Victor Lamme on Consciousness

This narrated powerpoint shows why humans have conscious sensations, while photo cameras don't. It describes some of the most recent work of the cognitive neuroscience group in Amsterdam on the neural and molecular basis of consciousness, and it shows why attention has nothing to do with consciousness. Will take you 25 minutes, but then you'll know how things are inside your mind

[@FlamingRock56]

Excellent work and a great presentation that is easy to follow.

[@EgorAnanyev]

Just what I needed! Thank you for the clear presentation!

[@NeeBflatearth]

😉

[@ducopieterse7103]

Waarschuwing: Dit is een googel vertaling van bovenstaand -> Deze gesproken powerpoint laat zien waarom mensen bewuste sensaties hebben, en fotocamera's niet. Het beschrijft een aantal van de meest recente werken van de cognitieve neurowetenschappengroep in Amsterdam over de neurale en moleculaire basis van bewustzijn, en het laat zien waarom aandacht niets met bewustzijn te maken heeft. Kost je 25 minuten, maar dan weet je hoe het in je hoofd zit

[@johannesfreud5732]

Interesting experiments, but some of the conclusions you make are non-sense to me.
When referring to the Fahrenfort 2012 study, you imply that consciousness is defined by a face being visible or invisible in the stimuli. Sounds very strange to me. Your definition says that when the thing I should see in a picture (e.g. a face) is invisible, then consciousness is off/absence, and when it is visible, then there is consciousness. Is that all to measuring consciousness within an experiment..?
Similarly, when you use the Scholte 2006 study to prove your point that "consciousness is independent from access", you use a very strange, maybe even contradictory, argumentation:
"Regardless of whether subjects notice these background textures or not..."
- [I assume that noticing and reporting the textures requires CONSCIOUS perception of the textures, right? It would otherwise be strange to assume that you can notice and report something without being conscious of it...] -
"...there is integration (reflected by the signals)"
- [and you assume that the integration of certain brain signals means conscious sensation/consciousness, as you state explicitly in your presentation]
Well, that means you are actually saying "Regardless of whether subjects are conscious, there is consciousness in their brain", which sounds contradictory to me. How can you not have access to a stimulus/sensation and at the same time be conscious of it (reflected by recurrent interactions measured by fMRI)?
I don't not get your definition of consciousness and its operationalization that you used.