I am a former USMC concepts and doctrine writer myself (I worked with John Schmitt on MCDP 1 and was the primary author of MCDP 1-1 and 1-2, etc.). This is a solid enough treatment of maneuver warfare at the tactical level. However, it incorporates a very serious flaw typical of many (by no means all) John Boyd and Sun Tzu "fans," who have an unfortunate tendency to sneer at and misrepresent other important thinkers, especially Clausewitz. For instance, a couple of years ago a lecturer on Sun Tzu visiting the National War College stated that the MCDPs "managed to avoid all that Clausewitz nonsense." Note, unfortunately for that argument, that MCDP 1 mentions Clausewitz's name 22 times (all positively), Boyd 6 times, and Sun Tzu 5. A quick look at the chapter and section titles will quickly inform anybody actually familiar with these writers that this document is very heavily influenced by the infamous "dead German." Schmitt does indeed consider himself a "Sun Tzu guy," while I am a pretty committed "Clausewitz guy," but we were very much on the same page throughout the writing of the MCDPs. That's because these three geniuses are far better understood as a team rather than as competitors--they are seldom truly in opposition to one another, though it is easy to create false conflicts by juxtaposing juicy quotations ripped out of their larger contexts. While Captain Grazier recognizes the importance of Clausewitz, he evidently cannot resist the pointless urge to flip him off anyway. If you're going to attack the guy, at least pronounce his name right: who's "Cloushwhitz"?
CBassford I appreciate the feedback. This is exactly what I am looking for with this version of the presentation. I was specifically referring to Clausewitz's discussion's of friction and the modern day obsession with doing everything possible to eliminate it. I regret I have given the impression I was dismissing his work outright. That was certainly not what I intended. I will work to correct that in the next version. In some of my other work, I write about what he had to teach us regarding the strength of the defense, beyond the "it's tied to terrain" aspect my TBS instructors taught me. Had military planners understood what he was talking about prior to engaging in prolonged counterinsurgency campaigns, in which our enemy's were perfectly demonstrating his point about the strength of the defense, we may have found more long-term success. Thanks again for your help. And I promise I will correct my pronunciation of his name in the next version.
***** We have a pronunciation guide on the Clausewitz.com "Videos" page.:-) Hey, we didn't make the video, but clearly somebody thought this was needed. It is always a mistake to go after an author because somebody else misapplies one of his ideas. Clausewitz certainly didn't think it was either possible or desirable to eliminate friction, though everyone naturally wants to minimize its negative effects on themselves. You are right to criticize DOD's frequent delusions in this regard--you just need to strike the right target. And you are also very right that Clausewitz is highly relevant to insurgencies. Insurgents (like, say, Mao) have no problem understanding this. Perhaps the problem is that we have a hard time imagining our enemies as the defenders.
To my Marine Corps Officers, thank you for providing this high-level insight to a lowly enlistee to learn about, and appreciate. I know it would've been asking much for collegiate level reading and intelligence amongst people who thought an ASVAB score of 70 was "pretty good" ... but I sure would've loved understanding more than my enlisted CV included. While I'm still so very ignorant, and have so much to learn (studying Russian now) ... it's hard to remotely overstate how incredibly ignorant I was when I was 20, even moreso. To emphasize, I didn't even know what it took to become an officer ... and if I actually did, I would've not needed to receive training to respect them ... but the respect would've been an endogenous expression of sincerely held beliefs over what you men deserved. It wasn't until watching Stewart Sheller on Jocko podcast that I learned how seriously the USMC takes giving an Officer an Infantry command. How I admire you. How sad I am ... to learn of the erosion to the left-wing ideologues infusing policy like, mixed-gender infantry units. The lessons of Kara Hultgreen. LGBTQ & the US Military. (I'm from the "don't ask, don't tell" epoch ... and see vulnerability arriving in waves, and a breakdown of unit cohesion forming like cracks in a hull battered by those waves). To all of you fighting for the tradition of what we represented, I truly salute you.
I'm so glad somebody finally put up a competent and well done video on Maneuver Warfare on youtube. I was actually thinking of doing it myself, but not as well done as this. Thanks for this video, hope you make more.
Apollo Morales Apollo, I appreciate your comment. I put this together after I noticed there seemed to be nothing like this out there either. Please feel free to share the link as widely as possible.
Thank you very much for this most motivating essay! As a German, of course, I am running to the support of Clausewitz: As far as I understand him, one of his central ideas is "friction" - and, even more, to accept friction as an essential and unevitable experience in war. His first concern are the pretty good generals who are making pretty good plans - without giving room for the unexpected, the mistakes, the errors and the bad wheather, i.e. - for the "frictions". A perfect example how not to do it would be the almost failed British attack on Goose Green during the Falkland campaign, where the brilliant and brave (but probably somewhat over-ambitious) Colonel Jones developed an almost perfect plan, which had only one weak point: It didn´t work, because of some unexpected stiff resistance. Instead of moving his schwerpunkt to the other (right) flank, he stubbornly went on, trying to break through, mit dem Kopf durch die Wand. If I remember correctly, Col. Jones had made something like a six-phases-plan for the battle, almost a screenplay. But not even the Argies did the favour to stick to it. On the other hand, the old Moltke (another one of our dear dead Germans) said, famously, no operational plan survives the first battle. This means: Prepare for everythink, and react to the unexpected. Clausewitz, again, spoke of strategy as an art, just because of this need for creative improvisation. Here the solutions lies with the Auftragstaktik, which gives to the commanders on the spot the liberty and responsibility to act freely in the best interest of the given mission. Clausewitz had experienced bad leadership as a young officer in the battle of Auerstädt in 1806, when the Prussians didn´t dare to attack an inferior French force. Other than Col. Jones the Prussian commander didn´t have any plan at all, not even a perfect one, and when he was shot, his deputy (and, even worse, the Prussian king) didn´t do anything at all - but letting the infantery stand and die in the line of fire. Very stimulating are the tactical situations you develop! Some years ago I read Lind´s Manoeuver handbook; I understood he holds a liking for the deep strike. So I would think that your flanking attacks are closing to early, especially with enemy tank reserve in front of them. I guess Bill Lind would lead the atttackers force strike further - this would move the action from a tactical to an operative solution, maybe similiar to the decisive breakthrough at Sedan in 1940 - which definitely "went for the king"! That being a brilliant comparison of yours! You see how inspiring you are! Thank you very much! Herzliche Grüße aus Deutschland, Ihr Burkhart Berthold
Can you please write out the full reference list shown at timestamp 2:38 - some of the titles (and authors) are not easy to read - thank you for the video it was really well done
To be an expert in a subject means that you've studied a subject exclusively for a significant period of time (measured in years for any non trivial subject). It does not mean that one knows everything about that subject. In fact, the more you know.(the higher the level of expertise) the more you understand how much you don't know about the subject.
Just wanted to say thank you for posting this video. I started researching John Boyd and now have an actually some coherent level of understanding of Sun Tzu. I have been excited and constantly learning during the journey for knowledge this video started. Thank you.
Thanks for caring to share your profound wisdom on living stone art of dead silent craft hidden in between dark sciences and deep spaces optics communications engineering dense military industry complexes combined strategic application technology spectrums.
John, I am glad you like it. I have a few more projects in mind to further explain the concept. I will release them as they are ready. In the meantime, please spread the word about this one.
As an old (enlisted) infantry soldier the one thing that I most dislike about Boyd-related theories is how they are, despite their "non-expert" claims, not applicable to the "non-experts" at lowest level of the military organization - the 4-man team. The "mindset" as taught by Col Boyd is not universal and was never meant to be. If there is one criticism that can be leveled against the venerable colonel, it is that he did not fully understand or accept why certain parts of the military (the Army) conducted matters the way they did. Near as I can tell neither The Colonel nor his followers had any interest in this essential self-learning. If the ideas are "difficult" and cannot be explained in terms understandable to your "average grunt", then it will never find application at that level. As an example, Boyd theory doesn't properly explain situations like Dien Bien Phu - even when basic or "average grunt" explanations exist. The fact Boyd theory expressly refuses to either acknowledge or build upon the existing grunt wisdom (i.e., OCOKA, the Principles of Patrolling, et al) exhibits the very same distractive thinking that led General Navarre to fortify his Assembly Area rather than formulate a coherent battle plan against the enemy. Westmoreland further proved, at Khe Sanh, that at best such ways of thinking are in the end pyrrhic. The second-handed nature of the psychological appeals in Boyd theory are also odd to me. Why is psychology given second shift to this "unexplainable" officer only stuff? Wouldn't the theory be better served if it could coherently explain to a grunt how a 4-man team can use psychology to advance it's given mission? I will never understand why Col Boyd flipped the table over a matter so universal as OCOKA; who in their right mind would choose to follow in the operational footsteps of General Henri Navarre? No amount of vehicle technology or "creative thinking" will get a ground commander out of poorly chosen terrain, doubly so if the ground commander didn't choose the terrain he was installed upon!
would you be able to skip the attack phase, if the enemy had superiour intelligence. if they knew that your attempts at exploitation and attempts to seed chaos were hollow, would you still be able to continue this strategy. on the modern battlefield, with satellites and sensors and networking, if maneuver as we used to think about it, may need a bit of a change.what that is? i dont know...
@@DanielGrazier Reading it again, its old Swedish. It sounds like a page from the Bible; it talks about the mercy of God. But I can only read some of the words, looks like something from medieval time? Anyhow, it suits your informative video just fine.
You should be considered a national treasure, though for this thought I may have written it under emotions. E: If not a treasure at least an admirable educator
This is a very good presentation. Thank you for your service and adding knowledge/value to others. Quick question, do you have a Website or PDF list of the books you've read to help with this presentation? I can see some of the titles in the video but others are hard to discern.
+carlohemi I am glad you found this useful. I don't have one posted on a website, but please shoot me an email at daniel.r.grazier@gmail.com and I will send you one.
The problem I have with how we teach maneuver warfare at TBS is the lack of context and past developments that influenced it today. We don’t teach how it evolved from Napoleon, Clausewitz analysis, Helmoth Von Moltke, Heinz Guderian (influenced by Mongolian mounted speed warfare), and later Boyd/Lind. For example, Napoleon won against the Australians at the battle of Ulm by just maneuvering around his enemy making it look like he was surrounded.
Benjamin McLean I've been in the US Army for 6, and no one's ever recommended I read Enders game. With that being said, I have read it. Can't remember the author's name, but he did a very good job. (IMO)
I actually Googled this after I posted that and the result I came up with was yeah, some parts of officer training in the Marines did recommend Ender's Game.
Oh right. Sorry, I meant commissioned officer. Total civie here: would be 4F on account of low vision if there was an active draft, so you'll almost certainly never see me in uniform, but greatest respect to everyone in the U.S. military.
@@ThePRCommander Yes you're right. But it doesn't change the fact that using firepower is easier than using maneuver. Both could bring victory, but maneuver is more satisfying. It makes you feel like a genius, not just a brute.
@@fpvillegas9084 Well, in theory at least, using Firepower instead of Manœuvre, should be the easier option, however, since change is the only constant factor within the battle dynamic itself, no doctrinal approach is the easiest or difficult. The easy way of things always depends on the situation. Sticking to a specific approach will only increase the risk of reduced combat efficiency. For instance, when a mobile battle runs out of speed, the opponents will most often consolidate their territory and hereby bake the foundation for the next change in the dynamic. In this example, the change morph into a static battle, where firepower now rule the day. Mobility no more. In warfare change is the only constant factor.
@@ThePRCommander Maneuver is not mere mobility. It's not maneuver if you're merely pushing the enemy back. Of course you'll run out of steam if you're just battling him head on, while he is consolidating his strength by falling back on his bases, resources, and reinforcements. Real maneuver requires surprise, rear/flank attacks, diversions, psyops, enemy confusion, speed, flexibility, etc. In other words, presenting the enemy with a "perfect storm". A successful maneuver puts the enemy off balance, and keeps it that way. Of course it's not that easy, but it's most likely the surest road to victory.
@@fpvillegas9084 I was probably too implicit in my example? If so, I apologize. I used the example of mobile versus static warfare, to address the change-factor. In relation to the amount of specific factors needed, to deliver a so-called real Manœuvre, if I understand your list correctly, maybe I read it too literally? But if not, I think it's too difficult to list the 'real' recipe? Nonetheless, a perfect Manœuvre in my mind, is the 1968 TET Offensive. The actor delivering it, was the Vietnamese alliance between North Vietnam and Viet Cong. They both had the same view on the US military as a common enemy. However, in terms of what type of post-war Vietnam, they wanted to create, their opinions diverged too much. So the North Vietnam leadership, decided to deliver a Two-Pronged Manœuvre, partly against the public opinion in the United States and partly against their own ally in the south, the forces of Viet Cong. The two objectives was to Defeat the US public opinion and Destroy the Viet Cong as a force to recognize in the future. Both objectives were completed with success. Viet Cong was massacred and the public opinion in the US was significantly reduced.
I still feel like maneuver warfare, even though its probably a good strategy has been morphed through public discourse into be like Desert Storm and Blitzkrieg and not Vietnam or Afghanistan
Some one please explain to me how Wagner happened, and somehow wastedtheir momentous outcome? Seriously this probably the most expensive outcome, Unless it was a typical maneuver tactics of diverting experienced expectation. And if so brav-fucking-o, tho I fucking doubt it
The unstable complex of this machine makes this war come across as incompatible to previous experiences.(meanig), I wish that people that actually understood these rule weren't wasting souls as indispensable beings capable of complexity commpacity. For and comparable that we have to relieve on the supply that we can ensure their completeness, for results that I dont trust? Since none have seen it work yet but only make money and cost lives, this algorithm needs to change, we are not as a nation performing manoeuvre accurately, which makes myself sad as it should yourself. Im just a farm boy but I seem to have a more complex understanding of war even never having been in war because I would not like to rifle my weapon to decisively deceased mode.
A point of importance if i may: A competent enemy will not offer an open flank to allow you to bypass and jump straight to exploitation. You will have to create it yourself with a frontal breakthrough. Which means massing combat power at a narrow objective to achieve local numerical superiority. Which means bloody combat. Now, if the breakthrough point happens to be a weaker position all the better. But even in this day and age the means of acquiring knowledge about enemy disposition and where he is the weakest are limited. Deception can go a long way when preparing for such a breakthrough but still you have to be ready for bloody frontal combat. Over reliance on outmaneuvering the enemy will prove costly if you lack the "full frontal" mentality required to open the enemy lines for maneuver. I fully disagree when such breakthrough assaults are viewed as attritionist mentality. Quite the contrary, they are the big and most important enablers of maneuver warfare.
The more and more time passes, more warfare is about attrition. So, yeah, you are correct. The key is that you and your enemy can't protect all places, so breakthrough points always exist. The key factor is inteligence and information to indentify them. Also, your enemy generally will have reserves, so you need to bait them. In inicial phases of war and battles any of that is necessary, only in more latter ones. That's because generally you and your enemy have less activated troops, less information and more space to maneuver.
Very interesting lecture - I loved the use of contrasting Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to illustrate the _Manuever_ concept. However I found it a bit ironic that he used the 2003 Iraq war (apologies for forgetting the op's name) to illustrate it. Although I acknowledge that he only was speaking about the opening decapitation of their command and control and the simultaneous actions taken by us and our allies in the field, it seems that from a macro perspective with regard to our* use of _Manuever_ in that war, one or a combination of the following must be true: 1. it was nonexistent, i.e. not employed 2. it was used so minimally as to render it ineffective 3. it was employed with such incompetence that it was effectively nonexistent The plan for what to do (following what was as near as a 100% probability of victory that one force can have over another) was obviously completely misguided. To lose control of the situation such that we did so soon after we had so quickly and dominantly achieved victory over their forces showed that we absolutely operated without _Manuever_ after the primary fighting was concluded. * Here, I am referring to the war's highest strategic planners such as Rumsfeld, not the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who actually fought the war.
+jwt242 I'm very pleased you appreciated the video. You make some great points. For this discussion, I was only talking about the initial invasion. I was simply showing that Manœuvre has nothing to do with movement on the ground. I still believe the major ground war portion of the wars in Iraq were excellent examples of Manœuvre Warfare. I also totally agree that in hindsight, the decisions about what to do after the initial invasion were flawed. That is why we study history, so we can learn from the past and hopefully not make the same mistakes twice. Still, one of the major lessons Clausewitz taught us it to properly understand military history, it is necessary to understand what the decision-makers knew at the exact moment they made their decisions and judge them based on that, not on what we know now. For example, it is easy for us to judge General Lee harshly for the decisions he made at Gettysburg. But when you take the time to understand what he knew when he made the decision to order the charge on the third day, it becomes harder to second-guess the decision.
+Daniel Grazier Thanks for your reply. Not being in the military and only being a person very interested in military history and not a military historian, I think I might have over-applied Manœuvre warfare with respect to the 2003 Iraq war. In my mind and due to your use of Sun Tzu as a way to illustrate Manœuvre warfare, I was referring not to coalition soldiers or other warfighters’ actions on the ground in Iraq; rather, I was specifically referring to the lack of or faulty plans made by the Bush administration prior to the war for what to do immediately following what would be a near-certain and quick victory over Iraqi forces. If the planning phase of military action is not considered a part of war, then obviously Manœuvre warfare would not apply as how can a type of warfare apply to something that is not warfare? However, if pre-war planning is considered part of warfare, then is it a mistake to apply Manœuvre warfare to this phase? Incidentally, this question about whether it is a mistake to apply Manœuvre warfare to the planning phase is not rhetorical; it is a real question I am asking. By the way, you don’t have to admit it, but I believe you agree with my view on our post-war activities in Iraq; again, I emphasize that when I say “our” I am referring to the war’s civilian leadership, not the soldiers and other warfighters’ actions; they were only following orders and doing their job, which was a nearly impossible one, indeed. But I digress, your essay “Heisenberg and Mao Zedong - The Occupier Effect” on Medium.com fleshes out the fact that at minimum you believe that our task was nearly impossible. Perhaps the final sentence of your essay sums it up best, “The only way to eliminate such violent acts is to leave.”
Yes, I do agree that our civilian leaders did not plan adequately for what happened after the statue fell. I think they didn't have the best information possible before ordering us into Iraq in 2003. From what I have read, they took as gospel what a few Iraqi ex-pats were telling them about the situation on the ground and never seemed to consider that they may have had ulterior motives. You absolutely divined my thoughts on counterinsurgency from my Small Wars essay. I actually began jotting down the notes that ultimately turned into that piece while I was in Afghanistan in 2013. I saw thousands of us working very hard and accomplishing absolutely nothing. As you can well imagine, it was hugely frustrating.
You asked me what shape I see, which happened to he the same shapes illustrated then showed a different shape to tell me THAT is what I saw, which was not the same as the other three. every step of that was incorrect - deception failed
You have absolutely no depth perception or understanding of geometry. He even explains how each shape are all basically only visible from certain angles on a pyramid. From the side, bottom, and from the top. Use your brain.
I sadly don't think Manœuvre Warfare is a realistic option for the U.S. military. Attrition is simply a much bigger business. Just think of the Iraq invasion in 2003. All that firepower brought in, even though the Iraqi army was only a shadow of it self. Martin Van Creveld, not sure where I read it, but in one of his writings, he pointed out the vast number of Apache Helicopters, even though there really never was any need for them. Maybe he wrote it in his book "Supplying War".
There is a great deal of truth in that. Institutionalizing Manoeuvre Warfare is very difficult because you are correct, there is a great deal of money on the other side. There are plenty of us out there working to overcome that, but it is an uphill fight.
I wonder what is needed, in order to convince big money, that Manoeuvre Warfare is a better option than Attration Warfare? Perhaps it is possible to find a similar situation, somewhere in the history of warfare, maybe from the era of the Roman Empire? Big money is probably not the only obstacle. I dont remember the book, but one of the famous authors writing on the battle of normandy, a British if I recall correct, use the bombing of Caen as an example on how democracies more often are more destructives in war, due to the public pressure on the decisionmakers. Boyds story, might be an option to look into. He faced that uphill fight too, once he entered the Pentagon. In the book "33 Strategies of WAR", by Robert Green, chapter 10 "Deterrence Strategies", example 4, he make use of Boyds strategy to overcome the opposition in the system. Its on page 132 and might be useful as inspiration? The book can also be found online in a PDF version: blackmystory.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/the-33-strategies-of-war.pdf Years ago I tried to find support in the Danish military, for an idea i had developed, related to future warfare, seen primarily from a Danish perspective. However, I learned that every doctrine we get, we get from NATO. They wouldent even discuss my idea. Dan, I will think about it and return if I come up with an idea for your reform movement. Moving away from the school of Attrition is simply too important too ignore. Oh and by the way, apologies, I am from Denmark. My name is Michael Nielsen.
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I cannot be impressed with Sun Tzu. Any man who cannot organize 12 women without first cruelly murdering two of them is nothing in my esteem. By all means read his book. You can be sure your enemy has. If he is very clever he will anticipate that you have as well and plan accordingly. That is the moment you will thoroughly surprise and confuse him by doing something UnSun Tzu.
I am a former USMC concepts and doctrine writer myself (I worked with John Schmitt on MCDP 1 and was the primary author of MCDP 1-1 and 1-2, etc.). This is a solid enough treatment of maneuver warfare at the tactical level. However, it incorporates a very serious flaw typical of many (by no means all) John Boyd and Sun Tzu "fans," who have an unfortunate tendency to sneer at and misrepresent other important thinkers, especially Clausewitz. For instance, a couple of years ago a lecturer on Sun Tzu visiting the National War College stated that the MCDPs "managed to avoid all that Clausewitz nonsense." Note, unfortunately for that argument, that MCDP 1 mentions Clausewitz's name 22 times (all positively), Boyd 6 times, and Sun Tzu 5. A quick look at the chapter and section titles will quickly inform anybody actually familiar with these writers that this document is very heavily influenced by the infamous "dead German." Schmitt does indeed consider himself a "Sun Tzu guy," while I am a pretty committed "Clausewitz guy," but we were very much on the same page throughout the writing of the MCDPs. That's because these three geniuses are far better understood as a team rather than as competitors--they are seldom truly in opposition to one another, though it is easy to create false conflicts by juxtaposing juicy quotations ripped out of their larger contexts. While Captain Grazier recognizes the importance of Clausewitz, he evidently cannot resist the pointless urge to flip him off anyway. If you're going to attack the guy, at least pronounce his name right: who's "Cloushwhitz"?
CBassford I appreciate the feedback. This is exactly what I am looking for with this version of the presentation. I was specifically referring to Clausewitz's discussion's of friction and the modern day obsession with doing everything possible to eliminate it. I regret I have given the impression I was dismissing his work outright. That was certainly not what I intended. I will work to correct that in the next version. In some of my other work, I write about what he had to teach us regarding the strength of the defense, beyond the "it's tied to terrain" aspect my TBS instructors taught me. Had military planners understood what he was talking about prior to engaging in prolonged counterinsurgency campaigns, in which our enemy's were perfectly demonstrating his point about the strength of the defense, we may have found more long-term success.
Thanks again for your help. And I promise I will correct my pronunciation of his name in the next version.
***** We have a pronunciation guide on the Clausewitz.com "Videos" page.:-) Hey, we didn't make the video, but clearly somebody thought this was needed.
It is always a mistake to go after an author because somebody else misapplies one of his ideas. Clausewitz certainly didn't think it was either possible or desirable to eliminate friction, though everyone naturally wants to minimize its negative effects on themselves. You are right to criticize DOD's frequent delusions in this regard--you just need to strike the right target. And you are also very right that Clausewitz is highly relevant to insurgencies. Insurgents (like, say, Mao) have no problem understanding this. Perhaps the problem is that we have a hard time imagining our enemies as the defenders.
Sir, what is 5G warfare?
To my Marine Corps Officers, thank you for providing this high-level insight to a lowly enlistee to learn about, and appreciate. I know it would've been asking much for collegiate level reading and intelligence amongst people who thought an ASVAB score of 70 was "pretty good" ... but I sure would've loved understanding more than my enlisted CV included.
While I'm still so very ignorant, and have so much to learn (studying Russian now) ... it's hard to remotely overstate how incredibly ignorant I was when I was 20, even moreso.
To emphasize, I didn't even know what it took to become an officer ... and if I actually did, I would've not needed to receive training to respect them ... but the respect would've been an endogenous expression of sincerely held beliefs over what you men deserved.
It wasn't until watching Stewart Sheller on Jocko podcast that I learned how seriously the USMC takes giving an Officer an Infantry command. How I admire you.
How sad I am ... to learn of the erosion to the left-wing ideologues infusing policy like, mixed-gender infantry units. The lessons of Kara Hultgreen. LGBTQ & the US Military.
(I'm from the "don't ask, don't tell" epoch ... and see vulnerability arriving in waves, and a breakdown of unit cohesion forming like cracks in a hull battered by those waves).
To all of you fighting for the tradition of what we represented, I truly salute you.
Dear Mr. Grazier, thank you for this refreshing and philosophical presentation.
I'm so glad somebody finally put up a competent and well done video on Maneuver Warfare on youtube. I was actually thinking of doing it myself, but not as well done as this. Thanks for this video, hope you make more.
Apollo Morales Apollo, I appreciate your comment. I put this together after I noticed there seemed to be nothing like this out there either. Please feel free to share the link as widely as possible.
Thank you for this interesting Keynote. Greetings from Germany from a former Panzergrenadier, Divisional HQ staff company of the former 13th PzGrenDiv
Thank you very much for this most motivating essay!
As a German, of course, I am running to the support of Clausewitz: As far as I understand him, one of his central ideas is "friction" - and, even more, to accept friction as an essential and unevitable experience in war. His first concern are the pretty good generals who are making pretty good plans - without giving room for the unexpected, the mistakes, the errors and the bad wheather, i.e. - for the "frictions".
A perfect example how not to do it would be the almost failed British attack on Goose Green during the Falkland campaign, where the brilliant and brave (but probably somewhat over-ambitious) Colonel Jones developed an almost perfect plan, which had only one weak point: It didn´t work, because of some unexpected stiff resistance. Instead of moving his schwerpunkt to the other (right) flank, he stubbornly went on, trying to break through, mit dem Kopf durch die Wand.
If I remember correctly, Col. Jones had made something like a six-phases-plan for the battle, almost a screenplay. But not even the Argies did the favour to stick to it. On the other hand, the old Moltke (another one of our dear dead Germans) said, famously, no operational plan survives the first battle. This means: Prepare for everythink, and react to the unexpected. Clausewitz, again, spoke of strategy as an art, just because of this need for creative improvisation. Here the solutions lies with the Auftragstaktik, which gives to the commanders on the spot the liberty and responsibility to act freely in the best interest of the given mission.
Clausewitz had experienced bad leadership as a young officer in the battle of Auerstädt in 1806, when the Prussians didn´t dare to attack an inferior French force. Other than Col. Jones the Prussian commander didn´t have any plan at all, not even a perfect one, and when he was shot, his deputy (and, even worse, the Prussian king) didn´t do anything at all - but letting the infantery stand and die in the line of fire.
Very stimulating are the tactical situations you develop! Some years ago I read Lind´s Manoeuver handbook; I understood he holds a liking for the deep strike. So I would think that your flanking attacks are closing to early, especially with enemy tank reserve in front of them. I guess Bill Lind would lead the atttackers force strike further - this would move the action from a tactical to an operative solution, maybe similiar to the decisive breakthrough at Sedan in 1940 - which definitely "went for the king"! That being a brilliant comparison of yours!
You see how inspiring you are! Thank you very much!
Herzliche Grüße aus Deutschland, Ihr Burkhart Berthold
VERY well executed, text, examples, and graphics. Timely too as petrified thinking can be locked into the reset of "getting back to sea roots."
Superb is the word. I am astounded by the clarity of thought. Well presented and my compliments to you. Brigadier V Mahalingam (Retired), Indian Army
Mahalingam Venkataraman Sir, I am very honored you appreciated this.
Can you please write out the full reference list shown at timestamp 2:38 - some of the titles (and authors) are not easy to read - thank you for the video it was really well done
To be an expert in a subject means that you've studied a subject exclusively for a significant period of time (measured in years for any non trivial subject). It does not mean that one knows everything about that subject. In fact, the more you know.(the higher the level of expertise) the more you understand how much you don't know about the subject.
It took me about 60 seconds to understand this concept. But I kept watching.
This is great stuff. I can't get enough of maneuver warfare and Boyd. It applies everywhere and the Boyd Cycle (the real one) is a work of genius.
Thanks Jason. You are absolutely right. Boyd's work has wide applications. I'm pleased you found this helpful.
Just wanted to say thank you for posting this video. I started researching John Boyd and now have an actually some coherent level of understanding of Sun Tzu. I have been excited and constantly learning during the journey for knowledge this video started. Thank you.
I am very pleased you found this of value. There is a great deal to read to really understand this material. Keep plugging away!
Thanks for caring to share your profound wisdom on living stone art of dead silent craft hidden in between dark sciences and deep spaces optics communications engineering dense military industry complexes combined strategic application technology spectrums.
very good presentation and explanation, hard work appreciated, kindly do post the links for mcdp docs for perusal
"I must break you" great line....
This is excellent!!! Captain Grazier, please do more of these!!!
John, I am glad you like it. I have a few more projects in mind to further explain the concept. I will release them as they are ready. In the meantime, please spread the word about this one.
I am. I just hope it reaches the right people.
Thank you Capt
This explanation is simply put great. Thank you Dan.
Is it okay to download it?
I just read a book Called The Marine Corps Way Of War. Really good in depth book on this topic.
Great job. Thank you.
+Ricardo Flores Thank you. Please share this with whomever you think may find it useful.
As an old (enlisted) infantry soldier the one thing that I most dislike about Boyd-related theories is how they are, despite their "non-expert" claims, not applicable to the "non-experts" at lowest level of the military organization - the 4-man team. The "mindset" as taught by Col Boyd is not universal and was never meant to be. If there is one criticism that can be leveled against the venerable colonel, it is that he did not fully understand or accept why certain parts of the military (the Army) conducted matters the way they did. Near as I can tell neither The Colonel nor his followers had any interest in this essential self-learning. If the ideas are "difficult" and cannot be explained in terms understandable to your "average grunt", then it will never find application at that level. As an example, Boyd theory doesn't properly explain situations like Dien Bien Phu - even when basic or "average grunt" explanations exist. The fact Boyd theory expressly refuses to either acknowledge or build upon the existing grunt wisdom (i.e., OCOKA, the Principles of Patrolling, et al) exhibits the very same distractive thinking that led General Navarre to fortify his Assembly Area rather than formulate a coherent battle plan against the enemy. Westmoreland further proved, at Khe Sanh, that at best such ways of thinking are in the end pyrrhic.
The second-handed nature of the psychological appeals in Boyd theory are also odd to me. Why is psychology given second shift to this "unexplainable" officer only stuff? Wouldn't the theory be better served if it could coherently explain to a grunt how a 4-man team can use psychology to advance it's given mission? I will never understand why Col Boyd flipped the table over a matter so universal as OCOKA; who in their right mind would choose to follow in the operational footsteps of General Henri Navarre? No amount of vehicle technology or "creative thinking" will get a ground commander out of poorly chosen terrain, doubly so if the ground commander didn't choose the terrain he was installed upon!
would you be able to skip the attack phase, if the enemy had superiour intelligence. if they knew that your attempts at exploitation and attempts to seed chaos were hollow, would you still be able to continue this strategy. on the modern battlefield, with satellites and sensors and networking, if maneuver as we used to think about it, may need a bit of a change.what that is? i dont know...
PIR Priority Information Requirement is where it starts.
excellent video, well crafted, very comprehensive
+J.E. Need, I appreciate your comments. I hope you find ways to incorporate these ideas in your work. Please pass the word along to others.
Just a question Dan. The two pages with old language, is it written in Medieval Danish or Medieval Swedish? Probably the latter.
I honestly have no idea. That was an image I pulled from a Google search.
@@DanielGrazier Reading it again, its old Swedish. It sounds like a page from the Bible; it talks about the mercy of God. But I can only read some of the words, looks like something from medieval time? Anyhow, it suits your informative video just fine.
Like commented and subscribed 👍
You should be considered a national treasure, though for this thought I may have written it under emotions.
E: If not a treasure at least an admirable educator
This is a very good presentation. Thank you for your service and adding knowledge/value to others. Quick question, do you have a Website or PDF list of the books you've read to help with this presentation? I can see some of the titles in the video but others are hard to discern.
+carlohemi I am glad you found this useful. I don't have one posted on a website, but please shoot me an email at daniel.r.grazier@gmail.com and I will send you one.
1:10 No i wasn't wrong. Its a 2d shape
Fascinating!
The problem I have with how we teach maneuver warfare at TBS is the lack of context and past developments that influenced it today. We don’t teach how it evolved from Napoleon, Clausewitz analysis, Helmoth Von Moltke, Heinz Guderian (influenced by Mongolian mounted speed warfare), and later Boyd/Lind. For example, Napoleon won against the Australians at the battle of Ulm by just maneuvering around his enemy making it look like he was surrounded.
Austrians
Is it true that the military recommends reading Ender's Game?
Benjamin McLean I've been in the US Army for 6, and no one's ever recommended I read Enders game. With that being said, I have read it. Can't remember the author's name, but he did a very good job. (IMO)
I think it was the Marines who were recommending it -- to officers.
I actually Googled this after I posted that and the result I came up with was yeah, some parts of officer training in the Marines did recommend Ender's Game.
I'm a Noncommissioned Officer. It's all beans and bullets on my end. But I can understand that.
Oh right. Sorry, I meant commissioned officer. Total civie here: would be 4F on account of low vision if there was an active draft, so you'll almost certainly never see me in uniform, but greatest respect to everyone in the U.S. military.
It's easier to just overwhelm the enemy with extreme firepower.
But maneuver makes you feel like you're Napoleon or Alexander or Hannibal.
It is only easier when your logistics can support such doctrine. Another way of saying it, is whether you want to defeat or destroy your opponent.
@@ThePRCommander Yes you're right. But it doesn't change the fact that using firepower is easier than using maneuver. Both could bring victory, but maneuver is more satisfying. It makes you feel like a genius, not just a brute.
@@fpvillegas9084 Well, in theory at least, using Firepower instead of Manœuvre, should be the easier option, however, since change is the only constant factor within the battle dynamic itself, no doctrinal approach is the easiest or difficult. The easy way of things always depends on the situation. Sticking to a specific approach will only increase the risk of reduced combat efficiency. For instance, when a mobile battle runs out of speed, the opponents will most often consolidate their territory and hereby bake the foundation for the next change in the dynamic. In this example, the change morph into a static battle, where firepower now rule the day. Mobility no more. In warfare change is the only constant factor.
@@ThePRCommander Maneuver is not mere mobility. It's not maneuver if you're merely pushing the enemy back. Of course you'll run out of steam if you're just battling him head on, while he is consolidating his strength by falling back on his bases, resources, and reinforcements. Real maneuver requires surprise, rear/flank attacks, diversions, psyops, enemy confusion, speed, flexibility, etc. In other words, presenting the enemy with a "perfect storm". A successful maneuver puts the enemy off balance, and keeps it that way. Of course it's not that easy, but it's most likely the surest road to victory.
@@fpvillegas9084 I was probably too implicit in my example? If so, I apologize. I used the example of mobile versus static warfare, to address the change-factor.
In relation to the amount of specific factors needed, to deliver a so-called real Manœuvre, if I understand your list correctly, maybe I read it too literally? But if not, I think it's too difficult to list the 'real' recipe?
Nonetheless, a perfect Manœuvre in my mind, is the 1968 TET Offensive.
The actor delivering it, was the Vietnamese alliance between North Vietnam and Viet Cong. They both had the same view on the US military as a common enemy. However, in terms of what type of post-war Vietnam, they wanted to create, their opinions diverged too much. So the North Vietnam leadership, decided to deliver a Two-Pronged Manœuvre, partly against the public opinion in the United States and partly against their own ally in the south, the forces of Viet Cong.
The two objectives was to Defeat the US public opinion and Destroy the Viet Cong as a force to recognize in the future. Both objectives were completed with success. Viet Cong was massacred and the public opinion in the US was significantly reduced.
Thank you for the guide on how to attack france!
The Alcyoneus Principle makes sense
I still feel like maneuver warfare, even though its probably a good strategy has been morphed through public discourse into be like Desert Storm and Blitzkrieg and not Vietnam or Afghanistan
This is the sort of thing I had hoped to learn in the Corps. But alas I was enlisted, and a field music. Smh.
The only maneuver you get to do is in band practice! 😆 jk I love you!
A pyramid is not a shape, its a geometric body
Some one please explain to me how Wagner happened, and somehow wastedtheir momentous outcome? Seriously this probably the most expensive outcome, Unless it was a typical maneuver tactics of diverting experienced expectation. And if so brav-fucking-o, tho I fucking doubt it
The unstable complex of this machine makes this war come across as incompatible to previous experiences.(meanig),
I wish that people that actually understood these rule weren't wasting souls as indispensable beings
capable of complexity commpacity. For and comparable that we have to relieve on the supply that we can ensure their completeness, for results that I dont trust? Since none have seen it work yet but only make money and cost lives, this algorithm needs to change, we are not as a nation performing manoeuvre accurately, which makes myself sad as it should yourself. Im just a farm boy but I seem to have a more complex understanding of war even never having been in war because I would not like to rifle my weapon to decisively deceased mode.
A point of importance if i may: A competent enemy will not offer an open flank to allow you to bypass and jump straight to exploitation. You will have to create it yourself with a frontal breakthrough. Which means massing combat power at a narrow objective to achieve local numerical superiority. Which means bloody combat. Now, if the breakthrough point happens to be a weaker position all the better. But even in this day and age the means of acquiring knowledge about enemy disposition and where he is the weakest are limited. Deception can go a long way when preparing for such a breakthrough but still you have to be ready for bloody frontal combat. Over reliance on outmaneuvering the enemy will prove costly if you lack the "full frontal" mentality required to open the enemy lines for maneuver. I fully disagree when such breakthrough assaults are viewed as attritionist mentality. Quite the contrary, they are the big and most important enablers of maneuver warfare.
The more and more time passes, more warfare is about attrition. So, yeah, you are correct. The key is that you and your enemy can't protect all places, so breakthrough points always exist. The key factor is inteligence and information to indentify them.
Also, your enemy generally will have reserves, so you need to bait them.
In inicial phases of war and battles any of that is necessary, only in more latter ones. That's because generally you and your enemy have less activated troops, less information and more space to maneuver.
wow
Very interesting lecture - I loved the use of contrasting Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to illustrate the _Manuever_ concept.
However I found it a bit ironic that he used the 2003 Iraq war (apologies for forgetting the op's name) to illustrate it. Although I acknowledge that he only was speaking about the opening decapitation of their command and control and the simultaneous actions taken by us and our allies in the field, it seems that from a macro perspective with regard to our* use of _Manuever_ in that war, one or a combination of the following must be true:
1. it was nonexistent, i.e. not employed
2. it was used so minimally as to render it ineffective
3. it was employed with such incompetence that it was effectively nonexistent
The plan for what to do (following what was as near as a 100% probability of victory that one force can have over another) was obviously completely misguided. To lose control of the situation such that we did so soon after we had so quickly and dominantly achieved victory over their forces showed that we absolutely operated without _Manuever_ after the primary fighting was concluded.
* Here, I am referring to the war's highest strategic planners such as Rumsfeld, not the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who actually fought the war.
+jwt242 I'm very pleased you appreciated the video. You make some great points. For this discussion, I was only talking about the initial invasion. I was simply showing that Manœuvre has nothing to do with movement on the ground. I still believe the major ground war portion of the wars in Iraq were excellent examples of Manœuvre Warfare.
I also totally agree that in hindsight, the decisions about what to do after the initial invasion were flawed. That is why we study history, so we can learn from the past and hopefully not make the same mistakes twice. Still, one of the major lessons Clausewitz taught us it to properly understand military history, it is necessary to understand what the decision-makers knew at the exact moment they made their decisions and judge them based on that, not on what we know now. For example, it is easy for us to judge General Lee harshly for the decisions he made at Gettysburg. But when you take the time to understand what he knew when he made the decision to order the charge on the third day, it becomes harder to second-guess the decision.
+Daniel Grazier Thanks for your reply.
Not being in the military and only being a person very interested in military history and not a military historian, I think I might have over-applied Manœuvre warfare with respect to the 2003 Iraq war.
In my mind and due to your use of Sun Tzu as a way to illustrate Manœuvre warfare, I was referring not to coalition soldiers or other warfighters’ actions on the ground in Iraq; rather, I was specifically referring to the lack
of or faulty plans made by the Bush administration prior to the war for what to do immediately following what would be a near-certain and quick victory over Iraqi forces. If the planning phase of military action is not considered a part of war, then obviously Manœuvre warfare would not apply as how can a type of warfare apply to something that is not warfare? However, if pre-war planning is considered part of warfare, then is it a mistake to apply Manœuvre warfare to this phase? Incidentally, this question about whether it is a mistake to apply Manœuvre warfare to the planning phase is not rhetorical; it is a real question I am asking.
By the way, you don’t have to admit it, but I believe you agree with my view on our post-war activities in Iraq; again, I emphasize that when I say “our” I am referring to the war’s civilian leadership, not the soldiers and other warfighters’ actions; they were only following orders and doing their job, which was a nearly impossible one, indeed. But I digress, your essay “Heisenberg and Mao Zedong - The Occupier Effect” on Medium.com fleshes
out the fact that at minimum you believe that our task was nearly impossible. Perhaps the final sentence of your essay sums it up best, “The only way to eliminate such violent acts is to leave.”
Yes, I do agree that our civilian leaders did not plan adequately for what happened after the statue fell. I think they didn't have the best information possible before ordering us into Iraq in 2003. From what I have read, they took as gospel what a few Iraqi ex-pats were telling them about the situation on the ground and never seemed to consider that they may have had ulterior motives.
You absolutely divined my thoughts on counterinsurgency from my Small Wars essay. I actually began jotting down the notes that ultimately turned into that piece while I was in Afghanistan in 2013. I saw thousands of us working very hard and accomplishing absolutely nothing. As you can well imagine, it was hugely frustrating.
This is a great job thanks for sharing I wish to communicate with you if ok
Certainly. You can find my email address in the "About" tab of the channel page. I'm pleased you found this useful.
28:00 - How Ukraine took back Kharkiv as well as the Donbas Airport (and counting)
You asked me what shape I see, which happened to he the same shapes illustrated then showed a different shape to tell me THAT is what I saw, which was not the same as the other three. every step of that was incorrect - deception failed
You have absolutely no depth perception or understanding of geometry. He even explains how each shape are all basically only visible from certain angles on a pyramid. From the side, bottom, and from the top. Use your brain.
I sadly don't think Manœuvre Warfare is a realistic option for the U.S. military. Attrition is simply a much bigger business. Just think of the Iraq invasion in 2003. All that firepower brought in, even though the Iraqi army was only a shadow of it self. Martin Van Creveld, not sure where I read it, but in one of his writings, he pointed out the vast number of Apache Helicopters, even though there really never was any need for them. Maybe he wrote it in his book "Supplying War".
There is a great deal of truth in that. Institutionalizing Manoeuvre Warfare is very difficult because you are correct, there is a great deal of money on the other side. There are plenty of us out there working to overcome that, but it is an uphill fight.
I wonder what is needed, in order to convince big money, that Manoeuvre Warfare is a better option than Attration Warfare? Perhaps it is possible to find a similar situation, somewhere in the history of warfare, maybe from the era of the Roman Empire?
Big money is probably not the only obstacle. I dont remember the book, but one of the famous authors writing on the battle of normandy, a British if I recall correct, use the bombing of Caen as an example on how democracies more often are more destructives in war, due to the public pressure on the decisionmakers.
Boyds story, might be an option to look into. He faced that uphill fight too, once he entered the Pentagon. In the book "33 Strategies of WAR", by Robert Green, chapter 10 "Deterrence Strategies", example 4, he make use of Boyds strategy to overcome the opposition in the system. Its on page 132 and might be useful as inspiration? The book can also be found online in a PDF version:
blackmystory.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/the-33-strategies-of-war.pdf
Years ago I tried to find support in the Danish military, for an idea i had developed, related to future warfare, seen primarily from a Danish perspective. However, I learned that every doctrine we get, we get from NATO. They wouldent even discuss my idea.
Dan, I will think about it and return if I come up with an idea for your reform movement. Moving away from the school of Attrition is simply too important too ignore. Oh and by the way, apologies, I am from Denmark. My name is Michael Nielsen.
Rah 🤙
G vi o mesmo valor da entrada e o mesmo valor e o mesmo valor e horário normal
You uttered an extreme misconception of boxing.
I’m here because of Enders game lmao
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Ah, los árboles y el biswue
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ooda loop has been debunked tho
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I cannot be impressed with Sun Tzu. Any man who cannot organize 12 women without first cruelly murdering two of them is nothing in my esteem. By all means read his book. You can be sure your enemy has. If he is very clever he will anticipate that you have as well and plan accordingly. That is the moment you will thoroughly surprise and confuse him by doing something UnSun Tzu.
physically remove, so to speak
Darn it. I thought this was manure warfare. Unsubscibed..