I was happy to see that Dr. Craig really dug in and engaged deeply with my work (by appealing to my epistemic origin story stuff). Sadly, the casual listener will probably have no idea why I use the terminology - my terms "undercutter-because-rebutter" and "undercutter-while-rebutter" - that I do. Dr. Craig uses them without explaining them, which is completely justified (because it takes a lot of time to explain them!) So, what are these terms? I'll explain for anybody interested. First, some basic epistemology. A rebutting defeater for a belief that p is a reason for thinking (or evidence that) p is false. An undercutting defeater for a belief that p is a reason to doubt that the belief that p was formed reliably. For a rebutting defeater for the belief that p to successfully work as a defeater, it must overcome the evidence in favor of p. This is not so for undercutting defeaters. They need only undercut one's evidence in favor of p (e.g., by showing that the evidence does not actually reliably indicate the truth of p). Now to EAAN. Is EAAN supposed to provide the naturalist an undercutting defeater for R or a rebutting defeater for R? Well, here's something interesting that happens, and I don't think it was noticed in the literature. If EAAN provides the naturalist with a rebutting defeater for R, then one will thereby getting an undercutting defeater for all of one's beliefs (a reason to doubt that they are formed reliably), including the belief in R. (Plantinga, of course, noticed this.) Now here's what's interesting. If this is so, then one has an undercutting defeater for R TOO, but only BECAUSE one had a rebutting defeater for R first. So, R has BOTH types of defeaters. I call this an "undercutter-because-rebutter". A response to EAAN by Michael Bergmann says that R has powerful prima facie, intuitive evidence in its favor. If it's strong enough, then the naturalist won't get a rebutting defeater, and hence, no undercutting defeater. But what if EAAN DIRECTLY provides the naturalist with a reason to doubt that their belief in R was not formed reliably? And this happens alongside the naturalist gaining a reason to doubt that R is true? Then the naturalist gains both an undercutting defeater for R and a rebutting defeater for R at the same time, but former does not depend on the latter. This is the undercutter-while-rebutter. Fwiw, I don't think that Plantinga thought of the argument this way, but I think this would make for a stronger version of EAAN. Now, even if Bergmann's right that R gets tons of prima facie, intuitive evidence in its favor, this will only block the potential rebutting defeater. But it won't necessarily block the potential undercutting defeater. The potential undercutting defeater will undercut this powerful, prima facie, intuitive evidence in favor of R. There's a lot more to say here, but anyway, that's what's motivating that part of the terminology in the paper, for anybody interested.
Thanks for putting this up for public consumption - reaallly appreciated (at least my brain thinks it appreciates it!). Which area on the RF site would help non-technical readers of this with more grounding on the basics of the causal-interaction problem? Thank you again to Dr. WLC and team.
Here are a few resources from the website: www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/questions-about-body-soul-interaction www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-1/s1-the-doctrine-of-man/the-doctrine-of-man-part-7 www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/how-can-an-immaterial-god-act-in-the-physical-world - RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg very helpful reply - the multiple response answer helped flesh out the underlying concepts for me and has given me a better grasp of the material covered by Dr WLC in the video. I'll watch it again and get more out of it. Thank you for your follow up.
The EEAN/EEACP is fascinating to me, because it seems to me that even if it shows that materialism can't be rationally held, nevertheless it could be true (or close to the truth). What if we really are irrational, and it so happens that this argument is one of the closest things we know to the truth? So many people believe the strangest things, and will die on a hill for it. Sure if materialism is true, these are just electrons on a screen. A sad reality, yet not a falsified one.
p1. If two things are distinct, then they have nothing in common (Law of Identity) p2. For a distinct substance to emerge from another, they must have something in common (Definition of emergence) p3. If they have something in common then that which they have in common, also encounters the interaction problem since it has two properties that are distinct (e.g. immaterial and material) p4. The interaction problem encounters an explanatory infinite regress unable to account for how two distinct things can count as one. p5. Thus, creation defined as the emergence of a distinct substance from another is incoherent
p1 is demonstrably false. Imagine there are two tigers in a zoo exhibit. These are each distinct creatures, yet both are animals, so they have in common the property of being animals. The Law of Identity does not preclude commonality. - RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg you are assuming the existence of properties. Platonism is false. It makes a category error and existential fallacy. Also, you are suggesting things can be distinct in one regard and identical in another. I am holding a strict interpretation of the law of identity, in which case if two things are distinct, they have nothing in common. So it seems your rebuttal is based on fallacious reasoning.
@@CMVMic //you are assuming the existence of properties. Platonism is false. It makes a category error and existential fallacy.// Not at all. On a neutralist theory of reference, one can quantify over singular terms like properties in true propositions without committing oneself to the existence of properties or propositions. We do this all the time: "My walk was refreshing" may be true, but that doesn't mean there is an object called a "walk" which provided me with refreshment. //Also, you are suggesting things can be distinct in one regard and identical in another. I am holding a strict interpretation of the law of identity, in which case if two things are distinct, they have nothing in common. So it seems your rebuttal is based on fallacious reasoning.// That's simply not the Law of Identity as it is used in philosophy. Do you not think that there are such things as distinct tigers that share in common that they are animals? - RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg well, firstly I deny there are infact two distinct tigers but rather a form matter takes that appears as two distinct entities. You are presupposing hylomorphism to form a false analogy. Conceptual distinctions can have conceptual similarities, but conceptions are not substances. Forms do not constitute new existents. If the distinction is merely conceptual, then there is no real distinction. It is simply the same substance. Furthermore, i would question your ability to identify where events start and end. For all we know, there is only a single potentially infinite event that a material substance undergoes. Re: deflationary/neutralist theory of reference for properties I want to get into the nature of referents and properties from a nominalist perspective. Are they the same? I want to avoid presupposing the metaphysical possibility of a substsnce that cannot be empirically verifiable, I view the distinction between referents and properties as a cognitive event. I want to say that without an objective account for the ontological status of such distinctions, then one is equally justified in claiming there is none. The language used to discuss properties inherently assumes the presence of distinctions, as quantification implies differentiation. If linguistic terms are not grounded in empirically verifiable referents, they risk devolving into mere gibberish, devoid of substantive meaning. Without a tangible connection to the empirical world, the pragmatic function of language becomes compromised, as communication relies on shared understanding rooted in observable phenomena. Merely associating terms with physical phenomena such as the "experience of walking" does not eliminate the need to account for distinctions between different instances of these phenomena. Without explaining the nature of these distinctions, the neutralist position remains incomplete. To defend the notion of divine interaction, the neutralist theory of reference actually undermines the defense against the interaction problem since it denies even the existence of distinct properties. So either you are presupposing the existence of distinctions or not, if you are then you are presupposing platonism, if not then there cannot be an interaction between them since there is still a lack of a substantive explanation for the properties that they do not share in common. Thus, the theist is in a self defeating position. If the neutralist doesnt deny the existence of distinct substances but denies the existence of properties, then they need to explain how distinct substances can possess qualities or attributes that are considered nonexistent. Denying the existence of properties undermines the coherence of the concept of interaction by eroding the foundational elements necessary for understanding and describing interactions. Properties provide defining characteristics of entities, shaping causal explanations, predictive power, and conceptual coherence in understanding interactions. Without properties, defining entities and their interactions becomes ambiguous, causal explanations lack identifiable factors, predictive capabilities diminish, and the conceptual framework for interaction weakens, leading to conceptual inconsistencies and limitations in comprehending entity dynamics. Furthermore, if such properties do not exist, then how do these substances interact? The concept of interaction implies the existence of a substantive connection. If the commonality or property shared between two distinct substances entities does not exist, then this begs the question. The Law of Identity, as I interpret it, asserts that if two things are distinct, they have nothing in common. This interpretation aligns with the notion of numerical identity, which requires absolute qualitative identity and holds only between a thing and itself. "My walk was refreshing" may be true, but that doesn't mean there is an object called a "walk" which provided me with refreshment. Ofcourse, there is an abstract object called a "walk" but it refers to a cognitive event that is identical to a physical activity. Now, such events are not existents nor true distinctions. You need to account for the causal relation between events and explain how it does not encounter Bradley's Regress. You still need to show that there are existing concrete relations, otherwise, your arguments do not hold. Thus, your argument is based on a false equivalence. For if two substances are distinct, then sharing identical non-existents such as "cognitive events" becomes special pleading. These events would simply be physical in which case, the immaterial is physical. If you are presupposing there is an event that two distinct substances share or they both possess an aspect such as the ability to change, then you need account for how such a shared aspect legitimizes an interaction. You have to show that there is infact, something that these substances share, rather than asserting there is a shared attribute between them. A logical possibility does not entail a metaphysical possibility. I reject the notion of distinct events and substances, viewing reality as a continuous, spatially changing substance. Saying that is not the law of identity as used in philosophy is simply unfounded and false. There are different interpretations of the Law of Identity in philosophy, the strict interpretation I'm employing aligns with its standard usage in philosophy and asserts that if two things are distinct, they have nothing in common. Your example of the tigers being animals doesn't challenge this interpretation. That's like saying there are two different kinds of substance but because they are both substances, they necessarily share a commonality i.e. the commonality/property of being a substance. However, this "being a substance" needs to be shown to be more than a cognitive event otherwise one risks making a category error. It's not that there actually is something that is being shared but something that is being asserted as being shared. Thus, the immaterial needs to first be proven to exist before asserting that a distinct substance can emerge from it simply because it is also a substance. The label "substance" is simply a relational concept, not something that actually exists and can be shared between two distinct entities. If "being a substance" is merely a relational concept or a cognitive event, then it doesn't necessarily denote an objective or independent property or mechanism in which two numerically distinct substances can interact. Also, the term "being" references a spatial empirically verifiable substance, otherwise, the term "being" or "existence" becomes incoherent gibberish. It must refer to something that exists independent of a cognitive activity. If the commonality of being a substance is merely conceptual, then it doesn't provide a substantive basis for interaction between distinct entities. Interaction typically involves the exchange or influence of properties or attributes between entities. Without concrete properties or attributes being shared, it becomes difficult to explain how interaction occurs. The theist will have no choice but to assert a brute metaphysical possibility which entails special pleading. Therefore, asserting a "non-existent" commonality is an incoherent account for the interaction between distinct substances. Whilst I acknowledge the notion that things can be distinct in one regard and identical in another, I am arguing that a substance is not distinct if it has identical aspects with a substance distinct from it. While one can leave open the ontological status of an event, presupposing a brute linguistic commonality does not provide a mechanism for such an interaction . Denying the need for a causal mechanism that isnt strictly linguistic in nature undermines causality itself and instead presupposes change itself is the shared aspect in which two distinct entities interact. This is demonstrably false. The changes two distinct substance undergo is not an accounnt for the interaction between them.
Someday, I really hope the work of people like Dreyfus, Taylor, and (especially) Peter Hacker is finally grappled with and the shadow of Descartes over these sorts of discussions can finally be lifted. The entire lecture is completely stuck in conceptual confusions which modern Materialists and Dualists alike share.
@@CMVMic As noted by Alvin Plantinga, there are many more false beliefs that may contribute to survival than true ones. So, on naturalism, if evolution selects for survival, the probability that our cognitive faculties deliver information aligning with the external world is incredibly low. - RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg Even if there are many more false beliefs that may contribute to survival than true ones and that's a big IF, it doesnt follow that the reliability of our cognitive faculties are necessarily low. That's a non-sequitur. Evolutionary processes do not operate solely on the basis of survival, traits are selected for based on their overall fitness, which can include truth-tracking abilities if they confer a survival advantage. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that truth-tracking abilities can indeed enhance survival. Accurate perceptions of the environment, social dynamics, and other factors contribute to better decision-making and adaptive behavior, thus increasing an organism's chances of survival. Additionally, Plantinga's argument relies on a strong version of naturalism that posits cognitive faculties as purely the product of blind evolutionary processes, neglecting the possibility of naturalistic explanations for the reliability of cognition. Plantinga's argument hinges on the conditional premise: if human cognitive faculties evolved solely through natural selection, their sole function would be survival and reproduction rather than truth-seeking. another non-sequitur.
If it were true that the immaterial which we don’t see could not affect the material that we do see then all of Christianity would be false and the Universe in some form would necessarily be eternal. No matter, no magic, no universe…..What I don’t understand and never will is the materialists insistence that they are able to do away with the eternal? Or that if its material that is some how less difficult to comprehend than Mind/God being eternal?
So many assertions... The number of attributes that are asserted for immaterial mental beings and how the immaterial interacts with the material is crazy considering the immaterial cannot be demonstrated to be real. So many words to justify presupposition... it's intellectually dishonest. The only honest thing said was at about the 6 min mark: "We have no understanding of how a non physical substance could have physical causal effects." And then you go on to assert the attributes of such effects... like the interaction being immediate, and souls are endowed with causal mental powers. Please demonstrate that a soul exists. I'm happy with "we can't therefore we don't know." But you seem to take "we can't" and then add 'but we know because I feel like it's true, so I will assert that it is and you can't change my mind."
@@Beyond_Right gravity is the effect of material acting on material... it is based on the amount of matter present in a location and its distance from other material. It only appears to be immaterial... but our understanding of the universe has grown beyond that and we now know that the force of gravity is completely dependent on physical matter. Try again.
I was happy to see that Dr. Craig really dug in and engaged deeply with my work (by appealing to my epistemic origin story stuff). Sadly, the casual listener will probably have no idea why I use the terminology - my terms "undercutter-because-rebutter" and "undercutter-while-rebutter" - that I do. Dr. Craig uses them without explaining them, which is completely justified (because it takes a lot of time to explain them!) So, what are these terms? I'll explain for anybody interested.
First, some basic epistemology. A rebutting defeater for a belief that p is a reason for thinking (or evidence that) p is false. An undercutting defeater for a belief that p is a reason to doubt that the belief that p was formed reliably.
For a rebutting defeater for the belief that p to successfully work as a defeater, it must overcome the evidence in favor of p. This is not so for undercutting defeaters. They need only undercut one's evidence in favor of p (e.g., by showing that the evidence does not actually reliably indicate the truth of p).
Now to EAAN. Is EAAN supposed to provide the naturalist an undercutting defeater for R or a rebutting defeater for R?
Well, here's something interesting that happens, and I don't think it was noticed in the literature. If EAAN provides the naturalist with a rebutting defeater for R, then one will thereby getting an undercutting defeater for all of one's beliefs (a reason to doubt that they are formed reliably), including the belief in R. (Plantinga, of course, noticed this.) Now here's what's interesting. If this is so, then one has an undercutting defeater for R TOO, but only BECAUSE one had a rebutting defeater for R first. So, R has BOTH types of defeaters. I call this an "undercutter-because-rebutter".
A response to EAAN by Michael Bergmann says that R has powerful prima facie, intuitive evidence in its favor. If it's strong enough, then the naturalist won't get a rebutting defeater, and hence, no undercutting defeater.
But what if EAAN DIRECTLY provides the naturalist with a reason to doubt that their belief in R was not formed reliably? And this happens alongside the naturalist gaining a reason to doubt that R is true? Then the naturalist gains both an undercutting defeater for R and a rebutting defeater for R at the same time, but former does not depend on the latter. This is the undercutter-while-rebutter. Fwiw, I don't think that Plantinga thought of the argument this way, but I think this would make for a stronger version of EAAN.
Now, even if Bergmann's right that R gets tons of prima facie, intuitive evidence in its favor, this will only block the potential rebutting defeater. But it won't necessarily block the potential undercutting defeater. The potential undercutting defeater will undercut this powerful, prima facie, intuitive evidence in favor of R.
There's a lot more to say here, but anyway, that's what's motivating that part of the terminology in the paper, for anybody interested.
Let me watch this about 4 more times
Errr…. 10 for me.
@@wickius12
Pfffftttt....I got you all beat, cuz I'm just gonna give up!
I revisited this and I’m still like “Hferrrrrrrp.”
Absolute unit.
Yeah it will take me 10 listens to understand what’s going on here
Good ideas I "like"
Thanks for putting this up for public consumption - reaallly appreciated (at least my brain thinks it appreciates it!). Which area on the RF site would help non-technical readers of this with more grounding on the basics of the causal-interaction problem? Thank you again to Dr. WLC and team.
Here are a few resources from the website:
www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/questions-about-body-soul-interaction
www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-1/s1-the-doctrine-of-man/the-doctrine-of-man-part-7
www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/how-can-an-immaterial-god-act-in-the-physical-world
- RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg very helpful reply - the multiple response answer helped flesh out the underlying concepts for me and has given me a better grasp of the material covered by Dr WLC in the video. I'll watch it again and get more out of it. Thank you for your follow up.
The EEAN/EEACP is fascinating to me, because it seems to me that even if it shows that materialism can't be rationally held, nevertheless it could be true (or close to the truth). What if we really are irrational, and it so happens that this argument is one of the closest things we know to the truth? So many people believe the strangest things, and will die on a hill for it.
Sure if materialism is true, these are just electrons on a screen. A sad reality, yet not a falsified one.
p1. If two things are distinct, then they have nothing in common (Law of Identity)
p2. For a distinct substance to emerge from another, they must have something in common (Definition of emergence)
p3. If they have something in common then that which they have in common, also encounters the interaction problem since it has two properties that are distinct (e.g. immaterial and material)
p4. The interaction problem encounters an explanatory infinite regress unable to account for how two distinct things can count as one.
p5. Thus, creation defined as the emergence of a distinct substance from another is incoherent
p1 is demonstrably false. Imagine there are two tigers in a zoo exhibit. These are each distinct creatures, yet both are animals, so they have in common the property of being animals.
The Law of Identity does not preclude commonality. - RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg you are assuming the existence of properties. Platonism is false. It makes a category error and existential fallacy.
Also, you are suggesting things can be distinct in one regard and identical in another. I am holding a strict interpretation of the law of identity, in which case if two things are distinct, they have nothing in common. So it seems your rebuttal is based on fallacious reasoning.
@@CMVMic //you are assuming the existence of properties. Platonism is false. It makes a category error and existential fallacy.//
Not at all. On a neutralist theory of reference, one can quantify over singular terms like properties in true propositions without committing oneself to the existence of properties or propositions. We do this all the time: "My walk was refreshing" may be true, but that doesn't mean there is an object called a "walk" which provided me with refreshment.
//Also, you are suggesting things can be distinct in one regard and identical in another. I am holding a strict interpretation of the law of identity, in which case if two things are distinct, they have nothing in common. So it seems your rebuttal is based on fallacious reasoning.//
That's simply not the Law of Identity as it is used in philosophy. Do you not think that there are such things as distinct tigers that share in common that they are animals? - RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg well, firstly I deny there are infact two distinct tigers but rather a form matter takes that appears as two distinct entities. You are presupposing hylomorphism to form a false analogy. Conceptual distinctions can have conceptual similarities, but conceptions are not substances. Forms do not constitute new existents. If the distinction is merely conceptual, then there is no real distinction. It is simply the same substance. Furthermore, i would question your ability to identify where events start and end. For all we know, there is only a single potentially infinite event that a material substance undergoes.
Re: deflationary/neutralist theory of reference for properties
I want to get into the nature of referents and properties from a nominalist perspective. Are they the same? I want to avoid presupposing the metaphysical possibility of a substsnce that cannot be empirically verifiable, I view the distinction between referents and properties as a cognitive event. I want to say that without an objective account for the ontological status of such distinctions, then one is equally justified in claiming there is none. The language used to discuss properties inherently assumes the presence of distinctions, as quantification implies differentiation.
If linguistic terms are not grounded in empirically verifiable referents, they risk devolving into mere gibberish, devoid of substantive meaning. Without a tangible connection to the empirical world, the pragmatic function of language becomes compromised, as communication relies on shared understanding rooted in observable phenomena. Merely associating terms with physical phenomena such as the "experience of walking" does not eliminate the need to account for distinctions between different instances of these phenomena. Without explaining the nature of these distinctions, the neutralist position remains incomplete. To defend the notion of divine interaction, the neutralist theory of reference actually undermines the defense against the interaction problem since it denies even the existence of distinct properties. So either you are presupposing the existence of distinctions or not, if you are then you are presupposing platonism, if not then there cannot be an interaction between them since there is still a lack of a substantive explanation for the properties that they do not share in common. Thus, the theist is in a self defeating position. If the neutralist doesnt deny the existence of distinct substances but denies the existence of properties, then they need to explain how distinct substances can possess qualities or attributes that are considered nonexistent.
Denying the existence of properties undermines the coherence of the concept of interaction by eroding the foundational elements necessary for understanding and describing interactions. Properties provide defining characteristics of entities, shaping causal explanations, predictive power, and conceptual coherence in understanding interactions. Without properties, defining entities and their interactions becomes ambiguous, causal explanations lack identifiable factors, predictive capabilities diminish, and the conceptual framework for interaction weakens, leading to conceptual inconsistencies and limitations in comprehending entity dynamics.
Furthermore, if such properties do not exist, then how do these substances interact? The concept of interaction implies the existence of a substantive connection. If the commonality or property shared between two distinct substances entities does not exist, then this begs the question.
The Law of Identity, as I interpret it, asserts that if two things are distinct, they have nothing in common. This interpretation aligns with the notion of numerical identity, which requires absolute qualitative identity and holds only between a thing and itself.
"My walk was refreshing" may be true, but that doesn't mean there is an object called a "walk" which provided me with refreshment.
Ofcourse, there is an abstract object called a "walk" but it refers to a cognitive event that is identical to a physical activity. Now, such events are not existents nor true distinctions. You need to account for the causal relation between events and explain how it does not encounter Bradley's Regress.
You still need to show that there are existing concrete relations, otherwise, your arguments do not hold. Thus, your argument is based on a false equivalence. For if two substances are distinct, then sharing identical non-existents such as "cognitive events" becomes special pleading. These events would simply be physical in which case, the immaterial is physical. If you are presupposing there is an event that two distinct substances share or they both possess an aspect such as the ability to change, then you need account for how such a shared aspect legitimizes an interaction. You have to show that there is infact, something that these substances share, rather than asserting there is a shared attribute between them. A logical possibility does not entail a metaphysical possibility. I reject the notion of distinct events and substances, viewing reality as a continuous, spatially changing substance.
Saying that is not the law of identity as used in philosophy is simply unfounded and false.
There are different interpretations of the Law of Identity in philosophy, the strict interpretation I'm employing aligns with its standard usage in philosophy and asserts that if two things are distinct, they have nothing in common. Your example of the tigers being animals doesn't challenge this interpretation. That's like saying there are two different kinds of substance but because they are both substances, they necessarily share a commonality i.e. the commonality/property of being a substance. However, this "being a substance" needs to be shown to be more than a cognitive event otherwise one risks making a category error. It's not that there actually is something that is being shared but something that is being asserted as being shared. Thus, the immaterial needs to first be proven to exist before asserting that a distinct substance can emerge from it simply because it is also a substance. The label "substance" is simply a relational concept, not something that actually exists and can be shared between two distinct entities.
If "being a substance" is merely a relational concept or a cognitive event, then it doesn't necessarily denote an objective or independent property or mechanism in which two numerically distinct substances can interact. Also, the term "being" references a spatial empirically verifiable substance, otherwise, the term "being" or "existence" becomes incoherent gibberish. It must refer to something that exists independent of a cognitive activity.
If the commonality of being a substance is merely conceptual, then it doesn't provide a substantive basis for interaction between distinct entities. Interaction typically involves the exchange or influence of properties or attributes between entities. Without concrete properties or attributes being shared, it becomes difficult to explain how interaction occurs. The theist will have no choice but to assert a brute metaphysical possibility which entails special pleading. Therefore, asserting a "non-existent" commonality is an incoherent account for the interaction between distinct substances.
Whilst I acknowledge the notion that things can be distinct in one regard and identical in another, I am arguing that a substance is not distinct if it has identical aspects with a substance distinct from it.
While one can leave open the ontological status of an event, presupposing a brute linguistic commonality does not provide a mechanism for such an interaction . Denying the need for a causal mechanism that isnt strictly linguistic in nature undermines causality itself and instead presupposes change itself is the shared aspect in which two distinct entities interact. This is demonstrably false. The changes two distinct substance undergo is not an accounnt for the interaction between them.
To summarize Craig's speech...we have no idea what is.
Someday, I really hope the work of people like Dreyfus, Taylor, and (especially) Peter Hacker is finally grappled with and the shadow of Descartes over these sorts of discussions can finally be lifted. The entire lecture is completely stuck in conceptual confusions which modern Materialists and Dualists alike share.
God, I always knew you could make a philosopher handsome.
Classical theism offers a much better account of the being and nature of God.
15:46 premise 1 is false!
Why think that? - RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg because it is not necessarily true that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is low. So please defend p1
@@CMVMic As noted by Alvin Plantinga, there are many more false beliefs that may contribute to survival than true ones. So, on naturalism, if evolution selects for survival, the probability that our cognitive faculties deliver information aligning with the external world is incredibly low. - RF Admin
@@ReasonableFaithOrg Even if there are many more false beliefs that may contribute to survival than true ones and that's a big IF, it doesnt follow that the reliability of our cognitive faculties are necessarily low. That's a non-sequitur.
Evolutionary processes do not operate solely on the basis of survival, traits are selected for based on their overall fitness, which can include truth-tracking abilities if they confer a survival advantage.
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that truth-tracking abilities can indeed enhance survival. Accurate perceptions of the environment, social dynamics, and other factors contribute to better decision-making and adaptive behavior, thus increasing an organism's chances of survival.
Additionally, Plantinga's argument relies on a strong version of naturalism that posits cognitive faculties as purely the product of blind evolutionary processes, neglecting the possibility of naturalistic explanations for the reliability of cognition. Plantinga's argument hinges on the conditional premise: if human cognitive faculties evolved solely through natural selection, their sole function would be survival and reproduction rather than truth-seeking. another non-sequitur.
If it were true that the immaterial which we don’t see could not affect the material that we do see then all of Christianity would be false and the Universe in some form would necessarily be eternal. No matter, no magic, no universe…..What I don’t understand and never will is the materialists insistence that they are able to do away with the eternal? Or that if its material that is some how less difficult to comprehend than Mind/God being eternal?
Matter is eternal
where did you get that from and why do you believe it?@@CMVMic
I will challenge any theist in these comments to a debate
So many assertions... The number of attributes that are asserted for immaterial mental beings and how the immaterial interacts with the material is crazy considering the immaterial cannot be demonstrated to be real. So many words to justify presupposition... it's intellectually dishonest. The only honest thing said was at about the 6 min mark: "We have no understanding of how a non physical substance could have physical causal effects." And then you go on to assert the attributes of such effects... like the interaction being immediate, and souls are endowed with causal mental powers. Please demonstrate that a soul exists. I'm happy with "we can't therefore we don't know." But you seem to take "we can't" and then add 'but we know because I feel like it's true, so I will assert that it is and you can't change my mind."
Gravity
@@Beyond_Right gravity is the effect of material acting on material... it is based on the amount of matter present in a location and its distance from other material. It only appears to be immaterial... but our understanding of the universe has grown beyond that and we now know that the force of gravity is completely dependent on physical matter. Try again.
@@Beyond_Right And coins randomly appearing out of an audience's ears.
He looks like Barney Fife
Was that before after Barney Fife face lifts? 😂😎
The reason God seems to not be there is really simple... He isn't.