Note that Dr. Roman Töppel did not receive the questions before my visit, so he had no time to prepare. Dr. Roman Töppel's book on the Battle of Kursk is available in English, German, French and a few other languages. Check it out on amazon or your local bookstore.
"Note that Dr. Roman Töppel did not receive the questions before my visit, so he had no time to prepare." If only that were true of the DNC primary debates. . . .
@@ludgerhoutman4464 wow that sound really racistic to label people by color 😒what kind of monster have invented such term? I bet it is american invention.
I really appreciate the 2 native German speakers, trying to reach a wider audience, giving me the German point of view, of German reports, on a topic I have always found fascinating. Thank you 🇬🇧🙏🇬🇧
These exchanges between Bernhard and Dr. Töppel are some of the most interesting I have witnessed so far in TH-cam. We tend to forget Hitler was human. Deeply flawed but human, nevertheless. And a perfect scape goat after he died.
A very nuanced discussion. No surface level pop-history content and for as much as MHV focuses on the Wehrmacht, it absolutely does not hype anything about them. Just a clean clinical study of strengths and weaknesses of their technology, tactics and strategy. I wonder what MHV thinks about Mark Felton's content.
Hey guys. Thx for doing the talk in English. I know it is cumbersome, but not as much as for me to watch the vid in German. Especially since it would involve me learning German. A lot of interesting things where said, but the part I found most thought provoking is at @7:04 where Dr. Roman Töppel says Hitler was often the one making the rational decisions regarding the grand scheme. I always thought of Hitler as a madman which was a burden for his military and country, but it seems I need to revise that. Even though he still was a monster, he might be a slightly more competent one than I gave him credit for.
It's always a doubly-good class when Professor Kast has Dr. Töppel w/ him. What consistently fascinating & engaging content you make for us, gentlemen. Veilen Dank!
The Russian buildup was indication of a general offensive, since Stalin was obsessed with offensive and counterattacks. Zhukov had a hard time convincing Stalin to wait for the Germans and let them grind themselves down attacking. What I'm saying is, plans are one thing, but you also have to be ready for what the enemy is doing.
well this perspective was shown in soviet military tactics, the defensive tactics only have 6 pages (idk the exact number, you can see in glantz's book), so defensive tactics in the soviet union was lacking, but the battle of Kursk greatly improved the Soviets perspective in defensive tactics
"Next evening we travelled by the train to Linz to visit the Reichswerke Hermann Göring and the Nibelungenwerke at St Florian. Pleiger, the Minister for Coal and managing director of the Reichswerke, met Speer in Linz and accompanied Hitler on his tour of both factories. In the Reichswerke Pleiger had achieved a substantial increase in production and in the Nibelungenwerke the new Panzer Mk III and IV models were beginning to roll off the line. Hitler had been waiting a long time for this news and looked pleased. He decided at once to postpone ‘Zitadelle’ to enable his panzer force to be strengthened. " Nicolaus. von Below, At Hitler's Side: The Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant 1937-1945 Von Below (if he is to believed) gets his tanks mixed up here he meant Tigers and Panthers and the dates which since he was operating from memory since he destroyed his diary might be off as he puts this news in early April. Guderian puts the news of increased production at May 10th with the caveat production was behind schedule but if Hitler waited he could have more tank if the date was put back to May 31st, which adds pressure from industry. According to Below, Guderian was for the postponement whilst Richthofen and the General staff were against it. Guderian's memoirs appear in general to dovetail with Below's understanding. As for motives, It is difficult to take everyone at face value. Model seems as likely to be arguing for a fresh plan using lack of forces and evidence of increased defences to circumvent Kluge and appeal directly to Hitler (there allegedly were two alternate plans) buying time for a reappraisal. Guderian was just as likely seeking a postponement to get the whole thing scrapped (Re Brexit tactics as an example). He used every opportunity to seek abandonment. Zeitzler and Kluge appear confident and with Manstein who actually knows, but based on the success of his last operation and his later advocacy of continuing the offensive, I would say he was a partisan for the operation at every stage.
With alternate history buffs, the usual nonsense question is "what if the Germans won the Battle of Kursk?" Which could never happen. I think the question that SHOULD be asked is: "what if Operation Citadel was delayed one more week, then Hitler saw the allied landing in Italy, and completely called the operation off?" The Red Army would still be sitting and waiting for an offensive that would have never happened. This would have upset the Red Army plan for the counter attacks Operation Kutuzov and Operation Rumyantsev, which would have been delayed and also have had to attack against untouched German armor formations. Would the eastern front have turned out differently?
I think in that case there would have been intense political pressure from the western Allies to have the Red Army go on at least a limited offensive to tie German units in place and prevent them from being relocated to face the invasion in Italy. Historically the mainland campaign in Italy was a tedious slog, even against what little forces the Germans could spare after the historical outcome at Kursk and subsequent Red Army counteroffensive. So the Allies would most likely face more or at least less depleted units in Italy and since the Red Army would probably also make less progress in 1943 against a German Army not weakened by Kursk - War in Europe goes on at least 3-6 months longer and we have a good chance to see Germany nuked instead of (or along with) Japan.
Very good perspective Dr Toppel! It took me a long time to get through my thick head Logistics is just as important as tactics. If you can't move troops and supplies you're at a serious disadvantage on the offensive or the defensive. For obvious reasons defensively you're not so bad off, until you run out of men and material. World War II in Europe was kicked off to provide living space for Germany. It wasn't just the land that Germany needed or wanted, it was raw materials and Manpower.
The audio quality on this is a bit shaky; you both are rather quiet so I have to turn my volume up. And even then, there's a bit of... sort of like you're both slightly muffled? I don't know if this is an insurmountable thing but I figured I should at least bring it to your attention in case it could be improved for future interview videos.
No, the best word really would still be to strategist. This is in juxtaposition of the grand strategist. We really dont have a word for being good at an operational level, In English at least. German generals were very good strategists but terrible grand strategists. Tactician is not really something you can say beyond divisional level. Rommel was a a pretty outstanding tactician, but he started to struggle trying to micro manage 2 divisions tactically. if you tried to command 12 divisions at a tactical level it would lead to utter ruin.
Candian here, we have the same and share close longitudes and therefore climate to Russia. After our snow melts we have what the oil industry calls spring break up where all drilling stops as equipment cannot move due to mud. Usually in April sometimes into May. I think the Germans could have launched Barbarossa earlier if not for Italy messing up in Greece. I know what those guys went through in winter. I have been in the middle of our prairies, flat ground for miles and miles and miles; cold wind blasts you.
Another excellent video. I wish you had talked about the debate among the Germans over whether to attack the strong point at all. I understand some said if we dont attack it they have to abandon it. This is also the first? time the Germans are attacking a strong point. Previously they attacked the weak points- aka France. To me this is the start of abandoning the tactics that brought the Germans so many victories. I would also like to know your thoughts on the German strategy for 1943- aka what they thought they could and could not do. AND how that changed after kursk.
I recall that Hitler once said that his greatest regret was "Citadel". Is this true? The Soviets were SO ready for this that it seemed impossible from the get go. 🤔
I still wonder why the Germans thought attacking the Kursk salient was a good idea at all. I mean yes, the Germans prepared for this attack for months, but in the same vein the Soviets were preparing their defenses for months! Attacking a heavily fortified front line with multiple layers of defenses, when the enemy KNOWS exactly where you're going to strike ... how can that ever result in anything other than an extremely casualty-intensive attrition battle?
It was their last opportunity to take initial back and they well knew it was their last change, even though very tough one. So they attacked in place where there was most chances to success and Kursk was that place. Other places were even worse. 30 % chance to win today is better that 0 % tomorrow
This contradicts something else I had heard about Model before the Kursk battle. Another source has him (Model) saying he needed at least six infantry divisions on both flanks for his tanks to safely make it all the way to Kursk. Well he didn't have those 12 infantry divisions so he purposely didn't go very far in the attack. He knew it was hopeless and didn't want his panzers decimated. He also kept two armored divisions out of the battle having them work on the Hagan line in preparation for Operation Kutuzov that he knew was coming. Is this true?
I always find the idea that just because the operation was solely delayed due to not receiving some of the two overrated tanks of the era are a gross oversimplification
Could you make a video on WWII game changers? What military hardware had the potential to change the tide of war? I can think of many candidates: Radar Nightvision Assault rifles Proximity fuses Jet technology German and Japanese ships (superior but in too short numbers) Churchill crocodile T34 and IS2 Panther and Jagdtiger Katyusha Flying fortress Mobile harbour The nuclear bomb Some of them clearly fell short and the question why is to me interesting as well...
Any sense of Mr Hitler's reaction to Citadel soon after it became apparent that a great victory was not in the cards ? Almost seems to me that Hitler was somewhat resigned to a failure of Citadel before it started.
Part of the preparation was pulling out of the Ryzev salient to generate more troops for Zitadel. Did doing this and moving the troops and refitting as needed cause any delay? I have read several Kursk books over the years but never read anything on this.
Question for the Dr Töppel and Bernhard I remember hearing that Mödel was a defensive general(I think it is mentioned in soviet storm). And it was possible he was demanding more time and resources for operation citadel to suggest that it couldn’t or shouldn’t be done. Instead he possibly wanted to switch to a defensive footing which he would be more used to. I don’t know if it’s true. But in your opinions is there any merit to this claim. And as a follow up what would the effect of such a drastic change be.
Thanks for a great video. I can well appreciate the difficulty translating this information into English. My German works for casual conversation, but isn't good enough to follow a complicated subject like this. Dr. Toppel. Every thing I have read of this battle says both sides had an excruciatingly long amount of time to prepare.... If Germany had been successful, would it have had any real positive effect for their country?
Kursk was the last German offensive in Russia. It should never have happened, because the Russian preparations (which the Germans could easily see from the air) made the attack impossible to succeed.What is amazing to me is how wasteful the Russians were in the counter-attack-they took about 3X the German casualties.So it was a complete disaster, and sealed the German defeat. Suppose the Germans did break through the Russian lines? They were too weak to hold the salient anyways.
Could it be a good idea to make a video about the reliability of the Tiger tanks? There's many different opinions but few people seem willing to or know how to get to the deep truths about how problematic the two Tigers were.
You get the economic benefits after the area is defensible and the situation on the front is tenable. Not before. Hitler's thinking was not rational. German losses would have been greatly reduced, their forces going into the later phases of the war would have been much stronger. We see a few hints of what was possible later in the war with the raid at Bari and even the Ardennes Offensive. Just having more operational secrecy could have made a tremendous difference.
Well, but there's MORE; delayed due to promised to Stalin frontline air superiority - etc. - that's where Luftwaffe was really grounded by Sturmoviks and Petlyakovs and Lavochkins bombing Luftwaffe close support bomber bases.
Is it just me,or is Model kind of an underrated general ? I surprisingly rarely hear his name mentioned,despite participating in some pretty famous battles,and being "Hitler's favorite general".
8.30 To be fair here, the generals were not charged with thinking in terms of economics or politics but in how to fight and win campaigns. The place for grand strategy is at the political arena. The argument between Hitler and Manstein is one where two equally valid perspectives clash and both are talking in different "languages".
As Dr. Toppel mentions, the Allies worked differently, Gen. Marshall in particular was attuned to the overall war effort picture. This allowed Roosevelt and Churchill to focus on diplomacy.
However, General Marshall was not involved with executing campaigns but with the organisation of the Army at the grand strategic level. I very much doubt that Bradley or Pattern were concerned with seizing the Renault factories in Paris. In the German case, supreme strategic direction was in the hands of the Fuhrer, advised by the senior political, military and economic leaderships.
The Germans had invested a lot in the Ukrainian industry, had repaired factories, mines and - most important - power plants, the barrages on the big rivers (Dnyepr, Donets) ... and were forced to blow them up just few months later before retreating westwards (1943).
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized First, I'm sorry for the misrepresentation: All Ukrainian river barrages are POST-WAR, except one. But its WW2 story is dramatic as told above: we will never get to know how many people drowned... ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Днепрогэс I recommend Mathias Riedel, 1973: Mining and smelting industry in the Ukraine under German occupation 1941-1944 www.ifz-muenchen.de/heftarchiv/1973_3_1_riedel.pdf He often quotes Georg Thomas, a general who has been portrayed by you in the video "Most unsuccessful Wehrmacht General?"
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized I've just found two publications of Norbert Müller, but I don't know them: "Wehrmacht und Okkupation 1941-1944", Militärverlag der DDR, Berlin, 1971. "Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung. Dokumente zur Besatzungspolitik der faschistischen Wehrmacht auf sowjetischem Territorium 1941 bis 1944." Militärverlag der DDR, Berlin, 1980. Probably, Roman Töppel is more familiar with GDR literature than I do...
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Do you have access to the following source? Schüler, Klaus A. Friedrich: Logistik im Rußlandfeldzug. Die Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planung, Vorbereitung und Durchführung des deutschen Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion bis zur Krise vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42. Frankfurt a. M./Bern/New York/Paris, 1987.
thank you, well, I doubt Thomas' memoirs are particularly more trustworthy than those of other generals. Abut the GDR the literature, yeah, that can be tricky. I think I heard of the Schüller book a few times, but I don't have it.
Citadell in May and Citadell in July are 2 total different battles. Wrong choosen identity operator. The battle concept changed from a normal military operation to a showcase that Wehrmacht is unbeatable.
Bemerkenswert ist, dass es kein deutsches Wort für "grand strategy" gibt. / It is remarkable that the English/French term "grand strategy" cannot be translated into German.
I never given this topic much thought, but when I think about it I see that... Hitler was nervous and wanted the invasion of France to happen under the winter, but it happened in the summer. The final push at Dunkirk in 1940 got deleyed. Barbarossa was supposed to happen in may, but was launched 22 of june. The battle of Moscow got deled because of the need to deal with troop concentration at the Kiev. Malta was bombed for months, and the air invasion then got canceled the same week it was supposed to take place. The evacation of the Rzhev pocket was a very old idea when the order to abandon the position finally came. The order of breakout from Stalingrad was also supposed to happen but it never came, and at one point it got too late for that to happen. Germany's handeling of the Afrika korps in late 1942 - early 1943 was wishy-washy, and the Germans couldn't take a firm decision to either evacuate the troops from Africa, or to plan a strong firm last stand, or to reinforce Nort Africa and try to play the game to win. Mansteins rescue campaign of army group south was filled with much hesitation from Hitler and decisions back and fourth, and the Kharkov offensive was partly part of the same story. And the Kursk offensive also got several deleys. The Korsun pocket was plagued with much bad luck, bad weather, mechanical failures of panther tanks, lack of big bridges to carry the heavy panther tanks etc.. so the rescue operation to save the encircled troops suffered from many deleys.. even if the operation itself started early. The decision of no evacuation of the German garrisons during operation bagration turned out to be fatal mistake, even if a permission to retreat came only a few days later - but then things were already too late. The German reaction to D-day was also deleyed. Hitlers Ardennes offensive had been planned for months before it was finally launched in december 1944, the operation had been deleyd several times and was therefore not launched earlier.
How couldn't the Germans realize that would be a tsunami of Soviet forces attacking from middle 43 onwards? How couldn't them be thinking and debating about retreating to the safest position possible, behind a large river, like the Dniepr or something? Because the front overall was somewhat stable, like in the center, for instance. The center of the front didn't collapse in 43. It was losing the South front that led to everything falling apart in 44. It seems so easy to understand this. After all that happened in Stalingrad couldn't they realize how strong the Soviet were and get into a more humble strategy?
you cant go to the war begin timid, and sometimes, a more "humble strategy" means more casualties actually (Viethnam) in 1944 there was nothing to do to save the eastern front, and you should take in account, that one thing that precipited the fall of the eastern front was the normandy landing and the fall of Italy
@@Mitaka.Kotsuka but they managed to stand many Soviet attacks before in the defensive, have you seen Military History Visualised video about Rzhev Salient? Warchief Thrall is one of those who can stand good defenses for the Horde, Kel Thuzad.
After Kursk the Generals urged to fall back to a defensive position, but as stated in the Video: Hitler knew he needed every factory, mine and acre of land if the wanted to continue the war in the long run, so instead he went for a stragtegy that, in theory, would allow Germany to continue it's war of movement even on the defense: Local Strongholds (Festungen/Feste Plätze) that would be heavyly fortified and could withstand the soviet assaults, even if they were encircled and cut off. Those strongholds would require lots of soviet troops and slow down the advance, and while the Soviets would be busy besieging/storming the Stronghold the Germans could regroup and counterattack, encircleing lots of Soviet Divisions in the process. History showed that this was a really bad plan, mostly since the Soviets in 1944 were capable of performing Deep Operations like for example Operation Bagration
Note that Dr. Roman Töppel did not receive the questions before my visit, so he had no time to prepare.
Dr. Roman Töppel's book on the Battle of Kursk is available in English, German, French and a few other languages.
Check it out on amazon or your local bookstore.
@Military History not Visualized this does not relate to the video but how was Austria’s history affected by it Celtic heritage?
Thank you gentlemen and subscribers. Please create the next video. Also, why develop the panther and tiger? Is it a weight issue? Thanks!
"Note that Dr. Roman Töppel did not receive the questions before my visit, so he had no time to prepare." If only that were true of the DNC primary debates. . . .
I bought Roman's book on amazon, looking forward to reading it. Herr Toppel, ich bedanken sie fur ihr intressante vortarg.
These discussions with Dr Töppel are great. Friendly, spontaneous, enthusiastic, and thoughtful. A lot of fun.
Roman Töppel always lives up to my hopes. He should start a Podcast series or something!
same idea here, its good to see Zittadel demystified, I hope you two have a lot more talks and share them with us.
keep up the good work
@Aggressive Tubesock what is poc?
@@ninaakari5181 People of Colour.
@@ludgerhoutman4464 wow that sound really racistic to label people by color 😒what kind of monster have invented such term? I bet it is american invention.
@@ninaakari5181 It is.
Looks like you two have a great chemistry going on. Always enjoy the collab videos with Dr. Toppel.
Brilliant analysis. Your description of Manstein as a tactician, not a strategist is insightful. Thank you.
I really appreciate the 2 native German speakers, trying to reach a wider audience, giving me the German point of view, of German reports, on a topic I have always found fascinating.
Thank you 🇬🇧🙏🇬🇧
These exchanges between Bernhard and Dr. Töppel are some of the most interesting I have witnessed so far in TH-cam. We tend to forget Hitler was human. Deeply flawed but human, nevertheless. And a perfect scape goat after he died.
The suit with the bald and beard is such an authoritative look lol
He is a God of garments along with his wisdom of warfare....
A very nuanced discussion. No surface level pop-history content and for as much as MHV focuses on the Wehrmacht, it absolutely does not hype anything about them. Just a clean clinical study of strengths and weaknesses of their technology, tactics and strategy. I wonder what MHV thinks about Mark Felton's content.
Respect to Dr. Töppel, I want to hear more of him and definetly going to read his books!
Hey guys. Thx for doing the talk in English. I know it is cumbersome, but not as much as for me to watch the vid in German. Especially since it would involve me learning German.
A lot of interesting things where said, but the part I found most thought provoking is at @7:04 where Dr. Roman Töppel says Hitler was often the one making the rational decisions regarding the grand scheme. I always thought of Hitler as a madman which was a burden for his military and country, but it seems I need to revise that.
Even though he still was a monster, he might be a slightly more competent one than I gave him credit for.
Watching this with my all new Panzer Evolution t-shirt, that just arrived. Love it! Nice vid as always.
Best strategy in history: the strategic positioning of Roman's book in the middle of the frame! Very informative though, great video
Really impressed with roman toppel just bought his book on amazon
It's always a doubly-good class when Professor Kast has Dr. Töppel w/ him. What consistently fascinating & engaging content you make for us, gentlemen. Veilen Dank!
The Russian buildup was indication of a general offensive, since Stalin was obsessed with offensive and counterattacks. Zhukov had a hard time convincing Stalin to wait for the Germans and let them grind themselves down attacking. What I'm saying is, plans are one thing, but you also have to be ready for what the enemy is doing.
well this perspective was shown in soviet military tactics, the defensive tactics only have 6 pages (idk the exact number, you can see in glantz's book), so defensive tactics in the soviet union was lacking, but the battle of Kursk greatly improved the Soviets perspective in defensive tactics
It took a lot of convincing, that's for sure
"Next evening we travelled by the train to Linz to visit the Reichswerke Hermann Göring and the Nibelungenwerke at St Florian. Pleiger, the Minister for Coal and managing director of the Reichswerke, met Speer in Linz and accompanied Hitler on his tour of both factories. In the Reichswerke Pleiger had achieved a substantial increase in production and in the Nibelungenwerke the new Panzer Mk III and IV models were beginning to roll off the line. Hitler had been waiting a long time for this news and looked pleased. He decided at once to postpone ‘Zitadelle’ to enable his panzer force to be strengthened.
"
Nicolaus. von Below, At Hitler's Side: The Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant 1937-1945
Von Below (if he is to believed) gets his tanks mixed up here he meant Tigers and Panthers and the dates which since he was operating from memory since he destroyed his diary might be off as he puts this news in early April. Guderian puts the news of increased production at May 10th with the caveat production was behind schedule but if Hitler waited he could have more tank if the date was put back to May 31st, which adds pressure from industry. According to Below, Guderian was for the postponement whilst Richthofen and the General staff were against it. Guderian's memoirs appear in general to dovetail with Below's understanding.
As for motives, It is difficult to take everyone at face value. Model seems as likely to be arguing for a fresh plan using lack of forces and evidence of increased defences to circumvent Kluge and appeal directly to Hitler (there allegedly were two alternate plans) buying time for a reappraisal. Guderian was just as likely seeking a postponement to get the whole thing scrapped (Re Brexit tactics as an example). He used every opportunity to seek abandonment. Zeitzler and Kluge appear confident and with Manstein who actually knows, but based on the success of his last operation and his later advocacy of continuing the offensive, I would say he was a partisan for the operation at every stage.
With alternate history buffs, the usual nonsense question is "what if the Germans won the Battle of Kursk?" Which could never happen. I think the question that SHOULD be asked is: "what if Operation Citadel was delayed one more week, then Hitler saw the allied landing in Italy, and completely called the operation off?" The Red Army would still be sitting and waiting for an offensive that would have never happened. This would have upset the Red Army plan for the counter attacks Operation Kutuzov and Operation Rumyantsev, which would have been delayed and also have had to attack against untouched German armor formations. Would the eastern front have turned out differently?
I think in that case there would have been intense political pressure from the western Allies to have the Red Army go on at least a limited offensive to tie German units in place and prevent them from being relocated to face the invasion in Italy. Historically the mainland campaign in Italy was a tedious slog, even against what little forces the Germans could spare after the historical outcome at Kursk and subsequent Red Army counteroffensive. So the Allies would most likely face more or at least less depleted units in Italy and since the Red Army would probably also make less progress in 1943 against a German Army not weakened by Kursk - War in Europe goes on at least 3-6 months longer and we have a good chance to see Germany nuked instead of (or along with) Japan.
Very good perspective Dr Toppel! It took me a long time to get through my thick head Logistics is just as important as tactics. If you can't move troops and supplies you're at a serious disadvantage on the offensive or the defensive. For obvious reasons defensively you're not so bad off, until you run out of men and material. World War II in Europe was kicked off to provide living space for Germany. It wasn't just the land that Germany needed or wanted, it was raw materials and Manpower.
The audio quality on this is a bit shaky; you both are rather quiet so I have to turn my volume up. And even then, there's a bit of... sort of like you're both slightly muffled? I don't know if this is an insurmountable thing but I figured I should at least bring it to your attention in case it could be improved for future interview videos.
They are using authentic Panzer throat microphones. Just the thing for clear communication between German forces at Kursk.
@@Otokichi786
Something something german engineering.
Is the word you are looking for at roughly 8:30, “tactician”?
No, the best word really would still be to strategist. This is in juxtaposition of the grand strategist. We really dont have a word for being good at an operational level, In English at least.
German generals were very good strategists but terrible grand strategists.
Tactician is not really something you can say beyond divisional level.
Rommel was a a pretty outstanding tactician, but he started to struggle trying to micro manage 2 divisions tactically. if you tried to command 12 divisions at a tactical level it would lead to utter ruin.
Thank you so much for all your effprts.
Candian here, we have the same and share close longitudes and therefore climate to Russia. After our snow melts we have what the oil industry calls spring break up where all drilling stops as equipment cannot move due to mud. Usually in April sometimes into May. I think the Germans could have launched Barbarossa earlier if not for Italy messing up in Greece.
I know what those guys went through in winter. I have been in the middle of our prairies, flat ground for miles and miles and miles; cold wind blasts you.
Another excellent video. I wish you had talked about the debate among the Germans over whether to attack the strong point at all. I understand some said if we dont attack it they have to abandon it. This is also the first? time the Germans are attacking a strong point. Previously they attacked the weak points- aka France. To me this is the start of abandoning the tactics that brought the Germans so many victories. I would also like to know your thoughts on the German strategy for 1943- aka what they thought they could and could not do. AND how that changed after kursk.
I recall that Hitler once said that his greatest regret was "Citadel". Is this true? The Soviets were SO ready for this that it seemed impossible from the get go. 🤔
I would think him killing his niece would be up there. Also getting thrown into jail in 33 (I believe).
@@princeofcupspoc9073 23...
Dr Toppel is the best guest.
I still wonder why the Germans thought attacking the Kursk salient was a good idea at all. I mean yes, the Germans prepared for this attack for months, but in the same vein the Soviets were preparing their defenses for months! Attacking a heavily fortified front line with multiple layers of defenses, when the enemy KNOWS exactly where you're going to strike ... how can that ever result in anything other than an extremely casualty-intensive attrition battle?
good question!
It was their last opportunity to take initial back and they well knew it was their last change, even though very tough one. So they attacked in place where there was most chances to success and Kursk was that place. Other places were even worse. 30 % chance to win today is better that 0 % tomorrow
This contradicts something else I had heard about Model before the Kursk battle. Another source has him (Model) saying he needed at least six infantry divisions on both flanks for his tanks to safely make it all the way to Kursk. Well he didn't have those 12 infantry divisions so he purposely didn't go very far in the attack. He knew it was hopeless and didn't want his panzers decimated. He also kept two armored divisions out of the battle having them work on the Hagan line in preparation for Operation Kutuzov that he knew was coming. Is this true?
Your videos are always such great eye openers! :)
I always find the idea that just because the operation was solely delayed due to not receiving some of the two overrated tanks of the era are a gross oversimplification
Could you make a video on WWII game changers?
What military hardware had the potential to change the tide of war?
I can think of many candidates:
Radar
Nightvision
Assault rifles
Proximity fuses
Jet technology
German and Japanese ships (superior but in too short numbers)
Churchill crocodile
T34 and IS2
Panther and Jagdtiger
Katyusha
Flying fortress
Mobile harbour
The nuclear bomb
Some of them clearly fell short and the question why is to me interesting as well...
Radar, liberty ships and Soviet propaganda. Nothing else comes close
industrial produktion of all material
@@julemandenudengaver4580 that's a very good one.
Germans never got enough tanks or planes...
Spare parts, aluminium, trucks, food, rails
Any sense of Mr Hitler's reaction to Citadel soon after it became apparent that a great victory was not in the cards ? Almost seems to me that Hitler was somewhat resigned to a failure of Citadel before it started.
Great video. Really enjoy your talks.
It is very good to get the perspective from two German-speaking Germans, especially from one who has examined the German archives.
Wunderbra, thanks again for inside angle as it where. Enjoy your week.
*cough* 'wunderbra' isn't what you think it is, but I'll let you Google it. (Sorry, cheap, pervy joke that I couldn't resist.)
@@russianbotfarm3036 haha, My apologies I was being a 50year old mischevious old fool trying to inject some fun., enjoy your weekend everyone xx
Part of the preparation was pulling out of the Ryzev salient to generate more troops for Zitadel. Did doing this and moving the troops and refitting as needed cause any delay? I have read several Kursk books over the years but never read anything on this.
Question for the Dr Töppel and Bernhard
I remember hearing that Mödel was a defensive general(I think it is mentioned in soviet storm). And it was possible he was demanding more time and resources for operation citadel to suggest that it couldn’t or shouldn’t be done.
Instead he possibly wanted to switch to a defensive footing which he would be more used to.
I don’t know if it’s true.
But in your opinions is there any merit to this claim.
And as a follow up what would the effect of such a drastic change be.
Thanks for a great video. I can well appreciate the difficulty translating this information into English. My German works for casual conversation, but isn't good enough to follow a complicated subject like this.
Dr. Toppel. Every thing I have read of this battle says both sides had an excruciatingly long amount of time to prepare.... If Germany had been successful, would it have had any real positive effect for their country?
What about Grand Admiral Raeder as a strategist?
Kursk was the last German offensive in Russia. It should never have happened, because the Russian preparations (which the Germans could easily see from the air) made the attack impossible to succeed.What is amazing to me is how wasteful the Russians were in the counter-attack-they took about 3X the German casualties.So it was a complete disaster, and sealed the German defeat. Suppose the Germans did break through the Russian lines? They were too weak to hold the salient anyways.
Guderian was right, get the divisions refitted and up to strength
Could it be a good idea to make a video about the reliability of the Tiger tanks?
There's many different opinions but few people seem willing to or know how to get to the deep truths about how problematic the two Tigers were.
You get the economic benefits after the area is defensible and the situation on the front is tenable. Not before. Hitler's thinking was not rational. German losses would have been greatly reduced, their forces going into the later phases of the war would have been much stronger. We see a few hints of what was possible later in the war with the raid at Bari and even the Ardennes Offensive. Just having more operational secrecy could have made a tremendous difference.
8:25 I think he means tactician.
You look totally what I was hoping you'd look like. Thanks for the vids!
They drove right into a trap - entire army one cannot imagine the situation, it was the end of the army.
Didn't he delayed due to wait for the Alien equipment?
My source is the history channel.
Blame the dead guy.
Excellent.
It's the eye of the Tiger!
Well, but there's MORE; delayed due to promised to Stalin frontline air superiority - etc. - that's where Luftwaffe was really grounded by Sturmoviks and Petlyakovs and Lavochkins bombing Luftwaffe close support bomber bases.
Fascinating...
*INTO THE MOTHERLAND*
*THE GERMAN ARMY MARCH*
*COMRADES STAND SIDE BY SIDE*
*TO STOP THE NAZI CHARGE*
*ONE MILLION MEN AT WAR*
IN THE SOVIET UNION
SUMMER 1943
matheus imon TANKS LINE UP IN THOUSANDS AS FAR THE EYE CAN SEE
Is it just me,or is Model kind of an underrated general ? I surprisingly rarely hear his name mentioned,despite participating in some pretty famous battles,and being "Hitler's favorite general".
How did they call him? Hitlers Feuerwehrmann (firefighter)
Interesting. The delay was not the main reason for the delay at Kursk, am I right?
it wasnt delayed for the sake of delaying operations
8.30 To be fair here, the generals were not charged with thinking in terms of economics or politics but in how to fight and win campaigns. The place for grand strategy is at the political arena. The argument between Hitler and Manstein is one where two equally valid perspectives clash and both are talking in different "languages".
As Dr. Toppel mentions, the Allies worked differently, Gen. Marshall in particular was attuned to the overall war effort picture. This allowed Roosevelt and Churchill to focus on diplomacy.
However, General Marshall was not involved with executing campaigns but with the organisation of the Army at the grand strategic level.
I very much doubt that Bradley or Pattern were concerned with seizing the Renault factories in Paris.
In the German case, supreme strategic direction was in the hands of the Fuhrer, advised by the senior political, military and economic leaderships.
The Germans had invested a lot in the Ukrainian industry, had repaired factories, mines and - most important - power plants, the barrages on the big rivers (Dnyepr, Donets) ... and were forced to blow them up just few months later before retreating westwards (1943).
do you have one or more book / article recommendations on this?
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized First, I'm sorry for the misrepresentation: All Ukrainian river barrages are POST-WAR, except one. But its WW2 story is dramatic as told above: we will never get to know how many people drowned... ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Днепрогэс
I recommend Mathias Riedel, 1973: Mining and smelting industry in the Ukraine under German occupation 1941-1944 www.ifz-muenchen.de/heftarchiv/1973_3_1_riedel.pdf He often quotes Georg Thomas, a general who has been portrayed by you in the video "Most unsuccessful Wehrmacht General?"
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized I've just found two publications of Norbert Müller, but I don't know them:
"Wehrmacht und Okkupation 1941-1944", Militärverlag der DDR, Berlin, 1971.
"Okkupation, Raub, Vernichtung. Dokumente zur Besatzungspolitik der faschistischen Wehrmacht auf sowjetischem Territorium 1941 bis 1944." Militärverlag der DDR, Berlin, 1980.
Probably, Roman Töppel is more familiar with GDR literature than I do...
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Do you have access to the following source?
Schüler, Klaus A. Friedrich: Logistik im Rußlandfeldzug. Die Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planung, Vorbereitung und Durchführung des deutschen Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion bis zur Krise vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42. Frankfurt a. M./Bern/New York/Paris, 1987.
thank you, well, I doubt Thomas' memoirs are particularly more trustworthy than those of other generals.
Abut the GDR the literature, yeah, that can be tricky.
I think I heard of the Schüller book a few times, but I don't have it.
Dr. Töppel looks quite a lot like Giles Coren.
Citadell in May and Citadell in July are 2 total different battles. Wrong choosen identity operator. The battle concept changed from a normal military operation to a showcase that Wehrmacht is unbeatable.
But did the Panthers break down because mice ate through the wires?!
Well and Italy inability to take out Greece and asking for help delayed things by about 6 wks, classic Italy.
Devastatingly delicious mushroom pizzas though, I must add. 😊
Bemerkenswert ist, dass es kein deutsches Wort für "grand strategy" gibt. / It is remarkable that the English/French term "grand strategy" cannot be translated into German.
Almost every German operation was delayed 5 to 10 times.
Source for that? Also I'm thinking that most armies usually have to delay their operations, take Operation Overlord for example (weather).
I never given this topic much thought, but when I think about it I see that...
Hitler was nervous and wanted the invasion of France to happen under the winter, but it happened in the summer. The final push at Dunkirk in 1940 got deleyed. Barbarossa was supposed to happen in may, but was launched 22 of june. The battle of Moscow got deled because of the need to deal with troop concentration at the Kiev. Malta was bombed for months, and the air invasion then got canceled the same week it was supposed to take place. The evacation of the Rzhev pocket was a very old idea when the order to abandon the position finally came. The order of breakout from Stalingrad was also supposed to happen but it never came, and at one point it got too late for that to happen. Germany's handeling of the Afrika korps in late 1942 - early 1943 was wishy-washy, and the Germans couldn't take a firm decision to either evacuate the troops from Africa, or to plan a strong firm last stand, or to reinforce Nort Africa and try to play the game to win.
Mansteins rescue campaign of army group south was filled with much hesitation from Hitler and decisions back and fourth, and the Kharkov offensive was partly part of the same story. And the Kursk offensive also got several deleys. The Korsun pocket was plagued with much bad luck, bad weather, mechanical failures of panther tanks, lack of big bridges to carry the heavy panther tanks etc.. so the rescue operation to save the encircled troops suffered from many deleys.. even if the operation itself started early.
The decision of no evacuation of the German garrisons during operation bagration turned out to be fatal mistake, even if a permission to retreat came only a few days later - but then things were already too late. The German reaction to D-day was also deleyed. Hitlers Ardennes offensive had been planned for months before it was finally launched in december 1944, the operation had been deleyd several times and was therefore not launched earlier.
How couldn't the Germans realize that would be a tsunami of Soviet forces attacking from middle 43 onwards?
How couldn't them be thinking and debating about retreating to the safest position possible, behind a large river, like the Dniepr or something?
Because the front overall was somewhat stable, like in the center, for instance. The center of the front didn't collapse in 43. It was losing the South front that led to everything falling apart in 44. It seems so easy to understand this. After all that happened in Stalingrad couldn't they realize how strong the Soviet were and get into a more humble strategy?
you cant go to the war begin timid, and sometimes, a more "humble strategy" means more casualties actually (Viethnam) in 1944 there was nothing to do to save the eastern front, and you should take in account, that one thing that precipited the fall of the eastern front was the normandy landing and the fall of Italy
@@Mitaka.Kotsuka but they managed to stand many Soviet attacks before in the defensive, have you seen Military History Visualised video about Rzhev Salient?
Warchief Thrall is one of those who can stand good defenses for the Horde, Kel Thuzad.
After Kursk the Generals urged to fall back to a defensive position, but as stated in the Video: Hitler knew he needed every factory, mine and acre of land if the wanted to continue the war in the long run, so instead he went for a stragtegy that, in theory, would allow Germany to continue it's war of movement even on the defense: Local Strongholds (Festungen/Feste Plätze) that would be heavyly fortified and could withstand the soviet assaults, even if they were encircled and cut off. Those strongholds would require lots of soviet troops and slow down the advance, and while the Soviets would be busy besieging/storming the Stronghold the Germans could regroup and counterattack, encircleing lots of Soviet Divisions in the process.
History showed that this was a really bad plan, mostly since the Soviets in 1944 were capable of performing Deep Operations like for example Operation Bagration
@@TheStugbit the horde are the commies and the alliance... well, the allies... who were us? the scourge?
Surprised that the Germans wasn't considered a "horde" early war considering the fact that they outnumbered the opposing forces during the offensive
Töp quality güys.
Short answer, yes. Gave Russia another 3mnths to prepare.
good chemistry and right length of discussion. Just can't stand those 60min long discussion even worse than lecture.
So Hitler was actually an extremely talented fellow then?*
*yes I'm fully aware that he was evil.
An evil genius, especially early to mid war
now has a ancient to make him more exotic that's just racist now
I don't know if anyone has told you this, but you are starting to look more and more like Sigmund Freud or Vladimir Lenin. :)
its all academic. isnt it? thumbs down from me ;