You are such an excellent teacher! You helped me learn this topic both as a PhD student and inspired me to teach with greater clarity as an instructor. Thank you!
I think that the mirroring aspects of the idol are one of the most important aspects of the idol. This is because the idol stops the gaze and then reflects it back to the gazer phenomenologically. This would give the gazer a window to the infinite and the divine in a human measure. How does the artist see the idol from material and not another idol that could inspire them? And that brings up how an idol can just be a concept that is intangible. Would that make things such as philosophical and scientific notions of the universe idols as well?
Hi Robert! How does the artist "zone in" on the idol in the material? I'm glad you asked! That is partly what the readings for next week deal with. So stay tuned. No doubt, you will want to raise this again in connection with next week's vids.
Lovely! Thanks man. Just the knowledgeable lowdown i was after,,, hmmm. But I've got to say,, i'm not convinced in the power dynamic gradient of the gaze and gaze holder... seems there must be a power dynamic flowing in the opposite direction... it being the gazer who is captured.... hmmm. thanks i'm gonna watch a few more of your talks... covid positives! Xx
Thank you for the video! Your explanation about "the gaze transpierce itself and transpierce visible things" was helpful. I wasn't sure what that meant when I read it, but I guess it's how we go about our every day experience, seeing things in our surroundings but not particularly paying attention to. I guess the word "transpierce" threw me off, and instead, thought there was a different kind of relationship at play. I was having trouble understanding why would it "transpierce," meaning pass through/puncture, because in so doing it would leave a "mark." I am not sure if I am explaining myself correctly, but, this led me to think it could have the opposite effect, that is does stop at things, but then again the gaze gets arrested by the idol in a different way? Thank you!
I think this is open for interpretation, but the way I was thinking of it, "transpierce" refers to the way, when we see things in everyday life, we are always already looking "through" them towards another thing. In this way, we navigate and organize our life-world. We don't contemplate things for their own sake, but only in order to "string" them together with other things in ur environment. Perhaps you might use the analogy of how a threaded needle "pierces" pieces of fabric to fasten them together. By contrast, the gaze is "frozen" and "fixed" upon the idol.
I found it interesting that a concept can be an idol. If so, the intellect must have a gaze. Marion does say on 18 that visible, sensible, intelligible are one. Would that have the same aspects of an asymmetric power relation as the visual gaze? I thought I understood the gaze constituting the idol, but the intellect’s constituting a concept seems a different thing. If the gaze has a constituting power, which as creating objectifation it would, I am not sure this is the relation of gaze to idol that Marion is theorizing. And I would not think the icon objectifies what it addresses.
Another important notion here is the "aim", which is essential to the gaze. Where we look is determined by our aim; e.g. in Ancient Greece the statue of Athena is an idol only because of our predisposition to look for a statue of Athena, we need an aim in order to fix our gaze upon something. In that sense, I can understand why a concept could be an idol. The intellect's "aim" (perhaps its intuition?) sets out what we would like to cognize, and the concept gives us an entity to gaze at. Is that helpful?
Hi Hank! Does the intellect have a gaze? Well, perhaps a form of "in-sight." The phenomenological intention is already at least quasi-conceptual, insofar as it serves as a kind of schematic anticipation of the intuition that would fulfill it in perception. The idol is supposed to be a complete "filling up" of an intention. So, we might ask: what is the analogue of a complete filling of an intention in the case of a concept?
I also thought that it was interesting that a concept can be an idol. Marion suggests on p. 16 that the idol corresponds to metaphysical concepts, even Christian metaphysical conceptions of God. The way that Marion is describing metaphysics seems to connect back to the theme of continuity v. discontinuity in the course with the idol representing continuity and the icon, discontinuity. Following Vattimo’s explication of Gadamer’s criticism of aesthetic consciousness in “Truth", you could say that in the idol, the gaze “never really encounters anything other than itself." If Marion is emphasizing above all the continuous character of metaphysics, then this might be a slightly different take on what constitutes a metaphysical concept.
@@louiseblanco8254 Hi Louise! Interesting-- it had not occurred to me to make that connection. Vattimo on discontinuity and Marion on saturated phenomenon would be a comparison worth exploring in detail. In both cases, they are trying to explicate a way to encounter "the given" beyond metaphysical constructions of "being." The concept of "event" is the obvious place to begin a comparison.
The idol and icon seem to have a sense that they are one thing, but they are two different concept that are divided by what item they are. One seems to be tangible while the other does not.
The icon seems to me to be quite different from the idol, though both are tangible objects. The difference between them is that our aim arrives at the object through our gaze, in the case of the object being an idol and is arrested there. The icon, similarly, is merely an object, but in this case, the gaze is invited to go past its aims, or more closely approach its aims, by contacting some manner of the invisible or the divine.
Towards the end of the lecture, Levinas's "face" is mentioned. It is concerning that Marion does not explicitly address the issues raised by Levinas's "Reality and Its Shadow," wherein Levinas impugns the sociocultural value of art because, he thinks, it precludes the infinite depth of "the face." Unlike those who depict artwork as a reservoir for inexhaustible, multiplicitous revelation (e.g., Heidegger's "earth"), Levinas depicts artwork as duplicitous in its pictorial and symbolic representation of events, ultimately concealing much more than it reveals. This is troubling for Marion's adaptation of "the icon," which he equates with Levinas's "face," because any finite, static representation (e.g., in a painting, in a novel, and so on) of the icon dispels and neglects its phenomenological qualities. In turn, how can "the icon" be portrayed in artwork without compromising its call, command, and summoning as described in the lecture?
I thought the icon does call forth the infinite. I think the reference to the icon painted on wood is confusing, even confused, in the way it raises and then almost negates the material aspect. I have little familiarity with Levinas, but a static representation would be subject to the gaze and so, I think, not an icon.
Hi Jason. Great questions. It has been a long time since I have read "Reality and its Shadow" (although I believe I read it about fifteen years ago in a continental aesthetics reading group), so I am not prepared to immediately comment on that. Can you say more about why Levinas would see the icon as duplicitous and concealing more than it reveals? That is interesting.
Thank you for the video! I have two thoughts that have come up for me during the video. The first is in regard to the gaze and the idol. Marion mentions that the gaze stops at the idol and that it is fulfilled by it. However, the gaze precedes and constitutes the idol. Does this mean that the power of the idol comes from the gaze? Perhaps this is too strong a claim, but imagine someone no longer being satisfied with the idol. They would be compelled to look further or beyond the idol. A complication of this is that the experiencing of an idol as an idol seems to be intentional by the artist and a shared experience of many "gazers". It seems to me if the idol no longer satisfies the gaze it could no longer be an idol but would become an icon. Is this one way that movement from idol to icon and vise-versa can come about? The second is in regard to the icon and the gaze. The gaze of the icon is different from the mirrored gaze of the idol. If the icon gazes into us, does this mean that we become objectified by it in a way? Or at least experience it by feeling objectified? This could be how the icon reveals things about who we are, but the experience of the icon seems unclear to me.
Hey Arlene! Good to hear from you. Good points. It does seem that the power of the idol comes from the gaze, but the gaze is something mysterious that we don't have the ability to "turn on and off" at will.I am not clear though why and how the idol that could no longer satisfy the gaze would become and icon. I might, but it might also just become "neutral," a "dead" thing. I don't think we become objectified by the icon, so much as "subjectified" "to" it. It reveals our identity as subjects to us, or calls us to a (usually "higher") way of being, thinking, and acting.
Thank you for the video, I hope you are doing well. I feel like the idea of the Icon and Idol are in direct contrast with Batailles conception of the inner experience. The Idol and Icon are by their very nature inundating and expansive, where as the Idol captures and mesmerizes the gaze of its viewers, the Icon can in some sense, expand infinitely in the plane of the mind. I think the Lacanian element of seeking a certain figure to be filled by i.e mother goddesses if you need a mother, father gods if you need a father etc, plays directly into the ideal of dazzlement and being overcome because its trying to substitute pieces of the self with external ideas. Batailles inner experience has more to do with the emptying of the self through aesthetic means, rather than filling ones self up, however both processes were to get to sort of the "personal truth" of not only the self but the subject at hand. Do you feel like the two would have some disagreements in that regard?
Hi Ryan! Good to hear from you. You make some points that are interesting to think about. Bataille seems to view "inner" experience as something closer to the traditional "mystic" notion of a union/ merging of the self into the whole of being. So, it would be a more violent and radical experience than of either the idol or icon. The Lacan connection is also intriguing, but I'm not sure I am seeing what you are getting at there. Perhaps you can develop those ideas further.
Around 20:00 you mention the gaze and its constitutive quality for the idol. I thought that Marion was explicit about this; so I suppose I'm saying that you aren't being "too strong". Without the gaze there can be no idol. Is that right? With respect to this idea of the "gaze" and the "aim" (or intentionality), do you think that it is appropriate to read Marion in a more subjectivist light? In other words, is Marion saying that to determine what an idol/icon is we should examine the subjective contents of a particular person's psychology? When you talk about the "mirror" and the idol, I am prompted to ask the same question. You can run the same game for the icon. A particular person's values determines what "seems" for them, and your mileage will vary as you survey different individuals. Your interpretation of Marion seems to put into opposition the idol and the icon, but I read him in a different way (which is implicit in my question above). I suppose that I read his analysis of Husserl in the second reading as indicative that the idol and the icon are two sides of the same coin. When I see a box, I don't see the side not facing me; so the visible and the invisible are always together whether I know it or not. I mapped that onto the idol and the icon to say that they are just two different ways of viewing the same thing.
Hi Vince. Thanks for the excellent comments. I hesitated over the word "constitutive," insofar as not just ANY (material) thing could be an idol. So, there has to be something "in" the material too, not just in the case. However, if forced to answer "True or False," I would say "True" to that claim. On the subjectivism point, I wonder about that. Marion seems to imply a Heideggerian sense of the force of "Schicksal" or fate in determining the gaze. In other words, there is more than just an individual psychology involved but a cultural "horizon" as well. In fact, the latter seems more important. (Note what he says about the "twilight" of the idol, and how the Greeks had a possibility of seeing the divine in statutes that are mere art for us, since "the gods have fled" (as Holderlin and Heidegger would say). But this is under the influence of Lacan and Sartre as well, so there is a subjectivism here too. The phenomenology of the icon might be compared to the encounter with a transformative human influence: it can make you into something that, antecedent to the encounter, you never could have imagined. However, I imagine that whether you find that possibility convincing depends on your own experience of it (or lack thereof). I agree that the idol and icon are not two distinct entities, but perhaps a better analogy than "two sides of the same coin" would be: "two gestalts of the same figure." In the idol, visibility completely fulfills the gaze, and the invisible is absolutely invisible. But in the icon, invisibility comes to visibility (in the manner of the Levinasian "face.") P.S. Certainly, you have discharged your duty with this fine commentary, but I hope that, in the service of the class and your overall pursuit of philosophical "paideia" or "Bilding" you will engage with other (esp. grad) student comments as well. One advantage of this format is we can keep several discussions going on in parallel for the next three weeks, which might yield interesting cross-pollination. So, please check back here this weekend to see what others have said, in case something inspires a response.
In response to your inquiry about "subjectivism," Vince, I think a more rigorous phenomenological account of "the gaze" is required. In the other assigned chapter by Marion ("The Icon or the Endless Hermeneutic"), we receive a passing reference to Husserl's notion of "adumbrations" associated with perceptual experience of the life-world. To be brief, the adumbrations arise from expectations implicit within our intentional aims (e.g., the act of perceiving): when I perceive the front side of a tree, I expect the backside to, for the most part, present a similar kind of tapestry (e.g., bark-like substance and texture as opposed to a human face). In turn, my previous conscious experience with tree-like entities informs, fills out, and unravels the intentional content of the perceptual act. I say "fill out" because we can never view the object from all sides; rather, we are limited in our perception of the intentional object by our finite spatiotemporal location. To be clear, though, it is not only my consciousness that carries these presuppositions about "perceiving a tree"; rather, others also share them to some extent. I am curious if a similar analysis can be performed with "the gaze" as described by Marion, especially in the context of idols which are fundamentally constituted by the gaze. In short, what sort of adumbration(s), apperception, and intentional implication(s) are necessary to "fill out" and "complete" the intentional aim of the gaze, and, more importantly for Vince's question, are they intersubjective? In a religious context, I would assume that a common background in upbringing and education (i.e., Heideggerian "thrownness") would be necessary. In an aesthetic context, I would assume the same, specifically at historical moments when aesthetic education was more tightly-controlled, monitored, and standardized (e.g., the 19th and early 20th centuries). We might worry, however, that such a phenomenological analysis presents insurmountable challenges as secularization and globalization continue to traverse cultural boundaries, a phenomenon welcomed by Vattimo.
@@jasonbarton6091 I believe that, in short, the answer is that we cannot analyze "gaze" in the same way that Husserl analyzes "adumbrations" or apperception more generally. The reason is that for Husserl there is deeper commitment to the notion of a noema which is objective (in the full metaphysical sense of the word). In contrast, (and now I'm stealing some of what the professor says in the next video with respect to Derrida) Marion doesn't appear to want such a notion, in agreement with Derrida. There is only noetic content, not a noema. And that would be the reason why I asked the question to begin with. It seems at first glance that Marion does not want an objective standard for idols/icons. Only a subjective one. There is also the concern of intersubjectivity raised by both Jason and the professor. What determines idols/icons is an intersubjective nexus of norms, handed down to us by culture. Having read Heidegger, I understand this answer, but I am nevertheless critical of it. Who decides what constitutes the nexus of norms? A group of people over time, of course. To my mind that leads us straight back to the issue at hand; whether we have a standard which is objective or subjective. I suppose that at root my question boils down to "If we want to decide whether an entity is an icon or idol, how do we choose?". I think that Marion has to say that the answer is subjective unless he wants to throw in with Husserl (and Frege) and commit to a larger metaphysical picture.
I am curious to learn your interpretation of Marion’s remarks on the Icon and the Invisible(to the bottom of P 17.) The specific passage where Marion writes: “The formula that Saint Paul applies to Christ [...] icon of the invisible God (Col. 1:15), must serve as our norm...” Does Marion think of said “Formula” as specific to the believer? Will the Icon evoke/lead to veneration in the religious believer alone? I find that Marion uses magnificent imagery, but remains elusive about who this notion of the Icon(Saint Paul’s formula) will be directed towards? I am inclined to say such an experience with the icon will be truly felt in the mind of the religious thinker.
Hi Dawson! Good to hear from you. I think we need to read that in context. The point is that there is no "icon of the visible," but only of the invisible." Christ exemplifies this: he is the "view" of the Father, who is essentially invisible. He serves this function through gradual "saturation," whereby, in an infinite process, the Father is revealed more and more in him.
Thank you for the video! It helped clarify a lot. For me, it seemed like the icon renders the invisible visible in the sense that it calls one to ponder what is beyond i.e. the invisible/the divine more so than the icon literally rendering the invisible visible. Is that the correct way of understanding Marion's description of the icon or is it the latter--that it has the function of literally rendering the divine apparent?
Hi Kate! Certainly, the icon can call one to ponder what is beyond. But I think it also renders the invisible visible literally, the the way the face does. That is, when one feels that IT sees YOU, rather than the reverse. That reversal of intention, or "counter-intentionality" as it is called, is the essence of that type of phenomenon. Of course, it may not happen to you personally; but in that case, the icon doesn't appear -- at least as an icon. That is my understanding.
Around 49:00 you mention the encounter with God by reading the Gospel as iconic, presenting a picture that could occur in painting, architecture, etc. And you mention this is mediated. You coming into contact with this iconic work of art let's say summons to surpass you... However, I am having questions whether the work of art can summon you in the same way the face does, because one is inanimate and the other is animate. When you say mediated, do you mean this cannot be the same iconic relation as to that with the face. Mediated because the work of art, gospel, sculpture are cannot impose a similar injunction/demand? The second reading makes it clear that the icon/ saturated phenomena is understood to be between people. This is more of a clarification than a question, I am just making sure this is correct. Thank you.
Good point. One might challenge Marion for assimilating the face and icon too closely. I think, however, that Marion does want to attribute a KIND of animation to the phenomenal experience of the icon. In this respect, it is similar to Heidegger ascribing a "battle" of earth and world to the work of art.
I would think that "brands" could be icons: 'I wear Nikes, and these shoes make me cool. And I advertise the fact with the highly visible swoop logo" that turns me into a human sandwhich board. etc.
You are such an excellent teacher! You helped me learn this topic both as a PhD student and inspired me to teach with greater clarity as an instructor. Thank you!
Thank you for the kind words! Glad you found it useful.
Thank you for your video, sir. It was very informative and gave some insight into the Icon and the Idol from a different angle. Much appreciated!
Outstanding presentation and explanation, Professor. Thank you so much.
I'm very glad to have found your channel: I have been searching for work on Marion, and you did an outstanding job. I'll certainly watch more!
Thank you sir for your very formative video. I had struggles while reading his books because there are parts where it is very vague to understand.
You are most welcome
Do you see any echoes here to Aquinas’S writing is aesthetics as outlined in, for example, in Umberto Eco’s work?
I think that the mirroring aspects of the idol are one of the most important aspects of the idol. This is because the idol stops the gaze and then reflects it back to the gazer phenomenologically. This would give the gazer a window to the infinite and the divine in a human measure. How does the artist see the idol from material and not another idol that could inspire them? And that brings up how an idol can just be a concept that is intangible. Would that make things such as philosophical and scientific notions of the universe idols as well?
Hi Robert! How does the artist "zone in" on the idol in the material? I'm glad you asked! That is partly what the readings for next week deal with. So stay tuned. No doubt, you will want to raise this again in connection with next week's vids.
Lovely! Thanks man. Just the knowledgeable lowdown i was after,,, hmmm. But I've got to say,, i'm not convinced in the power dynamic gradient of the gaze and gaze holder... seems there must be a power dynamic flowing in the opposite direction... it being the gazer who is captured.... hmmm. thanks i'm gonna watch a few more of your talks... covid positives! Xx
Thank you for your feedback! Let me know your future thoughts on the matter, so I can improve future presentations of this material.
Thank you for the video! I have one question: what are the differences between these concepts: icon, symble, sign?
Thank you for the video! Your explanation about "the gaze transpierce itself and transpierce visible things" was helpful. I wasn't sure what that meant when I read it, but I guess it's how we go about our every day experience, seeing things in our surroundings but not particularly paying attention to. I guess the word "transpierce" threw me off, and instead, thought there was a different kind of relationship at play. I was having trouble understanding why would it "transpierce," meaning pass through/puncture, because in so doing it would leave a "mark." I am not sure if I am explaining myself correctly, but, this led me to think it could have the opposite effect, that is does stop at things, but then again the gaze gets arrested by the idol in a different way? Thank you!
I think this is open for interpretation, but the way I was thinking of it, "transpierce" refers to the way, when we see things in everyday life, we are always already looking "through" them towards another thing. In this way, we navigate and organize our life-world. We don't contemplate things for their own sake, but only in order to "string" them together with other things in ur environment. Perhaps you might use the analogy of how a threaded needle "pierces" pieces of fabric to fasten them together. By contrast, the gaze is "frozen" and "fixed" upon the idol.
@@BrentKalar I see, that is way more helpful. I see it with the analogy of the 'threaded needle.' thanks!
I found it interesting that a concept can be an idol. If so, the intellect must have a gaze. Marion does say on 18 that visible, sensible, intelligible are one. Would that have the same aspects of an asymmetric power relation as the visual gaze? I thought I understood the gaze constituting the idol, but the intellect’s constituting a concept seems a different thing. If the gaze has a constituting power, which as creating objectifation it would, I am not sure this is the relation of gaze to idol that Marion is theorizing. And I would not think the icon objectifies what it addresses.
Another important notion here is the "aim", which is essential to the gaze. Where we look is determined by our aim; e.g. in Ancient Greece the statue of Athena is an idol only because of our predisposition to look for a statue of Athena, we need an aim in order to fix our gaze upon something. In that sense, I can understand why a concept could be an idol. The intellect's "aim" (perhaps its intuition?) sets out what we would like to cognize, and the concept gives us an entity to gaze at. Is that helpful?
Hi Hank! Does the intellect have a gaze? Well, perhaps a form of "in-sight." The phenomenological intention is already at least quasi-conceptual, insofar as it serves as a kind of schematic anticipation of the intuition that would fulfill it in perception. The idol is supposed to be a complete "filling up" of an intention. So, we might ask: what is the analogue of a complete filling of an intention in the case of a concept?
I also thought that it was interesting that a concept can be an idol. Marion suggests on p. 16 that the idol corresponds to metaphysical concepts, even Christian metaphysical conceptions of God. The way that Marion is describing metaphysics seems to connect back to the theme of continuity v. discontinuity in the course with the idol representing continuity and the icon, discontinuity. Following Vattimo’s explication of Gadamer’s criticism of aesthetic consciousness in “Truth", you could say that in the idol, the gaze “never really encounters anything other than itself." If Marion is emphasizing above all the continuous character of metaphysics, then this might be a slightly different take on what constitutes a metaphysical concept.
@@louiseblanco8254 Hi Louise! Interesting-- it had not occurred to me to make that connection. Vattimo on discontinuity and Marion on saturated phenomenon would be a comparison worth exploring in detail. In both cases, they are trying to explicate a way to encounter "the given" beyond metaphysical constructions of "being." The concept of "event" is the obvious place to begin a comparison.
The idol and icon seem to have a sense that they are one thing, but they are two different concept that are divided by what item they are. One seems to be tangible while the other does not.
The icon seems to me to be quite different from the idol, though both are tangible objects. The difference between them is that our aim arrives at the object through our gaze, in the case of the object being an idol and is arrested there. The icon, similarly, is merely an object, but in this case, the gaze is invited to go past its aims, or more closely approach its aims, by contacting some manner of the invisible or the divine.
Towards the end of the lecture, Levinas's "face" is mentioned. It is concerning that Marion does not explicitly address the issues raised by Levinas's "Reality and Its Shadow," wherein Levinas impugns the sociocultural value of art because, he thinks, it precludes the infinite depth of "the face." Unlike those who depict artwork as a reservoir for inexhaustible, multiplicitous revelation (e.g., Heidegger's "earth"), Levinas depicts artwork as duplicitous in its pictorial and symbolic representation of events, ultimately concealing much more than it reveals. This is troubling for Marion's adaptation of "the icon," which he equates with Levinas's "face," because any finite, static representation (e.g., in a painting, in a novel, and so on) of the icon dispels and neglects its phenomenological qualities. In turn, how can "the icon" be portrayed in artwork without compromising its call, command, and summoning as described in the lecture?
I thought the icon does call forth the infinite. I think the reference to the icon painted on wood is confusing, even confused, in the way it raises and then almost negates the material aspect. I have little familiarity with Levinas, but a static representation would be subject to the gaze and so, I think, not an icon.
Hi Jason. Great questions. It has been a long time since I have read "Reality and its Shadow" (although I believe I read it about fifteen years ago in a continental aesthetics reading group), so I am not prepared to immediately comment on that. Can you say more about why Levinas would see the icon as duplicitous and concealing more than it reveals? That is interesting.
Thank you for the video! I have two thoughts that have come up for me during the video.
The first is in regard to the gaze and the idol. Marion mentions that the gaze stops at the idol and that it is fulfilled by it. However, the gaze precedes and constitutes the idol. Does this mean that the power of the idol comes from the gaze? Perhaps this is too strong a claim, but imagine someone no longer being satisfied with the idol. They would be compelled to look further or beyond the idol. A complication of this is that the experiencing of an idol as an idol seems to be intentional by the artist and a shared experience of many "gazers". It seems to me if the idol no longer satisfies the gaze it could no longer be an idol but would become an icon. Is this one way that movement from idol to icon and vise-versa can come about?
The second is in regard to the icon and the gaze. The gaze of the icon is different from the mirrored gaze of the idol. If the icon gazes into us, does this mean that we become objectified by it in a way? Or at least experience it by feeling objectified? This could be how the icon reveals things about who we are, but the experience of the icon seems unclear to me.
Hey Arlene! Good to hear from you. Good points. It does seem that the power of the idol comes from the gaze, but the gaze is something mysterious that we don't have the ability to "turn on and off" at will.I am not clear though why and how the idol that could no longer satisfy the gaze would become and icon. I might, but it might also just become "neutral," a "dead" thing. I don't think we become objectified by the icon, so much as "subjectified" "to" it. It reveals our identity as subjects to us, or calls us to a (usually "higher") way of being, thinking, and acting.
Thank you for the video, I hope you are doing well.
I feel like the idea of the Icon and Idol are in direct contrast with Batailles conception of the inner experience. The Idol and Icon are by their very nature inundating and expansive, where as the Idol captures and mesmerizes the gaze of its viewers, the Icon can in some sense, expand infinitely in the plane of the mind. I think the Lacanian element of seeking a certain figure to be filled by i.e mother goddesses if you need a mother, father gods if you need a father etc, plays directly into the ideal of dazzlement and being overcome because its trying to substitute pieces of the self with external ideas. Batailles inner experience has more to do with the emptying of the self through aesthetic means, rather than filling ones self up, however both processes were to get to sort of the "personal truth" of not only the self but the subject at hand. Do you feel like the two would have some disagreements in that regard?
Hi Ryan! Good to hear from you. You make some points that are interesting to think about. Bataille seems to view "inner" experience as something closer to the traditional "mystic" notion of a union/ merging of the self into the whole of being. So, it would be a more violent and radical experience than of either the idol or icon. The Lacan connection is also intriguing, but I'm not sure I am seeing what you are getting at there. Perhaps you can develop those ideas further.
Around 20:00 you mention the gaze and its constitutive quality for the idol. I thought that Marion was explicit about this; so I suppose I'm saying that you aren't being "too strong". Without the gaze there can be no idol. Is that right?
With respect to this idea of the "gaze" and the "aim" (or intentionality), do you think that it is appropriate to read Marion in a more subjectivist light? In other words, is Marion saying that to determine what an idol/icon is we should examine the subjective contents of a particular person's psychology? When you talk about the "mirror" and the idol, I am prompted to ask the same question. You can run the same game for the icon. A particular person's values determines what "seems" for them, and your mileage will vary as you survey different individuals.
Your interpretation of Marion seems to put into opposition the idol and the icon, but I read him in a different way (which is implicit in my question above). I suppose that I read his analysis of Husserl in the second reading as indicative that the idol and the icon are two sides of the same coin. When I see a box, I don't see the side not facing me; so the visible and the invisible are always together whether I know it or not. I mapped that onto the idol and the icon to say that they are just two different ways of viewing the same thing.
Hi Vince. Thanks for the excellent comments. I hesitated over the word "constitutive," insofar as not just ANY (material) thing could be an idol. So, there has to be something "in" the material too, not just in the case. However, if forced to answer "True or False," I would say "True" to that claim.
On the subjectivism point, I wonder about that. Marion seems to imply a Heideggerian sense of the force of "Schicksal" or fate in determining the gaze. In other words, there is more than just an individual psychology involved but a cultural "horizon" as well. In fact, the latter seems more important. (Note what he says about the "twilight" of the idol, and how the Greeks had a possibility of seeing the divine in statutes that are mere art for us, since "the gods have fled" (as Holderlin and Heidegger would say). But this is under the influence of Lacan and Sartre as well, so there is a subjectivism here too.
The phenomenology of the icon might be compared to the encounter with a transformative human influence: it can make you into something that, antecedent to the encounter, you never could have imagined. However, I imagine that whether you find that possibility convincing depends on your own experience of it (or lack thereof).
I agree that the idol and icon are not two distinct entities, but perhaps a better analogy than "two sides of the same coin" would be: "two gestalts of the same figure." In the idol, visibility completely fulfills the gaze, and the invisible is absolutely invisible. But in the icon, invisibility comes to visibility (in the manner of the Levinasian "face.")
P.S. Certainly, you have discharged your duty with this fine commentary, but I hope that, in the service of the class and your overall pursuit of philosophical "paideia" or "Bilding" you will engage with other (esp. grad) student comments as well. One advantage of this format is we can keep several discussions going on in parallel for the next three weeks, which might yield interesting cross-pollination. So, please check back here this weekend to see what others have said, in case something inspires a response.
In response to your inquiry about "subjectivism," Vince, I think a more rigorous phenomenological account of "the gaze" is required. In the other assigned chapter by Marion ("The Icon or the Endless Hermeneutic"), we receive a passing reference to Husserl's notion of "adumbrations" associated with perceptual experience of the life-world. To be brief, the adumbrations arise from expectations implicit within our intentional aims (e.g., the act of perceiving): when I perceive the front side of a tree, I expect the backside to, for the most part, present a similar kind of tapestry (e.g., bark-like substance and texture as opposed to a human face). In turn, my previous conscious experience with tree-like entities informs, fills out, and unravels the intentional content of the perceptual act. I say "fill out" because we can never view the object from all sides; rather, we are limited in our perception of the intentional object by our finite spatiotemporal location. To be clear, though, it is not only my consciousness that carries these presuppositions about "perceiving a tree"; rather, others also share them to some extent.
I am curious if a similar analysis can be performed with "the gaze" as described by Marion, especially in the context of idols which are fundamentally constituted by the gaze. In short, what sort of adumbration(s), apperception, and intentional implication(s) are necessary to "fill out" and "complete" the intentional aim of the gaze, and, more importantly for Vince's question, are they intersubjective? In a religious context, I would assume that a common background in upbringing and education (i.e., Heideggerian "thrownness") would be necessary. In an aesthetic context, I would assume the same, specifically at historical moments when aesthetic education was more tightly-controlled, monitored, and standardized (e.g., the 19th and early 20th centuries). We might worry, however, that such a phenomenological analysis presents insurmountable challenges as secularization and globalization continue to traverse cultural boundaries, a phenomenon welcomed by Vattimo.
Vince, if you would care to respond to Jason, that would be great. I will hang back and observe and mull this over a bit for now...
@@jasonbarton6091 I believe that, in short, the answer is that we cannot analyze "gaze" in the same way that Husserl analyzes "adumbrations" or apperception more generally. The reason is that for Husserl there is deeper commitment to the notion of a noema which is objective (in the full metaphysical sense of the word). In contrast, (and now I'm stealing some of what the professor says in the next video with respect to Derrida) Marion doesn't appear to want such a notion, in agreement with Derrida. There is only noetic content, not a noema. And that would be the reason why I asked the question to begin with. It seems at first glance that Marion does not want an objective standard for idols/icons. Only a subjective one.
There is also the concern of intersubjectivity raised by both Jason and the professor. What determines idols/icons is an intersubjective nexus of norms, handed down to us by culture. Having read Heidegger, I understand this answer, but I am nevertheless critical of it. Who decides what constitutes the nexus of norms? A group of people over time, of course. To my mind that leads us straight back to the issue at hand; whether we have a standard which is objective or subjective.
I suppose that at root my question boils down to "If we want to decide whether an entity is an icon or idol, how do we choose?". I think that Marion has to say that the answer is subjective unless he wants to throw in with Husserl (and Frege) and commit to a larger metaphysical picture.
I am curious to learn your interpretation of Marion’s remarks on the Icon and the Invisible(to the bottom of P 17.) The specific passage where Marion writes: “The formula that Saint Paul applies to Christ [...] icon of the invisible God (Col. 1:15), must serve as our norm...” Does Marion think of said “Formula” as specific to the believer? Will the Icon evoke/lead to veneration in the religious believer alone? I find that Marion uses magnificent imagery, but remains elusive about who this notion of the Icon(Saint Paul’s formula) will be directed towards? I am inclined to say such an experience with the icon will be truly felt in the mind of the religious thinker.
Hi Dawson! Good to hear from you. I think we need to read that in context. The point is that there is no "icon of the visible," but only of the invisible." Christ exemplifies this: he is the "view" of the Father, who is essentially invisible. He serves this function through gradual "saturation," whereby, in an infinite process, the Father is revealed more and more in him.
Thank you for the video! It helped clarify a lot. For me, it seemed like the icon renders the invisible visible in the sense that it calls one to ponder what is beyond i.e. the invisible/the divine more so than the icon literally rendering the invisible visible. Is that the correct way of understanding Marion's description of the icon or is it the latter--that it has the function of literally rendering the divine apparent?
Hi Kate! Certainly, the icon can call one to ponder what is beyond. But I think it also renders the invisible visible literally, the the way the face does. That is, when one feels that IT sees YOU, rather than the reverse. That reversal of intention, or "counter-intentionality" as it is called, is the essence of that type of phenomenon. Of course, it may not happen to you personally; but in that case, the icon doesn't appear -- at least as an icon. That is my understanding.
@@BrentKalar That makes sense! Thank you
Around 49:00 you mention the encounter with God by reading the Gospel as iconic, presenting a picture that could occur in painting, architecture, etc. And you mention this is mediated. You coming into contact with this iconic work of art let's say summons to surpass you... However, I am having questions whether the work of art can summon you in the same way the face does, because one is inanimate and the other is animate. When you say mediated, do you mean this cannot be the same iconic relation as to that with the face. Mediated because the work of art, gospel, sculpture are cannot impose a similar injunction/demand? The second reading makes it clear that the icon/ saturated phenomena is understood to be between people. This is more of a clarification than a question, I am just making sure this is correct. Thank you.
Good point. One might challenge Marion for assimilating the face and icon too closely. I think, however, that Marion does want to attribute a KIND of animation to the phenomenal experience of the icon. In this respect, it is similar to Heidegger ascribing a "battle" of earth and world to the work of art.
I would think that "brands" could be icons: 'I wear Nikes, and these shoes make me cool. And I advertise the fact with the highly visible swoop logo" that turns me into a human sandwhich board. etc.