Hey drach! I actually just picked up my copy of shattered sword this week, and in the opening chapter, it mentions how akagi and kaga started with tripple flight decks before being transfered to the long single one. How would this work in theory? And could tripple deck carriers have been improved upon?
You mention that you don't want to cover battles like Midway because of the plethora of excellent documentaries on them. As a comparitive layman, I find it difficult to know which documentaries are reliable and which are sensationalized, a problem severely exacerbated if the documentary in question is TH-cam content. Could you offer some titles of those you find reliable? And if possible, also on various battles beyond Midway?
If there is a complaint about Fletcher's command at Midway, mine would be not launching VS-5 shortly after launching the morning strike that he did send. Hiryu could have been damaged before it could send off its first dive bomber strike. Or at least, shortly after. By the way, in your latest live Drydock show, I made a question about why Historians don't question why Nimitz did not do enough to get USS Saratoga out to Midway by June 4. You dismissed it with some reasons that I don't agree with without some historical evidence. I believe it is an under researched portion of the battle.
The U.S. Navy won the Battle of Midway, under the overall command of Admiral Fletcher, who was also, to that point in the war, by far, the most experienced U S. aircraft carrier commander.
On flag officers' orders and reality. On my first visit to the Pentagon as a lowly major, there was a sign in front of an elevator reading, "Closed for major repairs". Taped beneath was a neatly typed sign that read "Tell Major Repairs that General Public wants this fixed immediately".
Thank you for that. It's been a rather hum drum Friday today & I needed a good laugh! Right on time too. I hope you have a good weekend. And now I'm about to board a 16A Metro bus to the Pentagon, coincidentally!❤
Midway was a massive team effort Nimitz's leadership and intel created the general battle plan, kept the carriers ready for battle, his subordinates aware of the Japanese Midway invasion. The pearl harbor shipyard workers made Yorktown ready for battle ridiculously quickly and effectively. Fletcher and Spruance positioned the ambush and coordinated the recon efforts. Henderson and all the Midway aircraft conducted the initial recon that allowed the Americans to hit first. Waldron (VT-8), Lindsey/Ely (VT-6), Massey (VT-3), and Thach (VF-3) pestered the Kido Butai and kept them too busy dodging their hits, which prevented the launch of the counterstrike and distracted the IJN CAP from going after the dive-bombers. Best(VB-6), Mcluskey(VS/B-6), Leslie (VB-3), and Shumway (VB-3) delivered the final hammer blows that broke Nagumo's back. If any of these people had done anything different, Midway may have turned out very differently.
Excellent comment! Although you did leave out Nautalis attacking the Japanese carriers, causing Arashi to hang back, keeping her submerged, which then resulted in Arashi having to race back to catch up with the carriers. Had she but known that McCluskey would spot her wake, pointing like the finger of the Almighty towards the kido butai, Arashi's crew would surely have scuttled their ship rather than betray the fleet's position. Thus even the presence of the American submarines at Midway was crucial to the victory. What did it take for the Americans to win at Midway? Nothing less than absolutely everything they had.
The IJN train wreck had two polar opposite fails. Their picket submarines were too late arriving at Pearl to keep a fully ironclad track of the USN fleet sorties and their Midway -- Aleutians complex plan consisted of doing too much with too much.
If someone gets credit for command authority on the win? It's got to be Nimitz. He gave his subordinates a sufficient understanding of what he wanted - without tying their hands. And they pulled it off. I want to think it could have been done with a lot fewer casualties if the US strikes were coordinated. But if that coordination had come at the expense of Japan getting off a strike of their own - maybe there was nothing else for it?
@@t5ruxlee210 I'm kind of baffled that the IJN didn't have patrolling subs watching Pearl Harbor as a matter of course. (And if they did - why they were apparently so ineffective).
I really love how Fletcher's reputation has been restored a bit over the last few years with proper research and study. He was a good commander who did his best in his very difficult situations.
Still of the view that King prematurely removed him from the Guadalcanal Campaign (Saratoga's luck with Torpedoes notwithstanding). While the IJN had their carriers as a credible threat, it was a bad idea.
As a career Army officer, you cannot over emphasize the importance of Fletcher's decision to allow Spruance to take over control of the battle. It was absolutely the right tbing to do and yet I doubt many other admirals would have had the integrity to do so. Put yourself there. This is the biggest fleet fight to date in the Pacific. Win big and you'll be remembered forever. Reining in his ego to allow a subordinate to fight what might be the biggest action of the war (not knowing what is coming) ranks Fletcher above most admirals and generals I can think of. MacArthur would never have done that. Doubt if Halsey would have done that. Yet that decision was critical for the win. Drach, well done. Very well done . Most historians don't understand the intricacies and politics of command.
Beatty wanted to turn back the High Seas Fleet himself, with a little help from the battleship squadrons under Jellicoe. That's why Beatty kept the Grand Fleet in the dark about the enemy position when his entire job was to reconnoiter the situation and _report._ Fletcher did what Beatty could not. Thus the victory was his.
I totally agree with you and was about to make a similar post. I have always admired Nimitz, Fletcher and Spruance because they were leaders committed to winning a war not self aggrandisement. The same cannot be said of MacArthur.
Bull Halsey may have been able to do so later on in the war. And probably was for the best that he was laid up with shingles. He was a hard charger, and not one you would nominally want in command of a defensive action. Not to say he didn't do so later on in the war, and in fairness did at least a passible job.
Jon Parshall has observed that Fletcher was an eminently unselfish commander, and that it is a testament to his skill as a true leader that he was able to recognize that Spruance was sufficiently competent, capable, and on top of the course of the battle to let him take the lead following the strike on Yorktown. I agree. Sometimes the best thing a good leader can do is stay out of the way and let his fully capable subordinates do their jobs. Ego doesn't win wars; success does.
As far as Parshall's assessment is concerned, even a blind squirrel finds a nut once in a while. Agreed though, Fletcher did an excellent job of not micromanaging his subordinates.
Fletcher quickly took the right action that day. He did that often during the life-death battle in the early years of the Pacific War. He was one of our best admirals.
What NO ONE ever talks about is how Elliot Buckmaster was screwed over. Yorktown struck hard at Coral Sea. Her crew performed a miracle at Pearl Harbor with a hasty repairs and rearming. She was the only ship that put the DBs TBs and fighters over the enemy at the same time. He evaded a slew of attacks with superior ship handling and his damage control parties had the damaged ship looking like she was never hit. That guy should have been given greater commands.
YES! I just recently saw an interview with Richard "Dick" Best. This man was a pilot that was in charge of himself & two other pilots. He pulled his planes out of the dive on the Kaga in order to go after Akagi. Which he nailed while his other two planes missed. And then on the follow up strike on the Hiryu he also nailed that carrier as well. In his interview, he said that credit for winning that battle should go to the intelligence officers that broke the Japanese code & let us know what the Japanese plans were. Never did he boast about being the pilot that basically sank two Japanese fleet carriers. He viewed the entire thing as a team effort and he was just one man in this very LARGE team. A very humble man, or at least the interview that he gave made him appear very humble. When speaking about the torpedo squadrons, he got choked up & almost went into tears. You could tell that their sacrifice bothered him greatly. And I think he even claimed that although they scored no hits that they were the true heroes of the Battle of Midway. It was the only time I had ever seen him or heard him speak. But it made me think & feel that THAT ALTHOUGH THE USA won a great victory that day, that the victory came with a very high cost. And I could tell that by the way he talked about it. To me, it seemed that he accomplished what needed to be done. And that now, knowing how many died as a result of his bombing accuracy, that it wasn't something that he was very proud of doing. And as a human being it is very understandable. Although it is war, knowing I had killed over a five hundred people in one day would weigh fairly heavy on my mind. And it seemed to me Richard "Dick" Best felt that way too. Yes, he did it. But don't really want to talk about it. Not just a very good pilot but a good & decent human being.
@mitchellhawkes22 I truly feel that it was. Cuz if he didn't remove Akagi from the equation, that very first strike against Yorktown is more than likely going to either sink Yorktown or totally put her out of commission. Either way, the Japanese don't make the mistake of going after her during the second wave. And who knows what happens after that. Roll the dice and the Japanese wins, and roll the dice again and the Americans win. And another thing too is if Hornets pilots don't go on the "infamous flight to nowhere" then they could have sank or damaged Hiryu enough that Yorktown doesn't even have to deal with a strike at all!
I was administrator for the Marshall County (Iowa) historical museum about 20 years ago, located in Marshalltown, IA - Fletcher's birthplace. There was a small display about him there, but I understand the museum is (semi?) closed. I find it amusing that both Fletcher and Nimitz were born in landlocked towns (central Iowa and central Texas) but became famous admirals.
Obviously Fletcher needs more recognition. That he did not was, it seems. owning to King. It should be pointed out that King never commanded a carrier into battle. Yorktown really got into the fight, as well. Meanwhile there was Hornet. Then there was the poor performance of the captain of Enterprise. So it was the case that it WAS the pilots who sank those ships.
If I had to summarise this video, it's: "Who deserves credit for the overall Strategy, who gets credit for the Tactical aspects, and who gets credit for dropping the bombs." Overall a lovely video to listen to Drach, thanks a bunch.
Good point, we'll made. There's a difference between being the boss and being a leader, Fletcher is clearly a leader who rightly trusted his team to perform.
The most underrated skill in terms of military operations is that of knowing when to get the hell out of the way. Any military historian worth anything can think of half a hundred examples of a commander losing a battle by trying to control everything alone. Sometimes the best thing a commander can do is simply say "right, you got this, you know what you're doing", and letting the person who's actually in combat make the minute to minute decisions. Fletcher shouldn't get more credit than Spruance, but at the end of the day both did their jobs correctly and the US Navy won.
The navy has a principal of very extreme accountability. More than the other branches due to being far flung at sea. A commander is like god. The commanding officer of the battle gets all the blame....or all the credit. It is what is is...Fletcher deserves far more credit that he has received. Funny how no one blames Spruance for the Hornet, which was under his direct command.
MIdway has been my jam since being rewarded for good grades by being allowed to choose "The Battle of Midway' by Ira Peck from the scholastic reader catalog. For me, the battle is less about who is due the credit, but the blame that's due to Mitscher. As I age into my curmudgeonhood, I find myself talking about MItscher that same way Jon Parshall talks about Richmond Kelly "Terrible" Turner. Admiral Fletcher had just come off having Admiral King's former flagship (Lexington) sunk while under his command at Coral Sea. He then had the hastily-repaired Yorktown sunk out from under him here. I find myself agreeing with Jon Parshall's view that Mitscher sank Yorktown. Had Hornet contributed ANYTHING; apart form the sacrifice of her torpedo squadron; to the morning strike, the entire Kido Butai is permanently assigned to reef duty by lunchtime, and Yorktown survives. Enterprise's Dauntlesses sank Akagi and Kaga, Yorktown's got Soryu, and Hornet's were off reconnoitering the Aleutian Islands, or some such. Like Turner, MItchser gets a lot of credit for being indispensible to the US Navy's efforts in 1944, Turner for developing & implementing the amphibious doctrine, and MItscher for carrier doctrine. Parshall has stated that the system that was the US Navy must have produced several; if not many; officers who could've done Turner's job, without Turner's problems. I say the same thing about MItcher. There had to be any number of Admirals who could've led that flotilla of Essexes and Indepences against what was left of the IJN in 1944, and who hadn't disobeyed orders, then lied about it, contributing to one of the black marks against Fletcher, which caused his reputation to be ruined in his lifetime.
I couldn't agree more and while we are at it god forbid Halsey was in command for any of Fletcher's carrier battles or we wouldn't have been able to win at Gaudalcanal (and I love Halsey for the record).
I still have my copy of that book. It’s beat up, but it’s still on my bookshelf to remember how I got started in the Pacific war. And I also think your post is spot on.
Would McClusky, or any of the other flight leaders have needed to find a destroyer moving like a bat out of hell if there was a column of smoke on the horizon? How many of the pilots might not have taken a bath and made it back to their carriers? In the afternoon would the USN have sunk more of the escort forces? What would another USN carrier and fewer IJN cruisers and maybe fewer destroyers have meant for Guadalcanal?
It’s an interesting “What if?” Halsey absolutely would have fired up the conveyor belt and launched strikes at the IJN main body until he ran out of either fuel or ordinance. Thats who he was. “Strike. Repeat, strike.” But would he have been smart about it? I think he would have. He’d have been under the same “calculated risk” guidelines from Nimitz as Fletcher & Spruance. He’d have just had to keep them at arm’s length; out of enemy gun range, but within range of his strike aircraft; and he’d have had the IJN out in the open, a long way from home, no air cover of their own, just A-A to defend themselves. As long as he didn’t get oversgressive, and his scouts kept good tabs on where the IJN were so Yamato couldn’t put 18” holes in The Big E or Hornet, he could’ve won a little “harder” than they historically did.
I am allways amazed at how consistant such commanders can arrive at sound decisions, in the face of uncertainty. In pen and paper rpgs, or other tabletop games, folks can easliely spend entire evenings fussing and getting stuck on components of over all much simpler decisions.
Thank you for making this point about Fletcher, allowing Spruance to get on with it rather than allowing his ego to get in the way. Fletcher is a figure who should be much better known. I always feel he should be in the short list of great American commanders in the Pacific. I'm sure that in his later years he slept well knowing that when the moment's came, he made the correct decisions. He wound up sidelined, somewhat unfairly, in almost IJN fashion, when his only crime was not winning hard enough.
I'll just leave this here From November 1942 - 1945, Fletcher commanded naval forces in the North Pacific from the Alaskan island of Adak.[7] In November 1942, he became commandant of Thirteenth Naval District and commander of Northwestern Sea Frontier. He was relieved as commandant in October 1943, but continued to serve as commander Northwestern Sea Frontier until April 15, 1944, when the Northwestern Sea Frontier was abolished and the Alaskan Sea Frontier established. He then became Commander of the latter, with additional duty as Commander North Pacific Force and North Pacific Ocean Area. It was revealed in July 1945 that Task Force 90, under his overall command, had made the first penetration through the Kurile Islands in the Sea of Okhotsk on March 3 and 4, 1945, and the same task force on February 4, 1945, bombarded Paramushir in the first sea bombardment of the Kurile.[1]
@@marckyle5895being sent to a backwater section of the theater is still sidelining fletcher unfairly. The way wasn’t going to be decided in the icy waters of the northern pacific
@marckyle5895 Another of Fletcher's unsung achievements was getting the cooperation of the Army during the Aleutian campaign. While I hate that he was removed from main force command when he was, I also firmly believe he was the best man for the job in the Aleutians.
Drach, Loved the video! I think what happened at midway was (mostly) a great example of how U.S. Navy command philosophy is supposed to work. Fletcher was SOPA (senior officer present afloat) and as such was *responsible* for all forces. He was also OPCON (operational control) of both task forces (ie, responsible for overall concept of operations), and TACON (tactical control, responsible for localized execution) of the Yorktown Force. Spruance was TACON for the Hornet and Enterprise task force. When Fletcher's ability to exercise OPCON was impeded, he passed OPCON to the officer most able to exercise operational control of the forces- i.e., Spruance. I'm not clear on how TACON of the Yorktown group devolved, if at all, but I doubt Spruance was exercising TACON remotely. It likely devolved to the screen commander for the Yorktown force, but I don't know that for certain. That bit of mastery of the obvious aside, things that occurred to me as I watched the vid: 1- Fletcher never relinquished *responsibility* (he was still SOPA) for the battle, despite relinquishing operational *authority* (OPCON). If everything had gone wrong while under Spruance's operational control, Fletcher would have still been responsible. His decision to devolve OPCON was not only clear headed and doctrinally correct, but also selfless in that regard. 2- I believe Spruance, as TACON of Enterprise and Hornet, *should be held accountable for Hornet not obeying tactical direction.* Even though he could not of course read Mitscher's mind and countermand the flight plan, Hornet was under Spruance's TACON and as such its actions reflect a loss of command and control on Spruance as OTC (officer in tactical control.) Mind you I say this as a huge Spruance fan, but the question of, "What the hell, Ray, can't you control your carriers?" would have been valid from either Fletcher or Nimitz. 3- As far as "credit" goes, I don't think there's much point on dividing the credit amongst the officers present. Technically it was Fletcher's battle, in that he was responsible no matter what, but the decentralized TACON and shifting OPCON meant that everybody had to do their bit or it would come apart- witness what happened when Mitscher decided not to play along. Fletcher and Spruance were remarkably in-sync in their handling of their task groups and the overall operational concept, which just points to them both being true professionals who were doctrinally savvy and inter-personally trusting. Anyhow, I apologize for all the jargon- and I realize that this is modern jargon, not period. But the jargon defines the thought behind what happened- to wit, The SOPA was impeded in his OPCON and devolved it upon the officer most able to exercise it, while retaining overall responsibility. That is exactly what is supposed to happen, and you have to laud Fletcher for the selfless but correct call, and Spruance for showing absolutely no gaps or seams in control when the time came. Consummate professionals both, and both deserve credit for that.
I hear you and am familiar with it.....bottom line is a commander at sea is in charge PERIOD. FULL STOP. Unless one has been in the navy, they cannot understand fully the accountability piece that is often looked at strangely by both civilians and other services. Maritime law and customs are very unique. Fletcher was it. Fletcher, being senior and in COMMAND gets either all the praise or all the blame. Spruance had opcon for the Hornet....and the Hornet was a de facto failure at Midway. People overlook that, but if that battle went the other way.....
I have always thought Fletcher's handling of command at Midway showed a professionalism and competence that is often not present. When he couldn't exercise command he passed control to Spruance who could and he didn't interfere with Spruance. Also, post war Fletcher never engaged in a debate of "who won Midway" unlike Sampson and Schley in the Spanish-American War. Neither did Spruance. The argument has 'academic' because Morrison didn't like Fletcher.
I would be kinder to Spruance. He was a cruiser division admiral a week previously and both the Enterprise and Hornet had been used to how Halsey did it. Note the friction between him and Browning, who was later revealed to be already above his present level of competence when he was promoted to Captain. "You didn't just start being a fuckup this month, right? It took a while to make your officers that dumb." would have been my words to Mitscher about the Hornet. Browning himself gets the first sentence. I'd have rather been flying from Yorktown. None of them got lost, unlike B/S-8 and F-8. You'd think the Navy would already have hard and fast regs for things like Distance vs. Loadout, with standards for all types flying in print and accessible.
@@slightlyshabby9226 And that's why nothing was said - publicly. Nimitz didn't air the Navy's dirty laundry. But you know him, Nimitz and King all spoke to each other about it. Maybe they already saw the 1944 MM or he had rookie fever, muffed it and then settled down.
If you really want to nitpick. You can argue that Wade McClusky, Earl Gallagher, Dick Best and Max Leslie won the Battle of Midway. As it was their Dauntlesses that planted the bombs that blew up Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and later Hiryu and Mikuma.
I wouldn't make that argument. Credit goes to virtually every level of command. Not any one. I would however give the pilots a lot of credit -- the pilots had to find their targets, when their original vector was to open ocean. VDH makes a good argument for the pilots in Courage and Culture. The Americans did get more than a little lucky. They launched a piecemeal attack and when it got to the Kido Butai, it was a perfectly coordinated one.
But they couldn't have done that without the orders given to them, the direction to fly given to them, and the carriers having been in position to attack beforehand....
My thoughts exactly. But, both Spruance and Fletcher put them at the right place at the right time, whether by design or Brownian motion. i hate to say it, but Nimitz gets high marks too. Warfighting is a team sport.
I think its both, Fletcher was the over all commander for the US fleet but once Yorktowns out the fight Fletcher seems to basically hand command over to Spruance as hes away from the carriers at that point so from then on its Spruance in charce as he has the operational carriers to hand and Fletchers not in a posistion to take command of them before the strike on Hiryu.
In the Navy, if you are in command, you get all the credit or all the blame....full stop. The navy is not like other branches, accountability is extreme. For a reason. Fletcher won or fought to a draw the battles in 1942, all 4 of them.
No 'seem' to it. Fletcher explicitly turned over tactical command to Spruance after Yorktown was put out of the fight and gave him the freedom to wage the battle his way.
@@doctordetroit4339 And at the end of 1942, the USN had two fleet carriers, while the IJN were also down to the Zuikaku sisters. He won parity for us. He knocked the bully onto his back foot and then got tapped out.
Fletcher deserves the credit. "The commander is responsible for everything his unit does and fails to do" is something I learned as an 18 year old ROTC Cadet. He would have gotten the blame, so he deserves the credit.
Fletcher deserves a LOT of credit for knowing his command team is compromised, and he doesn't have the situational awareness that Spruence had. So it makes perfect sense for him to accede authority in a temporary way, to the officer better able to prosecute the battle. And it takes a big man to step aside. Ego is a thing.
@@jeromethiel4323 A lot of good work done as far as that goes. I don't think any of them would care who was in charge - if the result was four enemy carriers on the bottom. I think they would regret how many aviators were lost. And while it was a shame to lose Yorktown, most of the crew came off. That core of folks must have been a big help when it was time to build out crews for the Essex class.
@@jeromethiel4323 Somehow I couldn't see Dugout Doug nor Sempter Iratis King stepping aside, and I could see the later ordering a destroyer to taking him to the other carriers at full speed.
I'm glad to see the Fletcher Mafia come out in his defense. He was done dirty by Samuel Eliot Morison and Admiral King and it's good to see people now recognize his important contributions to the early Pacific war effort.
King did not believe Fletcher was pessimistic and not aggressive enough. I think the only time that this may have been true was the withdrawal of the carrier forces before Savo Island. One can easily argue that Fletcher was too aggressive at Coral Seas but otherwise Fletcher was effectively balancing the risk to his carrier forces against the potential losses.
@@gerardwall5847there was a Marine colonel with Fletcher during Guadalcanal. That Marine colonel said Fletcher did exactly the right thing, withdrawing when he did. Fletcher stood a good chance of losing too many aircraft or even a carrier, had he stayed in place. Savo Island would likely of had a different outcome of that had happened.
Fletcher did not like the Guadalcanal operation and said so in no uncertain terms to Turner and Vandegrift. Considering that Guadalcanal was Ernie King's idea and that Turner was one of King's "boys", is it any wonder than Fletcher wound up sidelined?
Sign me up for the Fletcher-Was-A-Great-American campaign. Without Fletcher, we might have lost ALL our carriers by the end of 1942. And today, almost a century later, we might still be speaking Japanese.
There were a grand total of 6 carrier vs carrier battles in all of the Pacific. Just six. 4 in 1942 alone....no more until closer until the end of the war, and they were very lopsided against Japan. Fletcher was the lead admiral in all of those 4. It was a battle against two equals, more or less. Strange how Spruance doesn't get blamed for the USS Hornet at Midway....I am not into revisionism, as carrier ops was in its infancy and the Hornet was brand spanking new....but still. Fletcher deserves seriously high praise for what he did. He already had a Medal of Honor. A real hero, alongside Spruance, Nimitz and Halsey.
I'm not sure what you mean about the USS Hornet at Midway. Hornet was sunk in the battle of Santa Cruz and I don't think Spruance was at that battle. Update: Ok. I think you are referring to the airgroups from Hornet that suffered grievous losses because of the piecemeal nature of the attack on the Japanese carriers, because the squadrons were taking so long to form up Spruance told them to just head out and find the Japanese carriers, form up then and attack. The torpedo bombers across the fleet were wiped out because of this. It did however leave the Japanese carriers without top cover when the dive bombers arrived.
I agree. I've been reading about the Pacific war for decades. I think the Pentagon knew it had a helluva dependable and capable carrier-group commander in Fletcher. How many can you name that were better?
@@Pablo668 I think he means that Mitscher sent the Hornet's dive bombers off on the "flight to nowhere". A horrible decision and performance by Mitscher (who was under Spruance's command).
Fletcher, Spruance all had their roles. To me you hit the nail on the head, Fletcher passed command on when was not capable of executing it. The strength of character that showed to do that, showed his professionalism. How many senior leaders would have instead raced to reassert their authority and ensure their press coverage? Lots. Which is simply a comment on humanity.
to comment here, ~ 27:00, Fletcher giving that signal was more-less formalizing, what has already more-less taken place without his presence. Because at this point hes not got the full picture of the battle; He's been out of coms, reports, and was on board a burning carrier, hes no longer got the situational/combat awareness anymore of exactly whats what and whats where. Its gonna take him some time to get back in the loop of it all. Spruance at this point has that awareness, Fletcher recognizes that and acts accordingly.
No one can question Admiral Fletcher's courage. Just look at the little blue ribbon on his "fruit salad"? The little blue one with white stars, on the top of the balance of his ribbons, is rather distinctive. Not many sailors ever get the chance to expose themselves the way you have to in order to be awarded that medal.
Command cohesiveness and the willingness to put personal glory and self-assertion aside according to the unfolding dynamics of battle - this is a greatly underappreciated quality.
Some thoughts: When Yorktown was knocked out, 3 Japanese carriers had already been neutralized, so Fletcher was in command in every respect until late in the battle. Fletcher's staff along with Yorktown's air group, being far more experienced with actual carrier combat than anyone in TF 17, got their torpedo bombers, dive bombers and fighters over the Soryu/Hiryu carrier division simultaneously due to how they planned and sequenced the launch and transit to target. Yorktown was also positioned in the correct location for recovering her air wing, resulting in her aircraft not encountering the desperate fuel situation that Enterprise and Hornet aircraft faced. That this was closer to the Japanese carriers is what made Yorktown the sole target for the Japanese counterattacks, which in and of itself spared the other two carriers. In the end, Enterprise's dive bomber pilots overcame rather poor (albeit inexperienced) planning and execution at the task force and air group level, while Hornet's air group did nothing at all positive despite her torpedo squadron being the first to find the Japanese carriers. Yorktown's strike was executed according to plan based on experience at Lae-Salamaua and Coral Sea. They just had less luck in that the torpedo bombers went after Hiryu (while the dive bombers went after Soryu) and, as had all American torpedo bomber squadrons at Midway, failed to take out the target. The one mistake that all American commanders at Midway made was overestimating the abilities of their torpedo bombers.
I would not say that the American commanders overestimated the abilities of the torpedo bombers. Combat experience at the time did not indicate that the torpedo bombers were any more vulnerable than any other bomber type (and in actuality, they were not really any more vulnerable than other bomber types). At Lae-Salamaua and Coral Sea the torpedo bombers did not suffer significant losses. The US torpedo bombers at Midway were attacked by considerably larger numbers of fighters, which tended to result in heavy losses, regardless of bomber type. (For example, the Japanese lost 11 of 18 dive bombers in the Hiryu attack on Yorktown before those bombers actually attacked the ship.) The only US torpedo squadron that had a fighter escort was that of Yorktown, and Torpedo 3 only had six escorting fighters while being attacked by roughly 40 Zeros. Had the Devastators been Kates or SM79s or Avengers or Swordfish (or Dauntlesses or Ju-87s or Vals), the result would likely have been the same. Again, unescorted bombers, or bombers attacked by fighters that greatly outnumber their escorts, tend to suffer heavy losses. The US commanders assumed that, as at Coral Sea, the Japanese fighters would not be able to concentrate on the torpedo bombers. Due to the flawed decisions by Mitscher and Ring, the poor coordination among the Enterprise aircraft, and the target fixation by the Japanese fighters attacking Torpedo 3, the torpedo squadrons were attacked by large numbers of defending fighters while the dive bomber squadrons were ignored. Enterprise's fighters were in the area but never intervened, and Hornet's fighters never found the Japanese. Only Yorktown's fighters contributed, and they were attacked by such overwhelming numbers that they were unable to prevent heavy losses among the Torpedo 3 aircraft.
Well, Nimitz gave the Grand Design for the battle: "Kick Nagumo's ass, but don't lose all the carriers." That general instruction was enough leeway for the tactical commanders. Unlike Nagumo, whose hight priority was not to lose any of his carriers.
Jack Fletcher was one hell of a good carrier commander and an excellent tactician but the credit goes to Nimitz in my estimation. He set the ambush really and he trusted the men under his command to do the job. A hallmark of a great military leader is the ability to bring along the right men, create a general strategy and then get out of the way. When you think of all the accolades given to certain theater commanders a name overlooked is Nimitz. His handling of the central Pacific might have been the most difficult command of the entire war.
Was the most difficult!! Europe First. No resources. A huge ocean. A dynamic enemy attacking everywhere. And a knife's edge between success and failure (carriers)
One might say that Nimitz knew commander Fletcher would not impair the action at Midway for egotisical reasons. Fletcher did not hesitate to give his command to Spruance, who eventually made history at Midway. I give Nimitz and Fletcher a lot of credit for that.
For the time we had to rely on him, Fletcher was the indispensable Admiral. His decision through that time, kept us in the fight. He was a better commander than Halsey, frankly. His misfortune was to be targeted for political reasons. His reputation is improving over time, however.
What I appreciate about Fletcher is that at Coral Sea, he fought the fleet according to the best practices and thinking at the time, while also being highly aware that the USN only had two big, best Yorktown-class fleet carriers in the entire Pacific theater, Yorktown and Enterprise, plus the (EDIT: new, smaller Hornet, which had just arrived and the) older, less-capable Lexington. Langley was considered only useful for aircraft transport. He was highly aware that he was responsible to turn back the Japanese effort to invade Port Moresby but also to do everything possible to preserve scarce national assets. Too many people look back on early 1942 and are unaware of just how relatively weak the USN was in relation to the IJN. When you don't have even adequate resources to fight a war, you do not have the luxury of engaging in slugging, highly-aggressive battles. You need to be a boxer, dancing in and landing your blows and then rapidly dancing back out of range of getting hit hard by your opponent.
@@MinnesotaGuy822 Langley had the additional problem that it had been sunk at the end of February. USN and IJN were actually fairly evenly matched at the start of the Pacific war, although the IJN had the edge in the all-important carriers. The problem for the USN was that it had to fight in 2 oceans, so the Pacific fleet was undersized compared to the IJN, albeit not as much as people like to make it sound.
I think you are correct that the prudent Fletcher was a better admiral than hair-on-fire Halsey. Especially by the end of the war, Halsey was not the guy you wanted guiding your fleet.
A good commander knows when to just get out of the way and let the subordinates do the job. Fletcher had other things to organize , fighting the fires, transferring men, reassigning his planes, looking after Yorktown and of course finding a safe haven for himself and staff. Bold move and deserve praise.
10:39 this passage, and the earlier mention of the pilot's role, put me in mind of a message from Nimitz to the entire Pacific Fleet cited in Rich Frank's book on Guadalcanal. In part: "Suitable targets present themselves only rarely to our guns, bombs, and torpedoes. On those rare occasions our tactics must be such that our objective will be gunned, bombed, or torpedoed to destruction."
At Midway, Fletcher was the most experienced carrier admiral on either side when it came to carrier v. carrier battles. A key lesson that both he and Hara had learned at Coral Sea was that SEARCH is everything. At Coral Sea Fletcher had thought that the fleet carriers would be with the transports but they were not, and his 1st search had missed them. At Midway he thought that the carriers might again be in two groups, and he did not rely on the PBYs to be his only eyes but ran his own search patterns. The first cleared the area to the North, and the second discovered Hiryu, which enabled Spruance to launch the afternoon attack that sank it. Fletcher also had to make the tough call on how many fighters to send in the 1st attack, leaving the rest for his CAP. (He only sent 6, must to Thach's disgust.) That decision paid off in part when Yorktown was attacked by the dive bombers (most were shot down). By the time Fletcher turned over command to Spruance the battle was basically over.
I love how a great video spawns a great discussion in the comments and then another great "reaction" video with even more analysis, commentary and comments to follow. Great stuff all around!
One thing I believe is clear from all that we know now is that neither Fletcher nor Spruance would have gone wild eye crazy in chasing after Nagumo. Only certain staff officers seemed that reckless. WE know Spruance said no; and I am pretty sure Fletcher would have done the same thing.
Had Halsey been in command, he would have pressed the attack after the sinking of Hiryu and possibly ran into the surface force Nagumo sent forward. Herman Wouk wrote in "War and Remembrance" (not an exact quote) that Spruance chose to pull back towards Midway/Point Luck where his fleet was both safe and dangerous. That was the masterstroke that sealed the Japanese defeat.
@@scottburton509 Yep. Nimitz had made it clear that preserving the carriers was his number one priority. Attack and take out some Jap carriers without risking too much. He got a LOT of criticism from so called Air experts for that. but honestly what could the american fleet have done? Down to two carriers; no torpedo planes; exhausted pilots. I mean look at how much effort it took to sink the Mikuma and mangle the Mogami and they were all but sitting targets. AND catching Nagumo would have probably run them out of fuel anyway.
I truly enjoyed this. I liked the goal and the result. The really interesting part is that the reality of the whole battle is that it comes down to three squadrons of dive bombers and the strategic decisions, the operational sacrifices, and the ironies of timing that determine the course and outcome of this battle.
Not strictly related to the video, but my family used to laugh because my Dad had never seen the old Midway movie. Whenever it came on TV, he'd always say 'I love this movie!', get comfortable, and promptly fall asleep within 30 minutes. He never actually finished the movie for YEARS! 😂
As a Navy brat these men and their names were such a large part my childhood. My farther was a destroyer sailor. Stationed. on two spruance class ships. My schools and almost everthing else was off Fletcher st .Traveling those streets and hearing those names everyday we tended to know lot of these men and their actions.
Again, I don't object to Spruance getting _some_ credit for the victory at Midway, I just object to describing him as the "Mastermind of Midway." And honestly, none of the subsequent explanation makes his role, which was largely reactive, sound any more "mastermind-y" to me. To continue the Trafalgar example - sure, Collingwood was the senior officer directly in charge of the bulk of the fighting, but does anyone call him the "Mastermind of Trafalgar"? Has anyone _ever_ said that?
I think that a battle like Midway had no "mastermind." The basic mission was "go out there, find the Japanese carriers, and sink 'em. Oh, and try not to lose any of your own." The positions were not static, as in a land battle, everything was reactive and spur-of-the-moment, backed by current doctrine (for better or worse). There could be nothing but the broadest of "plans" to fail to survive first contact with the enemy. Both TF commanders knew that when they found the Japanese carriers, and confirmed they were really the striking force and not a diversionary force (the mistake made at Coral Sea, which Fletcher was determined not to make again), they would hit it with everything they had. It doesn't require great command ability to recognize that.
Napoleon is credited with saying, "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake." A corollary to this would be, "Never interrupt your ally when he's winning the battle." The latter is something which Fletcher seemed to understand very well.
There’s a joke in the webcomic Schlock Mercenary that a sergeant in motion outranks a lieutenant who doesn’t know what’s going on. Obviously the ranks here are much higher and the difference in rank is arguably a bit lower, but I think the maxim applies. The comic also jokes that an ordinance technician at a dead run outranks everybody.
Not that my opinion is worth much but I'll go with everybody did their job and did them very well indeed! Fletcher effectively handed off command when he was unable to command thru no fault of his own. Not taking back command when he could have, possibly disrupting the chain of command was the right thing to do. He was a team player and displayed an amazing strength of character, integrity, and honor as a senior naval officer should. Jim Y
Both of them did, if your talking about the two admirals, but really, everybody in the task forces, plus the Midway folks, had a hand in the victory. So a great US TEAM Victory!
There is a good discussion of the Fletcher vs Spruance debate in, of all things, a work of fiction: War and Rembrance, by Herman Wouk. He has a (fictional) German general evaluating the Battle of Midway, who is dismissive of Fletecher. The novel's main character - Pug Henry - responds to that criticism in a way that opened my eyes and made me think Fletcher got an undeserved bad rap. It's a great novel - as is Winds of War - and the parts that focus on the war focus almost exclusively on the Pacific.
You probably know this but Wouk was a US navy officer aboard the USS Mason in the Pacific during the war. He was finally the CO of the Mason, a destroyer minesweeper.
Good Day Sir! As always you've done a wonderful job of explaining things. I agree that no battle belongs solely to one man making decisions. For better or worse, it is the team of people under a commander that determines the outcome of any battle. I also agree that Fletcher deserves much greater credit for his wartime performance. Seems to me that his modest personality contributed to his lackluster recognition more than anything else. That fact that Ernest King didn't much care for him didn't help. Still, I think Spruance and Nimitz may have done more to stand up for him. Perhaps they did but I hadn't heard about it. Of utmost importance is the fact that Fletcher recognized he was behind the curve going into the battle. He had to wait for YORKTOWN to be readied and Spruance had to plan with the notion he may not have Fletcher and YORKTOWN available or in time. Once YORKTOWN was disabled it was no longer an argument. Spruance HAD to take charge. Nimitz, for his part, (as is the responsibility of any commander), was responsible for setting the OBJECTIVES and providing guidance and any specific considerations to be taken into account. This provides the field commanders with the framework orders they are to work within. To the end all three of these men are primarily responsible for the victory.
I think the question "Who won Miday?" can be best summed up by indeed yuopr answer "The entire team" Rochefort for mustering the courage for the ruse of AF, Nimitz willing to listen, the courage for his calculated risk, and Spruance and Fletcher did what they did. Like you said, knowing when to hand over command - trusting your fellow sailor enough, because carriers, I think, were the best hub to gather and send out information. And of course every other airman, seaman and engineer who pulled the miracle of reparing Yorktown enough so she could sail. It basically proves the point of "If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together." Nimitz understood the only way to win, was to build a team (I especially realized this after reading "Mastering the Art of Command" of Trent Hone [Thanks Drachnifel for having the interview way back with Trent hone, can recommend the book]).
Fletcher did the right thing in conceding control to Spruance. Spruance, on Enterprise, had access to the staff (though Capt. Brown was not at the top of his game for some reason), facilities and information needed to direct the battle while Fletcher only had what was available on Astoria, which was not equipped to be a flagship.
Also, after Yorktown was hit, Spruance could see directly how the returning fliers were doing, and tally the usable aircraft and their ready states, while Fletcher would have to have minimal necessary airgroup status info blinkered to him (once he joined up with TF 16) until he could transfer to Enterprise or Hornet.
I do not read anything about ME Butcher's article, 1987: "Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, Pioneer Warrior or Gross Sinner?", in the Naval War College Review. He is the first one reviewing Fletcher's operational actions during the 3 carrierbattles. Butcher writes: "AFTER the Japanese striking power had been destroyed, Fletcher sent a message to Spruance, "I will conform to your movements" " (CTF 17 ltr A-16A-3 /A9(0029N), 26 June 1942, encl. A, p. 2). Let me rephrase this. The IJN Hiryu is sunk when Fletcher was in command, not Spruance. So all 4 Japanese heavy carriers were sunk when Fletcher was in command. To deny the honour of the best carrier admiral in the United States Navy for 45 years til 1987 represents all what has gone wrong in this country.
Rochefort's team famously devised a ruse. They sent a message to the base on Midway instructing personnel there to radio Pearl that the salt-water evaporators on the base had broken down. Two days later, a Japanese message was intercepted that reported AF was running out of fresh drinking water. That's not how they found out Midway was the target, though now it’s often interpreted that way, Rochefort knew to a good degree do to other intelligence it was likely midway, therefore so did Nimitz. Rebuttals up or down always welcome. Thanks ever much
The IJN calling their plan 'Operation MI' probably didn't help much. German high command had similar issues with their operation names ('Operation Sealion' being a classic). Allied high command noted this problem and reacted accordingly by selecting much more random names.
The battle of Miday was actually between Nimitz and Yamamoto and who had the better commanders under them and it turned out Nimitz had the better ones.
No, actual battles are operational level. Fletcher was the operational commander....Nimitz at strategic level set the stage. Fletcher, et al had to execute. Without a lot of luck to go with excellent planning....it could have very well been a disaster. Nimitz said McClusky's turn won the battle. Fletcher and Spruance put him there.
@@doctordetroit4339 yes but no, There was not a universal appeal to Nimitiz to put the fleet out there and go get them. In fact, quite the opposite. So Nimitiz rubbed his nose at the nay sayers and told his boys to 'go get them' and trusted them to succeed and avoid failure. On the day it is the pilots making heroic decisions that hit the target. But great leaders put them in that position.
Note that Yamamoto was actually at sea, but hamstrung because he was under radio silence as part of a "supporting group" hundreds of miles behind Kido Butai, while Nimitz was ashore and able to communicate, but he refrained from giving extraneous directions. Your point about the better commanders is still valid, although I get the sense that Nimitz had more choice in his group commanders than Yamamoto did.
I think the big thing that a lot of people don't realize is that Fletcher was the only commander with experience in the kind of fight that the fleet was headed into. That experience of carrier vs carrier (with the surface ships never seeing eachother) had just come about for the 1st time 30 days prior to Midway. Spruance likely had a good idea already what we anticipated were the best tactical level moves to make would be. Having Fletcher there with that first hand, real world experience was invaluable to assuring a victory. I can imagine that the 2 had a chance to confer a bit or at least swap some basic updated tactical ideas (via Nimitiz, aides, etc) between them before departing Pearl. Both men deserve equal credit for the win. It was definitely a team effort which they both understood clearly. It is disappointing that King seemed to have had so little confidence in Fletcher. He technically won (at least met the objectives of the operation at the time) the battles he was in command of. It is good that he is finally getting the credit that is long deserved to him.
I extensively researched and studied government documents, classified at the time, about the Battle of Midway, specifically the leadership decisions made, during and following the battle. Admirals Spruance and Fletcher were the primary leaders whom I studied, inlcluding extensive government biographies of both of these Admirals. Of interest, were the characters of both individuals and how it shaped their decisions during the Battle of Midway and other actions during WW2. Admiral Spruance's decisions and actions throughout WW2 were nothing short of brilliant. To Admiral Spruance's credit and modesty, he always credited his successes to officers under his command. An example from the Battle of Midway, Admiral Spruance made the decision to "light up" the carriers to recover the aircraft returning after dark, but bestowed the credit to Admiral Fletcher. Then Capt Mitscher took note and did the same at the Battle of Philippine Sea. Spruance was very aware of the unjust criticism by aviators for Fletcher "leaving behind" the crew of an aircraft which ditched at sea. (In actuality Fletcher dispatched 3 destroyers to look for survivors). Admiral Spruance and Admiral Fletcher mutually trusted each other. So the decision to "hand over" command by Fletcher was a mute point because he was still in the command loop for the tactical decisions to come. After the Battle of Midway, Admiral Spruance gave much credit to Fletcher. A strength of Admiral was he wasn't a micro manager. Spruance's leadership ability is that he placed the most capable officers in key positions of his command. He valued their expertise, judgement and their perspectives when to make decisions. Admiral Spruance was a three dimensional thinker who readily recognizes the priorities and details needed to accoumplish the strategic mission. In many ways, he is the opposite of Admiral Halsey and Admiral Fletcher. Admiral Halsey tended to have tunnel vision. Had Admiral Halsey been in command of Midway instead of Spruance, the Battle of Midway would've turned out much differently. Admiral Spruance is a 360 thinker. This is why Admiral Spruance was Admiral Nimitz's right hand man. Admiral Nimitz and Admiral King were both very aware of the leadership characteristics of Admirals under their command. Who won the Battle of Midway? If Admiral Spruance and Admiral Fletcher were alive today, they would give each other credit. So why was Admiral Fletcher not as recognized? Based upon my research, the answer is laced with the reputation of the men. In Admiral Fletcher's case, the criticism and accusations about him were based upon prejudice between the "black shoe" and "brown shoe" officers, and being the goat for the actions or orders of others. Despite Fletcher earning the Medal of Honor for gallantry under fire, he was unfairly labeled a coward by other flag officers because of the loss of Wake Island. Enroute to the beleaguered Marines defending Wake Island, Fletcher slowed his task force to fuel and resupply his ships in TF-14 and USS Saratoga, as ordered. Admiral Fletcher recognized the need to be provisioned the fight ahead. The reputation held despite arriving on schedule to the assigned rendezvous point. Fletcher was ordered return to Pearl Harbor by CINCPAC Admiral Pye, despite his request to engage the Japanese fleet. As previously mentioned, Fletcher was criticized for abandoning his pilots, with Captain Elliot Buckmaster of USS Yorktown fueling the fire and flames of distrust between the aviators and Fletcher. He never told the aircrew that Fletcher sent ships immediately to look for the lost crew. If he held the USS Yorktown and its aircraft for search and rescue, they would't have achieved the strategic victory of not only the damage to the Japanese carriers, but for the Japanese recalling the Port Moresby invasion fleet. Fletcher was ordered post haste tor return to Pearl Harbor to prepare for the invasion of Midway. The USMC, believing rumors Fletcher abandoned the Marines on Wake Island, and squarely blamed Fletcher abandoning them at Guadalcanal when that was not the case. To Admiral Spruance's dismay, "Black Jack" Fletcher was relegated to lesser roles for the rest of the war while Admiral Halsey, despite his many bad decisions, remained to achieve 5 star Admiral. Of note, my father, a navy veteran of WW2, sarcastically said Halsey probably killed more sailors than the Japanese. Fletcher's undoing besides his unassuming character, was communication. During naval engagements he commanded, his intentions were not communicated to area commanders. Samuel Elliot Morrison, author of , critically viewed Admiral Fletcher in his book. Admiral Fletcher's refusal to an interview for the book didn't help. Admiral "Black Jack" Fletcher was WW2's unsung naval hero.
It's beyond the scope of this video, but Adm. Fletcher probably doesn't receive appropriate credit for Coral Sea. Yes, it was a Japanese victory, but a Pyrrhic victory at best; their overall strategy for invasion was tripped-up, Shokaku and Zuikaku were unavailable for Midway, and Lexington's loss was IMO a matter of bad luck; if the wrong vapor cloud hadn't found the wrong motor at the wrong time, Lex would have been available for Midway. I'm as much an admirer of Adm. Spruance as any no-experience, civilian puke like me can be, but Adm. Fletcher's reputation deserves its rehabilitation.
I’d imagine running an aircraft carrier is a lot like running a manufacturing plant. You have the Plant Manager (the Captain), the Staff (top officers), etc, all the way down to the Team Members on the shop floor (the sailors). How did they keep up with their paperwork? The training records, quality records, purchasing and maintenance records. How did they keep track of all that, with the added complication of bombs dropping, and explosions ripping through your work areas?
it's always funny to me that anytime fletcher is brought up it's always the same photograph (regardless of creator/editor), it says a lot about him; he really did not care for theatrics or public image. fletcher was dissed in the States but i am a Filipino who appreciates the steady work and grand decisions he played on the table that was 1942
"Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan" of course this has a grain of truth. Victory in this case did have numerous skilled leaders making the correct call. Defeat had also numerous skilled leaders whose flaws came out in this battle. Yamamoto, Nagumo, and Yamaguchi with others had a fair amount to do with showing openings the US leaders skillfully exploited.
@@papajohnloki Read shattered sword. Nagumo adhered to doctrine, Yamaguichi after 3 carriers went down closed with what he knew was a superior force when his air units he also knew had a range advantage. Japanese doctrine, Yamamoto's plan and Japanese training and ship construction were far more responsible than Nagumo's error.
@@bryant7201 I've read Shattered Sword, my reference is to Yamaguchi's request to strike immediately after receiving the sighting of an American carrier
I don't think they had the opportunity without going against ijn carrier doctrine. Spotting and launching that strike would have taken time while damaged and low on fuel planes from the midway strike would circle and possibly some had to ditch.
@@bryant7201 Craig L Symonds book noted that they could have launched a fairly substantial, albeit w/o torpedo planes, as you note against IJN doctrine-but Spruance went against USN doctrine when he sent the aircraft that were aloft without waiting (the key word) to launch a co-ordinated attack.
many important points made about command and it's nature... I have to wonder though, in a battle like Midway, how much is decided on a strategic level and how much is down to individual ship captains and bomber commanders directly on the battlefield... I understand the very important role an admiral plays, but, it almost feels like the difference between success and failure lay more on a tactical level than a strategic one.
It's all the above. Strategic level is for Nimitz. Operational level was for Fletcher and Spruance. Tactical level was McClusky and his lucky turn. Nimitz said that turn won the battle of Midway. But Fletcher and Spruance put him there.
@@doctordetroit4339 I guess I am too far away from this... I never even considered Operational level as a distinct category here... thank you for the clear breakup, it really adds something!
As Drach was walking through the various roles, actions and who was responsible for what, I thought of a rough analogy. As has been mentioned in the comments, Midway was a massive team effort and the American success was due to (to be brief) many, many chaotically-and-complexly-interacting factors (yes, like chaotic and complex systems) and no small amount of luck. The analogy that came to mind was that of an American football team winning against a formidable opponent. Roughly, prior Navy and US leadership provided the equipment, training and community that employed, equipped, trained and put the team on the field, like the owners, management and coaching staff of the football team. In the weeks leading up to game day, the head coach and his staff (Joint Chiefs and Roosevelt's people, but mostly King and Nimitz, aided by intelligence groups) is preparing to do battle on game day with the best players and strategies they can field. Fletcher is analogous to the teams 1st-string quarterback on the field, taking direction from the coach but calling the local plays on the field, especially as fleeting opportunities arise. Spruance is like your second-string quarterback, nearly as good as your "prime position" quarterback and nearly as capable of leading the team on the field if for any reason the prime quarterback can't. The individual unit commanders for flight deck operations, ship operations, squadron leaders, and numerous individual sailors are like the players (this is not a perfect analogy). Not all the players are key players on the field at every moment, but everyone is prepared and ready to play their part, and everyone is going all out, doing their best with the training, equipment and capabilities of who they are. . When the quarterback hands the ball off to the halfback, for example, while the QB is still the QB, now everyone on the team "conforms to the movement" of the guy with the ball, doing what they can to help him move the ball down the field, which is the team's goal. . Meanwhile, while your entire team, from the owner on down to the water boy, is doing their best with what they have to help the team win, everyone on the opposition team is doing the same. . Skill, competence, incompetence, excellent and mediocre education, training, equipment and morale all play their complex, interacting parts. And that's before good and bad luck gets involved. The tiniest of details can influence outcomes at all scales, which all interact, as the two organizations battle. . If you ran a near-perfect simulation of the world on a super, supercomputer, the model starting in 1880 and leading up to the Midway battle to predict the outcome of Midway, tens of thousands of times, how many times do you think it would turn out just as it did in 1942? I think it would be like predicting the weather, a chaotic system. You'd get a range of outcomes.
Counter argument being USS Hornets performance in this battle. Intelligence doesn’t make you play your hand well, it just lets you see your opponents starting location.
@@scottl9660 It is admittedly tricky. A Battle of Midway was definitely going to happen because the IJN had their battle plan. But the USN had the date and order of battle for that plan weeks before the ships even set sail, so it is reasonable to assume that without the intelligence breakthrough, the attack would have been discovered much later. So it's not just a matter of starting location, but the actual forces being brought into play. Yamamoto's original plan was to bait in Midway reinforcements and slap them around with his battleships. As it turned out, intelligence allowed the USN to catch the attack early while all those back-up forces were out of position.
Way too simplistic and overreaching. Intelligence gave some "tools". Some were good, some were bad. It had a significant role but it doesn't neccessary would guarantee winning. There is much, much more here than just this.
I appreciate the depth in which the chains of command had been explained. The stresses of the complexity of unfolding events to establish an understanding of how to enhance or mitigate the battle space on sea as opposed to land has to be significantly more difficult if no other reason they're not on land. It's I think the underlying trust of these men prior to that engagement that cements the understanding of the judicious use of authority of a subordinate based on the overall responsibilities if the most senior officer is for whatever reason incapacitated in how that engagement unfolds. The responsibilities for better or worse were fletchers irrespective of spruances actions. The assumption of command under duress in times of crisis had to be appreciated as actions in the best interest of the mission. You can't fault the guy for that 😅. Thanks ever much
In the 1920s a German lady was sitting next to President Hindenburg at dinner. Very daringly, she asked him who had actually won the Battle of Tannenburg in 1914? Was it himself, or was it really his Chief of Staff (Ludendorf) or his Chief of Operations (Hoffman)? Hindenburg thought for a bit and then said: "I don't know who won the Battle of Tannenburg madam, but I do know who would have lost it." Admiral Nimitz won Midway.
I have to feel some sorrow for Nagumo. He actually did nothing wrong. He had absolutely no reason to suspect that US carriers would be present. Those who say you plan for what an enemy can do vs what they most likely do are the ones who may never lose a battle but definitely will never win one either.
I’ll disagree on Nagumo. He knew he’d been spotted before his aircraft even bombed Midway. Yamamoto’s plan was based on surprise. It was obvious the morning of the attack that wasnt the case. Had he recovered his Midway strike group and retired west overnight he would have been in position to strike the Americans the next day, on his terms. Rather than what did happen.
@@Idahoguy10157 Well, let's look at it from his point, not history's. He's got the four best carriers in the Japansese Navy, and their less-regarded sisters had just sunk two US carriers at Coral Sea (by their report) and not lost a fleet carrier. He knows his pilots and planes are the best on Earth, and in the Japanese Navy you lose style points if you're overly cautious. What would the Emperor have said if he ran away at the first sign of an enemy?
@@erichammer2751 … you misread what I wrote. Nagumo would be back in the fight in twelve hours. With all four carrier air wings armed for anti ship warfare. On the hunt
It would be great if you could tastefully superimpose captions over photographs. I often just pause the videos to study each image, but this only raises more curiosity - and frustration with the lack of information. Love the channel.
Fletcher while senior knew that his ship was not the equal to the Enterprise and Hornet taskforce. He knew just how damaged Yorktown actually was. While Spurance wasn't a carrier commander he had been given the command by Halsey. The Japanese battle planned for Halsey to be the commander not Spurance. The Japanese knew Halsey was aggressive and he would seek combat. Now let's get into how the Battle of Midway was fought from both sides of the US commanders. Spurance knew that he needed to get the first hit into the Japanese carriers in order to equal the odds of decks against him. Now Fletcher was running a scout search out to 100 miles to keep his and Task Force 16s flank secure. Once Spurance launched Fletcher recovered and launched his strike. Now Fletcher had a scrathed together air group. His was a combination of his original pilots some survivors from the Lexington and then filled out from the Saratoga air groups. Spurance and Tf16 had all their original air groups. The Yorktown didn't even have a full squadron of TBDs on board only had 12 planes. Now let's get into the attack on the 3 carriers hit first. The Enterprise had 30 SBDs in their attack wave and the Yorktown had 15. They did their duty and destroyed the carriers. Now let's get to the attacks on Yorktown. The Hiryu planes followed the Yorktown planes. The attack waves were decimated but still got enough planes through to damage the Yorktown. The damage control on Yorktown was heroic to get her back up to fast enough to launch planes and maneuver. When the second wave was detected they launched everything they could off the Yorktown to get them airborne and off the ship. Fletcher had by this time left the Yorktown and transferred his flag to Astoria. Then the second wave hit and forced the abandonment of Yorktown. We then discovered the Hiryu and destroyed her. Now here's were Spurance in command becomes so important. He remembered that keeping Midway safe along with his carriers became more important than running up the tonnage sunk. Spurance only attacks the cruisers when he has a positive position and he knows his planes are in range.
Three uber-important USA Admirals pictured at 2:00. Two of them so modest, but such great men. The guy in the middle? No way to replace the SOB, and he DID hire good people. Like those guys on either side of him....
I think that a battle like Midway had no "mastermind." The basic mission was "go out there, find the Japanese carriers, and sink 'em. Oh, and try not to lose any of your own." The positions were not static, as in a land battle, everything was reactive and spur-of-the-moment, backed by current doctrine (for better or worse). There could be nothing but the broadest of "plans" to fail to survive first contact with the enemy. Both TF commanders knew that when they found the Japanese carriers, and confirmed they were really the striking force and not a diversionary force (the mistake made at Coral Sea, which Fletcher was determined not to make again), they would hit it with everything they had. It doesn't require great command ability to recognize that.
Not really, Nimitz wanted to have Japan launch first, and then hit them when they were refueling. Growing wrote a paper in the NWC in the 30s about this very tactic. The entire thing was planned from jump. But luck had to play a huge part, as carrier ops were still very very new.
Was Collingwood and Nelson the inspiration for Monty Python's "I'm not quite dead yet"? I'm sorry, I couldn't stop myself and will leave quietly. Thank you, Drach. Thought provoking video on command relationships and the inter workings of the structure.
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Hey drach! I actually just picked up my copy of shattered sword this week, and in the opening chapter, it mentions how akagi and kaga started with tripple flight decks before being transfered to the long single one. How would this work in theory? And could tripple deck carriers have been improved upon?
Are there any instances of subordinates coming up with a full battle plan that an Admiral subsequently adopted?
You mention that you don't want to cover battles like Midway because of the plethora of excellent documentaries on them. As a comparitive layman, I find it difficult to know which documentaries are reliable and which are sensationalized, a problem severely exacerbated if the documentary in question is TH-cam content. Could you offer some titles of those you find reliable? And if possible, also on various battles beyond Midway?
If there is a complaint about Fletcher's command at Midway, mine would be not launching VS-5 shortly after launching the morning strike that he did send. Hiryu could have been damaged before it could send off its first dive bomber strike. Or at least, shortly after.
By the way, in your latest live Drydock show, I made a question about why Historians don't question why Nimitz did not do enough to get USS Saratoga out to Midway by June 4. You dismissed it with some reasons that I don't agree with without some historical evidence. I believe it is an under researched portion of the battle.
The U.S. Navy won the Battle of Midway, under the overall command of Admiral Fletcher, who was also, to that point in the war, by far, the most experienced U S. aircraft carrier commander.
On flag officers' orders and reality. On my first visit to the Pentagon as a lowly major, there was a sign in front of an elevator reading, "Closed for major repairs". Taped beneath was a neatly typed sign that read "Tell Major Repairs that General Public wants this fixed immediately".
LOL! That's hilarious.
Thank you for that. It's been a rather hum drum Friday today & I needed a good laugh! Right on time too. I hope you have a good weekend. And now I'm about to board a 16A Metro bus to the Pentagon, coincidentally!❤
Dad jokes at the Pentagon. Because of course.
Shades of Major Major Major Major from "Catch 22".
And the winner of the Internet is... 😅
Midway was a massive team effort
Nimitz's leadership and intel created the general battle plan, kept the carriers ready for battle, his subordinates aware of the Japanese Midway invasion.
The pearl harbor shipyard workers made Yorktown ready for battle ridiculously quickly and effectively.
Fletcher and Spruance positioned the ambush and coordinated the recon efforts.
Henderson and all the Midway aircraft conducted the initial recon that allowed the Americans to hit first.
Waldron (VT-8), Lindsey/Ely (VT-6), Massey (VT-3), and Thach (VF-3) pestered the Kido Butai and kept them too busy dodging their hits, which prevented the launch of the counterstrike and distracted the IJN CAP from going after the dive-bombers.
Best(VB-6), Mcluskey(VS/B-6), Leslie (VB-3), and Shumway (VB-3) delivered the final hammer blows that broke Nagumo's back.
If any of these people had done anything different, Midway may have turned out very differently.
Excellent comment! Although you did leave out Nautalis attacking the Japanese carriers, causing Arashi to hang back, keeping her submerged, which then resulted in Arashi having to race back to catch up with the carriers. Had she but known that McCluskey would spot her wake, pointing like the finger of the Almighty towards the kido butai, Arashi's crew would surely have scuttled their ship rather than betray the fleet's position.
Thus even the presence of the American submarines at Midway was crucial to the victory.
What did it take for the Americans to win at Midway? Nothing less than absolutely everything they had.
The IJN train wreck had two polar opposite fails. Their picket submarines were too late arriving at Pearl to keep a fully ironclad track of the USN fleet sorties and their Midway -- Aleutians complex plan consisted of doing too much with too much.
@@therealuncleowen2588 that was on the level of one of the Gods from Discworld saying "I'm gonna give Captain Vimes a hint".
If someone gets credit for command authority on the win? It's got to be Nimitz. He gave his subordinates a sufficient understanding of what he wanted - without tying their hands. And they pulled it off. I want to think it could have been done with a lot fewer casualties if the US strikes were coordinated. But if that coordination had come at the expense of Japan getting off a strike of their own - maybe there was nothing else for it?
@@t5ruxlee210 I'm kind of baffled that the IJN didn't have patrolling subs watching Pearl Harbor as a matter of course. (And if they did - why they were apparently so ineffective).
I really love how Fletcher's reputation has been restored a bit over the last few years with proper research and study. He was a good commander who did his best in his very difficult situations.
Still of the view that King prematurely removed him from the Guadalcanal Campaign (Saratoga's luck with Torpedoes notwithstanding). While the IJN had their carriers as a credible threat, it was a bad idea.
@@ph89787 Saratoga treated torpedoes like Pokémon, gotta catch em all !! Can't blame Fletcher for that.
Restored from whence?
@@JeffreyWilliams-dr7qe Samuel Elliot Morrison
@@JeffreyWilliams-dr7qe restored from the pits of history
As a career Army officer, you cannot over emphasize the importance of Fletcher's decision to allow Spruance to take over control of the battle. It was absolutely the right tbing to do and yet I doubt many other admirals would have had the integrity to do so. Put yourself there. This is the biggest fleet fight to date in the Pacific. Win big and you'll be remembered forever. Reining in his ego to allow a subordinate to fight what might be the biggest action of the war (not knowing what is coming) ranks Fletcher above most admirals and generals I can think of. MacArthur would never have done that. Doubt if Halsey would have done that. Yet that decision was critical for the win. Drach, well done. Very well done . Most historians don't understand the intricacies and politics of command.
Beatty wanted to turn back the High Seas Fleet himself, with a little help from the battleship squadrons under Jellicoe. That's why Beatty kept the Grand Fleet in the dark about the enemy position when his entire job was to reconnoiter the situation and _report._
Fletcher did what Beatty could not. Thus the victory was his.
The two admirals who might well have done that were Spruance and Lee. I think King would have demanded being carried to another carrier.
I totally agree with you and was about to make a similar post. I have always admired Nimitz, Fletcher and Spruance because they were leaders committed to winning a war not self aggrandisement. The same cannot be said of MacArthur.
Bull Halsey may have been able to do so later on in the war. And probably was for the best that he was laid up with shingles. He was a hard charger, and not one you would nominally want in command of a defensive action. Not to say he didn't do so later on in the war, and in fairness did at least a passible job.
@@dantreadwell7421”Halsey acted stupidly.” My favorite line from Red October and an appropriate description of Halsey on more than one occasion.
Jon Parshall has observed that Fletcher was an eminently unselfish commander, and that it is a testament to his skill as a true leader that he was able to recognize that Spruance was sufficiently competent, capable, and on top of the course of the battle to let him take the lead following the strike on Yorktown. I agree. Sometimes the best thing a good leader can do is stay out of the way and let his fully capable subordinates do their jobs. Ego doesn't win wars; success does.
As far as Parshall's assessment is concerned, even a blind squirrel finds a nut once in a while. Agreed though, Fletcher did an excellent job of not micromanaging his subordinates.
Fletcher quickly took the right action that day. He did that often during the life-death battle in the early years of the Pacific War. He was one of our best admirals.
What NO ONE ever talks about is how Elliot Buckmaster was screwed over. Yorktown struck hard at Coral Sea. Her crew performed a miracle at Pearl Harbor with a hasty repairs and rearming. She was the only ship that put the DBs TBs and fighters over the enemy at the same time. He evaded a slew of attacks with superior ship handling and his damage control parties had the damaged ship looking like she was never hit. That guy should have been given greater commands.
YES!
I just recently saw an interview with Richard "Dick" Best. This man was a pilot that was in charge of himself & two other pilots. He pulled his planes out of the dive on the Kaga in order to go after Akagi. Which he nailed while his other two planes missed. And then on the follow up strike on the Hiryu he also nailed that carrier as well.
In his interview, he said that credit for winning that battle should go to the intelligence officers that broke the Japanese code & let us know what the Japanese plans were. Never did he boast about being the pilot that basically sank two Japanese fleet carriers. He viewed the entire thing as a team effort and he was just one man in this very LARGE team. A very humble man, or at least the interview that he gave made him appear very humble. When speaking about the torpedo squadrons, he got choked up & almost went into tears. You could tell that their sacrifice bothered him greatly. And I think he even claimed that although they scored no hits that they were the true heroes of the Battle of Midway. It was the only time I had ever seen him or heard him speak. But it made me think & feel that THAT ALTHOUGH THE USA won a great victory that day, that the victory came with a very high cost. And I could tell that by the way he talked about it. To me, it seemed that he accomplished what needed to be done. And that now, knowing how many died as a result of his bombing accuracy, that it wasn't something that he was very proud of doing. And as a human being it is very understandable. Although it is war, knowing I had killed over a five hundred people in one day would weigh fairly heavy on my mind. And it seemed to me Richard "Dick" Best felt that way too. Yes, he did it. But don't really want to talk about it. Not just a very good pilot but a good & decent human being.
Dick Best and his smart diversion to go after and sink Akagi might just have been the true tipping point of the war.
@mitchellhawkes22 I truly feel that it was. Cuz if he didn't remove Akagi from the equation, that very first strike against Yorktown is more than likely going to either sink Yorktown or totally put her out of commission. Either way, the Japanese don't make the mistake of going after her during the second wave. And who knows what happens after that. Roll the dice and the Japanese wins, and roll the dice again and the Americans win. And another thing too is if Hornets pilots don't go on the "infamous flight to nowhere" then they could have sank or damaged Hiryu enough that Yorktown doesn't even have to deal with a strike at all!
Admiral Fletcher probably one of the most underrated and under appreciated admirals of WWII
맞습니다 그는 1942년에 6척의 일본항모가 격침된 해전때마다 모두 미함대를 이끌며 빛나는 전공을 세웠지요. 2차대전서 6척의 적항모를 격침하고도 홀대를 받다니 ... 42년 이후 내내 한직에 머문 것은 이해가 안가는 일이기도 합니다.
I was administrator for the Marshall County (Iowa) historical museum about 20 years ago, located in Marshalltown, IA - Fletcher's birthplace. There was a small display about him there, but I understand the museum is (semi?) closed.
I find it amusing that both Fletcher and Nimitz were born in landlocked towns (central Iowa and central Texas) but became famous admirals.
So was Ching Lee.
Obviously Fletcher needs more recognition. That he did not was, it seems. owning to King. It should be pointed out that King never commanded a carrier into battle. Yorktown really got into the fight, as well. Meanwhile there was Hornet. Then there was the poor performance of the captain of Enterprise. So it was the case that it WAS the pilots who sank those ships.
An ocean you say?
Not uncommon.Hipper was Bavarian.
I don't really find it amusing. I expect it. America is distinctly a meritocracy, and will find its leaders, even if born in a ghetto.
If I had to summarise this video, it's: "Who deserves credit for the overall Strategy, who gets credit for the Tactical aspects, and who gets credit for dropping the bombs."
Overall a lovely video to listen to Drach, thanks a bunch.
Okay, yeah. It's a lovely video. But you're supposed to form some of your opinions now. Hop to it.
Good point, we'll made. There's a difference between being the boss and being a leader, Fletcher is clearly a leader who rightly trusted his team to perform.
People are starting to question the Fletcher bashing of earlier accounts and give him more of his due credit. Thanks for posting this.
I've read a lot. I think Fletcher was one of our better admirals.
The Navy is a team. One handed the football off to the other.
Well said
Meanwhile, Mitscher tackled a cheerleader.
Marine snickers...
The most underrated skill in terms of military operations is that of knowing when to get the hell out of the way.
Any military historian worth anything can think of half a hundred examples of a commander losing a battle by trying to control everything alone. Sometimes the best thing a commander can do is simply say "right, you got this, you know what you're doing", and letting the person who's actually in combat make the minute to minute decisions.
Fletcher shouldn't get more credit than Spruance, but at the end of the day both did their jobs correctly and the US Navy won.
The navy has a principal of very extreme accountability. More than the other branches due to being far flung at sea. A commander is like god.
The commanding officer of the battle gets all the blame....or all the credit.
It is what is is...Fletcher deserves far more credit that he has received.
Funny how no one blames Spruance for the Hornet, which was under his direct command.
MIdway has been my jam since being rewarded for good grades by being allowed to choose "The Battle of Midway' by Ira Peck from the scholastic reader catalog.
For me, the battle is less about who is due the credit, but the blame that's due to Mitscher. As I age into my curmudgeonhood, I find myself talking about MItscher that same way Jon Parshall talks about Richmond Kelly "Terrible" Turner. Admiral Fletcher had just come off having Admiral King's former flagship (Lexington) sunk while under his command at Coral Sea. He then had the hastily-repaired Yorktown sunk out from under him here.
I find myself agreeing with Jon Parshall's view that Mitscher sank Yorktown. Had Hornet contributed ANYTHING; apart form the sacrifice of her torpedo squadron; to the morning strike, the entire Kido Butai is permanently assigned to reef duty by lunchtime, and Yorktown survives. Enterprise's Dauntlesses sank Akagi and Kaga, Yorktown's got Soryu, and Hornet's were off reconnoitering the Aleutian Islands, or some such.
Like Turner, MItchser gets a lot of credit for being indispensible to the US Navy's efforts in 1944, Turner for developing & implementing the amphibious doctrine, and MItscher for carrier doctrine. Parshall has stated that the system that was the US Navy must have produced several; if not many; officers who could've done Turner's job, without Turner's problems. I say the same thing about MItcher. There had to be any number of Admirals who could've led that flotilla of Essexes and Indepences against what was left of the IJN in 1944, and who hadn't disobeyed orders, then lied about it, contributing to one of the black marks against Fletcher, which caused his reputation to be ruined in his lifetime.
I couldn't agree more and while we are at it god forbid Halsey was in command for any of Fletcher's carrier battles or we wouldn't have been able to win at Gaudalcanal (and I love Halsey for the record).
This was the book that started me also on a lifelong hobby of Pacific War history. I got it in a school bookmobile in 4th grade.
I still have my copy of that book. It’s beat up, but it’s still on my bookshelf to remember how I got started in the Pacific war. And I also think your post is spot on.
Would McClusky, or any of the other flight leaders have needed to find a destroyer moving like a bat out of hell if there was a column of smoke on the horizon? How many of the pilots might not have taken a bath and made it back to their carriers? In the afternoon would the USN have sunk more of the escort forces? What would another USN carrier and fewer IJN cruisers and maybe fewer destroyers have meant for Guadalcanal?
It’s an interesting “What if?” Halsey absolutely would have fired up the conveyor belt and launched strikes at the IJN main body until he ran out of either fuel or ordinance. Thats who he was. “Strike. Repeat, strike.”
But would he have been smart about it? I think he would have. He’d have been under the same “calculated risk” guidelines from Nimitz as Fletcher & Spruance. He’d have just had to keep them at arm’s length; out of enemy gun range, but within range of his strike aircraft; and he’d have had the IJN out in the open, a long way from home, no air cover of their own, just A-A to defend themselves.
As long as he didn’t get oversgressive, and his scouts kept good tabs on where the IJN were so Yamato couldn’t put 18” holes in The Big E or Hornet, he could’ve won a little “harder” than they historically did.
I am allways amazed at how consistant such commanders can arrive at sound decisions, in the face of uncertainty.
In pen and paper rpgs, or other tabletop games, folks can easliely spend entire evenings fussing and getting stuck on components of over all much simpler decisions.
Thank you for making this point about Fletcher, allowing Spruance to get on with it rather than allowing his ego to get in the way. Fletcher is a figure who should be much better known. I always feel he should be in the short list of great American commanders in the Pacific. I'm sure that in his later years he slept well knowing that when the moment's came, he made the correct decisions.
He wound up sidelined, somewhat unfairly, in almost IJN fashion, when his only crime was not winning hard enough.
I'll just leave this here
From November 1942 - 1945, Fletcher commanded naval forces in the North Pacific from the Alaskan island of Adak.[7] In November 1942, he became commandant of Thirteenth Naval District and commander of Northwestern Sea Frontier. He was relieved as commandant in October 1943, but continued to serve as commander Northwestern Sea Frontier until April 15, 1944, when the Northwestern Sea Frontier was abolished and the Alaskan Sea Frontier established. He then became Commander of the latter, with additional duty as Commander North Pacific Force and North Pacific Ocean Area. It was revealed in July 1945 that Task Force 90, under his overall command, had made the first penetration through the Kurile Islands in the Sea of Okhotsk on March 3 and 4, 1945, and the same task force on February 4, 1945, bombarded Paramushir in the first sea bombardment of the Kurile.[1]
@@marckyle5895being sent to a backwater section of the theater is still sidelining fletcher unfairly. The way wasn’t going to be decided in the icy waters of the northern pacific
It was the naval battle off Guadalcanal, where he pulled out too early, that probably got him sidelined for the rest of the war.
@marckyle5895 Another of Fletcher's unsung achievements was getting the cooperation of the Army during the Aleutian campaign. While I hate that he was removed from main force command when he was, I also firmly believe he was the best man for the job in the Aleutians.
Drach,
Loved the video! I think what happened at midway was (mostly) a great example of how U.S. Navy command philosophy is supposed to work. Fletcher was SOPA (senior officer present afloat) and as such was *responsible* for all forces. He was also OPCON (operational control) of both task forces (ie, responsible for overall concept of operations), and TACON (tactical control, responsible for localized execution) of the Yorktown Force. Spruance was TACON for the Hornet and Enterprise task force. When Fletcher's ability to exercise OPCON was impeded, he passed OPCON to the officer most able to exercise operational control of the forces- i.e., Spruance. I'm not clear on how TACON of the Yorktown group devolved, if at all, but I doubt Spruance was exercising TACON remotely. It likely devolved to the screen commander for the Yorktown force, but I don't know that for certain.
That bit of mastery of the obvious aside, things that occurred to me as I watched the vid:
1- Fletcher never relinquished *responsibility* (he was still SOPA) for the battle, despite relinquishing operational *authority* (OPCON). If everything had gone wrong while under Spruance's operational control, Fletcher would have still been responsible. His decision to devolve OPCON was not only clear headed and doctrinally correct, but also selfless in that regard.
2- I believe Spruance, as TACON of Enterprise and Hornet, *should be held accountable for Hornet not obeying tactical direction.* Even though he could not of course read Mitscher's mind and countermand the flight plan, Hornet was under Spruance's TACON and as such its actions reflect a loss of command and control on Spruance as OTC (officer in tactical control.) Mind you I say this as a huge Spruance fan, but the question of, "What the hell, Ray, can't you control your carriers?" would have been valid from either Fletcher or Nimitz.
3- As far as "credit" goes, I don't think there's much point on dividing the credit amongst the officers present. Technically it was Fletcher's battle, in that he was responsible no matter what, but the decentralized TACON and shifting OPCON meant that everybody had to do their bit or it would come apart- witness what happened when Mitscher decided not to play along. Fletcher and Spruance were remarkably in-sync in their handling of their task groups and the overall operational concept, which just points to them both being true professionals who were doctrinally savvy and inter-personally trusting.
Anyhow, I apologize for all the jargon- and I realize that this is modern jargon, not period. But the jargon defines the thought behind what happened- to wit, The SOPA was impeded in his OPCON and devolved it upon the officer most able to exercise it, while retaining overall responsibility. That is exactly what is supposed to happen, and you have to laud Fletcher for the selfless but correct call, and Spruance for showing absolutely no gaps or seams in control when the time came. Consummate professionals both, and both deserve credit for that.
I hear you and am familiar with it.....bottom line is a commander at sea is in charge PERIOD. FULL STOP. Unless one has been in the navy, they cannot understand fully the accountability piece that is often looked at strangely by both civilians and other services. Maritime law and customs are very unique. Fletcher was it.
Fletcher, being senior and in COMMAND gets either all the praise or all the blame.
Spruance had opcon for the Hornet....and the Hornet was a de facto failure at Midway.
People overlook that, but if that battle went the other way.....
I have always thought Fletcher's handling of command at Midway showed a professionalism and competence that is often not present. When he couldn't exercise command he passed control to Spruance who could and he didn't interfere with Spruance. Also, post war Fletcher never engaged in a debate of "who won Midway" unlike Sampson and Schley in the Spanish-American War. Neither did Spruance. The argument has 'academic' because Morrison didn't like Fletcher.
@@washingtonradio Thank you for bringing up Sampson and Schley. It's a great counterexample!
I would be kinder to Spruance. He was a cruiser division admiral a week previously and both the Enterprise and Hornet had been used to how Halsey did it. Note the friction between him and Browning, who was later revealed to be already above his present level of competence when he was promoted to Captain. "You didn't just start being a fuckup this month, right? It took a while to make your officers that dumb." would have been my words to Mitscher about the Hornet. Browning himself gets the first sentence. I'd have rather been flying from Yorktown. None of them got lost, unlike B/S-8 and F-8.
You'd think the Navy would already have hard and fast regs for things like Distance vs. Loadout, with standards for all types flying in print and accessible.
@@slightlyshabby9226 And that's why nothing was said - publicly. Nimitz didn't air the Navy's dirty laundry. But you know him, Nimitz and King all spoke to each other about it. Maybe they already saw the 1944 MM or he had rookie fever, muffed it and then settled down.
"Victory has a thousand fathers, defeat is always an orphan."
You are a very faithful quoter.
If you really want to nitpick. You can argue that Wade McClusky, Earl Gallagher, Dick Best and Max Leslie won the Battle of Midway. As it was their Dauntlesses that planted the bombs that blew up Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and later Hiryu and Mikuma.
Dang it. You beat me to it. Great comment. Well done, Brah.
I wouldn't make that argument. Credit goes to virtually every level of command. Not any one. I would however give the pilots a lot of credit -- the pilots had to find their targets, when their original vector was to open ocean. VDH makes a good argument for the pilots in Courage and Culture. The Americans did get more than a little lucky. They launched a piecemeal attack and when it got to the Kido Butai, it was a perfectly coordinated one.
@@scottpankonin1068 I know it was a massive team effort by everyone involved. Especially the pilots involved.
But they couldn't have done that without the orders given to them, the direction to fly given to them, and the carriers having been in position to attack beforehand....
My thoughts exactly. But, both Spruance and Fletcher put them at the right place at the right time, whether by design or Brownian motion. i hate to say it, but Nimitz gets high marks too. Warfighting is a team sport.
I think its both, Fletcher was the over all commander for the US fleet but once Yorktowns out the fight Fletcher seems to basically hand command over to Spruance as hes away from the carriers at that point so from then on its Spruance in charce as he has the operational carriers to hand and Fletchers not in a posistion to take command of them before the strike on Hiryu.
In the Navy, if you are in command, you get all the credit or all the blame....full stop.
The navy is not like other branches, accountability is extreme. For a reason.
Fletcher won or fought to a draw the battles in 1942, all 4 of them.
No 'seem' to it. Fletcher explicitly turned over tactical command to Spruance after Yorktown was put out of the fight and gave him the freedom to wage the battle his way.
@@doctordetroit4339 And at the end of 1942, the USN had two fleet carriers, while the IJN were also down to the Zuikaku sisters. He won parity for us. He knocked the bully onto his back foot and then got tapped out.
@@doctordetroit4339Except for all of the exceptions...
@@marckyle5895 And the Japanese started out with massive superiority and far more talented aircrews.
Fletcher deserves the credit. "The commander is responsible for everything his unit does and fails to do" is something I learned as an 18 year old ROTC Cadet. He would have gotten the blame, so he deserves the credit.
Correct, there is no discussion, at least among navy types.
Fletcher deserves a LOT of credit for knowing his command team is compromised, and he doesn't have the situational awareness that Spruence had. So it makes perfect sense for him to accede authority in a temporary way, to the officer better able to prosecute the battle.
And it takes a big man to step aside. Ego is a thing.
@@jeromethiel4323 Good leaders don't have inflated egos.
@@jeromethiel4323 A lot of good work done as far as that goes. I don't think any of them would care who was in charge - if the result was four enemy carriers on the bottom. I think they would regret how many aviators were lost. And while it was a shame to lose Yorktown, most of the crew came off. That core of folks must have been a big help when it was time to build out crews for the Essex class.
@@jeromethiel4323 Somehow I couldn't see Dugout Doug nor Sempter Iratis King stepping aside, and I could see the later ordering a destroyer to taking him to the other carriers at full speed.
I'm glad to see the Fletcher Mafia come out in his defense. He was done dirty by Samuel Eliot Morison and Admiral King and it's good to see people now recognize his important contributions to the early Pacific war effort.
King did not believe Fletcher was pessimistic and not aggressive enough. I think the only time that this may have been true was the withdrawal of the carrier forces before Savo Island. One can easily argue that Fletcher was too aggressive at Coral Seas but otherwise Fletcher was effectively balancing the risk to his carrier forces against the potential losses.
@@gerardwall5847there was a Marine colonel with Fletcher during Guadalcanal. That Marine colonel said Fletcher did exactly the right thing, withdrawing when he did. Fletcher stood a good chance of losing too many aircraft or even a carrier, had he stayed in place. Savo Island would likely of had a different outcome of that had happened.
Fletcher did not like the Guadalcanal operation and said so in no uncertain terms to Turner and Vandegrift. Considering that Guadalcanal was Ernie King's idea and that Turner was one of King's "boys", is it any wonder than Fletcher wound up sidelined?
Sign me up for the Fletcher-Was-A-Great-American campaign.
Without Fletcher, we might have lost ALL our carriers by the end of 1942.
And today, almost a century later, we might still be speaking Japanese.
There were a grand total of 6 carrier vs carrier battles in all of the Pacific. Just six.
4 in 1942 alone....no more until closer until the end of the war, and they were very lopsided against Japan.
Fletcher was the lead admiral in all of those 4. It was a battle against two equals, more or less.
Strange how Spruance doesn't get blamed for the USS Hornet at Midway....I am not into revisionism, as carrier ops was in its infancy and the Hornet was brand spanking new....but still.
Fletcher deserves seriously high praise for what he did. He already had a Medal of Honor.
A real hero, alongside Spruance, Nimitz and Halsey.
I'm not sure what you mean about the USS Hornet at Midway. Hornet was sunk in the battle of Santa Cruz and I don't think Spruance was at that battle.
Update: Ok. I think you are referring to the airgroups from Hornet that suffered grievous losses because of the piecemeal nature of the attack on the Japanese carriers, because the squadrons were taking so long to form up Spruance told them to just head out and find the Japanese carriers, form up then and attack. The torpedo bombers across the fleet were wiped out because of this. It did however leave the Japanese carriers without top cover when the dive bombers arrived.
I agree. I've been reading about the Pacific war for decades. I think the Pentagon knew it had a helluva dependable and capable carrier-group commander in Fletcher. How many can you name that were better?
@@Pablo668 I think he means that Mitscher sent the Hornet's dive bombers off on the "flight to nowhere". A horrible decision and performance by Mitscher (who was under Spruance's command).
Fletcher, Spruance all had their roles.
To me you hit the nail on the head, Fletcher passed command on when was not capable of executing it.
The strength of character that showed to do that, showed his professionalism. How many senior leaders would have instead raced to reassert their authority and ensure their press coverage? Lots. Which is simply a comment on humanity.
to comment here, ~ 27:00, Fletcher giving that signal was more-less formalizing, what has already more-less taken place without his presence. Because at this point hes not got the full picture of the battle; He's been out of coms, reports, and was on board a burning carrier, hes no longer got the situational/combat awareness anymore of exactly whats what and whats where. Its gonna take him some time to get back in the loop of it all. Spruance at this point has that awareness, Fletcher recognizes that and acts accordingly.
So. We salute Fletcher. He coulda been a meat-head and tried to keep his severely weakened command. History provides many examples of that type.
Great video Drach! A clear component of the battle is that the commanders knew when to lead and when to follow.
No one can question Admiral Fletcher's courage. Just look at the little blue ribbon on his "fruit salad"? The little blue one with white stars, on the top of the balance of his ribbons, is rather distinctive. Not many sailors ever get the chance to expose themselves the way you have to in order to be awarded that medal.
An interesting way of putting that thought and a likely source of comfort for most sailors. The stains of glory tend toward red and brown.
The Navy awarded 56 CMH for the Vera Cruz action in 1914. Most, if not all of those would have been a lesser award, had they existed at the time.
@@JackNiles-hc8yzregardless of that fact, it still carried the same weight to those encountering a serviceman who had that ribbon on their chest.
@@Engine33Truck I rather doubt that those particular medals carried the same weight. Maybe they did.
@@JackNiles-hc8yz I’m referring to the CMH. Regardless of whether the Vera Cruz CMH’s *should’ve* been lesser awards, they were still CMHs nonetheless
Command cohesiveness and the willingness to put personal glory and self-assertion aside according to the unfolding dynamics of battle - this is a greatly underappreciated quality.
Some thoughts: When Yorktown was knocked out, 3 Japanese carriers had already been neutralized, so Fletcher was in command in every respect until late in the battle. Fletcher's staff along with Yorktown's air group, being far more experienced with actual carrier combat than anyone in TF 17, got their torpedo bombers, dive bombers and fighters over the Soryu/Hiryu carrier division simultaneously due to how they planned and sequenced the launch and transit to target. Yorktown was also positioned in the correct location for recovering her air wing, resulting in her aircraft not encountering the desperate fuel situation that Enterprise and Hornet aircraft faced. That this was closer to the Japanese carriers is what made Yorktown the sole target for the Japanese counterattacks, which in and of itself spared the other two carriers. In the end, Enterprise's dive bomber pilots overcame rather poor (albeit inexperienced) planning and execution at the task force and air group level, while Hornet's air group did nothing at all positive despite her torpedo squadron being the first to find the Japanese carriers. Yorktown's strike was executed according to plan based on experience at Lae-Salamaua and Coral Sea. They just had less luck in that the torpedo bombers went after Hiryu (while the dive bombers went after Soryu) and, as had all American torpedo bomber squadrons at Midway, failed to take out the target. The one mistake that all American commanders at Midway made was overestimating the abilities of their torpedo bombers.
I would not say that the American commanders overestimated the abilities of the torpedo bombers. Combat experience at the time did not indicate that the torpedo bombers were any more vulnerable than any other bomber type (and in actuality, they were not really any more vulnerable than other bomber types). At Lae-Salamaua and Coral Sea the torpedo bombers did not suffer significant losses. The US torpedo bombers at Midway were attacked by considerably larger numbers of fighters, which tended to result in heavy losses, regardless of bomber type. (For example, the Japanese lost 11 of 18 dive bombers in the Hiryu attack on Yorktown before those bombers actually attacked the ship.)
The only US torpedo squadron that had a fighter escort was that of Yorktown, and Torpedo 3 only had six escorting fighters while being attacked by roughly 40 Zeros. Had the Devastators been Kates or SM79s or Avengers or Swordfish (or Dauntlesses or Ju-87s or Vals), the result would likely have been the same. Again, unescorted bombers, or bombers attacked by fighters that greatly outnumber their escorts, tend to suffer heavy losses.
The US commanders assumed that, as at Coral Sea, the Japanese fighters would not be able to concentrate on the torpedo bombers. Due to the flawed decisions by Mitscher and Ring, the poor coordination among the Enterprise aircraft, and the target fixation by the Japanese fighters attacking Torpedo 3, the torpedo squadrons were attacked by large numbers of defending fighters while the dive bomber squadrons were ignored. Enterprise's fighters were in the area but never intervened, and Hornet's fighters never found the Japanese. Only Yorktown's fighters contributed, and they were attacked by such overwhelming numbers that they were unable to prevent heavy losses among the Torpedo 3 aircraft.
Spruance alway said, that by the time command was given to him, the battle was already won.
Drach sums it up well in the end. They all won. We are too quick to pick at content creators.
Well, Nimitz gave the Grand Design for the battle: "Kick Nagumo's ass, but don't lose all the carriers." That general instruction was enough leeway for the tactical commanders. Unlike Nagumo, whose hight priority was not to lose any of his carriers.
Pretty much the same instructions at Guadalcanal. Nimitz was willing to sacrifice the islands (and Marines) to keep the carriers afloat.
Jack Fletcher was one hell of a good carrier commander and an excellent tactician but the credit goes to Nimitz in my estimation. He set the ambush really and he trusted the men under his command to do the job. A hallmark of a great military leader is the ability to bring along the right men, create a general strategy and then get out of the way. When you think of all the accolades given to certain theater commanders a name overlooked is Nimitz. His handling of the central Pacific might have been the most difficult command of the entire war.
Was the most difficult!! Europe First. No resources. A huge ocean. A dynamic enemy attacking everywhere. And a knife's edge between success and failure (carriers)
One might say that Nimitz knew commander Fletcher would not impair the action at Midway for egotisical reasons. Fletcher did not hesitate to give his command to Spruance, who eventually made history at Midway. I give Nimitz and Fletcher a lot of credit for that.
One of the marks of a great commander is one that recognizes when they are not in the best position to command and defers to one that is.
For the time we had to rely on him, Fletcher was the indispensable Admiral. His decision through that time, kept us in the fight. He was a better commander than Halsey, frankly. His misfortune was to be targeted for political reasons. His reputation is improving over time, however.
"...always fueling"
What I appreciate about Fletcher is that at Coral Sea, he fought the fleet according to the best practices and thinking at the time, while also being highly aware that the USN only had two big, best Yorktown-class fleet carriers in the entire Pacific theater, Yorktown and Enterprise, plus the (EDIT: new, smaller Hornet, which had just arrived and the) older, less-capable Lexington. Langley was considered only useful for aircraft transport. He was highly aware that he was responsible to turn back the Japanese effort to invade Port Moresby but also to do everything possible to preserve scarce national assets. Too many people look back on early 1942 and are unaware of just how relatively weak the USN was in relation to the IJN. When you don't have even adequate resources to fight a war, you do not have the luxury of engaging in slugging, highly-aggressive battles. You need to be a boxer, dancing in and landing your blows and then rapidly dancing back out of range of getting hit hard by your opponent.
@@MinnesotaGuy822 Langley had the additional problem that it had been sunk at the end of February.
USN and IJN were actually fairly evenly matched at the start of the Pacific war, although the IJN had the edge in the all-important carriers. The problem for the USN was that it had to fight in 2 oceans, so the Pacific fleet was undersized compared to the IJN, albeit not as much as people like to make it sound.
I think you are correct that the prudent Fletcher was a better admiral than hair-on-fire Halsey. Especially by the end of the war, Halsey was not the guy you wanted guiding your fleet.
Salute to both those Admirals and you Drach for taking the time to discuss the details of their accomplishments and analyzing them as officers.
A good commander knows when to just get out of the way and let the subordinates do the job. Fletcher had other things to organize , fighting the fires, transferring men, reassigning his planes, looking after Yorktown and of course finding a safe haven for himself and staff. Bold move and deserve praise.
10:39 this passage, and the earlier mention of the pilot's role, put me in mind of a message from Nimitz to the entire Pacific Fleet cited in Rich Frank's book on Guadalcanal. In part:
"Suitable targets present themselves only rarely to our guns, bombs, and torpedoes. On those rare occasions our tactics must be such that our objective will be gunned, bombed, or torpedoed to destruction."
I'd bet money Nimitz was thinking, no captain can do very wrong if he lays his ship alongside of the enemy.
At Midway, Fletcher was the most experienced carrier admiral on either side when it came to carrier v. carrier battles. A key lesson that both he and Hara had learned at Coral Sea was that SEARCH is everything. At Coral Sea Fletcher had thought that the fleet carriers would be with the transports but they were not, and his 1st search had missed them. At Midway he thought that the carriers might again be in two groups, and he did not rely on the PBYs to be his only eyes but ran his own search patterns. The first cleared the area to the North, and the second discovered Hiryu, which enabled Spruance to launch the afternoon attack that sank it. Fletcher also had to make the tough call on how many fighters to send in the 1st attack, leaving the rest for his CAP. (He only sent 6, must to Thach's disgust.) That decision paid off in part when Yorktown was attacked by the dive bombers (most were shot down). By the time Fletcher turned over command to Spruance the battle was basically over.
I love how a great video spawns a great discussion in the comments and then another great "reaction" video with even more analysis, commentary and comments to follow. Great stuff all around!
THANKS DRACH.!! AWESOME JOB AS USUAL.!!! Your ability to break down the Big Picture is second to none.!! Best WISHES from the States.!!🥇🤔🤔🤔🤔🤔😉😉😉🙂
Answer - Richard Best. Did anyone notice that the pistol Nimitz is holding is a Colt ACE 22 LR, not a 1911 45 ACP?
1911forum from 2021 points this out, but had you not commented, I would not have known. You, sir, win this prize! 🏆
One thing I believe is clear from all that we know now is that neither Fletcher nor Spruance would have gone wild eye crazy in chasing after Nagumo. Only certain staff officers seemed that reckless. WE know Spruance said no; and I am pretty sure Fletcher would have done the same thing.
Fletcher was more cautious than Spruance....no doubt you are correct.
Had Halsey been in command, he would have pressed the attack after the sinking of Hiryu and possibly ran into the surface force Nagumo sent forward.
Herman Wouk wrote in "War and Remembrance" (not an exact quote) that Spruance chose to pull back towards Midway/Point Luck where his fleet was both safe and dangerous. That was the masterstroke that sealed the Japanese defeat.
@@scottburton509 Yep. Nimitz had made it clear that preserving the carriers was his number one priority. Attack and take out some Jap carriers without risking too much.
He got a LOT of criticism from so called Air experts for that.
but honestly what could the american fleet have done? Down to two carriers; no torpedo planes; exhausted pilots. I mean look at how much effort it took to sink the Mikuma and mangle the Mogami and they were all but sitting targets. AND catching Nagumo would have probably run them out of fuel anyway.
I truly enjoyed this. I liked the goal and the result. The really interesting part is that the reality of the whole battle is that it comes down to three squadrons of dive bombers and the strategic decisions, the operational sacrifices, and the ironies of timing that determine the course and outcome of this battle.
Thank you, this was very informative and using Nelson as an example helped me to follow and understand the nuances of Navel Commands.
Not strictly related to the video, but my family used to laugh because my Dad had never seen the old Midway movie. Whenever it came on TV, he'd always say 'I love this movie!', get comfortable, and promptly fall asleep within 30 minutes. He never actually finished the movie for YEARS! 😂
I can understand why someone would fall asleep watching that.
As a Navy brat these men and their names were such a large part my childhood. My farther was a destroyer sailor. Stationed. on two spruance class ships. My schools and almost everthing else was off Fletcher st .Traveling those streets and hearing those names everyday we tended to know lot of these men and their actions.
Again, I don't object to Spruance getting _some_ credit for the victory at Midway, I just object to describing him as the "Mastermind of Midway." And honestly, none of the subsequent explanation makes his role, which was largely reactive, sound any more "mastermind-y" to me.
To continue the Trafalgar example - sure, Collingwood was the senior officer directly in charge of the bulk of the fighting, but does anyone call him the "Mastermind of Trafalgar"? Has anyone _ever_ said that?
I think that a battle like Midway had no "mastermind." The basic mission was "go out there, find the Japanese carriers, and sink 'em. Oh, and try not to lose any of your own." The positions were not static, as in a land battle, everything was reactive and spur-of-the-moment, backed by current doctrine (for better or worse). There could be nothing but the broadest of "plans" to fail to survive first contact with the enemy. Both TF commanders knew that when they found the Japanese carriers, and confirmed they were really the striking force and not a diversionary force (the mistake made at Coral Sea, which Fletcher was determined not to make again), they would hit it with everything they had. It doesn't require great command ability to recognize that.
Napoleon is credited with saying, "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake." A corollary to this would be, "Never interrupt your ally when he's winning the battle."
The latter is something which Fletcher seemed to understand very well.
"We have partial main power back"
"Best we could do in two hours"
We need a Video of F. J. Fletcher 😂
Excellent! Other entities on TH-cam can’t come close to the quality of your videos. Thank you.
There’s a joke in the webcomic Schlock Mercenary that a sergeant in motion outranks a lieutenant who doesn’t know what’s going on. Obviously the ranks here are much higher and the difference in rank is arguably a bit lower, but I think the maxim applies. The comic also jokes that an ordinance technician at a dead run outranks everybody.
Not that my opinion is worth much but I'll go with everybody did their job and did them very well indeed!
Fletcher effectively handed off command when he was unable to command thru no fault of his own. Not taking back command when he could have, possibly disrupting the chain of command was the right thing to do.
He was a team player and displayed an amazing strength of character, integrity, and honor as a senior naval officer should. Jim Y
I agree with how you explained your presentation and the way you did the videos, Mr. Drach! Very Well Done, Sir!👏👍
Very well explained. Perhaps sometime (with permission) the lively discourse involved that precipitated this "fun Friday" occurred could be shared.
Idk how I didn't find this channel earlier so much great info and very well presented love it
Both of them did, if your talking about the two admirals, but really, everybody in the task forces, plus the Midway folks, had a hand in the victory. So a great US TEAM Victory!
There is a good discussion of the Fletcher vs Spruance debate in, of all things, a work of fiction: War and Rembrance, by Herman Wouk. He has a (fictional) German general evaluating the Battle of Midway, who is dismissive of Fletecher. The novel's main character - Pug Henry - responds to that criticism in a way that opened my eyes and made me think Fletcher got an undeserved bad rap. It's a great novel - as is Winds of War - and the parts that focus on the war focus almost exclusively on the Pacific.
You probably know this but Wouk was a US navy officer aboard the USS Mason in the Pacific during the war. He was finally the CO of the Mason, a destroyer minesweeper.
If Fletcher wasn't up to the task, Nimitz would have replaced him at Pearl. But he didn't.
Good Day Sir! As always you've done a wonderful job of explaining things. I agree that no battle belongs solely to one man making decisions. For better or worse, it is the team of people under a commander that determines the outcome of any battle. I also agree that Fletcher deserves much greater credit for his wartime performance. Seems to me that his modest personality contributed to his lackluster recognition more than anything else. That fact that Ernest King didn't much care for him didn't help. Still, I think Spruance and Nimitz may have done more to stand up for him. Perhaps they did but I hadn't heard about it. Of utmost importance is the fact that Fletcher recognized he was behind the curve going into the battle. He had to wait for YORKTOWN to be readied and Spruance had to plan with the notion he may not have Fletcher and YORKTOWN available or in time. Once YORKTOWN was disabled it was no longer an argument. Spruance HAD to take charge.
Nimitz, for his part, (as is the responsibility of any commander), was responsible for setting the OBJECTIVES and providing guidance and any specific considerations to be taken into account. This provides the field commanders with the framework orders they are to work within. To the end all three of these men are primarily responsible for the victory.
Both
I think the question "Who won Miday?" can be best summed up by indeed yuopr answer "The entire team"
Rochefort for mustering the courage for the ruse of AF, Nimitz willing to listen, the courage for his calculated risk, and Spruance and Fletcher did what they did. Like you said, knowing when to hand over command - trusting your fellow sailor enough, because carriers, I think, were the best hub to gather and send out information. And of course every other airman, seaman and engineer who pulled the miracle of reparing Yorktown enough so she could sail.
It basically proves the point of "If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together."
Nimitz understood the only way to win, was to build a team (I especially realized this after reading "Mastering the Art of Command" of Trent Hone [Thanks Drachnifel for having the interview way back with Trent hone, can recommend the book]).
Fletcher did the right thing in conceding control to Spruance. Spruance, on Enterprise, had access to the staff (though Capt. Brown was not at the top of his game for some reason), facilities and information needed to direct the battle while Fletcher only had what was available on Astoria, which was not equipped to be a flagship.
Also, after Yorktown was hit, Spruance could see directly how the returning fliers were doing, and tally the usable aircraft and their ready states, while Fletcher would have to have minimal necessary airgroup status info blinkered to him (once he joined up with TF 16) until he could transfer to Enterprise or Hornet.
I do not read anything about ME Butcher's article, 1987: "Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, Pioneer Warrior or Gross Sinner?", in the Naval War College Review. He is the first one reviewing Fletcher's operational actions during the 3 carrierbattles. Butcher writes: "AFTER the Japanese striking power had been destroyed, Fletcher sent a message to Spruance, "I will conform to your movements" " (CTF 17 ltr A-16A-3 /A9(0029N), 26 June 1942, encl. A, p. 2). Let me rephrase this. The IJN Hiryu is sunk when Fletcher was in command, not Spruance. So all 4 Japanese heavy carriers were sunk when Fletcher was in command. To deny the honour of the best carrier admiral in the United States Navy for 45 years til 1987 represents all what has gone wrong in this country.
Thanks for the clarification. As I recall in the previous video Spruance was given too much credit for alone planning the upcoming battle.
I am not an expert on anything but I sure enjoy listening to an expert in their field. bravo.
Rochefort's team famously devised a ruse. They sent a message to the base on Midway instructing personnel there to radio Pearl that the salt-water evaporators on the base had broken down. Two days later, a Japanese message was intercepted that reported AF was running out of fresh drinking water.
That's not how they found out Midway was the target, though now it’s often interpreted that way, Rochefort knew to a good degree do to other intelligence it was likely midway, therefore so did Nimitz. Rebuttals up or down always welcome. Thanks ever much
The IJN calling their plan 'Operation MI' probably didn't help much. German high command had similar issues with their operation names ('Operation Sealion' being a classic). Allied high command noted this problem and reacted accordingly by selecting much more random names.
Fascinating.
Mk 1 Human eyeball! Nice touch Drach!
The battle of Miday was actually between Nimitz and Yamamoto and who had the better commanders under them and it turned out Nimitz had the better ones.
No, actual battles are operational level. Fletcher was the operational commander....Nimitz at strategic level set the stage. Fletcher, et al had to execute. Without a lot of luck to go with excellent planning....it could have very well been a disaster. Nimitz said McClusky's turn won the battle. Fletcher and Spruance put him there.
@@doctordetroit4339 yes but no, There was not a universal appeal to Nimitiz to put the fleet out there and go get them. In fact, quite the opposite. So Nimitiz rubbed his nose at the nay sayers and told his boys to 'go get them' and trusted them to succeed and avoid failure. On the day it is the pilots making heroic decisions that hit the target. But great leaders put them in that position.
Note that Yamamoto was actually at sea, but hamstrung because he was under radio silence as part of a "supporting group" hundreds of miles behind Kido Butai, while Nimitz was ashore and able to communicate, but he refrained from giving extraneous directions. Your point about the better commanders is still valid, although I get the sense that Nimitz had more choice in his group commanders than Yamamoto did.
I think the big thing that a lot of people don't realize is that Fletcher was the only commander with experience in the kind of fight that the fleet was headed into. That experience of carrier vs carrier (with the surface ships never seeing eachother) had just come about for the 1st time 30 days prior to Midway. Spruance likely had a good idea already what we anticipated were the best tactical level moves to make would be. Having Fletcher there with that first hand, real world experience was invaluable to assuring a victory. I can imagine that the 2 had a chance to confer a bit or at least swap some basic updated tactical ideas (via Nimitiz, aides, etc) between them before departing Pearl. Both men deserve equal credit for the win. It was definitely a team effort which they both understood clearly.
It is disappointing that King seemed to have had so little confidence in Fletcher. He technically won (at least met the objectives of the operation at the time) the battles he was in command of. It is good that he is finally getting the credit that is long deserved to him.
I extensively researched and studied government documents, classified at the time, about the Battle of Midway, specifically the leadership decisions made, during and following the battle. Admirals Spruance and Fletcher were the primary leaders whom I studied, inlcluding extensive government biographies of both of these Admirals. Of interest, were the characters of both individuals and how it shaped their decisions during the Battle of Midway and other actions during WW2. Admiral Spruance's decisions and actions throughout WW2 were nothing short of brilliant. To Admiral Spruance's credit and modesty, he always credited his successes to officers under his command. An example from the Battle of Midway, Admiral Spruance made the decision to "light up" the carriers to recover the aircraft returning after dark, but bestowed the credit to Admiral Fletcher. Then Capt Mitscher took note and did the same at the Battle of Philippine Sea. Spruance was very aware of the unjust criticism by aviators for Fletcher "leaving behind" the crew of an aircraft which ditched at sea. (In actuality Fletcher dispatched 3 destroyers to look for survivors). Admiral Spruance and Admiral Fletcher mutually trusted each other. So the decision to "hand over" command by Fletcher was a mute point because he was still in the command loop for the tactical decisions to come. After the Battle of Midway, Admiral Spruance gave much credit to Fletcher. A strength of Admiral was he wasn't a micro manager. Spruance's leadership ability is that he placed the most capable officers in key positions of his command. He valued their expertise, judgement and their perspectives when to make decisions. Admiral Spruance was a three dimensional thinker who readily recognizes the priorities and details needed to accoumplish the strategic mission. In many ways, he is the opposite of Admiral Halsey and Admiral Fletcher. Admiral Halsey tended to have tunnel vision. Had Admiral Halsey been in command of Midway instead of Spruance, the Battle of Midway would've turned out much differently. Admiral Spruance is a 360 thinker. This is why Admiral Spruance was Admiral Nimitz's right hand man. Admiral Nimitz and Admiral King were both very aware of the leadership characteristics of Admirals under their command.
Who won the Battle of Midway? If Admiral Spruance and Admiral Fletcher were alive today, they would give each other credit. So why was Admiral Fletcher not as recognized? Based upon my research, the answer is laced with the reputation of the men. In Admiral Fletcher's case, the criticism and accusations about him were based upon prejudice between the "black shoe" and "brown shoe" officers, and being the goat for the actions or orders of others. Despite Fletcher earning the Medal of Honor for gallantry under fire, he was unfairly labeled a coward by other flag officers because of the loss of Wake Island. Enroute to the beleaguered Marines defending Wake Island, Fletcher slowed his task force to fuel and resupply his ships in TF-14 and USS Saratoga, as ordered. Admiral Fletcher recognized the need to be provisioned the fight ahead. The reputation held despite arriving on schedule to the assigned rendezvous point. Fletcher was ordered return to Pearl Harbor by CINCPAC Admiral Pye, despite his request to engage the Japanese fleet. As previously mentioned, Fletcher was criticized for abandoning his pilots, with Captain Elliot Buckmaster of USS Yorktown fueling the fire and flames of distrust between the aviators and Fletcher. He never told the aircrew that Fletcher sent ships immediately to look for the lost crew. If he held the USS Yorktown and its aircraft for search and rescue, they would't have achieved the strategic victory of not only the damage to the Japanese carriers, but for the Japanese recalling the Port Moresby invasion fleet. Fletcher was ordered post haste tor return to Pearl Harbor to prepare for the invasion of Midway. The USMC, believing rumors Fletcher abandoned the Marines on Wake Island, and squarely blamed Fletcher abandoning them at Guadalcanal when that was not the case.
To Admiral Spruance's dismay, "Black Jack" Fletcher was relegated to lesser roles for the rest of the war while Admiral Halsey, despite his many bad decisions, remained to achieve 5 star Admiral. Of note, my father, a navy veteran of WW2, sarcastically said Halsey probably killed more sailors than the Japanese. Fletcher's undoing besides his unassuming character, was communication. During naval engagements he commanded, his intentions were not communicated to area commanders. Samuel Elliot Morrison, author of , critically viewed Admiral Fletcher in his book. Admiral Fletcher's refusal to an interview for the book didn't help. Admiral "Black Jack" Fletcher was WW2's unsung naval hero.
It's beyond the scope of this video, but Adm. Fletcher probably doesn't receive appropriate credit for Coral Sea. Yes, it was a Japanese victory, but a Pyrrhic victory at best; their overall strategy for invasion was tripped-up, Shokaku and Zuikaku were unavailable for Midway, and Lexington's loss was IMO a matter of bad luck; if the wrong vapor cloud hadn't found the wrong motor at the wrong time, Lex would have been available for Midway.
I'm as much an admirer of Adm. Spruance as any no-experience, civilian puke like me can be, but Adm. Fletcher's reputation deserves its rehabilitation.
Credit for the victory at Midway should go to Watanabe Yasumasa, who as Captain of Arashi led the Enterprise dive-bombers to the KB.
Japanese negotiator: “won’t you meet us halfway?” American response: “no, we’ll meet you at Midway”.
Thank you.
great analasys Drach. Most appreciated,thanks
Conclusion:
TEAMWORK MAKES THE DREAM WORK
I’d imagine running an aircraft carrier is a lot like running a manufacturing plant.
You have the Plant Manager (the Captain), the Staff (top officers), etc, all the way down to the Team Members on the shop floor (the sailors).
How did they keep up with their paperwork? The training records, quality records, purchasing and maintenance records.
How did they keep track of all that, with the added complication of bombs dropping, and explosions ripping through your work areas?
Rochefort and his band of code-breakers deserve credit for this win as well.
it's always funny to me that anytime fletcher is brought up it's always the same photograph (regardless of creator/editor), it says a lot about him; he really did not care for theatrics or public image. fletcher was dissed in the States but i am a Filipino who appreciates the steady work and grand decisions he played on the table that was 1942
"Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan" of course this has a grain of truth. Victory in this case did have numerous skilled leaders making the correct call. Defeat had also numerous skilled leaders whose flaws came out in this battle. Yamamoto, Nagumo, and Yamaguchi with others had a fair amount to do with showing openings the US leaders skillfully exploited.
Nagumo ignored Yamaguchi whose instincts were correct and Kido Butai paid for it
@@papajohnloki Read shattered sword. Nagumo adhered to doctrine, Yamaguichi after 3 carriers went down closed with what he knew was a superior force when his air units he also knew had a range advantage. Japanese doctrine, Yamamoto's plan and Japanese training and ship construction were far more responsible than Nagumo's error.
@@bryant7201 I've read Shattered Sword, my reference is to Yamaguchi's request to strike immediately after receiving the sighting of an American carrier
I don't think they had the opportunity without going against ijn carrier doctrine. Spotting and launching that strike would have taken time while damaged and low on fuel planes from the midway strike would circle and possibly some had to ditch.
@@bryant7201 Craig L Symonds book noted that they could have launched a fairly substantial, albeit w/o torpedo planes, as you note against IJN doctrine-but Spruance went against USN doctrine when he sent the aircraft that were aloft without waiting (the key word) to launch a co-ordinated attack.
That is a great explanation of that and discussion on that complicated idea.
many important points made about command and it's nature...
I have to wonder though, in a battle like Midway, how much is decided on a strategic level and how much is down to individual ship captains and bomber commanders directly on the battlefield... I understand the very important role an admiral plays, but, it almost feels like the difference between success and failure lay more on a tactical level than a strategic one.
It's all the above.
Strategic level is for Nimitz.
Operational level was for Fletcher and Spruance.
Tactical level was McClusky and his lucky turn. Nimitz said that turn won the battle of Midway. But Fletcher and Spruance put him there.
@@doctordetroit4339 I guess I am too far away from this... I never even considered Operational level as a distinct category here... thank you for the clear breakup, it really adds something!
As Drach was walking through the various roles, actions and who was responsible for what, I thought of a rough analogy. As has been mentioned in the comments, Midway was a massive team effort and the American success was due to (to be brief) many, many chaotically-and-complexly-interacting factors (yes, like chaotic and complex systems) and no small amount of luck. The analogy that came to mind was that of an American football team winning against a formidable opponent. Roughly, prior Navy and US leadership provided the equipment, training and community that employed, equipped, trained and put the team on the field, like the owners, management and coaching staff of the football team. In the weeks leading up to game day, the head coach and his staff (Joint Chiefs and Roosevelt's people, but mostly King and Nimitz, aided by intelligence groups) is preparing to do battle on game day with the best players and strategies they can field. Fletcher is analogous to the teams 1st-string quarterback on the field, taking direction from the coach but calling the local plays on the field, especially as fleeting opportunities arise. Spruance is like your second-string quarterback, nearly as good as your "prime position" quarterback and nearly as capable of leading the team on the field if for any reason the prime quarterback can't. The individual unit commanders for flight deck operations, ship operations, squadron leaders, and numerous individual sailors are like the players (this is not a perfect analogy). Not all the players are key players on the field at every moment, but everyone is prepared and ready to play their part, and everyone is going all out, doing their best with the training, equipment and capabilities of who they are.
.
When the quarterback hands the ball off to the halfback, for example, while the QB is still the QB, now everyone on the team "conforms to the movement" of the guy with the ball, doing what they can to help him move the ball down the field, which is the team's goal.
.
Meanwhile, while your entire team, from the owner on down to the water boy, is doing their best with what they have to help the team win, everyone on the opposition team is doing the same.
.
Skill, competence, incompetence, excellent and mediocre education, training, equipment and morale all play their complex, interacting parts. And that's before good and bad luck gets involved. The tiniest of details can influence outcomes at all scales, which all interact, as the two organizations battle.
.
If you ran a near-perfect simulation of the world on a super, supercomputer, the model starting in 1880 and leading up to the Midway battle to predict the outcome of Midway, tens of thousands of times, how many times do you think it would turn out just as it did in 1942? I think it would be like predicting the weather, a chaotic system. You'd get a range of outcomes.
US Navy Intelligence won Midway. There, I said it.
It's a fair point. Without a timely warning, the Japanese plan - excessively complicated as it was - might have worked out differently.
Counter argument being USS Hornets performance in this battle.
Intelligence doesn’t make you play your hand well, it just lets you see your opponents starting location.
@@scottl9660 It is admittedly tricky. A Battle of Midway was definitely going to happen because the IJN had their battle plan. But the USN had the date and order of battle for that plan weeks before the ships even set sail, so it is reasonable to assume that without the intelligence breakthrough, the attack would have been discovered much later. So it's not just a matter of starting location, but the actual forces being brought into play. Yamamoto's original plan was to bait in Midway reinforcements and slap them around with his battleships. As it turned out, intelligence allowed the USN to catch the attack early while all those back-up forces were out of position.
Way too simplistic and overreaching. Intelligence gave some "tools". Some were good, some were bad. It had a significant role but it doesn't neccessary would guarantee winning. There is much, much more here than just this.
I appreciate the depth in which the chains of command had been explained. The stresses of the complexity of unfolding events to establish an understanding of how to enhance or mitigate the battle space on sea as opposed to land has to be significantly more difficult if no other reason they're not on land. It's I think the underlying trust of these men prior to that engagement that cements the understanding of the judicious use of authority of a subordinate based on the overall responsibilities if the most senior officer is for whatever reason incapacitated in how that engagement unfolds. The responsibilities for better or worse were fletchers irrespective of spruances actions. The assumption of command under duress in times of crisis had to be appreciated as actions in the best interest of the mission. You can't fault the guy for that 😅. Thanks ever much
In the 1920s a German lady was sitting next to President Hindenburg at dinner. Very daringly, she asked him who had actually won the Battle of Tannenburg in 1914? Was it himself, or was it really his Chief of Staff (Ludendorf) or his Chief of Operations (Hoffman)?
Hindenburg thought for a bit and then said: "I don't know who won the Battle of Tannenburg madam, but I do know who would have lost it."
Admiral Nimitz won Midway.
I wish that some of my bosses had been more 'Fletcher' 🤠
Fletcher and Spruance tag teamed to win. Mitcsher was nearly counter useful.
I have to feel some sorrow for Nagumo. He actually did nothing wrong. He had absolutely no reason to suspect that US carriers would be present. Those who say you plan for what an enemy can do vs what they most likely do are the ones who may never lose a battle but definitely will never win one either.
I’ll disagree on Nagumo. He knew he’d been spotted before his aircraft even bombed Midway. Yamamoto’s plan was based on surprise. It was obvious the morning of the attack that wasnt the case. Had he recovered his Midway strike group and retired west overnight he would have been in position to strike the Americans the next day, on his terms. Rather than what did happen.
@@Idahoguy10157 Well, let's look at it from his point, not history's. He's got the four best carriers in the Japansese Navy, and their less-regarded sisters had just sunk two US carriers at Coral Sea (by their report) and not lost a fleet carrier. He knows his pilots and planes are the best on Earth, and in the Japanese Navy you lose style points if you're overly cautious. What would the Emperor have said if he ran away at the first sign of an enemy?
@@erichammer2751 … you misread what I wrote. Nagumo would be back in the fight in twelve hours. With all four carrier air wings armed for anti ship warfare. On the hunt
It would be great if you could tastefully superimpose captions over photographs. I often just pause the videos to study each image, but this only raises more curiosity - and frustration with the lack of information. Love the channel.
Fletcher while senior knew that his ship was not the equal to the Enterprise and Hornet taskforce. He knew just how damaged Yorktown actually was. While Spurance wasn't a carrier commander he had been given the command by Halsey. The Japanese battle planned for Halsey to be the commander not Spurance. The Japanese knew Halsey was aggressive and he would seek combat.
Now let's get into how the Battle of Midway was fought from both sides of the US commanders. Spurance knew that he needed to get the first hit into the Japanese carriers in order to equal the odds of decks against him. Now Fletcher was running a scout search out to 100 miles to keep his and Task Force 16s flank secure. Once Spurance launched Fletcher recovered and launched his strike.
Now Fletcher had a scrathed together air group. His was a combination of his original pilots some survivors from the Lexington and then filled out from the Saratoga air groups.
Spurance and Tf16 had all their original air groups. The Yorktown didn't even have a full squadron of TBDs on board only had 12 planes.
Now let's get into the attack on the 3 carriers hit first. The Enterprise had 30 SBDs in their attack wave and the Yorktown had 15. They did their duty and destroyed the carriers. Now let's get to the attacks on Yorktown. The Hiryu planes followed the Yorktown planes. The attack waves were decimated but still got enough planes through to damage the Yorktown. The damage control on Yorktown was heroic to get her back up to fast enough to launch planes and maneuver. When the second wave was detected they launched everything they could off the Yorktown to get them airborne and off the ship.
Fletcher had by this time left the Yorktown and transferred his flag to Astoria.
Then the second wave hit and forced the abandonment of Yorktown. We then discovered the Hiryu and destroyed her.
Now here's were Spurance in command becomes so important. He remembered that keeping Midway safe along with his carriers became more important than running up the tonnage sunk. Spurance only attacks the cruisers when he has a positive position and he knows his planes are in range.
Three uber-important USA Admirals pictured at 2:00.
Two of them so modest, but such great men.
The guy in the middle? No way to replace the SOB, and he DID hire good people.
Like those guys on either side of him....
Both Admirals did a great job . Share the credit.
I think that a battle like Midway had no "mastermind." The basic mission was "go out there, find the Japanese carriers, and sink 'em. Oh, and try not to lose any of your own." The positions were not static, as in a land battle, everything was reactive and spur-of-the-moment, backed by current doctrine (for better or worse). There could be nothing but the broadest of "plans" to fail to survive first contact with the enemy. Both TF commanders knew that when they found the Japanese carriers, and confirmed they were really the striking force and not a diversionary force (the mistake made at Coral Sea, which Fletcher was determined not to make again), they would hit it with everything they had. It doesn't require great command ability to recognize that.
Not really, Nimitz wanted to have Japan launch first, and then hit them when they were refueling. Growing wrote a paper in the NWC in the 30s about this very tactic. The entire thing was planned from jump. But luck had to play a huge part, as carrier ops were still very very new.
Brilliant!!!
Credit for winning at Midway goes to the code breakers, who figured out where the Japanese Navy was headed.
Was Collingwood and Nelson the inspiration for Monty Python's "I'm not quite dead yet"? I'm sorry, I couldn't stop myself and will leave quietly.
Thank you, Drach. Thought provoking video on command relationships and the inter workings of the structure.