I've studied Pacific War history for about 50 of my 61 years. My father was a US Navy WWII vet and his cousin was lost in the sinking of USS Indianapolis, I bear his name today. So I went into this episode knowing something about Tarawa. Or so I thought. As I've gotten older, and having 2 sons (one a US Marine) and 2 grandsons, I've become "softer". So as I listen to this episode on my ride home from work a couple of days ago my heart was in my throat much of the time. When I got home I had to go up to my workshop to check on something and a few minutes later walking back to the house I passed by the grave of our dog we lost 11 months ago. I know it probably sounds silly, and there's no connection between my dog and those men who died at Tarawa but it was the last straw for this soft old man. I wept. I wept for Scrappy and I wept for the USMC. God Bless them all, past present and future.
God bless Scrappy and God bless the Marines. And God bless your relatives that fought in that God of War with the japanese. Sorry for your loss. Both Scrappy and your relatives.❤😔🇺🇲⚓️
Gentlemen, I just want to let you know that a LOT of young enlisted Marines listen to this podcast. There has been a resurgence of interest in the Pacific war in the Fleet Marine Force, especially in the infantry. Platoons worth of Marines every Friday are cracking open some beers and gathering around a TV to listen and learn. This isn't just a podcast for older people, and I want you to know your show is making an impact in the Marines of today, and helping change the way they think. Thanks for all that you two do, and we cant see Mr. Parshall pop up wearing another shirt that matches his wallpaper (we make bets on it)
Thank you for that post! It makes me feel really good that the Marines of today are doing their due diligence and studying what their forefathers did during World War II. Semper Fi!🇺🇲⚓️💯🙏
@rctbandit88 I am a field grade Army Officer, and I am listening too. There are many of us that see ourselves as students and stewards of our profession.
Great scene setting. The importance of Tarawa is, as you so eloquently highlighted, that it represents the pivotal point in the entire Pacific War. It marks the jumping off point for Plan Orange, the arrival of the massive resource build up, the testing of new doctrine and tactics, and also an essential piece of real estate. Nimitz, King and indeed MacArthur all knew that they were embarking on something that had never been done before, with rapidly evolving technology and doctrine. Fortunately they were wise enough to realise that learning and adapting was going to be the key to success. Their organisations had to not just reflect the need to learn and adapt, but aggressively embrace these skills. This is where it all started.
My dear friend, SGT Bob Schmitt managed to miss the battle of Tarawa but was there with the 184th Infantry Regiment every time it saw action in the Pacific War. As an officer much later, I listened to what he said to me which always served me well. I can only say thank-you to him and all those who served us and set the example for us to follow. Thanks for your programs and wish Bob was still with us to see it! Keep it up!!!
The Marine commander Gen. Holland Smith famously said, after the battle: "Was Tarawa worth it? My answer is unqualified: No. From the very beginning the decision of the Joint Chiefs to seize Tarawa was a mistake and from their initial mistake grew the terrible drama of errors, errors of omission rather than commission, resulting in these needless casualties." Thanks to Bill and Seth for helping to clarify here why, however understandable Smith's pained reaction may have been, GALVANIC had a great deal of compelling logic behind it - and urgent lessons that had to be learned about amphibious operations.
I feel compelled to tell you how much I appreciate what you do to remember and honor the those who did so much, and in so many cases, sacrificed their all for what we enjoy today. It sometimes brings tears to my eyes when I try to comprehend what these men did for me and their posterity. If it were not for you, we would likely forget those who gave so much, so I want to make sure you know that you are so important in your mission to explain, discuss, critique, and just tell the stories of those who gave us the world we are privileged to enjoy today.
Thanks for an excellent series. One quibble regarding Britain not fortifying the Gilberts: resourcing issues aside, the primary reason for this apparent failure was that the Gilberts were ex-German League of Nations Mandated Territories, the remit for which precluded fortification by the Brits. Australia likewise had New Guinea as a separate ex-German LoN Mandated Territory, which explains why it (in particular Rabaul) wasn't fortified before the war either. The Japanese, however, weren't quite as compliant (especially regarding Truk). Best wishes :-)
Seth and Bill, Thank you so much for your production. I'm pushing toward 70 years old, I was fortunate enough to associate with World War I and World War II veterans. Many of my Uncles and cousins fought in the Pacific Theater. Both of you bring to life the difficulties and guts it took to fight a very tough foe. I had long conversations with these veterans. Thanks for illuminating the logistics and other vital support services. My Mom was an Army nurse in the ETO so all this is much appreciated.
Capt. Toti’s description of the fortifications on Tarawa confirms my reading back in the ‘60s. The coconut logs on top of those forts, from what I read, would actually cause the 16 inch rifle rounds to bounce off because the angle was so shallow. The battleships had to back off farther from shore to get a higher angle of impact, closer to the vertical. Then the rounds could break through the sand and logs. That’s what I read, but I can’t remember where … I was about 14 then.
My dad was a first day lander, 2nd Marines Red Beach Two….survived the wade in under fire, stuck at the sea wall, wounded on the third day…..very dangerous battle for the Marines….god bless the USMC.
I am watching one at a time. Out of order. I so try to comment to further your efforts. I saw Capt. TOTI in dress whites. What a difference that haircut and uniform makes!
I cannot thank you enough for your podcast. I have been listening to it with my mother who is 97 years old. She went into nursing in 1943 under a program that paid for nurses to help the war effort. Her sister was a nurse already with the navy and was in Pearl Harbour in 1941. My aunt Millie was then posted to Australia and look after many sailors and marines from Guadalcanal. Millie's husband was Captain Bill Robinson who flew B 17's in the earliest days of the European Theatre. My mom frequently cries when she listens to your podcast and then tells us stories of caring for servicemen in Wisconsin who had been sent home with severe life altering wounds (she worked from 44 til 46 in a burn unit). Some of the stories are both uplifting and shocking. I hope at some point you tell the story of nurses in WW2 especially those who served the Pacific theatre.
Capt Toti, that was the best explanation I’ve heard about the tides at Tarawa. I liked the screen writing too. It really helps with the maps. You’re the Navy version of John Madden! 😂 Great job on the episode. A great book about Tarawa and it’s influences on the creation of the UDTs is “By Water Beneath The Walls” by Ben Milligan. He was a SEAL officer and and did a good job of the early TRUE history of the Scouts/Rangers and UDTs. “The Water Is Never Cold” by James Douglas O’Dell is another good book about the early UDTs.
Thanks for mentioning the Kiwi input to the tide problem. I recall reading that US planners based in New Zealand consulted NZ boaties who were familiar with Tarawa and they warned them of the reef and tide issues. Also early in the war a number of Kiwi Post Office radio & telegraph staff were executed by Japanese Army.
You have a wonderful series here for students of the WWII Pacific war. I am myself most interested in the PTs, those heroic and romantic albeit not terribly effective weapons systems. Might I suggest that a single episode on these boats, how they evolved, why they were not wildly successful, but (sorta) came into their own as gunboats up against Japanese barges. Any reference you can add to your discourse would be most appreciated.
I’ve been a major fan of history, mainly WWII and USN history for over 60 of my 78 years and I’m a 25 year navy retiree (63-88) and retired as a MCPO. In my humble view the worst losses we suffered in WWII had to be either the MacArthur losses of his planes on December 8th, as he did have adequate advance alert of the Pearl Harbor attack - the losses of those 4 heavy cruisers in the slot during the Guadalcanal campaign because the OTC didn’t trust those few radars he had - or the decision to not bypass Tarawa in their island hopping campaign or at least not choose such a strongly fortified target for the first big amphibious proving ground operation for the marines. It’s best lesson learned (again IMHO) was that much better intelligence was needed for future amphibious efforts. A question I have not ever addressed was there any degree of senior marine involvement in planning or developing of intel prior to the start of the operation.
Another great torpedo Tuesday. I really enjoyed the oceanography lesson from Professor Skipper Toti. It's details like this that make these videos so interesting. It totally amazes me about the US navy size at this time. Seventeen carriers!! Wow! Those boys a year earlier at Guadalcanal could only dream of fleets like this. I am really looking forward to the remaining episodes of the Tarawa battle. Keep up the good work.
I had a young Japanese boy stay at my house and we used to like watching warmovies and docos. Obviously we had to respect each other. But when I told him about Roosevelt order for the 24 Essex carriers - he just could not believe it!
One of the best things about your podcasts is that, when necessary, you take the time to set the stage for major operations. Just as with Guadalcanal, this episode goes into detail about why the operation was done, the order of battle for both sides, and the logistics that were available in that time and at that place. It is obvious that you believe in providing as much context as you can so that we viewers/listeners can glean the most from your presentations.
Watching your series in conjunction with reading Ian W Toll’s trilogy has been extremely educational and entertaining . Great work celebrating The Greatest Generation
I can't believe you only have 17K subscribers. Some highly suspect history channels have Millions of subscribers. No justice. You guys are the best by far. Keep up the great work. I look forward to Tuesdays for a new episode every week.
I don’t know if either of you gentlemen ever took to the stage while in high school, college, or at some other time. But you touched upon the first two laws of the stage: the first, of course, being.” the show must go on.” doesn’t matter if you’re using new software or not the second slightly less well known, is “ if the audience doesn’t know, it’s a f-up; it’s not a f-up.” Very fine work as always, gentlemen. Keep the high quality content coming!
My uncle, Sgt. George W. Bowden was a Marine in the 2nd Corp. His amphibious tank was named, My Deloris, which has been referenced as one of the first to make land. My uncle died that day, and his body eventually returned home in 1947. I recently found all the letters home and am compiling what information I can find to write his story. Thank you for all the additional information your podcast has provided.
I’ve learned more in one month of this podcast than I ever learned in my entire life up until this point about WWII history and our country’s role in the Pacific theatre. Thank you for the incredible content and narration of this podcast!
I just love your channel, and look forward to it every week. I would like to reiterate that you should be making a DVD series of your entire series - it is so good and informative. It should be a documentary series to be had for many decades and more! 'Victory at Sea' is still available, and it was made in 1952, which is 71 years ago! I have to comment about your comments regarding the 16" battleship projectiles. The US Navy had two tactical shortcomings using the battleships for land bombardments. The first is that they used HE rounds mostly instead of AP rounds, and a lot of the island were heavily fortified, and INTO the island as well. Using HE rounds had little impact in these cases, as in Tarawa, and Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and probably other island landings and campaigns. The second was that they did not fire the battleship round to come down directly, or as directly as possible. This would have meant shooting the battleship rounds from afar, at 40-45 degrees so that the round comes from the sky and would have penetrate anything. I have a ballistics file I have created over the past 10-15 years, that is mainly for purchasing handgun and rifle ammo from online retailers, to get the best price, or order the ammo with the ballistics you desire. This file has over 3,500 entries, and each entry is a link to a website that sells that ammo, and each entry displays the ballistics info for that round as well. So, how does this file relate here? I entered in ballistics info for the main WW II battleships many years ago also, and treated their guns and ammo just like the rounds you can shoot from a handgun or rifle. So, there is a section in this file just on the WW II battleships, and I list 10 of them, the most significant ones of the War. But I went beyond the normal ballistics info with these ships, and included their power (in ft. lbs.) and penetration capability over varying distances (all references are documented). As you increase the distance, you have to raise the angle of delivery, and normally the power goes down over distance, just like any non powered projectile does. The very interesting fact about the big heavy battleship projectiles, like the 2,700 lb. AP round of the US 16" guns, is that it starts to gain power at certain distances, as it comes back down, simply due to gravity. I contend that had the US Navy done both of these when bombarding heavily entrenched islands during the War, that a lot less US service men would have been lost. I have sent this file to both Ryan Szmanski (New Jersey curator), and Drach. Ryan has looked at it and commented that he didn't realize the huge difference between the AP rounds vs. the HE ones, especially on the US 16" ammo. I do not think Drach has ever looked at it or used it, which is evident from his conclusions about battleship ammo in his channel, and his channel is usually VERY good, as you know. I offer this file to whomever would like it, and it is free to all. Its original form is MS Excel, and all power ratings are calculated, and I do not use any of the stipulated power ratings (for the handgun and rifle ammo from the online retailers) when one is given, which is not always. I release this file in PDF format, so anyone on any device can read it. So, the battleship power is similarly calculated. I have included a lot of other info on the battleships, like when built, their weight, length, speed, range, and more, all in 4 categories by the bore of their gun - 14", 15", 16", 18.1". If anyone would like a copy of this file, click on my name here, and then click on 'About', and either email me or go to my website and find the file there in my WW II section.
There was some use of AP on shore defenses. Also, you have the differences with nose-fused and base-fused HE. The US wasn't particularly well prepared for shore bombardment missions early in the war. You see it here and you see it in North Africa. AP was used in later invasions on hardened defensive points (when you could pinpoint them), but the BB drivers were always somewhat parsimonious with it from paranoia about encountering Japanese surface forces. I think it was the Aleutian campaign where Pennsylvania was convinced to use some AP on bunkers with devastating effect, but the ship's captain refused to use more than a few salvos since rumors of Japanese surface forces in the area were uppermost in his mind.
Vincent, I have a couple questions/remarks: 1) A round gaining power at long range does not make physical sense. Any kinetic energy gained by falling from apogee first had to be stored as gravitational potential energy during the flight up. The round leaves the barrel with E_total = KE_1, it ascends to apogee where E_total = GPE_max + KE_2, and then it descends so that (in a vacuum) the GPE goes back to zero and the impact energy = E_total = KE_1 again. Of course in reality, the projectile's drag is bleeding its energy the whole time, so impact energy (KE_3) is less than KE_1. I am curious to see the calculations you used to get these results. 2) The big guns on these ships were designed and housed for direct fire. They typically had maximum elevations less than 40 degrees and even those that could exceed that range often experienced operational difficulties in doing so (often the guns had to be depressed to load again). 3) Firing at 30 or 40 degrees elevation produced maximum range shots for these ships and therefore maximum dispersion. Throughout every account I have read of Pacific shore bombardment actions, the universal aim of the bombarding ships is to get as close to shore as is reasonable so they can accurately direct their own fire onto point targets. Hiking the guns up 45 degrees makes this impossible. 4) Firing guns this large at max elevation places the firer over the horizon from the island. Therefore all fire support can only be coordinated, ranged, and spotted by radio. Again, go read the accounts - flag signals, smoke, and good old-fashioned waving your arms on the beach were all critical at one point or another. Consider also that battleships losing their own comms due to muzzle blast was not an infrequent occurrence. 5) The interaction of firing at maximum dispersion and limited barrel life make this method an operational nonstarter. Yes, a plunging shot anywhere onto an enemy battleship could be a one-hit kill. That's not the case with an island. Consider that over 20 salvos Prince of Wales put 3 hits on Bismarck (roughly the size of Red 1 beach) at 20kyd. That's firing at masts (which Tarawa did not have) and eyeballing the range/elevation of the 14" Mk VII suggests they had the guns at about 25 degrees to do this. Two of those hits were ineffective, but one was an operational kill (the fuel bunker). Not so on a fortified landmass. The task confronting these naval fire support forces was not to put a shell anywhere, but to put it exactly into the enemy fortification. Even on the most heavily fortified beaches, there's 50 square feet of nothing for every square foot of bunker. Using the Prince of Wales calculation (1 effective hit for 200 rounds fired), knocking out 5 bunkers will empty an entire battleship - and that's assuming the accuracy at 20 degrees deflection! Going to indirect fire may result in 400 or 500 rounds per bunker!
Heroes all of them. My Uncles fought in Burma, one of whom at 86 just prior to his death still suffered from malaria, another Uncle killed in Normandy, my father who served 1940 onwards in both the Royal Navy on Malta Convos ( torpedoed) & U.S.Navy aboard the U.S.S.South Dakota in the Arctic 1943, until invalided out in late 1944. 👍🏻🇺🇸✌️🏴🇬🇧 He lost a boyhood friend machine-gunned rescuing a shipmate on the sinking Repulse off Malaya.
Tuesday has become my favorite day of the week! Thanks for the time you put into this effort. As a kid I read a book on the Battle of Tarawa and have studied it since then. With the benefit of hindsight our victories take on an aura of inevitability. However, this was a dicey affair that we won through tenacity, bravery, and good leadership. Can’t wait until the next drop.
Former Amphib Sailor trained in ship to shore movement and served as a Boat Group Commander. Nothing but complete admiration for what was done and accomplished at Betio. Great series you are putting together. Was in Michigan last week and took a day to tour Silversides, well worth the day. You need to plug the necessity to view and support these ships. They are in need of financial support to maintain the ships in suitable conditions or they should be in a dry dock facility. Again Bravo Zulu on your presentations.
You guys are great! This has quickly become my favorite Video Podcast no fluffing or wandering round the subject, well presented with honest opinions voiced. Willing to call attention to "F@#k ups" and less then stellar personalities for what they were with no apologies or softning an opinion over worry of losing viewers. Can't wait for next weeks episode.
After many years of reading, I am quite familiar with Tarawa and the pros and cons about the landing and completely agree with you as the necessity of the operation for any one of a number of very valid reasons. My question is really about the entire Central Pacific thrust vis a vis War Plan Orange. I have done a lot of reading over the years about the life and career of USMC Lt. Col. Earl "Pete" Ellis (12/19/1880-05/12/1923), whom was heavily involved in the projected possibility of amphibious action against the Japanese in the former Imperial German colonies in Micronesia which were mandated to Japan after WW I. Was his interest and work strictly about Micronesia or did it apply to the entire Central Pacific thrust, which included the Gilberts, Marshall's and the Mariana's. There was a lot of speculation about his travels in the area and his contact with the Japanese, especially after his rather mysterious death on Palau in 1923. Was his "Operations Plan 712: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia" one of the pillars the whole amphibious doctrine followed by the US in the Pacific in WW II ? Or was he something less important ? Thanks again for another impressive podcast gentlemen. I look forward to the rest of the Tarawa Trilogy.
I find myself waiting w/ anticipation for your videos every week, it's nearly akin to childhood Christmas mornings. Eddie Albert (Green Acres) joined the Coast Guard and later became a Navel Reservist and rescued 47 Marines as a coxswain, in addition to supervising the rescue of 30 more. (prior to the war, he served w/ the US Army as an Intelligence spy photographing German U-boats in Mexican harbors)
All this excellent content from folks like you and drach make me think of my grandad and his love for ww2 history. He would have absolutely loved it if he was still around.
Thanks, guys. I consider myself reasonably informed about the conduct of the Pacific war, but I must admit that your discussion here of the strategic details around Galvanic and future events was VERY informative. The B-29 WAS a huge reason Japan was brought to its knees, but I never considered how important Galvanic was for setting up the B-29 and all the learning curve represented by Tarawa and Makin. All the servicemen who died and were wounded there were every bit the heroes that all the other ones who served after were. They all served on each other's shoulders, even extending to the oil worker busting his butt in Texas or California, the farmers, or the gal-riveters working in the war factories. What an amazing story. No wonder Yamamoto warned his countrymen about what the US was capable of. Bless you for continuing to bring out these stories back into the light of day so we can marvel and learn from these amazing times.
My Uncle was in Many of the Pacific War island jumping. While quite rare he rose from Private USMC to Bren at Iwo Jima. He spent many of his earlier career in Places Like Nicaragua doing support functions as quartermaster. In my navy career (1960-80) I spent two tours helping teaching Amphibious operations. Most of that was a carry over from WWII. Still today the abilities to land troops on a foreign shore is a positive for the US
Awesome presentation as always, guys. I too have huge admiration for Admiral Nimitz and it pains me to see that he did not understand the importance of a sustained barrage before the landings began. I eagerly await the next episode!
The Captain aint lying about those tides!!! Starting @29:00...Captain Toti explains those tides. When i was in the Navy(1986-89), we had to deal with tides all the time in San Diego(32nd st) and Long Beach.
Bill, that was actually an excellent explanation of the tidal situations facing every amphibious landing in WW2, and necessary for us to understand the challenges facing our troops and logistical supply.
God bless all the courageous veterans with nerves of steel who risked everything and sacrificed so much to protect our countries and preserve the freedoms we enjoy today! God bless all the souls - military and civilian - that we have lost in times of war! God bless America! God bless us all and grant us peace!
Great foundation episode. I can hardly wait for the next installment. You guys have made Tuesdays much better! Years ago, I read Russ Martin's book "Line of Departer: Tarawa". I have had a special place in my heart for Betio and Makin ever since. Steady at the helm and keep up the good work.
I have always enjoyed WW 2 history. Especially pacific naval history. I think its because I saw and visited the USS North Carolina often. This is one of the most enjoyable series Ive ever seen. It will be alright with me if when you get to the end of the war you start again
I have been watching tv and reading about Tarawa for decades. You guys have done it again- excellent show. I also look forward to each TUESDAY morning to see what great content you guys come up with. Keep up the great work 👍
Tarawa was a real wake-up call for the amphibious operation planners. Out of Tarawa came improvements in equipment, UDT and better training for Marines and sailors in amphibious ops.
Great episode - talk about a cliff-hanger - even though I'm familiar with the events in general, the great detail you provide leaves me with great anticipation for next Tuesday!!
Okay. I assumed there needed to be a supply line, but Seth brings up a great point, about the eighteen minute mark, of assumed repair after each engagement. Anyway, this demonstrates why the planners are competent and I am not. Only an experienced military commander can anticipate reality, and I am becoming more and more impressed with the commanders of that time. I certainly forgive mis-steps because it’s one thing to criticize and quite another to be in the fight. I salute both you guys for conveying the picture and am more and more amazed at the accomplishments of the navy.
This setting-the-stage discussion was very well done, especially the talks of the tides and the centrality of Tarawa. Re Britain's neglect to protect the Gilbert Islands, Washington Naval Treaty's Article XIX forbade the building of additional defensive and maintenance fortifications. The parties were to maintain the status quo. The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder: (1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands; (2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand; (3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire. The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace. Section (1) forbade the US fortifying the Philippines, Guam, Midway, Guano Islands, etc. Section (2) forbade Britain fortifying any possession east of Singapore. Much is made of Japan's upset re 5:5:3 ratio, yet Article XIX was a significant win for Tokyo because it adhered to Japan's national defensive strategy. Draw America across the Pacific to attrit its navy through breakdowns, mishaps, and violence. Impede US (and UK) ability to maintain and sustain its navy anywhere near Japan. The Treaty ended on 31 Dec 1936, so the US and UK could have begun massive building projects to transform their Pacific possessions into fortresses, but trying to defend everything means one defends nothing. The cost, manpower, and logistical burden were not feasible, especially for Britain. In setting the stage for Tarawa's invasion, the Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees) landed on the Ellice Islands in April '43, building two airbases and a bunker oil depot to supply the USN's oilers. US Marines arrived about a half year earlier. Eunice Islands is a large atoll, and with dredging the lagoon was capable of anchoring 100 ships. This become Naval Base Funafuti. About 1,100 km southeast of the Gilberts, it served as the USN's staging area. During the War more than 400 of these advance naval bases were built worldwide. Just as pre-fabrication of sections cut the built time of ships, the same was used for building the bases. I think the largest one was Naval Base Ulithi, just east of the Philippines - all the atolll's islands were miniscule. It could anchor up more than 700 ships, base 150 fighter aircraft for defence and replenishing the carriers, and had floating repair facilities large enough to handle aircraft carriers. There's a good book about the USN's service squadrons _The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II: Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil_ by Rear Admiral Worrall Reed Carter. If you don't want to spend $385.75 for it, you'll find it at HyperWar's ibiblio.
I wish I had the benefit of this series BEFORE we went to the museum of the pacific war in Texas. Just kind of stumbled up it when on vacation in Texas. Any and all that listen to this series would benefit from a visit to that most excellent museum. Keep up the great work.
I agree with @cjohnson7391 wholeheartedly. I have been waiting for these episodes with bated breath and dreading it at the same time. Strangely enough after the mutual emasculation of both the IJN and USN in the Solomons campaign and the literal torture to death of Aussies, Marines, US Army, and Japanese soldiers in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands campaigns things start to get "real" at Tarawa and I think this is the beginning of a new chapter in military horror that stays with this war till Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These fierce and in comparison, to the earlier campaigns rather short battles shows how supremely vicious the fighting was going to become.
@@SaundersE5 YES! I’ve read about the Pacific War since before high school. They are filling in so many puzzling details and I appreciate their scholarship and defication
Two things that surprise me were the 20 B-24s providing aerial recon but there was no bombing campaign leading up to the landings. To reach it did they has tanks installed in the bomb bay to give them the legs? And with that many carriers available I'd have thought Nimitz would welcome the Combined Fleet coming out. At that point the air superiority would be overwhelming for the USN. And again these videos are amazing and so educating. Thank you both!
Your new software seems to be working quite well--if you hadn''t have said anything about it at the top of the podcast I woud not have known that you had it.
Great job guys. The detail you provide in this presentation addresses so many questions I have had about this operation. The use of demonstratives like the annotated map of the central Pacific elevates your presentation to a whole new level. I am looking forward to the next two episodes.
Honor, Duty, Integrity, Humility - I haven't always succeeded but always returned to continue trying to making these my life philosophy. I have tall shoulders to stand on to help with my goal. Excellent Show Gentlemen, I should be able to return to my old self by next week.
Seth and Bill fantastic as always. Thank you both for the time and effort you put into this history. You always fill in the spots no one else ever covers. Looking forward to next week.
Excellent episode, as usual. In regards to Admiral King, by serendipity, yesterday Paul Woodard posted an excellent episode on his WW2 TV channel, "Germany First, but not so fast: Admiral Earnest J. King and the War in the Pacific".
Greeting and thanks Seth and Bill for your work. I just finished the The Bomber Mafia and it fit's in so well with what Seth said about the attack on Japan. It was insane, prosecuting the air war from the backside of the Hump and then China to Japan. It took 9 gallons of fuel to get just one gallon to the other side. Not to mention the horrendous numbers of operations accidents to make it happen. The B-29s were coming one way or another. It has been amazing to follow your work and fit that into other accounts of that war that have recently been written.
Just want to say that I absolutely love the podcast and look forward to every new episode. Amazing work that just keeps getting better. I also wanted to make a suggestion. The episodes Pearl Harbour --> Philippines --> Midway sidestepped a lot of interesting events around the fall of the European powers in the Pacific and it would be great to revisit that period. Would be great to see some episodes on the Battle of the Java Sea and its aftermath and the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales. Especially if you could get Mike Carlton (Australian author) as a guest for Java Sea and Drachinifel back for the Prince of Wales.
Interesting outline on why Tarawa was considered important by war planners and even-handed criticism of the Navy’s planning. Many hard lessons learned here payed off later in the Pacific War. Thanks guys for your hard work.
You guys do an excellent job in these podcasts. I thoroughly enjoy them. I think one of the real problems for the shore bombardment is that Navy leadership just didn't understand how effective (or ineffective) most forms of artillery fire are against troops in prepared fortifications. Even a simple foxhole with overhead cover can protect the occupants against most shellfire. Artillery against prepared positions has to be extremely accurate to be effective, targeting individual positions; "area bombardment" just doesn't do it. And though you both clearly believe the Tarawa attack was necessary, it's worth asking whether the Marines could have occupied some undefended or less heavily defended island and built a new airfield, bypassing the Japanese on Betio. The U.S. built the Bonriki airport, which is the modern airport for Tarawa atoll, after the battle. I believe Bonriki was only lightly defended or undefended in 1943. When confronted with the prospect of a direct assault against a prepared, dug-in enemy, it's always worth asking, is there a different way to get the effect we want? If Nimitz or Holland Smith had simply ruled out an assault on Betio, what alternatives might Nimitz's staff come up with?
I've studied Pacific War history for about 50 of my 61 years. My father was a US Navy WWII vet and his cousin was lost in the sinking of USS Indianapolis, I bear his name today. So I went into this episode knowing something about Tarawa. Or so I thought. As I've gotten older, and having 2 sons (one a US Marine) and 2 grandsons, I've become "softer". So as I listen to this episode on my ride home from work a couple of days ago my heart was in my throat much of the time. When I got home I had to go up to my workshop to check on something and a few minutes later walking back to the house I passed by the grave of our dog we lost 11 months ago. I know it probably sounds silly, and there's no connection between my dog and those men who died at Tarawa but it was the last straw for this soft old man. I wept. I wept for Scrappy and I wept for the USMC. God Bless them all, past present and future.
God bless Scrappy and God bless the Marines. And God bless your relatives that fought in that God of War with the japanese. Sorry for your loss. Both Scrappy and your relatives.❤😔🇺🇲⚓️
I'm an old Marine, I do not sleep well, I am blessed by your work.
"Hope is not a strategy." Well said. Useful in many situations.
Let me add my thanks and appreciation for this series. A deeper dive with plenty of background- well done. Again, thank you for sharing.
Gentlemen, I just want to let you know that a LOT of young enlisted Marines listen to this podcast. There has been a resurgence of interest in the Pacific war in the Fleet Marine Force, especially in the infantry. Platoons worth of Marines every Friday are cracking open some beers and gathering around a TV to listen and learn. This isn't just a podcast for older people, and I want you to know your show is making an impact in the Marines of today, and helping change the way they think. Thanks for all that you two do, and we cant see Mr. Parshall pop up wearing another shirt that matches his wallpaper (we make bets on it)
Thank you for that post! It makes me feel really good that the Marines of today are doing their due diligence and studying what their forefathers did during World War II. Semper Fi!🇺🇲⚓️💯🙏
@rctbandit88 I am a field grade Army Officer, and I am listening too. There are many of us that see ourselves as students and stewards of our profession.
Great scene setting. The importance of Tarawa is, as you so eloquently highlighted, that it represents the pivotal point in the entire Pacific War. It marks the jumping off point for Plan Orange, the arrival of the massive resource build up, the testing of new doctrine and tactics, and also an essential piece of real estate.
Nimitz, King and indeed MacArthur all knew that they were embarking on something that had never been done before, with rapidly evolving technology and doctrine. Fortunately they were wise enough to realise that learning and adapting was going to be the key to success. Their organisations had to not just reflect the need to learn and adapt, but aggressively embrace these skills. This is where it all started.
My dear friend, SGT Bob Schmitt managed to miss the battle of Tarawa but was there with the 184th Infantry Regiment every time it saw action in the Pacific War. As an officer much later, I listened to what he said to me which always served me well. I can only say thank-you to him and all those who served us and set the example for us to follow. Thanks for your programs and wish Bob was still with us to see it! Keep it up!!!
We were airfield hungry, and this would be our main goals throughout the campaign across the Pacific.
The Marine commander Gen. Holland Smith famously said, after the battle: "Was Tarawa worth it? My answer is unqualified: No. From the very beginning the decision of the Joint Chiefs to seize Tarawa was a mistake and from their initial mistake grew the terrible drama of errors, errors of omission rather than commission, resulting in these needless casualties." Thanks to Bill and Seth for helping to clarify here why, however understandable Smith's pained reaction may have been, GALVANIC had a great deal of compelling logic behind it - and urgent lessons that had to be learned about amphibious operations.
I feel compelled to tell you how much I appreciate what you do to remember and honor the those who did so much, and in so many cases, sacrificed their all for what we enjoy today. It sometimes brings tears to my eyes when I try to comprehend what these men did for me and their posterity. If it were not for you, we would likely forget those who gave so much, so I want to make sure you know that you are so important in your mission to explain, discuss, critique, and just tell the stories of those who gave us the world we are privileged to enjoy today.
Hear, hear!
We both thank you. All of you.
Thank you for every word that you just said!
Thank you for honoring these men and their sacrifice.
Seth & Bill,
1) I can't believe I am just finding your platform.
2) When I read the comments from the Veterans, I realize I found a good home.
Thanks for an excellent series. One quibble regarding Britain not fortifying the Gilberts: resourcing issues aside, the primary reason for this apparent failure was that the Gilberts were ex-German League of Nations Mandated Territories, the remit for which precluded fortification by the Brits. Australia likewise had New Guinea as a separate ex-German LoN Mandated Territory, which explains why it (in particular Rabaul) wasn't fortified before the war either.
The Japanese, however, weren't quite as compliant (especially regarding Truk).
Best wishes :-)
Seth and Bill,
Thank you so much for your production. I'm pushing toward 70 years old, I was fortunate enough to associate with World War I and World War II veterans. Many of my Uncles and cousins fought in the Pacific Theater. Both of you bring to life the difficulties and guts it took to fight a very tough foe. I had long conversations with these veterans. Thanks for illuminating the logistics and other vital support services. My Mom was an Army nurse in the ETO so all this is much appreciated.
My favorite history is WWII Pacific. Newly subscribed 👍
Capt. Toti’s description of the fortifications on Tarawa confirms my reading back in the ‘60s. The coconut logs on top of those forts, from what I read, would actually cause the 16 inch rifle rounds to bounce off because the angle was so shallow. The battleships had to back off farther from shore to get a higher angle of impact, closer to the vertical. Then the rounds could break through the sand and logs. That’s what I read, but I can’t remember where … I was about 14 then.
My dad was a first day lander, 2nd Marines Red Beach Two….survived the wade in under fire, stuck at the sea wall, wounded on the third day…..very dangerous battle for the Marines….god bless the USMC.
Thanks for your dads service
I am watching one at a time. Out of order. I so try to comment to further your efforts.
I saw Capt. TOTI in dress whites. What a difference that haircut and uniform makes!
Outstanding podcast once again gentlemen. Well done.
I cannot thank you enough for your podcast. I have been listening to it with my mother who is 97 years old. She went into nursing in 1943 under a program that paid for nurses to help the war effort. Her sister was a nurse already with the navy and was in Pearl Harbour in 1941. My aunt Millie was then posted to Australia and look after many sailors and marines from Guadalcanal. Millie's husband was Captain Bill Robinson who flew B 17's in the earliest days of the European Theatre. My mom frequently cries when she listens to your podcast and then tells us stories of caring for servicemen in Wisconsin who had been sent home with severe life altering wounds (she worked from 44 til 46 in a burn unit). Some of the stories are both uplifting and shocking. I hope at some point you tell the story of nurses in WW2 especially those who served the Pacific theatre.
So glad she is listening
God bless your mother and her sister! Nurses are true angels on Earth!🇺🇲⚓️💯🙏💖
Best part of my Tuesday morning 🤝
❤❤❤ just wanted to say this old lady is subscribing. . It was like listening to a book. Very mature fact based conversation thank you
Capt Toti, that was the best explanation I’ve heard about the tides at Tarawa. I liked the screen writing too. It really helps with the maps. You’re the Navy version of John Madden! 😂 Great job on the episode.
A great book about Tarawa and it’s influences on the creation of the UDTs is “By Water Beneath The Walls” by Ben Milligan. He was a SEAL officer and and did a good job of the early TRUE history of the Scouts/Rangers and UDTs.
“The Water Is Never Cold” by James Douglas O’Dell is another good book about the early UDTs.
Thank you for the book recommendations! I've ordered both of them from Amazon and I'm excited to read them!🇺🇲⚓️💯👍
Gentlemen thank you for the in-depth pod cast of this series I am learning much more of the pacific theater during this world wide war.
Thanks for mentioning the Kiwi input to the tide problem. I recall reading that US planners based in New Zealand consulted NZ boaties who were familiar with Tarawa and they warned them of the reef and tide issues. Also early in the war a number of Kiwi Post Office radio & telegraph staff were executed by Japanese Army.
As Jon Parshall says, the Japanese Army was a cruel army.
"If your only objective of your fleet is to protect your fleet what is the point of having it?"
*Imperial Germany Navy has entered the chat*
Tarawa was the Fredericksburg of WW2. A staggering event. Outstanding episode, maybe your best yet.
No. Not quite. The United States Marines WON Tarawa. Fredericksburg was a clear loss.
If Tarawa was Fredricksburg then iwojima was Gettysburg
Apt comparison
You have a wonderful series here for students of the WWII Pacific war. I am myself most interested in the PTs, those heroic and romantic albeit not terribly effective weapons systems. Might I suggest that a single episode on these boats, how they evolved, why they were not wildly successful, but (sorta) came into their own as gunboats up against Japanese barges. Any reference you can add to your discourse would be most appreciated.
I’ve been a major fan of history, mainly WWII and USN history for over 60 of my 78 years and I’m a 25 year navy retiree (63-88) and retired as a MCPO. In my humble view the worst losses we suffered in WWII had to be either the MacArthur losses of his planes on December 8th, as he did have adequate advance alert of the Pearl Harbor attack - the losses of those 4 heavy cruisers in the slot during the Guadalcanal campaign because the OTC didn’t trust those few radars he had - or the decision to not bypass Tarawa in their island hopping campaign or at least not choose such a strongly fortified target for the first big amphibious proving ground operation for the marines. It’s best lesson learned (again IMHO) was that much better intelligence was needed for future amphibious efforts. A question I have not ever addressed was there any degree of senior marine involvement in planning or developing of intel prior to the start of the operation.
Another great torpedo Tuesday. I really enjoyed the oceanography lesson from Professor Skipper Toti. It's details like this that make these videos so interesting.
It totally amazes me about the US navy size at this time. Seventeen carriers!! Wow! Those boys a year earlier at Guadalcanal could only dream of fleets like this.
I am really looking forward to the remaining episodes of the Tarawa battle. Keep up the good work.
I had a young Japanese boy stay at my house and we used to like watching warmovies and docos.
Obviously we had to respect each other.
But when I told him about Roosevelt order for the 24 Essex carriers - he just could not believe it!
"Tirelessly" is a polite way to describe forces labor shifts the Japanese had those guys on
One of the best things about your podcasts is that, when necessary, you take the time to set the stage for major operations. Just as with Guadalcanal, this episode goes into detail about why the operation was done, the order of battle for both sides, and the logistics that were available in that time and at that place. It is obvious that you believe in providing as much context as you can so that we viewers/listeners can glean the most from your presentations.
Watching your series in conjunction with reading Ian W Toll’s trilogy has been extremely educational and entertaining . Great work celebrating The Greatest Generation
I can't believe you only have 17K subscribers. Some highly suspect history channels have Millions of subscribers. No justice. You guys are the best by far. Keep up the great work. I look forward to Tuesdays for a new episode every week.
It’s like Christmas every Tuesday morning! Thanks Seth and Bill and all your wonderful guests.
This episode was so good, i think Captain Toti should expand his showers to + 3 min. The gentleman deserves it!!
Captain, no need to apologize for being an expert in your field. We get the great benefit of your knowledge to help us more fully understand the War.
I don’t know if either of you gentlemen ever took to the stage while in high school, college, or at some other time. But you touched upon the first two laws of the stage: the first, of course, being.” the show must go on.” doesn’t matter if you’re using new software or not the second slightly less well known, is “ if the audience doesn’t know, it’s a f-up; it’s not a f-up.”
Very fine work as always, gentlemen. Keep the high quality content coming!
Seth responding: I most certainly never "graced" a stage of any sort.
The stage you never “graced” was absolutely deprived by your non-presence on its hallowed boards.
My uncle, Sgt. George W. Bowden was a Marine in the 2nd Corp. His amphibious tank was named, My Deloris, which has been referenced as one of the first to make land. My uncle died that day, and his body eventually returned home in 1947. I recently found all the letters home and am compiling what information I can find to write his story. Thank you for all the additional information your podcast has provided.
I love your content. Thanks!
I’ve learned more in one month of this podcast than I ever learned in my entire life up until this point about WWII history and our country’s role in the Pacific theatre.
Thank you for the incredible content and narration of this podcast!
I just love your channel, and look forward to it every week. I would like to reiterate that you should be making a DVD series of your entire series - it is so good and informative. It should be a documentary series to be had for many decades and more! 'Victory at Sea' is still available, and it was made in 1952, which is 71 years ago!
I have to comment about your comments regarding the 16" battleship projectiles. The US Navy had two tactical shortcomings using the battleships for land bombardments. The first is that they used HE rounds mostly instead of AP rounds, and a lot of the island were heavily fortified, and INTO the island as well. Using HE rounds had little impact in these cases, as in Tarawa, and Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and probably other island landings and campaigns. The second was that they did not fire the battleship round to come down directly, or as directly as possible. This would have meant shooting the battleship rounds from afar, at 40-45 degrees so that the round comes from the sky and would have penetrate anything.
I have a ballistics file I have created over the past 10-15 years, that is mainly for purchasing handgun and rifle ammo from online retailers, to get the best price, or order the ammo with the ballistics you desire. This file has over 3,500 entries, and each entry is a link to a website that sells that ammo, and each entry displays the ballistics info for that round as well. So, how does this file relate here? I entered in ballistics info for the main WW II battleships many years ago also, and treated their guns and ammo just like the rounds you can shoot from a handgun or rifle. So, there is a section in this file just on the WW II battleships, and I list 10 of them, the most significant ones of the War. But I went beyond the normal ballistics info with these ships, and included their power (in ft. lbs.) and penetration capability over varying distances (all references are documented). As you increase the distance, you have to raise the angle of delivery, and normally the power goes down over distance, just like any non powered projectile does. The very interesting fact about the big heavy battleship projectiles, like the 2,700 lb. AP round of the US 16" guns, is that it starts to gain power at certain distances, as it comes back down, simply due to gravity. I contend that had the US Navy done both of these when bombarding heavily entrenched islands during the War, that a lot less US service men would have been lost.
I have sent this file to both Ryan Szmanski (New Jersey curator), and Drach. Ryan has looked at it and commented that he didn't realize the huge difference between the AP rounds vs. the HE ones, especially on the US 16" ammo. I do not think Drach has ever looked at it or used it, which is evident from his conclusions about battleship ammo in his channel, and his channel is usually VERY good, as you know. I offer this file to whomever would like it, and it is free to all. Its original form is MS Excel, and all power ratings are calculated, and I do not use any of the stipulated power ratings (for the handgun and rifle ammo from the online retailers) when one is given, which is not always. I release this file in PDF format, so anyone on any device can read it. So, the battleship power is similarly calculated. I have included a lot of other info on the battleships, like when built, their weight, length, speed, range, and more, all in 4 categories by the bore of their gun - 14", 15", 16", 18.1". If anyone would like a copy of this file, click on my name here, and then click on 'About', and either email me or go to my website and find the file there in my WW II section.
There was some use of AP on shore defenses. Also, you have the differences with nose-fused and base-fused HE. The US wasn't particularly well prepared for shore bombardment missions early in the war. You see it here and you see it in North Africa. AP was used in later invasions on hardened defensive points (when you could pinpoint them), but the BB drivers were always somewhat parsimonious with it from paranoia about encountering Japanese surface forces. I think it was the Aleutian campaign where Pennsylvania was convinced to use some AP on bunkers with devastating effect, but the ship's captain refused to use more than a few salvos since rumors of Japanese surface forces in the area were uppermost in his mind.
Vincent, I have a couple questions/remarks:
1) A round gaining power at long range does not make physical sense. Any kinetic energy gained by falling from apogee first had to be stored as gravitational potential energy during the flight up. The round leaves the barrel with E_total = KE_1, it ascends to apogee where E_total = GPE_max + KE_2, and then it descends so that (in a vacuum) the GPE goes back to zero and the impact energy = E_total = KE_1 again. Of course in reality, the projectile's drag is bleeding its energy the whole time, so impact energy (KE_3) is less than KE_1. I am curious to see the calculations you used to get these results.
2) The big guns on these ships were designed and housed for direct fire. They typically had maximum elevations less than 40 degrees and even those that could exceed that range often experienced operational difficulties in doing so (often the guns had to be depressed to load again).
3) Firing at 30 or 40 degrees elevation produced maximum range shots for these ships and therefore maximum dispersion. Throughout every account I have read of Pacific shore bombardment actions, the universal aim of the bombarding ships is to get as close to shore as is reasonable so they can accurately direct their own fire onto point targets. Hiking the guns up 45 degrees makes this impossible.
4) Firing guns this large at max elevation places the firer over the horizon from the island. Therefore all fire support can only be coordinated, ranged, and spotted by radio. Again, go read the accounts - flag signals, smoke, and good old-fashioned waving your arms on the beach were all critical at one point or another. Consider also that battleships losing their own comms due to muzzle blast was not an infrequent occurrence.
5) The interaction of firing at maximum dispersion and limited barrel life make this method an operational nonstarter. Yes, a plunging shot anywhere onto an enemy battleship could be a one-hit kill. That's not the case with an island. Consider that over 20 salvos Prince of Wales put 3 hits on Bismarck (roughly the size of Red 1 beach) at 20kyd. That's firing at masts (which Tarawa did not have) and eyeballing the range/elevation of the 14" Mk VII suggests they had the guns at about 25 degrees to do this. Two of those hits were ineffective, but one was an operational kill (the fuel bunker). Not so on a fortified landmass. The task confronting these naval fire support forces was not to put a shell anywhere, but to put it exactly into the enemy fortification. Even on the most heavily fortified beaches, there's 50 square feet of nothing for every square foot of bunker. Using the Prince of Wales calculation (1 effective hit for 200 rounds fired), knocking out 5 bunkers will empty an entire battleship - and that's assuming the accuracy at 20 degrees deflection! Going to indirect fire may result in 400 or 500 rounds per bunker!
Heroes all of them. My Uncles fought in Burma, one of whom at 86 just prior to his death still suffered from malaria,
another Uncle killed in Normandy, my father who served 1940 onwards in both the Royal Navy on Malta Convos ( torpedoed) & U.S.Navy aboard the U.S.S.South Dakota in the Arctic 1943, until invalided out in late 1944. 👍🏻🇺🇸✌️🏴🇬🇧 He lost a boyhood friend machine-gunned rescuing a shipmate on the sinking Repulse off Malaya.
Thanks again Seth and Bill, the depth of the information you give us is incredible. Your work and knowledge is much appreciated.
Great history and great discussion between two knowledgeable and thoughtful historians. Interesting format and an incredible topic
Another wonderful day and video. Thanks Seth n CPT BILL.
Stay safe, Stay healthy.
Love your vids.
SGT DOUG, RECON, 101ST, RVN 68-69
Tuesday has become my favorite day of the week! Thanks for the time you put into this effort. As a kid I read a book on the Battle of Tarawa and have studied it since then. With the benefit of hindsight our victories take on an aura of inevitability. However, this was a dicey affair that we won through tenacity, bravery, and good leadership. Can’t wait until the next drop.
Former Amphib Sailor trained in ship to shore movement and served as a Boat Group Commander. Nothing but complete admiration for what was done and accomplished at Betio. Great series you are putting together. Was in Michigan last week and took a day to tour Silversides, well worth the day. You need to plug the necessity to view and support these ships. They are in need of financial support to maintain the ships in suitable conditions or they should be in a dry dock facility. Again Bravo Zulu on your presentations.
You guys are great! This has quickly become my favorite Video Podcast no fluffing or wandering round the subject, well presented with honest opinions voiced. Willing to call attention to "F@#k ups" and less then stellar personalities for what they were with no apologies or softning an opinion over worry of losing viewers. Can't wait for next weeks episode.
After many years of reading, I am quite familiar with Tarawa and the pros and cons about the landing and completely agree with you as the necessity of the operation for any one of a number of very valid reasons. My question is really about the entire Central Pacific thrust vis a vis War Plan Orange. I have done a lot of reading over the years about the life and career of USMC Lt. Col. Earl "Pete" Ellis (12/19/1880-05/12/1923), whom was heavily involved in the projected possibility of amphibious action against the Japanese in the former Imperial German colonies in Micronesia which were mandated to Japan after WW I. Was his interest and work strictly about Micronesia or did it apply to the entire Central Pacific thrust, which included the Gilberts, Marshall's and the Mariana's. There was a lot of speculation about his travels in the area and his contact with the Japanese, especially after his rather mysterious death on Palau in 1923. Was his "Operations Plan 712: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia" one of the pillars the whole amphibious doctrine followed by the US in the Pacific in WW II ? Or was he something less important ? Thanks again for another impressive podcast gentlemen. I look forward to the rest of the Tarawa Trilogy.
Another excellent "rabbit hole" in which for me to dive. Thank you.
I find myself waiting w/ anticipation for your videos every week, it's nearly akin to childhood Christmas mornings.
Eddie Albert (Green Acres) joined the Coast Guard and later became a Navel Reservist and rescued 47 Marines as a coxswain, in addition to supervising the rescue of 30 more. (prior to the war, he served w/ the US Army as an Intelligence spy photographing German U-boats in Mexican harbors)
All this excellent content from folks like you and drach make me think of my grandad and his love for ww2 history. He would have absolutely loved it if he was still around.
This is the BEST WW2 podcast there is. Head and shoulders above everything else out there. Keep up the Great work. From a UK subscriber.
@@iainharding1992 many thanks
I to am a fan since first stumbling on your first episode. There’s just something about your personalities or presentation that is so entertaining.
Thank you gentlemen for honoring and preserving the history of all who have served in the Pacific war.
Excellent as always. I've been looking forward to this one.
Thanks, guys. I consider myself reasonably informed about the conduct of the Pacific war, but I must admit that your discussion here of the strategic details around Galvanic and future events was VERY informative. The B-29 WAS a huge reason Japan was brought to its knees, but I never considered how important Galvanic was for setting up the B-29 and all the learning curve represented by Tarawa and Makin. All the servicemen who died and were wounded there were every bit the heroes that all the other ones who served after were. They all served on each other's shoulders, even extending to the oil worker busting his butt in Texas or California, the farmers, or the gal-riveters working in the war factories. What an amazing story. No wonder Yamamoto warned his countrymen about what the US was capable of.
Bless you for continuing to bring out these stories back into the light of day so we can marvel and learn from these amazing times.
Thank you so much for this series. Brings me to tear up thinking about the sacrifice of the US marines in this battle.
My Uncle was in Many of the Pacific War island jumping. While quite rare he rose from Private USMC to Bren at Iwo Jima. He spent many of his earlier career in Places Like Nicaragua doing support functions as quartermaster. In my navy career (1960-80) I spent two tours helping teaching Amphibious operations. Most of that was a carry over from WWII. Still today the abilities to land troops on a foreign shore is a positive for the US
Great show
My father, USMC, fought on IwoJima, start to finish. He never talked much about it. Thank you Seth and John for providing much needed background.
I think that this channel should be authorised by now.
I really enjoy them, but its going to take me a few years to watch them all
Awesome presentation as always, guys. I too have huge admiration for Admiral Nimitz and it pains me to see that he did not understand the importance of a sustained barrage before the landings began. I eagerly await the next episode!
The Captain aint lying about those tides!!! Starting @29:00...Captain Toti explains those tides. When i was in the Navy(1986-89), we had to deal with tides all the time in San Diego(32nd st) and Long Beach.
Thanks fellas. In the states for this one. Back Down Under tomorrow….
Bill, that was actually an excellent explanation of the tidal situations facing every amphibious landing in WW2, and necessary for us to understand the challenges facing our troops and logistical supply.
God bless all the courageous veterans with nerves of steel who risked everything and sacrificed so much to protect our countries and preserve the freedoms we enjoy today! God bless all the souls - military and civilian - that we have lost in times of war! God bless America! God bless us all and grant us peace!
Great foundation episode. I can hardly wait for the next installment. You guys have made Tuesdays much better! Years ago, I read Russ Martin's book "Line of Departer: Tarawa". I have had a special place in my heart for Betio and Makin ever since. Steady at the helm and keep up the good work.
I have always enjoyed WW 2 history. Especially pacific naval history. I think its because I saw and visited the USS North Carolina often. This is one of the most enjoyable series Ive ever seen. It will be alright with me if when you get to the end of the war you start again
I have been watching tv and reading about Tarawa for decades. You guys have done it again- excellent show. I also look forward to each TUESDAY morning to see what great content you guys come up with. Keep up the great work 👍
Every Tuesday night for me. Thank you for your exceptional content.
Tarawa was a real wake-up call for the amphibious operation planners. Out of Tarawa came improvements in equipment, UDT and better training for Marines and sailors in amphibious ops.
Great episode - talk about a cliff-hanger - even though I'm familiar with the events in general, the great detail you provide leaves me with great anticipation for next Tuesday!!
Okay. I assumed there needed to be a supply line, but Seth brings up a great point, about the eighteen minute mark, of assumed repair after each engagement. Anyway, this demonstrates why the planners are competent and I am not. Only an experienced military commander can anticipate reality, and I am becoming more and more impressed with the commanders of that time. I certainly forgive mis-steps because it’s one thing to criticize and quite another to be in the fight. I salute both you guys for conveying the picture and am more and more amazed at the accomplishments of the navy.
This setting-the-stage discussion was very well done, especially the talks of the tides and the centrality of Tarawa.
Re Britain's neglect to protect the Gilbert Islands, Washington Naval Treaty's Article XIX forbade the building of additional defensive and maintenance fortifications. The parties were to maintain the status quo.
The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo
at the time of the signing of the present Treaty, with regard to fortifications
and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions
specified hereunder:
(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may
hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the
coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including
the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;
(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;
(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific
Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the
Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or
possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.
The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies
that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories
and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing
naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no
increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions
above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.
Section (1) forbade the US fortifying the Philippines, Guam, Midway, Guano Islands, etc. Section (2) forbade Britain fortifying any possession east of Singapore.
Much is made of Japan's upset re 5:5:3 ratio, yet Article XIX was a significant win for Tokyo because it adhered to Japan's national defensive strategy. Draw America across the Pacific to attrit its navy through breakdowns, mishaps, and violence. Impede US (and UK) ability to maintain and sustain its navy anywhere near Japan.
The Treaty ended on 31 Dec 1936, so the US and UK could have begun massive building projects to transform their Pacific possessions into fortresses, but trying to defend everything means one defends nothing. The cost, manpower, and logistical burden were not feasible, especially for Britain.
In setting the stage for Tarawa's invasion, the Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees) landed on the Ellice Islands in April '43, building two airbases and a bunker oil depot to supply the USN's oilers. US Marines arrived about a half year earlier. Eunice Islands is a large atoll, and with dredging the lagoon was capable of anchoring 100 ships. This become Naval Base Funafuti. About 1,100 km southeast of the Gilberts, it served as the USN's staging area. During the War more than 400 of these advance naval bases were built worldwide. Just as pre-fabrication of sections cut the built time of ships, the same was used for building the bases.
I think the largest one was Naval Base Ulithi, just east of the Philippines - all the atolll's islands were miniscule. It could anchor up more than 700 ships, base 150 fighter aircraft for defence and replenishing the carriers, and had floating repair facilities large enough to handle aircraft carriers.
There's a good book about the USN's service squadrons _The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II: Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil_ by Rear Admiral Worrall Reed Carter. If you don't want to spend $385.75 for it, you'll find it at HyperWar's ibiblio.
I've commented nearly the same once, you 2 Gentlemen were made for this.
I wish I had the benefit of this series BEFORE we went to the museum of the pacific war in Texas. Just kind of stumbled up it when on vacation in Texas. Any and all that listen to this series would benefit from a visit to that most excellent museum. Keep up the great work.
For the algo. Another magnificent episode, Seth and CAPT Bill!
I agree with @cjohnson7391 wholeheartedly. I have been waiting for these episodes with bated breath and dreading it at the same time. Strangely enough after the mutual emasculation of both the IJN and USN in the Solomons campaign and the literal torture to death of Aussies, Marines, US Army, and Japanese soldiers in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands campaigns things start to get "real" at Tarawa and I think this is the beginning of a new chapter in military horror that stays with this war till Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These fierce and in comparison, to the earlier campaigns rather short battles shows how supremely vicious the fighting was going to become.
Another outstanding effort. I am learning so much from these sessions
It’s important to learn
@@SaundersE5 YES! I’ve read about the Pacific War since before high school. They are filling in so many puzzling details and I appreciate their scholarship and defication
Two things that surprise me were the 20 B-24s providing aerial recon but there was no bombing campaign leading up to the landings. To reach it did they has tanks installed in the bomb bay to give them the legs? And with that many carriers available I'd have thought Nimitz would welcome the Combined Fleet coming out. At that point the air superiority would be overwhelming for the USN.
And again these videos are amazing and so educating. Thank you both!
Great work. History is about people and you guys do a great job reporting
Great lead up to the operation. Can't wait for the next episode. Thx!!
Your new software seems to be working quite well--if you hadn''t have said anything about it at the top of the podcast I woud not have known that you had it.
Great job guys. The detail you provide in this presentation addresses so many questions I have had about this operation. The use of demonstratives like the annotated map of the central Pacific elevates your presentation to a whole new level. I am looking forward to the next two episodes.
Honor, Duty, Integrity, Humility - I haven't always succeeded but always returned to continue trying to making these my life philosophy. I have tall shoulders to stand on to help with my goal. Excellent Show Gentlemen, I should be able to return to my old self by next week.
The production quality is going up, glad to see this podcast grow! I've been an avid fan since the Legend of Dugout Doug!
Seth and Bill fantastic as always. Thank you both for the time and effort you put into this history. You always fill in the spots no one else ever covers. Looking forward to next week.
Excellent episode, as usual. In regards to Admiral King, by serendipity, yesterday Paul Woodard posted an excellent episode on his WW2 TV channel, "Germany First, but not so fast: Admiral Earnest J. King and the War in the Pacific".
Thank you
Excellent as always.👍🇦🇺
An outstanding introduction to the operation. I really love the detail you give. Looking forward to the next episode.
I’m at a loss for words other than thank you both!
Well put
Greeting and thanks Seth and Bill for your work. I just finished the The Bomber Mafia and it fit's in so well with what Seth said about the attack on Japan. It was insane, prosecuting the air war from the backside of the Hump and then China to Japan. It took 9 gallons of fuel to get just one gallon to the other side. Not to mention the horrendous numbers of operations accidents to make it happen. The B-29s were coming one way or another.
It has been amazing to follow your work and fit that into other accounts of that war that have recently been written.
This is one of your best. Thank you!
Just want to say that I absolutely love the podcast and look forward to every new episode. Amazing work that just keeps getting better. I also wanted to make a suggestion.
The episodes Pearl Harbour --> Philippines --> Midway sidestepped a lot of interesting events around the fall of the European powers in the Pacific and it would be great to revisit that period.
Would be great to see some episodes on the Battle of the Java Sea and its aftermath and the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales. Especially if you could get Mike Carlton (Australian author) as a guest for Java Sea and Drachinifel back for the Prince of Wales.
Interesting outline on why Tarawa was considered important by war planners and even-handed criticism of the Navy’s planning. Many hard lessons learned here payed off later in the Pacific War. Thanks guys for your hard work.
Great quality as always. Favorite podcast by far
Another outstanding presentation, gentlemen!
You guys do an excellent job in these podcasts. I thoroughly enjoy them. I think one of the real problems for the shore bombardment is that Navy leadership just didn't understand how effective (or ineffective) most forms of artillery fire are against troops in prepared fortifications. Even a simple foxhole with overhead cover can protect the occupants against most shellfire. Artillery against prepared positions has to be extremely accurate to be effective, targeting individual positions; "area bombardment" just doesn't do it. And though you both clearly believe the Tarawa attack was necessary, it's worth asking whether the Marines could have occupied some undefended or less heavily defended island and built a new airfield, bypassing the Japanese on Betio. The U.S. built the Bonriki airport, which is the modern airport for Tarawa atoll, after the battle. I believe Bonriki was only lightly defended or undefended in 1943.
When confronted with the prospect of a direct assault against a prepared, dug-in enemy, it's always worth asking, is there a different way to get the effect we want? If Nimitz or Holland Smith had simply ruled out an assault on Betio, what alternatives might Nimitz's staff come up with?