WWI Changed Us Webinar Series: Causes of WWI - Michael Neiberg

Do you teach the MAIN causes of WWI? Find out what that acronym gets right - and where it needs to be changed, in a lively, not-to-be missed conversation with award-winning author Dr. Michael Neiberg who serves as Chair of War Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Streamed on October 28, 2020.
A professional development certificate can be obtained online. Use the password provided in the webinar to access the pdf file:
theworldwar-prod.s3.amazonaws...
Education resources:
Books by Michael Neiberg:
The Treaty of Versailles: A Concise History
Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I
The World War I Reader
Additional written work and podcasts can be found on Dr. Neiberg’s website:
neiberg102.wixsite.com/michae...
Additional lectures from Dr. Neiberg can be found on our TH-cam channel
/ nationalwwimuseum
“Why Did the War Begin?” - Understanding the Great War newsletter, No. 1 (
Includes links to teaching resources discussed by Lora Vogt
)
myemail.constantcontact.com/-...
For more information about the National WWI Museum and Memorial visit theworldwar.org

[@knockshinnoch1950]

Interesting to watch this presentation from the perspective of 2023. Three years on and the world has changed dramatically. The war in Ukraine brings a new perspective to the events leading up to the outbreak of WW1. We now have personal experience of how quickly world events can shift and change position leading to fear and uncertainty about where current events and decisions might lead. With regards to the presentation itself, it's always fascinating to hear a different perspective on the conflict and Neiberg does just that- from an American viewpoint too. He says the war was NOT about Imperialism but IT WAS- Germany was hell bent on dominating the European continent at the expense of France and Russia. This was a simple policy of Imperial expansionism. He also talks about it being a July crisis rather than a June crisis- this is kinda stating the obvious as apart from the Assassination of Franz Ferdinand who was the heir to the Austro Hungarian Empire- a very important fact he conveniently overlooks- which took part at the very tail end of June all the major events that followed did of course play out in July and the first couple of days in August. It WAS a July crisis! I do believe he presents a very naive and oversimplified view of events (yes I'm aware the presentation is for school teachers and therefore aimed at making the facts accessible to youngsters) and more than a bit misleading at points. America and US Citizens have a very different more distant and detached relationship with the First World War and this is evident throughout the presentation- an observation not a criticism. This makes it all the more fascinating to watch.

[@Fallen420chan]

I wish I could have seen him live and ask questions, but I'm so happy I have the opportunity to see another talk from Michael Neiberg!!! Thank you for uploading this content, Laura and friends. When this whole pandemic is over I am going to visit the museum and make a trip out of it. I'm going to start saving now.

[@johnelliott0101]

Dr. Neiberg is the best! 😊

[@Marmocet]

The demands in the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia were actually pretty mild. What was it about them that made them designed to be rejected?

[@martinjohnson5498]

I suggest that the problem was not only that the Powers planned for a different crisis than the one they got, but there were three problems that were specific to that time, which led to the plans being wrong for the circumstances.
1. Despite ample evidence, the militaries almost universally thought the offensive was tactically superior to the defensive, and despite the possibility of heavy casualties the offense would dominate and win. So, the side that could mobilize fastest and get in the first heavy blows, would gain a huge advantage, pobable win the war in short order.
2. Given the economics and esp. the technology of the time, the only way to mobilize quickly was by railroad. And railroads, while they have large capacity, are extremely inflexible--and, to maximize that capacity the system has to become even more inflexible.
Hence, in order to take the offensive initiative, they built rigid, railroad-based mobilization plans, and once engaged they could not be stopped without creating utter chaos and leaving them vulnerable, indeed almost helpless, to an enemy attack. And given the time required to achieve mobilization, nobody could risk being later than their immediate opponents.
Add to all that the machinations of Hartwig and Sazanov, the fears of Serbia in Vienna and of Russia in Berlin and Vienna, and the Eastern Front was primed to blow up. Still, that might have been only the Third Balkan War, between Serbia and Austria-Hungary--if Russia had stayed out, so would Germany.
3. But, the third aspect: Germany was committed to a war plan, the "Schlieffen Plan," that was obsolete from a political or grand strategic perspective. Schlieffen developed his concept as he was retiring in 1905-06-- a quick attack in the West to knock out France and then turn on Russia, which could not mobilize quickly. Russia had a primitive rail network in the militarily important areas, had just been defeated by the Japanese, its military was a total mess and its regime was still trying to recover from the 1905 Revolution and all that implied. And the Germans having defeated France in a few weeks in 1870-71, when France was (compared to Germany) stonger than it was subsequently, Schlieffen was confident Germany could do it again. Not to mention the French military was a bit of a mess in the aftermath of the Dreyfuss Affair.
Very little of that still applied in 1914. Russia had rebuilt their army, with French financial assistance were wquickly improving their rail net, the regime once again had h uthoity to declare and implement mobilization. France had sorted out its politico-military relations in the wake of Dreyfuss, and gone to 3-year conscription which equalized the core of teh French Army with the Germans.
And, in the bargain, the Anglo-French Entente had evolved from a glimmer in the eye in 1905 to a much closer relationship and with military and naval consultations occurring.
And, finally, the industrialization of war had proceeded to the point that by 1914 the logistical requirements for the Schlieffen Plan's right wing were impossible to meet. The manpower, ammunition, weaponry, distances to be travelled, and all the logistical support those imply, were beyond what a rail-based mobile army group could sustain in hostile territory.
The German plans, from their mobilization/war plan based on facts that no longer existed, to their diplomatic assumptions about the British, based on ancient Franco-English rivalries that had not applied since the Fashoda Incident was settled in 1899, and not cognizant of the import of Britain's 1904 and 1907 Ententes with France and Russia, were deeply misguided.
And to Prof. Neiberg's point, Germany could not call up its reserves and mobilize against only Russia--the embedded assumption was that any war with Russia would also be a war with France, and France would strive to attack, and such an attack would be successful. Given the worship of the offensive, even if it were able, would Germany risk mobilizing against Russia (to protect Austria) while leaving France alone? In hindsight we can see that a covering force of 20-25 divisions or so (two or three field armies) could have contained a French offensive (in fact what happened when the French unleashed Plan XVII) until Germany could respond--but they didn't think that, at the time.
Had Schlieffen not retired when he did, but still been in charge a few years later, maybe he would have seen all this and made changes. But his successor, Moltke the Younger, had not the intellect to see what was happening, nor the prestige to question the great Schlieffen, if he had.
So, when Germany mobilized and set in train the attack on Belgium and France, the Third Balkan War became the Great war.

[@benoplustee]

Nice comment ! Appreciate your weaving together of various contexts. Although I will say in a way that almost all of your points could be construed as "the great powers not getting the crisis theyd planned for"

[@jeffersonwright9275]

The young German lieutenant who caused the Zabern Affair, Second Lieutenant Günter Freiherr von Forstner, was killed in action on the Eastern Front in the Ukraine on 29 August 1915

[@jeffersonwright9275]

Minute 34: “So what I teach at the Army War College is that they planned for crisis and got another. Their assumptions were inflexible, their plans were inflexible...”. Is he referring to WWI or ... Vietnam????

[@Doc_Tar]

I won't be so fast to dismiss "MAIN."
Militarism - a number of countries, German, Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania used military force to achieve territorial gains.
Alliance - sure the Entente nations were after balance, but what's with Germany handing the Hapsburg the "Blank Check" that absolutely reassured them that their ally had their back. Imperialism - what about Hapsburg imperialism? What about an empire disintegrating, i.e. the Ottomans and their perceived weakness being open invitation for neighboring countries to adventure militarily and scrap over the pieces.
Nationalism- Serbian national aspirations were a prime cause of the Hapsburg assessing them as a threat to be extinguished before it set parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire on fire.
I would add "Weakness" both perceived in others and in themselves nationally as a key contributor that had all these nations rushing to war in 1914.
Enjoyable presentation with plenty of insightful observations. Wish we could have hashed over parts of the interpretation.

[@theobolt250]

MN's talk on thinking differently (the war really nobody wanted or expected) about the outbreak of WW1, does leave open to me one (hard to answer) question. It goes like this: if nobody really wants it, a) why does it happen anyway and b) was there never a moment they tried to put it back in the box?
The impression that I get is that there is a common undercurrent in the human psyche that wants to do nothing else but... go to war! And our civilised beliefs keep this undercurrent at bay. Has compelling arguments (al kinds of gain that come from maintaining peace).... but... this undercurrent does not want to listen to arguments, it wants what it wants; violence and death!
The person who advocated in favor of this undercurrent? Adolf Hitler. In other words, do we humans really understand ourselves? I think we don't.

[@DavidErdody]

Recorded one day before the US Capitol was invaded

[@Doc_Tar]

What does that have to do with anything?