Kant's ethics has been having such a huge impact because it doesn't differ from the Christian ethics principally. He simply "reasoned" all that had already been said in Bible. So I think his ethics has been driven by the inertia of the same premises of fear of God.
It does differ in one way (where it's worse), which is that in the Christian ethic, at least you're allowed to be happy with your altruism. In Kant you lose any moral value if you're happy (doesn't make it immoral, but ceases to be moral). This will be covered in the lectures on Kant later. But I agree with your point overall.
@@YashArya01To be fair to Kant, he doesn’t say that doing something in accordance with moral duty is worthless if it makes you happy. It has value and is good objectively, especially if, alongside your immediate inclination, your faculty of moral reason also recognizes the situation and agrees with your impulse. Technically you’d have to recognize the situation otherwise you’d be doing the “good” thing compulsively without awareness of moral significance. When you’re happy to do that thing, there is no need to exercise the moral will to do otherwise. There is no moral dilemma or conflict associated with this scenario which means it’s not a moral question which, again, doesn’t mean it has no worth of any kind, according to Kant. It has no specifically moral worth because there is no moral conflict but it has objectively good “worthiness” of other kinds. He said in fact that one who is more naturally inclined to be virtuous is better situated than one less inclined… less suffering but not less goodness. It’s when you’re disinclined to do the right thing that a moral situation arises in a practical sense because it’s in that situation that the moral will has to overrule the inclination as a matter of duty. The more disinclined you are the greater the moral worth in this case because it’s harder to overcome. It’s better in his view if you do the good naturally and happily.
@@hamish001 in other words, you get no moral credit for being the kind of person who simply has no desire to set your neighbor's house on fire. But you get moral credit if you really want to set it on fire, but don't. Did you see the lectures on Kant?
@@YashArya01 I listened to the lecture and read his books. Short answer is yes. But to leave it there makes it sound like Kant is saying you’re not good unless you’re miserable. The thing is that Kant doesn’t say moral credits are something to be sought after or accumulated like learning or virtue or wealth. This is what I think the lecturer may have misunderstood. Morality for Kant isn’t a virtue, it’s a duty that arises on occasions where inner virtue reveals itself to be lacking as when one is inclined and considering to cheat, steal, harm, etc. In his philosophy it’s much better if you simply don’t want to burn houses, or steal, or harm, and the fact that you won’t be in a position to receive a moral credit for that is not a bad but a good thing. It’s genuinely “good” according to Kant if you are naturally inclined to act decently and it’s not a burden to you. And those people are lucky from a moral perspective since they neither consider doing the wrong thing nor what advantage they lost by not doing it. But why should we want to attach specifically moral credit to this, especially given the way he actually defines morality? It already has its own kind of goodness and praise worthiness. If someone dies for their child we call them something noble because of the sacrifice they made and the credit we give that is in a category of it’s own, a moral credit if it’s a moral duty and maybe other kinds. It’s a lesser case but for the person who Kant help but want to burn other peoples homes and, for whatever reason, can only feel good doing so, it’s their moral duty to sacrifice a lifetime of gratification and resign themselves to a miserable life in that area for obvious reasons. That has moral credit if they did it out of moral duty which in Kant’s formulations can be summed up as the principle of not treating others as means to ends but as ends in themselves. Risking people’s lives, costing them money, burning their house, and all for gratification is treating them as means to an end. The main concern here is the equal dignity of others. That’s what the various formulations of the categorical imperative are designed to establish.
The potentiality of sin exists inside human just as the the potentiality of staying away from it. Given the free will, if one acts on former it’s sin and if one acts on later it’s virtue. The potentiality of adultery and murder exists inside human, would you not call it sin or immoral?
@Tadaburrr man hasn't understood a word that has been said. Giving the argument which has been rejected by its own logic. The same people arguing for free will after reading all the evidence counter to it. Yes everything is influencing each other and we don't understand how and why and god is omnipotent and rulez over all and that's exactly why we have free will. Thank you my man for your brilliance.
38:19 What an autoirony that Peikoff is a disciple who parrots his mistress, who's not only not a major philosopher, but arguably no philosopher at all.
Aristotle series comes to an end...
@20:38 Aristotle's passage on the virtue of Pride - Liquid gold!
You sure lol? You realize that he thinks you are less than him right? It's pure elitism.
29:00 These stock photos are killing me lol
52:20 he was just on his sigma male grindset
Kant's ethics has been having such a huge impact because it doesn't differ from the Christian ethics principally. He simply "reasoned" all that had already been said in Bible.
So I think his ethics has been driven by the inertia of the same premises of fear of God.
It does differ in one way (where it's worse), which is that in the Christian ethic, at least you're allowed to be happy with your altruism. In Kant you lose any moral value if you're happy (doesn't make it immoral, but ceases to be moral). This will be covered in the lectures on Kant later. But I agree with your point overall.
@@YashArya01 Thank you for the clarification.
@@YashArya01To be fair to Kant, he doesn’t say that doing something in accordance with moral duty is worthless if it makes you happy. It has value and is good objectively, especially if, alongside your immediate inclination, your faculty of moral reason also recognizes the situation and agrees with your impulse. Technically you’d have to recognize the situation otherwise you’d be doing the “good” thing compulsively without awareness of moral significance.
When you’re happy to do that thing, there is no need to exercise the moral will to do otherwise. There is no moral dilemma or conflict associated with this scenario which means it’s not a moral question which, again, doesn’t mean it has no worth of any kind, according to Kant. It has no specifically moral worth because there is no moral conflict but it has objectively good “worthiness” of other kinds. He said in fact that one who is more naturally inclined to be virtuous is better situated than one less inclined… less suffering but not less goodness.
It’s when you’re disinclined to do the right thing that a moral situation arises in a practical sense because it’s in that situation that the moral will has to overrule the inclination as a matter of duty. The more disinclined you are the greater the moral worth in this case because it’s harder to overcome. It’s better in his view if you do the good naturally and happily.
@@hamish001 in other words, you get no moral credit for being the kind of person who simply has no desire to set your neighbor's house on fire. But you get moral credit if you really want to set it on fire, but don't.
Did you see the lectures on Kant?
@@YashArya01 I listened to the lecture and read his books.
Short answer is yes. But to leave it there makes it sound like Kant is saying you’re not good unless you’re miserable. The thing is that Kant doesn’t say moral credits are something to be sought after or accumulated like learning or virtue or wealth. This is what I think the lecturer may have misunderstood. Morality for Kant isn’t a virtue, it’s a duty that arises on occasions where inner virtue reveals itself to be lacking as when one is inclined and considering to cheat, steal, harm, etc. In his philosophy it’s much better if you simply don’t want to burn houses, or steal, or harm, and the fact that you won’t be in a position to receive a moral credit for that is not a bad but a good thing.
It’s genuinely “good” according to Kant if you are naturally inclined to act decently and it’s not a burden to you. And those people are lucky from a moral perspective since they neither consider doing the wrong thing nor what advantage they lost by not doing it. But why should we want to attach specifically moral credit to this, especially given the way he actually defines morality? It already has its own kind of goodness and praise worthiness.
If someone dies for their child we call them something noble because of the sacrifice they made and the credit we give that is in a category of it’s own, a moral credit if it’s a moral duty and maybe other kinds. It’s a lesser case but for the person who Kant help but want to burn other peoples homes and, for whatever reason, can only feel good doing so, it’s their moral duty to sacrifice a lifetime of gratification and resign themselves to a miserable life in that area for obvious reasons. That has moral credit if they did it out of moral duty which in Kant’s formulations can be summed up as the principle of not treating others as means to ends but as ends in themselves. Risking people’s lives, costing them money, burning their house, and all for gratification is treating them as means to an end. The main concern here is the equal dignity of others. That’s what the various formulations of the categorical imperative are designed to establish.
"original sin is impossible because if something is inherent to one's nature it cannot be sin." yes, thank you Aristotle
The potentiality of sin exists inside human just as the the potentiality of staying away from it. Given the free will, if one acts on former it’s sin and if one acts on later it’s virtue.
The potentiality of adultery and murder exists inside human, would you not call it sin or immoral?
if you act on it sure
@@Tadabburrr
@@TadabburrrPotential is not the same as actual. To have an inherent potential for sin does not mean inherent actual sin.
there will one day be a species of sentient wasps glad to know this. Muhahahaha
@Tadaburrr man hasn't understood a word that has been said. Giving the argument which has been rejected by its own logic. The same people arguing for free will after reading all the evidence counter to it. Yes everything is influencing each other and we don't understand how and why and god is omnipotent and rulez over all and that's exactly why we have free will. Thank you my man for your brilliance.
So dank
What if the acorn identifies as a willow?
38:19 What an autoirony that Peikoff is a disciple who parrots his mistress, who's not only not a major philosopher, but arguably no philosopher at all.
He doesn't claim to be one, you're missing the point of his work