Took my boys to this talk. Ranger Atkinson is an awesome speaker; a true American original. We are lucky to have him. If you want to learn how to speak, begin with him--he does all the things well that can't really be taught.
Ranger Atkinson is an exceptional presenter. This particular topic is one of the biggest controversies of the battle, as we all know. Being a Pennsylvania-born Yankee, I appreciate that some of the Rangers giving these talks are from the South. We're all seeking to enhance our perspectives, no matter the individual opinions. I was also happy to see the large audience. Excellent work.
I'm a native Alabaman who's always rooted for the Union. Guess that's what happens when you're raised near racists who fly the rebel flag. Grateful for my family. Peace, y'all.
@mortalclown3812 I am a fan of the Stars and Bars, and also a Southerner. NOT a racist particle in my body. Perhaps you could enlarge your research before you speak.
Lee was violating the fundamental principles of wisdom; that is, “hear counsel and receive instruction”(Proverbs). Lee was like Hitler when he was @ Gettysburg; that is, he wasn’t willing to listen to the minds of wise men around him.
I so admire US Park Rangers. Every one I have ever met has given the impression of a person of absolute integrity, competent to the extent of knowing his job as much as anyone could know their job, and loving that job. The Park Ranger service is a textbook example of how to recruit the right people for the job.
Matt Atkinson has to be the best speaker I have ever listened to. Love all of his presentations both in the field and in a conference setting. I grew up in Gettysburg and have learned more in these videos watching Matt than I did in 20 years living there.
I dint know how I missed thus lecture before. Ranger Atkinson enthrall his audience with facts plus humor. Every park ranger is well informed and s credit to whichever park they serve. Truly inspiring talks.
I'm really hoping to make it to Gettysburg sometime this summer. (After getting the hay done.) It'd be great if I could possibly get a tour or presentation by Ranger Matt! During these deliberations it seems people forget about George Gordon Meade. He was a proven first-rate fighter at division command and he set himself up to easily shift his forces around where and when needed. He also seems to have had Lee's number dialed in at Gettysburg also. In short, Meade didn't scare and reacted accordingly all less than a week in command.
...bring yer musket and a bucket of minie balls !!! Y'all gonna need em when you run into them thar " Antifa" varmints who will be trying to topple Lee from his horse on Seminary Ridge !!
the column had to keep going forward and do a U turn because it would have been impossible to turn every single mule drawn wagon and artillery limber and gun team one at a time around and go back. The baggage would have been in the front and all the horse and mule drawn vehicle would have completely choked the road. People have assumed the column was only marching men and surely that would be easy to counter-march. Ranger Matt as entertaining as ever justly puts the march into perspective.
Gettysburg is a litmus test for how you feel about confederate generals. The truth is that they all had a bad day. Longstreet couldn’t get the march around the flank or be spotted. Ewell didn’t do much of anything, Stewart failed to gather reconnaissance, and Lee gave the disastrous attack order against an entrenched position. Point out which confederate general did well that day
Probably only Ambrose Wright (Hill’s Corps) and William Barksdale (Longstreet’s Corps) who’s Brigades both broke the Federal lines on Cemetery Ridge unsupported.
I think the park service should do a presentation on Athur Fremantle. Not just his experience at Gettysburg. The rest of his story if you have read his book is fascinating. He talks about seeing a female confederate solider on a train on his way to Atlanta.
Corey Pfarr has alot of things to say about Longstreet at Gettysburg, not only about what happened, but also what so many - including Douglas Southhall Freeman - have said about what happened. His books are worth a good read . Aloha 🤙🏼
I honestly think Longstreet's delay was deliberate. In his eyes, his corp would be saved by nightfall. His captains and he were intuitive enough to know the federal position was near impregnable. And, any advantage gained could not be supported. The entire movement was ill-advised and Lee is the only one to blame. Sorry, Matt.
Ill-advised is exactly the right term. Lee sent Longstreet off to fight with almost zero intelligence about the Union position. An example of sloppy staff work that rivals the Lost Order.
This is the crux of it - the real issue is not whether Longstreet should have attacked earlier, but the ultimate futility of attacking Meade’s position at all.
Here's my conclusion. Longstreet by his own accounts KNEW that these attacks and movements were folly, and after heated arguments, and Lee circumventing him, Longstreet.... washed his hands... as it were, and let the responsibility for the ill-fated attacks on 2-3 July fall squarely where they should, and in fact where Lee himself said the blame lied, on Mars Robert E. Lee. Also, according to Longstreet, J. B. Hood made a formal verbal objection to the attack on 2nd July directly to Longstreet. At which time Longstreet told him that Lee himself had taken direct command and Longstreet could not override or even alter to the smallest detail, this attack. Hood later wrote in his diaries about the exchange as well, and went into Devils Den expecting to die. Hood almost did. I think it was very clearly demonstrated that Lee's charisma was unparalleled, but his tactical and strategic weaknesses, as well as his eccentric and vague leadership style were brutally exposed after the death of Thomas Jackson, who, as Lee said, was his right arm. After Gettysburg, Lee began to trust Longstreet much more than he demonstrated previously, and Longstreet proved himself very capable in multiple engagements thereafter.
Ted Logan Lordie, I would have HATED to be in Longstreet’s boots that day. He KNEW Lee had just about lost his mind in his desire to “ “just get things over,” so to speak. Or maybe just knew he had lost his mind, but did not know why.
logical assessment, I would add that Lee's failing health do to heart trouble may have also caused him to act so recklessly. he may have thought his time was short and he wanted to end the war quickly so that everybody could enjoy the fruits of victory. I think it was clear from the moment Heth went up against Buford that things were out of his control and the loss of half of his planning team (Jackson) left him severely at the Union's mercy despite it's ineptitude. Lee should have order Johnson's division from Ewell's Corps to the right flank with Anderson from Hill's Corps forming the first part of the hammer to hit Cemetery Ridge while Sickles is moving his Corps forward. Hood and Mclaws then come in afternoon and provide the crushing blow while rolling up the Union left flank and possibly capturing the II and III Union Corps and forcing the remaining Union forces off the hills back to the Pipe Creek line. There you would only have the V, VI, and XII Corps with the remains of the I and XI from the first day. The Union would probably have lost a lot of artillery and unless Burnside and some of the other Union Corps can come up from the Peninsula in time then Lee has a strong chance to roll up the rest of Meade's command and force Lincoln to either surrender or march into Washington and arrest him. Now of course that is if everything goes perfectly despite the losses of the first day. The Union left flank was the key to the whole battle and failing to take it, very little success could have happened after that. Sedgewick's VI was barely even engaged in the battle so if he was plugged in with his fresh Corps as Pickett's men might have cracked the center, they still would have been thrown back by Sedgewick. My thoughts of course, who knows what if any of it would have happened. I think the only thing we all can agree on is if Jackson would have been there the South wins the war.
What I don't understand is if there were so many delays and things going wrong and no coordination of attacks why didn't Lee call everything off and go back to the drawing board? Also, the fault should go back to Lee since as Harry Truman use to say the buck stops here.
Robert I think it is due to the fact that he was seen as someone who went against the grain of former CSA Generals during the post war period (i.e. he became a Republican and friendly to the Grant Administration). This for many made him a model post war ex Confederate. While I think though he should be commended for his post war behavior, this doesn’t mean or translate that he was some perfect general during the actual war.
If Longstreet had attacked when he was supposed to...Sickles would have been where the Third Corps was supposed to be: with its flanks anchored on Little Round Top and on Cemetery Ridge right next to the Second Corps. Pickett's Charge would have been a day early, and without Pickett. And if Longstreet had tried to swing around, he would have ended up with the Fifth Corps on his ass.
Always an interesting discussion on the topic. I expect that Atkinson (a very pro-Lee historian, for good reason) would side with Lee, if really there is a side. I will offer two points to consider in support of Longstreet: 1. Longstreet was a proven defensive strategist with his performances at 2nd Bull Run, Antietam and Fredericksburg. Lee had praised his performances and promoted him one day ahead of Jackson to make him the senior commander. So it is reasonable to think that Longstreet had planned and expected Lee to accept his plan. And it is also reasonable to conclude that Longstreet had been working on a maneuver to a defensive position through the night with his staff and commanders. There are accounts that Longstreet did just this by scouting around Big Roundtop during the night. Thus, the decision at dawn, so to speak, was surprising and disappointing to any commander, and now you had to go back to the drawing board. So yes, what commander wouldn't be discouraged when his idea, which had been accepted previously, was then set aside. Plus, as a present day commander, I know a Corps staging, setting, marching and forming, even in Civil War times takes more than a few hours to complete, let alone plan and complete. Also, in this same point, never underestimate the impacts usurpation or micro management of command. The impact is that it sucks commander's authority away from subordinates. So yes, "come on man." 2. The question of Lee v. Longstreet on Day 2 is really made up by those who wanted to place blame, and by historians who enjoy this controversy. The fact is that, and I am going to yell this for effect: LEE ORDERED LONGSTREET TO ATTACK ON DAY 3. (Sorry about my outburst of bellicosity) In fact he gave him two divisions (Pettigrew and Trimble)to support Pickett. Again, Longstreet objects to the plan and begs Lee to reconsider a full on attack against a much larger entrenched force over open ground. Lee, rather than ordering his other corps commanders, tells Longstreet that he, his most trusted commander, will prevail. So, Day 2 is an empty argument because of the facts of Day 3. Had Longstreet really failed in carrying out Lee's orders to the General's satisfaction or within his control, Lee would have had AP Hill attack from a shorter area of open ground with their organic divisions with an extra day's rest.
I’m not sure that the day three order is enough proof. Maybe lee had even less confidence in Hill. Maybe Lee didn’t place the blame on Longstreet, but just blamed fortune.
They were both recommended for promotion same time. Longstreet was senior to jackson so was going to be senior subordinate either way. Two of the three instances you state for longstreet being a “defensive strategist” really shows him at his best which was fighting on the tactical offensive
Regarding blame for the delays, it sounds like there was plenty of blame to go around. A bigger question in my mind: had Longstreet been in position sooner, would it have changed the outcome? No. Attacking in the heat of the day would not have been favorable to anyone on the move, and Sickles was in a better position south of Hancock's II Corps along Cemetery Ridge. Could V Corps have extended the Union line further south of Sickles' III Corps and occupy LRT before Hood arrived? In my opinion, the result would have been the same. Same troops on both sides, but now with the Union occupying a stronger position with shorter interior lines.
Porter had Sgt Henry Wentz in his command who was both a Gettysburg native who was positioned 600 yards from his father's house. John Wentz spent the battle in the cellar of his house that was opposite the Peach Orchard and the wheat field. Henry wasn't mentioned in the records but could easily gotten Porter and his artillery in place easily. Lee also had Wesley Culp on the first day until he was killed on Wolf's Hill the morning of the second day. Plus Robert Hoffman with 2 more Hoffman brothers in the rear. All of whom were born and raised in Gettysburg. Officers in their commands knew they had locals but never used them.
It seems both are at fault. Lee was expecting Longstreet to act more like Jackson and assault as he saw fit; however, Longstreet was more cautious and awaited explicit orders.
Abby Grant I have to agree. It's just my opinion, that Gen. Longstreet wanted to stay on defense. Gen. Lee wanted to strike. Lee supposedly agreed to a 'defensive' campaign at the beginning, or so we have read. The anxiousness of Lee is understandable, as is reluctance of Longstreet. The plan was full of faults and friction. Col. Alexander was probably the best performer on the march, having found his way around the hill quickly to avoid detection. Unfortunately, we cannot know what was really going through each mind... all we have are the notes.
You people seem to be a little forgetful when it comes to Longstreet as a General. General Longstreet was with the Army of Virginia before, General Lee was given command of said army. General Lee knew exactly who Longstreet was, and how Longstreet would fight when told to do so. And General Longstreet knew how stubborn and hard-headed General Lee could be, he had seen it before at Malvern Hill. When General Lee pulled McLaw aside, pulled out a map and said, I want you to do this. That is a direct order, and it is (in my opinion) proof that General Lee knew Longstreet well enough, to override the normal chain of command. If, that indeed happened. What everybody forgets, is that nobody sent out scouts in the 6+ hrs between the first scouting mission, and the time of Longstreet's start of march. General Lee's plan was flawed from the start, because the intel was bogus, and it only snowballed as the day wore on. Any half-wit military man, should have been expecting Union reinforcements to continually show up at Gettysburg, all through the second day of battle. General Longstreet supposedly waited for the stragglers from his command before moving out. Someone in the Confederate leadership, should have taken a looky-see to find out if things had changed, on the Union side of that battlefield. All it would have taken is a short little ride to the seminary, and a pair of field glasses, from there they could have seen all of Cemetary Ridge.
zettle 234: I agree with you on your major points. I'll make some statements. Firstly, we cannot know what was in the minds and hearts of each individual in question. Having said that, I'll address your points and give you my viewpoint respectfully. The flanking plan, originally, was a good one, in my opinion, given Ewell's actions on July 1 with Culp's hill now occupied by Yankees. Okay, so we're going to flank them and hit their left. Good plan, but inadequate recon, as you say. The main problems, as I see them... 1: Early morning recon of the Union left, which was not followed up before attack time. 2: Lee agreeing to allow Longstreet to wait for Gen. Law, causing a delay. There were other options, (IMO), such as attaching one of Anderson's brigades to Longstreet to make up for Law. 3: No scouting of a good route to get to the Union left, prior to Longstreet's march. 4: Encountering Bream's Hill, which probably frustrated Longstreet, who may not have been on-board with the attack in the first place. 5: Longstreet's decision to counter-march instead of an "about face" of 1st Corps, causing further delays. 6: No pre-attack reconnaissance of the Union left. There are other more subtle points and details. What we're dealing with is history, and we have a lot of conflicting information, and twelve different sides of the story. Overall, I agree with you on what I believe to be your best point: Riding to the Seminary, or to Bream's Hill, to observe any changes on the Union left before the attack. Thanks for listening to my perspective, remembering we still cannot know all the actual words and facts. We must also consider what Lee expected vs. what Longstreet felt was practical. And also evidence that Lee was ill. Military hindsight is always 20/20, and there is no shortage of armchair generals. Thank you for your thoughts, Sir. :-)
I'm sorry Montgomery, I did not mean it to sound like a point by point thing. I just get tired of people trying to assign blame. Flanking your enemy was a good tactic before these guys fought, and it will be a good tactic after we are gone. Agreed. The leader comes up with a plan and if it is successful, the leader takes the credit. If it fails, it is still the leaders plan. Ike wrote a letter before D-Day, and General Lee rode out on to the field on day 3. No blame is needed. And yes, Lee could have told Longstreet to go ahead and move, and Lee could have sent the stragglers when they arrived. There was no reason to wait. The trail the Artillery left, when they went around the hill, had to be like a modern day tank track with all the horses, cannons, ammo train and men on foot. Never have figured that one out. The counter march? I don't know how far they got. If the supply train is started already, you have to put the cart before the horse to just turn it in place. Like you said 20/20. Oh, and no I am not saying you blamed anybody lol Thank you Montgomery, for adding your perspective to the questions I find hard to answer. To look at pieces of a battle, and not keep in mind the entire battle, takes away from the battle (IMO). If we stop the clock at Chancelorsville when Hooker had flanked Lee, Hooker looks like a brilliant General for dividing his Army.
zettle 234 Thanks for your comment. I think you're right with your comment about dissecting a battle too much... I agree, it takes away from the whole. Battles and wars are like tornadoes: Mass destruction and confusion. And the best laid plans in war mostly go awry about a minute after a battle starts. There weren't any body-cams back then, (too bad), or none of us would have to discuss intentions, orders or results LOL. I agree about the counter-march, in that if their supply trains were following the same route, it would have been even more difficult to just about-face the whole column. I play a lot of strategy games, including Sid Meyer's Gettysburg. People who play and win as the South often boast about it. Well, in a game, we have the advantage of seeing the entire field and basically knowing who is going to arrive and when. In real-life, plans and results are usually quite different. Thanks for reading my perspective, and thank you for yours! Cheers.
As fine a combat commander as he was Longstreet had a history of the blame game and a potentially too high opinion of himself. I will never understand how he and Bragg permitted the Union landings from Mocassin Point without as massive counter attack as possible. Or, the Knoxville debacle and his efforts to work under Johnson. I understand Lee was suffering with what might have been angina at Gettysberg and I do not underestimate but realize that one could only speculate as to the mental condition of some of these people. Thank you for your presentations they are always very perceptive, easy to understand and thought provoking
Another great video by Matt. Please keep them coming. Unfortunately a portion of it was ruined by the person with the coughing fit. Too bad they couldn’t remove that individual. I realize it can’t be helped but boy it’s annoying. Keep it up Matt! You are a talented historian. Please put up a “no coughing during filming” sign. Please.
I have always thought that everything that happens at Gettysburg can only be understood when you think of what happened at Chancellorsville 2 months before. It appears that Lee is upset almost from the beginning of the battle, he is definitely insecure and missing Jackson. What happens with Ewell on the first day when he fails to assault Cemetery Hill seems to put questions in Lee's head about the leadership in the First Corp. Longstreet seems to have had his own plan as to what to do about the situation after the opening of the battle, and certainly was not acting as Jackson would have under similar circumstances. We seem to be missing some important conversation that occurred sometime that night of July 1st between Lee and his Corp Commanders, something put everybody off their game that night.
Matthew Miller - Good take and viewpoint on this matter. The loss of Gen. Jackson, I believe, is a hidden factor here. Plus Gen. Hill is new to Corps command, and Gen. Lee knows Gen. Longstreet favors defense. So much to discuss, and unfortunately we weren't there to hear it all.
What upset everyone just below the surface was J.E.B. Stuart. Going into a major conflict without knowing the numbers and placement would upset any commander.
im confused more than ever after this presentation...everything ive read and battlefield walks with other rangers, is the column turned around at the top of the crest on BLACK HORSE TAVERN road about a 1/4 from the Fairfield rd. NOT Breams Hill road. AND, the route they ended up taking was along Willioughby run road..no mention here of that.
I think what Mr. Atkinson said in the last minute of the lecture is correct. It is clear in Longstreet's book that he did not agree with the orders. And if you read between the lines a little it is fairly obvious that he didn't put his heart into it. I think Longstreet was right that the attack should have not been made on the 2nd, but once given the orders he should done his military duty and gave 100% to accomplish the orders. I don't believe that he gave 100% on the 2nd or the 3rd either for that matter.
I know that Facebook Live is a popular feature on that social media platform, but as a suggestion, could you please record the lectures for TH-cam as well? The sound quality and video presentation were much better for last year's lectures.
Just a side note maybe speculation but many Confederates had dysentery from cherries being in season that week. Lee also may have suffered an angina attack on the 2nd day of Gettysburg. Hood told Longstreet they could just roll boulders down on them before his attack.
Interestingly, I think a great deal of this presentation would also apply to Longstreet's behavior, mindset and actions on July 3rd as well! (and Lee's as well, in various ways)
The fact that Captain Johnson, while leading the First Corp to its position per Lee's orders (based upon his earlier reconnaissance) ended up exposing the movement which resulted in a march of 6 miles instead of 3 miles. In spite of this major delay which really had Longstreet irritated, they were in position by 4PM. That hour is the hour many participants expected the troops to be ready. I fail to see any reason to say Longstreet baulked or purposely delayed anything. What did cause ANOTHER problem for Longstreet was Hood and McClaw's both requested a delay, because once in position they discovered that the Union forces were now where they weren't near sunrise that morning. Now what do you do? If your a good commander you attack as ordered and that is what he did, regardless of his apprehension of a frontal attack on an enemy of unknown strength. My feeling is...Regardless of how Longstreet "felt" he followed all orders, dealt with the dynamics of the battlefield as always and hoped that the decisions made by ALL would result in a victory. Remember....IF frogs had wings they wouldn't bump their butts a hoppin.
Longstreet's case of the slows......has become something of a red herring in the Gettysburg debate. Longstreet's real sin wasn't that he was slow it was that his Corp dispositions and attacks were fundamentally tactically unsound. McClaws and Hood asked for delays and changes to their orders because they saw that the situation on the ground was manifestly unsound as planned. Hood felt so strongly that he protested his orders at least 3 times and then ignored them anyway when he executed his attack. A good commander does not blindly follow orders, a good commander reports changes on the battlefield to his commander and requests new orders to account for those changes. Longstreet flatly refused to do this, claiming that he had already tried to do so before the flank attack was arranged. Longstreet tried to equate a request for changes in the tactical disposition of his corp with a request he had made for the movement of the entire army to an alternate location where they might await an attack from Meade. This is errant nonsense and should be ignored by anybody with the most rudimentary understanding of troop movements, tactics and strategy. McClaws and Hood's request was tactical, Longstreet's was more in the nature of a strategic request and it was a fundamentally unsound one at that. Longstreet was extremely unhappy that his advice was being ignored by Lee and that he was not to be considered an equal as he imagined Jackson had been (Jackson had been no such thing of course). Nursing his wounded ego and pride he became like a passive aggressive child that follows the letter of every command but refuses to honor the spirit of those orders. He put his entire corp and army at risk and ended up taking needless casualties in a tactically unsound assault.
@@ashleighelizabeth5916 an interesting theory, but what adjustment should have been made? How long would it have taken? How much more marching in the July heat? And how would you predict the Union would respond to the adjustment?
@@mjfleming319 well the original attack plan called for a flanking attack on the left flank of the AotP by Longstreet's two divisions that were then on the field up the Emmitsburg Rd. In the absence of Stuart the actual position of that flank was left to the determination of Captain Samuel Johnston who was sent on a reconnaissance mission to discover the Union disposition on that part of the battlefield. The trouble is that while the job he did was well enough in it's own way for a lone scouting staff officer it did not account for the shifting troop dispositions of the AotP on that day. When Longstreet's troops were nearing their positions for the start of the attack Major General Daniel Sickles III Corp had moved forward into the Wheat Field and the Peach Orchard which straddled the Emmitsburg Rd and was in a position to pour enfilade fire into the flanks of Longstreet's attack. Meanwhile Little Round Top was left uncovered by Sickle's movement as well as the shifting of other units of the AotP on the Left Flank. Hood and McLaws were able to see that the conditions on the field were manifestly different then what they were told to expect and that executing the attack as outline would be extremely costly. Hood could also see that capturing Little Round Top would be the key to flanking the entire AotP position and he requested 2 or 3 times ( I forget the exact number here) of Longstreet to shift his attack to Little Round Top. The last of these requests was made in person and all were refused with the reasoning that General Lee had refused to allow a flank attack. Now this is complete hogwash as the whole point of the attack was to catch the AotP in flank and role it up. Longstreet was trying to equate his request to Lee that the AofNVa disengage from the battlefield move across the face of the AotP and take up a defensive position between Washington and the AotP and there await it's attack as being the same as allowing Hood and McLaws to move from an attack up the Emmitsburg Rd to an attack up Little Round Top as equivalent military moves. The first move is a strategic move of the entire army in the face of an alert and active enemy that would take one or more days to execute where as Hood's was a tactical request to shift the attack of his division and that of McLaws from the area of the Emmitsburg Rd to the area of Little Round Top which would take at most an hour or two of additional marching for some of the troops (but not all of them mind) involved. In the event Hood ignored Longstreet's orders and attacked Little Round Top on his own initiative with what he had at hand. As he very nearly succeeded with his attack one can presume that the additional weight of McLaws division had a reasonable chance of taking and holding the hill. Had they done so it would have been the AotP that would have been forced to make a strategic withdraw in the face of an active and alert enemy army or risk destruction where they were. Meade had already made plans for a withdraw if necessary towards Harrisburg but to have to do so in the face of an alert and active enemy army would have been a very difficult and potentially costly maneuver and what's more it would have provided Lee and the AofNVa with yet another victory and another demoralizing retreat of the AotP. I want to make one thing above all others clear here. Much of what Longstreet said and wrote about Gettysburg didn't happen until after Lee was dead and gone. With Lee not alive to contradict him he could say whatever he wanted about any conversation they had. And while Longstreet was a very solid and reliable corp commander (one of the best in the war in fact) he was not what would call a smooth off the cuff speaker. So to believe that he gave these long monologues to Lee about tactics and strategy while Lee silently sat there and ignored his opinions and advice stretches credibility a great deal. A lot of the deification of Lee during the Lost Cause Period gets wrapped up into the controversy of Gettysburg, but if one can be objective and separate the myth from the facts, and the hearsay from the truth one can't help but be struck by how badly Longstreet exercised control of the troops under his command on July 2nd and July 3rd. One must also recognize that the only witness to most of what Longstreet and Lee spoke of on those two days was Longstreet. And it would presume to much of human nature to assume that Longstreet would not try to exonerate himself from any responsibility for the disaster that day 2 and day 3 of Gettysburg was for the Lee, the AofNVa and the Confederacy.
@@ashleighelizabeth5916 the original plan was based on faulty intelligence. I think Allen Guelzo has demonstrated convincingly that whatever Cpt. Johnston said, he was nowhere near the round tops. Lee’s plan called for an attack along the Emmitsburg road, not knowing that Sickles’ corps had already extended the Union line far to the left, and if Longstreet had blindly obeyed the original plan at, say, nine o’clock in the morning, sickles would have enfiladed him. So yes, the problems start with lousy staff work, going all the way back to Lee’s convoluted orders to Stuart at the very beginning of the campaign. But Longstreet is finally in contact with Sickles at 4:00 pm., and Hood requests that they move even further to the right. Let’s be generous and say that Hood’s proposed maneuver would only take an hour. What would the Union have done in that time? For one thing, an extra hour would have given Meade enough time to reposition Sickles back where he belonged. Then Longstreet’s force would be stretched thin over a wide front, and Sickles would be in a compact line, well supported, and anchored on Little Round Top...just as it should have been and would have been if Longstreet attacked at ten o’clock in the morning. As it happened, Longstreet and the ANV caught a lucky break when Sickles moved forward. The closest thing they got to a breakthrough occurred not on the rugged terrain of the round tops, it occurred on the flattest part of the whole Union line. It occurred there because 1. Big gaps opened when Sickles’ salient collapsed and 2. It was a lot easier to march there. Ultimately the charge of the First Minnesota saved the day, but we might wonder, “what if Hood hadn’t wasted so much time trying to sneak through unscouted woods to get to the union flank and had just obeyed Longstreet?” In that case, the attack on the lowest part of cemetery ridge might have had a little more weight, and there might have been a breakthrough. But in the end, it all comes down to “active and alert”, as you rightly note. The Union army was active and alert at Gettysburg, and we have to assume that if the ANV took an extra hour to do something, the AOP would have countered that move.
The more I read the more I'm convinced that Sickles moving his corp out in front probably saved the day for the union - obviously at great cost. Without it Longstreet's advance would have hit the union left at full strength and very well may have been able to roll up the union flank.At the least the rocky tops would have been captured and who knows how that would have changed the third day of the battle. Would love to hear Atkinson's opinion on this as he seems to be a wealth of knowledge on the subject.
Sickles moved out & isolated his corp. ( didn't tell the commander). Without support on his flanks his command was wrecked & left a huge hole in the union line. He never got another command.
@@Noland55 he .loved his corps to a better position, after he realized that Meade had no intention of heeding the warnings that Sickles was sending. Sickles's corps acted as a breakwater to slow, disrupt, and break up the momentum of the Confederate attack. In this, it worked perfectly. Meade was lucky to have a scapegoat in Sickles after he completely ignored his left flank and the imminent danger.
great job ranger Matt: You are truly amazing. Here's my thoughts on this lecture. At the end you mention about the obedience but not the spirit. I challenge that would you as one who sees the battle as a complete loss because the commanding general isn't listening to sound advice and ordering the deaths of thousands of soldiers and essentially the confederacy: Would you as Longstreet be in the spirit of "doing ones duty". I would find it difficult to be very spirited if I knew the way to win the battle but was told to do otherwise. Lees refusal to attack to the right and gain access to the rocky tops when he had the chance was not only the biggest fumble, but along with the failed Pickett's charge was responsible for the death of Confederacy.. Thanks again
General god Lee was in command. His fault. But the southern baptist bastards couldn’t allow this. Add to this that Longstreet converted to Catholicism and joined a republican administration. .
They did attack the Round Tops. About 6 hours too late. Longstreet wasn’t arguing for seizing the heights but of bypassing them. Which would have failed due to Sikes corps coming up from the Federal rear.
One capt. scouting unfamiliar landscape is NOT a reconnaissance for committing an entire corps in a flank attack. Compare with Fitzhugh Lee's entire cavalry troop & Jackson's cartographer at Chancellorsville leading Jackson around the Union right (replete with a map & course deviations to avoid detection). Same on the Union right - Lee was blind, using infantry to scout his flanks.
I agree. Jedediah Hotchkiss may have been the best cartographer of the war. On the other hand, that flank march was detected. Howard just ignored Hooker’s order to prepare for it. A modest breastwork and a couple of prepared batteries by the XI corps and that battle would have been very, very different.
Johnston was part of a reconnaissance party of five or six men, including Longstreet's engineer and it was far from the only group detailed over the 1st and the 2nd to scout the Union lines.
.@Jonathan Parks: With all due respect, Ewell's troops & misc. cavalry had marched back & forth thru G'burg for 2 days b/f Longstreet had arrived in Cashtown. The actual recon sent by Longstreet three (3) days later is moot - That had been the cavalry's job - days earlier. Given the CSA troop distribution on days 1&2, Lee had Meade right where he wanted for a Napoleonic battle. (surrounded on over 200 degrees) with one corps (Hill) in front, one corps (Ewell) on the Union right & rear, & 1 corps (Longstreet) arriving on the Union left. - while Meade arrived piecemeal by 2 parallel roads from the only direction possible. So many 'what if's' - but they all depend on cavalry duties unmet - but "Lee was blind, using infantry to scout his flanks." (above).
After just watching this again with additional perspective about the presentation of the speaker. Very well done in preparation and execution. GB was a simple example of time to chew gum or kick butt. While they were all out of gum. The initiative dictates the plan becoming all too painfully obvious. Lee committed to have his battle the night of the 1st and Longstreet understood this completely. Longstreet saved his corps to fight another day while giving Lee his battle as instructed. You have to determine when it is time to fish or cut bait. This is exactly what they did. The VI corps of Sedgwick in reserve, confirmed Longstreet called an end to the attack at the definitive time to the very predictable result.
Okay I must have missed something about the photo of Samuel Johnson? Why did the audience act like they were frozen? I guess the glare of the light on the projection screen hid something that would make more sense to those watching at home.
I think a few people were responding to Atkinson's joke about seeing the audience's reaction to the picture by hamming it up when the camera panned over the audience
PERHAPS: Too many of Lee's generals delayed too long and had too little comittment to Lee's plan of attack. Considering Longstreet's preference for a defensive battle he should have rushed to occupy Little & Big Round Top where he would have turned the federal left and could attack or hold a superior position on high ground overlooking the Union left. If he found Union troops on these locations he might have overcome them given the strength of his forces versus the number of Union troops . the logistical problems were considerable but might have been overcome. MAYBE. Jackson mightr have performed better & understood the spirit/genius of the orders better than Longstreet. But Jackson was dead. Longstreet was not the agressive attack-oriented general that Jackson had been. He was defensively minded and it meant he would act in that spirit not in the spirit of Jackson or Lee. Longstreet was the right man for another battle, a defensive battle which might have destroyed the AofP as had nearly happened in previous battles .
Lee spoke to Ewell more than once before midmorning. (Ewell was supposed to make an attack to extend the line of defense making it harder to make use of interior line strength.) The failure of Anderson can be justified by the order to Wofford by Longstreet not to impale his GA brigade on Sedgwick. The order came at the same time Hill and Anderson apparently ignored Posey and not pressing Mahone for the his apparent lack of enthusiasm. Leaving Wright out on a limb with Wilcox. The Florida Brigade showing less than a genuine interest also. Due to the late hour, allowing the federal reserve corps to line up in front of Longstreet. DS Freeman wrote the definitive contemporary work on Lee and his Lieutenants.
Longstreet was much to blame. He knew lee gave his commanders on the field much discretion so Longstreet's refusal to listen to Hood about flanking Little round Top and he dragged his feet because he was upset with Lee. Longstreet wanted to hold firm to Lee's orders without trying to find the best way to accomplish the mission like Jackson would have. . I live in the former home town of Col. William C. Oats commander the 15th Alabama of Little Round Top fame where he had his law practice in Abbeville Alabama.
I have read the book about Col. Oates. Can't recall the title, but he had already been Gov. of Alabama. It also tells of his grief of leaving his brother on Little Round Top. I am from Texas, and kinfolk went up that dang hill being in the 4th Texas, Co.K. The book was a great read! DEO VINDICE
What did Lee say? Did I miss it? Wouldn't that be the gold standard assessment of Longstreet's job performance? Surely, I missed it. It could not possibly be omitted here. Well, off to google search.
Our recollections of history would be wonderful if only they were representative of the entire truth; unfortunately we look retrospectively through a prism of time darkened by inaccuracy, myth, supposition and subjectivity. As it is, however, these lectures are splendid, highly entertaining and interesting.
So what you're really saying is that THEY, whoever THEY is in your world point of view, does not say what you believe real history or the "entire truth" is according to your opinion.
Whenever I hear about the debate between General Lee and General Longstreet, I keep thinking about the foot soldier who had to bear the load of indecision between their Commanding Generals. I think about the men who charged Little Round Top relentlessly, simply because they were told to. By the end of the day, many of them would be dead, dying, wounded or prisoners of war. I like to think that General Longstreet was a mature man with a brilliant military background. A man who would not have allowed his personal feelings to get in the way of the military objective as set forth by his Commanding General. I like to believe that neither General Longstreet or any General since then would be so petty as to endanger the lives of their troops with a half hearted approach. Soldiers will die in war. Yes timing is everything. But once that whistle blows, it's go time. I just refuse to believe that General Longstreet sacrificed so many troops because his feelings were hurt. General Lee didn't have drones to fly over the battlefield. By the time recon made their reports it was already hours old. On a battlefield five minutes is too old. Useless. Anyway, here I am 157 years after the battle of Gettysburg with my opinion. History has said over and over again that if General Jackson had been at Gettysburg the outcome would have been different. Maybe. Seemed like General Lee was waiting to hear cannon fire and the report of 14,000 muskets after breakfast. Maybe the blame lays in the untimely death of a beloved General just a couple of months before. Or as General Lee said, "God's will."
The war was lost because Lee refused to listen to Hood and Longstreet. Hood was adamant about flanking to the enemies extreme left and circling to the rear of Round Top. Instead, Longstreet kept repeating Lee's orders to attack in a frontal assault on the left flank. Hood's division took heavy casualties and accomplish nothing. The second blow was Lee's intransience and insistence to not take Longstreet's advice, and attack the center on July 3rd across a mile of open ground when the union had the higher ground and a stone wall. After Hood took heavy casualties due to Lee's orders on July 2nd, these two errors in judgement, IMO, cost the Confederacy the war. I often wonder if Lee, after suffering from arterial disease, was not in full command of his faculties. If Jackson had been at Gettysburg, I am certain these two catastrophic mistakes would not have occurred.
Ewell was to "demonstrate," basically act as a decoy via skirmishing and feigned attack formations, in order to keep the union's right flank occupied and distracted on Culp's and Cemetery Hills while Longstreet's divisions prepared to attack the left flank. He had orders to launch a proper attack anytime if a good enough opportunity presented itself.
Ewell didn’t attack until at least 7pm and this was after Longstreet’s assault had finished. Ewell only did so with one division (Johnson’s) who managed to take some trenches at the base of Culps Hill. Ewell was never good enough to command a Corps and his shocking performance at Gettysburg (along with his demotion after Spotsylvania) reflect this.
While this counter march was poorly executed and allowed visibility, I dont think it cost victory for the ANV. I think the Confederates lost Gettysburg when Stonewall Jackson was accidentally killed by his own men at Chancellorsville.. Jacksons Corps was split 3 ways Between Ewell, Johnson, and Hill. Arriving on day 1 Ewell refused to take the hills and high ground northeast of the town. He felt his men were tired and spent from a forced march, and trying to occupy the heights would be too costly. There were few Union troops defending those heights during these critical hours. General Jackson did not care if his men may be tired he would have immediately organized a full assault on those heights and he would have continued fighting long after dark. Ewell Johnson and Hill were ok generals but poor replacement for Stonewall Jackson.
It’s easy for us to sit here and criticize. But have any of us been i the position to order 14k of your subordinates to their very likely death? On 2 separate occasions. What is not mentioned in this lecture is the fact that longstreets Corp was backed up the road and had to pass a 10 mile long wagon train. And was without his 3rd division - might 20k men have seized that position? Possibly. But arm chair generals we are. The order never should have been given if the army was not in the position to attack by 9am. The failure is lees and most specifically his staff for not taking the initiate and scouting earlier and issuing orders in advance to be ready and dawn
The unanswerable question will always be what would have happened if Longstreet commenced this attack in the morning. That would have been before Sickles moved his corps forward. And I don't believe many of Sickles men were deployed in battle ranks in their original morning positions. Sickles was stretched thin even in the original morning line. All the union reinforcements that were deployed in the afternoon to shore up Sickles were not there in the morning. Even just marching around Bream's Hill instead of undertaking a counter march would have put many confederates on Little Round Top before most union troops arrived there.
You’re assuming that Sickles’ men would have sat on their thumbs all morning, lazily watching Longstreet’s corps take the high ground unopposed. As it happened, various Union officers besides Sickles were alert and active all day. We have no reason to think Longstreet would have been able to surprise them. We also know that Sickles’ men fought with skill and determination. We should assume they would have done the same if they had been deployed where Meade wanted them instead of the unsupported salient where Sickles foolishly deployed them, except that in addition to their ferocious fighting, it would have been much easier to support them. By far the most probable result to an earlier attack would have been an earlier defeat.
Longstreet's troops were not on the field yet. Law was furthest behind. Early in the day, with no Sickles there, Longstreet would have hit nothing , and his right flank would have been enfiladed from the Federal troops there, back of where Lee thought they were. But above all, at dawn, there would be zero knowledge of the ground.
I never saw Matt without a hat. I didn't recognize him. Anyway, I can to the conclusion that after Jackson was wounded and out of action the southern army was not much of an attacking army and more of a defending army.
I'm putting up my hand to blame Lee. July 1 at Gettysburg just wasn't the right time or place but he chose not to see that...his boys were invincible In close consultation with Longstreet, he'd premised his Pennsylvania campaign on strategic offense and tactical defense. That sounds to me like '...get as close as we can to Washington or Harrisburg, find some suitable ground, dig in and then let them attack us'. Lee threw all of that away. Day 1 was unplanned. He concocted a half-assed, very poorly communicated order-of-battle plan for July 2..his generals should have all turned in the night before with a clear idea of what was to happen IN THE MORNING but they didn't, and that's not on any of his Corps commanders. And that Lee chose to fight without the benefit of his cavalry as a highly mobile reconnaissance asset and infantry fighting force multiplier is practically inexcusable. After his lunge at the Federals left flank on Little Round Top failed and with so many of his valiant infantrymen dead or gravely wounded, Longstreet was seething at his CO. He stayed away from him and didn't speak to him until the next morning when Lee sought him out. When Lee told him that the Confederate offensive attack would continue that day, Longstreet insisted that they still had a chance to swing the entire army around Meade's and maneuver into a defensive posture. Lee said nope, you're commanding your own 1st Corps and A.P. Hills 3rd Corps in an attack right at the center of their line. This was Longstreet's version of nuts to that: "General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by pairs, companies, regiments, divisions and armies, and should know, as well as anyone, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men arranged for battle can take that position." Pshaw...Lee put Longstreet in charge of Lee's big push for Day 3, which was as poorly conceived as his battle plan for the day before. Two of Hill"s divisions were positioned ad hoc because he thought that was commander Longstreet's purview (this would've been news to Longstreet) so there were large gaps between the two attacking corps. Why were so many of them set to bake in the sun for hours before the attack commenced? What exactly was the mission for the gunners? What conditions had to exist before the attack could commence? (btw, George Custer had just repulsed Lee's cavalry, who had finally showed up less than 24 hours before.) Don't know much about Lee's earlier American Civil War successes...did he improvise a lot the way he did at Gettysburg, was he better at choosing when/where to fight, was he more focused, was it all because of Thomas Jackson?
General Longstreet was correct. That’s why he was hesitant…. not insubordinate. General Lee had the two best generals of the Civil War … General Longstreet and his defense strategy . General Jackson in his offensive brilliance . And, That’s why general Lee gave vague orders.
Longstreet knew his TROOPS had FOUGHT HARD that 1st. day. and had marched HARD before that. He KNEW his troops needed to REST & EAT FOOD before giving it that 110%. Obviously, MORE RECON should have have happened BEFORE the initial attack.
Longstreet's corps did not fight on day 1. By the time he got there Hancock had already occupied the high ground and Sykes was quickly approaching Little Round Top. Lee's army could not stand and wait to be attacked while it was still forming up and establishing its communications.
If Lee had attacked in the morning I'm not convinced it would have made a significant difference. The reason is that Dan Sickles would not have had time to make a foolish decision to move his corps out into isolation to be picked apart from all sides like what actually happened on the 2nd day. Instead Dan sickles corps would have held the union left on high ground next to cemetery hill. It would have been less likely for Confederate success I think simply because the union line was more organized on the morning of July 2nd than it was shortly before the Confederate attack.
Nah, Sickles's original position was very poor and would have been completely overrun. Meade completely ignored his left flank until Sickles took matters into his own hands and moved to a stronger position to preempt the Confederate attack.
I would likely have a bad attitude about orders that would send my soldiers to their doom as well. The reports state he had poor attitude. The records show they performed relatively well
Folks, it’s not that complex. Lee acquired his mystique operating and fighting on his home turf. When he went on the offensive in Maryland and especially Pennsylvania, he was stripped of his usual advantages and suddenly his enemy enjoyed the opportunity to operate and/or fight on compact interior lines. There’s an awful lot of talk about how Longstreet should have listened to Hood. Well, how long would it have taken to continue marching in the July heat to get around the round tops? Who was going to guide them through the forests? What were they going to find after they stretched their lines ever further to the right, blundering through those thick, un-scouted forests? And most important of all, why on earth would we imagine that the Union army would sit on its thumbs while Hood schlepped his division through the woods? Remember, the success of Jackson’s wild gamble at Chancellorsville all hinged on Howard ignoring Hooker’s warning to prepare for a flank attack. It really was not a surprise...Howard just ignored the intelligence. Were the Union commanders going to be that stupid again? (Well, Sickles was, but it was a different kind of stupid, not the same mistake). There’s a lot of talk about what if Longstreet had attacked earlier. Ok, what if he had? Lee’s plan called for him to attack up the Emmitsburg road. That would have exposed his flank to enfilading fire from Sickle’s corps, so that plan was garbage and would have had to be changed. How long would it have taken to change the plan? How would Meade have countered? One thing is for sure, Sickles wouldn’t have had time to commit the awful blunder he did. No, what you’re looking at is not some sudden breakdown in Lee and his generals; it’s not the loss of Jackson, who was streaky and fed some of Lee’s worst tendencies anyway; what you’re seeing is Lee’s weaknesses being exposed when he went on the offensive and had all the challenges faced by all the Union commanders he manhandled in Virginia. Lee did a lot of things well, but he had a weak, sloppy staff. He gave vague, unwritten orders. He had a very hands-off approach when battle started. His strategy basically hinged on the hope that he’d be able to win a Cannae. And he believed his own side’s propaganda about the superiority of the southern fighting man. By 1863, after the poundings the Confederates got any time they faced a moderately competent Union general, Lee should have known better than to think that his men were going to carry the field at bayonet point just because of superior elan. The Union had plenty of bad-asses of its own. Just to name a few, John Gibbon’s green brigade went toe to toe with Jackson’s veterans for two hours at Brawners Farm, withdrawing in good order as night fell (see also my comment above about a Jackson being streaky). The First Minnesota was a battle-hardened outfit long before Gettysburg. And of course there was the superior Union artillery. All those men needed was a chance to fight on their home turf with a decent commander. Lee handed them the opportunity on a silver platter at Gettysburg, and they predictably whipped him. In the end, none other than a George Pickett probably explained the Confederate loss best: “I always thought the Union army had something to do with it.” But that’s just, like, my opinion, man.
In conclusion yet another Lee defender. Lousy staff work and vague orders delivered verbally are not the hallmarks of greatness. Once Stonewall Jackson was gone, another Lee appeared.
By today's standards, Lee would be interpreted as giving vague orders. But for the times, Rank and Respect were paramount. Maybe Lee should not have expected Longstreet to replace his attacker "Jackson", in the field. As mentioned, Longstreet's skills played more to a defensive preparation for battle. For the 1980's this may be a correct approach. Looking back in time, charging a well fortified position was suicidal. This is not my opinion but what I have read, maybe Lee seriously may have thought that this was the best chance for the Confederacy to destroy the Army of the Potomac. A completely different approach to war fought by General Washington and the Revolution.
Alexander had no problem moving to the right finding a path unobserved from BRT. Longstreet sullied over Lee explaining the attack plan to McLaws and the complete rejection of his idea to move the army around the union left. He left the manuever in the hands of a Johnson and was no better than a private moving along to attack position. Longstreet was good in this fight at laying critical decisions on subordinates which is further demonstratred on the 3rd with Alexander.
Within the first five minutes of this presentation, what's obvious that you have "him", "her", "he", "she", "his", "them" and "us" as well as the "truth", "the whole truth" and "nothing but the truth." Then, and if the Ranger's presentation doesn't turn into a Utah divorce proceeding, the Ranger fails to enlighten the audience regarding 18th century battle tactics, what the word "attack" means in this context; and, in the end, we are left with the Ranger's "expert" opinion, which isn't based upon eyewitness accounts, journals written at the time of the battle or artifacts (such as written battle orders). So, and with this said, how can anyone be expected to really give this presentation any attention, when it deserves none. It's enough to make Shelby Foote turn over in his grave!!!
You fail to appreciate one of the most respectable park rangers of the day. He laid out a very comprensive review of the actions taken on the second and leaves the audience to draw their own conclussions. Your derogatory comment reveils much about your character and in no way can reflect what Shelby Foote would or would not think of this presentation.
😂😂😂 you hold up Shelby Foote as a paragon of history😂 he’s was a novelist, a good one, but not a historian. His Gettysburg works don’t even have footnotes…please!😂
Lee put himself in a situation where many things could go wrong, and without good reason. He should have never been so far north, and never should have risked so much. Lee should have followed George Washington's strategy, and done everything to keep his army intact-his ultimate "limited resource" was manpower. Wasting manpower in battles like Gettysburg and Antietam was poor strategic thinking.
Thank you for saying that! Of all people, shouldn’t Lee have known about Washington’s generalship? It’s like the whole Confederacy knew nothing about the Revolution.
Lee sends 14,000 against 30,000 dug in in the woods on the high ground and Lee is a great general? That's as bad as Pickett's charge on day three. Say what you want about the delays the fact that it was anything past 10 AM should have caused Lee to abort. Without Jackson, Lee was "should have could have would have".. all the way to Appomattox. ..
Huh? So the overall commander needs to abort plans when his subordinates sulk and sabotage? Longstreet has blood on his hands because his ego couldn't handle it
Took my boys to this talk. Ranger Atkinson is an awesome speaker; a true American original. We are lucky to have him. If you want to learn how to speak, begin with him--he does all the things well that can't really be taught.
5 STAR RANGER
Absolutely!
Ranger Atkinson is an exceptional presenter. This particular topic is one of the biggest controversies of the battle, as we all know. Being a Pennsylvania-born Yankee, I appreciate that some of the Rangers giving these talks are from the South. We're all seeking to enhance our perspectives, no matter the individual opinions. I was also happy to see the large audience. Excellent work.
I'm a native Alabaman who's always rooted for the Union. Guess that's what happens when you're raised near racists who fly the rebel flag. Grateful for my family. Peace, y'all.
@mortalclown3812 I am a fan of the Stars and Bars, and also a Southerner. NOT a racist particle in my body. Perhaps you could enlarge your research before you speak.
@@cindy-followerofjesuschris6572 you failed to understand his comment didn't you
Finnish fan here. Your lectures are all outstanding and posting them here for posterity is amazing. Keep up the good work guys and gals.
As a time traveler from the 500th century, I can tell you we still enjoy Matt Atkinson's lectures on Gettysburg. We don't get all the jokes, though.
Lee was violating the fundamental principles of wisdom; that is, “hear counsel and receive instruction”(Proverbs).
Lee was like Hitler when he was @ Gettysburg; that is, he wasn’t willing to listen to the minds of wise men around him.
He’s awesome
@@jaywinters2483 c m
Longstreet was slow day 2. Sorry.
I so admire US Park Rangers. Every one I have ever met has given the impression of a person of absolute integrity, competent to the extent of knowing his job as much as anyone could know their job, and loving that job. The Park Ranger service is a textbook example of how to recruit the right people for the job.
Uh h high huh you u99ooó juju 77j JJ Julio
Matt Atkinson has to be the best speaker I have ever listened to. Love all of his presentations both in the field and in a conference setting. I grew up in Gettysburg and have learned more in these videos watching Matt than I did in 20 years living there.
I'm addicted to these lectures....
Another excellent job by Matt Atkinson. Bravo
Great presentation! Please upload more!
I dint know how I missed thus lecture before. Ranger Atkinson enthrall his audience with facts plus humor. Every park ranger is well informed and s credit to whichever park they serve. Truly inspiring talks.
Sorry about typos
Very interesting and entertaining as usual, Matt. Keep up your great work!
I'm really hoping to make it to Gettysburg sometime this summer. (After getting the hay done.) It'd be great if I could possibly get a tour or presentation by Ranger Matt!
During these deliberations it seems people forget about George Gordon Meade. He was a proven first-rate fighter at division command and he set himself up to easily shift his forces around where and when needed. He also seems to have had Lee's number dialed in at Gettysburg also. In short, Meade didn't scare and reacted accordingly all less than a week in command.
...bring yer musket and a bucket of minie balls !!! Y'all gonna need em when you run into them thar " Antifa" varmints who will be trying to topple Lee from his horse on Seminary Ridge !!
He basically just sent reinforcements where they were requested. Not difficult.
the column had to keep going forward and do a U turn because it would have been impossible to turn every single mule drawn wagon and artillery limber and gun team one at a time around and go back. The baggage would have been in the front and all the horse and mule drawn vehicle would have completely choked the road. People have assumed the column was only marching men and surely that would be easy to counter-march. Ranger Matt as entertaining as ever justly puts the march into perspective.
Atkinson is a gifted speaker. Heck, I incorporate his lollygagging, jokster "aw shucks" style into presentations that I give.
Gettysburg is a litmus test for how you feel about confederate generals. The truth is that they all had a bad day. Longstreet couldn’t get the march around the flank or be spotted. Ewell didn’t do much of anything, Stewart failed to gather reconnaissance, and Lee gave the disastrous attack order against an entrenched position.
Point out which confederate general did well that day
Probably only Ambrose Wright (Hill’s Corps) and William Barksdale (Longstreet’s Corps) who’s Brigades both broke the Federal lines on Cemetery Ridge unsupported.
I think the park service should do a presentation on Athur Fremantle. Not just his experience at Gettysburg. The rest of his story if you have read his book is fascinating. He talks about seeing a female confederate solider on a train on his way to Atlanta.
I met Ranger Atkinson at the park in May. I was giddy.
12rwoody I met him at the park recently myself. He was a lovely man, and was very kind and brilliant in his delivery. Took a tour as well.
Another masterpiece by Mr. Atkinson
Corey Pfarr has alot of things to say about Longstreet at Gettysburg, not only about what happened, but also what so many - including Douglas Southhall Freeman - have said about what happened.
His books are worth a good read .
Aloha 🤙🏼
I just suggested that to someone above
I honestly think Longstreet's delay was deliberate. In his eyes, his corp would be saved by nightfall. His captains and he were intuitive enough to know the federal position was near impregnable. And, any advantage gained could not be supported. The entire movement was ill-advised and Lee is the only one to blame. Sorry, Matt.
Ill-advised is exactly the right term. Lee sent Longstreet off to fight with almost zero intelligence about the Union position. An example of sloppy staff work that rivals the Lost Order.
This is the crux of it - the real issue is not whether Longstreet should have attacked earlier, but the ultimate futility of attacking Meade’s position at all.
Longstreet was slow.
Lost Cause nonsense! Read Longstreet at Gettysburg, by Cory Pfarr.
Here's my conclusion. Longstreet by his own accounts KNEW that these attacks and movements were folly, and after heated arguments, and Lee circumventing him, Longstreet.... washed his hands... as it were, and let the responsibility for the ill-fated attacks on 2-3 July fall squarely where they should, and in fact where Lee himself said the blame lied, on Mars Robert E. Lee. Also, according to Longstreet, J. B. Hood made a formal verbal objection to the attack on 2nd July directly to Longstreet. At which time Longstreet told him that Lee himself had taken direct command and Longstreet could not override or even alter to the smallest detail, this attack. Hood later wrote in his diaries about the exchange as well, and went into Devils Den expecting to die. Hood almost did. I think it was very clearly demonstrated that Lee's charisma was unparalleled, but his tactical and strategic weaknesses, as well as his eccentric and vague leadership style were brutally exposed after the death of Thomas Jackson, who, as Lee said, was his right arm. After Gettysburg, Lee began to trust Longstreet much more than he demonstrated previously, and Longstreet proved himself very capable in multiple engagements thereafter.
Ted Logan Lordie, I would have HATED to be in Longstreet’s boots that day. He KNEW Lee had just about lost his mind in his desire to “ “just get things over,” so to speak. Or maybe just knew he had lost his mind, but did not know why.
logical assessment, I would add that Lee's failing health do to heart trouble may have also caused him to act so recklessly. he may have thought his time was short and he wanted to end the war quickly so that everybody could enjoy the fruits of victory. I think it was clear from the moment Heth went up against Buford that things were out of his control and the loss of half of his planning team (Jackson) left him severely at the Union's mercy despite it's ineptitude. Lee should have order Johnson's division from Ewell's Corps to the right flank with Anderson from Hill's Corps forming the first part of the hammer to hit Cemetery Ridge while Sickles is moving his Corps forward. Hood and Mclaws then come in afternoon and provide the crushing blow while rolling up the Union left flank and possibly capturing the II and III Union Corps and forcing the remaining Union forces off the hills back to the Pipe Creek line. There you would only have the V, VI, and XII Corps with the remains of the I and XI from the first day. The Union would probably have lost a lot of artillery and unless Burnside and some of the other Union Corps can come up from the Peninsula in time then Lee has a strong chance to roll up the rest of Meade's command and force Lincoln to either surrender or march into Washington and arrest him. Now of course that is if everything goes perfectly despite the losses of the first day. The Union left flank was the key to the whole battle and failing to take it, very little success could have happened after that. Sedgewick's VI was barely even engaged in the battle so if he was plugged in with his fresh Corps as Pickett's men might have cracked the center, they still would have been thrown back by Sedgewick. My thoughts of course, who knows what if any of it would have happened. I think the only thing we all can agree on is if Jackson would have been there the South wins the war.
What I don't understand is if there were so many delays and things going wrong and no coordination of attacks why didn't Lee call everything off and go back to the drawing board? Also, the fault should go back to Lee since as Harry Truman use to say the buck stops here.
Robert I think it is due to the fact that he was seen as someone who went against the grain of former CSA Generals during the post war period (i.e. he became a Republican and friendly to the Grant Administration). This for many made him a model post war ex Confederate. While I think though he should be commended for his post war behavior, this doesn’t mean or translate that he was some perfect general during the actual war.
If Longstreet had attacked when he was supposed to...Sickles would have been where the Third Corps was supposed to be: with its flanks anchored on Little Round Top and on Cemetery Ridge right next to the Second Corps. Pickett's Charge would have been a day early, and without Pickett. And if Longstreet had tried to swing around, he would have ended up with the Fifth Corps on his ass.
Always an interesting discussion on the topic. I expect that Atkinson (a very pro-Lee historian, for good reason) would side with Lee, if really there is a side. I will offer two points to consider in support of Longstreet: 1. Longstreet was a proven defensive strategist with his performances at 2nd Bull Run, Antietam and Fredericksburg. Lee had praised his performances and promoted him one day ahead of Jackson to make him the senior commander. So it is reasonable to think that Longstreet had planned and expected Lee to accept his plan. And it is also reasonable to conclude that Longstreet had been working on a maneuver to a defensive position through the night with his staff and commanders. There are accounts that Longstreet did just this by scouting around Big Roundtop during the night. Thus, the decision at dawn, so to speak, was surprising and disappointing to any commander, and now you had to go back to the drawing board. So yes, what commander wouldn't be discouraged when his idea, which had been accepted previously, was then set aside. Plus, as a present day commander, I know a Corps staging, setting, marching and forming, even in Civil War times takes more than a few hours to complete, let alone plan and complete. Also, in this same point, never underestimate the impacts usurpation or micro management of command. The impact is that it sucks commander's authority away from subordinates. So yes, "come on man." 2. The question of Lee v. Longstreet on Day 2 is really made up by those who wanted to place blame, and by historians who enjoy this controversy. The fact is that, and I am going to yell this for effect: LEE ORDERED LONGSTREET TO ATTACK ON DAY 3. (Sorry about my outburst of bellicosity) In fact he gave him two divisions (Pettigrew and Trimble)to support Pickett. Again, Longstreet objects to the plan and begs Lee to reconsider a full on attack against a much larger entrenched force over open ground. Lee, rather than ordering his other corps commanders, tells Longstreet that he, his most trusted commander, will prevail. So, Day 2 is an empty argument because of the facts of Day 3. Had Longstreet really failed in carrying out Lee's orders to the General's satisfaction or within his control, Lee would have had AP Hill attack from a shorter area of open ground with their organic divisions with an extra day's rest.
Longstreet should have been working on a plan to follow out the orders to attack the next day! A strategic move to the right, is at best absurd.
I’m not sure that the day three order is enough proof. Maybe lee had even less confidence in Hill. Maybe Lee didn’t place the blame on Longstreet, but just blamed fortune.
They were both recommended for promotion same time. Longstreet was senior to jackson so was going to be senior subordinate either way.
Two of the three instances you state for longstreet being a “defensive strategist” really shows him at his best which was fighting on the tactical offensive
Regarding blame for the delays, it sounds like there was plenty of blame to go around. A bigger question in my mind: had Longstreet been in position sooner, would it have changed the outcome? No. Attacking in the heat of the day would not have been favorable to anyone on the move, and Sickles was in a better position south of Hancock's II Corps along Cemetery Ridge. Could V Corps have extended the Union line further south of Sickles' III Corps and occupy LRT before Hood arrived? In my opinion, the result would have been the same. Same troops on both sides, but now with the Union occupying a stronger position with shorter interior lines.
Porter had Sgt Henry Wentz in his command who was both a Gettysburg native who was positioned 600 yards from his father's house. John Wentz spent the battle in the cellar of his house that was opposite the Peach Orchard and the wheat field. Henry wasn't mentioned in the records but could easily gotten Porter and his artillery in place easily. Lee also had Wesley Culp on the first day until he was killed on Wolf's Hill the morning of the second day. Plus Robert Hoffman with 2 more Hoffman brothers in the rear. All of whom were born and raised in Gettysburg. Officers in their commands knew they had locals but never used them.
It’s dazzling tidy to put your favourite author up there with Ike as an relatable opinion on military command behaviour
It seems both are at fault. Lee was expecting Longstreet to act more like Jackson and assault as he saw fit; however, Longstreet was more cautious and awaited explicit orders.
Abby Grant I have to agree. It's just my opinion, that Gen. Longstreet wanted to stay on defense. Gen. Lee wanted to strike. Lee supposedly agreed to a 'defensive' campaign at the beginning, or so we have read. The anxiousness of Lee is understandable, as is reluctance of Longstreet. The plan was full of faults and friction. Col. Alexander was probably the best performer on the march, having found his way around the hill quickly to avoid detection. Unfortunately, we cannot know what was really going through each mind... all we have are the notes.
You people seem to be a little forgetful when it comes to Longstreet as a General. General Longstreet was with the Army of Virginia before, General Lee was given command of said army. General Lee knew exactly who Longstreet was, and how Longstreet would fight when told to do so. And General Longstreet knew how stubborn and hard-headed General Lee could be, he had seen it before at Malvern Hill. When General Lee pulled McLaw aside, pulled out a map and said, I want you to do this. That is a direct order, and it is (in my opinion) proof that General Lee knew Longstreet well enough, to override the normal chain of command. If, that indeed happened. What everybody forgets, is that nobody sent out scouts in the 6+ hrs between the first scouting mission, and the time of Longstreet's start of march. General Lee's plan was flawed from the start, because the intel was bogus, and it only snowballed as the day wore on. Any half-wit military man, should have been expecting Union reinforcements to continually show up at Gettysburg, all through the second day of battle. General Longstreet supposedly waited for the stragglers from his command before moving out. Someone in the Confederate leadership, should have taken a looky-see to find out if things had changed, on the Union side of that battlefield. All it would have taken is a short little ride to the seminary, and a pair of field glasses, from there they could have seen all of Cemetary Ridge.
zettle 234: I agree with you on your major points. I'll make some statements. Firstly, we cannot know what was in the minds and hearts of each individual in question. Having said that, I'll address your points and give you my viewpoint respectfully. The flanking plan, originally, was a good one, in my opinion, given Ewell's actions on July 1 with Culp's hill now occupied by Yankees. Okay, so we're going to flank them and hit their left. Good plan, but inadequate recon, as you say. The main problems, as I see them... 1: Early morning recon of the Union left, which was not followed up before attack time. 2: Lee agreeing to allow Longstreet to wait for Gen. Law, causing a delay. There were other options, (IMO), such as attaching one of Anderson's brigades to Longstreet to make up for Law. 3: No scouting of a good route to get to the Union left, prior to Longstreet's march. 4: Encountering Bream's Hill, which probably frustrated Longstreet, who may not have been on-board with the attack in the first place. 5: Longstreet's decision to counter-march instead of an "about face" of 1st Corps, causing further delays. 6: No pre-attack reconnaissance of the Union left. There are other more subtle points and details. What we're dealing with is history, and we have a lot of conflicting information, and twelve different sides of the story. Overall, I agree with you on what I believe to be your best point: Riding to the Seminary, or to Bream's Hill, to observe any changes on the Union left before the attack. Thanks for listening to my perspective, remembering we still cannot know all the actual words and facts. We must also consider what Lee expected vs. what Longstreet felt was practical. And also evidence that Lee was ill. Military hindsight is always 20/20, and there is no shortage of armchair generals. Thank you for your thoughts, Sir. :-)
I'm sorry Montgomery, I did not mean it to sound like a point by point thing. I just get tired of people trying to assign blame. Flanking your enemy was a good tactic before these guys fought, and it will be a good tactic after we are gone. Agreed. The leader comes up with a plan and if it is successful, the leader takes the credit. If it fails, it is still the leaders plan. Ike wrote a letter before D-Day, and General Lee rode out on to the field on day 3. No blame is needed. And yes, Lee could have told Longstreet to go ahead and move, and Lee could have sent the stragglers when they arrived. There was no reason to wait. The trail the Artillery left, when they went around the hill, had to be like a modern day tank track with all the horses, cannons, ammo train and men on foot. Never have figured that one out. The counter march? I don't know how far they got. If the supply train is started already, you have to put the cart before the horse to just turn it in place. Like you said 20/20. Oh, and no I am not saying you blamed anybody lol Thank you Montgomery, for adding your perspective to the questions I find hard to answer. To look at pieces of a battle, and not keep in mind the entire battle, takes away from the battle (IMO). If we stop the clock at Chancelorsville when Hooker had flanked Lee, Hooker looks like a brilliant General for dividing his Army.
zettle 234 Thanks for your comment. I think you're right with your comment about dissecting a battle too much... I agree, it takes away from the whole. Battles and wars are like tornadoes: Mass destruction and confusion. And the best laid plans in war mostly go awry about a minute after a battle starts. There weren't any body-cams back then, (too bad), or none of us would have to discuss intentions, orders or results LOL. I agree about the counter-march, in that if their supply trains were following the same route, it would have been even more difficult to just about-face the whole column. I play a lot of strategy games, including Sid Meyer's Gettysburg. People who play and win as the South often boast about it. Well, in a game, we have the advantage of seeing the entire field and basically knowing who is going to arrive and when. In real-life, plans and results are usually quite different. Thanks for reading my perspective, and thank you for yours! Cheers.
As fine a combat commander as he was Longstreet had a history of the blame game and a potentially too high opinion of himself. I will never understand how he and Bragg permitted the Union landings from Mocassin Point without as massive counter attack as possible. Or, the Knoxville debacle and his efforts to work under Johnson. I understand Lee was suffering with what might have been angina at Gettysberg and I do not underestimate but realize that one could only speculate as to the mental condition of some of these people. Thank you for your presentations they are always very perceptive, easy to understand and thought provoking
Another great video by Matt. Please keep them coming. Unfortunately a portion of it was ruined by the person with the coughing fit. Too bad they couldn’t remove that individual. I realize it can’t be helped but boy it’s annoying. Keep it up Matt! You are a talented historian. Please put up a “no coughing during filming” sign. Please.
Buggs Bunny sign: “Throw the bumb out!”
I was afraid the person was choking to death! 😮
excellent analysis
I have always thought that everything that happens at Gettysburg can only be understood when you think of what happened at Chancellorsville 2 months before. It appears that Lee is upset almost from the beginning of the battle, he is definitely insecure and missing Jackson. What happens with Ewell on the first day when he fails to assault Cemetery Hill seems to put questions in Lee's head about the leadership in the First Corp. Longstreet seems to have had his own plan as to what to do about the situation after the opening of the battle, and certainly was not acting as Jackson would have under similar circumstances. We seem to be missing some important conversation that occurred sometime that night of July 1st between Lee and his Corp Commanders, something put everybody off their game that night.
Matthew Miller - Good take and viewpoint on this matter. The loss of Gen. Jackson, I believe, is a hidden factor here. Plus Gen. Hill is new to Corps command, and Gen. Lee knows Gen. Longstreet favors defense. So much to discuss, and unfortunately we weren't there to hear it all.
What upset everyone just below the surface was J.E.B. Stuart. Going into a major conflict without knowing the numbers and placement would upset any commander.
Fantastic job... I truly enjoyed the presentation...
im confused more than ever after this presentation...everything ive read and battlefield walks with other rangers, is the column turned around at the top of the crest on BLACK HORSE TAVERN road about a 1/4 from the Fairfield rd. NOT Breams Hill road. AND, the route they ended up taking was along Willioughby run road..no mention here of that.
I think what Mr. Atkinson said in the last minute of the lecture is correct. It is clear in Longstreet's book that he did not agree with the orders. And if you read between the lines a little it is fairly obvious that he didn't put his heart into it. I think Longstreet was right that the attack should have not been made on the 2nd, but once given the orders he should done his military duty and gave 100% to accomplish the orders. I don't believe that he gave 100% on the 2nd or the 3rd either for that matter.
How did he not give 100%?
I know that Facebook Live is a popular feature on that social media platform, but as a suggestion, could you please record the lectures for TH-cam as well? The sound quality and video presentation were much better for last year's lectures.
Just a side note maybe speculation but many Confederates had dysentery from cherries being in season that week. Lee also may have suffered an angina attack on the 2nd day of Gettysburg. Hood told Longstreet they could just roll boulders down on them before his attack.
Interestingly, I think a great deal of this presentation would also apply to Longstreet's behavior, mindset and actions on July 3rd as well! (and Lee's as well, in various ways)
Matt Atkinson is my favorite of GettysburgNPS.
23:13 yea that scout report is out of date by far.
Thought this was about Longstreet, not Mr.Atkinson.
The fact that Captain Johnson, while leading the First Corp to its position per Lee's orders (based upon his earlier reconnaissance) ended up exposing the movement which resulted in a march of 6 miles instead of 3 miles. In spite of this major delay which really had Longstreet irritated, they were in position by 4PM. That hour is the hour many participants expected the troops to be ready. I fail to see any reason to say Longstreet baulked or purposely delayed anything.
What did cause ANOTHER problem for Longstreet was Hood and McClaw's both requested a delay, because once in position they discovered that the Union forces were now where they weren't near sunrise that morning. Now what do you do?
If your a good commander you attack as ordered and that is what he did, regardless of his apprehension of a frontal attack on an enemy of unknown strength.
My feeling is...Regardless of how Longstreet "felt" he followed all orders, dealt with the dynamics of the battlefield as always and hoped that the decisions made by ALL would result in a victory.
Remember....IF frogs had wings they wouldn't bump their butts a hoppin.
Longstreet's case of the slows......has become something of a red herring in the Gettysburg debate. Longstreet's real sin wasn't that he was slow it was that his Corp dispositions and attacks were fundamentally tactically unsound. McClaws and Hood asked for delays and changes to their orders because they saw that the situation on the ground was manifestly unsound as planned. Hood felt so strongly that he protested his orders at least 3 times and then ignored them anyway when he executed his attack.
A good commander does not blindly follow orders, a good commander reports changes on the battlefield to his commander and requests new orders to account for those changes. Longstreet flatly refused to do this, claiming that he had already tried to do so before the flank attack was arranged. Longstreet tried to equate a request for changes in the tactical disposition of his corp with a request he had made for the movement of the entire army to an alternate location where they might await an attack from Meade. This is errant nonsense and should be ignored by anybody with the most rudimentary understanding of troop movements, tactics and strategy. McClaws and Hood's request was tactical, Longstreet's was more in the nature of a strategic request and it was a fundamentally unsound one at that.
Longstreet was extremely unhappy that his advice was being ignored by Lee and that he was not to be considered an equal as he imagined Jackson had been (Jackson had been no such thing of course). Nursing his wounded ego and pride he became like a passive aggressive child that follows the letter of every command but refuses to honor the spirit of those orders. He put his entire corp and army at risk and ended up taking needless casualties in a tactically unsound assault.
@@ashleighelizabeth5916 Bah, you've chose to believe the post war hype.
Lee himself asked Longstreet later, "Why didn't you stop me that day?"
@@ashleighelizabeth5916 an interesting theory, but what adjustment should have been made? How long would it have taken? How much more marching in the July heat? And how would you predict the Union would respond to the adjustment?
@@mjfleming319 well the original attack plan called for a flanking attack on the left flank of the AotP by Longstreet's two divisions that were then on the field up the Emmitsburg Rd. In the absence of Stuart the actual position of that flank was left to the determination of Captain Samuel Johnston who was sent on a reconnaissance mission to discover the Union disposition on that part of the battlefield. The trouble is that while the job he did was well enough in it's own way for a lone scouting staff officer it did not account for the shifting troop dispositions of the AotP on that day. When Longstreet's troops were nearing their positions for the start of the attack Major General Daniel Sickles III Corp had moved forward into the Wheat Field and the Peach Orchard which straddled the Emmitsburg Rd and was in a position to pour enfilade fire into the flanks of Longstreet's attack. Meanwhile Little Round Top was left uncovered by Sickle's movement as well as the shifting of other units of the AotP on the Left Flank. Hood and McLaws were able to see that the conditions on the field were manifestly different then what they were told to expect and that executing the attack as outline would be extremely costly. Hood could also see that capturing Little Round Top would be the key to flanking the entire AotP position and he requested 2 or 3 times ( I forget the exact number here) of Longstreet to shift his attack to Little Round Top. The last of these requests was made in person and all were refused with the reasoning that General Lee had refused to allow a flank attack.
Now this is complete hogwash as the whole point of the attack was to catch the AotP in flank and role it up. Longstreet was trying to equate his request to Lee that the AofNVa disengage from the battlefield move across the face of the AotP and take up a defensive position between Washington and the AotP and there await it's attack as being the same as allowing Hood and McLaws to move from an attack up the Emmitsburg Rd to an attack up Little Round Top as equivalent military moves. The first move is a strategic move of the entire army in the face of an alert and active enemy that would take one or more days to execute where as Hood's was a tactical request to shift the attack of his division and that of McLaws from the area of the Emmitsburg Rd to the area of Little Round Top which would take at most an hour or two of additional marching for some of the troops (but not all of them mind) involved. In the event Hood ignored Longstreet's orders and attacked Little Round Top on his own initiative with what he had at hand. As he very nearly succeeded with his attack one can presume that the additional weight of McLaws division had a reasonable chance of taking and holding the hill. Had they done so it would have been the AotP that would have been forced to make a strategic withdraw in the face of an active and alert enemy army or risk destruction where they were. Meade had already made plans for a withdraw if necessary towards Harrisburg but to have to do so in the face of an alert and active enemy army would have been a very difficult and potentially costly maneuver and what's more it would have provided Lee and the AofNVa with yet another victory and another demoralizing retreat of the AotP.
I want to make one thing above all others clear here. Much of what Longstreet said and wrote about Gettysburg didn't happen until after Lee was dead and gone. With Lee not alive to contradict him he could say whatever he wanted about any conversation they had. And while Longstreet was a very solid and reliable corp commander (one of the best in the war in fact) he was not what would call a smooth off the cuff speaker. So to believe that he gave these long monologues to Lee about tactics and strategy while Lee silently sat there and ignored his opinions and advice stretches credibility a great deal. A lot of the deification of Lee during the Lost Cause Period gets wrapped up into the controversy of Gettysburg, but if one can be objective and separate the myth from the facts, and the hearsay from the truth one can't help but be struck by how badly Longstreet exercised control of the troops under his command on July 2nd and July 3rd. One must also recognize that the only witness to most of what Longstreet and Lee spoke of on those two days was Longstreet. And it would presume to much of human nature to assume that Longstreet would not try to exonerate himself from any responsibility for the disaster that day 2 and day 3 of Gettysburg was for the Lee, the AofNVa and the Confederacy.
@@ashleighelizabeth5916 the original plan was based on faulty intelligence. I think Allen Guelzo has demonstrated convincingly that whatever Cpt. Johnston said, he was nowhere near the round tops. Lee’s plan called for an attack along the Emmitsburg road, not knowing that Sickles’ corps had already extended the Union line far to the left, and if Longstreet had blindly obeyed the original plan at, say, nine o’clock in the morning, sickles would have enfiladed him. So yes, the problems start with lousy staff work, going all the way back to Lee’s convoluted orders to Stuart at the very beginning of the campaign.
But Longstreet is finally in contact with Sickles at 4:00 pm., and Hood requests that they move even further to the right. Let’s be generous and say that Hood’s proposed maneuver would only take an hour. What would the Union have done in that time? For one thing, an extra hour would have given Meade enough time to reposition Sickles back where he belonged. Then Longstreet’s force would be stretched thin over a wide front, and Sickles would be in a compact line, well supported, and anchored on Little Round Top...just as it should have been and would have been if Longstreet attacked at ten o’clock in the morning.
As it happened, Longstreet and the ANV caught a lucky break when Sickles moved forward. The closest thing they got to a breakthrough occurred not on the rugged terrain of the round tops, it occurred on the flattest part of the whole Union line. It occurred there because 1. Big gaps opened when Sickles’ salient collapsed and 2. It was a lot easier to march there. Ultimately the charge of the First Minnesota saved the day, but we might wonder, “what if Hood hadn’t wasted so much time trying to sneak through unscouted woods to get to the union flank and had just obeyed Longstreet?” In that case, the attack on the lowest part of cemetery ridge might have had a little more weight, and there might have been a breakthrough.
But in the end, it all comes down to “active and alert”, as you rightly note. The Union army was active and alert at Gettysburg, and we have to assume that if the ANV took an extra hour to do something, the AOP would have countered that move.
The more I read the more I'm convinced that Sickles moving his corp out in front probably saved the day for the union - obviously at great cost. Without it Longstreet's advance would have hit the union left at full strength and very well may have been able to roll up the union flank.At the least the rocky tops would have been captured and who knows how that would have changed the third day of the battle. Would love to hear Atkinson's opinion on this as he seems to be a wealth of knowledge on the subject.
I've considered this myself. The wrong move might have still been a longterm benefit?
Sickles moved out & isolated his corp. ( didn't tell the commander). Without support on his flanks his command was wrecked & left a huge hole in the union line. He never got another command.
@@Noland55 perfect response to the op.
@@Noland55 he .loved his corps to a better position, after he realized that Meade had no intention of heeding the warnings that Sickles was sending. Sickles's corps acted as a breakwater to slow, disrupt, and break up the momentum of the Confederate attack. In this, it worked perfectly. Meade was lucky to have a scapegoat in Sickles after he completely ignored his left flank and the imminent danger.
Fantastic!! Side note: I hope the annoying person with the cough is ok.
great job ranger Matt: You are truly amazing. Here's my thoughts on this lecture. At the end you mention about the obedience but not the spirit. I challenge that would you as one who sees the battle as a complete loss because the commanding general isn't listening to sound advice and ordering the deaths of thousands of soldiers and essentially the confederacy: Would you as Longstreet be in the spirit of "doing ones duty". I would find it difficult to be very spirited if I knew the way to win the battle but was told to do otherwise. Lees refusal to attack to the right and gain access to the rocky tops when he had the chance was not only the biggest fumble, but along with the failed Pickett's charge was responsible for the death of Confederacy.. Thanks again
General god Lee was in command. His fault. But the southern baptist bastards couldn’t allow this. Add to this that Longstreet converted to Catholicism and joined a republican administration. .
They did attack the Round Tops. About 6 hours too late. Longstreet wasn’t arguing for seizing the heights but of bypassing them. Which would have failed due to Sikes corps coming up from the Federal rear.
Enjoyed all of this presentation...except that the glances at the maps were much too brief.
As a fellow Mississippian it's as if an old neighbor is retelling a favorite old ass Tory every time ok listen to Matt.
One capt. scouting unfamiliar landscape is NOT a reconnaissance for committing an entire corps in a flank attack. Compare with Fitzhugh Lee's entire cavalry troop & Jackson's cartographer at Chancellorsville leading Jackson around the Union right (replete with a map & course deviations to avoid detection). Same on the Union right - Lee was blind, using infantry to scout his flanks.
I agree. Jedediah Hotchkiss may have been the best cartographer of the war. On the other hand, that flank march was detected. Howard just ignored Hooker’s order to prepare for it. A modest breastwork and a couple of prepared batteries by the XI corps and that battle would have been very, very different.
Johnston was part of a reconnaissance party of five or six men, including Longstreet's engineer and it was far from the only group detailed over the 1st and the 2nd to scout the Union lines.
.@Jonathan Parks: With all due respect, Ewell's troops & misc. cavalry had marched back & forth thru G'burg for 2 days b/f Longstreet had arrived in Cashtown. The actual recon sent by Longstreet three (3) days later is moot - That had been the cavalry's job - days earlier.
Given the CSA troop distribution on days 1&2, Lee had Meade right where he wanted for a Napoleonic battle. (surrounded on over 200 degrees) with one corps (Hill) in front, one corps (Ewell) on the Union right & rear, & 1 corps (Longstreet) arriving on the Union left. - while Meade arrived piecemeal by 2 parallel roads from the only direction possible. So many 'what if's' - but they all depend on cavalry duties unmet - but "Lee was blind, using infantry to scout his flanks." (above).
Great lecture. Intelligent and humorous.
I'm afraid the real truth is lost to time..........
Just remember history is written by the victiors
Lee was the commander. He was on the field. He bears the responsibility. It’s no more complicated than that.
After just watching this again with additional perspective about the presentation of the speaker.
Very well done in preparation and execution.
GB was a simple example of time to chew gum or kick butt. While they were all out of gum.
The initiative dictates the plan becoming all too painfully obvious.
Lee committed to have his battle the night of the 1st and Longstreet understood this completely.
Longstreet saved his corps to fight another day while giving Lee his battle as instructed.
You have to determine when it is time to fish or cut bait.
This is exactly what they did.
The VI corps of Sedgwick in reserve, confirmed Longstreet called an end to the attack at the definitive time to the very predictable result.
Okay I must have missed something about the photo of Samuel Johnson? Why did the audience act like they were frozen? I guess the glare of the light on the projection screen hid something that would make more sense to those watching at home.
I think there was a mannequin challenge built into the program..
I think a few people were responding to Atkinson's joke about seeing the audience's reaction to the picture by hamming it up when the camera panned over the audience
Definitely a mannequin challenge. Ranger Matt's sense of humor I would guess. :)
Coughing is from a Confederate vet still choking from the dust of the turn@?
PERHAPS: Too many of Lee's generals delayed too long and had too little comittment to Lee's plan of attack. Considering Longstreet's preference for a defensive battle he should have rushed to occupy Little & Big Round Top where he would have turned the federal left and could attack or hold a superior position on high ground overlooking the Union left. If he found Union troops on these locations he might have overcome them given the strength of his forces versus the number of Union troops . the logistical problems were considerable but might have been overcome. MAYBE. Jackson mightr have performed better & understood the spirit/genius of the orders better than Longstreet. But Jackson was dead. Longstreet was not the agressive attack-oriented general that Jackson had been. He was defensively minded and it meant he would act in that spirit not in the spirit of Jackson or Lee. Longstreet was the right man for another battle, a defensive battle which might have destroyed the AofP as had nearly happened in previous battles .
Jackson would have performed better. He would have captured Cemetery and Culp's Hills. Different battle!
Lee spoke to Ewell more than once before midmorning. (Ewell was supposed to make an attack to extend the line of defense making it harder to make use of interior line strength.)
The failure of Anderson can be justified by the order to Wofford by Longstreet not to impale his GA brigade on Sedgwick.
The order came at the same time Hill and Anderson apparently ignored Posey and not pressing Mahone for the his apparent lack of enthusiasm. Leaving Wright out on a limb with Wilcox. The Florida Brigade showing less than a genuine interest also. Due to the late hour, allowing the federal reserve corps to line up in front of Longstreet.
DS Freeman wrote the definitive contemporary work on Lee and his Lieutenants.
Longstreet was much to blame. He knew lee gave his commanders on the field much discretion so Longstreet's refusal to listen to Hood about flanking Little round Top and he dragged his feet because he was upset with Lee. Longstreet wanted to hold firm to Lee's orders without trying to find the best way to accomplish the mission like Jackson would have. . I live in the former home town of Col. William C. Oats commander the 15th Alabama of Little Round Top fame where he had his law practice in Abbeville Alabama.
I have read the book about Col. Oates. Can't recall the title, but he had already been Gov. of Alabama. It also tells of his grief of leaving his brother on Little Round Top.
I am from Texas, and kinfolk went up that dang hill being in the 4th Texas, Co.K.
The book was a great read! DEO VINDICE
"That's what the staff officer said..." some years after the events being described.
What did Lee say? Did I miss it? Wouldn't that be the gold standard assessment of Longstreet's job performance? Surely, I missed it. It could not possibly be omitted here. Well, off to google search.
Our recollections of history would be wonderful if only they were representative of the entire truth; unfortunately we look retrospectively through a prism of time darkened by inaccuracy, myth, supposition and subjectivity. As it is, however, these lectures are splendid, highly entertaining and interesting.
So what you're really saying is that THEY, whoever THEY is in your world point of view, does not say what you believe
real history or the "entire truth" is according to your opinion.
Whenever I hear about the debate between General Lee and General Longstreet, I keep thinking about the foot soldier who had to bear the load of indecision between their Commanding Generals. I think about the men who charged Little Round Top relentlessly, simply because they were told to. By the end of the day, many of them would be dead, dying, wounded or prisoners of war. I like to think that General Longstreet was a mature man with a brilliant military background. A man who would not have allowed his personal feelings to get in the way of the military objective as set forth by his Commanding General. I like to believe that neither General Longstreet or any General since then would be so petty as to endanger the lives of their troops with a half hearted approach. Soldiers will die in war. Yes timing is everything. But once that whistle blows, it's go time. I just refuse to believe that General Longstreet sacrificed so many troops because his feelings were hurt. General Lee didn't have drones to fly over the battlefield. By the time recon made their reports it was already hours old. On a battlefield five minutes is too old. Useless. Anyway, here I am 157 years after the battle of Gettysburg with my opinion. History has said over and over again that if General Jackson had been at Gettysburg the outcome would have been different. Maybe. Seemed like General Lee was waiting to hear cannon fire and the report of 14,000 muskets after breakfast. Maybe the blame lays in the untimely death of a beloved General just a couple of months before. Or as General Lee said, "God's will."
generations are slaughtered for nothing, as in other wars. That is the bottom line. Wealthy people stand back and watch and profit.
The war was lost because Lee refused to listen to Hood and Longstreet. Hood was adamant about flanking to the enemies extreme left and circling to the rear of Round Top. Instead, Longstreet kept repeating Lee's orders to attack in a frontal assault on the left flank. Hood's division took heavy casualties and accomplish nothing. The second blow was Lee's intransience and insistence to not take Longstreet's advice, and attack the center on July 3rd across a mile of open ground when the union had the higher ground and a stone wall. After Hood took heavy casualties due to Lee's orders on July 2nd, these two errors in judgement, IMO, cost the Confederacy the war. I often wonder if Lee, after suffering from arterial disease, was not in full command of his faculties. If Jackson had been at Gettysburg, I am certain these two catastrophic mistakes would not have occurred.
😂😂😂 I see you’ve watched the movie Gettysburg a few times!
Can somebody get that person a drink?
6:06 ?!?!?!
(asap would normally mean right away )
I thought Ewell was supposed to attack in the morning while Longstreet attacked as soon as he was able???
Ewell was to "demonstrate," basically act as a decoy via skirmishing and feigned attack formations, in order to keep the union's right flank occupied and distracted on Culp's and Cemetery Hills while Longstreet's divisions prepared to attack the left flank. He had orders to launch a proper attack anytime if a good enough opportunity presented itself.
Ewell didn’t attack until at least 7pm and this was after Longstreet’s assault had finished. Ewell only did so with one division (Johnson’s) who managed to take some trenches at the base of Culps Hill. Ewell was never good enough to command a Corps and his shocking performance at Gettysburg (along with his demotion after Spotsylvania) reflect this.
While this counter march was poorly executed and allowed visibility, I dont think it cost victory for the ANV. I think the Confederates lost Gettysburg when Stonewall Jackson was accidentally killed by his own men at Chancellorsville.. Jacksons Corps was split 3 ways Between Ewell, Johnson, and Hill. Arriving on day 1 Ewell refused to take the hills and high ground northeast of the town. He felt his men were tired and spent from a forced march, and trying to occupy the heights would be too costly. There were few Union troops defending those heights during these critical hours. General Jackson did not care if his men may be tired he would have immediately organized a full assault on those heights and he would have continued fighting long after dark. Ewell Johnson and Hill were ok generals but poor replacement for Stonewall Jackson.
It’s easy for us to sit here and criticize. But have any of us been i the position to order 14k of your subordinates to their very likely death? On 2 separate occasions. What is not mentioned in this lecture is the fact that longstreets Corp was backed up the road and had to pass a 10 mile long wagon train. And was without his 3rd division - might 20k men have seized that position? Possibly. But arm chair generals we are. The order never should have been given if the army was not in the position to attack by 9am. The failure is lees and most specifically his staff for not taking the initiate and scouting earlier and issuing orders in advance to be ready and dawn
Yep. Lousy staff work. Probably even worse than the infamous Lost Order.
26:27 "Almost" doesn't count
The unanswerable question will always be what would have happened if Longstreet commenced this attack in the morning. That would have been before Sickles moved his corps forward. And I don't believe many of Sickles men were deployed in battle ranks in their original morning positions. Sickles was stretched thin even in the original morning line. All the union reinforcements that were deployed in the afternoon to shore up Sickles were not there in the morning. Even just marching around Bream's Hill instead of undertaking a counter march would have put many confederates on Little Round Top before most union troops arrived there.
You’re assuming that Sickles’ men would have sat on their thumbs all morning, lazily watching Longstreet’s corps take the high ground unopposed. As it happened, various Union officers besides Sickles were alert and active all day. We have no reason to think Longstreet would have been able to surprise them.
We also know that Sickles’ men fought with skill and determination. We should assume they would have done the same if they had been deployed where Meade wanted them instead of the unsupported salient where Sickles foolishly deployed them, except that in addition to their ferocious fighting, it would have been much easier to support them.
By far the most probable result to an earlier attack would have been an earlier defeat.
Longstreet's troops were not on the field yet. Law was furthest behind. Early in the day, with no Sickles there, Longstreet would have hit nothing , and his right flank would have been enfiladed from the Federal troops there, back of where Lee thought they were. But above all, at dawn, there would be zero knowledge of the ground.
amazing
I never saw Matt without a hat. I didn't recognize him. Anyway, I can to the conclusion that after Jackson was wounded and out of action the southern army was not much of an attacking army and more of a defending army.
Atkinson is great
The guy who keeps choking on himself is so rude
Truth is, we'll never know the truth. Only hear say.
I'm putting up my hand to blame Lee. July 1 at Gettysburg just wasn't the right time or place but he chose not to see that...his boys were invincible
In close consultation with Longstreet, he'd premised his Pennsylvania campaign on strategic offense and tactical defense. That sounds to me like '...get as close as we can to Washington or Harrisburg, find some suitable ground, dig in and then let them attack us'. Lee threw all of that away. Day 1 was unplanned. He concocted a half-assed, very poorly communicated order-of-battle plan for July 2..his generals should have all turned in the night before with a clear idea of what was to happen IN THE MORNING but they didn't, and that's not on any of his Corps commanders. And that Lee chose to fight without the benefit of his cavalry as a highly mobile reconnaissance asset and infantry fighting force multiplier is practically inexcusable.
After his lunge at the Federals left flank on Little Round Top failed and with so many of his valiant infantrymen dead or gravely wounded, Longstreet was seething at his CO. He stayed away from him and didn't speak to him until the next morning when Lee sought him out.
When Lee told him that the Confederate offensive attack would continue that day, Longstreet insisted that they still had a chance to swing the entire army around Meade's and maneuver into a defensive posture. Lee said nope, you're commanding your own 1st Corps and A.P. Hills 3rd Corps in an attack right at the center of their line. This was Longstreet's version of nuts to that:
"General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by pairs, companies, regiments, divisions and armies, and should know, as well as anyone, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men arranged for battle can take that position."
Pshaw...Lee put Longstreet in charge of Lee's big push for Day 3, which was as poorly conceived as his battle plan for the day before. Two of Hill"s divisions were positioned ad hoc because he thought that was commander Longstreet's purview (this would've been news to Longstreet) so there were large gaps between the two attacking corps. Why were so many of them set to bake in the sun for hours before the attack commenced? What exactly was the mission for the gunners? What conditions had to exist before the attack could commence? (btw, George Custer had just repulsed Lee's cavalry, who had finally showed up less than 24 hours before.)
Don't know much about Lee's earlier American Civil War successes...did he improvise a lot the way he did at Gettysburg, was he better at choosing when/where to fight, was he more focused, was it all because of Thomas Jackson?
Fantastic presentation .... but omg.. that frekkin coughing ... around 23-24 mins ...
Yeah, that was rough. I would have excused myself from the room, but that's just me.
What was so funny about the picture of Johnson?
Longstreet was essentially borderline insubordinate at Gettysburg, and his men paid the price.
General Longstreet was correct.
That’s why he was hesitant…. not insubordinate.
General Lee had the two best generals of the Civil War …
General Longstreet and his defense strategy .
General Jackson in his offensive brilliance . And,
That’s why general Lee gave vague orders.
Longstreet was right battle was lost on day 1
Just freaking worthy more of a government paycheck. True love of subject.
Longstreet knew his TROOPS had FOUGHT HARD that 1st. day. and had marched HARD before that. He KNEW his troops needed to REST & EAT FOOD before giving it that 110%. Obviously, MORE RECON should have have happened BEFORE the initial attack.
Longstreet's corps did not fight on day 1. By the time he got there Hancock had already occupied the high ground and Sykes was quickly approaching Little Round Top. Lee's army could not stand and wait to be attacked while it was still forming up and establishing its communications.
Longstreet's men didn't fight on day 1
Really, where did Longstreets men fight on Day 1? Please let us know. 😂
If Lee had attacked in the morning I'm not convinced it would have made a significant difference. The reason is that Dan Sickles would not have had time to make a foolish decision to move his corps out into isolation to be picked apart from all sides like what actually happened on the 2nd day. Instead Dan sickles corps would have held the union left on high ground next to cemetery hill. It would have been less likely for Confederate success I think simply because the union line was more organized on the morning of July 2nd than it was shortly before the Confederate attack.
Nah, Sickles's original position was very poor and would have been completely overrun. Meade completely ignored his left flank until Sickles took matters into his own hands and moved to a stronger position to preempt the Confederate attack.
Right there!
Fer sure. Makes me chuckle every time. I've become so fond of it that it has creeped into my utterances upon occasion.
@@howardclegg6497 Me too!
Nice
The biggest person you blame is Stuart
I would likely have a bad attitude about orders that would send my soldiers to their doom as well. The reports state he had poor attitude. The records show they performed relatively well
Their doom? You speak as if it was a suicidal attack. It was not.
Folks, it’s not that complex. Lee acquired his mystique operating and fighting on his home turf. When he went on the offensive in Maryland and especially Pennsylvania, he was stripped of his usual advantages and suddenly his enemy enjoyed the opportunity to operate and/or fight on compact interior lines.
There’s an awful lot of talk about how Longstreet should have listened to Hood. Well, how long would it have taken to continue marching in the July heat to get around the round tops? Who was going to guide them through the forests? What were they going to find after they stretched their lines ever further to the right, blundering through those thick, un-scouted forests? And most important of all, why on earth would we imagine that the Union army would sit on its thumbs while Hood schlepped his division through the woods?
Remember, the success of Jackson’s wild gamble at Chancellorsville all hinged on Howard ignoring Hooker’s warning to prepare for a flank attack. It really was not a surprise...Howard just ignored the intelligence. Were the Union commanders going to be that stupid again? (Well, Sickles was, but it was a different kind of stupid, not the same mistake).
There’s a lot of talk about what if Longstreet had attacked earlier. Ok, what if he had? Lee’s plan called for him to attack up the Emmitsburg road. That would have exposed his flank to enfilading fire from Sickle’s corps, so that plan was garbage and would have had to be changed. How long would it have taken to change the plan? How would Meade have countered? One thing is for sure, Sickles wouldn’t have had time to commit the awful blunder he did.
No, what you’re looking at is not some sudden breakdown in Lee and his generals; it’s not the loss of Jackson, who was streaky and fed some of Lee’s worst tendencies anyway; what you’re seeing is Lee’s weaknesses being exposed when he went on the offensive and had all the challenges faced by all the Union commanders he manhandled in Virginia.
Lee did a lot of things well, but he had a weak, sloppy staff. He gave vague, unwritten orders. He had a very hands-off approach when battle started. His strategy basically hinged on the hope that he’d be able to win a Cannae. And he believed his own side’s propaganda about the superiority of the southern fighting man. By 1863, after the poundings the Confederates got any time they faced a moderately competent Union general, Lee should have known better than to think that his men were going to carry the field at bayonet point just because of superior elan.
The Union had plenty of bad-asses of its own. Just to name a few, John Gibbon’s green brigade went toe to toe with Jackson’s veterans for two hours at Brawners Farm, withdrawing in good order as night fell (see also my comment above about a Jackson being streaky). The First Minnesota was a battle-hardened outfit long before Gettysburg. And of course there was the superior Union artillery. All those men needed was a chance to fight on their home turf with a decent commander. Lee handed them the opportunity on a silver platter at Gettysburg, and they predictably whipped him.
In the end, none other than a George Pickett probably explained the Confederate loss best: “I always thought the Union army had something to do with it.”
But that’s just, like, my opinion, man.
You are another redditor midwit who knows just enough to be dangerously stupid.
how do i get more dukes of hazzard reruns?
This audience needs some damn cough drops!
In conclusion yet another Lee defender. Lousy staff work and vague orders delivered verbally are not the hallmarks of greatness. Once Stonewall Jackson was gone, another Lee appeared.
By today's standards, Lee would be interpreted as giving vague orders. But for the times, Rank and Respect were paramount.
Maybe Lee should not have expected Longstreet to replace his attacker "Jackson", in the field. As mentioned, Longstreet's skills played more to a defensive preparation for battle. For the 1980's this may be a correct approach. Looking back in time, charging a well fortified position was suicidal.
This is not my opinion but what I have read, maybe Lee seriously may have thought that this was the best chance for the Confederacy to destroy the Army of the Potomac. A completely different approach to war fought by General Washington and the Revolution.
Alexander had no problem moving to the right finding a path unobserved from BRT. Longstreet sullied over Lee explaining the attack plan to McLaws and the complete rejection of his idea to move the army around the union left. He left the manuever in the hands of a Johnson and was no better than a private moving along to attack position. Longstreet was good in this fight at laying critical decisions on subordinates which is further demonstratred on the 3rd with Alexander.
Absolutely fantastic, except for the person coughing and eating cheetos.
Clark Amy Lee Sandra Perez David
Within the first five minutes of this presentation, what's obvious that you have "him", "her", "he", "she", "his", "them" and "us" as well as the "truth", "the whole truth" and "nothing but the truth." Then, and if the Ranger's presentation doesn't turn into a Utah divorce proceeding, the Ranger fails to enlighten the audience regarding 18th century battle tactics, what the word "attack" means in this context; and, in the end, we are left with the Ranger's "expert" opinion, which isn't based upon eyewitness accounts, journals written at the time of the battle or artifacts (such as written battle orders). So, and with this said, how can anyone be expected to really give this presentation any attention, when it deserves none. It's enough to make Shelby Foote turn over in his grave!!!
You fail to appreciate one of the most respectable park rangers of the day. He laid out a very comprensive review of the actions taken on the second and leaves the audience to draw their own conclussions. Your derogatory comment reveils much about your character and in no way can reflect what Shelby Foote would or would not think of this presentation.
Roman, you are obviously a passionate patriot. Opinions like noses come in varying degrees.
😂😂😂 you hold up Shelby Foote as a paragon of history😂 he’s was a novelist, a good one, but not a historian. His Gettysburg works don’t even have footnotes…please!😂
Lee put himself in a situation where many things could go wrong, and without good reason.
He should have never been so far north, and never should have risked so much.
Lee should have followed George Washington's strategy, and done everything to keep his army intact-his ultimate "limited resource" was manpower. Wasting manpower in battles like Gettysburg and Antietam was poor strategic thinking.
Thank you for saying that! Of all people, shouldn’t Lee have known about Washington’s generalship? It’s like the whole Confederacy knew nothing about the Revolution.
gettusburg?....pronounced like lettuce burg?
Lee sends 14,000 against 30,000 dug in in the woods on the high ground and Lee is a great general? That's as bad as Pickett's charge on day three.
Say what you want about the delays the fact that it was anything past 10 AM should have caused Lee to abort.
Without Jackson, Lee was "should have could have would have".. all the way to Appomattox.
..
Wrong. There were not 30k there. They were not dug in. And you could hardly call it high ground.
😮😶😮😮😮Set alarm Erica What is the ultimate boy 🇺🇸
Everybody knows Longstreet botched the attack!
NO! SINCE he considered the orders WRONG and it turns out, he was CORRECT he was RIGHT to refuse or drag his foot carrying out BAD orders!!!!
Wrong. He had a duty to carry out his orders with vigor, and he did not. He sulked instead.
You must have never been in the military if you say that!
The buck stops with Lee. He had the responsibility to get Longstreet on board. He needed his buy in.
Huh? So the overall commander needs to abort plans when his subordinates sulk and sabotage? Longstreet has blood on his hands because his ego couldn't handle it
I disagree