‘Identify the Expert’: an Experimental Study in Economic Advice - Zacharias Maniadis

Abstract:
In a set of preregistered experiments with the UK general population, experimental participants receive recommended answers to an economics questionnaire by two computerized advisors. One advisor is of high accuracy (‘the Expert’) and recommends the answers produced by academic consensus. The other advisor is of low accuracy (‘the Populist’), and recommends the modal answers of participants from a pilot study. We examine which advisor participants select to answer the questionnaire on their behalf. Our participants overwhelmingly choose the Populist, even when fully informed about the modus operandi of the two advisors. Bayesian models fail to explain these choices, even in the degenerate case where participants should be able to identify the Expert with 100% accuracy. Overconfidence partly accounts for advisor choice, while ego-involvement cannot explain behaviour.
Bio:
Zacharias Maniadis is the ERA Chair in Science and Innovation Policy and Studies at the University of Cyprus. He obtained his PhD in Economics from UCLA in 2008 and has held positions at Bocconi University and University of Southampton. His primary interests lie in the application of microeconomic theory to the problem of understanding the incentives of researchers. His publications have appeared in journals such as the American Economic Review, Economic Journal, PLOS Biology, and Research Policy. In Cyprus he is leading an interdisciplinary research team with the vision of incorporating economic methods and insights into meta-research.