One reason I doubt that convincing everyone of error theory or of some other form of moral antirealism would have a significant effect on anyone's behavior is that I don't think people are typically moral realists, or speak, think, or act like moral realists to begin with. A lot of philosophers seem to assume nonphilosophers are moral realists, or that moral realism is some kind of default or commonsense position, but I don't believe there's much evidence to support those assumptions.
@@Micro-Digressions I'm not sure non-error theorists would act any differently than error theorists. Error theory is a bit of a tough case though, since it's not clear to me whether error theorists are committed to an empirical view where ordinary people are moral realists, or some semantic view where the meaning of ordinary moral claims is realist independent of people's psychology. Part of the reason I'm not an error theorist is because I think both views are wrong. In any case, if people aren't realists to begin with, I'm not sure why convincing them of error theory should make much of a difference. For comparison, if we came across an alien species that had no concept of God, it's not clear why convincing them that earth gods don't exist would change their behavior.
@@Micro-Digressions that sounds like you’re saying it’s a conversion by definition or in this case, description. It still doesn’t suggest that people act as if they are moral realists.
Using the same form of argument, I can show that cows do not exist. Premise 1: A cow is a member of the genus 'equus' of normal size with wings that can fly on Earth. Premise 2: No member of the genus 'equus' of normal size with wings that can fly on Earth exists. Conclusion: Therefore, no cows exist. That thing which Lutz says does not exist truly does not exist, but it is not morality. One of my reasons for holding that these "categorical imperative" or "view from nowhere" definitions of morality isn't the morality of public discourse is because the average moral-term-using individual does not have a PhD in philosophy. If we are going to interpret the claims of the average competent speakers in a language, we must give them a principle of charity - select interpretations that work over interpretations that do not work unless forced to choose the latter. Morality involves the use of praise and condemnation to promote among others those desires and aversions that are useful to others - that cause others to repeat behaviors that are useful to others and inhibit behaviors that are harmful to others. This is all consistent with David Hume's theory of reasons. Each of us has an aversion to our own pain (and, let us assume, only their own pain). This aversion to pain gives each us a reason to cause others to have an aversion to performing acts of a type that tend to cause pain. Nature has given us a learning system whereby we acquire modifications to our desires and aversions based on experience. Therefore, each of us has a reason to generate those cultural experiences that cause each other to have aversions to performing actions that tend to cause pain. The experiences that work in his regard are (moral) praise and condemnation. Praise and condemnation shape the desires and aversions of people within a culture. So, each of us has reason to praise actions that tend to prevent pain in others and condemn actions that tend to cause pain in others. We also have reasons to engage in debate over exactly what we should be praising or condemning, because it is often not obvious. Each of us has reason to use praise and condemnation to encourage in each other kindness, honesty, responsibility, and reliably. Each of us has a reason to promote in each other aversions to performing such acts as drunk driving, breaking promises, taking property without consent, assault, rape, murder. These are facts. These facts do not support any kind of categorical imperatives. These facts are founded precisely on our reasons to be - and for those whom we care about to be - the beneficiaries of helpful actions and of social inhibitions on harmful actions. Thus, morality: Act types that people generally have reasons to cause everybody to desire to perform are "obligations" and the dispositions to perform such actions "virtues". Act types that people generally have reason to be adverse to performing are "prohibitions" and dispositions to perform such actions "vices". And these desires and aversions are created and reinforced using social praise and condemnation. This comes from Hume. It was Hume who argued that character traits are to be evaluated on the basis of their being "useful and pleasing to oneself and others". And "useful to others" is precisely that property that gives others a reason to nurture and promote certain desires and aversions within the community.
I think that as a social species in a global society, the distinction between food preferences and morality is unmistakable (except maybe in the case of veganism). I also think that precisely because our individual moral preferences can directly affect us at a societal level, then even error theorists can and should participate in ethical debate.
Oxford Reference via Google to the rescue: Error theory is a term due to 20th century philosopher J.L.Mackie, describing a theory according to which everyday thought in some area [morality in this case] is sufficiently infected by mistaken philosophical views to be widely in error.
27:28 is something that always got me. What impact does an objective morality exsistance or non exsistance have on anyone's life? Even if you add a God to enforce it then what impact does the moral system have? None, what God does is what has the impact regardless of if it's right or wrong.
I don't think it has any impact at all, unless they care about whether moral realism is true, in which case it only has an impact because they care about it. If you simply didn't care about what the objective moral facts are, even if you knew what they were, and simply didn't comply with them....what follows from that? As far as I can tell, absolutely nothing.
Buy Matt's book here: www.amazon.com/Morality-Little-Debates-about-Questions/dp/1032023872/
One reason I doubt that convincing everyone of error theory or of some other form of moral antirealism would have a significant effect on anyone's behavior is that I don't think people are typically moral realists, or speak, think, or act like moral realists to begin with. A lot of philosophers seem to assume nonphilosophers are moral realists, or that moral realism is some kind of default or commonsense position, but I don't believe there's much evidence to support those assumptions.
They don't have to act like realists. They just have to act like non-error theorists. That's consistent with having never thought about metaethics.
@@Micro-Digressions I'm not sure non-error theorists would act any differently than error theorists. Error theory is a bit of a tough case though, since it's not clear to me whether error theorists are committed to an empirical view where ordinary people are moral realists, or some semantic view where the meaning of ordinary moral claims is realist independent of people's psychology. Part of the reason I'm not an error theorist is because I think both views are wrong.
In any case, if people aren't realists to begin with, I'm not sure why convincing them of error theory should make much of a difference. For comparison, if we came across an alien species that had no concept of God, it's not clear why convincing them that earth gods don't exist would change their behavior.
@@Micro-Digressions that sounds like you’re saying it’s a conversion by definition or in this case, description. It still doesn’t suggest that people act as if they are moral realists.
Using the same form of argument, I can show that cows do not exist.
Premise 1: A cow is a member of the genus 'equus' of normal size with wings that can fly on Earth.
Premise 2: No member of the genus 'equus' of normal size with wings that can fly on Earth exists.
Conclusion: Therefore, no cows exist.
That thing which Lutz says does not exist truly does not exist, but it is not morality.
One of my reasons for holding that these "categorical imperative" or "view from nowhere" definitions of morality isn't the morality of public discourse is because the average moral-term-using individual does not have a PhD in philosophy. If we are going to interpret the claims of the average competent speakers in a language, we must give them a principle of charity - select interpretations that work over interpretations that do not work unless forced to choose the latter.
Morality involves the use of praise and condemnation to promote among others those desires and aversions that are useful to others - that cause others to repeat behaviors that are useful to others and inhibit behaviors that are harmful to others.
This is all consistent with David Hume's theory of reasons. Each of us has an aversion to our own pain (and, let us assume, only their own pain). This aversion to pain gives each us a reason to cause others to have an aversion to performing acts of a type that tend to cause pain. Nature has given us a learning system whereby we acquire modifications to our desires and aversions based on experience. Therefore, each of us has a reason to generate those cultural experiences that cause each other to have aversions to performing actions that tend to cause pain. The experiences that work in his regard are (moral) praise and condemnation. Praise and condemnation shape the desires and aversions of people within a culture. So, each of us has reason to praise actions that tend to prevent pain in others and condemn actions that tend to cause pain in others. We also have reasons to engage in debate over exactly what we should be praising or condemning, because it is often not obvious.
Each of us has reason to use praise and condemnation to encourage in each other kindness, honesty, responsibility, and reliably. Each of us has a reason to promote in each other aversions to performing such acts as drunk driving, breaking promises, taking property without consent, assault, rape, murder. These are facts. These facts do not support any kind of categorical imperatives. These facts are founded precisely on our reasons to be - and for those whom we care about to be - the beneficiaries of helpful actions and of social inhibitions on harmful actions.
Thus, morality: Act types that people generally have reasons to cause everybody to desire to perform are "obligations" and the dispositions to perform such actions "virtues". Act types that people generally have reason to be adverse to performing are "prohibitions" and dispositions to perform such actions "vices". And these desires and aversions are created and reinforced using social praise and condemnation.
This comes from Hume. It was Hume who argued that character traits are to be evaluated on the basis of their being "useful and pleasing to oneself and others". And "useful to others" is precisely that property that gives others a reason to nurture and promote certain desires and aversions within the community.
I think that as a social species in a global society, the distinction between food preferences and morality is unmistakable (except maybe in the case of veganism). I also think that precisely because our individual moral preferences can directly affect us at a societal level, then even error theorists can and should participate in ethical debate.
Oxford Reference via Google to the rescue: Error theory is a term due to 20th century philosopher J.L.Mackie, describing a theory according to which everyday thought in some area [morality in this case] is sufficiently infected by mistaken philosophical views to be widely in error.
27:28 is something that always got me. What impact does an objective morality exsistance or non exsistance have on anyone's life? Even if you add a God to enforce it then what impact does the moral system have? None, what God does is what has the impact regardless of if it's right or wrong.
I don't think it has any impact at all, unless they care about whether moral realism is true, in which case it only has an impact because they care about it. If you simply didn't care about what the objective moral facts are, even if you knew what they were, and simply didn't comply with them....what follows from that? As far as I can tell, absolutely nothing.
Yikes.
Why yikes?
typical 2nd half century analytic philosophy- boring af - this guy would get wrecked by a Thomistic scholar
Crush Matt about what? Moral realism?
I found Matt to be a worthy sparring partner... so it'd have to be a pretty smart Thomist.
@@Micro-Digressions Agreed. I think this was an excellent showing. Clear, careful, and comprehensive responses to the points raised in the video.
@@Micro-Digressions a Thomist (or neo-scholastic) by necessity is pretty smart; only goes up from there. They don't try to monkey "science."
Second