Top tip: put your quality in the TH-cam player up to 2160p for this, even if your screen is only 1080p or lower - the video will play at a higher bit rate and look much better for it. And its a couple of days early, but happy thanksgiving this week to all our US viewers :) Consider supporting the creation of more videos: www.patreon.com/historigraph
Hey friend please keep on doing video's about these little known battles. They're quite informative. I had no idea this engagement ever happened. So keep up the good work.
The travesty behind the development of the Mark 14 Torpedo was completely criminal and it was a devastating detriment to the US Navy early in the war. Firing 11+ torpedoes and none of them detonating is unbelievable!
At least at Narvik it was the cold that caused them to malfunction. But these American torpedoes not having a single live fire demonstration to see if they even work is just criminal.
Clemson class destroyers did not use Mark 15 torpedoes. They used the older technology Mark 8 torpedoes (and, FWIW, S-boats used older technology Mark 10 torpedoes). Whatever the cause of the misses in this battle, the Mark 15 torpedo was not the cause. Another difference between the Wickes and Clemson classes and 1930s and 1940s destroyers is that the former had 4"/50 main guns rather than 5"/38 DP guns. OTOH, Wickes and Clemson class destroyers were similar in speed to newer destroyers.
Might be because it was just so bad. All the MOTs and destroyers in the PI not only failed to stop a single Japanese landing but failed sink a single enemy ship.
Geez Gee3. Let’s at least blame the crap torpedoes, crap subs, lack of night training, small numbers of old ships, not trusting early radar, lack of coordination with allies - something. I think they did the best they could with what they had against an adversary who had been at war for years already and was really good at night fighting. Sure it could have been better. But context is everything, especially in the dark early days of ‘41-‘42. The IJN had a plan, and the allies did not.
@@geeeeeee3that might be true, and only shows how pretentious Americans are in their respect to their service members; they only respect the famous and the ones present
My dad actually spotted the American fleet before it went onto attack the transports not knowing they were even in the area. All the ships they had been seeing were Japanese and were not informed the Americans were attacking at all. He was a a PBY pilot with Patrol Wing ten and somehow survived not being shot down by the Japanese. The clouds were the only chance they had to survive.
My Uncle was a tailgunner in a B-17 and made 29 sorties over Germany and watched his friends and fellow air man fall out of the sky right next to him. How he made it home alive is a miracle just like your dad. I don't know if it's luck, destiny or God's plan. I read his logbook from time to time. He had notes in there whether he saw parachutes and the approximate location, fighter types they encountered, it's a book in itself.
@@t.r.4496 What the USAAF commanders and Eisenhower (and British counterparts) did to send those men off like cannon fodder was criminal, really. They didn't care about them and just sent them all off to die essentially. P-51s or P-38s (with larger fuel tanks) could have easily been made available since 1942 but all the historical documentation has been doctored to make it look like there was no possible way for them to be ready until mid-1944 because we can't make the USAAF or Eisenhower look bad, can we? Most of the pilots and co-pilots of B-17s and B-24s were 18-20 year old lieutenants with less than 100 hours of flying time.
well. you also got to remember that the odds for AA to take down a plane even one as big as a pby is somewhere between 1 in 100000 and 1 in 1000000 depending on the whether. also they didn't have america's super ridiculous AA shells which gave them a DRASTICALLY higher chance to hit.
Human arrogance can be so detrimental, i.e., IJN commander, "There's no way enemy ships could have gotten by us." Also (more famously) U.S. Bureau of Ordinance, "It's not our torpedo that's the problem, it's all of your pilots, mariners and submariners."
Also, "we can't blame Nimitz for anything because we have to treat him as a "godlike" being who can do no wrong even though he knew about the torpedo problems since before Pearl Harbor and he still allowed the horrible torpedoes to be used all the way to November 1943 despite he having supreme commander powers during the Pacific Theater"
the way to handle this situation is you come up with actual evidence instead of just attacking the man making the decision to keep using them the USAAF famously made the same mistake with the B-17 and B-29, NASA likewise made it with the Shuttle
@@touristguy87 I do agree. Unfortunately in the case of the Mark 14 torpedo there was plenty of evidence that was put forth to the leadership of the Department of Ordinance but not only did they refuse to accept this evidence, but they also refused to conduct their own proper research on the weapon; the Department of Ordinance even ordered service personal not to make any changes to the weapon that had shown to improve the weapon's functionality, (which active fighting crews often did anyway in order to save their own lives.) The Department of Ordinance did not relent until after many U.S. sailors and airmen and suffered the consequences of faulty munitions; the evidence becoming too overwhelming to ignore or deny. As well, with NASA shuttles, it is now well known that NASA engineers were very concerned (in particular) about the O-rings' possible failings on the Challenger, yet despite their concerns reaching the higher-ups, who were ultimately responsible for deciding whether or not to proceed with the launch, decided that, despite the evidence, the issue wasn't going to stop the launch. Of course, more or less, the issue did stop the launch in its tracks, so to speak. This tragic failing would, however, result in a massive overhaul on how the safety and engineering recommendations, by those of qualified status, would be assessed and applied in future launches to ensure that bureaucrats were not the deciding persons of go/no-go for launch. Yes, issues should be assessed as you described, and in most cases that is how they are assessed, but historically this has not always been the case.
Well maybe it's like when you take your car to a mechanic cause it's making that noise but stops making it it may have worked every time during testing but in the field for whatever reason they had issues
As I noted below, Clemson (and Wickes) class destroyers did not use Mark 15 (the destroyer version of the Mark 14) torpedoes. Older technology Mark 8 torpedoes were used by these destroyers, making a disappointing anachronism in an otherwise good account of this battle.
Just so you know, from a person who once lived in Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia, the name of the Borneo port of Balikpapan is pronounced - baaal-ik-paaa-pan.
Read about this first in the US Naval History magazine. Amazing to think this is actually the first surface engagement of the US Navy since the Spanish American War. Despite the setbacks, I think CMDR Talbot did a fine job keeping up the Navy spirit. Well done to the crews of the John D. Ford, Pope, Parrott, and Paul Jones, and RIP to those on the Pope, lost later in the 2nd Battle of the Java Sea.
My Dad was a Chief Machinist Mate on a Tin Can in the North Atlantic when the war broke out. The Destroyer (Tin Cans) were well aware of the problems of the Mark 14 failure to detonate. According to dad who knew some of the men involved in the raid, they were the most surprised that the torpedoes worked. They thought the whole thing was a suicide mission. Extremely lucky outcome.
I remember when I first heard about this battle on a Wikipedia binge session, I couldn't understand the casualty summary tab. Four destroyers attack 14 unguarded defenseless transports in a desperate attempt to slow the Japanese invasion, yet they only managed to sink 4 of those transports. Would be fascinating to speculate what could have happened if the USS Boise hadn't hit that reef. Simply having that one extra ship with state of the art radar and 15x 6 inch guns would have decimated this entire transport fleet and may have even saved ABDACOM from the Java Sea travesty about to unfold. One would assume the Japanese would henceforth have needed to call up their immensely powerful battleship fleet for involvement in the theatre. It's inexplicable that the attacks on Darwin, the entire Guadalcanal campaign, and subsequent Papua New Guinea campaigns unfolded almost entirely without capital ship support. Simply having one or two extra battleships present in these early battles would have certainly won them Guadalcanal and Port Moresby and the whole shape of the war could have been quite different.
Capital ships would have been of use in the other battles, but not those around Guadalcanal. The reason only the Kongos were sent is because they were the only ones fast enough. The Yamatos were nearly fast enough but they also had the distinction of being the centerpieces of the battle line so putting them in grave danger of torpedo attack before the decisive battle was not an acceptable option. All the other Japanese battleships were too slow and would have just been sunk by aircraft even if they had gone in and sank the entire allied fleet at Guadalcanal.
@@collinwood6573 Makes perfect sense. Thank you. It seems the Japanese were slaves to their “one decisive naval battle” doctrine. The reality is the Americans would have been even more ticked off, rebuilt their fleet and thrashed them again in a year or two.
watching this in balikpapan, absolutely stunning, the distance between the fleet, the depth of water there, and the tactic used is surreal to see within my window
I read a book about the USS Houston's last run when I was young, the Houston was technically a cruiser but was under-gunned. The captain was a destroyer captain and he maneuvered the USS Houston like a destroyer nearly laying it over while avoiding Japanese bombs. Like the destroyers in this video, the Houston's last run was against Japanese landing ships lined up along the shore (the Battle of Sundra Strait). The pursuing destroyers hit some of their own ships with carelessly fired torpedoes while the USS Houston hit the transports with fire at close range and got away until the next morning when Japanese air found it.
Not exactly. Houston was a heavy cruiser with proper heavy cruiser guns. Her main armament consisted of 9 8” guns in three triple turrets. Her problem was that she was very badly armored. Houston was a Treaty cruiser. The Washington $ London naval treaties limited cruisers to 10000 tons displacement. Basically you had to skimp on guns, engines or armor. Houston, like her sister ships in the Northampton class had VERY light armor. The main belt was less than 4” thick, about half of what you’d normally expect for an 8” gunned cruiser.
'Eggshells armed w/ hammers', early US CAs, ori 13:30 originally classed as scout cruisers. Also known as 'tinclads', upping designed armor only came w/ Portland & Indianapolis, & the beautiful but unlucky Astoria class (almost pocket battleships)
@@jamesbugbee9026Astoria class was something else. 3 were sunk at the Battle of Savo Island, 3 more suffered severe damage in other naval battles around Guadalcanal (their crews performed miracles keeping them afloat).
Your mistaken about the sinking of the Houston she was sunk around 2am by naval gunfire and torpedoes not Japanese air attacks. March 1 1942. Both her and the HAMAS PERTH were the only 2 American ships in the sundra strait.
I was lived in Balikpapan several years ago. It is really perfect place for Japanese to land their troops to get access to the interior of the island and its oil, coal, and rubber resources. Lots of shallow beach and clearing. Weather kinda unbearable because its very hot there. Also at 2:06 the city is called Manado.
Admiral Nishimura commanded throughout almost the whole war, until he was killed commanding part of the Southern Force at the Battle of Surigao Strait. I had no idea he was leading as far back as Balikpapan.
Yes, they were based in the Philippines, and I heir flagship was U.S.S. Langley, which was America's first aircraft carrier. Of course by this time the Langley had converted into a seaplane tender. It was sunk by Japanese aircraft.
Hart commanded for the Navy....McArthur commanded the Army/Army Air. They did not get along. Hart actually thought McArthur was mental. And once McArthur LOST almost the entire Air Force in Philippines, it was over. Hart ordered his ships and subs South....saved the Sub and Destroyer Tenders. Very chaotic, but Hart did what he could with what he had. McArthur.... got The Medal of Honor after losing badly...and high tailing it to Australia. (My Dad was a Navy Dentist on USS Otus. Sub Tender damaged by air attack on Dec 10th. )
Outstanding! The minute by minute story w/the detailed diagram made ti easy to follow too. A long neglected story of the dark days of the Pacific theater of WW2.
what i have learned from this battle is: do your best don't get unmotivated because you don't know exactly what is going on or what is you impact, dutch submarine inspired me.
Of note that should be mentioned is that while US subs used Mk 14 torpedos, US surface ships used Mk 15’s but had similar torpedo issues between the two. US subs COULD use Mk 15’s but only in the after torpedo rooms as the torpedos were longer than Mk 14’s and the after tubes on subs could accommodate their additional length.
There's a lot of British names in the US, of course. Including some of the nobility due to "second sons", those not due to inherit much, heading to the colonies early on to try their own thing. My grandmother's family, coming to the colonies early on in the 1600s, fit that description.
Great depression was on. Back then the U S. Government actually tried to stay within budget, modern day Congress hasn't passed a budget in 30 years. Let alone limit spending.
@@kdrapertruckerThe Great Depression didnt severely impact equipment development in any of the other sectors like this. By 1942, the P-51s and F6Fs were already in it's late stages of development and the P-38 were also already being widely used. Not to mention the new developments for the M4 Sherman, B-17s, etc etc
Speaking of 1st nations to stop the Japanese, do you recon you could do a video on Kokoda and the Aussies input into the war? As an Australian, we so often see the US and the Brits contributions but rarely any from the ANZACs (or other allied troops, Canada, India, the Dutch, etc).
To everyone who wants a great military sci fy book series set in WW2 where members of the Asiatic fleet end up in an alternate earth where they must fight against beings bent on conquering the known world while either enslaving or eating the survivors, The Destroyermen Series by Taylor Anderson is a great choice.
Nishimura, having just ordered all 11 Japanese destroyers to go out sub-hunting, seeing 4 destroyers coming back in: "new ship, who dis?" Talbot: "uh... how do you do, fellow IJN warships" Nishimura: "understandable, have a nice day" _a few moments later_ Nishimura: "How could the Americans have possibly gotten past our fleet?"
I am Japanese. I respect you for your detailed and clear explanations and for being well educated. Most Japanese avoid conflict in their daily lives, at work, and in general. Japanese people never fight if there is no need to fight. This is the same for the Japanese of the previous generation and the Japanese of today. I am saddened by the various conflicts in many countries today. I hope one day we can see a more peaceful world.
In some ways a mirror image of the Battle of Savo Island in August 1942. In that case, the American destroyers failed to alert their fellows as the Japanese warships steamed past. However, the big Japanese torpedoes clobbered the US and Australian ships before the Japanese sailed away nearly unscathed. The Allied force at Savo had to hold its fire for fear of hitting one another during a key part of that engagement.
My grandfather and two of his brothers were on the cruiser Boise mentioned in the video. I have his diary from the very beginning of the war. He talked about Boise joining the rest of the fleet and sailing for days. This would have been the fleet leaving Manila that you mentioned. He talked about things that almost always turned out to be rumor, seeing Japanese subs, seeing Japanese planes fly by, etc. He kept it all the way through the Battle of Cape Esperance where the Boise was damaged badly and had to return to Philadelphia. After that my grandfather was transferred to a North Atlantic patrol ship and the diary ends.
Theres a great game called Battlestations Midway where the first missions about the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and dutch East indies a few things are historically inaccurate but still highly recommend it
Ah yes, I remember what a struggle it was when I took too long to complete the mission and I ended up having to fight a cruiser with my destroyer. Wasn't exactly easy
I remember that mission you commanded 2 destroyers one fletcher class and one Clemson class which where the historical inaccuracy comes in where no fletcher class were involved
Beautiful presentation. I was unaware this was the first victory in the areas, of which have not, as of yet been so designated. I tip my hat to that Captain (although probably a LTCR by rank) who turned around, went back into the cluster, fired, turned around, went back through the cluster, and came out with very minor damage. From the sounds of it, the Captain, at minimum, might be deserving of the Navy Distinguished Service Metal.
Mark 8 torpedo as used on clemsons was designed in 1911. It was slow and had it's own problems,such as not enough exlosives to sink a ship if you actually hit it. great video even if you assumed the clemsons had Mark 14 Torpedo's
Loved the video @historigraph! Can't wait for the next video man! I didn't expect to see that USS Boise (CL-47) from the Interwar Brooklyn-class, Brooklyn-Subclass Light Cruisers was initially part of what would eventually become America's Part of the Ill-Fated ABDACOM, Our Asiatic Fleet. This looks like another Naval Battle to try and Represent in Axis & Allies: War at Sea, Granted the Only Clemson-class Destroyer in the Game in the USS Edsall (DD-219), However, Edsall was lost during the Fighting in the Dutch East Indies in this point in the war all thanks to about 5 Destroyers Confusing her for a Light Cruiser. Imagine a Multi-Game Campaign with the Various Axis & Allies Games and the Use of Flames of War by Battlefront Miniatures as an Option in Place of the Ground Warfare Miniatures for Axis & Allies set across the Entirety of the Second World War. A Team Game with The Team Leader at the Global Map, one Player to play with the War at Sea Miniatures (Custom and Official, depending upon the Player's Choice), One to Play with the Angels 20 and Bandits High Miniatures (Again, Custom and Official Depending upon the Player's Choice) and one to Play either the Ground Warfare Miniatures or Flames of War by Battlefront Miniatures, for each Nation in Axis & Allies. The Individual Games for Battles for when you want to see a Battle Through and the Global Map for when you want to "Autoresolve" or have the Battle Played out like the Classic Global Axis & Allies Games. I am working various National Tech Trees and Aircraft Movement Distances for War at Sea, with each New Successive Design for each unit Type being Unlocked with the Usual Research Die Rolls, each of those costing you the usual 5 IPC (Industrial Production Costs/Currency). This same Method, so far as I've figured out, can also be used for Repair Die Rolls. Similar to the "Damage Control" Special Ability on some of the Ships in the Official Cards for War at Sea, Each Repair Die will succeed on a 5 or Better and will remove 1 Point of Hull Damage. If this is Unsuccessful, then you'll have to simply Wait a Turn and Try again. For each Point of Damage a Ship Survives a Battle with, roll a Die and the Result will be How long to remove one of those Points of Damage. Let me know what you think about these Ideas and I'll catch you in your next video man!
One outstanding book about the Asiatic Fleet is 'The Fleet the Gods Forgot' And also a book written by a u.s. sailor who was crew aboard the 'John D. Ford' is called 'Another 600' Further still an excellent book about a u.s. destroyer that disappeared during the battle of the java sea uss edsall. 'A Blue Sea of Blood'
I would say this engagement was more embarrassing for the Americans, since 4 destroyers fire dozens of torpedoes at stationary targets that couldn’t return fire, and all escorts were otherwise engaged, and yet after an hour of fighting only sunk 4 ships which also begs the question why didn’t they use artillery as soon as their presence was known, especially since they also confirmed they’re torpedoes weren’t reliable.
Until the military announces a change of doctrine, they cant just change tactics of their own volition. Especially when at the time, the Dept of Ordinance were still adamant that thousands of men were wrong and they were right. The tactic was sound and effective, had the torpedoes been working. If they opened up with their batteries, they would easily be spotted by everyone there as they will clearly see a train of 8 to 12 red flashing lights with tracers going out to hit their own ships
Even submarines had issues with same torpedo. It was the magnetic detonator that suppose to activate the explosion under the keel. I read about from USA submarines patrolling in that area
Was anyone in the Bureau of Ordinance ever shot, court martialed, demoted or otherwise punished for the failure of the Mark 14 torpedo in the early stages of the war?
As other commenters already mentioned, the US torpedoes used in this engagement were the older Mark 8 torpedoes, not the Mark 14 (or rather its destroyer variant, the Mark 15). The Mark 8 did have its own serious issues though.
Very Brave men and ships, the Germans knew even if out numbered the Royal navy would attack - it struck fear into them. I met a German navy vet in Stuttgart a many years ago and we had a beer session - he said " when the alarm sounded British navy attacking" he shook with terror. He was an awesome guy and his tales left us very drunk- he became a good friend- but the years took him. My wife is a skilled flouriest - we send a battle ship flower arrangement to his wife for his funeral. War sucks big time - Germany has become my place to go.
It's highly probable that Cmdr Talbot did not know and could not determine the disposition of the transports. Had he been able to do so, he may have attacked the fleet differently, ie run northerly in column with four ships, all firing 3 torpedoes at 2 allocated targets to port. Thus firing 6 torpedoes obliquely at a pair of transports ensured maximum chance of hits and avoided wasting torpedoes. Then turn to starboard and run south and fire the stbd torpedoes into the second column as per the first. Guns could be used as targets came to bear.
you should look into the accounts of the USS Asheville a 1920's gunboat assign to the same fleet, mind you her only combat action while short and rather one sided proved to be interesting considering only one of her crew survived the engagement.
The destroyer-launched US torpedoes were specifically the Mk. 15 torpedoes, not the more infamous submarine-launched Mk. 14. They were heavier and longer, giving longer range and bigger warhead. They do have similar faultiness with the Mk. 14.
I believe it's called Balikpapan as in magIc (not eek) but nevertheless another great video. Sorry it sounds weird I used to work there and I have friends live there. Cheers.
The Mk 14 torpedo wasn't the problem. It was the new magnetic exploder. This prevented the torpedoes to detonate prematurely or cause the detonator to crush on a 90 degree strike.
@@historigraph what kind of idiot takes all his ships to look for a submarine and leave a transport fleet unguarded Did he not think the submarine could circle round and attack the transports again How he wasn't releaved of duty or executed is surprising given how mad Japan was during the war
@@historigraph I just thought to myself "wait what, the video series about the south east asia battles including Java Sea, Malaya etc are not that old, why is he talking about a remaster." It is in fact already over 2 years old. If I remember correctly I started watching you when you released the Dreadnought video. That was 5 years ago. God where has the time gone.... It feels like that was only 2 years ago instead of 5..... Anyways, I love your content.
@@xxnightdriverxx9576 Yeah its a long time ago now- and also the videos have seen a big jump in visual quality in the last 18 months or so, which really dates some of the other stuff now
Ernest King in his position as COC of the Navy resisted the investigation of faulty Mk 14 torpedos which greatly frustrated both destroyer and submarine operations for way too long.
It is interesting to compare the actions of the US Navy (and Australian Navy) to the IJN in these types of encounters. Although on much smaller scale it is telling that at Balikpapan and later at Sundra Strait the Allied forces didn't hesitate - they pressed forward and got in amongst the Japanese transport. At Balikpapan the US destroyers got clean away, at Sundra Strait the Houston and HMAS Perth were sunk, but in both cases they understood what there were there for. Compare that to the Battle of Savo Island and the Battle Off Samar where immensely powerful IJN forces were in a position to sink an entire invasion force and... in both occasions the Japanese commander turned around and fled before reaching the transport ships. WTF?
Savo Island can be explained. The battle against the US cruiser force took a bit too long, and the japanese cruisers had been split up, requireing some time to find themselves again and line up again in the dark. Both of this took too much time. If they had attacked the transports after that, they would have still been in aircraft range once the sun had risen. This would have resulted in them getting attacked by the US carrier they thought was in the area (even though said carrier, I forgot which one it was, had retired south a day prior due to being low on fuel and having lost too many fighters in air battle against japanese planes, thus the carrier was not in striking range, but the japanese didnt know that). These air attacks by a carrier would have posed a great danger to Kuritas cruiser force, and he did not want to lose any ships. He prioritised the survival of his ships, which in itself is not a bad decision to make. We have hindsight, he did not. Plenty of allied cruiser captains also prioritised the survival of their ships (though none were such a missed opportunity as here), sacrificing destroyers is a completly different thing to sacrificing cruisers. Also, Kurita had been told by the Japanese Army that they could not only contain the US marine landing force, but actively push them back into the sea. This was of course false, and a result of the japanese interservice rivalry. Looking at it from Kuritas perspective, he had won a major naval battle and sunk a bunch of allied cruisers with no losses of his own, and he was told that the US land forces would soon be driven away by the japanese army. But if he stuck around to sink a few cargo ships, some of his own ships would likely be sunk at the beginning of the next day due to US air attack. He would effectively trade cruisers for cargo ships, but from his perspective at the time the sinking of the cargo ships would not have changed the overall strategic situation. Of course he was wrong, but again we have hindsight, and with the infos Kurita had at the time he decided to withdraw, his decision is understandable, its debatable if the decision was right or wrong (I think its somewhere in the middle), but it was understandable. Regarding the Battle off Samar, yeah that was just stupid. The entire battle was initiated to attack the invasion ships, with an entire fleet being formed that was supposed to be sacrificed, including some of Japans last carriers. And once the battleship force had defeated Taffey 3 and could have attacked the transports they just left..... sure they were under air attack, and sinking the transports would have likely resulted in the japanese fleet being sunk by carrier air attack the next day due to the time it took to sink them, but that was the enitre point of them being there in the first place, with everyone being aware that they might not return....
@@xxnightdriverxx9576 The simple fact is that he had orders to attack and destroy the American transports that were anchored off the beaches. If he had done that then the entire American offensive would have stopped dead in the first 48 hours and Japan would have scored a stunning strategic victory. What you are saying amounts to making a virtue out of a tactical decision that totally ignored the strategic imperatives that sent those cruisers into Savo Island in the first place. I have no doubt - none whatsoever - that had the situation been reversed then a USN cruiser force would have pressed on the get at the Japanese transports and would have stayed their until all their ammo was exhausted or until all the cruisers had been sunk. Basically, exactly what happened at the Battle of Sundra Strait. Except there the two allied cruisers were grossly outgunned and so went down with all guns blazing. The Japanese cruiser force should have pressed on the the transports, and then let tomorrow bring what may.
@@johnreynolds7996 I agree. It's not just the benefit of hindsight regarding Savo and Samar. Yamamoto understood his nation had no chance of winning a war of attrition, but that's what Japan's rings of islands defense plan was, in effect. Given the way the US shipyards would go brrrr and churn out everything imaginable, Japan's ONLY chance of repeating the Russo-Japanese War experience was piling up truly decisive victories. That meant regarding their ships as fairly disposable to win a short war. Husbanding them for a long war only guaranteed there would be a surrender treaty signing ceremony in Tokyo. If you really examine the actions of most Japanese Navy admirals, they weren't very good and certainly a notch below the average American admiral. Yamamoto's Midway plan and execution was borderline absurd. Failures of nerve at Savo and Samar were not that unusual. Nagumo was flat terrible, nearly losing carriers during the Indian Ocean Raid, then actually losing all four of them at Midway. Yet he was back to managing carriers again in the Solomon Islands Campaign. If Ray Spruance and Fitch had lost Hornet , Enterprise, and Yorktown at Midway, they would have been in charge of Maine lighthouses for the rest of their miserable careers. The Japanese Navy's system was too reliant on seniority and just badly flawed.
@@amerigo88 "Failures of nerve at Savo and Samar were not that unusual. Nagumo was flat terrible, nearly losing carriers during the Indian Ocean Raid, then actually losing all four of them at Midway." Nagumo was indeed terrible in the Indian Ocean Raid. He had a crushingly powerful fleet to throw at a delapidated Royal Navy Indian Ocean Fleet. Not even close to being a fair matchup. Except.... the British had one of the best Admirals of WW2 running their side of the show: Somerville, who had cut his teeth with Force H out of Gibraltar. Somerville quit literally ran rings around Nagumo, and at all times had a much better understanding of the Japanese movements than Nagumo had regarding the British fleet. I assume you were referring to Somerville moving his carrier into a position to launch a nighttime torpedo attack on the Japanese fleet? His positioning was perfect, and his Swordfish bombers were radar-equipped so a nighttime attack was quite plausible. It was only stymied because Somerville sent out reconn at dusk to do a final pinpoint of Nagumo's forces, and the ONLY Swordfish to suffer mechanical failure was the one plane that had been assigned to sweep the area where the Japanese fleet actually was. Without that confirmation Somerville wasn't willing to risk the strike and he withdrew. Nagumo had no idea the British had been on his shoulder. Pity. Somerville might have scored a stunning success at the time when the allies were doing it tough. But nonetheless he handled his much-inferior force with great skill.
@@johnreynolds7996 Funny as I was thinking more of the 11 Bristol Blenheim bombers that actually attacked the Japanese carriers during the Indian Ocean Raid. These bombers slipped right past the Japanese CAP and dropped their bombs from 11,000 feet. The IJN Hiryu had spotted the Blenheims, but failed to alert the rest of Kido Butai (Parshall). Of course the Enterprise and Yorktown dive bombers would slip past the CAP two months later at Midway. Another consideration regarding Japanese failures was the Zuikaku was not hit by a single bomb or torpedo during the Battle of the Coral Sea, yet she sat out the Battle of Midway. The Shokaku was undergoing repairs, but the Zuikaku could have joined her Pearl Harbor Raid sister carriers, greatly increasing IJN air strength for the expected Kantai Kessen off Midway. Yamamoto allowed Zuikaku to miss the battle while training up a new air group for operations. Mind you, this was BEFORE the massive attrition of Midway, Guadalcanal, and the rest of the Solomon Islands Campaign. I would think Japan had plenty of fully-trained naval aviators who had been blooded at Pearl, Coral Sea, Indian Ocean, and so on, not to mention over the skies of China. Yet Zuikaku was allowed to miss Midway. Imagine Enterprise and the ineffective Hornet facing off against Hiryu AND Zuikaku during Round Two at Midway. Of course, that's another carrier for Nagumo and his staff to squander, but it still would have meant more Japanese opportunities for success.
Top tip: put your quality in the TH-cam player up to 2160p for this, even if your screen is only 1080p or lower - the video will play at a higher bit rate and look much better for it.
And its a couple of days early, but happy thanksgiving this week to all our US viewers :)
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Also, I've just realised I said Mark 14 torpedo - I of course meant the Mark 15, which was the destroyer version
In the time 5:48 your video shows 1 light cruiser and 10 destroyers and u said 11
@@zinniasana8578one tiny mistake
Hey friend please keep on doing video's about these little known battles. They're quite informative. I had no idea this engagement ever happened. So keep up the good work.
Destroyers used Mk 15 Torpedos, which except for the size were essentially identical to the submarine based Mk 14s though.
The travesty behind the development of the Mark 14 Torpedo was completely criminal and it was a devastating detriment to the US Navy early in the war. Firing 11+ torpedoes and none of them detonating is unbelievable!
Actually just realised I meant to say Mark 15, which was the destroyer version
@@historigraph Oh thanks! I didn't know that the Mark 15 was the Destroyer version!
At least at Narvik it was the cold that caused them to malfunction. But these American torpedoes not having a single live fire demonstration to see if they even work is just criminal.
@@ryanelliott71698 German torpedoes didn't work either funnily enough due to being closer to the electromagnitic pole
Clemson class destroyers did not use Mark 15 torpedoes. They used the older technology Mark 8 torpedoes (and, FWIW, S-boats used older technology Mark 10 torpedoes). Whatever the cause of the misses in this battle, the Mark 15 torpedo was not the cause. Another difference between the Wickes and Clemson classes and 1930s and 1940s destroyers is that the former had 4"/50 main guns rather than 5"/38 DP guns. OTOH, Wickes and Clemson class destroyers were similar in speed to newer destroyers.
It's sad that the Asiatic Fleet is so overlooked and unremembered despite its vital role in the early stages of the War
Might be because it was just so bad. All the MOTs and destroyers in the PI not only failed to stop a single Japanese landing but failed sink a single enemy ship.
@@geeeeeee3so bad?
Geez Gee3. Let’s at least blame the crap torpedoes, crap subs, lack of night training, small numbers of old ships, not trusting early radar, lack of coordination with allies - something. I think they did the best they could with what they had against an adversary who had been at war for years already and was really good at night fighting. Sure it could have been better. But context is everything, especially in the dark early days of ‘41-‘42. The IJN had a plan, and the allies did not.
@@huskergator9479 geeeee3 didnt say why it was bad, just that it was bad. You are both right.
@@geeeeeee3that might be true, and only shows how pretentious Americans are in their respect to their service members; they only respect the famous and the ones present
My dad actually spotted the American fleet before it went onto attack the transports not knowing they were even in the area. All the ships they had been seeing were Japanese and were not informed the Americans were attacking at all. He was a a PBY pilot with Patrol Wing ten and somehow survived not being shot down by the Japanese. The clouds were the only chance they had to survive.
Your dad Rocked ! Tim UK
My Uncle was a tailgunner in a B-17 and made 29 sorties over Germany and watched his friends and fellow air man fall out of the sky right next to him. How he made it home alive is a miracle just like your dad. I don't know if it's luck, destiny or God's plan. I read his logbook from time to time. He had notes in there whether he saw parachutes and the approximate location, fighter types they encountered, it's a book in itself.
He was one of the lucky ones. I think all but 3 of the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 were shot down by the Japanese, which is crazy.
@@t.r.4496 What the USAAF commanders and Eisenhower (and British counterparts) did to send those men off like cannon fodder was criminal, really. They didn't care about them and just sent them all off to die essentially. P-51s or P-38s (with larger fuel tanks) could have easily been made available since 1942 but all the historical documentation has been doctored to make it look like there was no possible way for them to be ready until mid-1944 because we can't make the USAAF or Eisenhower look bad, can we? Most of the pilots and co-pilots of B-17s and B-24s were 18-20 year old lieutenants with less than 100 hours of flying time.
well. you also got to remember that the odds for AA to take down a plane even one as big as a pby is somewhere between 1 in 100000 and 1 in 1000000 depending on the whether. also they didn't have america's super ridiculous AA shells which gave them a DRASTICALLY higher chance to hit.
Human arrogance can be so detrimental, i.e., IJN commander, "There's no way enemy ships could have gotten by us."
Also (more famously) U.S. Bureau of Ordinance, "It's not our torpedo that's the problem, it's all of your pilots, mariners and submariners."
"& we're not gonna test any of them, because fuck you, that's why!"
- some dick at the Ordinance Bureau...probably
Also, "we can't blame Nimitz for anything because we have to treat him as a "godlike" being who can do no wrong even though he knew about the torpedo problems since before Pearl Harbor and he still allowed the horrible torpedoes to be used all the way to November 1943 despite he having supreme commander powers during the Pacific Theater"
the way to handle this situation is you come up with actual evidence instead of just attacking the man making the decision to keep using them
the USAAF famously made the same mistake with the B-17 and B-29, NASA likewise made it with the Shuttle
@@touristguy87 I do agree. Unfortunately in the case of the Mark 14 torpedo there was plenty of evidence that was put forth to the leadership of the Department of Ordinance but not only did they refuse to accept this evidence, but they also refused to conduct their own proper research on the weapon; the Department of Ordinance even ordered service personal not to make any changes to the weapon that had shown to improve the weapon's functionality, (which active fighting crews often did anyway in order to save their own lives.) The Department of Ordinance did not relent until after many U.S. sailors and airmen and suffered the consequences of faulty munitions; the evidence becoming too overwhelming to ignore or deny.
As well, with NASA shuttles, it is now well known that NASA engineers were very concerned (in particular) about the O-rings' possible failings on the Challenger, yet despite their concerns reaching the higher-ups, who were ultimately responsible for deciding whether or not to proceed with the launch, decided that, despite the evidence, the issue wasn't going to stop the launch. Of course, more or less, the issue did stop the launch in its tracks, so to speak. This tragic failing would, however, result in a massive overhaul on how the safety and engineering recommendations, by those of qualified status, would be assessed and applied in future launches to ensure that bureaucrats were not the deciding persons of go/no-go for launch.
Yes, issues should be assessed as you described, and in most cases that is how they are assessed, but historically this has not always been the case.
Well maybe it's like when you take your car to a mechanic cause it's making that noise but stops making it it may have worked every time during testing but in the field for whatever reason they had issues
As I noted below, Clemson (and Wickes) class destroyers did not use Mark 15 (the destroyer version of the Mark 14) torpedoes. Older technology Mark 8 torpedoes were used by these destroyers, making a disappointing anachronism in an otherwise good account of this battle.
Fair enough, have chased this down in response to your comment and yep I got that wrong. My apologies to everyone
I think they still had been retrofitted with the Mark VI exploder giving them basically the same problems.
Just so you know, from a person who once lived in Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia, the name of the Borneo port of Balikpapan is pronounced - baaal-ik-paaa-pan.
Read about this first in the US Naval History magazine. Amazing to think this is actually the first surface engagement of the US Navy since the Spanish American War. Despite the setbacks, I think CMDR Talbot did a fine job keeping up the Navy spirit. Well done to the crews of the John D. Ford, Pope, Parrott, and Paul Jones, and RIP to those on the Pope, lost later in the 2nd Battle of the Java Sea.
US Naval History magazine sounds like great bathroom reading.
The Pope, Parrott, and Paul Hones were cowards. Running away from a city that had just barely started.
My Dad was a Chief Machinist Mate on a Tin Can in the North Atlantic when the war broke out. The Destroyer (Tin Cans) were well aware of the problems of the Mark 14 failure to detonate. According to dad who knew some of the men involved in the raid, they were the most surprised that the torpedoes worked. They thought the whole thing was a suicide mission. Extremely lucky outcome.
Destroyers did not carry the Mk 14.
The Clemsons had Mk10, which worked. LAter ones the MkXIII, which had similar problems to the Mk14
I remember when I first heard about this battle on a Wikipedia binge session, I couldn't understand the casualty summary tab. Four destroyers attack 14 unguarded defenseless transports in a desperate attempt to slow the Japanese invasion, yet they only managed to sink 4 of those transports.
Would be fascinating to speculate what could have happened if the USS Boise hadn't hit that reef. Simply having that one extra ship with state of the art radar and 15x 6 inch guns would have decimated this entire transport fleet and may have even saved ABDACOM from the Java Sea travesty about to unfold.
One would assume the Japanese would henceforth have needed to call up their immensely powerful battleship fleet for involvement in the theatre. It's inexplicable that the attacks on Darwin, the entire Guadalcanal campaign, and subsequent Papua New Guinea campaigns unfolded almost entirely without capital ship support. Simply having one or two extra battleships present in these early battles would have certainly won them Guadalcanal and Port Moresby and the whole shape of the war could have been quite different.
The Yamato steaming into Savo Bay? That is a terrifying thought.
Capital ships would have been of use in the other battles, but not those around Guadalcanal. The reason only the Kongos were sent is because they were the only ones fast enough. The Yamatos were nearly fast enough but they also had the distinction of being the centerpieces of the battle line so putting them in grave danger of torpedo attack before the decisive battle was not an acceptable option. All the other Japanese battleships were too slow and would have just been sunk by aircraft even if they had gone in and sank the entire allied fleet at Guadalcanal.
@@collinwood6573 Makes perfect sense. Thank you. It seems the Japanese were slaves to their “one decisive naval battle” doctrine. The reality is the Americans would have been even more ticked off, rebuilt their fleet and thrashed them again in a year or two.
Did not have the fuel
@@docbailey3265
And fuel hogs@@collinwood6573
watching this in balikpapan, absolutely stunning, the distance between the fleet, the depth of water there, and the tactic used is surreal to see within my window
Imagine how much damage the Americans could have done with working torpedoes 😮
Some did hit and explode.
The transports must have been well built that one explosion did not sink it.
or with the boise and marblehead
not just here but early in the pacific war in general. the coalition in the java sea might have had a fighting chance
I read a book about the USS Houston's last run when I was young, the Houston was technically a cruiser but was under-gunned. The captain was a destroyer captain and he maneuvered the USS Houston like a destroyer nearly laying it over while avoiding Japanese bombs. Like the destroyers in this video, the Houston's last run was against Japanese landing ships lined up along the shore (the Battle of Sundra Strait). The pursuing destroyers hit some of their own ships with carelessly fired torpedoes while the USS Houston hit the transports with fire at close range and got away until the next morning when Japanese air found it.
Not exactly. Houston was a heavy cruiser with proper heavy cruiser guns. Her main armament consisted of 9 8” guns in three triple turrets. Her problem was that she was very badly armored. Houston was a Treaty cruiser. The Washington $ London naval treaties limited cruisers to 10000 tons displacement. Basically you had to skimp on guns, engines or armor. Houston, like her sister ships in the Northampton class had VERY light armor. The main belt was less than 4” thick, about half of what you’d normally expect for an 8” gunned cruiser.
'Eggshells armed w/ hammers', early US CAs, ori 13:30 originally classed as scout cruisers. Also known as 'tinclads', upping designed armor only came w/ Portland & Indianapolis, & the beautiful but unlucky Astoria class (almost pocket battleships)
@@jamesbugbee9026Astoria class was something else. 3 were sunk at the Battle of Savo Island, 3 more suffered severe damage in other naval battles around Guadalcanal (their crews performed miracles keeping them afloat).
Your mistaken about the sinking of the Houston she was sunk around 2am by naval gunfire and torpedoes not Japanese air attacks. March 1 1942. Both her and the HAMAS PERTH were the only 2 American ships in the sundra strait.
@@crazyeddie1981 HMAS Perth was an Australian Leander Class cruiser, not an American ship.
Babe, wake up, historiograph just dropped a new video
I was lived in Balikpapan several years ago. It is really perfect place for Japanese to land their troops to get access to the interior of the island and its oil, coal, and rubber resources. Lots of shallow beach and clearing. Weather kinda unbearable because its very hot there. Also at 2:06 the city is called Manado.
Quite that daring raid especially given the Japanese where on a winning streak at this point in the Pacific War.
Always learn something new. Thank you for these incredible documentaries!
Thank you for covering this engagement. I've only ever seen it either vaguely referred to or as a footnote.
Admiral Nishimura commanded throughout almost the whole war, until he was killed commanding part of the Southern Force at the Battle of Surigao Strait. I had no idea he was leading as far back as Balikpapan.
@@mbryson2899 Either he wasn't the greatest leader or our fathers and grandfathers were much better military than the Japanese.
@@mikerosner-e2x A bit of both, I believe (though the USN had its share of incompetent or ineffective admirals).
My father served on one of the destroyers, the USS John D Ford DD228. It was one of the Clemson four stack destroyers in this video.
This has blessed me more than you can possibly know. Thanks for this word of encouragement!
From the North Atlantic to the Pacific, Allied destroyers sure have liking to launch punch-above-their-weight attacks.
I'm a big fan of WW2 naval history and had no idea an asiatic fleet even existed! Well produced video!
Yes, they were based in the Philippines, and I heir flagship was U.S.S. Langley, which was America's first aircraft carrier. Of course by this time the Langley had converted into a seaplane tender. It was sunk by Japanese aircraft.
Hart commanded for the Navy....McArthur commanded the Army/Army Air. They did not get along. Hart actually thought McArthur was mental. And once McArthur LOST almost the entire Air Force in Philippines, it was over. Hart ordered his ships and subs South....saved the Sub and Destroyer Tenders. Very chaotic, but Hart did what he could with what he had. McArthur.... got The Medal of Honor after losing badly...and high tailing it to Australia. (My Dad was a Navy Dentist on USS Otus. Sub Tender damaged by air attack on Dec 10th. )
I’ve been deeply interested in the Pacific War and never heard of this engagement before
At least we are not alone. Same here.
I love this kind of content educational and fun to look at keep up the good work !
These small obscure battles are so much more interesting than the large ones we already know.
Outstanding! The minute by minute story w/the detailed diagram made ti easy to follow too. A long neglected story of the dark days of the Pacific theater of WW2.
wow, im from Balikpapan and this is great story🙂🙂
Slightly off topic: the cruiser Houston is featured in Alexander Fullertons "All the Drowning Seas". Great read for any other naval ficton fans.
These videos are awesome man. Very detailed and easy to follow. Props to you
what i have learned from this battle is: do your best don't get unmotivated because you don't know exactly what is going on or what is you impact, dutch submarine inspired me.
Of note that should be mentioned is that while US subs used Mk 14 torpedos, US surface ships used Mk 15’s but had similar torpedo issues between the two. US subs COULD use Mk 15’s but only in the after torpedo rooms as the torpedos were longer than Mk 14’s and the after tubes on subs could accommodate their additional length.
this channel is just amazing
I never heard of this battle before this, thanks for posting.
I just realised something Captain Talbot, Carries the name of the Earl Of Shrewsbury from the 14-15th century. Fitting for somebody that brave.
There's a lot of British names in the US, of course. Including some of the nobility due to "second sons", those not due to inherit much, heading to the colonies early on to try their own thing. My grandmother's family, coming to the colonies early on in the 1600s, fit that description.
How they were able to put several models of torpedoes ( mk 14/+) into service without ever live firing a single one is mind blowing!
Great depression was on. Back then the U S. Government actually tried to stay within budget, modern day Congress hasn't passed a budget in 30 years. Let alone limit spending.
@@kdrapertruckerThe Great Depression didnt severely impact equipment development in any of the other sectors like this. By 1942, the P-51s and F6Fs were already in it's late stages of development and the P-38 were also already being widely used. Not to mention the new developments for the M4 Sherman, B-17s, etc etc
Speaking of 1st nations to stop the Japanese, do you recon you could do a video on Kokoda and the Aussies input into the war? As an Australian, we so often see the US and the Brits contributions but rarely any from the ANZACs (or other allied troops, Canada, India, the Dutch, etc).
To everyone who wants a great military sci fy book series set in WW2 where members of the Asiatic fleet end up in an alternate earth where they must fight against beings bent on conquering the known world while either enslaving or eating the survivors, The Destroyermen Series by Taylor Anderson is a great choice.
Well done! I have binged watched you post. Riveting and entertaining. All the best.
Nishimura, having just ordered all 11 Japanese destroyers to go out sub-hunting, seeing 4 destroyers coming back in: "new ship, who dis?"
Talbot: "uh... how do you do, fellow IJN warships"
Nishimura: "understandable, have a nice day"
_a few moments later_
Nishimura: "How could the Americans have possibly gotten past our fleet?"
Nishimura probably never heard of the 4 New contacts until much later. It wasn't his ship that spotted them but one of the destroyers in his flotilla.
He had a worse night at Surigao, Leyte Gulf...
I am Japanese. I respect you for your detailed and clear explanations and for being well educated.
Most Japanese avoid conflict in their daily lives, at work, and in general.
Japanese people never fight if there is no need to fight.
This is the same for the Japanese of the previous generation and the Japanese of today.
I am saddened by the various conflicts in many countries today.
I hope one day we can see a more peaceful world.
In some ways a mirror image of the Battle of Savo Island in August 1942. In that case, the American destroyers failed to alert their fellows as the Japanese warships steamed past. However, the big Japanese torpedoes clobbered the US and Australian ships before the Japanese sailed away nearly unscathed. The Allied force at Savo had to hold its fire for fear of hitting one another during a key part of that engagement.
Drach has a FUN video about the torpedoes that never wanted to work.
Me borned in balikpapan and seeing my city lore: 🤯
cool, have read about that encounter a few times, (as always)really enjoyed the historigraph!!!! Many thanks
My grandfather and two of his brothers were on the cruiser Boise mentioned in the video. I have his diary from the very beginning of the war. He talked about Boise joining the rest of the fleet and sailing for days. This would have been the fleet leaving Manila that you mentioned. He talked about things that almost always turned out to be rumor, seeing Japanese subs, seeing Japanese planes fly by, etc. He kept it all the way through the Battle of Cape Esperance where the Boise was damaged badly and had to return to Philadelphia. After that my grandfather was transferred to a North Atlantic patrol ship and the diary ends.
I am not aware that USN destroyers carried reload torpedoes.
I've just checked, and they didn't- that line was an error by me. Didn't catch it in the edit
@@historigraph as far as I know only Japanese warships carried reloads.
You had me going, I hadn't heard anywhere else.
Splendid vid by the way.
Theres a great game called Battlestations Midway where the first missions about the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and dutch East indies a few things are historically inaccurate but still highly recommend it
Balikpapan raid mission was so hard, 10 year old me still has trauma
Ah yes, I remember what a struggle it was when I took too long to complete the mission and I ended up having to fight a cruiser with my destroyer. Wasn't exactly easy
I remember that mission you commanded 2 destroyers one fletcher class and one Clemson class which where the historical inaccuracy comes in where no fletcher class were involved
It’s Working torpedoes isn’t it?
Beautiful presentation.
I was unaware this was the first victory in the areas,
of which have not, as of yet been so designated.
I tip my hat to that Captain (although probably a LTCR by rank) who turned around, went back into the cluster, fired, turned around, went back through the cluster, and came out with very minor damage.
From the sounds of it, the Captain, at minimum, might be deserving of the Navy Distinguished Service Metal.
Very nicely done! quite informative and entertaining. thank you
Imagine if the USN had actual functioning torps at the start of the war in the pacific.
Mark 8 torpedo as used on clemsons was designed in 1911. It was slow and had it's own problems,such as not enough exlosives to sink a ship if you actually hit it. great video even if you assumed the clemsons had Mark 14 Torpedo's
Loved the video @historigraph! Can't wait for the next video man! I didn't expect to see that USS Boise (CL-47) from the Interwar Brooklyn-class, Brooklyn-Subclass Light Cruisers was initially part of what would eventually become America's Part of the Ill-Fated ABDACOM, Our Asiatic Fleet.
This looks like another Naval Battle to try and Represent in Axis & Allies: War at Sea, Granted the Only Clemson-class Destroyer in the Game in the USS Edsall (DD-219), However, Edsall was lost during the Fighting in the Dutch East Indies in this point in the war all thanks to about 5 Destroyers Confusing her for a Light Cruiser.
Imagine a Multi-Game Campaign with the Various Axis & Allies Games and the Use of Flames of War by Battlefront Miniatures as an Option in Place of the Ground Warfare Miniatures for Axis & Allies set across the Entirety of the Second World War. A Team Game with The Team Leader at the Global Map, one Player to play with the War at Sea Miniatures (Custom and Official, depending upon the Player's Choice), One to Play with the Angels 20 and Bandits High Miniatures (Again, Custom and Official Depending upon the Player's Choice) and one to Play either the Ground Warfare Miniatures or Flames of War by Battlefront Miniatures, for each Nation in Axis & Allies. The Individual Games for Battles for when you want to see a Battle Through and the Global Map for when you want to "Autoresolve" or have the Battle Played out like the Classic Global Axis & Allies Games. I am working various National Tech Trees and Aircraft Movement Distances for War at Sea, with each New Successive Design for each unit Type being Unlocked with the Usual Research Die Rolls, each of those costing you the usual 5 IPC (Industrial Production Costs/Currency). This same Method, so far as I've figured out, can also be used for Repair Die Rolls. Similar to the "Damage Control" Special Ability on some of the Ships in the Official Cards for War at Sea, Each Repair Die will succeed on a 5 or Better and will remove 1 Point of Hull Damage. If this is Unsuccessful, then you'll have to simply Wait a Turn and Try again. For each Point of Damage a Ship Survives a Battle with, roll a Die and the Result will be How long to remove one of those Points of Damage.
Let me know what you think about these Ideas and I'll catch you in your next video man!
Bro thanks for make a history video about my City Balikpapan. So good video bro i hope you success 😄👍
Nice video again.....👇🏻
Could you just let me know when will you start the British Pacific Fleet series ?❤ You promised me almost a year ago 😅😅
Nice one! I think I might of requested it in the discord but can't remember!
One outstanding book about the Asiatic Fleet is 'The Fleet the Gods Forgot'
And also a book written by a u.s. sailor who was crew aboard the 'John D. Ford' is called 'Another 600'
Further still an excellent book about a u.s. destroyer that disappeared during the battle of the java sea uss edsall.
'A Blue Sea of Blood'
The sailors back were truly built different
I am pretty sure evert sailor ever were all built the same way. :-)
Let's agree to disagree.
May I suggest of read of the 1982 Falklands War?
I would say this engagement was more embarrassing for the Americans, since 4 destroyers fire dozens of torpedoes at stationary targets that couldn’t return fire, and all escorts were otherwise engaged, and yet after an hour of fighting only sunk 4 ships which also begs the question why didn’t they use artillery as soon as their presence was known, especially since they also confirmed they’re torpedoes weren’t reliable.
Not their fault, early in the war the mark14 were notorious for its unreliability
They used the Mark 8, not 14 (plus it'd have been the 15 on Destroyers)@@navyseal1689
True and if I remember correctly it took America a year to admit they’re torpedoes didn’t work
Until the military announces a change of doctrine, they cant just change tactics of their own volition. Especially when at the time, the Dept of Ordinance were still adamant that thousands of men were wrong and they were right. The tactic was sound and effective, had the torpedoes been working. If they opened up with their batteries, they would easily be spotted by everyone there as they will clearly see a train of 8 to 12 red flashing lights with tracers going out to hit their own ships
Very interesting video, I has no knowledge of this operation. Brave fellas those destroyermen!
I do very much enjoy these keep it up 👍
Imagine how shorter the Pacific war would've been, and American lifes lost because of those damn torpedoes. 🤨
The tin cans are and always have been the workhorse of the fleet and consistently under rated.
Even submarines had issues with same torpedo. It was the magnetic detonator that suppose to activate the explosion under the keel. I read about from USA submarines patrolling in that area
Was anyone in the Bureau of Ordinance ever shot, court martialed, demoted or otherwise punished for the failure of the Mark 14 torpedo in the early stages of the war?
As other commenters already mentioned, the US torpedoes used in this engagement were the older Mark 8 torpedoes, not the Mark 14 (or rather its destroyer variant, the Mark 15). The Mark 8 did have its own serious issues though.
Not that I’m aware of, but BuOrd itself was disbanded in 1959.
Amazing raid. I never heard of this attack. Faulty torpedoes were a big problem.
True but in this case that's no excuse. Potatoes could have done the job.
Very Brave men and ships, the Germans knew even if out numbered the Royal navy would attack - it struck fear into them.
I met a German navy vet in Stuttgart a many years ago and we had a beer session - he said " when the alarm sounded British navy attacking" he shook with terror.
He was an awesome guy and his tales left us very drunk- he became a good friend- but the years took him. My wife is a skilled flouriest - we send a battle ship flower arrangement to his wife for his funeral.
War sucks big time - Germany has become my place to go.
Nice to see a video from you !❤
Never heard of this battle... great video!
Solid content
Great video as usual!
That was very interesting. I've never even heard of that battle before.
I love the animations, great story as well.
Incredible how tens of thousands of men ended up at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean alone during WWII.
I wonder how many of the similar issues like the Us early war torpedos are still happening today.
i need clarification, iirc i have heard like 4 or 5 "first american navy victory" in the pacific
Currently I’m reading a great book about the Asiatic Fleet titled “In the Highest Degree Tragic”. Highly recommended.
I had NEVER even heard of this naval battle until I watched the video.
It's highly probable that Cmdr Talbot did not know and could not determine the disposition of the transports. Had he been able to do so, he may have attacked the fleet differently, ie run northerly in column with four ships, all firing 3 torpedoes at 2 allocated targets to port. Thus firing 6 torpedoes obliquely at a pair of transports ensured maximum chance of hits and avoided wasting torpedoes. Then turn to starboard and run south and fire the stbd torpedoes into the second column as per the first. Guns could be used as targets came to bear.
Battlestations Midway had a campaign mission of this battle and it was HARD
The thumbnail reminded me of Port Arthur/Russo Japanese War at first glance. Perhaps an idea for a future video?
you should look into the accounts of the USS Asheville a 1920's gunboat assign to the same fleet, mind you her only combat action while short and rather one sided proved to be interesting considering only one of her crew survived the engagement.
My father was a WW 2 veteran, and he regarded the Mark 14 torpedo's dangerous unreliability as a significant scandal.
I have never heard the word "hare" used as a verb before. I like it!
The destroyer-launched US torpedoes were specifically the Mk. 15 torpedoes, not the more infamous submarine-launched Mk. 14. They were heavier and longer, giving longer range and bigger warhead. They do have similar faultiness with the Mk. 14.
If not heard of this engagement. Thanks. Dud fish had a lot to answer for in WWII.
When a battering ram could do more damage than 10 torpedos. ...
I believe it's called Balikpapan as in magIc (not eek) but nevertheless another great video. Sorry it sounds weird I used to work there and I have friends live there. Cheers.
The Mk 14 torpedo wasn't the problem. It was the new magnetic exploder. This prevented the torpedoes to detonate prematurely or cause the detonator to crush on a 90 degree strike.
The Clemson class destroyers used older Mk8 torpedoes, but they had problems with depth control.
For the next video, can you explain how the worst Naval Disaster in WW2 (Sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff) happened?
Couldn’t think of a better person to name an American ship after than John Paul jones
Make Video about the Battle of Java sea pls, or How the Dutch HNLMS Abraham Crijnssen escape from Japanese attack and ended in Australia
Did cover Java sea way back, but it is definitely on the list of old historigraph videos that could do with a remaster
@@historigraph what kind of idiot takes all his ships to look for a submarine and leave a transport fleet unguarded
Did he not think the submarine could circle round and attack the transports again
How he wasn't releaved of duty or executed is surprising given how mad Japan was during the war
Wasn't the Crijnsen the destroyer that disguised itself as a small island?
@@historigraph I just thought to myself "wait what, the video series about the south east asia battles including Java Sea, Malaya etc are not that old, why is he talking about a remaster." It is in fact already over 2 years old.
If I remember correctly I started watching you when you released the Dreadnought video. That was 5 years ago. God where has the time gone.... It feels like that was only 2 years ago instead of 5..... Anyways, I love your content.
@@xxnightdriverxx9576 Yeah its a long time ago now- and also the videos have seen a big jump in visual quality in the last 18 months or so, which really dates some of the other stuff now
Ernest King in his position as COC of the Navy resisted the investigation of faulty Mk 14 torpedos which greatly frustrated both destroyer and submarine operations for way too long.
It is interesting to compare the actions of the US Navy (and Australian Navy) to the IJN in these types of encounters.
Although on much smaller scale it is telling that at Balikpapan and later at Sundra Strait the Allied forces didn't hesitate - they pressed forward and got in amongst the Japanese transport.
At Balikpapan the US destroyers got clean away, at Sundra Strait the Houston and HMAS Perth were sunk, but in both cases they understood what there were there for.
Compare that to the Battle of Savo Island and the Battle Off Samar where immensely powerful IJN forces were in a position to sink an entire invasion force and... in both occasions the Japanese commander turned around and fled before reaching the transport ships.
WTF?
Savo Island can be explained.
The battle against the US cruiser force took a bit too long, and the japanese cruisers had been split up, requireing some time to find themselves again and line up again in the dark. Both of this took too much time. If they had attacked the transports after that, they would have still been in aircraft range once the sun had risen. This would have resulted in them getting attacked by the US carrier they thought was in the area (even though said carrier, I forgot which one it was, had retired south a day prior due to being low on fuel and having lost too many fighters in air battle against japanese planes, thus the carrier was not in striking range, but the japanese didnt know that). These air attacks by a carrier would have posed a great danger to Kuritas cruiser force, and he did not want to lose any ships. He prioritised the survival of his ships, which in itself is not a bad decision to make. We have hindsight, he did not. Plenty of allied cruiser captains also prioritised the survival of their ships (though none were such a missed opportunity as here), sacrificing destroyers is a completly different thing to sacrificing cruisers. Also, Kurita had been told by the Japanese Army that they could not only contain the US marine landing force, but actively push them back into the sea. This was of course false, and a result of the japanese interservice rivalry.
Looking at it from Kuritas perspective, he had won a major naval battle and sunk a bunch of allied cruisers with no losses of his own, and he was told that the US land forces would soon be driven away by the japanese army. But if he stuck around to sink a few cargo ships, some of his own ships would likely be sunk at the beginning of the next day due to US air attack. He would effectively trade cruisers for cargo ships, but from his perspective at the time the sinking of the cargo ships would not have changed the overall strategic situation.
Of course he was wrong, but again we have hindsight, and with the infos Kurita had at the time he decided to withdraw, his decision is understandable, its debatable if the decision was right or wrong (I think its somewhere in the middle), but it was understandable.
Regarding the Battle off Samar, yeah that was just stupid. The entire battle was initiated to attack the invasion ships, with an entire fleet being formed that was supposed to be sacrificed, including some of Japans last carriers. And once the battleship force had defeated Taffey 3 and could have attacked the transports they just left..... sure they were under air attack, and sinking the transports would have likely resulted in the japanese fleet being sunk by carrier air attack the next day due to the time it took to sink them, but that was the enitre point of them being there in the first place, with everyone being aware that they might not return....
@@xxnightdriverxx9576 The simple fact is that he had orders to attack and destroy the American transports that were anchored off the beaches.
If he had done that then the entire American offensive would have stopped dead in the first 48 hours and Japan would have scored a stunning strategic victory.
What you are saying amounts to making a virtue out of a tactical decision that totally ignored the strategic imperatives that sent those cruisers into Savo Island in the first place.
I have no doubt - none whatsoever - that had the situation been reversed then a USN cruiser force would have pressed on the get at the Japanese transports and would have stayed their until all their ammo was exhausted or until all the cruisers had been sunk.
Basically, exactly what happened at the Battle of Sundra Strait. Except there the two allied cruisers were grossly outgunned and so went down with all guns blazing.
The Japanese cruiser force should have pressed on the the transports, and then let tomorrow bring what may.
@@johnreynolds7996 I agree. It's not just the benefit of hindsight regarding Savo and Samar. Yamamoto understood his nation had no chance of winning a war of attrition, but that's what Japan's rings of islands defense plan was, in effect. Given the way the US shipyards would go brrrr and churn out everything imaginable, Japan's ONLY chance of repeating the Russo-Japanese War experience was piling up truly decisive victories. That meant regarding their ships as fairly disposable to win a short war. Husbanding them for a long war only guaranteed there would be a surrender treaty signing ceremony in Tokyo.
If you really examine the actions of most Japanese Navy admirals, they weren't very good and certainly a notch below the average American admiral. Yamamoto's Midway plan and execution was borderline absurd. Failures of nerve at Savo and Samar were not that unusual. Nagumo was flat terrible, nearly losing carriers during the Indian Ocean Raid, then actually losing all four of them at Midway. Yet he was back to managing carriers again in the Solomon Islands Campaign. If Ray Spruance and Fitch had lost Hornet , Enterprise, and Yorktown at Midway, they would have been in charge of Maine lighthouses for the rest of their miserable careers. The Japanese Navy's system was too reliant on seniority and just badly flawed.
@@amerigo88 "Failures of nerve at Savo and Samar were not that unusual. Nagumo was flat terrible, nearly losing carriers during the Indian Ocean Raid, then actually losing all four of them at Midway."
Nagumo was indeed terrible in the Indian Ocean Raid. He had a crushingly powerful fleet to throw at a delapidated Royal Navy Indian Ocean Fleet.
Not even close to being a fair matchup.
Except.... the British had one of the best Admirals of WW2 running their side of the show: Somerville, who had cut his teeth with Force H out of Gibraltar.
Somerville quit literally ran rings around Nagumo, and at all times had a much better understanding of the Japanese movements than Nagumo had regarding the British fleet.
I assume you were referring to Somerville moving his carrier into a position to launch a nighttime torpedo attack on the Japanese fleet?
His positioning was perfect, and his Swordfish bombers were radar-equipped so a nighttime attack was quite plausible.
It was only stymied because Somerville sent out reconn at dusk to do a final pinpoint of Nagumo's forces, and the ONLY Swordfish to suffer mechanical failure was the one plane that had been assigned to sweep the area where the Japanese fleet actually was.
Without that confirmation Somerville wasn't willing to risk the strike and he withdrew. Nagumo had no idea the British had been on his shoulder.
Pity. Somerville might have scored a stunning success at the time when the allies were doing it tough. But nonetheless he handled his much-inferior force with great skill.
@@johnreynolds7996 Funny as I was thinking more of the 11 Bristol Blenheim bombers that actually attacked the Japanese carriers during the Indian Ocean Raid. These bombers slipped right past the Japanese CAP and dropped their bombs from 11,000 feet. The IJN Hiryu had spotted the Blenheims, but failed to alert the rest of Kido Butai (Parshall). Of course the Enterprise and Yorktown dive bombers would slip past the CAP two months later at Midway.
Another consideration regarding Japanese failures was the Zuikaku was not hit by a single bomb or torpedo during the Battle of the Coral Sea, yet she sat out the Battle of Midway. The Shokaku was undergoing repairs, but the Zuikaku could have joined her Pearl Harbor Raid sister carriers, greatly increasing IJN air strength for the expected Kantai Kessen off Midway. Yamamoto allowed Zuikaku to miss the battle while training up a new air group for operations. Mind you, this was BEFORE the massive attrition of Midway, Guadalcanal, and the rest of the Solomon Islands Campaign. I would think Japan had plenty of fully-trained naval aviators who had been blooded at Pearl, Coral Sea, Indian Ocean, and so on, not to mention over the skies of China. Yet Zuikaku was allowed to miss Midway. Imagine Enterprise and the ineffective Hornet facing off against Hiryu AND Zuikaku during Round Two at Midway. Of course, that's another carrier for Nagumo and his staff to squander, but it still would have meant more Japanese opportunities for success.
11:13 Transport ship: scores hit
American Destroyer: How dare you! *fires all guns at point blank*
The mighty Clemson.!
Known as the Clubson in World of Warships, because it's basically the BEST DD for its tier in the game.
They shot torpedoes head-on instead of side-on. The torpedoes split the vessels.
I very much hope any porcurement experts learn about this story and dont porcure weapons without testing them.
Four-Pipers punching above their weight once again...
I had no idea the Clemson class destroyers saw such decisive frontline action.
33 seconds from upload is wild