While this argument does indeed raise important limitations of blockchain technology today, it makes a category error by prematurely concluding that such limitations are fundamental rather than incidental. It is true that Bitcoin and other major crypto-networks currently lack a formalized mechanism for protocol governance. But, as far as I can see, there exists no fundamental reason why such mechanisms for governance cannot exist. It is perfectly conceivable that a network protocol might encode rules not only for "rule enforcing" but also for "rule creation" and "rule modification." Such a mechanism might, for example, conduct a distributed voting process where each participant's voting power is proportional to his/her stake in the network. In fact, there is already promising work along these lines (by folks at Protocol Labs and Tezos). Most problematic, is this argument's "provocation" at the end. It claims that "Once you address the problem of governance, you no longer need DLTs; you can use tech that assumes a trusted central party to enforce the rules, because you're already trusting a central party to make the rules." This is shortsighted because it assumes that the only possible way to solve the governance problem is through trust in a central party (i.e. a board of directors of some sort). This, however, is not necessarily the case. The same breakthroughs that have lead to decentralized enforcement, can very well lead to decentralized governance. In fact, I very much expect that they will.
you already have this now with the miners. the mining pool makes the final decision on everything and its a mess. endless forks which dilute the brand and fast money decisions the users dont support.
"...where each participant's voting power is proportional to his/her stake in the network" - Who will enforce this rule? Who will decide whether and how to change this rule?
19:30 "If Bitcoin is to thrive, it needs more robust governance institutions, more robust ways of making decisions about what rules are going to be included in the protocol". Your premise is derived from applying old thinking to a new paradigm. You see Bitcoin's decision-making process as a "not very well functioning process" namely because it differs completely from what we have thus far considered good governance: a centralized, trusted, transparent and accountable institution. Bitcoin's governance is nothing like that, and it may very well turn out to be the most robust - albeit not very expeditious - form of governance we have created so far. The scaling debate is the very proof that none of the stakeholders has enough power to force changes into the protocol solely in benefit of their own interests. Whether this apparent staleness will be the end of Bitcoin or is instead just the cost to pay for distributed consensus, only time will tell. I do agree with your final remarks though: if you add central governance to a DLT, then you no longer need the DLT. The whole value proposition of the blockchain is decentralized consensus.
This talk seems to use utopian principles as the foundation for its conclusions. Firstly that a centralised power that involved humans would follow the governance wishes of the network participants and secondly that a centralised enforcement power would apply the agreed rules without bias When I see these principles in the real world as a persistent, stable, feature then I'll be willing to consider that DLTs may be oversold. The speaker does raise interesting questions about how the governance features of DLTs relate to their value. Yet we see that DLTs also hold value simply due to other features as well, including longevity, reliability of the community, number of users, etc. It's quite difficult to make absolute claims about governance but the questions are clearly important.
While this argument does indeed raise important limitations of blockchain technology today, it makes a category error by prematurely concluding that such limitations are fundamental rather than incidental. It is true that Bitcoin and other major crypto-networks currently lack a formalized mechanism for protocol governance. But, as far as I can see, there exists no fundamental reason why such mechanisms for governance cannot exist. It is perfectly conceivable that a network protocol might encode rules not only for "rule enforcing" but also for "rule creation" and "rule modification." Such a mechanism might, for example, conduct a distributed voting process where each participant's voting power is proportional to his/her stake in the network. In fact, there is already promising work along these lines (by folks at Protocol Labs and Tezos).
Most problematic, is this argument's "provocation" at the end. It claims that "Once you address the problem of governance, you no longer need DLTs; you can use tech that assumes a trusted central party to enforce the rules, because you're already trusting a central party to make the rules." This is shortsighted because it assumes that the only possible way to solve the governance problem is through trust in a central party (i.e. a board of directors of some sort). This, however, is not necessarily the case. The same breakthroughs that have lead to decentralized enforcement, can very well lead to decentralized governance. In fact, I very much expect that they will.
you already have this now with the miners. the mining pool makes the final decision on everything and its a mess. endless forks which dilute the brand and fast money decisions the users dont support.
"...where each participant's voting power is proportional to his/her stake in the network" - Who will enforce this rule? Who will decide whether and how to change this rule?
19:30 "If Bitcoin is to thrive, it needs more robust governance institutions, more robust ways of making decisions about what rules are going to be included in the protocol". Your premise is derived from applying old thinking to a new paradigm. You see Bitcoin's decision-making process as a "not very well functioning process" namely because it differs completely from what we have thus far considered good governance: a centralized, trusted, transparent and accountable institution. Bitcoin's governance is nothing like that, and it may very well turn out to be the most robust - albeit not very expeditious - form of governance we have created so far. The scaling debate is the very proof that none of the stakeholders has enough power to force changes into the protocol solely in benefit of their own interests. Whether this apparent staleness will be the end of Bitcoin or is instead just the cost to pay for distributed consensus, only time will tell. I do agree with your final remarks though: if you add central governance to a DLT, then you no longer need the DLT. The whole value proposition of the blockchain is decentralized consensus.
Is this satoshi?
This talk seems to use utopian principles as the foundation for its conclusions. Firstly that a centralised power that involved humans would follow the governance wishes of the network participants and secondly that a centralised enforcement power would apply the agreed rules without bias When I see these principles in the real world as a persistent, stable, feature then I'll be willing to consider that DLTs may be oversold. The speaker does raise interesting questions about how the governance features of DLTs relate to their value. Yet we see that DLTs also hold value simply due to other features as well, including longevity, reliability of the community, number of users, etc. It's quite difficult to make absolute claims about governance but the questions are clearly important.