Part 3 contingent A sentence is contingent if it is true in some possible circumstances (or possible worlds) and false in others. Thus ‘it rained in Edinburgh on 1 January 2016’ is contingent: it is true, but it might have been false. A sentence is non-contingent, or necessary, if it is either true in every possible circumstance or false in every possible circumstance. Ordinary objects can also be said to be contingent. A contingent being, such as you or I, is a being which exists but might not have done. counterfactual conditional A counterfactual conditional is a conditional with a false antecedent which states what would have been the case had the antecedent been true. Thus, I may not throw a brick at the window, but we can still truly say: if I had thrown a brick at the window, the window would have smashed. We all use and understand counterfactuals, but there is much dispute about their underlying logic. David Lewis, for example, holds that ‘if A had happened, B would have happened’ is true just if the most similar A-world to the actual world is also a B-world. criteria of identity A criterion of identity for (concrete) Fs tells us what the identity over time of Fs consists in, and hence tells us what changes an F can survive, and what changes destroy an F. It is normally assumed that the criterion of identity for Fs will not presuppose the notion of F-identity. Criteria of identity are thus standardly conceived as reductive in character. de dicto/de re This distinction crops up in different areas of philosophy - for example, modality and epistemology. It is a well known distinction in the philosophy of possibility and necessity. In a de dicto modal sentence such as ‘necessarily 2 + 2 = 4’ necessity is predicated of a sentence or proposition. In the de re sentence ‘Socrates is essentially human’ Socrates is held to have a property essentially. deductively valid An argument is deductively valid just in case its conclusion follows from its premises by truth-preserving rules of inference. If an argument is deductively valid, it is impossible for its premises to be true and conclusion false. determinism The thesis that the past, together with the laws of nature, implies that the actual future is the only possible future.
I just purchased this from Amazon to my kindle, and I do intend to read it, but........... I cannot in any way, shape, or form agree that spiritualism is any kind of solution to the problems that plague humanity, quite the opposite, in my humble opinion. And I see no link between materialism and nature..... what??? not sure where that thought comes from. Aside from that, Great Enthusiastic Review👍🏻
I can understand how one might disagree with the notion of spirit as the basis of human rights, but I think it's critical nonetheless that we not conceive of Man as purely a physical entity, but one with a metaphysical element also. As Paterson puts it in the book: “Materialism must regard mankind as simply an animal species whose behavior is predicated and determined by instinct and expedience. On those grounds, there are no rights and no moral questions; whatever happens must happen, and whatever must happen does happen.” … “Strict materialism must finally deny that a human being is an entity; it resolves him into a lump of plasmic material “conditioned” to various “responses” or “reactions.””
@@TH3F4LC0Nx And would mankind then be the only possessor of a this "metaphysical element", or do other non-human animals possess it too? As for morals, these come to us naturally, via 'The Golden Rule'. But rights? those are different. I'm afraid that they are purely human constructs, nothing divinely inspired about them, unless you equate mankind with divinity, which I think is actually at the root of the god problem. Just my opinion of course. Looking forward to reading the book👍🏻
Part 6 inhere On the Platonic conception of properties as universals, universals inhere in, or are instantiated by, particulars. It is hard to say much about inherence/instantiation or even to make clear sense of it. This difficulty is one of the motivations behind nominalism. laws of nature A standard example of a law of nature is: all metals expand when heated. But what are laws of nature? Some philosophers (Humeans) think that laws of nature are simply well established regularities. Others (anti-Humeans) think that laws involve some kind of necessity which explains the observed regularities. Leibniz’s Law The law which states that if A is identical to B, then every property of A is a property of B and vice versa. This law must be distinguished from the principle of the identity of indiscernibles: if A and B share all their properties, then A is identical to B. Logical Atomism This doctrine was associated with Wittgenstein and Russell in the early part of the twentieth century. Although their versions of logical atomism differed, one key idea was that language and reality share a common structure and that each decomposes to basic constituents (atoms) under logical analysis. logical constants These are logical words - such as ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’ and ‘if …, then …’ - which allow us to construct complex sentences out of atomic ones. From atomic sentences ‘A’ and ‘B’ we can construct, for example, ‘A and B’, ‘A or B’, ‘not-A’, ‘not-B’ and ‘if A, then B’. The constants are standardly held to be truth-functional (though this claim is controversial in the case of ‘if …, then …’). love A mechanism of cognitive distortion, initially accompanied by pro-feelings towards the beloved. Interestingly, loves is the polar opposite of identity, since it is neither reflexive, symmetric nor transitive.
Part 11 thought-experiment A thought-experiment is an imaginary experiment in which, typically, some controversial possibility is made vivid. If someone claims ‘necessarily P’ they stand refuted if a merely possible case in which not-P can coherently be described. Thus, for example, if we can coherently describe a possible scenario in which there is time without change, we refute the claim that necessarily time involves change. Since much philosophy attempts to uncover necessities and possibilities, thought-experiments are an important part of the philosopher’s toolkit. transitive A relation R is transitive just if aRb and bRc together imply aRc. Relations which are transitive include ‘being the same height as’, ‘being bigger than’, etc. Relations which are not transitive include ‘loves’, ‘is a neighbour of’, ‘looks the same colour as’, etc. truth-functions A complex sentence is a truth-function of its component sentence (or sentences) just if the truth-value of its component sentence (or sentences) fixes the truth-value of the complex sentence. The logical constants of elementary logic (at least ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’) are truth-functional. Thus ‘P and Q’ is a truth-function of ‘P’ and ‘Q’; in contrast, ‘Necessarily P’ and ‘Bob believes that P’ are not truth-functions of ‘P’. vicious regress A vicious regress is one where the truth of one step in the regress depends for its truth on the previous step, that step on its previous step and so on without end. The truth of the first step is thus never established. Not all regresses are vicious. The regress ‘if “P” is true, then “P is true” is true; if …, etc.’ is virtuous rather than vicious.
Part 7 metaphysical necessity/possibility Necessity grounded in the identity and nature of things. It is necessary for 2 to be even, for water to be H2O and for Socrates to be human. These necessities flow from the nature of the number 2, water and Socrates respectively. Metaphysical possibility is possibility consistent with the nature of an object or natural kind. Thus, given his nature as a human being, Socrates might have been a carpenter but could not have been a tree. modal Pertaining to possibility and necessity. Modal sentences are those of the form: possibly P, necessarily P, A might have been F, A is necessarily G, B can’t be G, etc. Modal claims have different strengths depending on the modality in question. Thus ‘I can’t lift that car’ refers to a physical impossibility; ‘Socrates might not have been a number’ refers to a metaphysical impossibility; ‘A triangle cannot be circular’ refers to a logical impossibility. There are other modalities, too (for example, legal: ‘you can’t park there’). natural kind A natural kind, as the name suggests, is a naturally occurring stuff (gold, water, etc.) or species (tiger, dolphin, etc.). Natural kinds can be contrasted with human-made or artificial kinds (cars, computers, etc.). Saul Kripke claimed that natural-kind terms are rigid designators, and that the identity of a natural kind is fixed not by its superficial observable characteristics but by its internal structure. On this view, the empirical discovery that water is H2O revealed the essence of water. necessary being God is traditionally conceived to be a necessary being. That is, God exists and it is impossible that He not exist. In possible-worlds talk, God exists in every possible world. nominalism Sometimes understood as the view that there are no abstract objects. It is also used to denote the range of views opposed to the conception of properties as universals. numerical identity This sense of ‘identity’ (formalized by ‘=’) is expressed in sentences such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, ‘Superman is Clark Kent’ and ‘2+2 is 4’. Each of these sentences concerns just one entity, differently named. Numerical identity conforms to Leibniz’s Law. That is, if A = B, then every property of A is a property of B and vice versa.
Part 10 rigid designator This is a technical term, of great theoretical fecundity, coined by Saul Kripke. A singular term is rigid just if it picks out the same object in every possible world in which that object exists. Kripke claimed that proper names are rigid but that standard uses of definite descriptions are not. Thus ‘the world’s tallest man’ is non-rigid, since, though it picks out Ivan in this world, it picks out other men in other possible worlds. But a proper name such as ‘Obama’ does not behave in this way. To put the idea intuitively: someone other than Ivan might have been the world’s tallest man, but no one other than Obama might have been Obama. singular term A term, such as ‘New York’, ‘Saul Kripke’ or ‘Pluto’, whose function is to refer to exactly one object (though it will often be an object which itself has parts). structural isomorphism The cases that interest us involve representations (sentences, propositions, etc.) and the states of affairs represented. Wittgenstein thought that the arrangement of names in a fully analysed elementary proposition mirrors the arrangement of objects in a corresponding state of affairs. Propositions and state of affairs are thus structurally identical or isomorphic. substance We can distinguish three notions of substance. First, substances as objects of reference or as that which has properties. This is the sense of ‘substance’ relevant to the realist/nominalist debate. Second, individual substances (this man, that tree, etc.) conceived as unified, self-sufficient entities, conceptually independent of other entities. In this sense, the dent in my car bonnet is not a substance: we cannot think of the dent without thinking of the bonnet of which it is a dent (and the dent cannot exist without the bonnet existing). Third, there are substances in the sense of natural kinds (water, gold, tigers, etc.). symmetric A relation R is symmetric just if aRb implies bRa. Thus the relation ‘is a brother of’ is symmetric: if Bill is a brother of Ben, Ben is a brother of Bill. tensed facts These are facts expressed using A-series terms such as ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. A-theorists hold that tensed facts are irreducible, yet changing, aspects of temporal reality. B-theorists hold that there are no tensed facts (so understood), though they agree it is convenient to use A-series language.
Part 2 antecedent In a conditional of the form ‘if P, then Q’, P is the antecedent (and Q is the consequent). asymmetric A relation R is asymmetric just if aRb implies not-(bRa). The relation ‘is the father of’ is asymmetric: if Ron is the father of Dick, Dick is not the father of Ron. biconditional The relation ‘if and only if’ expresses the biconditional, so-called because it is the conjunction of two conditionals. ‘P if and only if Q’ is equivalent to ‘if P, then Q and if Q, then P’ and is true just if P and Q have the same truth-value. bivalence The principle that every statement is either true or false. Bivalence should be distinguished from the Law of Excluded Middle which says, for all p, either p or not-p. One could reject bivalence but accept Excluded Middle. The principle of bivalence has been questioned in the case of statements containing, for example, vague predicates and on anti-realist grounds. causal loop A causal loop involves both backwards and forwards causation (for example, A causes the later B, B causes the later C, C causes the earlier D, D causes the earlier A). Some philosophers think that causal loops are paradoxical, and so impossible. Others think they are odd but metaphysically possible. concrete A concrete object is one existing in time or in space and time. The objects we see around us exist in space and time; souls and symphonies exist in time only. Not all concrete objects are made of matter - for example, shadows and holes. There is also a more colloquial use of ‘concrete’ meaning familiar or realistic - for example, as in ‘can you give a concrete example?’ conditional A conditional is any sentence of the form ‘if P, then Q’, where P is the antecedent and Q the consequent.
Part 5 eternal An object is eternal just if it always has existed and always will exist. Eternal objects need not be necessary existents. factive A term F is factive just if Fp implies p. Knowledge is factive: if X knows p, then p is true. Belief is not factive: X may believe q though q is false. Necessity is factive: necessarily p implies p; possibility is not factive. fatalism The view that the reality of the future (or the existence of truths about our future actions) undermines our freedom. There is also a theological version of fatalism, which holds that God’s foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. general term A general term, such as ‘red’, ‘square’ or ‘horse’, is a term which applies to, or can apply to, more than one object. if and only if A sentence of the form ‘P if and only if Q’ is equivalent to the conjunction ‘if P, then Q and if Q, then P’ and is therefore true only when P and Q have the same truth-value. (See biconditional.) indeterministic On some scientific theories, the world is not deterministic. That is, certain future outcomes are not determined by the past states of the universe together with the laws of nature. Indeterminism is thought to be a consequence of Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics. indexical A word is an indexical just in case its reference is determined by the context of its utterance. Thus an utterance of ‘I’ is indexical, since its reference is determined by the identity of its utterer; an utterance of ‘here’ is indexical, since its reference is determined by the location of its utterer; an utterance of ‘now’ is indexical, since its reference is determined by its time of utterance. ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ are referring terms yet have the curious feature of immunity to both reference-failure and misreference.
Part 9 qualitative identity Exactly resembling things are qualitatively identical. This sense of ‘identical’ is expressed in ‘Bill and Ben are identical twins’. This sentence concerns two people not one. Qualitative identity does not conform to Leibniz’s Law: if Bill and Ben are identical twins, it is not the case that every property of Bill is a property of Ben and vice versa. For example, the twins differ in the exact time of their births and in their subsequent spatial paths. quantifiers These are words which tell us what proportion or quantity of things has a certain property. Thus all of the following are answers to the question ‘How many Fs are Gs?’: all Fs are Gs; some Fs are Gs; most Fs are Gs; many Fs are Gs; a few Fs are Gs; no Fs are Gs. The development of quantificational logic by Gottlob Frege in the nineteenth century represented a major advance over previous systems of logic. realism The term ‘realism’ has many different meanings in philosophy. The following three are relevant to metaphysics. In one sense, realism is the view that the typical objects of perception (trees, mountains, planets, etc.) are mind-independent entities. Their existence does not depend on the existence of any minds. The opposite of realism in this sense is idealism. In a second sense, made popular by Dummett, realism allows for a complete divorce between truth and knowability. Statements about, for example, the external world can be true or false whether or not we are able to know them. The opposite of realism in this sense is anti-realism. Finally, realism has also been used to designate the view that properties are universals. The opposite of realism in this sense is nominalism. reductio A reductio argument is one in which an assumption leads to absurdity and is thus shown to be false. Hence the Latin reductio ad absurdum. reductionism Words such as ‘reduction’, ‘reductive’ and ‘reductionism’ have many different meanings. It is no longer thought that a reduction of Fs to Gs requires sentences about Fs to be equivalent in meaning to sentences about Gs. It is enough if truths about Fs can be captured without remainder by truths about Gs. For example, we can reduce committees to individuals if truths about committees (for example, ‘the committee unanimously voted to appoint Smith’) can be accounted for by truths about individuals. Modality, time, causation and personal identity are four areas where reductionist claims have been advanced.
![Chris Langan - The Interview THEY Didn't Want You To See - CTMU [Full Version; Timestamps]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/9miVG2xT5jY/mqdefault.jpg)
Part 3
contingent
A sentence is contingent if it is true in some possible circumstances (or possible worlds) and false in others. Thus ‘it rained in Edinburgh on 1 January 2016’ is contingent: it is true, but it might have been false. A sentence is non-contingent, or necessary, if it is either true in every possible circumstance or false in every possible circumstance. Ordinary objects can also be said to be contingent. A contingent being, such as you or I, is a being which exists but might not have done.
counterfactual conditional
A counterfactual conditional is a conditional with a false antecedent which states what would have been the case had the antecedent been true. Thus, I may not throw a brick at the window, but we can still truly say: if I had thrown a brick at the window, the window would have smashed. We all use and understand counterfactuals, but there is much dispute about their underlying logic. David Lewis, for example, holds that ‘if A had happened, B would have happened’ is true just if the most similar A-world to the actual world is also a B-world.
criteria of identity
A criterion of identity for (concrete) Fs tells us what the identity over time of Fs consists in, and hence tells us what changes an F can survive, and what changes destroy an F. It is normally assumed that the criterion of identity for Fs will not presuppose the notion of F-identity. Criteria of identity are thus standardly conceived as reductive in character.
de dicto/de re
This distinction crops up in different areas of philosophy - for example, modality and epistemology. It is a well known distinction in the philosophy of possibility and necessity. In a de dicto modal sentence such as ‘necessarily 2 + 2 = 4’ necessity is predicated of a sentence or proposition. In the de re sentence ‘Socrates is essentially human’ Socrates is held to have a property essentially.
deductively valid
An argument is deductively valid just in case its conclusion follows from its premises by truth-preserving rules of inference. If an argument is deductively valid, it is impossible for its premises to be true and conclusion false.
determinism
The thesis that the past, together with the laws of nature, implies that the actual future is the only possible future.
I just purchased this from Amazon to my kindle, and I do intend to read it, but........... I cannot in any way, shape, or form agree that spiritualism is any kind of solution to the problems that plague humanity, quite the opposite, in my humble opinion. And I see no link between materialism and nature..... what??? not sure where that thought comes from. Aside from that, Great Enthusiastic Review👍🏻
I can understand how one might disagree with the notion of spirit as the basis of human rights, but I think it's critical nonetheless that we not conceive of Man as purely a physical entity, but one with a metaphysical element also. As Paterson puts it in the book: “Materialism must regard mankind as simply an animal species whose behavior is predicated and determined by instinct and expedience. On those grounds, there are no rights and no moral questions; whatever happens must happen, and whatever must happen does happen.” … “Strict materialism must finally deny that a human being is an entity; it resolves him into a lump of plasmic material “conditioned” to various “responses” or “reactions.””
@@TH3F4LC0Nx And would mankind then be the only possessor of a this "metaphysical element", or do other non-human animals possess it too?
As for morals, these come to us naturally, via 'The Golden Rule'. But rights? those are different. I'm afraid that they are purely human constructs, nothing divinely inspired about them, unless you equate mankind with divinity, which I think is actually at the root of the god problem.
Just my opinion of course.
Looking forward to reading the book👍🏻
Part 6
inhere
On the Platonic conception of properties as universals, universals inhere in, or are instantiated by, particulars. It is hard to say much about inherence/instantiation or even to make clear sense of it. This difficulty is one of the motivations behind nominalism.
laws of nature
A standard example of a law of nature is: all metals expand when heated. But what are laws of nature? Some philosophers (Humeans) think that laws of nature are simply well established regularities. Others (anti-Humeans) think that laws involve some kind of necessity which explains the observed regularities.
Leibniz’s Law
The law which states that if A is identical to B, then every property of A is a property of B and vice versa. This law must be distinguished from the principle of the identity of indiscernibles: if A and B share all their properties, then A is identical to B.
Logical Atomism
This doctrine was associated with Wittgenstein and Russell in the early part of the twentieth century. Although their versions of logical atomism differed, one key idea was that language and reality share a common structure and that each decomposes to basic constituents (atoms) under logical analysis.
logical constants
These are logical words - such as ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’ and ‘if …, then …’ - which allow us to construct complex sentences out of atomic ones. From atomic sentences ‘A’ and ‘B’ we can construct, for example, ‘A and B’, ‘A or B’, ‘not-A’, ‘not-B’ and ‘if A, then B’. The constants are standardly held to be truth-functional (though this claim is controversial in the case of ‘if …, then …’).
love
A mechanism of cognitive distortion, initially accompanied by pro-feelings towards the beloved. Interestingly, loves is the polar opposite of identity, since it is neither reflexive, symmetric nor transitive.
Part 11
thought-experiment
A thought-experiment is an imaginary experiment in which, typically, some controversial possibility is made vivid. If someone claims ‘necessarily P’ they stand refuted if a merely possible case in which not-P can coherently be described. Thus, for example, if we can coherently describe a possible scenario in which there is time without change, we refute the claim that necessarily time involves change. Since much philosophy attempts to uncover necessities and possibilities, thought-experiments are an important part of the philosopher’s toolkit.
transitive
A relation R is transitive just if aRb and bRc together imply aRc. Relations which are transitive include ‘being the same height as’, ‘being bigger than’, etc. Relations which are not transitive include ‘loves’, ‘is a neighbour of’, ‘looks the same colour as’, etc.
truth-functions
A complex sentence is a truth-function of its component sentence (or sentences) just if the truth-value of its component sentence (or sentences) fixes the truth-value of the complex sentence. The logical constants of elementary logic (at least ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’) are truth-functional. Thus ‘P and Q’ is a truth-function of ‘P’ and ‘Q’; in contrast, ‘Necessarily P’ and ‘Bob believes that P’ are not truth-functions of ‘P’.
vicious regress
A vicious regress is one where the truth of one step in the regress depends for its truth on the previous step, that step on its previous step and so on without end. The truth of the first step is thus never established. Not all regresses are vicious. The regress ‘if “P” is true, then “P is true” is true; if …, etc.’ is virtuous rather than vicious.
Part 7
metaphysical necessity/possibility
Necessity grounded in the identity and nature of things. It is necessary for 2 to be even, for water to be H2O and for Socrates to be human. These necessities flow from the nature of the number 2, water and Socrates respectively. Metaphysical possibility is possibility consistent with the nature of an object or natural kind. Thus, given his nature as a human being, Socrates might have been a carpenter but could not have been a tree.
modal
Pertaining to possibility and necessity. Modal sentences are those of the form: possibly P, necessarily P, A might have been F, A is necessarily G, B can’t be G, etc. Modal claims have different strengths depending on the modality in question. Thus ‘I can’t lift that car’ refers to a physical impossibility; ‘Socrates might not have been a number’ refers to a metaphysical impossibility; ‘A triangle cannot be circular’ refers to a logical impossibility. There are other modalities, too (for example, legal: ‘you can’t park there’).
natural kind
A natural kind, as the name suggests, is a naturally occurring stuff (gold, water, etc.) or species (tiger, dolphin, etc.). Natural kinds can be contrasted with human-made or artificial kinds (cars, computers, etc.). Saul Kripke claimed that natural-kind terms are rigid designators, and that the identity of a natural kind is fixed not by its superficial observable characteristics but by its internal structure. On this view, the empirical discovery that water is H2O revealed the essence of water.
necessary being
God is traditionally conceived to be a necessary being. That is, God exists and it is impossible that He not exist. In possible-worlds talk, God exists in every possible world.
nominalism
Sometimes understood as the view that there are no abstract objects. It is also used to denote the range of views opposed to the conception of properties as universals.
numerical identity
This sense of ‘identity’ (formalized by ‘=’) is expressed in sentences such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, ‘Superman is Clark Kent’ and ‘2+2 is 4’. Each of these sentences concerns just one entity, differently named. Numerical identity conforms to Leibniz’s Law. That is, if A = B, then every property of A is a property of B and vice versa.
Part 10
rigid designator
This is a technical term, of great theoretical fecundity, coined by Saul Kripke. A singular term is rigid just if it picks out the same object in every possible world in which that object exists. Kripke claimed that proper names are rigid but that standard uses of definite descriptions are not. Thus ‘the world’s tallest man’ is non-rigid, since, though it picks out Ivan in this world, it picks out other men in other possible worlds. But a proper name such as ‘Obama’ does not behave in this way. To put the idea intuitively: someone other than Ivan might have been the world’s tallest man, but no one other than Obama might have been Obama.
singular term
A term, such as ‘New York’, ‘Saul Kripke’ or ‘Pluto’, whose function is to refer to exactly one object (though it will often be an object which itself has parts).
structural isomorphism
The cases that interest us involve representations (sentences, propositions, etc.) and the states of affairs represented. Wittgenstein thought that the arrangement of names in a fully analysed elementary proposition mirrors the arrangement of objects in a corresponding state of affairs. Propositions and state of affairs are thus structurally identical or isomorphic.
substance
We can distinguish three notions of substance. First, substances as objects of reference or as that which has properties. This is the sense of ‘substance’ relevant to the realist/nominalist debate. Second, individual substances (this man, that tree, etc.) conceived as unified, self-sufficient entities, conceptually independent of other entities. In this sense, the dent in my car bonnet is not a substance: we cannot think of the dent without thinking of the bonnet of which it is a dent (and the dent cannot exist without the bonnet existing). Third, there are substances in the sense of natural kinds (water, gold, tigers, etc.).
symmetric
A relation R is symmetric just if aRb implies bRa. Thus the relation ‘is a brother of’ is symmetric: if Bill is a brother of Ben, Ben is a brother of Bill.
tensed facts
These are facts expressed using A-series terms such as ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. A-theorists hold that tensed facts are irreducible, yet changing, aspects of temporal reality. B-theorists hold that there are no tensed facts (so understood), though they agree it is convenient to use A-series language.
Part 2
antecedent
In a conditional of the form ‘if P, then Q’, P is the antecedent (and Q is the consequent).
asymmetric
A relation R is asymmetric just if aRb implies not-(bRa). The relation ‘is the father of’ is asymmetric: if Ron is the father of Dick, Dick is not the father of Ron.
biconditional
The relation ‘if and only if’ expresses the biconditional, so-called because it is the conjunction of two conditionals. ‘P if and only if Q’ is equivalent to ‘if P, then Q and if Q, then P’ and is true just if P and Q have the same truth-value.
bivalence
The principle that every statement is either true or false. Bivalence should be distinguished from the Law of Excluded Middle which says, for all p, either p or not-p. One could reject bivalence but accept Excluded Middle. The principle of bivalence has been questioned in the case of statements containing, for example, vague predicates and on anti-realist grounds.
causal loop
A causal loop involves both backwards and forwards causation (for example, A causes the later B, B causes the later C, C causes the earlier D, D causes the earlier A). Some philosophers think that causal loops are paradoxical, and so impossible. Others think they are odd but metaphysically possible.
concrete
A concrete object is one existing in time or in space and time. The objects we see around us exist in space and time; souls and symphonies exist in time only. Not all concrete objects are made of matter - for example, shadows and holes. There is also a more colloquial use of ‘concrete’ meaning familiar or realistic - for example, as in ‘can you give a concrete example?’
conditional
A conditional is any sentence of the form ‘if P, then Q’, where P is the antecedent and Q the consequent.
Part 5
eternal
An object is eternal just if it always has existed and always will exist. Eternal objects need not be necessary existents.
factive
A term F is factive just if Fp implies p. Knowledge is factive: if X knows p, then p is true. Belief is not factive: X may believe q though q is false. Necessity is factive: necessarily p implies p; possibility is not factive.
fatalism
The view that the reality of the future (or the existence of truths about our future actions) undermines our freedom. There is also a theological version of fatalism, which holds that God’s foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom.
general term
A general term, such as ‘red’, ‘square’ or ‘horse’, is a term which applies to, or can apply to, more than one object.
if and only if
A sentence of the form ‘P if and only if Q’ is equivalent to the conjunction ‘if P, then Q and if Q, then P’ and is therefore true only when P and Q have the same truth-value. (See biconditional.)
indeterministic
On some scientific theories, the world is not deterministic. That is, certain future outcomes are not determined by the past states of the universe together with the laws of nature. Indeterminism is thought to be a consequence of Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics.
indexical
A word is an indexical just in case its reference is determined by the context of its utterance. Thus an utterance of ‘I’ is indexical, since its reference is determined by the identity of its utterer; an utterance of ‘here’ is indexical, since its reference is determined by the location of its utterer; an utterance of ‘now’ is indexical, since its reference is determined by its time of utterance. ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ are referring terms yet have the curious feature of immunity to both reference-failure and misreference.
Part 9
qualitative identity
Exactly resembling things are qualitatively identical. This sense of ‘identical’ is expressed in ‘Bill and Ben are identical twins’. This sentence concerns two people not one. Qualitative identity does not conform to Leibniz’s Law: if Bill and Ben are identical twins, it is not the case that every property of Bill is a property of Ben and vice versa. For example, the twins differ in the exact time of their births and in their subsequent spatial paths.
quantifiers
These are words which tell us what proportion or quantity of things has a certain property. Thus all of the following are answers to the question ‘How many Fs are Gs?’: all Fs are Gs; some Fs are Gs; most Fs are Gs; many Fs are Gs; a few Fs are Gs; no Fs are Gs. The development of quantificational logic by Gottlob Frege in the nineteenth century represented a major advance over previous systems of logic.
realism
The term ‘realism’ has many different meanings in philosophy. The following three are relevant to metaphysics. In one sense, realism is the view that the typical objects of perception (trees, mountains, planets, etc.) are mind-independent entities. Their existence does not depend on the existence of any minds. The opposite of realism in this sense is idealism. In a second sense, made popular by Dummett, realism allows for a complete divorce between truth and knowability. Statements about, for example, the external world can be true or false whether or not we are able to know them. The opposite of realism in this sense is anti-realism. Finally, realism has also been used to designate the view that properties are universals. The opposite of realism in this sense is nominalism.
reductio
A reductio argument is one in which an assumption leads to absurdity and is thus shown to be false. Hence the Latin reductio ad absurdum.
reductionism
Words such as ‘reduction’, ‘reductive’ and ‘reductionism’ have many different meanings. It is no longer thought that a reduction of Fs to Gs requires sentences about Fs to be equivalent in meaning to sentences about Gs. It is enough if truths about Fs can be captured without remainder by truths about Gs. For example, we can reduce committees to individuals if truths about committees (for example, ‘the committee unanimously voted to appoint Smith’) can be accounted for by truths about individuals. Modality, time, causation and personal identity are four areas where reductionist claims have been advanced.