th.
What he won - he won because of overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA,Naval Power and Air Superiority. Then barely.......and poorly.The evidence was the yodeling chode Monty again & again ran advantages into the sand with his unimaginative schemes,a gross under estimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain and unwillingness to move forward with anything resembling speed and very stunted results. Sounds like you two dregs in the comment section
@@bigwoody4704 Monty rode to Bradley's rescue twice. First by capturing Antwerp to make up for Bradley's utter failure to capture Brest as a working port. Monty was asked to provide a new US Supply port because they could not get one for themselves. Then when Bradley lost control of his Armies during The Bulge Monty was tasked by Ike with saving Bradley's arse. It seems saving Bradley's arse was something Monty was quite good at. Cue homophobic slurs from a demented Exceptionalist who suddenly realises he 'aint that exceptional after all.
How many times do you repeat the same bilge? what did I tell you last time thicko?never happened at all your pervo got thrown into the channel and you make crap up. Monty even groveled back to IKE and apologized. Because Monty got driven from the continent - the Germans had 4 yrs to wire all the docks/ports with explosives.Have your handler read to you - once the GIs got there Bernard never got bounced off again - you welcome,I should be charging you for this
@@bigwoody4704 Poor littlewoody. Can not stand finding out that Bradley was twice forces to ask Monty to pull him out of the merde. I guess if you grow up believing the world revolves around you and yours it will crush you to discover that rather than being the saviour you were the saved. Patton stuck on his arse outside Metz for 3 months and Bradley incapable of capturing a port to keep his army supplied. Then to have the Germans run rings around him during The Bulge. Monty was called upon to help Bradley and he obliged. He captured a port for Bradley and then saved his arse during The Bulge. Unlike arse-sitting Patton Monty got the job done.
Sponsor intro then an ad. Simon that’s a violation
You said it...A pompous British dandy 🤣
Still the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way.
um no you have your head so far up his successful you can see what he had for lunch
What a sight to see!
Despite the fact he has an exceptional record of success from El Alamein up until the end of the war, and for the large part of the Western European front of WW2 he was commanding around 1/3 of all allied forces, including in many of the most important and hard fought campaigns, Montgomery seems to be very poorly regarded by history.
Its always been a mystery to me, the man who won the war in North Africa, commanded all land forces during the invasion of Sicily, Italy and Normandy, commanded during Market Garden, the Battle of the Scheldt and the Rhine Crossing.
He could well stake a claim to the title of most important general of the western allies during the war.
He was certainly the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2. Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery.
America hogs all the credits, as usual.
Monty was a lying braggert,the tommies were great guys unfortunate to serve under that poof
@@bigwoody4704 If you genuinely take a step back, Monty behaved no differently than Patton, Bradley, Clark etc. in most cases he behaved far less badly. its almost as if you need a certain personality type to be a successful general.
But there is one difference between Monty and the others isn't there? I wonder what that difference might be.. maybe its just because he isn't a US general.
@@hardlyworking1351 I wouldn't invite either one to dinner . I don't care he was a braggart - he lied excessively - taking credit that belonged to other especially in the desert. He also denied responsibility and deflected his blunders. Patton was an ass but a mobile effectiv one
Can you do a biography about Filipino General Antonio Luna?
Yes Monty got up people's noses ..., but the people concerned were the stuffy, cavalry-bred oafs from the colonial days (who knew nothing of the newer mechanical warfare) and that was why he was so much more favoured by the ordinary men. Being vain isn't nevessarily a bad thing, when you consider most of the great generals (Patton, McArthur, even Powell and Swartzkopf)
And those under his command seemed to like an appreciate him including Americans like Simpson, Ridgway, Gavin, Hasbrouck and even Richard Winters of Band of Brothers fame.
On the topic of ww2 could you do Captain Charles Upham or Major Leslie Young?
They are such badass individuals. I’d ask for Jack Churchill but I’m pretty sure you’ve already done a video of him.
If anyone bothers to read my comment and is a history buff tell me your favourite badasses of history.
As a Kiwi, Charlie Upham has to be on my list too.
@@JanjayTrollface
Came across him in the warehouse house. 'Searching for Charlie' couple year ago.
Leslie is some badass British dude. I actually came across his book due to a podcast. The book is called 'Escaping With His Life; From Dunkirk To D-Day And Beyond.
Ceaușescu when?
Swearer detected!
You should do Carl Gustaf Emil
Mannerheim next
The lowest point to which Montgomery stooped was when he blamed the failure of Market Garden on General Sosabowski and his Free Polish Forces.
Montgomery did not blame the failure of Market Garden on General Sosabowski and his Free Polish Forces.
@@thevillaaston7811 Yes, he did. Read some history books.
@@AudieHolland
Montgomery to Alanbrooke, 17 October 1944. referring to Arnhem:
`Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you may like to send them to join other Poles in Italy.’
FYI: Alanbrooke is Field Marshal Alan Francis Brooke, at that time, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
That is quite different to blaming Polish forces for the outcome at Arnhem.
@@thevillaaston7811 Crooks never leave their exact intentions on paper.
Informally, Montgomery had Sosabowski removed and fired from the Polish military.
Anyone officially claiming the Polish Airbornes were unwilling to fight is a liar and should certainly not be in any official position himself.
Brooke, Browning and Montgomery should all have been fired.
Note that the Americans called for Monty's resignation/firing as early as the Battle of Normandy and during the Battle of the Bulge, Montgomery claimed 'he had saved the day' and that he should be made general commander of Allied forces in Europe.
This led to the well known incident that almost broke the Alliance between the British and the Americans. Only after Eisenhower threatened to fire him, did Montgomery eat humble pie.
@@AudieHolland great post and true
Do General Courtney Hodges, who was most responsible for Remagen Bridge and the Designated Commander for the final offensive in Japan before Japan surrendered.
Lazily regurgitating the idea that Market Garden was a disaster.
I mean it was such a disaster that Monty launched Operation Gatwick from Nijmegen (taken during Market Garden) in October ‘44 to capture the Ruhr but had to call it off as the US forces hadn’t secured the right flank. The Allies later used Nijmegen to to launch Operation Veritable to advance into Germany.
It was such a disaster that Hitler, in a special Fuhrer Directive issued on 25 September, had personally ordered the destruction of the allies in the Nijmegen - Arnhem area. For the German High Command regarded the allied bridgehead north of the Waal River as a severe threat and feared that the allies could still use the area as a springboard to the north to cut off the German Fifteenth Army in the western part of Holland and threaten the plains of North-Western Germany.
It was such a disaster that Walter Model attempted to regain the Nijmegen salient which had been seized by the allies in an effort to contain the offensive and drive them off the Betuwe. For Model it was imperative to recapture the ground they had lost in the Betuwe in order to restore the situation by acting quickly, before the allied front had settled.
Monty actually signaled Eisenhower’s headquarters postponing the operation. Eisenhower resurrecting it and a cable from the War office about V2s committed Montgomery to the operation.
From Nigel Hamilton’s biography of Monty:
_For Monty now to cancel the British part of ‘the main effort of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border. Moreover the Arnhem-Nijmegan axis had been Monty’s proposal, making it doubly hard to rescind._
_Eisenhower’s directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September - for during the afternoon a ‘Secret’ cable arrived from the War Office, sent by VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:_
_Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM._
_Will you please report urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared._
_By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to ‘rope off’ the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites._
Few people are aware that there were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions.
It should be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had.
Montgomery had also wanted to use Hodges 1st US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. But Bradley was stealing fuel and other resources from Hodges and giving it to Patton.
Eisenhower:
_”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”._
Eisenhower insisted it go ahead and Eisenhower under-resourced it.
MG wasn’t even an army just a corps. The idea that Monty had been given everything for a thrust to Berlin is laughable. By this time Monty had given up on an immediate thrust into Germany and Berlin.
The plan after Market Garden and getting a bridgehead over the Rhine wasn’t to go rushing off to Berlin but to stop and clear the Low Countries and open up a port.
From Nigel Hamilton’s 3 volume biography of Monty:
_”Again, Eisenhower’s biographer claimed that Monty proposed on 10th September to ‘make a single thrust thought Arnhem to Berlin’, and that Eisenhower refused to sanction this. _*_In fact by 10 September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot:_*
_I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] _*_that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before the winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year._*
_Monty’s statement _*_is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself,_*_ when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:_
*_Monty had no idea of going on to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine._*
_In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff ( Air-Marshal Portal ) immediately after the 19th September meeting, Tedder stated that_
_the advance to Berlin _*_was not discussed as a serious issue.”_*
-Monty, The Field-Marshal 1944-1976. Nigel Hamilton.
Notice the date: September 19th.
_The evidence also suggests that certain necessary objectives on the road to Berlin, crossing the Rhine and perhaps even taking the Ruhr, were possible with the existing logistical set-up, provided the right strategy to do so was set in place. Montgomery’s popular and astute Chief of Staff, Freddie de Guingard, certainly thought so: ‘If Eisenhower had not taken the steps he did to link up at an early date with Anvil and had held back Patton, and had he diverted so released to the north, I think it possible we might have obtained a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter - but not more.’_
*_Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful - and much more than was actually achieved.dThis view was confirmed after the war in interviews with senior surviving German commanders, von Runstedt, Student, Blummentritt and Rommel’s former Chief of Staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944._
_…The evidence from the two previous chapters seems to suggest that, provided the right strategy was employed, getting to the Rhine by the end of 1944 was probable, seizing the Ruhr was possible-but taking Berlin was a pipe-dream, even if the Allies had opened Antwerp by, say, the end of September.”_
Robin Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
The territory taken during Market Garden protected Antwerp from counter-attack.
The low-lying boggy grounds, rivers and canals between Arnhem and Nijmegen is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces directly back to Germany in perfect country for a counter-attack. Market Garden was the offensive SHAEF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans at the start of September were in disarray.
Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for a jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anytime at all- that is protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant was vital and was successfully seized. Fighting in low lying mud and waterways of the scheldt, which will take time, while the Germans are still holding Noord Brabant makes no sense at all.
SHAEF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view. Unfortunately the US 82 failed to secure the Nijmegen bridge and therefore Arnhem couldn’t be seized.
Market Garden:
♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces in Germany. Antwerp was the only port taken intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge attack right through US lines. The German went through a forest rather than the direct route, which would have been through the Market Garden salient.
♦ It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen, which was used.
♦ It limited V rocket launching sites aimed at London.
♦ It isolated the German 15th army in Holland.
♦ They reached the Rhine.
♦ The salient was fleshed out to the Meuse.
♦ The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken.
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND 1947
Page 419
_’It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the _*_Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.'_*
Continued…
Continued…
And Monty was under pressure from London to do something about the V2 threat.
A MOST ENIGMATIC WAR
JAMES GOODCHILD
Page 543
_’Speer recalled that he first rockets ‘fired at England’ were not, ‘as Hitler imagined, five thousand at one blow, but twenty-five, and then not, ‘as one blow but over a period of ten days. Twenty-six V2 rockets reached London during those 10 days, until Operation Market-Garden forced the rocket firing troops far enough eastward thereby negating the required range for the rockets to reach England.’_
The salient was then fleshed out. US 7th armor were sent into Overloon. They failed to take the town, were extracted snd British forces sent in to take it.
Continued…
The Germans never thought Market Garden was a failure. It punched a 60 mile salient right into their lines in a few days, right on their border. They saw it as a staging area to jump into Germany - which it was.
In late '44/early '45, the longest allied advance was the 60 mile Market Garden advance. The only operation to fully achieve its goals in that time period was Monty's clearing of the Scheldt.
The Market Garden salient was a buffer, one of its prime objectives. Proving it’s worth when the Germans rammed through through US lines in the Bulge. It stood between the advancing Germans and the German 15th Army. It prevented any German attempt to re-take Antwerp directly. The Germans had to try and get to Antwerp the long war round via the Ardennes in December.
Market Garden prevented that vital German link up with the 15th Army. Keeping the 15th isolated was a real part of the operation. The salient was vital and proved its worth.
The most direct and easiest route to Antwerp was via Venlo. It would have been easier for the Germans to go via Venlo from the Ruhr area but the British were in their way. Going through the Ardennes was one third longer at least in more difficult terrain, for an army desperately short of fuel the extra miles mean a lot, as was proven. They could go through Venlo if they liked but the British in the Market Harden salient between the Germans and Antwerp would have seen the build up and been prepared. The Germans refrained from attacking directly through British defended front lines after 1943. They avoided it and chose to attack through American lines instead. General Blummentritt said the British were next to impossible to dislodge once they were ensconced in defence but the Americans were prone to not defend so stubbornly.
Market Garden almost certainly blocked an easier routed German counter attack on Antwerp.
From Wikipedia:
_the Allies did possess a deep salient into German occupied territory that was quickly reinforced. Milton Shulmanobserved that the operation had driven a wedge into the German positions, isolating the 15th Army north of Antwerp from the First Parachute Army on the eastern side of the bulge. This complicated the supply problem of the 15th Army and removed the chance of the Germans being able to assemble enough troops for a serious counterattack to retake Antwerp. Chester Wilmot agreed with this, claiming that the salient was of immense tactical value for the purpose of driving the Germans from the area south of the Maas and removing the threat of an immediate counterattack against Antwerp._
Brian Urquhart who was privy to some of the initial planning before he was sacked, said they were considering taking huge parts of Southern Holland Eisenhower’s broad font meant there was not enough resources to do this. In fact, German General Blummmetritt said that had Eisenhower given Montgomery the resources he wanted in September it would have been all over for the Germans at that point.
Under Monty the allies moved 400 miles in just 3 months from June to September 1944. Under Eisenhower the allies didn’t move 100 miles in 7 months from September 1944 to March 1945.
_Blumentritt disagreed with the Allies′ strategy in the west, discussing the precarious nature of the German position with its meager one armoured division against the twelve of the Allies, and he stated that had Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group been unleashed earlier for a concentrated armoured assault (as he had wished) rather than fighting on a broad front, "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."_
General Student, in a statement after the war actually considered the Market Garden Operation to have been proved to be a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of the vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of the war.
It got 90% of the way. It gained the allies almost 100km of German held terrority and brought them to the German border
British 2nd Army then fleshed out the salient with Operation Aintree and the Battle of Overloon.
Historian Christer Bergson Operation Market Garden has written that at the time was at the time regarded as essentially a success. It was only due to the following development of events such as the battle at Overloon in October 1944 (where the US 7th Armoured suffered heavy casualties, failed to take the town, had to be pulled out and the British go in and take it for them) that meant that the strategic success of Operation Market Garden could not be utilized to end the war before the turn of the year 1944.
The British would have had to take that corridor at some point anyway. They didn’t have to fight through the southern Netherlands in 1945 as they were already there due to Market Garden. The Allies later used Nijmegen to to launch Operation Veritable to advance into Germany.
Most ground troops did not view the operation as a failure either. They just pounded over 60 miles through German lines in a few days. The Germans never considered the operation a failure either. They now had an army isolated on the coast and a buffer between them and the vital port of Antwerp. Also the Allies were just on the German border near the Ruhr.
Even with its’s problems and lack of resources, Market Garden would probably have been 100% successful *if Gavin and the 82nd had captured the Nijmegen bridge.*
He did nothing for peate sake isn't that right John Burns
What other gems have you mined for us you poltroon?None of the objectives were met
♦One would say Montgomery appeared lost & helpless but the sad fact is he never appeared at all
♦Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
♦The V-2s were still being launched
♦The massive deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for suppliesfor an operation that size
♦Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
♦The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation,exposure and disease.
♦And all of the Netherlands live stock was sent/driven to the Reich as the Wehrmacht fell back. The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the Germans for assisting the allies.
♦Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as Montgomery boasted
♦Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
♦400,000 Dutchmen - thu out the War were sent to work as slave laborers for the Reich in defense industry or on bunker/tunnel projects
♦Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later *"My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success
@@bigwoody4704
This would be why Monty launched Operation Gatwick to capture the Ruhr from Nijmegen but had to call it off as the Americans hadn’t secured the right flank.
John Burns Monty didn't capture the ruhr you misguided skragg.Bradley/Patton/Hodges did.Monty got 1,100 killed in one day trying desperately to get back in the headlines - he would have been removed in the U.S. Army,Shot in Germany/Russia
*This from History Net Dot Com* - Operation Varsity, the Allied airborne assault over the Rhine River at Wesel, Germany, on March 24, 1945, is one of those military actions whose value has sometimes been questioned. American forces had already crossed the Rhine at two locations when British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery mounted his assault in the north. Some have speculated that the airborne phase of the assault may have been unnecessary for the success of the overall operation. *Montgomery has been accused of using the airborne troops to ‘put on a good show’ and to further his own reputation*
The Americans, on the other hand, saw Montgomery as a pompous and overly conservative commander. *He sought to enhance his public image and tried to take credit for success even when it was not due him*
For Operation Varsity, the northern route into the industrial heart of Germany was now wide open. The cost had been high. *The 6th Airborne had suffered 590 killed* and another 710 wounded or missing. Several hundred of the missing later turned up to rejoin their units, however. *The 17th Airborne had 430 killed,* with 834 wounded and 81 missing. Casualties among the glider pilots and the troop plane pilots and crews included *91 killed,* 280 wounded and 414 missing in action.
Eighty planes were shot down, and only 172 of the 1,305 gliders that landed in Germany were later deemed salvageable.
*A total of 1,111 Allied soldiers had been killed during the day’s fighting. In comparison, the 101st Airborne Division had lost 182 killed and the 82nd Airborne 158 on D-Day. Operation Varsity, March 24, 1945, was the worst single day for Allied airborne troops.*
*Hodges 1st US Army got across at Remagen with a casualty count of 31 men Patton's 3rd US Army came across near Oppenheim "with the total loss of 28 men killed and wounded*
@@bigwoody4704
Monty was responsible for Garden, the ground part. XXX were got to Nijmegen on schedule, barely putting a foot wrong.
The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans. The other two airborne units, both US, *failed* to seize their assigned bridges immediately.
If they had taken their bridges XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on *d-day+*1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match. The Germans would not have known what had hit them.
The *12 hour delay* caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical *time window* to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem. The longer the time delay the more Germans poured in, hence more resistance, hence a slower XXX Corps. Obvious.
On top of the 12 hour delay, the 82nd not seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), caused an additional *36 hour delay.* This meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The extra 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the *two day time window in total* given to the Germans was far too long.
The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine. The two US para units *failed* in theirs. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
Do a video on Keith Park, aka "the Defender of London" from the Battle of Britain in WW2
And Charles Upham, the only combat soldier to win the Victoria Cross twice.