While ideas of flexible response were only starting to be developed at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The approach taken by the Democrat administration showed in the quarantine and white house debate and actions that more flexible response than mass missile launch on warning of incoming missile was considered.In terms of likely UK response and readinesss in 1962 to Soviet bombersttacks on the UK the Sandy's report had eliminated fighter command with only 3 RAF Lightning squadrons a Aila le were the development of even existing aircraft in 1957-8 would have provided 400 additional hunters and Seahawks fitted with Sidewinder. The ability of the V bombers to penetrate to their provable Target areas of Moscow, Leningrad, Murmansk, Archangel and Bak1970 would have been possible in the1970s even if TRS2 had been built given the disastrous performance of the similar Vigilante F5GA over Vietnam in 1964. In 1971 and 1993 the US relied on high level attack with electronic suppression Over Hanoi and Bagdad. In 1962 it was dubious and it seems even less likely that later low level attacks in the The RNs ability to attack such targets in 1962 was hardly existant Eagle and Ark Royal were in refit, Victorious in the far East. Only the small HMS Hermes was available and the Buccaneer was still in development. The So iet use of client states in NK and India I. 1950 and 1971 to launch land, air and na Al attacks was impressive .😮
While ideas of flexible response were only starting to be developed at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The approach taken by the Democrat administration showed in the quarantine and white house debate and actions that more flexible response than mass missile launch on warning of incoming missile was considered. O terms of likely UK response and readinesss in 1962 to Soviet bombersttacks on the UK the Sandy's report had eliminated fighter command with only 3 RAF Lightning squadrons available while the development of even existing aircraft in 1957-8 would have provided 400 additional hunters and Seahawks fitted with Sidewinder. The abilty of the V bombers to penetrate to their probable Target areas of Moscow, Leningrad, Murmansk, Archangel and Baku ( as implied in D.Owens. Britains Nuclear Defencw Lucerpool Uni). The RNs ability to attack such targets in 1962 was hardly existant.Eagle and Ark Royal were in refit, Victorious in the far East. Only the small HMS Hermes was available and the Buccaneer was still in development. The Soviet use of client states in NK and India I. 1950 and 1971 to launch land, air and naval attacks with Russian equipment in attacks planned by Soviet Army and naval staff in Moscow and Vladivostok, suggests the Soviet capability and intent was real enough. And the threat of the Soviet Navy SSN and guided missilw subs was wven greater. Given that the USSR had broken all the USN/ UK RN naval communucations including those to SSBN in n 1968 according Weinberger, Sec Def, Lehman, Sec Navy, HeadCIA Counter Intelligence and 2024 USNI Proceedings the thrwat that existed to the UK and Nato was probably greater than assessed and would gave directee the SSN attacks imnediately on CVN, Invincibles and UK RN and USN SSN and SSBN in some sirt of simultaneous first strike using extwnsively tactical and conventional weapons in an effort to degrade and eliminate Western steategic response with ICBM more specifuxally directed at SSN and SSBN and Minuteman silos rather rhan city targets I suspect .The Soviet steategic bombers of Vear, Backfire and Blackjack aoowar to have been more the anti merchant shipping and resupply shipping again suggesting the RN / USN escort frigate convoy forces were even more woefully illequipped in 1981 than John Nott suggested. The counter to the Soviet challenge was clearly in the counter intelligence and black propogandq field and that effort by Thatcher and Reagan succeded
While ideas of flexible response were only starting to be developed at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The approach taken by the Democrat administration showed in the quarantine and white house debate and actions that more flexible response than mass missile launch on warning of incoming missile was considered.In terms of likely UK response and readinesss in 1962 to Soviet bombersttacks on the UK the Sandy's report had eliminated fighter command with only 3 RAF Lightning squadrons a Aila le were the development of even existing aircraft in 1957-8 would have provided 400 additional hunters and Seahawks fitted with Sidewinder. The ability of the V bombers to penetrate to their provable Target areas of Moscow, Leningrad, Murmansk, Archangel and Bak1970 would have been possible in the1970s even if TRS2 had been built given the disastrous performance of the similar Vigilante F5GA over Vietnam in 1964. In 1971 and 1993 the US relied on high level attack with electronic suppression Over Hanoi and Bagdad. In 1962 it was dubious and it seems even less likely that later low level attacks in the The RNs ability to attack such targets in 1962 was hardly existant Eagle and Ark Royal were in refit, Victorious in the far East. Only the small HMS Hermes was available and the Buccaneer was still in development. The So iet use of client states in NK and India I. 1950 and 1971 to launch land, air and na Al attacks was impressive .😮
While ideas of flexible response were only starting to be developed at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The approach taken by the Democrat administration showed in the quarantine and white house debate and actions that more flexible response than mass missile launch on warning of incoming missile was considered. O terms of likely UK response and readinesss in 1962 to Soviet bombersttacks on the UK the Sandy's report had eliminated fighter command with only 3 RAF Lightning squadrons available while the development of even existing aircraft in 1957-8 would have provided 400 additional hunters and Seahawks fitted with Sidewinder. The abilty of the V bombers to penetrate to their probable Target areas of Moscow, Leningrad, Murmansk, Archangel and Baku ( as implied in D.Owens. Britains Nuclear Defencw Lucerpool Uni). The RNs ability to attack such targets in 1962 was hardly existant.Eagle and Ark Royal were in refit, Victorious in the far East. Only the small HMS Hermes was available and the Buccaneer was still in development. The Soviet use of client states in NK and India I. 1950 and 1971 to launch land, air and naval attacks with Russian equipment in attacks planned by Soviet Army and naval staff in Moscow and Vladivostok, suggests the Soviet capability and intent was real enough. And the threat of the Soviet Navy SSN and guided missilw subs was wven greater. Given that the USSR had broken all the USN/ UK RN naval communucations including those to SSBN in n 1968 according Weinberger, Sec Def, Lehman, Sec Navy, HeadCIA Counter Intelligence and 2024 USNI Proceedings the thrwat that existed to the UK and Nato was probably greater than assessed and would gave directee the SSN attacks imnediately on CVN, Invincibles and UK RN and USN SSN and SSBN in some sirt of simultaneous first strike using extwnsively tactical and conventional weapons in an effort to degrade and eliminate Western steategic response with ICBM more specifuxally directed at SSN and SSBN and Minuteman silos rather rhan city targets I suspect .The Soviet steategic bombers of Vear, Backfire and Blackjack aoowar to have been more the anti merchant shipping and resupply shipping again suggesting the RN / USN escort frigate convoy forces were even more woefully illequipped in 1981 than John Nott suggested.
The counter to the Soviet challenge was clearly in the counter intelligence and black propogandq field and that effort by Thatcher and Reagan succeded