Physical Side Channel Attacks On PCs by Daniel Genkin & Roei Schuster | hardwear.io USA 2022

Abstract:
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Physical side channel attacks, such as power analysis or electromagnetic radiation, are often used to extract secret information from computing devices. By monitoring these minute interactions between computation and the physical word, attackers have been able to extract secret keys from cryptographic implementations running on embedded devices such as smart cards and micro controllers.
Pivoting from embedded devices, in this talk we will discuss how to mount physical side channel attacks on laptop computers. Despite their complexity and speed, we will show that cryptographic implementation on PCs is also vulnerable to physical side channel attacks, which can be mounted cheaply and at large distances.
Next, we will also debunk the common belief that physical attacks require physical proximity and external measurement equipment. In particular, we will show that built-in microphones inadvertently capture electromagnetic side-channel leakage from ongoing computation. Moreover, this information is often conveyed by supposedly-benign channels such as audio recordings and common Voice-over-IP applications. Using this source of leakage, we show how attackers can obtain information about the victim’s browsing habits, as well as extract the machine's ECDSA signing
#electromagnetic #sidechannelattack #embedded #PC #hardwear_io
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[@dylanvega352]

The CounterStrike analogy 😂