I truly enjoy reading your works Mr. Knight. I have often wondered as to why Lt. Col Pulleine placed his troops they way he did. I can understand the initial placement of Dyson, Mostlyn, and Cavaye's companies, as at the time the Zulu force was moving in that direction as the mounted irregulars were being pushed down that avenue of approach. These men could also cover the valley to their left. But once he began his placement of the main defensive line (which the previously mentioned companies fell back to), it was obviously too large a defensive perimeter for his forces to adequately cover. I read a passage in "Zulu Rising" where you said the officers had been examining the defensive potential of the area, noting dead zones and such. I would expect Pulleine would have been privy to these discussions, and placements of the troops to cover these areas would without a doubt would have been discussed. Now it has been more than adequately stated Pulleine was inexperienced in front line command. Could it be he chose to place his troops where he did because of those previous discussions? And is it possible these discussions regarding the defense of the camp were meant for the placement of the entire force, and not just the forces at his disposal? It seems to me this could explain why he was defending too large a perimeter. What are your thoughts?
Even though I am very familiar with this action and consequently that of Rorkes Drift, this telling was very very concise, well informed and a pleasure to watch. You really know your stuff. Very well done mate
Mr. Knight, Thank you for the excellent video. I've subscribed to Isandlwana.Mov. I've read a number of books on the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and possess your book, "Dead Men's Blood", which I read with much pleasure.
Thank you Mr knight I have enjoyed all your movies on this subject. A question Please Can you explain in more detail the weapons and equipment of both fighting units. thank you.
I wonder if it was possible for Brits to utilize Isandlwana mountain as a defensive position during retreat or as a high ground sniper or artillery base if They had enough warning time before battle or during ?
I've always been a massive fan of the Anglo zulu, more so since discovering Ian knights books. And my wife and I are planning to visit the battle fields from the Uk next year, does Ian live there and give talks still does anyone know please?
I am also of the opinion of a few things some of the commentators have made. In regards to Chelmsford splitting his forces, there was a certain logic to his actions. Not as if the decision was a wise one mind you, but I can still see why he decided to do so. Now, I do not believe he was lured in by a decoy force. My understanding is the Zulus Dartnell had come across were "late comers" who were on their way to join up with the main army which was already camped out north of the British camp.These guys did play some games trying to entice the British reconnaissance force to follow them so that the main Impi could wipe them out, but they still were not a diversionary force. Chelmford's fault lay in not having the camp Laager up, leaving no barrier for the soldiers to fight behind (think the buscuit boxes at Rourke's Drift). As far as Dunford was concerned, his was technically an independent command, While he was the ranking officer and technically in command once he arrived at the camp, he still saw himself in the role of providing support for the General's advance. Learning of a force that may have been moving towards Chelmford, he may have thought a spoiling attack would dissuade them from continuing their advance. It turned out not to be a good idea, but it did put him in a position to delay the left horn moving toward the British right for some time. Had Pulleine's perimeter been smaller and not so extended, Dunford would have been able to fall back when he ran low on ammo without compromising the camp defense.
A few things. 1. Durnfords orders were to "reinforce the camp", following on from the orders to Pulleine to act on the defensive. 2. It was Durnford asking Pulleine to support him and then choosing a far extended defensive position which caused the British line to be so far out. 3. Durnford went chasing after Zulus before his ammo wagon arrived at camp did not make sure where it would be located when it arrived so when his men ran out of ammo and riders were sent back to camp to replenish, they couldn't find the wagon.
@@lyndoncmp5751 just finished reading Zulu Rising. Did Durnford move out as he thought Chelmsford might be cut off by a Zulu force? I thought that was his reasoning but seems they inadvertently blundered into the main Zulu army and would have probably been ambushed the next day as they moved the camp forwards as per Chelmsford's instructions
@@barbellsamurai8014 Yes I believe it was used by Durnford at the time as a reason to go after the Zulus but I do think that was an excuse to justify his actions because the Zulus were seen to be retiring to the north east, whereas Chelmsford was ten miles away to the south east. The retiring Zulus simply weren't heading in the direction of Chelmsford. Nor were the reports of the Zulus retiring to the northeast in any huge vast numbers. About 4,000 or so. Chelmsford had more than enough men to easily deal with that threat. Nobody, especially not Durnford, knew there were 25,000 Zulus there. If Durnford's NNMH didn't run smack bang into the main Zulu impi, thus bringing the battle forward a day, then Pulleine would have packed up camp and moved on THAT day, the day the actual battle was fought, because Chelmford sent orders back for Pulleine to pack up camp and join the rest of the force at Mengeni. Its interesting to speculate what the Zulus would have done about this on the 22nd if they had not been discovered and their scouts watched the camp pack up and seen a long strung out force move towards Mengeni.
If only Durnford had followed orders and defended the camp rather than riding off it could have all been so different! Lt Cochrane (Durnford's staff officer who survived the battle) recalled that Pulliene's orders to 'defend the camp' were definately passed to Durnford when he assumed command at Isandlwana on the morning of the battle. But Durnford still rode off with 1/3 of the defenders that morning.
Mr Knight Thank you A question please I have read in other accounts of the battle that Chelmsford did in fact receive as many as two timely messages of the Impi sighting near Isandlwana but he dismissed the reports as exaggerations Have you given any consideration to these claims in your analyses? Thanks and regards
Looking at an overview of the battlefield it was obvious at some point they were going to be outflanked on the righthand side of the firing line I think pulliene like the rest of the British command underestimated the Zulu and thought they wouldn't stand against the martini henry
I find it pretty unlikely that only a 1,000 Zulu warriors were killed outright during the battle. The older estimates of 2,000-3,000 Zulu's killed outright during the battle sounds a lot more plausible considering the head on assault over mostly open ground for almost an hour. The rifle fire was after all effective to the point that the Zulu center had to stop and lie down for cover for part of the battle.
Ian Knight said that 1,000 killed at the battle plus another 1,000 of mortal wounds after leaving,so around 2,000 in total.Musketry was not a question of individual marksmanship but laying down fire in a general direction,there was always the call to 'aim low' as the general tendency was to miss over the target,by lying down the Zulu were protected and allowed the British infantry to exhaust their ammunition. How accurate would a British recruit have been with a Martini-Henry firing through a cloud of black powder smoke with the realisation that a rather unpleasant death was bearing down a few hundred yards away?
I agree it seems remarkably low esp with the brits fire at a mass body of men. Now in panic they could of aiming higher. There may be some truth in this. American report found that most casualties inflicted on the German army in WW 2 was done by only 25 percent of their forces. So they changed tactics, ie got their men to fire at human targets and used to fire at the human shapes. it seems humans do not like kill other humans even when ordered too. However, this is supposition here, as the men knew if they did not kill the Zulus they are dead. At Rorke's Drift, it goes to show how much firepower a small detachment of men can do, but even they had fired a lot of ammo. Of course, they could have missed, being played with, etc. The same happens in Afghanistan with the paras at Helmand, they got told off for firing over 30,000 + rounds in a month.
@@christopherfranklin972 Pretty accurate when you see 20,000 men making a lot of noise and running at you. At waterloo 53,000 men died in one day. Also even though it was black powder they were using, it was not the same as the one used a waterloo. Sure it limited visibility but remember the brits were spaced out. 20,000 men make a dam big target when bunched together. So for example you have 5,000 men each for the horns, which leaves a10,000 for the head and the body. The Zulus kept 5,000 in reserve and they did not take part in the attack though formed part of the body. it this body that attacked Rorke's drift. Some say they could not have been any weapons from the brits to be used at Rorke's drift as they were not there. They were there but not used and once the battle was over, they could have taken a few weapons off the dead brits. If the brits had a larger fortification, and readouts they would have won the battle.
@@Mulberry2000 At Rorke's Drift the defenders fired 1,000's of rounds at such a rate that by evening rounds were 'cooking off' and firing prematurely due to the heat in the chamber and barrel yet despite firing from a resting position on a barricade they accounted for around 350 dead plus 500 wounded,so not a high percentage.
@@Mulberry2000 Whoa!The casualties at Waterloo have no relevance to what happened at Isandlwana,a completely different scenario with massed artillery,cavalry charges and masses of musketry at close ranges. The British infantry at Isandlwana were too spaced out for their fire to have the same effect that it did in later battles like Kambula and Ulundi where the concentrated fire of Martini Henry rifles decimated the Zulu charges. 20,000 men sounds like a big target but a man is a very small target at 200 yards and the average soldier had little musketry practice,under battlefield stress it was probably a case of point and pray,they were not marksmen by any means. Get 10 of your friends to stand 200 yards away and consider if you would be confident of hitting any of them using an 8 1/2 pound rifle that kicks like a mule.
Chelmsford not only split his force. He split it again and yet again in the Mangeni hills. He himself could easily have been overwhelmed personally as he breakfasted with but a small bodyguard near him.
Durnford did the same thing. Durnford split his horsemen and then rode out to confront the Zulus with totally insufficient numbers. The blunders of both Chelmsford and Durnford were very similar.
very well spoken thankyou now that's how you describe information. ive just come from a video on the reasons of the decline of the west and this guy said um um um ever 3 seconds on average you felt you wanted to squeeze down the fibre optics and talk on his behalf .some highly intelligent fellows cant talk properly
did you see the video (cant remember which one exactly now) but they said being very thinly spread out british troops and due to the fog the infantry were overwhelmed as they couldn't see far enough and so far apart to be effective. and the same video assessed the problems of ammunition of the new issue rifle which was state of the art for the time
Zulu casualties of 2,000 seem remarkably low. Some sources say min 3,000 + and then add the 800 -1000 lost at Rorke's drift in one day the Zulus had lost 3,000 to 5,000 men
Durnford was a scapegoat, Chelmsford should never have split his forces without knowing where the main impi was. The Zulus had to fight soon as they needed their manpower to get the crops in before the winter came.
+John Cornell I doubt in those days he would have been able to radio G Company to tell them of his intentions! The regular Companies were spread too thin and too far out from the camp anyway.
The British did as every other force has fought the Zulu they met their end from the Horns of The Buffalo. Head and chest that they were fighting it was late when the encircling horn closed in on them by that time they were unable to retreat. That was the reason Chelmsford and other wanted to defeat the Zulu for they feared the ideal that if they were able to buy or get weapon equal to the British. The Zulu would be a force equal to the British then with the use of The Horn of Buffalo could take the hole of South Africa. Shaka Zulu with 400 worriers defeated larger tribes and became the Supper power in the region in just 25 years and that what the British and Bores feared.
John Cornell This time period was the Victorian Era in which men or women were looked down upon for leaving a spouse's bed for another. Durnford had fought the Zulu for years but being he was having an affair with the Bishop's daughter Lord Chelmsford and his officers looked down on him. He should have taken command of the forces at Islandlwana. It was Lord Chelmsford who made the decision to make Durnford second in command and Pullenine overall command at Islandlwana. The problem here was Pulleine had never fought the Zulu at any other time would had fortified his position from a unknown force for he believed until the battle that Chelmsford was following the Zulu Impi. It was to late after it brought to his attention of the Zulu Impi was with in striking distance of his camp at Islandwana. The defeat from the Zulu at Islandlwana from Lord Chelmsford bad decisions from splitting his 15,000 man forces into three forces one in the West and one in the Center and one in the East. The Zulu would have been defeated if he had keep his force together.
Liverpoolscottis H It was the person who was in command of the operation He split the force into three section in which the Zulu had recognized it as it had looked like the Horns of The Bull Buffalo for they had spies who reported back to Cetshwayo. He and his generals knew the movement of the British and planed the attack at Islandlwana to the tee they sent a force for Lord Chelmsford to follow. Pulling him away so they would face the force left behind and it was defeat that did not have to happen.
LIVERPOOLSCOTTISH Chard’s decisions, as an Engineer, made all the difference in setting up barricades at Rorke’s Drift. Your point on Durnford, also an Engineer, taking action to organise the camp’s defences makes sense to me. The battle was there to be won but that Zulu right horn appearing in the British rear would be a shock.
A bloodthirsty demon a warlord a Savage with a demon who believes in payback don't let your enemies rise up and charge at your throat make sure you kill them off
It's Quite ! Amazing ! HOW ! it's ! All ! JUST !! FULL !! OF !! HOUSING ! ESTATES !! And Shopping ! Centres ! There ! Now !! BUT ! I ! GUESS ! TOMORROW ! IT ! WILL BECOME !! A ! MOSS ! EISLEY ! SPACE ! PORT !! There !
I may be totally naïve here but surely the worst thing you can do is split an already outnumbered force, not once but twice, and not take advantage of the high ground that is available. Ian Knight does his best to gloss over the obvious incompetence of Chelmsford by trying to put some logic into his actions. Chelmsford had the foolish British colonial attitude of thinking they were fighting mere natives and it would be a stroll in the park. Some stroll.
I wonder if any of those men considered the immorality of their actions and how they were used by the British ruling class. Glorious defeat can't cloak how evil the British army was.
Nothing about the NNC units, half the force numbers, situated between the British companies breaking & fleeing, allowing the Zulus to turn those British flanks & assisting the Zulu win. Very PC, Ian K, & making this show meaningless. Even the local birdlife's giving his performance the whistle..
It didn't quite happen like that Iain. The NNC units were not situated between the British infantry companies. They were to the rear of them, and while they did mostly panic and flee, the firing line was not breached due to them as they were not part of the actual front firing line. In no way would the British have given such a prominent role to a native force that they would never have trusted to hold any line. As Ian Knight rightly states, it was mainly due to Durnford falling back without warning and compromising the right flank, which quickly caved in forcing the infantry companies to withdraw. G Company was left exposed and all on it's own. It was quickly overrun and annihilated but the rest of the British infantry companies mostly withdrew in coherent order back to the camp, still firing. The NNC were only ever meant to be a secondary force, to be used to chase after an already retreating and defeated enemy, or for scout and escort duties. They were not used like a British infantry company. How could they be? Only 1 in 10 had a gun.
This guy does not have a clue , does not tell all the facts and by the way i lved here for 30years and studied this history in depth, his doc he do for tv was a joke as well.
It’s all well and good critiquing someone (someone well respected by the way) but how about you back your negative feedback with some facts and pointers as to where you believe he went wrong...
Ian Knights knowledge on the Zulu wars is legendary,i could listen him all day,he paints such vivid pictures with his talks..Brilliant guy.!!!
Thanks for this. Reading your book Zulu Rising at the moment. Has become one of my favorites. Cheers from the USA.
Wonderfully described, gives a real sense of nostalgia and brings the story to life. Great job 👍🏽
Just reading Zulu Rising and this short vid really helps to understand the topography described in the book
Great explanation. Have read over the battle many times. Zulu is still one of the best films of all time. As a kid i watched it many times over.
11bravo1789 it's not accurate
Thanks for posting this , I have read much about this period but it helps a great deal to hear commentary like this and balanced commentary at that.
I truly enjoy reading your works Mr. Knight. I have often wondered as to why Lt. Col Pulleine placed his troops they way he did. I can understand the initial placement of Dyson, Mostlyn, and Cavaye's companies, as at the time the Zulu force was moving in that direction as the mounted irregulars were being pushed down that avenue of approach. These men could also cover the valley to their left. But once he began his placement of the main defensive line (which the previously mentioned companies fell back to), it was obviously too large a defensive perimeter for his forces to adequately cover. I read a passage in "Zulu Rising" where you said the officers had been examining the defensive potential of the area, noting dead zones and such. I would expect Pulleine would have been privy to these discussions, and placements of the troops to cover these areas would without a doubt would have been discussed. Now it has been more than adequately stated Pulleine was inexperienced in front line command. Could it be he chose to place his troops where he did because of those previous discussions? And is it possible these discussions regarding the defense of the camp were meant for the placement of the entire force, and not just the forces at his disposal? It seems to me this could explain why he was defending too large a perimeter. What are your thoughts?
Even though I am very familiar with this action and consequently that of Rorkes Drift, this telling was very very concise, well informed and a pleasure to watch. You really know your stuff. Very well done mate
I found this video really interesting and insightful. Thanks.
Thank you for this really interesting video. Just watched the film "Zulu Dawn" and wanted to find out more. Thanks.
Fantastic. Thank you
Excellent video, very informative and well filmed.
Excellent account of the battle.
Excellent Explanation thanks Ian. I've got your books and I'm off to SA in July
Very interesting. Grazie
Mr. Knight, Thank you for the excellent video. I've subscribed to Isandlwana.Mov. I've read a number of books on the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and possess your book, "Dead Men's Blood", which I read with much pleasure.
Thank you Mr knight I have enjoyed all your movies on this subject.
A question Please Can you explain in more detail the weapons and equipment of both fighting units. thank you.
lester wilson
Nice video. There’s something very frustrating though being at the site but pointing off camera. 😐
I wonder if it was possible for Brits to utilize Isandlwana mountain as a defensive position during retreat or as a high ground sniper or artillery base if They had enough warning time before battle or during ?
I've always been a massive fan of the Anglo zulu, more so since discovering Ian knights books. And my wife and I are planning to visit the battle fields from the Uk next year, does Ian live there and give talks still does anyone know please?
I am also of the opinion of a few things some of the commentators have made. In regards to Chelmsford splitting his forces, there was a certain logic to his actions. Not as if the decision was a wise one mind you, but I can still see why he decided to do so. Now, I do not believe he was lured in by a decoy force. My understanding is the Zulus Dartnell had come across were "late comers" who were on their way to join up with the main army which was already camped out north of the British camp.These guys did play some games trying to entice the British reconnaissance force to follow them so that the main Impi could wipe them out, but they still were not a diversionary force. Chelmford's fault lay in not having the camp Laager up, leaving no barrier for the soldiers to fight behind (think the buscuit boxes at Rourke's Drift). As far as Dunford was concerned, his was technically an independent command, While he was the ranking officer and technically in command once he arrived at the camp, he still saw himself in the role of providing support for the General's advance. Learning of a force that may have been moving towards Chelmford, he may have thought a spoiling attack would dissuade them from continuing their advance. It turned out not to be a good idea, but it did put him in a position to delay the left horn moving toward the British right for some time. Had Pulleine's perimeter been smaller and not so extended, Dunford would have been able to fall back when he ran low on ammo without compromising the camp defense.
A few things.
1. Durnfords orders were to "reinforce the camp", following on from the orders to Pulleine to act on the defensive.
2. It was Durnford asking Pulleine to support him and then choosing a far extended defensive position which caused the British line to be so far out.
3. Durnford went chasing after Zulus before his ammo wagon arrived at camp did not make sure where it would be located when it arrived so when his men ran out of ammo and riders were sent back to camp to replenish, they couldn't find the wagon.
@@lyndoncmp5751 just finished reading Zulu Rising. Did Durnford move out as he thought Chelmsford might be cut off by a Zulu force? I thought that was his reasoning but seems they inadvertently blundered into the main Zulu army and would have probably been ambushed the next day as they moved the camp forwards as per Chelmsford's instructions
@@barbellsamurai8014
Yes I believe it was used by Durnford at the time as a reason to go after the Zulus but I do think that was an excuse to justify his actions because the Zulus were seen to be retiring to the north east, whereas Chelmsford was ten miles away to the south east. The retiring Zulus simply weren't heading in the direction of Chelmsford. Nor were the reports of the Zulus retiring to the northeast in any huge vast numbers. About 4,000 or so. Chelmsford had more than enough men to easily deal with that threat. Nobody, especially not Durnford, knew there were 25,000 Zulus there.
If Durnford's NNMH didn't run smack bang into the main Zulu impi, thus bringing the battle forward a day, then Pulleine would have packed up camp and moved on THAT day, the day the actual battle was fought, because Chelmford sent orders back for Pulleine to pack up camp and join the rest of the force at Mengeni. Its interesting to speculate what the Zulus would have done about this on the 22nd if they had not been discovered and their scouts watched the camp pack up and seen a long strung out force move towards Mengeni.
If only Durnford had followed orders and defended the camp rather than riding off it could have all been so different! Lt Cochrane (Durnford's staff officer who survived the battle) recalled that Pulliene's orders to 'defend the camp' were definately passed to Durnford when he assumed command at Isandlwana on the morning of the battle. But Durnford still rode off with 1/3 of the defenders that morning.
That open order certainly was a major blunder
Mr Knight Thank you A question please I have read in other accounts of the battle that Chelmsford did in fact receive as many as two timely messages of the Impi sighting near Isandlwana but he dismissed the reports as exaggerations Have you given any consideration to these claims in your analyses?
Thanks and regards
Thanks for the interesting info.
So, did Chelmsford then go to Rorkes Drift and meet up with Chad and Bromhead
Yes he did.
Looking at an overview of the battlefield it was obvious at some point they were going to be outflanked on the righthand side of the firing line I think pulliene like the rest of the British command underestimated the Zulu and thought they wouldn't stand against the martini henry
great stuff, on location too, are you British??
The British should have laagered the wagons like the Boers at Blood River (1838). Behind this barricade it could have been Rorke's Drift writ large.
I find it pretty unlikely that only a 1,000 Zulu warriors were killed outright during the battle. The older estimates of 2,000-3,000 Zulu's killed outright during the battle sounds a lot more plausible considering the head on assault over mostly open ground for almost an hour. The rifle fire was after all effective to the point that the Zulu center had to stop and lie down for cover for part of the battle.
Ian Knight said that 1,000 killed at the battle plus another 1,000 of mortal wounds after leaving,so around 2,000 in total.Musketry was not a question of individual marksmanship but laying down fire in a general direction,there was always the call to 'aim low' as the general tendency was to miss over the target,by lying down the Zulu were protected and allowed the British infantry to exhaust their ammunition.
How accurate would a British recruit have been with a Martini-Henry firing through a cloud of black powder smoke with the realisation that a rather unpleasant death was bearing down a few hundred yards away?
I agree it seems remarkably low esp with the brits fire at a mass body of men. Now in panic they could of aiming higher. There may be some truth in this. American report found that most casualties inflicted on the German army in WW 2 was done by only 25 percent of their forces. So they changed tactics, ie got their men to fire at human targets and used to fire at the human shapes. it seems humans do not like kill other humans even when ordered too.
However, this is supposition here, as the men knew if they did not kill the Zulus they are dead. At Rorke's Drift, it goes to show how much firepower a small detachment of men can do, but even they had fired a lot of ammo. Of course, they could have missed, being played with, etc. The same happens in Afghanistan with the paras at Helmand, they got told off for firing over 30,000 + rounds in a month.
@@christopherfranklin972 Pretty accurate when you see 20,000 men making a lot of noise and running at you. At waterloo 53,000 men died in one day. Also even though it was black powder they were using, it was not the same as the one used a waterloo. Sure it limited visibility but remember the brits were spaced out. 20,000 men make a dam big target when bunched together. So for example you have 5,000 men each for the horns, which leaves a10,000 for the head and the body.
The Zulus kept 5,000 in reserve and they did not take part in the attack though formed part of the body. it this body that attacked Rorke's drift. Some say they could not have been any weapons from the brits to be used at Rorke's drift as they were not there. They were there but not used and once the battle was over, they could have taken a few weapons off the dead brits.
If the brits had a larger fortification, and readouts they would have won the battle.
@@Mulberry2000 At Rorke's Drift the defenders fired 1,000's of rounds at such a rate that by evening rounds were 'cooking off' and firing prematurely due to the heat in the chamber and barrel yet despite firing from a resting position on a barricade they accounted for around 350 dead plus 500 wounded,so not a high percentage.
@@Mulberry2000 Whoa!The casualties at Waterloo have no relevance to what happened at Isandlwana,a completely different scenario with massed artillery,cavalry charges and masses of musketry at close ranges.
The British infantry at Isandlwana were too spaced out for their fire to have the same effect that it did in later battles like Kambula and Ulundi where the concentrated fire of Martini Henry rifles decimated the Zulu charges.
20,000 men sounds like a big target but a man is a very small target at 200 yards and the average soldier had little musketry practice,under battlefield stress it was probably a case of point and pray,they were not marksmen by any means.
Get 10 of your friends to stand 200 yards away and consider if you would be confident of hitting any of them using an 8 1/2 pound rifle that kicks like a mule.
Did you record this inside your budgie cage?
PLEASE redo the subtitles!!! it is a MESS!
Chelmsford not only split his force. He split it again and yet again in the Mangeni hills. He himself could easily have been overwhelmed personally as he breakfasted with but a small bodyguard near him.
Durnford did the same thing. Durnford split his horsemen and then rode out to confront the Zulus with totally insufficient numbers. The blunders of both Chelmsford and Durnford were very similar.
very well spoken thankyou now that's how you describe information. ive just come from a video on the reasons of the decline of the west and this guy said um um um ever 3 seconds on average you felt you wanted to squeeze down the fibre optics and talk on his behalf .some highly intelligent fellows cant talk properly
did you see the video (cant remember which one exactly now) but they said being very thinly spread out british troops and due to the fog the infantry were overwhelmed as they couldn't see far enough and so far apart to be effective. and the same video assessed the problems of ammunition of the new issue rifle which was state of the art for the time
Zulu casualties of 2,000 seem remarkably low. Some sources say min 3,000 + and then add the 800 -1000 lost at Rorke's drift in one day the Zulus had lost 3,000 to 5,000 men
Add in their losses at Inyezane too.
Durnford was a scapegoat, Chelmsford should never have split his forces without knowing where the main impi was. The Zulus had to fight soon as they needed their manpower to get the crops in before the winter came.
+John Cornell I doubt in those days he would have been able to radio G Company to tell them of his intentions! The regular Companies were spread too thin and too far out from the camp anyway.
The British did as every other force has fought the Zulu they met their end from the Horns of The Buffalo. Head and chest that they were fighting it was late when the encircling horn closed in on them by that time they were unable to retreat. That was the reason Chelmsford and other wanted to defeat the Zulu for they feared the ideal that if they were able to buy or get weapon equal to the British. The Zulu would be a force equal to the British then with the use of The Horn of Buffalo could take the hole of South Africa. Shaka Zulu with 400 worriers defeated larger tribes and became the Supper power in the region in just 25 years and that what the British and Bores feared.
John Cornell
This time period was the Victorian Era in which men or women were looked down upon for leaving a spouse's bed for another. Durnford had fought the Zulu for years but being he was having an affair with the Bishop's daughter Lord Chelmsford and his officers looked down on him. He should have taken command of the forces at Islandlwana. It was Lord Chelmsford who made the decision to make Durnford second in command and Pullenine overall command at Islandlwana. The problem here was Pulleine had never fought the Zulu at any other time would had fortified his position from a unknown force for he believed until the battle that Chelmsford was following the Zulu Impi. It was to late after it brought to his attention of the Zulu Impi was with in striking distance of his camp at Islandwana. The defeat from the Zulu at Islandlwana from Lord Chelmsford bad decisions from splitting his 15,000 man forces into three forces one in the West and one in the Center and one in the East. The Zulu would have been defeated if he had keep his force together.
Liverpoolscottis H
It was the person who was in command of the operation He split the force into three section in which the Zulu had recognized it as it had looked like the Horns of The Bull Buffalo for they had spies who reported back to Cetshwayo. He and his generals knew the movement of the British and planed the attack at Islandlwana to the tee they sent a force for Lord Chelmsford to follow. Pulling him away so they would face the force left behind and it was defeat that did not have to happen.
LIVERPOOLSCOTTISH Chard’s decisions, as an Engineer, made all the difference in setting up barricades at Rorke’s Drift. Your point on Durnford, also an Engineer, taking action to organise the camp’s defences makes sense to me. The battle was there to be won but that Zulu right horn appearing in the British rear would be a shock.
A bloodthirsty demon a warlord a Savage with a demon who believes in payback don't let your enemies rise up and charge at your throat make sure you kill them off
And they still lost the battle how many British troops died by the end of a spear
why did you pick a place to do a documentary when we can barely hear you? wish the birds would shut up!
james downer Don’t exaggerate. The narration was perfectly audible.
Reading one of his books right now. British line companies were simply too far spread out from the camp and were easily outmaneuvered.
It's Quite ! Amazing ! HOW ! it's ! All ! JUST !! FULL !! OF !! HOUSING ! ESTATES !! And Shopping ! Centres ! There ! Now !! BUT ! I ! GUESS ! TOMORROW ! IT ! WILL BECOME !! A ! MOSS ! EISLEY ! SPACE ! PORT !! There !
How many heads were chopped off and put on the end of a spear use people knew that you shouldn't have invaded Africa from the get-go
I may be totally naïve here but surely the worst thing you can do is split an already outnumbered force, not once but twice, and not take advantage of the high ground that is available. Ian Knight does his best to gloss over the obvious incompetence of Chelmsford by trying to put some logic into his actions.
Chelmsford had the foolish British colonial attitude of thinking they were fighting mere natives and it would be a stroll in the park. Some stroll.
I have to agree for when they had the sense of the battle to come it was to late and did not fortify their position.
Shaka was a a barbaric and the Savage leader maybe he was possessed by a demon
I wonder if any of those men considered the immorality of their actions and how they were used by the British ruling class. Glorious defeat can't cloak how evil the British army was.
Terrible reconnaissance! Preconceived notions and Hubris fatal ?
Nothing about the NNC units, half the force numbers, situated between the British companies breaking & fleeing, allowing the Zulus to turn those British flanks & assisting the Zulu win. Very PC, Ian K, & making this show meaningless. Even the local birdlife's giving his performance the whistle..
It didn't quite happen like that Iain. The NNC units were not situated between the British infantry companies. They were to the rear of them, and while they did mostly panic and flee, the firing line was not breached due to them as they were not part of the actual front firing line. In no way would the British have given such a prominent role to a native force that they would never have trusted to hold any line. As Ian Knight rightly states, it was mainly due to Durnford falling back without warning and compromising the right flank, which quickly caved in forcing the infantry companies to withdraw. G Company was left exposed and all on it's own. It was quickly overrun and annihilated but the rest of the British infantry companies mostly withdrew in coherent order back to the camp, still firing.
The NNC were only ever meant to be a secondary force, to be used to chase after an already retreating and defeated enemy, or for scout and escort duties. They were not used like a British infantry company. How could they be? Only 1 in 10 had a gun.
That is an old scapegoat.
This guy does not have a clue , does not tell all the facts and by the way i lved here for 30years and studied this history in depth, his doc he do for tv was a joke as well.
Do do is also funny
It’s all well and good critiquing someone (someone well respected by the way) but how about you back your negative feedback with some facts and pointers as to where you believe he went wrong...