How A Broken Antenna Crashed This Plane | Turkish Airlines Flight 1951
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This is the story of Turkish airlines flight 1951. On the 25th of february 2009 a 737-800 was making the trip from turkey’s ataturk airport to amsterdam's schiphol airport. The 737 had 135 passengers onboard which included 7 crew members. The plane left istanbul at 8:23 am. The cockpit that day had three pilots. The first officer was being trained and the captain was supervising the first officer. Another first officer was seated in the jumpseat and was acting as the safety officer.
By 9:53 am the plane was over Germany at 36,000 feet and the pilots conducted their approach briefing. The first officer listened to the ATIS or the automatic terminal information service, a broadcast from the airport that beams out information like weather and runway in use. On that day theyd be landing on runway 18R theyd be performing a ILS cat I approach. The runway was equipped with the much more precise CAT III system but the pilots were not trained on the CAT III system. The 737 began its descent and as it did it entered dutch airspace.
By 10:15 am the plane was descending it was descending down to 7000 feet.the pilots and ATC were talking about the instrument approach when they got a configuration warning about the landing gear. That was weird they were pretty high up, landing gear configuration warnings usually happened at lower altitudes. As they flew this happened quite a few times. The captain remarked “radio altimeter”. His radio altimeter was malfunctioning; it showed an altitude of -8 feet. The radio altimeter as the name implies uses radio waves to measure the altitude of a plane, there are antennas at the bottom of the fuselage they beam out radio waves, those are reflected by the terrain back towards the plane, that delay between the transmission and reception is used to calculate the altitude of the plane. But this didnt faze the pilots too much, they were asked to descend down to 2000 feet and the captain started to talk to the ground handling arm of turkish airlines about their arrival. Minutes later the plane was at 2000 feet and the pilots slowed the plane down to 195 knots, they slowly started to bring the flaps out. Airtraffic control vectored the plane to set it up for an approach onto runway 18R. The Autopilot on the right hand side had been engaged for pretty much the entire flight and for the landing the crew wanted both autopilots online, but when they tried to engage the autopilot on the left hand side, the left hand autopilot failed to engage and the right hand autopilot disengaged. Something was off so they decided to re-engage the right hand autopilot and use that for this landing.
As the speed hit 160 knots the landing gear was extended and flaps were set to 15. The plane was a few minutes from touchdown, it had lined up with the runway but it was way too high. The runway was 5.5 Nautical miles away and they needed to lose some altitude. The pilots dialed in a descent rate of 1400 feet per minute into the autopilot so that they could intercept the glideslope or the correct descent path from above. Usually you fly below the glideslope, you intercept the glideslope and then you follow it down all the way to the runway. Intercepting a glideslope from above was a bit more tricky.
A few moments later the plane was handed off to schipol tower, the first officer was flying the approach and the safety pilot noted that the radio altimeter was still broken. As he did so the plane intercepted the glideslope and the autopilot began to follow the glideslope. The plane was supposed to stay at 160 knots but from the moment it intercepted the glidelsope its speed started to fall. 10:24 am the flight 1951 got its clearance to land on runway 18R the captain acknowledged. This would be the last time theyd hear from flight 1951. The plane continued to slow it the plane hit the required speed of 144 knots at an altitude of 800 feet and they extended the flaps to 40. Moments from touch down the captain and the first officer went over some checklists. As they were about to check off the last item on the checklist the captain called out 500 feet, The non flying pilot monitors the planes altitude and makes call outs so that everyone knows where the plane is in relation to the ground. The last item on the checklist was to warn the cabin crew about the landing so that they could be seated for landing. As the safety pilot fini - วิทยาศาสตร์และเทคโนโลยี
"The altimeter showed -8 feet, which was impossible for the plane to attain"
Well, it sure tried to.
Schiphol airport is 4 m (13 feet) under mean sea level, so it is possible to attain -8 feet.
Source: www.schiphol.nl/nl/jij-en-schiphol/pagina/luchthavenfeitjes/
@@zonzeven on a barometric altimeter yes. Not a radio altimeter
@@zonzeven And then there's Baku, at -28m.
@The crash recreator where's that?
@The crash recreator lol, where's that tho
I've read the accident report in the past -- over 200 information dense pages.
There's a lot of work involved in reading and analyzing aviation reports and condensing them into 15 minute videos. Great job, sir!
It’s just a shame Sydney Dekker’s analysis of the facts was not read as well.
BOOMNG 737 = FLYEING COFFIONES
@@ilovecops5499 coffiones?
They simply could have disconnected the auto pilot and land it manually, 9 lives could have been with us today
Bad bad bad captain mistake
He knew he has a problem especially the left auto pilot didn’t engage, so simple this happens every day
Fly the plane manual
Whatch aci ahaha
To answer your question on the 37 Max. If Boeing would have set it to be a double redundant system then it would have required more scrutiny from the FAA (So more time to get an approval) and simulator training for transitioning pilots. Since they were trying to avoid both to cut costs the decided not to do it. Boeing put profits ahead of safety.
It's sort of like training people who drive tanker trucks that haul milk to haul around gasoline or propane with an iPad and acting like you're not responsible when they level a city block because of static electricity or a tool spark etc. Boeing unfortunately inherited the profits-before-people mentality of McDonnell Douglas in the merger and the Max is just the latest in a series of safety bulletins and airworthiness directives that came about because people died due to business decisions. We had a Boeing campus here in Wichita along with Textron and Bombardier Learjet until 2008ish when they spun off subassembly to a wholly owned subsidiary [Spirit Aerosystems] to get rid of existing union contracts.
That's spot on. Any system that is deemed to warrant redundancy, automatically results in additional FAA certification requirements, as well as further training. Boeing basically wanted to match the newest A320 which didn't require additional training, and this was a major selling point for airlines. They took shortcuts on safety to ensure they get the sales that were otherwise heading to Airbus, and we can only hope that the heavy price of their decisions will cause them to think twice in the future on matters of aviation safety.
Sounds like the '737 MAX' again.
Back in 1972 the 'Windsor Incident' showed that there were risks of potentially-fatal hull-ruptures on the new DC-10s that could have been reduced or eliminated by the retrofitting of pressure-equalisation vents in the cabin-floors. The consequent production holdups were a threat to McConnell-Douglas's sales, so they fixed it with the FAA to take their time over the work. When a fully-loaded DC-10 jet was lost early in 1974, with 346 people turned mostly into mincemeat, the cause was loss of control consequent to hull damage resulting from depressurisation (in a plane that had been modified).
@@None-zc5vg while that DC-10 was modified, it didn't have all of the modifications recommended by the NTSB. The cargo door locks had been changed, however some time in between when the DC-10 left MD's manufacturing plant and the crash, the locking pins were modified again. That DC-10 also didn't have the floor holes to prevent the floor from collapsing during sudden decompression, which would sever the control cables to the tail control surfaces.
The pilots forgot the basic rules of flight, you always fly the plane first, aviate first if there is a problem with the automation system disconnect it and fly the aircraft then navigate to where it is you need to be then communicate. If they followed this basic rule the outcome would have been a safe landing.
As always, fly the damned aircraft!
Clearly you have never flown an aircraft . You think it’s that easy to analyze everything . You think you can read all yo instruments in a second . Mate they reacted faster than average
@@SizzlyPK I never said anything about it being easy but I have a multi certificate for commercial and private aircraft I am also retired now but I also have been trained on multi engine turbine aircraft and have over 12000 hours in both turbine and piston engine aircraft. So I have some ideas on what to do when things are not going to plan and we used to train for these types of events and almost every single one you are taught to first fly the plane and once you are in stable flight then you can work on whatever you need to do to resolve the problem 😉 to tell you the truth I always checked and rechecked the automation because I once had an issue with it and never really trusted it 100 percent after. It only takes a few seconds to verify that everything is going to plan and also having a copilot sitting next to me to verify that everything is operating correctly and or not is very useful 🙂.
@@SizzlyPK flying a jetliner is easy. Try riding a bicycle.
Pilot sat there and let the computer fly them into the ground
VERY TRUE, whatever was the problem, the PILOTS still have control of the plane,
How about Max-8? Boeing pure greed killed all these people.
Huge mistake by the captain taking control at such a critical moment. The FO was doing the right things and if the captain had just continued to monitor and tell him what to do (eg. call go-around) they'd likely have missed the ground.
But that’s not the way it works. This goes down to human nature that has to be overcome with astonishing self-control and regular training.
That is correct. The FO increased power and pushed the nose down, but the Captain took over control at he most critical moment, the throttle returned automatically to idle and whatever time they had left to recover from the stall evaporated. There were a series of other mistakes too ( for example they failed to monitor their speed), missed opportunities to diagnose the problem (the landing gear warning horn,the speed brake warning, the autopilot disconnect alarm etc.) but one thing is certain: the failure of a single antenna can't bring a plane down.
@@Trevor_Austin I agree that that's not human nature, but flying is not a natural situation. Hence the training.
I saw another accident report recently, late take-off abort and ran off the end of the runway, where the Captain (PM) restrained that urge and just did the PM job. Everyone survived. If he'd taken over it would have been much worse.
@@mikes4163 Not sure what value these anecdotal stories add to this. There's been many emergencies where a captain have taken over and saved the plane as well. People make split second decisions in an emergencies, sometimes they are right, sometimes they are not. It's very much hindsight to blame a pilot for such a decision in retrospective.
3 professional pilots fail to monitor airspeed and they crash Day VFR When they knew the RA was inop they should have turned off the AP . Plane still flies perfectly without the RA.
Wrong! The main problem was the effect of RadAlt 1 on the autothrottle system.
They should have immediately clicked off autothrottles and autopilot upon initiating a go around.
Their is too much relying on the automation. When time comes to manually fly no one is wants too. Too much automation and very little hand flying capabilities.
@@portanav true. In this one pilots were not monitoring their air speed which is crucial for landings. So it wasn't only Antenna problem that crashed the plane
@Fidd88 The three causes you gave were, in my opinion Wrong, wrong and contributory. 1. We have no information anywhere to suggest these pilots were badly trained. They behaved as most normal pilots would and that is sort the problem or and get the job done. Overcoming the urge to get the job done and meet the schedule is very difficult to train out of pilots. I’ll suggest this airline’s training was as good as most. We also have to accept there were three pilots on this flight deck. The third pilot, an F/O was there as a “safety pilot.” These poor sods are placed there without training, with little authority and are sucked into the loop of trouble shooting. 2. We have no information anywhere to suggest these pilots were not current at hand flying. The RHS was an ex-airforce Phantom pilot with 2,000 hours. I’ll suggest he was very proficient at hand flying. What this guy didn’t expect was that when he advanced the thrust lever during the approach it would retard again. 3. This was an old fashioned 737 with 30 year old autothrottle design, hardly modern FBW. The undocumented traps were 1. RadAlt1 always drives the autothrottle. Boeing’s AOM’s did not state this as the time. 2. RETARD as an announciation on the PFD can be for two reasons a) Flight Idle selected to achieve preselected speed and b) Flight Idle selected as part of the Flare logic in the autoland. As a pilot you don’t know what is causing flight idle. Bear in mind they were intercepting the GS from above. Another design flaw present in virtually every aircraft is the nose-up trimming when the aircraft is flying a vertical mode but flying below selected speed. The only reason for this is to keep the autopilot engaged. Why?
The scourges of modern airline flying are crap Flight Operations departments and pathetic, timid training departments full of prima-donnas who believe only they can fly. They demonstrate this with absurd SOP’s, reams of pointless notes, extra items checklists, ridiculous bloated briefings and stipulations that the automatics must be used to their fullest extent and punitive action for anything found “undesirable” on FDR’s. Flush these out and replace them with pragmatic pilots and we might have a chance.
I retired from this plane and saw this glitch a few times. Just a minor inconvenience. This crash is yet another sad example of pilots who should not have been there. Too unskilled to fly their planes with out all of the automation working. This isn't fair to the passengers, they buy a ticket, not a chance.
Do airlines or regulators require their pilots to land manually on occassion (outside of the simulators)?
@@rowboat0317 Good airlines yes. But some airlines (Middle and Far East) expect autolands to be performed wherever possible.
@rob737700 - I disagree. This is an example of how things can go wrong if they are not managed properly. It is also an example of how useless an untrained “safety” pilot is.
@@Trevor_Austin Well, sir, I believe there should be more flying going on instead of managing. Basic piloting skills are just too lacking these days. Pilots are struggling with their automation all they way to impact. Sad times..
I did not even watch the movie as i know the case so well..
When it happened within halve a day i had my conclusion which (appart from the political correctness bullshit) almost was the same as the official report a year later.
If four pilots are not able to do what every hobby pilots does as general practice then they should stay on the ground. Much saver for them.
I fully agree with Rob !!!
About the dual aoa sensor software, as far as I know: that is the obvious and safe choice however then the system would be flagged as safety critical in the documentation and would require extra training and certification which they wanted to avoid.
The problem was NOT that there was no comparator (or redundancy) it was that RadAlt No. 1 ALWAYS drives the Autothrottles no matter which autopilot is engaged. This was ‘feature” not documented.
IIRC the MAX also hat the ability to actually display a warning when both AOA-sensor-readouts didn't match up. But it was an optional feature that airlines had to pay extra for.
It's what happens when bean-counters get to decide technical choices.
@@brkr78 an how does AOA-Disgagree indicator information help? Is there a system linked to only one AOA-sensor that behaves as automatic antistall using the trimming? Boeing still denies that.
The Boeing 747 does not have an anti stall system linked to the AOA Sensor that autotrims the plane out of stall. MCAS is totally not an anti-stall system and pilot totally do not need to know, that MCAS is trimming their plane, because that totally only happens in certain flight configurations.
@@brkr78 extortion, for safety features. Nice ...we really have come far as a species
Hey Mini - Request for you "West Caribbean Airways Flight 708" - The plane that flew too high.
Why does an autothrottle not disengage on manual input?
That's what I wanna know. Why isn't it like cruise control in a car, deactivating on manual input?
@@MisterFribble I assume because if your a little low, you could probably push it forward a bit, then have it return. Or it could be so that you don't accidentally bump it.
I am a retired airline captain with many hours in the 737 and it’s many variants. In order to disengage the autothrottles you had to press a button on the side of the throttle handle. If you didn’t do that, yes, you could overpower the servo and move the throttles forward but that wouldn’t make much sense when all you had to do was press the button.
@@MisterFribble It is like cruise control.. If you want to pass someone on cruise control you can either push a button to accelerate, or override that by stomping on the gas peddle. Neither disconnects the cruise, as soon as you take your foot off the peddle, the car will "resume" the speed it was set to originally. The only way to get a car off cruise is to either hit the brake, or disengage it with the switch. Auto throttle works much the same way, if you need a blip of power, you manually throttle up, then you can forget about it, and auto throttle will "resume" To disengage auto throttle, you have to press the auto throttle button, until the light goes off.
It’s a small thing, but I love how you end your videos with the airplane landing safely. It’s a nice way to wrap things up.
So long as it remains allowable to sacrifice lives for profit, there will be crashes like this and many other lives lost if more money was simply spent to do the things we know make things safer, not just in aviation, but seemingly in nearly everything these days.
So true
"Adding more redundancy saves lives ... Do you think we've learned from our mistakes?"
Clearly, Boeing hasn't. But at least we can trust Airbu- oh, they're developing a single-pilot A350.
These companies don't give a shit about our lives, just our money.
The aircraft won’t be flown by a single pilot from takeoff to landing. There will be 2 pilots onboard and both will be up front for takeoff, climb, descent, approach and landing. It’s only during long cruise where one pilot will then go and rest, the other will monitor
Single pilot! What a chilling concept to save a buck
@@tomstravels520 That absolutely does not instill any fit of confidence whatsoever. Is what you said supposed to be comforting or making it any better? Simply because "the most dangerous parts of flying is just taking off and landing guys, so its perfectly fine and okay during cruise"
@@DrSabot-A would your rather have 1 pilot only or 2 pilots but one is resting during cruise?
@@tomstravels520 I think I'd rather just have two pilots not resting.
Good on TA for the 1000' policy. That is straight "safety over money" thinking.
Bad on pilots for ignoring it. They were "that guy" in the left lane of a crowded 8-lane freeway who tries to get across to his exit in 1/4 mile instead of just going to the next exit.
As I watch these videos, one of the most "baffling" aspects is the failure to FLY THE PLANE!!! EVERY pilot KNOWS fly the damn plane. So why are so many pilots NOT flying the plane? This was an easy fix, turn off the damn outopilot and hand fly. Why 3 experienced pilots, no one could hand fly?????? STUPID yes, I am an instrument rated pilot.
Watch the "Children Of The Magenta Line" video for why that happens.
@@k53847 Yep, I saw this some time ago. Very informative.
I am a nervous flier. A very nervous flyer. If I fall asleep the plane will crash, my wakefulness is keeping that lump of old iron aloft. Am 100% with your comment. With emphasis, FLY the FUCKING PLANE! The basic flight systems RARELY EVER fail, y'know, up-down, left right, throttle, human EYESIGHT.
Hoary old joke:
"Flying scares shit out of me!"
Seasoned air traveller, "Man, when yr number's up it's up."
Me, "What if I'm onth plane and th pilot's number is up?"
... because 1.3 millions lives were lost each year due to humans insisting pilotting something manually: their cars.
@@ylstorage7085 You could use aircraft style autopilots You'll need to maintain 1 mile distance between cars front and back and 1000 feet between lanes. And only have one or two parking areas per city - maybe call them carports. And we'll have to straighten all the roads they are supposed to use so they run at compass directions between carports.
You should do one of the Max accidents or both if possible
Regarding the 737 Max, I remember doing a deep dive on it when it happened. If I'm remembering correctly, they do use redundancy for the AoA sensors almost everywhere on the aircraft. Indeed, I think FAA regulations demand it. However from recollection the MCAS was developed initially for a USAF aircraft and didn't have redundancy. So they took that system without modifying it for redundancy and that became the MCAS we all know and... know? I'm vaguely recalling that the USAF aircraft couldn't use redundancy for some reason, possibly because the AoA sensor was moved or removed, possibly for another reason? But my memory isn't good enough to know for sure. And it may be FAA regulations demanding they couldn't modify the MCAS already in use without testing everything again somewhere along that story. Likely time constraints competing against the A320NEO played a role. Anyway there was a real reason for lacking redundant AoA sensors, albeit a bad one.
Marry me pilot bitch!! 😍
Money.
I mean they moved the engines forward and put in software to mitigate without telling pilots. All so they didn't have to recertify it as a new airframe. The gov let them and Boeing is going to pay a lot more than just fucking penalties on contracts and licensing fees.
You are really doing a great job! I like how you get into the technical details, and you have a great voice!
when i see a upload, I instally have to come and watch straight away! loving the content :)
true! This is the only channel on which I have enabled notifications. Very good stuff!
Just a point to add as I think it was missed. The reason CMD A wouldn’t engage was because the FO accidentally tried to engage the autopilot first instead of pressing approach first which is needed to be done in order to have dual coupling. Because the pilot was essentially just switching from 1 autopilot to the other and because of the faulty RA, CMD A wouldn’t activate. FO reconnected CMD B but didn’t reattempt to connect CMD A. Not sure if it would have actually worked anyway
Loving the content, amazing as usual
Amazing like always
I'm super excited ! cant wait to watch.Know it's gonna be a banger
If you get a stall warning that close to the ground I would think going to full power and raising the landing gear to cut drag would be SOP.
At that speed and altitude the landing gear wouldn’t make much difference to the drag. I’d leave it down to cushion the impact of it were to happen. That’s why on a go around you wait until you have positive rate of climb before raising the gear, not as soon as you increase power
They did advance power to full thrust, but the autothrottle retarded the thrust levers immediately afterwards
The C-5a has SIX AOA fins on it's nose. 3 on each side. I am pretty sure they not there for decoration.
You’ve taught me SO much & you talk about exactly what I’m wondering. Suburb job on all your videos!
Great job explaining this complex accident.
Another great video. This channel has turned me into a aviation geek. Keep up the great content. 👍🙂✈✈✈✈
Amazing video as usual ❤️❤️❤️
great video as usual i really love your narration style and your voice is really soothing(maybe just me?) your stuff is great and entertaining i just wanted to say thanks for making such great videos
Great analysis. Sadly another case of Increasing dependancy in automation with less frequent hand flying. Procedurally drilled out of instinctive flying situational awareness.
Excellent report - thank you.
I really enjoy your summaries of these accidents. They provide the non flying population with an easy to understand explanation of the events that transpired while being very entertaining and providing a glimpse into the world of aviation and the inner workings of the individual aircraft involved. Very interesting and fun to watch. Keep up the great work its appreciated! I always look forward to new videos from your channel. Take care and best wishes.
You explained VERY, VERY WELL.
B737s sure have unique fuselage fracture points when they crash but are not in small pieces. The fuselage seems to break apart into 2 or 3 pieces probably at bulkhead attachment areas a whole bunch of times. Good idea not to sit in those areas.
I like to sit over the wings for that reason - it's a stronger part of the aircraft, and this safer in the event of a crash.
Another wonderful video!
Loving your content ❤️❤️
Amazing video!
Wonderful video, thanks, very informative. The graphics were amazing, too. Istanbul and Schiphol wwere both recognisable.
Can't stop bingeing.
737Max has sold in "record" numbers.
"its the safest plane we have" - final words of Boeing CEO
This wasn’t a max
I don’t understand much about aviation; I’m new to the study of. But I really enjoy your graphics AND the way you tell the story 👍👍👏👏 your channel is awesome 🤩
As far as the Max goes, it was built by a company that was out to make money, not airplanes. A departure from its earlier years unfortunately
Not a 737Max
Neither this issue nor the 747 door latch failures prevented Boeing from cutting corners and FAA and NTSB from being too lenient if not straight up helping Boeing bypass the regulations. I might be a pessimist but I see next MAX as very likely, if not inevitable.
I would not be so affirmative for the NTSB nor whole FAA, but FAA west coast is known to be a little bit to "close" to boeing since decades. The MAX is just the last exemple and hopfully will definitively change this bad habit
Nice video 👍
The 3 killed pilots in the cockpit probably died from slamming into the yoke (head & chest injuries)
so we need airbags in plane yokes ?
@@BillCipher1337 prabobaly?
The jump seat has a yoke?
@@advorak8529 lol
@@advorak8529 It's not a functional yoke. It's just there to give him emotional security.
in the 737 MAX they actually only had 1 sensor installed, as to avoid both pilot re-training and a new certification. essentially, the system wasn't redundant
No. All 737 Max had 2 sensors. But only 1 fed data to the MCAS and it was switched every flight so there was no comparison of data
@@tomstravels520 ooo thanks i wasn't aware of that
@Fidd88 Having two sensors and only using one is in therms of system engineering horrific.
The software has all the information it needs and boeing very specifically decided against using it, because a redundant system is indicative of safety critical, which MCAS "totally" is not.
Great episode, I didn’t even get time to make a hot milk before I watch because the commercials were only 15 seconds long at the start , but then I got 2 more commercials both 15 seconds again a few mins before end of video, , I wouldn’t think. It will happen again from this day forward
Not Bad Video!
I was flying on a 737 MAX 8 Recently to Turkey
As soon as they realize the altimeter is faulty, shouldn't they immediately flip a switch or something to prevent the autopilot from using it? It's very odd no action is taken.
Flipped what switch and why? The linking of the RadAlt 1 to the Autothrottle was not documented. It was assumed that it was linked to side in control.
Systems fail and will continue to do so. That is why as airline pilots, we go trough extensive simulator training and checking every 6 months. We learn how to cope with a multitude of different scenarios, each involving system failures. And the first adagio is systematically: fly the airplane first! Deal with the failure next.
Something else that I think may help situations such as this incident, is to have the flight control system take other actions in the event of pilot warning events (such as the stick shaker) and set a warning that would change the operation of the automation, such as to disable autothrottle so that the pilots are required to retard the throttle on landing, and that no thrust below, say, 10% below an appropriate cruse speed may not be permissible without verification from other sensors, such as weight switches on all three landing gear to indicate the airplane is actually on the ground. Sanity checks also shouldn't be too difficult to implement, such as the radio altimeter shall always read higher than 5 feet or something, as it is impossible for the bottom of the plane to be less than the height of the landing gear, so if it is less, the instrument is definitely lying.
I am not in general a sceptical person and certainly not about the older versions of the 737. The 737 Max I am not certain if I would fly on the plane. That said I was very lucky to be on a maiden flight of a 787 many years ago and that plane impressed me.
CFIT is unfortunate when it occurs due to bad ATC instructions or unknown faults that could not reasonably be known. Relying on automation when you know it is not working correctly when you can turn it off and land the plane with the flight controls is insane.
The problem is that there are way too many layers of automation that can interact with each other, and they're full of band-aid patches. The solution is to make it possible for the pilots to hand fly the plane without any of the scraps of automation trying to grab it away from them again.
thank you! : )
No thank you for watching!
@ 2:53 you mentioned the issues with the left hand autopilot. Somehow I missed why it couldn't be activated and if this played eventually into the crash. I also do not understand how an autothrottle could work against an autopilot, is there no hierarchical dependency? And how is this played when the two autopilots would have been activated?
This seems incredibly stupid. The two computers should act in tandem, not push the plane into stall. It's so dumb.
CMD A wouldn’t activate because of the faulty RA. The autopilot cannot be engaged below (I think) 400ft unless you’re landing. It is not a case of hierarchy it’s depended on which system feeds which information to other system. Remember the autothrottle cannot see so it relies on the RA to know when to enter RETARD mode if the autopilot is in approach mode. The flaw I see here is the captains RA was used to control the autothrottle even thought the FO’s autopilot was the one activated when it should realistically be the FO’s RA being used
Mentour pilot has done a very detailed analysis of this
I've watched a few things about this crash, and you have the clearest explanation of it by far. Thank you for your work. Sadly, I think another accident of this type will occur again. By the way, I will never fly on a max 8. They've recently had more issues with this line of aircraft. Electrical issues, they say.
This was not a 737Max
Lessons from history are never truly learnt, the best you can hope for is that one generation will take notice!
Do you know the phenomenon, when too many people are involved, noone takes the correct action?
If you're walking near a canal and you see a person in the water who is clearly in distress, with noone else around except you, chances are that you'll go into the water to try and save that person.
If, however, there's someone in the water and there's a bunch of people standing nearby, you'll think 'oh, people already know, one of them will save that person.' And so we get those little news reports about a man drowning in front of a dozen people who did nothing.
On this flight, an extra FO was sitting behind both pilots to monitor, for extra safety because the FO at the controls was being trained.
However, I read in another report, while the incident started, the security FO was busy informing the passengers and crew to take landing positions.
The security FO was just being used as an extra hand, not doing the job he was supposed to do but (in my view, doing menial 'household' chores while he should only have been focused on monitoring the pilots).
Regarding the autothrottle working against the other system, automation is fine as long as it works.
If it doesn't, we get tragic incidents and crashes like these.
Just after this crash had happened, Turkish critics residing in Holland started pointing fingers at the Turkish Airlines tradition of hiring veteran airforce pilots as their Captains. In the end, those critics' instincts were correct. Without the gung-ho attitude of the Captain, who overruled his FO, who was taking the correct actions, the plane may not have crashed.
This makes the huge task of training the large number of young four engine pilots for B-17 and B-24 to fly those planes during WW ll without computer assistance seem all that much more daunting.
Rip to the people who died amazing video btw
Good pronounciation of Schiphol. Shorter I and O, and slightly stronger annunciation of the H, and it is perfect. Much better than other videos however!
GOOD SHOW AS ALWAYS.
LET'S ALL GET CHANNEL TO ONE MILLION SUBS BY END OF YEAR.
Thank you!
Welp, yuo´ve just earned a subscriber :)
I'm sorry but if you realize the autopilot is being faulty why would you not disable it and land it yourself? Only makes sense to me. I'd rather rely on my skills/training then a faulty autopilot system.
Because only 1 was faulty. CMD B was still working
NO. No excuse for the pilots. They failed in the very first rule of aviation: Fly the plane. All automation should have been disengaged as soon as they started getting false readings. The pilots and only the pilots are at fault for this accident.
The engineers and trainers bear responsibility too. A single point of failure for a major system is asking for trouble.
Good work ~ from a former avionics tech
as soon as the issue with the radio antenna started surely the next thought would be the automation would be a bad idea with faulty information.
Nice
Nice vid! Learned a lot, becouse I have seen the Dutch news video s but they don't know sh* about aviation. Can you also mabay do el al flight 1862?
Sounds like a plane from the computer stone age where computers are present but do not communicate with each other and where everyone makes his own game.
And they still havent fixed any of these communications issues. Like after watching a lot of these videos I'm baffled why more pilots dont rely on their skills and what they have been trained instead of relying on automation
There's no technical reason the 737 max didn't use both AOA sensors - the whole idea with the max was that pilots wouldn't need to be re-certified to fly it. The MCAS system needed to compensate for the new engine position (which created a new moment arm) could use either one or both AOA sensors, but if it needed both then it's a critical system and pilots would have to be re-certified. So they made it use just one to fulfill their customers' wish to have a re-engined 737 with no new type certification required.
You haven't done Stockport 1967 yet, or Staines 1972 for that matter. Or Manchester 1985 either. All would be good ones for you to do.
Situational awareness and all-around confusion. The final leg of the flight is busy enough and when you add this problem for the unskilled pilots, this will happen again. Time to take this problem seriously and fix it. Both, the pilots and the planes.
The same thing happened to a Boeing 777-200ER operating Asiana Airlines Flight 214 5 years later, the same sequence of events lead to the same outcome in both accidents. Neither watched the speed, and they both crashed nose high.
Similar but not the same. The 777 wasn’t a faulty Rad Alt
@@kickedinthecalfbyacow7549 The altimeter wasn't faulty on 1951 at all, it was all caused in a sequence by the first officer, who incorrectly dialed altimeter data and then used it in a dual channel, then used the captain's altimeter, which had incorrect information. Also in this case, the plane thought that the pilots wanted to descend *(EDIT: instead of hold the current altitude that they had assigned into autopilot command 1), therefore adding another reason as to why the autothrottle didn't allow the throttles to hold the 144 KIAS (knot/kt) speed on the approach.
@@gaztastic I’ve read your post a couple of times, I can’t make any sense of it
Manual flying on an NG when she's drunk..its a life and license saver.
Okay guys I have played MS-FS and I think he should have gone fully inverted to land quicker
I’ve got your voice in my head! THIS …. is the story of…🤣
12:05 Pilots - "The code is more what you’d call ‘guidelines’ than actual rules."
Information from BOTH? sensors ?
Anyone working in this field knows the minimum number of sensors required is 3. Then, when one disagrees with the other 2, you can GUESS Which is incorrect.
BUT NEVER ASSUME the 2 in agreement are right - they might have died and there's only one still active !
But at least with 2 sensors if they disagree you can disable the automation. Since pilots are supposed to be trained on such scenarios it doesn’t seem like a big deal.
Oh 737 the gift that keeps on killing
I met someone who survived a crash in a small jet that happened in Cairns Australia. The trip was on behalf of the liver transplant unit who were collecting a donor liver. This happened about 20 years ago. Are you able to investigate and do a video on this crash? Thanks
You want to know why they can't do the calculations from 2 antennas? It would cost another $20 to figure that in...MD dba Boeing said that's too expensive and chances of failure is 1 in a million.
"His radio altimeter was showing a reading of -8 feet..."
I'm sorry, but it does rather seem that if your aircraft, and those on board, are already 8 feet underground then it's a bit late to be telling the crew to put the landing gear down...
-8 is what it reads when the nose gear is on the ground
A problem with relying on automation is that people don't know what to do when the automation goes wrong...
A LOT OF PEOPLE ARE GETTING COMPLACENT WITH ISSUES ON PLANES.
I SAW SOME GUY DISMISS AN ISSUE SAYING PLANES ARE STILL SAFEST WAY TO TRAVEL.
Hey Mini… can you do Nigeria plane crashes? Sosoliso Airlines Flight 1145 in 2005. Thanks.
Boeing didn't use redundant AoA sensors on the Max because tat would have triggered expensive retraining for all pilots. Boeing was playing catchup with Airbus and promised carriers that there would be no required sim time for the new training. Instead, pilots had a 1 hr iPad course that they could take to qualify, which didn't even mention the MCAS system. There is a new documentary/expose out. I think it's on 60 Minutes Australia's YT channel.
Those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it an old saying but true
Another completely useless comment from John Hoon, a person who sees something and can't help but spill out the first drivel that comes to his mind.
The flap retraction was just for filmmaking purposes right? :)
Yeah so that the plane would stall a bit more dramatically. Otherwise it would just touch down on the ground
@@MiniAirCrashInvestigation interesting point. I notice this is FS and wonder if the sensitivity of professional flight simulators are set like this giving pilots a false sense of security? Heck, I am sure most pilots now started flying in Microsoft Flight Simulator. Lol
@@JasonFlorida oh no the plane i used is very bad, its not realistic at all, but looks good from the outside. Its like a $10 addon so i dont think anyones using it to train
@@MiniAirCrashInvestigation I would sure hope someone learning to fly could spare a measly $10 for added realism. Lol. You know just as I do that this is the way many inspiring pilots start out on a at home flight simulator andnI am sure just as realistic they are now that they are used for fun and also as a little training
Wasn't the 737 crash early in the year also due to autothrottle dropping power when it shouldn't?
Should include a timer for the flare mode. If auto pilot is programmed to decend @ xxxxft/min, a simple timer could override the flare mode until the plane has decended.
Making everything more complicated and illogical.
Automation should be predictable, and not yank the carpet out from under the pilot.
You are spectacularly correct in your pointing out of Boeings culpibility in the Max crashes especially after this. Well done! Hopefully criminal charges will be brought against the system and software engineering leadership in that engineering failure called Boeing. And to answer a question .. No, there are absolutely no bandwith problems when it comes to safety first software engineering .... the only restriction is blind stupidity and coprorate Hubris.
Your reply is a joke. Those two MAXes went down because the pilots were idiots and did not know how to turn off the elevator trim. Hitting two switches on the throttle quadrant would have stopped those nose downs instantly. None of those pilots did this despite the procedure being required knowledge to fly the plane. ONe hundred percent pilot error. Things happen, there are procedures to deal with those events.
@@rob737700 And you are awarded The Darwin award of Knob of The Year! Iesu Grist!
@@alphalunamare Lol
One ironic detail... 3 of the 4 passengers that died in this crash were Boeing employees.
That signal wasn't enough for the Boeing management to contemplate on the word 'redundancy' other than in relation to the HR department...
What this crash really underscored wasn't the issue of unreliable data but rather the lack of basic airmanship at THY.
Regarding the 737-Max:
They didn't add a second AOA sensor because the system should have been a non-critical system to begin with. If the system requires two sensors to be safe then that also requires additional training for the pilots which they tried to avoid.
The Max always had a second sensor. Only one was used for MCAS at a time though
@@tomstravels520 that is correct and probably the worst fact in all of this. The more reliable and safer option would have been to just use all sensors that were already installed. But due to a technical required that is supposed to make aircraft safer bit costs a tiny bit more money they didn't use it. Still makes me sick thinking about it.
Awesome video! I’d love to see you do a video on the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes!