Aristotle's Argument for God Explained

This video explains one of the most important arguments for the existence of God, Aristotle's Argument from Motion.
Got Questions? I can be reached at [e-mail].

[@abramurbanski1902]

Very interesting, excited to see more my friend

[@BigKevs-zm2hw]

Someone hates pencils…

[@RealAtheology]

Neat video, but the Aristotlian Argument has some objections that I think are quite formidable. For example, as Jordan Howard Sobel pointed out in "Logic and Theism" (see the section on Aquinas' Second Way), it is insufficiently justified as to why something needs an actualization of its very existence. Such a "concurrent, sustaining actualization" doesn't even seem to be a real feature of reality. What is the justification for thinking that the substance itself is right here, right now, being moved from potential to actual with respect to its existence and not just with respect to its aesthetic properties? (Say an apple going from red to green).
Change is evident to the senses, but a concurrent, right here, right now actualization of something's existence is by no means evident to the senses. Yet, the existence of such a chain per-se is precisely what the argument needs to succeed. What reason, then, do we have for thinking that an object's existence itself is right here, right now undergoing a change from potential to actual? I do not see any immediate difficulty with saying that an object is reduced from potential to actual when it was caused to exist at the beginning of its existence -- and from then until something comes along and causes it to cease to exist, there isn't any causal process which sustains in being, but rather it persists in actual existence as "existential inertia", as it were. At the very least, the argument presupposes that something's existence right here, right now needs to be reduced from potentiality to actuality and not just the beginning of its existence -- and it thereby presupposes the falsity of the existential inertia thesis -- and yet this presupposition needs justification.
It is also worth noting that per se chains (chains that Aquinas considers can't go back into infinity) can possibly terminate in entities that are part of non-essentially ordered chains i.e. an essentially ordered series can get us to a mover who still moves. This movement could occur in the context of an accidentally ordered series or other causes by things within a non-essentially ordered series. It may be the case that the terminus of an essentially ordered series can't further have some causal power that it derives from some other source concerning the relevant per se chain. Still, it does not follow that it, therefore, can't have been caused in the context of a non-essentially ordered series. Here is one way to illustrate this: Let's borrow Aquinas's example of a person holding a stick pushing a stone. In this chain, the person holding the stick is the source of the causal power of the per se instances of chain that imparts motion into the stick and, furthermore, to the stone. While this may seem like an instance of a per se series, the terminus of this specific series (the person) may have a cause of his very existence that ultimately terminates in a per accidens sense (i.e. the person being a product of their parents). This person can also still "change" or "move" within a per accidens series, being a product of their parents, and eventually having children of their own, all of which occurs temporally as opposed to hierarchically. This means the person can still be part of a greater causal network but within the per accidens series. This tells us that various chains that may initially be per se chains can terminate with entities that can be located within broader per accidens chains, which can go back to infinity and can exist as a multiplicity instead of a singular chain.

[@alanrosenthal6323]

Thanks for sending me this link!
I am no expert but I think your description of this argument is excellent. Very, very well presented.
That said - it is not evidence for a unmoved-mover aka god. It is only speculation as to what some people would like to think. But let’s imagine that there is a god out there.
You say that there must only be one god. There is no reason to believe this outside of what is written in some old books. There could easily be two gods. They might both be identical. They could both be different with complementary abilities. They could each be responsible for different things. There is nothing to support the idea that there must be one or two or ten or a million.
You also say that this god must be the ultimate in goodness. Again this is just speculation. God could be 50% good and 50% bad. It could be 80/20 or 90/10 or even 100% bad. It would be nice to think that the god above is all good but there is no proof for that.
You also said that it is all knowing. I assume that includes all knowing about the future. How do you know that it is even possible for anything to know the future? Again, a comforting thought but ???
I would never try to compare myself so Aristotle - but he could definitely be wrong.