Damn. This is a good argument. If ALL that is true for A is also true for B, then, A and B are the same thing (they are identical). But if there is, at least, one difference between A and B, then, A and B are not the same thing. I can imagine me in a completely different body (an artificial one). Therefore, there is something ( The possibility of imagine me in another body, an artificial one) that is true for A (my identity, lets say), that is not true for B (my natural body), therefore, A and B are not the same thing. In order to reject this argument, it is necessary to show that Leibniz Law is false or that is impossible to imagine oneself in another body (or show that metaphysical naturalism is true)
Gustav Alexandrie "1. I can conceive of my body's not existing. 2. I cannot conceive of my not existing. 3. If A is identical to B, then every property A has is one B has and vice versa." I think your understanding of Plantinga is faulty. Lets avoid the imagine part and use a more concrete example. Every ten years or so all the cells in the human body are replaced, so every ten years or so you have a completely knew body with no physical components from the previous you. 1. I can show that my body b1 is no longer existent, given that it was ten years ago. 2. I exist apart from b1. 3. Therefore I am not identical to b1 and I am not identical to my body. B1 being my body ten years ago. If I was identical to that body I would not be me know. The fact that you are you know shows you were not identical to your body of ten years ago, given that it does not exist. So it is a fact that b1 does not exist and you as a person are distinct from b1. So yes Plantinga's argument is sound. He just used an analogy that can easily be misunderstood. "I can conceive of their being no author of this youtube-comment." Your first premise is obviously false. Any information (aka comment) must come from an intelligent source. Therefore it is impossible for a piece of information that does not also have a source. Also he is using Modal Logic, which is hard and I am not familiar with modal logic.
Gustav Alexandrie “It is unclear what this argument shows. Do you mean that 1 and 2 are independent premisses or do you mean that 2 follows from 1? If you mean the first of my suggestions then your argument presupposes what is to be proved. If you mean the latter, then I think your argument is flawed, here is why:” I mean that premise 1 and 2 are separate and imply premise 3. I should have stated premise 2 as “I can show that I am independent of b1.” Namely I exist and b1 does not. Therefore premise 3. “It is not clear that the fact that all the components of an object are gradually replaced does imply that the object stop existing. Imagine a flower who's cells are gradually replaced during its life time, does that mean that it is not the same flower when all original cells are gone? This is not clear to me, rather I would say that flower identity over time requires physical continuity, but not necessarily that the components are the same. I may be wrong, but these remarks at least show that the transition from 1 to 2 in your argument is far from unproblematic.” Physical continuity is vague. If you mean that a physical object is identical to what it is because throughout all of its existence it shares one unchaining part, then we have two problems (1) the flower is not identical to the ‘whole’ flower, but only to that unchanging portion, which seems problematic, and (2) there is not such material component that does not change in any organism. If you meant something else than my interpretation, please correct. “However, let say that you would succeed in arguing that identity over time requires some components to continue existing. It may still be true that human persons are physical and that you are not the same persons as what you thought were yourself seven years ago (providing all cells are replaced by the time of seven years). For your argument to succeed you need to have another account of what makes a person at time A and a person at time B the same person.” What accounts for human continuity is the First Person Perspective or FPP. FPP is located in the mind, which I believe for various reasons is the soul. I argue the mind is not identical to the brain because mental states are not identical to brain states. For example if I have the thought of the color red, even if you look into my brain and look at the particular neurons firing you will not see red. Also unlike my brain, my mind is not accessible to outside observation, but if it is a physical object it should be. “For your argument to succeed you need to have another account of what makes a person at time A and a person at time B the same person.” Actually I don’t, if my intent is merely to show I am not identical to my body. All I have to show is I am not identical to my body. If I were arguing that I am the same person I was seven years ago then yes you are right. But these are two different claims. “. It may still be true that human persons are physical and that you are not the same persons as what you thought were yourself seven years ago (providing all cells are replaced by the time of seven years).” That seems highly problematic and something most people would not want to accept. But the problem I see here is that I am the same person I was seven years ago because in part I have the same memories, the effects of my actions prior to seven years ago still affect me both physically and mentally. Lets say I had my leg broken (I did not, but for a thought experiment let’s assume), seven years later my leg is still lame. Yet if it was a totally new leg then the trauma of the break should not still be felt, since those cells did not exist seven years ago. “To answer your other remarks. It is very problematic to say that memory constitutes "the person", for there seem to be possible that two different persons could have the same memories. Surely they would not be the same person” Two different persons could have the same memories only in the sense that say person A and person B both remember going to dinner together. It is impossible for person A to have an identical memory to person B in the sense that person A remembers all the same sensory and physiological effects happening to person B at that time. For example if person A was visiting person B in the hospital, because person B had just been operated on. Person A cannot have the memory of person B in these sense that person A could not have the memory of the meeting and the pain in his neck (due to the operation) since person A’s neck was not operated on. Also the contents of person B’s memory are know only to himself so it is impossible for person A to know what those memories are unless person B tells him. “Furthermore, most people would say that you can loose your memory, but that it is impossible on your view since loosing memory would, on your view, imply that that the person does not exist anymore.” If I seemed to imply that I am identical to my memories I did not mean to say that. I am identical to my soul. My memories and my soul are not identical, but my soul contains my memories.
Gustav Alexandrie “Secondly, saying that the soul does interact with the body seems to imply that the body is not governed by physical laws. “ The problem with this is that “how do two things interact” does not entail that the position is false or invalid. For example nobody really knows how Stonehenge or the Nazca lines were created, but saying since we do not know how they were made, therefore we cannot postulate human originators is erroneous. There is no problem is assuming that the body is not totally governed by physical laws. In fact the assumption that the body is governed by physical laws alone is a very big problem. All the laws of nature are deterministic in nature. If man is governed solely by those laws his actions are deterministic. If man’s actions are deterministic then he has no free will. If man has no free will no one can be guilty of crime since he was determined to do it. “ But since the body is physical it can hardly be true that it does not obey physical laws.” This is a mistake. Of course the body is governed by physical laws, but the body is not solely governed by such laws. “ However, I think that those who believe in an immaterial soul have a far greater amount of explaining to do.” The materialist have the most to explain, who can a massless, extensionless, colorless object known as the mind even exist? If all that exists is material? How do numbers, the laws of logic or information exist? None of those are material as well. Also if we assume that logic and mathematical principles, while non material, operate on material objects, it is no great stretch of reason to assume the soul operates on the body in ways similar to the aforementioned principles. One does not have to explain the "means by which" a relationship between objects exists, only that such a relationship exists. “I should note also that I do not think that identity is a all-or-non property. Once this assumption is weakened, the possibility of a satisfactory view of personal identity seem possible.” It seems from the tenor of this conversation that you are denying Leibniz’s Law of identity, if so your position on identity is incoherent and not even false. “Yes you are right about that. And I am quite ready to admit that I am not sure exactly how to fill in all the details of my view of personal identity.” I gave a possible account of what you might have meant and shown how I think it is problematic. Do you accept the possible description of physical continuity I gave earlier?
Gustav Alexandrie “No, I do not. My objection to Plantinga is that he (falsely) assume that Leibniz's Law can be applied to his "conceive"-statements. This is a mistake since his conceive-statements are not statements about properties.” Ok. First of Plantinga is using modal logic. Something I doubt your or I are capable at this time of understanding. So I will give Plantinga the benefit of the doubt. Also his basic point is valid, as I reformulated it in a less speculative way. “ On the contrary, postulating the existence of a soul is a very strong metaphysical assumption since it assumes the existence of a non-physical, causally efficacious, intelligent entity. Anyone who postulates such an entity have to explain how it can exist.” No such burden needs to be born. I only have to show that an object exists that is massless, extension-less, and colorless, I.e. not material. If an object is not material, than it must be spiritual by definition. “I think this is mistaken. Mathematical objects may exist and we may have epistemic access to them, but it is certainly not the case that we are in a causal relationship with them. My own view is that we are designed by natural selection to respond to valid reasoning since it promoted our fitness.” What is certain is that mathematics are in a causal relationship with matter. For example the shell of a nautilus conforms to the Fibonacci sequence. “However, this is not enough for a soul. A soul must stand in a causal relation with the body. It is hard to se how that can be possible given that they are immaterial.” Again mathematics is in a causal relationship with matter. If it is and not to many people, I believe would find it objectionable, then it is not a stretch to argue that other metaphysical entities, such as souls, can causally relate to physical objects as well. “No, the laws of physics are (according to the standard interpretation) indeterministic and probabilistic.” I think this is highly contentious view of modern physics. By definition if all that exists is matter it is determined. Rocks and water do not “choose” to act in certain ways they “behave” in accordance with certain laws. Indeterminacy of nature is based on a philosophical misunderstanding of Schrödinger “Most philosophers believe that determinism is compatible with free will and moral responsibility.” I would not say most, but some. Compatibalism is unsatisfactory in that it does not adequately show how the “inability to do otherwise” is compatible with free will. Free will is the ability to do otherwise, which of course rocks and water do not have. “Furthermore, if determinism implied no moral responsibility this would hardly in itself constitute an argument against determinism. “ Correct it would not disprove determinism per say, but it would pose metaphysical problems that contradict common sense. “The challenge is left untouched - how can the non-physical soul govern the body which is governed by the laws of physics.” The same way mathematics governs physical objects, but the problem can also be returned to the materialist, how can a physical object the brain give rise to a mass-less object the mind? The problem goes two ways, but we know from the attributes of matter that the brain cannot give rise to the mind; since the mind contains properties that are not shared by matter. “ On this view there must be a line through space and time that connects object A and object B. Applied to the person I think there must be a spatio-temporal line connecting the brain at time 1 and time 2 and some sort of mental continuity. This view escapes your cell-replacement-objection.” Funny that just sounds like another name for a soul. Because the “materiel” link is not observable or measurable, ergo it is not material. If said line is physical it must be observable, such a line is not observable it is a metaphysical construct very similar to a soul. There is no material account of how such a line could be possible, at least to the scientific satisfaction of most. Such a postulate is a metaphysical assumption of the same nature as the soul, though inferior because it posits properties to a material object “the space time link” that are obviously not material. For example the “space time link” has no mass, for a living man and a dead man have the same mass. If they have the same mass then anything unique to the living man must be mass-less, I.e. spiritual.
This isn't really Plantinga's argument. It goes back as far as Descartes. Kripke presents a similar argument at the end of his third lecture on Naming & Necessity.
Kuhn is confusing epistemic possibility with modal possibility. Plantinga did not help because Kuhn is right to think that imagination is usually just a guide to what we think a term refers to (epistemic possibilities), not to what a term actually refers to in all possible worlds (modal). We can imagine that water could have turned out to be a different chemical structure. We had to discover that, in fact, water is identical to H2O. Names are not a matter of imagination or definition: they are ways of referring/picking something out. Despite that we can imagine that water is not H2O, in fact, what the word “water” refers to is H2O. Philosophers realized that identity is aposteriori because we realized, largely because of science, that a phenomenon can turn out to be different than what we imagine it was. If names were strictly our mental descriptions, then science would never discover anything surprising, but would instead be changing the subject with each new discovery. Another example: I can imagine that Clark Kent goes to work and then to sleep every night. I can imagine that while Kent is sleeping, Superman is out flying around somewhere. However, our imagination does not show that the person picked out and referred to by both names are therefore not the same person! Normally, our names refer to things whose identities have to be discovered. That is why we can not establish real difference on the basis of imagining descriptive differences between things. However, when it comes uniquely to “the mind”, there is no differences between how it appears in imagination according to description, and what it picks out. Thus, when we imagine the mind without a body or in a different body, the description of the mind is identical to what it picks out. This does not entail that the mind in nomologically distinct from the body, but it does show that the mind is metaphysically distinct from the body.
of course the mind is more than it appears in imagination. but i guess when Plantiga doesn't see that, it would explain that he thinks a mind without a brain is imaginable that would somehow make it possible.
-ehem- That a highly educated, dense response is necessary shows why dualism is so commonplace - it is intuitive to believe, and unintuitive to disbelieve.
But yes, upon reconsideration, I think Plantinga's major burden will be to show that his conception of the self which enables him to conceive of it as being separate, is complete. It could be that there are hidden properties of the self, which if known, would make it inconceivable to be separate from the body.
Those who don't understand this argument - such as the interviewer, don't understand Leibniz's Law. Because he doesn't understand that necessarily it could be true (since the body and the mind do not each posses all attributes of the other) that the mind can exist independently of the body. Since that's the case (or is at least possible,) then Plantiga is correct. Remember, this is a philosophical argument, and most people, including those "smart scientists" often don't grasp that there is no scientific argument being made here. Plantiga is not asserting that it IS the case that his argument is correct, but only that it could be true - a possibility - and he's showing that his argument exhibits no logical inconsistencies. The power in his argument comes from that very fact - that it's perfectly logical - and just because you can't grasp this fact has no bearing on whether it is sound or not.
Steven Robinson Not so. By the way, his name is Plantiga, not Plantings. All he claims is that his argument is logically coherent. Even if that was not the case, his argument is still logically coherent, regardless of what he, or anyone else says about it. However you can find other videos on the net where Plantiga confirms that he's not stating his argument is a proof, and that many will disagree. None of that affects his argument.
Dunzel Kirk By the way, his name is Plantinga, not Plantiga. Plantinga is confident his argument is correct, obviously he's not certain but he thinks it's a good argument, not just a coherent argument. I can make a logically coherent argument right now. P1: Dunzel Kirk is a fish P2: If Dunzel Kirk is a fish Dunzel Kirk is a shark C: Dunzel Kirk is a shark That argument is logically coherent, yet nobody in their right mind is going to believe it's conclusion because the premisses are obviously false. With Plantinga's argument the premisses aren't obviously false, in fact they seem plausible.
Steven Robinson You're correct - it's "Plantinga." I stand corrected. Of course he's confident his argument is correct and is a good argument - why else present it? You did make a logical argument - the caliber of a first year high school philosophy student. P2 doesn't follow from P1, so C is not logically consistent. By the way - logical arguments can be either true, or false. Just because an argument (or premise) is false doesn't mean it's not logically coherent, and people believing the argument is not a criterion for its validity either. No one here yet, including you, has shown why Plantinga's argument doesn't work and is not logically sound. Here's your argument written in a logical format, which is logically coherent. P1: All fish are sharks. P2: Robinson is a fish. C: Therefore Robinson is a shark. You're welcome.
Dunzel Kirk A few things: 1. When you say 'you didn't make a logical argument' I guess you mean a sound one, since it was quite clearly valid. 2. You can make a sound argument without P2 following from P1, for example: P1: Every human is a mammal P2: Every mammal is mortal C: Every human is mortal In no way does P2 'follow' from P1. 3. When you say 'validity' I guess you mean soundness I know precisely why Plantinga's argument doesn't work, because he equivocates conceivability with metaphysical possibility. This generally is not correct. It is up to Plantinga to demonstrate why in this case conceivability does imply possibility. 4. That is not my argument in logical format: My argument was of the form: P If P then Q Q This is a simple application of modus ponens and so is logically coherent. My P1 only says of one particular, Dunzel Kirk, if he's a fish then he's a shark, not that every fish is a shark.
@soultorment27 Right. The argument is sound in that he showed that P implies Q, but he didn't show that P was true (that what he is imagining is actually the mind and not an approximation of it). My 2nd part was just an analogy (which are never perfect) attempting to show an example of imagining something (sun/mind) vs. imagining an approximation of something (sun without gravity/mind without body). Thanks for the reply - Trun
You have to love Philosophy! Materialism is so illogical and it's hard to see how anyone who has studied Philosophy and Modal Logic could be a materialist.
This is a very easy argument and very easy to analyse. The argument has a modus tollens shape. prop 1: If A is identical to B then everything that is true of A is true of B. prop 2: Not everything that is true of A is true of B. conclusion: A is not identical to B So if you want to disagree with the conclusion then proposition 1 or 2 or both should be false. Although prop 1 is hard to deny, quantum mechanics does seem to show us that the same thing can be something different (contradictory even) depending on how you look at it. But let's assume prop 1 is correct. (Otherwise one would get into an interpretation discussion about the findings of quantum mechanics.) I think it's much easier to deny prop 2. Kafka simply was false to describe a situation in which Gregor Samsa was still Gregor Samsa when he turned into a bug. This is in no conceivable way possible. So the conclusion doesn't follow necessarily. Being possible and being able to "easily imagine it" are not identical so to speak. And defining it that way is kind of confusing.
Good post. But as to your claim that Kafka was wrong, I find this strange because a common scif-trope is switching people's body and minds around. It would appear that it is intuitive in some way, which explains the popularity of that trope. It may not be possible know for us humans to do that, but then again it was circa 1500 impossible for us to fly.
what are you guys talking about? his point from what i saw is that if A = B then A will have all the same properties as B. If A has some property B does not, then A does not = B. It has nothing to do with "if you can imagine X then X is possible". the key is if there are possibilities for A that aren't possible for B then A is not B.
This argument is embarrassingly circular. It assumes the very thing it sets out to demonstrate: "it's possible that I exist when my body doesn't, therefore my body and I are distinct entities, because if I were identical to my body, anything that is true of me would be true of my body ." The question one has to ask here is what do you mean by "I". "I" has to mean consciousness. But consciousness is the very thing we want to show to be distinct from body or not. Thus we don't know whether it's POSSIBLE for I" (consciousness) to exist when the body doesn't.
MrSidney9 I think that you dont know what "circular reasoning" is. Plantinga here is appealing to Leibniz's law of Identity of Indiscernibles... far from circular reasoning. Is funny how some people think that philosophers like Plantinga could eventually speak without know his own field... Try some Modal logic :)
Cristopher A This is clearly begging the question. In order for it to follow Leibniz's law, the mind and body would have to be two different entities. To prove that his theory follows this law, Plantinga said that he could imagine his mind and his body were two different entities. That is the definition of using your conclusion as your premise.
Mitchell Sheppard Sorry my friend, in one comment I cannot explain Modal Logic extensively. Still, Plantinga explains it a little with an example. It is possible or conceivable that we can exist in a different body, from that we can say that we and our current bodies are not the same thing. In modal logic the word "possible" is related with the laws of logic, and is not used in the ordinary sense. - If two things are identical, then in all possible worlds will share the same properties. - Its possible that in some world we (as persons) can exist in a different body. - Therefore, we and our bodies are not the same in all possible worlds - Therefore, we and our bodies are not the same. Seriously, if you dont understand modal logic its difficult that you could understand it Regards!
If Plantinga is not saying that A exists separately from B, then what is he saying about A? It stands to reason that if you do not postulate that A and B exist separately from each other in this world, but you entertain the idea that they can be separate, what is being said about A? You assume a quality of A that would make it different from B, when all A has seemed to shown thus far is synonymy with B. If A=B and always has done, when and how could you conceive when A would not = B? Synonymy implies sameness and isn't an excuse for separation.
He's saying that A has at least one property that B doesn't have, and he's further saying that if their properties aren't exactly the same as each other, then they are not exactly the same as each other. If they aren't exactly the same as each other, then they are two different things. He didn't say anything about being separate -- the difference he mentioned between A and B was that A could possibly exist when B does not exist, not that A could possibly be separate from B.
I can't believe this is an adult human being using this kind of reasoning, "It's possible because I can easily imagine it." There are things I can say about a spectrum that aren't true about a glass prism that produces that specific spectrum. Just because I can imagine in my mind a rainbow on the wall without including the prism in my imaginary picture doesn't mean that one can exist without the other. The phenomenon is dependent on the physical source of the phenomenon. To say "They are two different things" is a meaningless statement that leads nowhere if arguing that the spectrum could "possibly" exist without the prism that produces it.
***** Nobody claims that the individual's personality is identical with the body, they say that it is a phenomenon dependent on the physiological workings of the brain. There is a huge difference between DEPENDENT ON and IDENTICAL WITH. Therefore it is not necessary to say they are identical in all descriptive aspects. It is not necessary that everything that is said of the mind is also true of the brain. Therefore it is not a contradiction to say that the mind depends on the workings of the brain, and that it is not possible for the mind to exist without the brain. If dependence is the truth then possibility of 'A' without 'B' is a completely meaningless and irrelevant idea. This argument by Plantinga is childish word-play sophistry
***** It's not philosophy, it's dishonest sophistry when you employ a straw man fallacy strategy in your argument. Plantinga did that when he implied that the naturalist position is that the mind is "identical" with the physical body or brain. It is more complicated than that. So disproving identity does not lead to the conclusion that effect can exist without the cause.
***** Synergism and emergent phenomena. You don't simply describe a human thought as a clump of neural connections. There are complicated energy interactions going on constantly between individual neurons and areas of the cerebral cortex and even substructures of the brain. The emergent phenomenon of consciousness is a synergistic phenomenon which is capable of alteration. Plantinga suggests that a "belief" is like a physical adaptive trait which exists unchanging as its physical form, without the ability to evaluate its truth value. "Belief" is not a static physical neuronal form, it is an active emergent phenomenon that comes from continuous internal communication of elements of the brain.
*****, what cruelsuit1 is saying is closer to the major contemporary view in philosophy of mind, which is that the mind supervenes (but is not identical to) the brain, as a functional property; not "minds are brains", but rather "brains are mind-ed". Mental properties are functional, in that they demarcate a range of abilities that things with said properties can do, though that doesn't imply that there's anything "spooky" or ethereal about the mind. The brute "stuff" is physical stuff; it's just describable in two non-identical ways, just like how the physical characteristics of a banknote aren't identical to its economic/monetary characteristics (though there's no "soul" or essence to the banknote).
If you're going to a university, you probably have access to the book online. If not, I'm pretty sure the book is still in print, expect that it's really expensive. You might try interlibrary loan./What time in the video does Plantinga talk about logical possibility? I'll pay more attention if I know when to listen for it. (He may have just slipped up on the wording or decided not to go into the differences. Plantinga's word for metaphysical necessity, btw, is broadly logical necessity.)
Wow... Worst argument I have ever heard. I can imagine myself existing in another body, therefore my body and "me" are two seperate things? Well, why? If "I" imagine being in another body, then my body does too, because the brain is part of our body as well. And who really thinks, that imagination has nothing to do with our brains? That`s what happens when people try to make points just with their creativity and without scienctific methods like empirical evidence. It just doesn't work.
Paul Jojo Dude you showed your lack of understanding when you said people try to make arguments without the scientific method. The creation of the scientific method was created in that very way.
If it's the one from 17 hours ago, then I still see it. However, I have had some trouble with comments disappearing on videos before; such is TH-cam. :-/
Theologos Whilst Guillatra is clearly a moron, the switch from conceivability to possibility is not a trivial step. I can conceive that the morning star isn't the evening star, yet it is not possible that they are distinct since they are identical
I can imagine that my arm has a consciousness of it's own, separate from me. My consciousness is A, my body is B, and my arm's consciousness is C. If it's possible that my my arm has a separate consciousness, then there are properties true of my arms consciousness (C) that are separate of my consciousness (A). Therefore if my arm's consciousness (C) kills someone, you cannot hold responsible my consciousness (A).
Theologos Plantinga and I agree, and you seem to disagree with us. I never said "because I can imagine it", so you are falsely quoting me. What I'm said was that the fact that I (and you) can imagine it is what makes it credible, and therefore true. When we go to court, I hope that you do not let your prejudice convict me for what the consciousness of my arm has done.
@Purushadasa I said the "me" can be fully dependent on the body, not necessarily that it is. I was just trying to say that naturalism can be compatible with the conclusion of Alvin's argument. I don't think non-naturalists (don't know a better term) have provided evidence that the mind is independent on the body either (as far as i know)...could be a standstill. I think an argument for the naturalist "body dependent" case can be made through fMRI, Phineas Gage, and neurodegenerative type stuff.
You've also missed an important point: not being identical doesn't mean that there is no dependency relationship involved. In fact, this is what mind-body dualism is all about. This is a separate discussion from whether the mind can actually exist WITHOUT the body. That's another step further.
@CowLunch The Modal argument does not introduce any such controversial aspects (such as stars having souls, let alone any such aspect as a soul itself) as you try to insert. It takes a person & a person's body, and asks if these two things are identical (Law of Identity, A=A). If there is any possibility that A has a property that B does not have, then A and B are not equal or identical in every way, and therefore it necessarily follows that A and B are not in fact not identical.
To paraphrase Plantinga's argument: 1. If A and B are identical then anything that is true of A is true of B and vice versa 2. I (A) can exist when my body (B) doesn't. 3. Therefore, I (A) and my body (B) are not identical. The problem is that Plantinga doesn't demonstrate that premise 2 is true so the argument does not hold.
Justin Glick I think that the real problem is that Plantinga DOESNT say: "I (A) can exist when my body (B) doesn't". Plantinga says "Seems to me perfectly conceivable that I should exist when my body doesnt"... He is talking about the possibility, within modal logic. So ITS TRUE that exist that possibility, therefore, premise 2 is valid. Its conceivable that I could exist in another body, with a totally different collections of atoms, but still "I", there is any contradiction, logically speaking, because I and my body are not the same thing. On the other hand, you cannot say "A specific stone can exist when that specific stone doesnt exist"... thats ilogical...
Cristopher A I thought more about Plantinga's argument, and it is not even true that (1) is valid. See the Masked Man Fallacy: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masked_man_fallacy
Justin Glick I sorry my friend, but "wikipedia" is not necessarily a criterion for truth... even that, Plantinga never use the phrase "I dont know"... Is a matter of fact, logically speaking, that is conceivable that I (or you) could exist in another body. You, your personality, doesnt depends on your physical structure. Im not the same as my body, because: there is a property of me (namely, possible exist in another body), that is not a property of my body (my body cannot exist in another body, thats a logical contradiction) Regards!
Cristopher A"your personality, doesnt depends on your physical structure." You can't state that as a fact. The precise opposite can be stated as fact, and it is probably true. Everything that is your "mind" depends entirely on your physical body - from your toenails to your cerebral cortex. You don't make a figment of imagination a fact by putting it in the form of a declarative sentence.
What's key here is to understand the logical IMPLICATIONS of it being possible to conceive of the self as being separate from the body, but not logically possible to conceive the body as being distinct from the body (i.e. 1 cannot not be 1). Because this possibility indicates something about the identities of the subjects A and B; namely, that they are not the same. [cont
For Immanuel Kant, it can be said that A exists if it is actually possible for A to exist. That is a geometrical thinking in which existence is related to actual possibility and not merely to sensory examples in the phenomenal world. So, in order for Plantinga to be justified in positing the existence of A, he needs to prove the actual possibility of A's existence, and NOT merely the possibility of thinking about A without contradiction.
@langengro The argument that Plantinga is making is not just that persons and bodies are distinct concepts, which seems trivially true, but that they're distinct substances. A house and the material it is made of are not distinct substances, though they are distinct concepts. It is possible that our understanding of how the brain works could reveal a dependence of the mind on the body like that of the house and it's materials.
I think the problem is that he defined A (him) and B (his body) essentially as two different things from start, only then he could start assuming that it's possible that A has something something that B doesn't. If you take A (a stone) and B (exactly the same stone), then you cannot start assuming that it's possible that A has something that B doesn't.
@DazedSpy2 Not at all. My first exposure to it was when I looked it up on Wikipedia after reading your comment so if I have somehow misrepresented the axiom I apologize and invite you to correct me. Otherwise I have a wonderful reductio ad absurdum that will completely disprove it: It is possible flowers grow only with the assistance of magic fairies. (You can't disprove it.) Flowers grow. Therefore it is possible magic fairies necessarily exist. Apply Axiom S5 Magic fairies probably exist.
I can conceive someone proving the Goldbach conjecture, but that doesn't mean it's possible. Simply because Plantinga can imagine his mind without his body is no reason at all to think it is possible.
@windowpain1 "If you're talking about distinct concepts, that's true, but not if you're talking about distinct substances. It is possible that they are the same thing." This is the sentence I fail to understand. Does it just mean that one and the same thing may fall under two definite descriptions (like "the morning star" and "the evening star")? Or does it mean something else?
The character in Kafka's story "The Metamorphosis" is called Gregor Samsa. If I got correctly what he says, then he is contradicting the catholic dogma that resurrection occurs only in such a way that you'll get your body back. I wonder if his bosses are fine with that.
"I don't see how you can accuse him of abusing Liebniz's law..." If A and B are identical then they are metaphysically necessarily identical. If A and B are not identical then it's metaphysically impossible for them to be identical. I can conceive of A continuing without B. It's logically possible. I can also conceive of A NOT continuing without B. It's also logically possible.
I wrote this for someone else, but I'll also write it for you. (You might already be well aware of it, so "sorry" if you are.) Conceivability is often times used as a test for metaphysical possibility - if I can conceive of x, then x is metaphysically possible. There are some who dispute this, though. So, see "Conceivability and Possibility" on amazon. There you can read the first few pages of Bealer's chapter.
"there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable" -David Hume
You're misunderstanding the argument. He's not saying 'I can conceive of my mind without the body, therefore my mind is not my body'. There's another step in between: my mind has a property that my body does not have (namely, I can imagine myself existing without my body, but not without my mind.) Hence, my body can't be identical with my mind. Don't get me wrong, the argument still fails, but not for the reason you cite.
@Purushadasa I appreciate the reply. I don't think it does. Imagining the emergent property of an entity separate from that entity means it isnt the same as the entity, not that it is independent of that entity. Using his argument it can be shown that mass is not the same as gravity (imagining a mass not having gravity or gravity without mass), but gravity is fully dependent on mass. The me can be fully dependent on the body and not be the same as the body. I honestly do not see a problem.
The point is that the self & the body have different properties, even if modal properties. An implicit premise is Leibniz Law, which says: For any objects, if they are identical then they share all properties, by that & classical logic (modus tollens over the consequent) the difference between self & body follows if Plantinga's premises are granted. Leibniz Law & classical logic are pretty secure, so it's best to attack some of Plantinga's premises.
He's saying that became he can exist of A without B that means it's possible that A can exist without B. He goes further to say that B must have all the possibilities of A in order to equal A. Therefore, A =/= B
Before I go on I would like to note that I respect Alvin Plantinga and his work immensly, and I would by no means claim to be his equal. Now then, it seems to me that his modal argument is quite objectionable on the basis that being able to depict an idea doesn't confirm that the scenario in question is possible in the real world. I can conceive of Godzilla roaming the earth, and causing chaos, but science in this case informs us that an animal his size cannot exist. Similarly, his being able to envision that he exists in the absence of his physical body, or his brain specifically, doesn't prove that he can in fact exist in that same way. He has therefore failed in what he's trying to establish. I'd be perfectly willing to grant that pointing to a way in which we could exist without our brains, or some other physical item to keep us alive would essentially prove that we are distinct from some particular material substance. That allows him to advance his theory about us being spiritual entities with souls, but his argument does not appear to succeed in demonstrating that.
Joey Clavette Hey Joey, I get how the "imagining" part is problematic. Consider more closely what he explains relative to A and B not being identical. He's saying that there's something true about A, that is not true about B. In essence he's saying that the "mind" or "consciousness" (which would be A), has properties that B (merely the physical body) does not have. Some argue that the mind or consciousness is merely atoms crashing into one another. He believes that consciousness, and the presence of a mind indicate that humans are not just bodies, but "spiritual" if you will.
I hear you Joey. I think the point Dr. Plantinga is trying to make is that the "self" is not composed of "matter" but rather something else. This is why he can imagine his body being almost any kind of body, such as a beetle. His "self" would inhabit the body, but not be the body. His self (A) can imagine, while whatever form his body (B) may be cannot.
"However, we are justified to believe that which seems true barring countervailing reasons to think otherwise." Agreed and here is where each persons intuitions come into play. Though I am a Christian I do not think it is intuitive to believe that we could exist without our bodies. The apparent thing to believe is that we are in fact our bodies. When I say our bodies, of course, I do include the totality of the physical, material body, which encompasses the brain. Most people find it self evidently true that we are our brains, thus the argument you posit would actually help the materialist, if anything. Logically possible ≠ metaphysically possible, and thus even if it is possible to think of yourself in the absence of your physical body, that doesn't mean it is actually possible for that to happen. I don't agree that, "it seems evident that it is metaphysically possible that A could exist without B existing". Where are you getting this from? Nor, of course, have I met too many materialists who are willing to grant what you say. In fact the point of contention lies here. How is it evidently possible that we could exist without our physical bodies when all we know, and our intuitions point to our _being_ our physical bodies? Notice that a scenario such as the one proposed by Descartes does not help you here because it only proves logical possibility. Also, if there's something here that I'm missing or misinterpreted, please do let me know, since that comment was written ages ago. Some of the things that I might have said then I might no stand by now, and furthermore I'm not terribly sure what this argument was about when I wrote my comment. May the Lord be with you!
***** To share something personal, I am consistently afraid of death. Though I am a Christian and I do belief in the afterlife, sometimes I am in doubt about it. I go through these phases where I cannot visualize how I'd be ended with the death of my body, but then I'm still afraid of dying. I think from this we can surmise that the human intuition, despite wanting to stay alive by any means available to it, still acknowledges the unlikelihood of such a scenario. I'm thinking to myself, I don't want to die, and it depresses me to an unprecentended extent. I'm thinking, what if I'm wrong? What if there is no afterlfe? So from what I understand belief in an afterlife is motivational for sure, though that doesn't mean it's false, but the intuitive thing to believe has always been that we go *poof* once our hearts stop beating.
the problem with Plantinga's argument is: "it is possible that A exists when B doesn't" is not a truth statement. it's a counterfactual statement about the future of B that hasn't obtained yet. Once B ceases to exist, who is the observer that can verify whether the statement of confirmation or discomfirmation that the modal statement holds a space for is true or false? Imagine a world in which A can and does make a truth evaluation of an actual occasion where A exists and B doesn't!
If anyone wants a more carefully developed version of this argument by Plantinga, look in "The Nature of Necessity". Does anyone know if he wrote anything before that book on this argument?/Also, I'm sure there are others who have advanced this argument. Does anyone know who?
If "A" is "ME", your identity, and B is your human body, B is the mechanism of A. It could also be that C, D and E are also mechanisms of A, where C has a beatle body, D has a square head, 2 tails and yellow poker dots, and E is computer software. In no case is A independent of B, C, D or E.
@the1qb I say againonce again....(in reply to you saying) "we can't imagine our body existing when our body doesn't exist " Yes we can!(well I most certainly can!) How do you square that particular circle?
@windowpain1 (VI) By the way, you say, "The argument that Plantinga is making is not just that persons and bodies are distinct concepts, which seems trivially true, but that they're distinct substances." I don't know why you seem to think I denied that. I've discussed Plantinga's argument at rather great length further down in the comments. My guess about why the argument fails would be the "Obama is the President" analogy given a couple of pages below ...
@soultorment27 Thank you being the first of several here to at least attempt to make a counterexample. Lets see.. 1. Why can you conceive of star B and not A? This seems to not meet the same form as plantiga's premise. 2. What is the modal property that the evening star does not have? It's not just the position in the sky right? If it is i'm not sure if this is a modal property. again I appreciate this response, get back to me.
It makes perfect sense. The question I asked was: do you argue that your emotions are also one and the same as your body? I ask this for semantic purposes, so that it becomes clear what is meant by "one and the same as your body". When I say that, I do not mean a bodily process, or even a by-product of a bodily process. I mean, literally one and the same as your own body. Clearly, no one would say that their emotions are this. [cont
Well, you seem to present his case much better than he did. Well yes, it is evident that "self" is not equal to it's physical medium, although a case must be made that it is not, in fact, contingent on it. A flame is not the same as oxygen and fuel, and it's likewise illogical to require them, dogmatically, to produce combustion... but you need to provide more than that argument to build any sort of further conclusions about what this "fuel-less" combustion would be like and what it could do.
Howdy, Do you know if "Nature of Necessity" is still in print? I'll check it out... I just don't see how this is possible given the argument. Maybe there is something I'm not seeing.
Continued: But my body cannot have that modal property since that would be a contradiction. By Leibniz' law - if I have a property (in this case a modal one) that my body does not and cannot have then I cannot be identical with my body. In order for two things to be identical they must share all their properties - I and my body do not so we are not identical.
@Purushadasa Do you read or do you just like to talk? He just said it doesn't need to necessarily be dependent. By the way, saying different means different really means nothing. Thank you for letting us have a glimpse into the reasoning skills of your mind.
I don't know what Chalmers has written. Kripke, on the other hand, is arguing against type identity theories of mind. So, all that might have to be affirmed if we're to say Kripke is right is that property dualism is correct. Does Plantinga's argument require a strong substance dualism for it's conclusion? Or perhaps it's not as strong as that? Not sure...
I'm thinking.....the mind can be severed from the body by nerves and such so perhaps if we consider the mind and its inner thoughts/functions different from what we consider the body and its "thoughtless" functions this isn't far fetched at all. Took me a minute to understand but I find this as a deeper understanding of mind-body dualism. An interesting belief system(if that's how you'd classify it).
@RandomVortex ok here it is man. Plantinga says: I have a modal property (namely the property of possibly not being my body) that my body lacks. An object A and an object B that have incompatible properties cannot be identical. The properties 'possibly not being my body' and 'not possibly not being my body' are incompatible. Therefore I am not identical with my body. (btw, 'identical' has a technical meaning in philosophy, check out the SEP online if you wanna look things up)
@blackplatypus (8) Now what the Kafka story shows us is that the person CAN remain while the body undergoes metamorphosis (where “CAN” expresses logical possibility). By contrast, and trivially, the body CANNOT remain while the body undergoes metamorphosis. With this, we have found a difference in the modal properties of Plantinga and his brain, respectively. We may conclude that they are not one and the same thing.
Well, I can write a computer program that "thinks" about things, and then upon making a decision, turns an electric motor. How is that different from what you're talking about?
@WilliamofWare and the "evening star" as 2 different stars in the sky. Modern astronomy revealed that they were both actually the same thing (Venus). Someone a bit too philosophical could've said "if they are the same thing, all of the properties of each should be identical" HOWEVER, I can imagine the morning star in the morning. I can't imagine the evening star in the morning, therefore they don't share the same properties and are in fact distinct."
@WilliamofWare The conclusion that people SHOULD draw from this is that all the argument shows is that our concept of the morning star and evening star are distinct. It does nothing to show that our concepts are actually correct representations. Likewise, if the mind IS just a product of the brain (and that's the only way to get a mind), you CAN'T imagine the mind without the body and you just thought you could because your concept of the mind was wrong.
@XxVINCEROxX I'm asking because my understanding of what that means seemed to be different from yours and the first rule of debate is to define your terms. I must confess I don't fully grasp your explaination. Could you give an example?
@stethoscanomaly I simply do not agree that "HE"(the person etc...)has this modal property(the property of possibly not being a body/brain etc) Basically it would appear I hold the materialistic view which obviously puts me at odds with Plantingas argument. Thanks for the feedback though!(and of course I could be wrong...possibly.)
@windowpain1 (III) Conversely, if, by doing renovations, you changed the materials of a house brick by brick, you could eventually say: “This is the same house, but those are not the same bricks”. But identity, we should remind ourselves, is a transitive relation . The upshot of this, according to the Geach school and maybe also according to common sense (not to mention Aristotle), is that you can’t really say that the house and the bricks are identical.
Good question! It is conceivable for A to exist while B does not exist, but B does not have that property -- if B exists, then B exists. If B does not exist, then B does not exist. B existing while B does not exist is not even conceivable, but it is conceivable for A to exist when B does not. A has the property "conceivable to exist while B does not exist," but B does not have that property. Therefore, A and B are clearly not identical.
In other words, physicalists agree that smiles, like minds, are not identical with bodies, but dependent on them. So Plantinga proves the distinctness, but not the independent existence of minds
@LetReasonPrevail1 - So among the properties a person has are what are called modal properties. These are just properties which are true just in case something is possible for whatever has them. So rocks, say, have the modal property of being able to be located differently from where they are. Plantinga's argument here (and this trades on conceivability being a good guide to possibility) is that I have the modal property "possibly existing without my body."
For the materialists here, I think there's a way to conceive of this mind-body distinction in a purely physicalist universe: let's say we develop a way of mapping out our entire neural networks, and copy all the information contained therein into a computer. Insofar as all of our mind, our personal identity, is instantiated in that information, we can clearly see how our personality can exist independently of our body.
@the1qb Can you really not"Imagine"a square circle? What do you know about quantum theory? More importantly(with regard to the subject in question)what do you make of both psychology and neurology? Ultimately what do make of theology?(just curious!)
I don't think memories and personality amount to your person hood simply because you can have different memories and still be you as an existing entity. In fact, you could have your memories erased completely and yet still exist. You might act different, but you're still you. The brain, nor the body alone makes us who we are.
Well, since no one is making the argument that the mind and body are identical, then it doesn't need to be defeated. That is a red herring. The argument is that the mind is a phenomena of neural processing. This is a fact. And as a fact, it acts as a pretty iron clad defeater against anything that would involve the processing without the neurons.
This makes sense. Your brain (A) is not your heart (B) and your heart is not your arm (C) and your arm is not your kidney (D) in the sense that these are all differing phenotypic machines deployed by genes. If I could copy the structure of this brain into another body sufficiently so as this transfer process could be functional (principally I don't see why not despite our inability to do so currently) then yes your body could be destroyed and you would still be the you behind your eyes despite being in another body, but this you would not be the original it would be a copy. It's in this sense that this view is compatible with physicalism.
@soultorment27 As I said, they are different in that plantinga assumes materialism taking the form of reductio ad absurdum; and the other is that your A and B have the same posibility of existing which is not the case in Plantinga's.
@surroundix Yes unfortunately it is, and it has being defended as an argument by David Chalmers (a dualist again). About the transplants, I guess they would still be implemented by hardware, right?
Upon further consideration, I'm actually no longer sure how well this argument sits with me. Dr. Plantinga seems to already presuppose an abstract difference between the self and body, based on his self-awareness, which enables him to conceive of the self as being separate from the body. However, this first requires that he have a basic understanding of what the self is (I suppose he means his self-awareness). Who is to say this is correct? [cont
His argument is essentially that because he can imagine something is possible for A but not for B, A, he concludes, cannot be identical with B. But all his argument really amounts to is the hypothetical that if something is possible for A but not for B, then A is not identical with B. However, the possibility he refers to (the self being able to inhabit different bodies) relies on an intution which presupposes dualism. His version of the ontological argument is flawed in a similar way.
I am discussing the modal ontological argument for consciousness =/= body, not for the existence of God. In the latter case, if God is defined as necessary, it follows from modal logic that if he is possible, he is necessary (but this is still begging the question about whether or not God is in fact necessary). For the consciousness argument, there is no "necessity" for consciousness to be different from physical processes, and the argument falls, but don't confuse the two arguments.
@CowLunch I am not being facetious. I am saying that you are introducing terms into your opponents argument that he did not use, and that have their own set of baggage. It is unnecessary to talk of a soul in this argument. Simply refer to the person, rather than the person's soul. I am not saying that something is true because you can conceive of it. The Modal argument states that if it is possible for A to have properties that B doesn't then they cannot be identical to one another.
Even materialists would most probably say emotions are by-products of bodily processes and not identical with their bodies. That is the purpose of the modal argument too. Whatever the nature of the self, it is not identical to the body, even if the result of a bodily process.
@RandomVortex I made no such distinction. By the way, even though I never said his argument is sound, I do actually believe that his argument is sound.
Plantinga is saying exactly what you have in quotes: "I can conceive of X, therefore possibly X." Those are almost his exact words. To finish the argument he says, "If possibly X is true of me (where X = being disembodied) and possibly X is not true of my body (a body could not be disembodied), then I am not identical to my body.
Which is to say, The modal statement "It is possible that A exists when B doesn't" does not count as knowledge. It can't be construed to have truth value UNLESS we can be convinced of actual knowledge concerning the metaphysics that the confirmation of the modal statement would require. Now here's where it gets interesting. Why? Because, at the fringes of society there are supernormal experiences.
"It seems to be I could exist while my body doesn't." This sounds suspiciously like Descartes, and seems to ignore functionalist arguments of materialism.
Yes, you must suppose that when you conceive of something that that thing is possible. And yes, conceivings occur; and we can conceive of taking on the body of beetle while our former body ceases to exist... I guess I'm having problems seeing where you disagree with the argument./Also, as far as you're able, please use the wording that Plantinga uses so we can each stay on the same page. Thanks!
That's true IF mind and body are identical, but you have no basis to assume that they are. Plantinga's argument only assumes that it's possible that mind and body are not identical, which is a far more conservative assumption.
Right, so although the modal argument might show that minds can be conceived of without bodies (that's a subject of debate) it doesn't show that it can in fact exist without the body. That's all I wanted to get across in my original comment.
(...cont) What Plantinga is presenting is a sound logical argument for the *possibility* that the self can exist independently of a physical body. He's not presenting an argument that it ever does or will. He has merely presented a logical proof that the idea that it *may* is not illogical in itself.
@windowpain1 Hum ... I think I still don't understand your point. Plantinga asks whether he and his body are identical. In a more traditional terminology (which he himself doesn't use), we might rephrase this by saying: He asks whether they are the same substance. And of course one and the same thing (or substance, if you like) can satisfy different descriptions. Plantinga's question is: do the phrases "I" and "my body", which certainly express different concepts, refer to the same substance?
I agree. As far as I'm concerned, though, there is no need to be dogmatic either way. Perhaps it is possible for an unembodied mind to exist. But the point is: If you cannot tell if your observation of the inmaterial side of the mind (or self, for that matter) is true or simply imagination, then you cannot claim that it exists. Conceivable? Sure, as pretty much anything. There are few unconceivable fantasies, if any. I would not claim it cannot be, but I know Plantinga fails at observing it is.
@windowpain1 (II) And the reasoning behind this claim is somewhat similar to what Plantinga is trying to do here. Imagine, for instance, that a house were destroyed. Its materials are later used to build a new house. In that case, it would be rather natural to say: “These are the same bricks, but it is not the same house”.
Actually, basic experiments like Kepler's and Newtons are performed in elementary and high school every day, so yeah, they're still being done. The results of these earlier scientists' experiments have become part of our body of knowledge. They're accepted because they work, not because "newton said it, so it must be true". In fact, Einstein showed newton to be wrong, so there you have a great example of ignoring the "authority" of an earlier scientist.
@shilohwillcome He's arguing that the 'I' not identical with the body, because he can imagine that they are separated. He argues further that this means that this means that the 'I' has a property that the body does not have; namely that the 'I can be thought the exist independent og the body. However, just because he can imagine the 'I' distinct from the body, does not mean that the 'I' owns the property of being distinct from the body.
Damn. This is a good argument. If ALL that is true for A is also true for B, then, A and B are the same thing (they are identical). But if there is, at least, one difference between A and B, then, A and B are not the same thing.
I can imagine me in a completely different body (an artificial one). Therefore, there is something ( The possibility of imagine me in another body, an artificial one) that is true for A (my identity, lets say), that is not true for B (my natural body), therefore, A and B are not the same thing.
In order to reject this argument, it is necessary to show that Leibniz Law is false or that is impossible to imagine oneself in another body (or show that metaphysical naturalism is true)
LaResistanceChannel
Yup, Leibniz is great. I use his Law of Identity all the same.
Gustav Alexandrie
"1. I can conceive of my body's not existing.
2. I cannot conceive of my not existing.
3. If A is identical to B, then every property A has is one B has and vice versa."
I think your understanding of Plantinga is faulty.
Lets avoid the imagine part and use a more concrete example. Every ten years or so all the cells in the human body are replaced, so every ten years or so you have a completely knew body with no physical components from the previous you.
1. I can show that my body b1 is no longer existent, given that it was ten years ago.
2. I exist apart from b1.
3. Therefore I am not identical to b1 and I am not identical to my body.
B1 being my body ten years ago. If I was identical to that body I would not be me know. The fact that you are you know shows you were not identical to your body of ten years ago, given that it does not exist. So it is a fact that b1 does not exist and you as a person are distinct from b1. So yes Plantinga's argument is sound. He just used an analogy that can easily be misunderstood.
"I can conceive of their being no author of this youtube-comment."
Your first premise is obviously false. Any information (aka comment) must come from an intelligent source. Therefore it is impossible for a piece of information that does not also have a source.
Also he is using Modal Logic, which is hard and I am not familiar with modal logic.
Gustav Alexandrie
“It is unclear what this
argument shows. Do you mean that 1 and 2 are independent premisses or do you
mean that 2 follows from 1? If you mean the first of my suggestions then your
argument presupposes what is to be proved. If you mean the latter, then I think
your argument is flawed, here is why:”
I mean that premise 1 and 2
are separate and imply premise 3. I should have stated premise 2 as “I can show
that I am independent of b1.” Namely I exist and b1 does not. Therefore premise 3.
“It is not clear that the
fact that all the components of an object are gradually replaced does imply
that the object stop existing. Imagine a flower who's cells are gradually
replaced during its life time, does that mean that it is not the same flower
when all original cells are gone? This is not clear to me, rather I would say
that flower identity over time requires physical continuity, but not
necessarily that the components are the same. I may be wrong, but these remarks
at least show that the transition from 1 to 2 in your argument is far from
unproblematic.”
Physical continuity is
vague.
If you mean that a physical object is identical to what it is because throughout
all of its existence it shares one unchaining part, then we have two problems
(1) the flower is not identical to the ‘whole’ flower, but only to that
unchanging portion, which seems problematic, and (2) there is not such material
component that does not change in any organism.
If you meant something else
than my interpretation, please correct.
“However, let say that you
would succeed in arguing that identity over time requires some components to
continue existing. It may still be true that human persons are physical and
that you are not the same persons as what you thought were yourself seven
years ago (providing all cells are replaced by the time of seven years). For
your argument to succeed you need to have another account of what makes a
person at time A and a person at time B the same person.”
What accounts for human
continuity is the First Person Perspective or FPP. FPP is located in the mind, which
I believe for various reasons is the soul. I argue the mind is not identical to
the brain because mental states are not identical to brain states. For example
if I have the thought of the color red, even if you look into my brain and look
at the particular neurons firing you will not see red. Also unlike my brain, my
mind is not accessible to outside observation, but if it is a physical object
it should be.
“For your argument to
succeed you need to have another account of what makes a person at time A and a
person at time B the same person.”
Actually I don’t, if my
intent is merely to show I am not identical to my body. All I have to show is I
am not identical to my body. If I were arguing that I am the same person I was
seven years ago then yes you are right. But these are two different claims.
“. It may still be true that
human persons are physical and that you are not the same persons as what you
thought were yourself seven years ago (providing all cells are replaced by
the time of seven years).”
That seems highly
problematic and something most people would not want to accept. But the problem
I see here is that I am the same person I was seven years ago because in part I
have the same memories, the effects of my actions prior to seven years ago
still affect me both physically and mentally. Lets say I had my leg broken (I
did not, but for a thought experiment let’s assume), seven years later my leg
is still lame. Yet if it was a totally new leg then the trauma of the break
should not still be felt, since those cells did not exist seven years ago.
“To answer your other
remarks. It is very problematic to say that memory constitutes "the
person", for there seem to be possible that two different persons could
have the same memories. Surely they would not be the same person”
Two different persons could
have the same memories only in the sense that say person A and person B both
remember going to dinner together. It is impossible for person A to have an
identical memory to person B in the sense that person A remembers all the same
sensory and physiological effects happening to person B at that time. For
example if person A was visiting person B in the hospital, because person B had
just been operated on. Person A cannot have the memory of person B in these
sense that person A could not have the memory of the meeting and the pain in
his neck (due to the operation) since person A’s neck was not operated on. Also
the contents of person B’s memory are know only to himself so it is impossible
for person A to know what those memories are unless person B tells him.
“Furthermore, most people would
say that you can loose your memory, but that it is impossible on your view
since loosing memory would, on your view, imply that that the person does not
exist anymore.”
If I seemed to imply that I
am identical to my memories I did not mean to say that. I am identical to my
soul. My memories and my soul are not identical, but my soul contains my
memories.
Gustav Alexandrie
“Secondly, saying that the soul does interact with the body seems to imply that the body is not governed by physical laws. “
The problem with this is that “how do two things interact” does not entail that the position is false or invalid. For example nobody really knows how Stonehenge or the Nazca lines were created, but saying since we do not know how they were made, therefore we cannot postulate human originators is erroneous.
There is no problem is assuming that the body is not totally governed by physical laws. In fact the assumption that the body is governed by physical laws alone is a very big problem. All the laws of nature are deterministic in nature. If man is governed solely by those laws his actions are deterministic. If man’s actions are deterministic then he has no free will. If man has no free will no one can be guilty of crime since he was determined to do it.
“ But since the body is physical it can hardly be true that it does not obey physical laws.”
This is a mistake. Of course the body is governed by physical laws, but the body is not solely governed by such laws.
“ However, I think that those who believe in an immaterial soul have a far greater amount of explaining to do.”
The materialist have the most to explain, who can a massless, extensionless, colorless object known as the mind even exist? If all that exists is material? How do numbers, the laws of logic or information exist? None of those are material as well. Also if we assume that logic and mathematical principles, while non material, operate on material objects, it is no great stretch of reason to assume the soul operates on the body in ways similar to the aforementioned principles. One does not have to explain the "means by which" a relationship between objects exists, only that such a relationship exists.
“I should note also that I do not think that identity is a all-or-non property. Once this assumption is weakened, the possibility of a satisfactory view of personal identity seem possible.”
It seems from the tenor of this conversation that you are denying Leibniz’s Law of identity, if so your position on identity is incoherent and not even false.
“Yes you are right about that. And I am quite ready to admit that I am not sure exactly how to fill in all the details of my view of personal identity.”
I gave a possible account of what you might have meant and shown how I think it is problematic. Do you accept the possible description of physical continuity I gave earlier?
Gustav Alexandrie
“No, I do not. My
objection to Plantinga is that he (falsely) assume that Leibniz's Law can be
applied to his "conceive"-statements. This is a mistake since his
conceive-statements are not statements about properties.”
Ok. First of
Plantinga is using modal logic. Something I doubt your or I are capable at this
time of understanding. So I will give Plantinga the benefit of the doubt. Also his
basic point is valid, as I reformulated it in a less speculative way.
“ On the contrary, postulating the
existence of a soul is a very strong metaphysical assumption since it assumes
the existence of a non-physical, causally efficacious, intelligent entity.
Anyone who postulates such an entity have to explain how it can exist.”
No such burden needs
to be born. I only have to show that an object exists that is massless, extension-less,
and colorless, I.e. not material. If an object is not material, than it must be
spiritual by definition.
“I think this is
mistaken. Mathematical objects may exist and we may have epistemic access to
them, but it is certainly not the case that we are in a causal
relationship with them. My own view is that we are designed by natural
selection to respond to valid reasoning since it promoted our fitness.”
What is certain is that
mathematics are in a causal relationship with matter. For example the shell of
a nautilus conforms to the Fibonacci sequence.
“However, this is not
enough for a soul. A soul must stand in a causal relation with the body. It is
hard to se how that can be possible given that they are immaterial.”
Again mathematics is
in a causal relationship with matter. If it is and not to many people, I
believe would find it objectionable, then it is not a stretch to argue that
other metaphysical entities, such as souls, can causally relate to physical
objects as well.
“No, the laws of physics are (according to the standard interpretation)
indeterministic and probabilistic.”
I think this is highly contentious view of modern physics. By
definition if all that exists is matter it is determined. Rocks and water do
not “choose” to act in certain ways they “behave” in accordance with certain
laws. Indeterminacy of nature is based on a philosophical misunderstanding of Schrödinger
“Most philosophers
believe that determinism is compatible with free will and moral responsibility.”
I would not say most,
but some. Compatibalism is unsatisfactory in that it does not adequately show
how the “inability to do otherwise” is compatible with free will. Free will is
the ability to do otherwise, which of course rocks and water do not have.
“Furthermore, if determinism
implied no moral responsibility this would hardly in itself constitute an
argument against determinism. “
Correct it would not disprove determinism per say, but
it would pose metaphysical problems that contradict common sense.
“The
challenge is left untouched - how can the non-physical soul govern the body
which is governed by the laws of physics.”
The same way
mathematics governs physical objects, but the problem can also be returned to
the materialist, how can a physical object the brain give rise to a mass-less
object the mind? The problem goes two ways, but we know from the attributes of
matter that the brain cannot give rise to the mind; since the mind contains
properties that are not shared by matter.
“ On this view there must be a line through space and time that
connects object A and object B. Applied to the person I think there must be a
spatio-temporal line connecting the brain at time 1 and time 2 and some sort of
mental continuity. This view escapes your cell-replacement-objection.”
Funny that just
sounds like another name for a soul. Because the “materiel” link is not
observable or measurable, ergo it is not material. If said line is physical it
must be observable, such a line is not observable it is a metaphysical
construct very similar to a soul. There
is no material account of how such a line could be possible, at least to the
scientific satisfaction of most. Such a postulate is a metaphysical assumption
of the same nature as the soul, though inferior because it posits properties to
a material object “the space time link” that are obviously not material. For
example the “space time link” has no mass, for a living man and a dead man have
the same mass. If they have the same mass then anything unique to the living
man must be mass-less, I.e. spiritual.
This isn't really Plantinga's argument. It goes back as far as Descartes. Kripke presents a similar argument at the end of his third lecture on Naming & Necessity.
Kuhn is confusing epistemic possibility with modal possibility. Plantinga did not help because Kuhn is right to think that imagination is usually just a guide to what we think a term refers to (epistemic possibilities), not to what a term actually refers to in all possible worlds (modal).
We can imagine that water could have turned out to be a different chemical structure. We had to discover that, in fact, water is identical to H2O. Names are not a matter of imagination or definition: they are ways of referring/picking something out. Despite that we can imagine that water is not H2O, in fact, what the word “water” refers to is H2O.
Philosophers realized that identity is aposteriori because we realized, largely because of science, that a phenomenon can turn out to be different than what we imagine it was. If names were strictly our mental descriptions, then science would never discover anything surprising, but would instead be changing the subject with each new discovery.
Another example: I can imagine that Clark Kent goes to work and then to sleep every night. I can imagine that while Kent is sleeping, Superman is out flying around somewhere. However, our imagination does not show that the person picked out and referred to by both names are therefore not the same person!
Normally, our names refer to things whose identities have to be discovered. That is why we can not establish real difference on the basis of imagining descriptive differences between things.
However, when it comes uniquely to “the mind”, there is no differences between how it appears in imagination according to description, and what it picks out. Thus, when we imagine the mind without a body or in a different body, the description of the mind is identical to what it picks out. This does not entail that the mind in nomologically distinct from the body, but it does show that the mind is metaphysically distinct from the body.
Great comment.
of course the mind is more than it appears in imagination. but i guess when Plantiga doesn't see that, it would explain that he thinks a mind without a brain is imaginable that would somehow make it possible.
DAMN real heat in this comment. Should be top and pinned!
-ehem- That a highly educated, dense response is necessary shows why dualism is so commonplace - it is intuitive to believe, and unintuitive to disbelieve.
But yes, upon reconsideration, I think Plantinga's major burden will be to show that his conception of the self which enables him to conceive of it as being separate, is complete. It could be that there are hidden properties of the self, which if known, would make it inconceivable to be separate from the body.
This is beautiful, it's such an elegant argument 90% of people think it's ridiculous.
It's ridiculous if you transfer it to actual reality. On logical terms only, it's sound. But reality =/= logic. Just like science =/= math
@@adriancioroianu1704 what?
@@WakeRunSleep what?
@@adriancioroianu1704 reiterate please?
@@WakeRunSleep maybe one day, if i have the time and will to do it.
I'm pretty sure Kripke was the first. Chalmers has also written about it.
Those who don't understand this argument - such as the interviewer, don't understand Leibniz's Law. Because he doesn't understand that necessarily it could be true (since the body and the mind do not each posses all attributes of the other) that the mind can exist independently of the body. Since that's the case (or is at least possible,) then Plantiga is correct. Remember, this is a philosophical argument, and most people, including those "smart scientists" often don't grasp that there is no scientific argument being made here. Plantiga is not asserting that it IS the case that his argument is correct, but only that it could be true - a possibility - and he's showing that his argument exhibits no logical inconsistencies. The power in his argument comes from that very fact - that it's perfectly logical - and just because you can't grasp this fact has no bearing on whether it is sound or not.
You quite clearly do not understand the argument. Plantings is claiming his argument is correct, not just that it's logically consistent.
Steven Robinson
Not so. By the way, his name is Plantiga, not Plantings. All he claims is that his argument is logically coherent. Even if that was not the case, his argument is still logically coherent, regardless of what he, or anyone else says about it. However you can find other videos on the net where Plantiga confirms that he's not stating his argument is a proof, and that many will disagree. None of that affects his argument.
Dunzel Kirk
By the way, his name is Plantinga, not Plantiga. Plantinga is confident his argument is correct, obviously he's not certain but he thinks it's a good argument, not just a coherent argument. I can make a logically coherent argument right now.
P1: Dunzel Kirk is a fish
P2: If Dunzel Kirk is a fish Dunzel Kirk is a shark
C: Dunzel Kirk is a shark
That argument is logically coherent, yet nobody in their right mind is going to believe it's conclusion because the premisses are obviously false. With Plantinga's argument the premisses aren't obviously false, in fact they seem plausible.
Steven Robinson
You're correct - it's "Plantinga." I stand corrected. Of course he's confident his argument is correct and is a good argument - why else present it?
You did make a logical argument - the caliber of a first year high school philosophy student. P2 doesn't follow from P1, so C is not logically consistent. By the way - logical arguments can be either true, or false. Just because an argument (or premise) is false doesn't mean it's not logically coherent, and people believing the argument is not a criterion for its validity either. No one here yet, including you, has shown why Plantinga's argument doesn't work and is not logically sound. Here's your argument written in a logical format, which is logically coherent.
P1: All fish are sharks.
P2: Robinson is a fish.
C: Therefore Robinson is a shark.
You're welcome.
Dunzel Kirk A few things: 1. When you say 'you didn't make a logical argument' I guess you mean a sound one, since it was quite clearly valid.
2. You can make a sound argument without P2 following from P1, for example:
P1: Every human is a mammal
P2: Every mammal is mortal
C: Every human is mortal
In no way does P2 'follow' from P1.
3. When you say 'validity' I guess you mean soundness
I know precisely why Plantinga's argument doesn't work, because he equivocates conceivability with metaphysical possibility. This generally is not correct. It is up to Plantinga to demonstrate why in this case conceivability does imply possibility.
4. That is not my argument in logical format:
My argument was of the form:
P
If P then Q
Q
This is a simple application of modus ponens and so is logically coherent. My P1 only says of one particular, Dunzel Kirk, if he's a fish then he's a shark, not that every fish is a shark.
@soultorment27
Right. The argument is sound in that he showed that P implies Q, but he didn't show that P was true (that what he is imagining is actually the mind and not an approximation of it).
My 2nd part was just an analogy (which are never perfect) attempting to show an example of imagining something (sun/mind) vs. imagining an approximation of something (sun without gravity/mind without body).
Thanks for the reply - Trun
You have to love Philosophy! Materialism is so illogical and it's hard to see how anyone who has studied Philosophy and Modal Logic could be a materialist.
This isn't philosophy, is just logic. Philosophy is more than just logic, just like science is more than just maths.
This is a very easy argument and very easy to analyse. The argument has a modus tollens shape.
prop 1: If A is identical to B then everything that is true of A is true of B.
prop 2: Not everything that is true of A is true of B.
conclusion: A is not identical to B
So if you want to disagree with the conclusion then proposition 1 or 2 or both should be false. Although prop 1 is hard to deny, quantum mechanics does seem to show us that the same thing can be something different (contradictory even) depending on how you look at it. But let's assume prop 1 is correct. (Otherwise one would get into an interpretation discussion about the findings of quantum mechanics.) I think it's much easier to deny prop 2. Kafka simply was false to describe a situation in which Gregor Samsa was still Gregor Samsa when he turned into a bug. This is in no conceivable way possible.
So the conclusion doesn't follow necessarily.
Being possible and being able to "easily imagine it" are not identical so to speak. And defining it that way is kind of confusing.
Good post. But as to your claim that Kafka was wrong, I find this strange because a common scif-trope is switching people's body and minds around. It would appear that it is intuitive in some way, which explains the popularity of that trope. It may not be possible know for us humans to do that, but then again it was circa 1500 impossible for us to fly.
Solid logic
what are you guys talking about? his point from what i saw is that if A = B then A will have all the same properties as B. If A has some property B does not, then A does not = B. It has nothing to do with "if you can imagine X then X is possible". the key is if there are possibilities for A that aren't possible for B then A is not B.
This argument is embarrassingly circular. It assumes the very thing it sets out to demonstrate: "it's possible that I exist when my body doesn't, therefore my body and I are distinct entities, because if I were identical to my body, anything that is true of me would be true of my body ." The question one has to ask here is what do you mean by "I". "I" has to mean consciousness. But consciousness is the very thing we want to show to be distinct from body or not. Thus we don't know whether it's POSSIBLE for I" (consciousness) to exist when the body doesn't.
MrSidney9 I think that you dont know what "circular reasoning" is. Plantinga here is appealing to Leibniz's law of Identity of Indiscernibles... far from circular reasoning.
Is funny how some people think that philosophers like Plantinga could eventually speak without know his own field...
Try some Modal logic :)
Cristopher A This is clearly begging the question. In order for it to follow Leibniz's law, the mind and body would have to be two different entities. To prove that his theory follows this law, Plantinga said that he could imagine his mind and his body were two different entities. That is the definition of using your conclusion as your premise.
Mitchell Sheppard
Clearly you dont know what Modal Logic is.
You are comment a video without understand the very subject that the video is about.
Ad hominem is a poor way to convince me that I'm wrong. Please explain what I'm not understanding.
Mitchell Sheppard
Sorry my friend, in one comment I cannot explain Modal Logic extensively.
Still, Plantinga explains it a little with an example. It is possible or conceivable that we can exist in a different body, from that we can say that we and our current bodies are not the same thing.
In modal logic the word "possible" is related with the laws of logic, and is not used in the ordinary sense.
- If two things are identical, then in all possible worlds will share the same properties.
- Its possible that in some world we (as persons) can exist in a different body.
- Therefore, we and our bodies are not the same in all possible worlds
- Therefore, we and our bodies are not the same.
Seriously, if you dont understand modal logic its difficult that you could understand it
Regards!
If Plantinga is not saying that A exists separately from B, then what is he saying about A? It stands to reason that if you do not postulate that A and B exist separately from each other in this world, but you entertain the idea that they can be separate, what is being said about A? You assume a quality of A that would make it different from B, when all A has seemed to shown thus far is synonymy with B. If A=B and always has done, when and how could you conceive when A would not = B? Synonymy implies sameness and isn't an excuse for separation.
He's saying that A has at least one property that B doesn't have, and he's further saying that if their properties aren't exactly the same as each other, then they are not exactly the same as each other. If they aren't exactly the same as each other, then they are two different things.
He didn't say anything about being separate -- the difference he mentioned between A and B was that A could possibly exist when B does not exist, not that A could possibly be separate from B.
I can't believe this is an adult human being using this kind of reasoning, "It's possible because I can easily imagine it." There are things I can say about a spectrum that aren't true about a glass prism that produces that specific spectrum. Just because I can imagine in my mind a rainbow on the wall without including the prism in my imaginary picture doesn't mean that one can exist without the other. The phenomenon is dependent on the physical source of the phenomenon. To say "They are two different things" is a meaningless statement that leads nowhere if arguing that the spectrum could "possibly" exist without the prism that produces it.
***** Nobody claims that the individual's personality is identical with the body, they say that it is a phenomenon dependent on the physiological workings of the brain. There is a huge difference between DEPENDENT ON and IDENTICAL WITH. Therefore it is not necessary to say they are identical in all descriptive aspects. It is not necessary that everything that is said of the mind is also true of the brain. Therefore it is not a contradiction to say that the mind depends on the workings of the brain, and that it is not possible for the mind to exist without the brain. If dependence is the truth then possibility of 'A' without 'B' is a completely meaningless and irrelevant idea.
This argument by Plantinga is childish word-play sophistry
***** It's not philosophy, it's dishonest sophistry when you employ a straw man fallacy strategy in your argument. Plantinga did that when he implied that the naturalist position is that the mind is "identical" with the physical body or brain. It is more complicated than that. So disproving identity does not lead to the conclusion that effect can exist without the cause.
***** Synergism and emergent phenomena. You don't simply describe a human thought as a clump of neural connections. There are complicated energy interactions going on constantly between individual neurons and areas of the cerebral cortex and even substructures of the brain. The emergent phenomenon of consciousness is a synergistic phenomenon which is capable of alteration. Plantinga suggests that a "belief" is like a physical adaptive trait which exists unchanging as its physical form, without the ability to evaluate its truth value. "Belief" is not a static physical neuronal form, it is an active emergent phenomenon that comes from continuous internal communication of elements of the brain.
*****, what cruelsuit1 is saying is closer to the major contemporary view in philosophy of mind, which is that the mind supervenes (but is not identical to) the brain, as a functional property; not "minds are brains", but rather "brains are mind-ed". Mental properties are functional, in that they demarcate a range of abilities that things with said properties can do, though that doesn't imply that there's anything "spooky" or ethereal about the mind. The brute "stuff" is physical stuff; it's just describable in two non-identical ways, just like how the physical characteristics of a banknote aren't identical to its economic/monetary characteristics (though there's no "soul" or essence to the banknote).
@@cruelsuit1 You are a moron, and you straw manned his argument.
If you're going to a university, you probably have access to the book online. If not, I'm pretty sure the book is still in print, expect that it's really expensive. You might try interlibrary loan./What time in the video does Plantinga talk about logical possibility? I'll pay more attention if I know when to listen for it. (He may have just slipped up on the wording or decided not to go into the differences. Plantinga's word for metaphysical necessity, btw, is broadly logical necessity.)
Wow... Worst argument I have ever heard. I can imagine myself existing in another body, therefore my body and "me" are two seperate things? Well, why? If "I" imagine being in another body, then my body does too, because the brain is part of our body as well. And who really thinks, that imagination has nothing to do with our brains? That`s what happens when people try to make points just with their creativity and without scienctific methods like empirical evidence. It just doesn't work.
Paul Jojo Dude you showed your lack of understanding when you said people try to make arguments without the scientific method. The creation of the scientific method was created in that very way.
If it's the one from 17 hours ago, then I still see it. However, I have had some trouble with comments disappearing on videos before; such is TH-cam. :-/
Even if we grant all the premises, the argument fails. The correct conclusion is , that I'm not neccessarily my body.
Theologos Whilst Guillatra is clearly a moron, the switch from conceivability to possibility is not a trivial step. I can conceive that the morning star isn't the evening star, yet it is not possible that they are distinct since they are identical
Steven Robinson If they are identical you cannot conceive . Is like say I can conceive that A is not A or that 2 is not 2.
I can imagine that my arm has a consciousness of it's own, separate from me. My consciousness is A, my body is B, and my arm's consciousness is C. If it's possible that my my arm has a separate consciousness, then there are properties true of my arms consciousness (C) that are separate of my consciousness (A). Therefore if my arm's consciousness (C) kills someone, you cannot hold responsible my consciousness (A).
Theologos Plantinga and I agree, and you seem to disagree with us. I never said "because I can imagine it", so you are falsely quoting me. What I'm said was that the fact that I (and you) can imagine it is what makes it credible, and therefore true. When we go to court, I hope that you do not let your prejudice convict me for what the consciousness of my arm has done.
@Purushadasa I said the "me" can be fully dependent on the body, not necessarily that it is. I was just trying to say that naturalism can be compatible with the conclusion of Alvin's argument. I don't think non-naturalists (don't know a better term) have provided evidence that the mind is independent on the body either (as far as i know)...could be a standstill. I think an argument for the naturalist "body dependent" case can be made through fMRI, Phineas Gage, and neurodegenerative type stuff.
You've also missed an important point: not being identical doesn't mean that there is no dependency relationship involved. In fact, this is what mind-body dualism is all about. This is a separate discussion from whether the mind can actually exist WITHOUT the body. That's another step further.
@CowLunch The Modal argument does not introduce any such controversial aspects (such as stars having souls, let alone any such aspect as a soul itself) as you try to insert. It takes a person & a person's body, and asks if these two things are identical (Law of Identity, A=A). If there is any possibility that A has a property that B does not have, then A and B are not equal or identical in every way, and therefore it necessarily follows that A and B are not in fact not identical.
To paraphrase Plantinga's argument: 1. If A and B are identical then anything that is true of A is true of B and vice versa 2. I (A) can exist when my body (B) doesn't. 3. Therefore, I (A) and my body (B) are not identical.
The problem is that Plantinga doesn't demonstrate that premise 2 is true so the argument does not hold.
Justin Glick I can't imagine a better example of "begging the question." There is a desperation in his "logic" which is painful to listen to.
Justin Glick
I think that the real problem is that Plantinga DOESNT say: "I (A) can exist when my body (B) doesn't".
Plantinga says "Seems to me perfectly conceivable that I should exist when my body doesnt"... He is talking about the possibility, within modal logic. So ITS TRUE that exist that possibility, therefore, premise 2 is valid.
Its conceivable that I could exist in another body, with a totally different collections of atoms, but still "I", there is any contradiction, logically speaking, because I and my body are not the same thing.
On the other hand, you cannot say "A specific stone can exist when that specific stone doesnt exist"... thats ilogical...
Cristopher A I thought more about Plantinga's argument, and it is not even true that (1) is valid. See the Masked Man Fallacy: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masked_man_fallacy
Justin Glick
I sorry my friend, but "wikipedia" is not necessarily a criterion for truth... even that, Plantinga never use the phrase "I dont know"...
Is a matter of fact, logically speaking, that is conceivable that I (or you) could exist in another body. You, your personality, doesnt depends on your physical structure.
Im not the same as my body, because:
there is a property of me (namely, possible exist in another body),
that is not a property of my body (my body cannot exist in another body, thats a logical contradiction)
Regards!
Cristopher A"your personality, doesnt depends on your physical structure."
You can't state that as a fact. The precise opposite can be stated as fact, and it is probably true. Everything that is your "mind" depends entirely on your physical body - from your toenails to your cerebral cortex.
You don't make a figment of imagination a fact by putting it in the form of a declarative sentence.
What's key here is to understand the logical IMPLICATIONS of it being possible to conceive of the self as being separate from the body, but not logically possible to conceive the body as being distinct from the body (i.e. 1 cannot not be 1). Because this possibility indicates something about the identities of the subjects A and B; namely, that they are not the same. [cont
For Immanuel Kant, it can be said that A exists if it is actually possible for A to exist. That is a geometrical thinking in which existence is related to actual possibility and not merely to sensory examples in the phenomenal world.
So, in order for Plantinga to be justified in positing the existence of A, he needs to prove the actual possibility of A's existence, and NOT merely the possibility of thinking about A without contradiction.
@langengro The argument that Plantinga is making is not just that persons and bodies are distinct concepts, which seems trivially true, but that they're distinct substances. A house and the material it is made of are not distinct substances, though they are distinct concepts. It is possible that our understanding of how the brain works could reveal a dependence of the mind on the body like that of the house and it's materials.
I think the problem is that he defined A (him) and B (his body) essentially as two different things from start, only then he could start assuming that it's possible that A has something something that B doesn't. If you take A (a stone) and B (exactly the same stone), then you cannot start assuming that it's possible that A has something that B doesn't.
@DazedSpy2 Not at all. My first exposure to it was when I looked it up on Wikipedia after reading your comment so if I have somehow misrepresented the axiom I apologize and invite you to correct me. Otherwise I have a wonderful reductio ad absurdum that will completely disprove it:
It is possible flowers grow only with the assistance of magic fairies. (You can't disprove it.)
Flowers grow.
Therefore it is possible magic fairies necessarily exist.
Apply Axiom S5
Magic fairies probably exist.
I can conceive someone proving the Goldbach conjecture, but that doesn't mean it's possible. Simply because Plantinga can imagine his mind without his body is no reason at all to think it is possible.
@windowpain1 "If you're talking about distinct concepts, that's true, but not if you're talking about distinct substances. It is possible that they are the same thing." This is the sentence I fail to understand. Does it just mean that one and the same thing may fall under two definite descriptions (like "the morning star" and "the evening star")? Or does it mean something else?
The character in Kafka's story "The Metamorphosis" is called Gregor Samsa.
If I got correctly what he says, then he is contradicting the catholic dogma that resurrection occurs only in such a way that you'll get your body back. I wonder if his bosses are fine with that.
"I don't see how you can accuse him of abusing Liebniz's law..."
If A and B are identical then they are metaphysically necessarily identical.
If A and B are not identical then it's metaphysically impossible for them to be identical.
I can conceive of A continuing without B. It's logically possible.
I can also conceive of A NOT continuing without B. It's also logically possible.
I wrote this for someone else, but I'll also write it for you. (You might already be well aware of it, so "sorry" if you are.) Conceivability is often times used as a test for metaphysical possibility - if I can conceive of x, then x is metaphysically possible. There are some who dispute this, though. So, see "Conceivability and Possibility" on amazon. There you can read the first few pages of Bealer's chapter.
"there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable"
-David Hume
That means nothing, just because A is causally related to B, doesn't mean B stops existing when A does.
You're misunderstanding the argument. He's not saying 'I can conceive of my mind without the body, therefore my mind is not my body'. There's another step in between: my mind has a property that my body does not have (namely, I can imagine myself existing without my body, but not without my mind.) Hence, my body can't be identical with my mind.
Don't get me wrong, the argument still fails, but not for the reason you cite.
@Purushadasa I appreciate the reply. I don't think it does. Imagining the emergent property of an entity separate from that entity means it isnt the same as the entity, not that it is independent of that entity. Using his argument it can be shown that mass is not the same as gravity (imagining a mass not having gravity or gravity without mass), but gravity is fully dependent on mass. The me can be fully dependent on the body and not be the same as the body. I honestly do not see a problem.
The point is that the self & the body have different properties, even if modal properties. An implicit premise is Leibniz Law, which says: For any objects, if they are identical then they share all properties, by that & classical logic (modus tollens over the consequent) the difference between self & body follows if Plantinga's premises are granted. Leibniz Law & classical logic are pretty secure, so it's best to attack some of Plantinga's premises.
He's saying that became he can exist of A without B that means it's possible that A can exist without B.
He goes further to say that B must have all the possibilities of A in order to equal A. Therefore, A =/= B
Before I go on I would like to note that I respect Alvin Plantinga and his work immensly, and I would by no means claim to be his equal. Now then, it seems to me that his modal argument is quite objectionable on the basis that being able to depict an idea doesn't confirm that the scenario in question is possible in the real world. I can conceive of Godzilla roaming the earth, and causing chaos, but science in this case informs us that an animal his size cannot exist. Similarly, his being able to envision that he exists in the absence of his physical body, or his brain specifically, doesn't prove that he can in fact exist in that same way. He has therefore failed in what he's trying to establish. I'd be perfectly willing to grant that pointing to a way in which we could exist without our brains, or some other physical item to keep us alive would essentially prove that we are distinct from some particular material substance. That allows him to advance his theory about us being spiritual entities with souls, but his argument does not appear to succeed in demonstrating that.
Joey Clavette Hey Joey, I get how the "imagining" part is problematic. Consider more closely what he explains relative to A and B not being identical. He's saying that there's something true about A, that is not true about B. In essence he's saying that the "mind" or "consciousness" (which would be A), has properties that B (merely the physical body) does not have. Some argue that the mind or consciousness is merely atoms crashing into one another. He believes that consciousness, and the presence of a mind indicate that humans are not just bodies, but "spiritual" if you will.
I hear you Joey. I think the point Dr. Plantinga is trying to make is that the "self" is not composed of "matter" but rather something else. This is why he can imagine his body being almost any kind of body, such as a beetle. His "self" would inhabit the body, but not be the body. His self (A) can imagine, while whatever form his body (B) may be cannot.
"However, we are justified to believe that which seems true barring countervailing reasons to think otherwise."
Agreed and here is where each persons intuitions come into play. Though I am a Christian I do not think it is intuitive to believe that we could exist without our bodies. The apparent thing to believe is that we are in fact our bodies. When I say our bodies, of course, I do include the totality of the physical, material body, which encompasses the brain. Most people find it self evidently true that we are our brains, thus the argument you posit would actually help the materialist, if anything.
Logically possible ≠ metaphysically possible, and thus even if it is possible to think of yourself in the absence of your physical body, that doesn't mean it is actually possible for that to happen. I don't agree that, "it seems evident that it is metaphysically possible that A could exist without B existing". Where are you getting this from? Nor, of course, have I met too many materialists who are willing to grant what you say. In fact the point of contention lies here.
How is it evidently possible that we could exist without our physical bodies when all we know, and our intuitions point to our _being_ our physical bodies? Notice that a scenario such as the one proposed by Descartes does not help you here because it only proves logical possibility. Also, if there's something here that I'm missing or misinterpreted, please do let me know, since that comment was written ages ago. Some of the things that I might have said then I might no stand by now, and furthermore I'm not terribly sure what this argument was about when I wrote my comment. May the Lord be with you!
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To share something personal, I am consistently afraid of death. Though I am a Christian and I do belief in the afterlife, sometimes I am in doubt about it. I go through these phases where I cannot visualize how I'd be ended with the death of my body, but then I'm still afraid of dying. I think from this we can surmise that the human intuition, despite wanting to stay alive by any means available to it, still acknowledges the unlikelihood of such a scenario. I'm thinking to myself, I don't want to die, and it depresses me to an unprecentended extent. I'm thinking, what if I'm wrong? What if there is no afterlfe? So from what I understand belief in an afterlife is motivational for sure, though that doesn't mean it's false, but the intuitive thing to believe has always been that we go *poof* once our hearts stop beating.
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You missed the point. That was a personal comment, not furthering the discussion we were having.
Dang, I thought most of the comments would be trashing Plantinga, but they're largely supportive
the problem with Plantinga's argument is:
"it is possible that A exists when B doesn't" is not a truth statement. it's a counterfactual statement about the future of B that hasn't obtained yet. Once B ceases to exist, who is the observer that can verify whether the statement of confirmation or discomfirmation that the modal statement holds a space for is true or false?
Imagine a world in which A can and does make a truth evaluation of an actual occasion where A exists and B doesn't!
If anyone wants a more carefully developed version of this argument by Plantinga, look in "The Nature of Necessity". Does anyone know if he wrote anything before that book on this argument?/Also, I'm sure there are others who have advanced this argument. Does anyone know who?
If "A" is "ME", your identity, and B is your human body, B is the mechanism of A. It could also be that C, D and E are also mechanisms of A, where C has a beatle body, D has a square head, 2 tails and yellow poker dots, and E is computer software. In no case is A independent of B, C, D or E.
@the1qb
I say againonce again....(in reply to you saying)
"we can't imagine our body existing when our body doesn't exist "
Yes we can!(well I most certainly can!)
How do you square that particular circle?
@windowpain1
(VI) By the way, you say,
"The argument that Plantinga is making is not just that persons and bodies are distinct concepts, which seems trivially true, but that they're distinct substances."
I don't know why you seem to think I denied that. I've discussed Plantinga's argument at rather great length further down in the comments. My guess about why the argument fails would be the "Obama is the President" analogy given a couple of pages below ...
@soultorment27 Thank you being the first of several here to at least attempt to make a counterexample. Lets see..
1. Why can you conceive of star B and not A? This seems to not meet the same form as plantiga's premise.
2. What is the modal property that the evening star does not have? It's not just the position in the sky right? If it is i'm not sure if this is a modal property.
again I appreciate this response, get back to me.
It makes perfect sense. The question I asked was: do you argue that your emotions are also one and the same as your body? I ask this for semantic purposes, so that it becomes clear what is meant by "one and the same as your body". When I say that, I do not mean a bodily process, or even a by-product of a bodily process. I mean, literally one and the same as your own body. Clearly, no one would say that their emotions are this. [cont
Well, you seem to present his case much better than he did.
Well yes, it is evident that "self" is not equal to it's physical medium, although a case must be made that it is not, in fact, contingent on it. A flame is not the same as oxygen and fuel, and it's likewise illogical to require them, dogmatically, to produce combustion... but you need to provide more than that argument to build any sort of further conclusions about what this "fuel-less" combustion would be like and what it could do.
Why is it that Kripke is so very fun to bring up in conversation?
Howdy,
Do you know if "Nature of Necessity" is still in print? I'll check it out... I just don't see how this is possible given the argument. Maybe there is something I'm not seeing.
Continued: But my body cannot have that modal property since that would be a contradiction. By Leibniz' law - if I have a property (in this case a modal one) that my body does not and cannot have then I cannot be identical with my body. In order for two things to be identical they must share all their properties - I and my body do not so we are not identical.
@Purushadasa Do you read or do you just like to talk? He just said it doesn't need to necessarily be dependent.
By the way, saying different means different really means nothing. Thank you for letting us have a glimpse into the reasoning skills of your mind.
Your english is better than a number of people I've argued with, and it's their first language. :)
I don't know what Chalmers has written. Kripke, on the other hand, is arguing against type identity theories of mind. So, all that might have to be affirmed if we're to say Kripke is right is that property dualism is correct. Does Plantinga's argument require a strong substance dualism for it's conclusion? Or perhaps it's not as strong as that? Not sure...
I'm thinking.....the mind can be severed from the body by nerves and such so perhaps if we consider the mind and its inner thoughts/functions different from what we consider the body and its "thoughtless" functions this isn't far fetched at all. Took me a minute to understand but I find this as a deeper understanding of mind-body dualism. An interesting belief system(if that's how you'd classify it).
@RandomVortex ok here it is man. Plantinga says: I have a modal property (namely the property of possibly not being my body) that my body lacks. An object A and an object B that have incompatible properties cannot be identical. The properties 'possibly not being my body' and 'not possibly not being my body' are incompatible. Therefore I am not identical with my body. (btw, 'identical' has a technical meaning in philosophy, check out the SEP online if you wanna look things up)
@blackplatypus (8) Now what the Kafka story shows us is that the person CAN remain while the body undergoes metamorphosis (where “CAN” expresses logical possibility). By contrast, and trivially, the body CANNOT remain while the body undergoes metamorphosis. With this, we have found a difference in the modal properties of Plantinga and his brain, respectively. We may conclude that they are not one and the same thing.
Well, I can write a computer program that "thinks" about things, and then upon making a decision, turns an electric motor. How is that different from what you're talking about?
@WilliamofWare
and the "evening star" as 2 different stars in the sky. Modern astronomy revealed that they were both actually the same thing (Venus). Someone a bit too philosophical could've said "if they are the same thing, all of the properties of each should be identical" HOWEVER, I can imagine the morning star in the morning. I can't imagine the evening star in the morning, therefore they don't share the same properties and are in fact distinct."
@WilliamofWare
The conclusion that people SHOULD draw from this is that all the argument shows is that our concept of the morning star and evening star are distinct. It does nothing to show that our concepts are actually correct representations. Likewise, if the mind IS just a product of the brain (and that's the only way to get a mind), you CAN'T imagine the mind without the body and you just thought you could because your concept of the mind was wrong.
@XxVINCEROxX I'm asking because my understanding of what that means seemed to be different from yours and the first rule of debate is to define your terms. I must confess I don't fully grasp your explaination. Could you give an example?
What's different to Plantinga's argument here and Descartes' conceivability argument?
And it's back!
@stethoscanomaly
I simply do not agree that "HE"(the person etc...)has this modal property(the property of possibly not being a body/brain etc)
Basically it would appear I hold the materialistic view which obviously puts me at odds with Plantingas argument.
Thanks for the feedback though!(and of course I could be wrong...possibly.)
@windowpain1 (III) Conversely, if, by doing renovations, you changed the materials of a house brick by brick, you could eventually say: “This is the same house, but those are not the same bricks”. But identity, we should remind ourselves, is a transitive relation . The upshot of this, according to the Geach school and maybe also according to common sense (not to mention Aristotle), is that you can’t really say that the house and the bricks are identical.
Good question!
It is conceivable for A to exist while B does not exist, but B does not have that property -- if B exists, then B exists. If B does not exist, then B does not exist. B existing while B does not exist is not even conceivable, but it is conceivable for A to exist when B does not.
A has the property "conceivable to exist while B does not exist," but B does not have that property.
Therefore, A and B are clearly not identical.
In other words, physicalists agree that smiles, like minds, are not identical with bodies, but dependent on them. So Plantinga proves the distinctness, but not the independent existence of minds
@LetReasonPrevail1 - So among the properties a person has are what are called modal properties. These are just properties which are true just in case something is possible for whatever has them. So rocks, say, have the modal property of being able to be located differently from where they are. Plantinga's argument here (and this trades on conceivability being a good guide to possibility) is that I have the modal property "possibly existing without my body."
For the materialists here, I think there's a way to conceive of this mind-body distinction in a purely physicalist universe: let's say we develop a way of mapping out our entire neural networks, and copy all the information contained therein into a computer. Insofar as all of our mind, our personal identity, is instantiated in that information, we can clearly see how our personality can exist independently of our body.
@the1qb
Can you really not"Imagine"a square circle?
What do you know about quantum theory?
More importantly(with regard to the subject in question)what do you make of both psychology and neurology?
Ultimately what do make of theology?(just curious!)
I don't think memories and personality amount to your person hood simply because you can have different memories and still be you as an existing entity. In fact, you could have your memories erased completely and yet still exist. You might act different, but you're still you. The brain, nor the body alone makes us who we are.
Well, since no one is making the argument that the mind and body are identical, then it doesn't need to be defeated. That is a red herring. The argument is that the mind is a phenomena of neural processing. This is a fact. And as a fact, it acts as a pretty iron clad defeater against anything that would involve the processing without the neurons.
This makes sense. Your brain (A) is not your heart (B) and your heart is not your arm (C) and your arm is not your kidney (D) in the sense that these are all differing phenotypic machines deployed by genes. If I could copy the structure of this brain into another body sufficiently so as this transfer process could be functional (principally I don't see why not despite our inability to do so currently) then yes your body could be destroyed and you would still be the you behind your eyes despite being in another body, but this you would not be the original it would be a copy. It's in this sense that this view is compatible with physicalism.
@soultorment27 As I said, they are different in that plantinga assumes materialism taking the form of reductio ad absurdum; and the other is that your A and B have the same posibility of existing which is not the case in Plantinga's.
@surroundix Yes unfortunately it is, and it has being defended as an argument by David Chalmers (a dualist again). About the transplants, I guess they would still be implemented by hardware, right?
Upon further consideration, I'm actually no longer sure how well this argument sits with me. Dr. Plantinga seems to already presuppose an abstract difference between the self and body, based on his self-awareness, which enables him to conceive of the self as being separate from the body. However, this first requires that he have a basic understanding of what the self is (I suppose he means his self-awareness). Who is to say this is correct? [cont
His argument is essentially that because he can imagine something is possible for A but not for B, A, he concludes, cannot be identical with B. But all his argument really amounts to is the hypothetical that if something is possible for A but not for B, then A is not identical with B. However, the possibility he refers to (the self being able to inhabit different bodies) relies on an intution which presupposes dualism. His version of the ontological argument is flawed in a similar way.
I am discussing the modal ontological argument for consciousness =/= body, not for the existence of God. In the latter case, if God is defined as necessary, it follows from modal logic that if he is possible, he is necessary (but this is still begging the question about whether or not God is in fact necessary).
For the consciousness argument, there is no "necessity" for consciousness to be different from physical processes, and the argument falls, but don't confuse the two arguments.
@CowLunch I am not being facetious. I am saying that you are introducing terms into your opponents argument that he did not use, and that have their own set of baggage. It is unnecessary to talk of a soul in this argument. Simply refer to the person, rather than the person's soul. I am not saying that something is true because you can conceive of it. The Modal argument states that if it is possible for A to have properties that B doesn't then they cannot be identical to one another.
And where can we find you're published works ?
Can someone point out how Plantinga's argument is not the following?
If we assume A is not B, then A is not B
Even materialists would most probably say emotions are by-products of bodily processes and not identical with their bodies. That is the purpose of the modal argument too. Whatever the nature of the self, it is not identical to the body, even if the result of a bodily process.
@RandomVortex I made no such distinction. By the way, even though I never said his argument is sound, I do actually believe that his argument is sound.
Plantinga is saying exactly what you have in quotes: "I can conceive of X, therefore possibly X." Those are almost his exact words. To finish the argument he says, "If possibly X is true of me (where X = being disembodied) and possibly X is not true of my body (a body could not be disembodied), then I am not identical to my body.
Which is to say, The modal statement "It is possible that A exists when B doesn't" does not count as knowledge. It can't be construed to have truth value UNLESS we can be convinced of actual knowledge concerning the metaphysics that the confirmation of the modal statement would require.
Now here's where it gets interesting.
Why? Because, at the fringes of society there are supernormal experiences.
"It seems to be I could exist while my body doesn't." This sounds suspiciously like Descartes, and seems to ignore functionalist arguments of materialism.
Substance Dualism was created by Descartes to begin with... and Materialism was debunked by Quantum Physics
@theepsilon2010 It's from a documentary show called "Closer to Truth." If you Google the title you can find the official website.
Hope that helps. :-)
I asked you why it is a great making property? How does one determine great making properties are they arbitrary?
Yes, you must suppose that when you conceive of something that that thing is possible. And yes, conceivings occur; and we can conceive of taking on the body of beetle while our former body ceases to exist... I guess I'm having problems seeing where you disagree with the argument./Also, as far as you're able, please use the wording that Plantinga uses so we can each stay on the same page. Thanks!
That's true IF mind and body are identical, but you have no basis to assume that they are. Plantinga's argument only assumes that it's possible that mind and body are not identical, which is a far more conservative assumption.
Right, so although the modal argument might show that minds can be conceived of without bodies (that's a subject of debate) it doesn't show that it can in fact exist without the body. That's all I wanted to get across in my original comment.
(...cont) What Plantinga is presenting is a sound logical argument for the *possibility* that the self can exist independently of a physical body. He's not presenting an argument that it ever does or will. He has merely presented a logical proof that the idea that it *may* is not illogical in itself.
@windowpain1
Hum ... I think I still don't understand your point.
Plantinga asks whether he and his body are identical. In a more traditional terminology (which he himself doesn't use), we might rephrase this by saying: He asks whether they are the same substance. And of course one and the same thing (or substance, if you like) can satisfy different descriptions. Plantinga's question is: do the phrases "I" and "my body", which certainly express different concepts, refer to the same substance?
I agree. As far as I'm concerned, though, there is no need to be dogmatic either way. Perhaps it is possible for an unembodied mind to exist.
But the point is: If you cannot tell if your observation of the inmaterial side of the mind (or self, for that matter) is true or simply imagination, then you cannot claim that it exists. Conceivable? Sure, as pretty much anything. There are few unconceivable fantasies, if any.
I would not claim it cannot be, but I know Plantinga fails at observing it is.
@windowpain1 (II) And the reasoning behind this claim is somewhat similar to what Plantinga is trying to do here. Imagine, for instance, that a house were destroyed. Its materials are later used to build a new house. In that case, it would be rather natural to say: “These are the same bricks, but it is not the same house”.
Actually, basic experiments like Kepler's and Newtons are performed in elementary and high school every day, so yeah, they're still being done.
The results of these earlier scientists' experiments have become part of our body of knowledge. They're accepted because they work, not because "newton said it, so it must be true".
In fact, Einstein showed newton to be wrong, so there you have a great example of ignoring the "authority" of an earlier scientist.
I have another video called "Alvin Platinga on the Mind Body Problem" which is a hoot as well.
@shilohwillcome
He's arguing that the 'I' not identical with the body, because he can imagine that they are separated. He argues further that this means that this means that the 'I' has a property that the body does not have; namely that the 'I can be thought the exist independent og the body.
However, just because he can imagine the 'I' distinct from the body, does not mean that the 'I' owns the property of being distinct from the body.